

3. THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE PRESENTERS, ALAN WALLACE, OWEN FLANAGAN pdf

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A dialogue between the Dalai Lama and a group of scientists and philosophers unites research in education, psychology, and neuroscience with Buddhist practice to discuss how to cope with, transform, and eliminate negative emotions.

One model, advocated by Alan Wallace, holds that we can learn This article considers and assesses three different models of what contemporary philosophy of mind can learn from Buddhist thought. A second model, supported by Owen Flanagan, maintains that we should accept from Buddhist thought only what is compatible with physicalism, and thus draws from Buddhism only insights into moral psychology and spirituality.

Introduction There has in recent years been a growing interest in traditional and contemporary Buddhist thought as a potential source for novel perspectives on the nature of consciousness and the mind. This interest has several sources. For philosophers of mind with a materialist inclination, Buddhism, as a religion that has no place for a monotheistic creator God and that in some of its forms eschews deities altogether, may offer a source of insight into ethical and spiritual issues related to the mind that is compatible with materialism. But there has also been in recent philosophy of mind a resurgent interest in alternatives to materialism, and herein lies another source of contemporary attraction to Buddhist thought. The most prominent traditional alternative to materialism in Western philosophy of mind is the type of substance dualism advocated by Descartes, which views the mind or self as a substance “ a concrete particular which persists through time and bears properties “ that is immaterial, thinking, and non-extended, in contrast to material substances, which are non-thinking and extended. But many contemporary philosophers attracted to non-materialist views of the mind reject substance dualism due to the many problems traditionally associated with it. Buddhist theories of mind may thus be appealing because they resist straightforward materialism but also reject the view that the mind is an immaterial substance, since they repudiate the notion that there are substances quite generally, whether mental or material. Buddhism may thus also represent a source for non-materialist views of the mind different from those which have predominated in the West. The goal of the models we will consider, it should be emphasized, is not, or at any rate not only, to reconstruct the exact nature of any of the traditional Buddhist accounts of the mind. The aim of the models, and of this article, is rather to consider what can be learned from traditional Buddhist thought about how we might best think about the mind and its relation to the physical. It is also worth emphasizing that these models draw their views on the mind from many different strands of the variegated Buddhist tradition. Finally, we will consider a Buddhist-inspired phenomenological construal of the relation between the mental and the physical. I will suggest, however, that each of these proposals faces significant challenges, and will propose instead a different model derived from Buddhist thought which has the potential to resolve some of these challenges. Before we begin, a few words about some of the central views on the mind-body problem that will concern us. In contrast with substance dualism, property dualism maintains that although all substances if there are any are physical, nonetheless mental properties are irreducible to material properties. Materialist views typically proclaim that the mental is simply identical to the physical, but it is common to distinguish between two main kinds of identity theory. Type-identity theories hold that mental state or event types kinds are identical to physical state or event types. For instance the mental state of being in pain might “ no doubt oversimplifying “ be identical to being in a c-fiber stimulation state. More widely held at present, however, are token identity theories, which make no commitments as to the identity of mental types with physical types, but hold only that each mental state or event token instance of a given type is identical to a mental state or event token of some type.

A Consciousness-Based View The first model to be considered is one developed in recent years by Alan Wallace, which is based on certain traditions within Tibetan Buddhism, and bears close affinities with the views expressed by The Dalai Lama Wallace characterizes his view as rejecting all of the traditional Western doctrines of materialism, substance dualism, and idealism Wallace But like some forms of idealism, his

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account posits that the fundamental nature of the world is not distinct from a certain type of consciousness. His view appears to depart from idealism mainly in that for him in the ultimate nature of the world, consciousness and its object are one; but at any rate, this nature is not independent of consciousness. Each of these principles he regards as unsubstantiated, and as incapable of giving an adequate account of the mind. Wallace supports this position mainly by reference to two kinds of argument. Wallace argues that physical processes can be understood from the third person perspective of scientific inquiry; but the nature of mental processes can only be known from the first person point of view; so there is thus an explanatory gap between the two. One of the best ways of making this idea vivid is by means of an example from Jackson. Suppose it was discovered that there is an individual, Fred, who can perceive not only all the colors that normal humans can see, but also a different color they cannot see. We could, Jackson argues, learn all we like about the neural processes in Fred underlying this ability, the reflectance properties of the relevant objects, and so on, but none of this would ever tell us what it is like for Fred to see that color. Further, if mental processes can only be understood from a subjective perspective, the third-person requirement of objectivity will leave out much of our mental states. And most importantly, the explanatory gap shows, contra physicalism, that mental processes and physical processes cannot be identical, by which I take him to mean token identical. Once it is acknowledged that third-person descriptions cannot tell us the full nature of consciousness, the door is opened to using first-person experience – specifically, meditative experience – to provide fuller insights. This is the second main type of argument Wallace presents for his position, and it is on this foundation that he bases his specific account of the relation between the mental and the physical. What advanced meditative techniques for cultivating sustained, high-resolution attention reveal about the nature of consciousness, Wallace suggests, is embodied in the views of the Great Perfection Dzogchen school of Tibetan Buddhism. According to this doctrine, there is a tripartite division of levels of consciousness. Though the specific mental contents of the psyche are causally conditioned by the brain, the body, and the environment, they are not identical to anything physical; their fundamental nature is that of the consciousness from which they emerge. But Wallace also emphasizes that at the relative level, the processes of the individual psyche are not token identical with neurological processes. For this reason, this view is susceptible to some, though not all, of the difficulties that face Cartesian substance dualism, most prominently objections concerning how causal relations between mental processes and physical processes are possible. The most basic problem here is often referred to as the problem of causal interaction. If mental processes are immaterial, it is hard to see what sort of mechanism could allow them to interact causally with the material processes of the body. Wallace might perhaps be able to avoid this challenge by pointing out that on his view matter itself ultimately has the same nature as consciousness, so that his view would have no more or less difficulty in accounting for how mind and matter could interact than would the materialist view that both share the nature of matter. This problem is generated by the claim that mental events are token distinct from physical events, which Wallace accepts, together with two other widely accepted principles, the principle of the causal closure of the physical and the principle of non-overdetermination. The principle of causal closure is that every physical event has a set of physical causes sufficient to bring it about. For instance, if I touch a hot stove and jerk my hand away, we generally suppose that there is a sequence of neurological causes which are sufficient to cause me to remove my hand. This also assumes, of course, the principle of non-overdetermination, that physical events do not generally have more than one sufficient cause. But this principle seems widely borne out by experience. Kim. The difficulty with this response is that, if what is meant by calling the principle a metaphysical assumption is that it is rationally unjustified, this hardly follows from the evident fact that it is not itself supported by scientific experiments. The principle has been widely viewed as supported rather by more general theoretical considerations, most importantly the inductive one that it has generally worked so well in the past. Explanations in terms of physical causation have succeeded in making sense of a great variety of phenomena, including many that were at one time widely thought not to be physically explicable. This success arguably gives us good reason to accept the principle as a working hypothesis. Buddhism Naturalized In sharp contrast with the

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consciousness-based view, several contemporary philosophers have proposed appropriations of Buddhist thought which are broadly physicalist e. Siderits ; Flanagan , ; Garfield forthcoming. Most importantly for our purposes, he appeals to the causal exclusion argument discussed above Flanagan But he also rejects both of the main arguments that Wallace relies on, the arguments from the explanatory gap and from meditative experience. He raises doubts, on epistemological grounds, about the appeal to meditative experience as a source of knowledge about the mind Flanagan ; Chapter 3. What explains why there is an explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical, on this view, is that we possess two irreducibly different ways of knowing conscious states, by means of what David Papineau calls material concepts and phenomenal concepts. Material concepts are concepts of conscious states as items knowable from a third-person perspective, for instance as certain physiological or functional states of the nervous system. These two types of concepts are however simply two different modes of access to physical states, states of the nervous system. The phenomenal concept of painfulness and the material concept of c-fiber stimulation are two modes of access to the relevant state of the nervous system. But because the two kinds of concepts are inferentially isolated from each other, so that we cannot infer what it is like to feel pain from the knowledge that pain is c-fiber stimulation, or vice versa, there is an explanatory gap between pain and c-fiber stimulation. Since both kinds of concepts refer to physical states, and what it is to possess these concepts is itself physicalistically explicable, there is nothing about the explanatory gap that is incompatible with physicalism. Given this physicalist orientation, what Flanagan seeks to draw from Buddhist theories of mind is not alternatives to materialism, but what he views as a sophisticated moral psychology and an insightful account of the conditions for human flourishing. Since my main concern here is with the relevance of Buddhist ideas to the mind-body problem, I will not dwell on the ethical claims Flanagan develops. I would suggest, however, that there is room to question whether the notion of Buddhism naturalized underestimates the insight that we can gain from Buddhist views for how to resolve the difficulties facing contemporary accounts of the mind. There are challenges that confront physicalist accounts of the mind, even those which adopt something like the phenomenal concepts strategy, which a different Buddhist-inspired account might help to resolve. The challenges I have in mind have been raised by a number of philosophers in response to the phenomenal concepts defense of physicalism. The first of these, developed for instance by Levine and Chalmers , questions whether the phenomenal concepts theorist can really account for the explanatory gap in a way compatible with physicalism. Chalmers raises this problem by asking, in effect, whether it is conceivable that there could be zombies “ beings physically identical to humans but without any phenomenally conscious experience at all “ who lacked our phenomenal concepts. If the theorist answers yes, then phenomenal concepts will not themselves be physically explicable, for the fact that we have phenomenal concepts and zombies do not would not be explicable by any physical difference between us. If the theorist answers no, then phenomenal concepts cannot account for what is distinctive about our epistemic situation in regard to consciousness, for the zombies would have our phenomenal concepts, but lack phenomenal experience. The second problem for advocates of the phenomenal concepts strategy concerns the response they typically give to another type of anti-physicalist argument, what are often called conceivability arguments. According to one such argument e. Chalmers , it is conceivable that there could be a being who was physically identical to me but whose color experience was systematically inverted from mine, so that what looks red to me would look green to him, and similarly for all other colors. If such a being is conceivable, so the argument goes, it is metaphysically possible. But if it is metaphysically possible, then conscious experience does not metaphysically supervene on the physical, since we have here a case of two physically identical beings with different conscious experiences. A similar argument is sometimes offered for the possibility of zombies. Assuming that physicalism requires the metaphysical supervenience of consciousness on the physical, then, physicalism is false. The usual reply to such arguments among phenomenal concepts strategists is to accept that the inverted spectrum scenario is conceivable, but to deny that it is metaphysically possible e. The idea is that we can appeal to the inferential isolation of phenomenal concepts and material concepts to explain why such scenarios are conceivable by us

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“ why we can imagine them ” thus relieving us of any necessity to suppose that such things are really possible. This reply does not, of course, offer a positive argument for physicalism, but only serves to deflect the conceivability arguments against it. It assumes physicalism itself to be supported by independent arguments, most importantly the argument from mental causation and arguments based on theoretical and ontological simplicity, and there is no reason to think the conceivability arguments have been deflected unless one accepts these physicalist arguments. In assessing the conceivability arguments, then, we are thus ultimately left weighing the arguments for physicalism against the apparent cogency of the conceivability arguments themselves. To my mind this is, at any rate, not a dispute decisively won by physicalism. I do not take these difficulties for the phenomenal concepts defense of physicalism to be conclusive; there have, of course, been a variety of physicalist replies, though I cannot consider these here. A Phenomenological Approach A different way of drawing on Buddhist thought is offered by several recent philosophers who adopt a phenomenological approach to understanding the mind e. Perhaps the most fully developed view of this kind is offered by Evan Thompson. These teachings they regard as having important parallels with the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. From this perspective, the mistake of materialism is in thinking that objects in the world are wholly independent of mental construction; the parallel error of idealism is to suppose consciousness or the mind can exist independently of the world. Rather, mind and world arise in dependence on each other, in the causal process Buddhists call dependent co-arising. The notion of an unbridgeable explanatory gap is, on this picture, a byproduct of the Cartesian conceptualization of consciousness and the life of the body as necessarily excluding each other, of consciousness as inner experience accessible only to first-person reflection, and life as external, mechanistic function. Consciousness is an emergent process that arises from the self-organizing interactions of brain, body, and environment. The enactive approach has been controversial on a number of different fronts. If all life involves a kind of interiority, an at least rudimentary sense of bodily self that makes the environment a place of significance for the organism p. Either there is something that it is like for the organism to have this kind of interiority, or there is not. If there is, it might be questioned whether it is possible to explain what it is like for a given organism to have its kind of interiority wholly in terms of the physical and functional characteristics of the organism and its interactions with the environment. Even so paradigmatic a proponent of the explanatory gap as Chalmers, for instance, holds that consciousness is representational rather than intrinsic, and that cognition and mental states extend into the world in an important way.

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2: PREVIEW-Episode Buddhism and Naturalism with Guest Owen Flanagan

-- 3. *The Western perspective / presenters, Alan Wallace, Owen Flanagan* -- 4. *A Buddhist psychology / presenter, Matthieu Ricard* -- 5. *The anatomy of mental afflictions / presenters, Alan Wallace, Thupten Jinpa* -- *Day two: feelings in everyday life* -- 6. *The universality of emotion / presenter, Paul Ekman* -- 7.

Unconscientiousness Distraction Interestingly, there was some disagreement among the Buddhists about this list. The inclusion of forgetfulness on the list does not imply that all instances of forgetfulness are afflictive. So it is with doubt. To feel that one dislikes Brussels sprouts is not a mental affliction unless it is conflated with attachment. But the goals of Western psychology basically stop there. Eastern psychology, while recognizing that you have to build a healthy ego before you can let go of it, also focuses on the next step: Buddhists, on the other hand, seek to eradicate destructive emotions altogether. How does this difference play out? We can, however, work to reduce the impact and duration of our negative emotions. But feelings are distinct from behavior, and thus we say that behaviors may be okay or not okay. That takes a lot of time for many children to discern. They also believe that even feeling certain emotions is already being bad. They arise and we need to look at them. Adults similarly measure emotional maturity or success by their ability to separate out feelings from actions. But they were able to change how they responded even though they felt the same emotional impulse. This is, in part, because we misunderstand what freedom from destructive emotions means, at least from the Buddhist perspective. Matthieu [Ricard] jumped in, to clarify: To be free from an erroneous way of dealing with the arising of thought, free of an erroneous way of perceiving reality, we are not just blanking out our mind. We are getting rid of unknowing, and of wrong perception. As they acquire more and more knowledge, they dispel degrees of ignorance about different subjects. Antidotes emerge out of the belief that a person cannot hold two opposing states of mind at the same time. Thus love is a direct antidote to hatred. Likewise, one can contemplate the unpleasant aspects of an object of compulsive desire, or try to have a more objective assessment. For ignorance, or lack of discernment, we try to refine our understanding of what needs to be accomplished and what avoided. A more intermediate method of dealing with destructive emotions is meditation, which Ricard describes as a kind of all-purpose antidote that blasts ignorance and delusion away. It does so by training the mind. How does that happen within the context of contemplative training? We know that emotions last for seconds, that moods last for, say, a day, and that temperament is something that is forged over the years. So if we want to change, obviously we need to first act on the emotions, and this will help to change our moods, which will eventually stabilize as a modified temperament. In other words, we must start by working with the instantaneous events that take place in our mind. As we say, if we take care of the minutes, the hours will take care of themselves. At the beginning when a thought of anger, desire, or jealousy arises, we are not prepared for it. Just as when a spark of fire has set a whole forest on fire, we are in trouble. When a thought arises, we need to watch it and look back at its source. We need to investigate the nature of that thought that seems so solid. As we stare at it, its apparent solidity will melt away and that thought will vanish without giving birth to a chain of thoughts. The point is not to try to block the arising of thoughts—this is not possible anyway—but not to let them invade our mind. We need to do this again and again because we are not used to dealing with thoughts in that way. We are like a sheet of paper that has been rolled for a long time. If we try to flatten it down on the table, it will roll again the moment we lift our hands. They do precisely that: They familiarize themselves with a new way of dealing with the arising of thoughts. Monks in the lab Can meditation actually do what the monks claim it does? The answer appears to be yes. The initial suggestions from the research team were for three meditative states: By contrast, most untrained subjects given a mental task are unable to focus exclusively on the task—and consequently have considerable noise added to the signals that reflect their voluntary mental strategies. They both scored far higher than any of the five thousand other people tested. Ekman had become interested in the startle reflex when he learned that its intensity predicts the magnitude of the negative emotions a person feels. The bigger

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your startle, the data showed, the more strongly you tended to experience negative emotions. They asked that he try to suppress the inevitable flinch, so that someone looking at him would not know he felt it. Some people can do better than others, but no one can come remotely close to completely suppressing it. No one Ekman and Robert Levenson had ever tested could do it. Earlier researchers found that even police marksmen, who fire guns routinely, are unable to keep themselves from startling. Nor have any other researchers. This is a spectacular accomplishment. Taken together, these studies suggest that the monks are onto something with their meditation and mindfulness techniques. Additional studies are currently underway, to determine whether these findings are replicable. How much does this matter in the real world? At the level of individual people, even if you could learn to suppress your startle, so what? The Dalai Lama seemed to have this in mind when he warned that meditation is about internal transformation, not muscle control. Hopefully that will do the book more justice.

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3: Buddhofascism: B. Alan Wallace, for instance | Speculative Non-Buddhism

An Extraordinary Collaboration Between Scholars and Western Psychologists, Neuroscientists, and Philosophers Buddhist philosophy tells us that all personal happiness and interpersonal conflict lie in the "three poisons": craving, anger, and delusion.

Upcoming Events On Aesthetics December 8, at A Review of B. Evola was a proponent of what is known as Traditionalism. Anyway, as I was reading the piece on Evola, my thoughts kept turning to B. Before allowing myself such a drastic conclusion, I did some research. It is a tour de force. Every practicing Buddhist should read it. But it is even more so today. The article is rich in lines of thought and conclusions to be drawn for the identity of Western Buddhism and of Western Buddhist subjectivity. The one that I want to mention here is this: Wallace looms yet again. This time as a Buddhist St. My point here is not, of course, that Wallace is fascist in the way that a violent brown-shirted thug is. I am suggesting that we may find in Wallace the same kind of unconscious? Spiritualized apocalyptic thought, whether of the New Age or Traditionalist variety, involves beliefs about the end times of the old world and the coming of a new world. He uses different language. His argument is cool and reasoned. The age of Western Buddhist innocence has passed. Alan Wallace is a major player in Western Buddhism. In the last eight years he started the Santa Barbara Institute of Consciousness Studies, published nine books, and is engaged in the International Shamatha Project. He has impressive credentials, with a Ph. He has created himself as the leading authority on the relationship between Western science and Buddhism. Along the way, Wallace argues against a reductive, materialist philosophy of science, and for a particular version of Tibetan Buddhism, as the correct way to finally understand human consciousness. I was hoping he might be trying to demonstrate that both Buddhism and quantum physics could be understood from a realist perspective. That is, I thought he was going to choose reality; instead, his book made a case for idealism, and argued that we choose reality. In the process, he misrepresented contemporary physics and showed a startling lack of knowledge of recent developments in the philosophy of science. In responding to this book, then, I have no intention of debating his take on Buddhism. I know very little about Tibetan Buddhism, and I am confident that Wallace knows quite a bit about it. I will assume that his representation of Tibetan Buddhism is accurate. If we all accepted this version of Buddhism as true, and all began practicing it, what would that mean for us? I will not give Wallace the same benefit of the doubt when it comes to his discussions of Western science and philosophy. In this realm, I will point out the errors and misrepresentations, the sophistries and false dilemmas, and the false conclusions resulting from his limited knowledge of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. My aim here, however, is the same: I also want to begin with a few points on which I absolutely agree with Wallace. I point these out to make it clear that I think his goals are often not always goals that I share; it is my argument, however, that his ideas on how to reach these goals are terribly problematic, and that his philosophical assumptions can only hinder his project. For one thing, it would be wonderful if more people understood, as Wallace points out quite clearly pp. Wallace also makes clear that absolute acceptance of whatever comes into our minds is not the typical Buddhist approach; instead, Buddhist have traditionally been very keen on controlling what goes on in the mind, to eliminate the afflictions of attachment, aversion, and ignorance. Vipashyana vipassana does not mean, Wallace reminds us pp. Finally, and most importantly, I absolutely agree with Wallace that the reductive materialist attempts to map the mind onto the neurological activity of the brain is a mistake, a dead end, that will prevent any real progress both in philosophical considerations of consciousness and in psychology. The mind, I will argue, is neither concomitant with the brain, nor is it an epiphenomenon. However, I will completely disagree with how he seeks to avoid reductive materialism. Our greater freedom, it seems, is achieved by removing the defilements, conventional accretions inhibiting the ability of the pure consciousness to subtly and imperceptibly influence the conventional mind. He presents us, then, with the very definition of an atman: Of course, Wallace says this is not an atman at all, but simply asserting that it is not an

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atman does not make it any less of one. The Quantum Myth and a Scientific Straw Man Wallace has gotten quite a bit of mileage over the years out of the popular mythos of quantum theory, and he hits that note several times in this book. This sophistry is fascinating: According to metaphysical realism, the entire objective universe consists of physical entities that produce the effects measured by human beings; however, we can never perceive these entities, as they exist independently of all measurement. Therefore, we can never infer the contents of the absolutely objective world on the basis of observations, which always arise relative to systems of measurement. This argument depends on many philosophical errors, but the three most important here are: Of course, as Brukner and Zeilinger indicate in the passage quoted above, it is exactly because we can be aware of our systems of measurement, including perceptual ones, that we can make reasonably correct inferences about the objective world. He spells this out for us right in the first chapter. It includes the possibility that reality is stratified, with different levels of causal mechanisms, and therefore accepts the possibility of emergence. The false philosophical dilemma Wallace sets up requires absolute ignorance of serious philosophical thought about science, and so a misunderstanding of how science operates. Wallace assumes that there must be final, complete answers, or there are no answers at all—and therefore science fails. This assumption depends upon an ontology that is both materially monist and non-stratified; these are not assumptions that are required for a realist ontology. Wallace demands of science that it jump immediately to the rock-bottom answer, rejecting the possibility of stratification, and the transitive nature of explanatory mechanisms. He is incapable of seeing that physicists may be less likely than he is to reify their transitive objects of knowledge; for the best physicists, the interpretations we produce in concepts are what we argue about, because they are always constructs designed to move us toward better descriptions and explanations of the intransitive object. But there are so many alternative scientific epistemologies, I could not imagine why Wallace would pick up on this glaringly reactionary, elitist, and theistic form of capitalist ideology and mistake it for a philosophy of science. Even if he were reluctant to engage the more radically realist philosophies of science, there have certainly been more philosophically sophisticated versions of radical empiricism advanced in the past century. In *The Principles of Psychology*, James makes no bones about it: It should be clear why James appeals to Wallace: There is no room for theoretical causal mechanisms, and no way to distinguish between the kinds of reality that obtain in a thought and in a bomb. The rejection of such dimensions of thought in positivist philosophies is always in the service of conservatism. That this is not what Freud meant by the unconscious should be clear to anybody who is familiar with serious psychoanalytic thought. Suffice it to say that the dynamic unconscious, for Freud, is not subtle and unnoticed but positively existing mental activity; rather, the unconscious is precisely what is unthinkable or unspeakable within a specific conceptual system. You cannot change any of that. In what manner, then, can you help me? The point Freud is making, however, is much different. Interdependence, it seems, was more troubling than the possibility of a soul. And now I come to what will undoubtedly be the most controversial claim I will make in this essay: That is, I will dare to say what is unspeakable in Western Buddhist circles: What could be a better justification for inherited aristocracy than the belief that they have earned their wealth and power by meritorious actions in past lives? A couple hundred aristocratic families lived in opulence, while Buddhist monastics sought meditative bliss in idle luxury, all supported by the labor of an uneducated and economically oppressed hereditary peasant cast, who apparently had some bad karma to work off. This is the Shangri-La whose loss brings tears to the eyes of Hollywood celebrities. Somehow it has come to seem a horrible injustice that an oppressive oligarchy was deposed. An elite class, however, turns out to be essential to the kind of Buddhism Wallace is presenting. He repeatedly emphasizes the rarity of achieving the first dhyana, citing a Sri Lankan monk who says there are fewer than five people in Sri Lanka who have achieved it, and assuring us that even in Tibet, where the higher form of Buddhism is supposedly practiced, it is rare p. Still, he quotes Atisha: Such long stretches of idle time Wallace reminds us that it took even Buddha six years, and the provision of all material comforts, is clearly the privilege of only an elite class of people with good karma. The vast majority of people would simply remain karmically incapable of such spiritual progress in this

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lifetime. Not a definition of skeptic I have ever heard before. I have no idea whether this is standard Tibetan Buddhism or not—I can only assume Wallace knows of what he speaks. If it is, I can only say I would have no interest in it. And we can rest assured that our eternal atman-that-is-not-one will dwell in bliss, without having to make any change whatsoever in our current ideology: For both James and Wallace, and indeed for much of Western thought, the insistence on discrete, individual consciousnesses has led to endless paradoxes, aporia, and irresolvable problems—from free will to solipsism, from the status of knowledge to the existence of a mind, there are a host of problems that cannot be solved unless we abandon the notion of consciousness or mind existing individually, the depths of a mind. Eighty years ago, V. Volosinov proposed that we drop this line of pursuit. Psychoanalysis, beginning with Freud and most thoroughly with Lacan, presented a radically empty subject, arising not from deep within but from without, in a socially produced symbolic network. To become subjects with true agency, we must participate in a truth procedure, a practice which functions to extend our capacity to interact with reality beyond what is possible within a given system of knowledge—the subject is not an individual, but a social entity. We will never find consciousness in the firing of neurons, because it exists only in the symbolic social interaction of multiple individuals. I would suggest that this line of thought is much more compatible with the Buddhist concepts of pratityasamutpada, sunyata, and anatman than any other form of Western philosophical thought. Further, I would suggest that this line of thought could learn a great deal from Buddhist thinkers of the past couple thousand years—not all of them, but certainly Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, and Candrakirti at the very least could help teach us to think the radical implications of a non-atomist subject. That Wallace cannot see his decisional structure is evident from his ostensible rejection of it: His reductive understanding of science and epistemology and absolute faith in the authority of the Buddhist tradition would leave us no choice but to accept the existence of an atman that he simply insists is not one. From within his decisional structure, no argument could defeat Buddhist authority; since none of us can achieve the transcendent meditative states of the masters, we can neither debate their existence and value nor even hope to comprehend what such states actually are. No alternative version of science is possible, since for Wallace only rock-bottom positivist answers can count as scientific. This combination produces a self-replicating hermetic system designed to perpetuate inequality with the promise of future bliss. Second Manifesto for Philosophy. Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.

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4: Destructive Emotions - THÆ- VIÁ»†N PHÁ-T GIÃ•O

Full text of "Daniel Goleman, Dalai Lama Destructive Emotions How Can We Overcome Them Bantam ()" See other formats.

Buddhist Thought and Applied Psychological Research: Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism. Transcending the Boundaries explores the interface between Buddhist studies and the uses of Buddhist principles and practices in psychotherapy and consciousness studies. The contributors present a compelling collection of articles that illustrate the potential of Buddhist informed social sciences in contemporary society, including new insights into the nature of human consciousness. The book examines the origins and expressions of Buddhist thought and how it is now being utilized by psychologists and social scientists, and also discusses the basic tenets of Buddhism and contemporary Buddhist-based empirical research in the psychological sciences. Further emphasis is placed on current trends in the areas of clinical and cognitive psychology, and on the Mahayana Buddhist understanding of consciousness with reference to certain developments in consciousness studies and physics. A welcome addition to the current literature, the works in this remarkable volume ably demonstrate how Buddhist principles can be used to develop a deeper understanding of the human condition and behaviours that lead to a balanced and fulfilling life. Germano and William Waldron 4. Vacuum States of Consciousness: A Tibetan Buddhist View B. The Co-Emergence of the Knower and the Known: Neuroscience and Happiness Owen Flanagan, Jr 9. Buddhist and Scientific Approaches William S. Their Arising and Deconstruction Zen Koan and Mental Health: Buddhism in the West: Destructive Emotions Daniel Goleman Finding the Middle Way: Parks, Anil Coumar The Psychological Processes Underlying Mindfulness: Buddhist Practice and Emotional Intelligence: Finding the Convergence Joseph Ciarrochi Mindfulness and Enactment in Psychoanalysis Jeremy D.

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5: Project MUSE - The Bodhisattva's Brain

presentation by Allan Wallace and Owen Flanagan aimed at clarifying what exactly do Buddhist and Western cognitive scientists mean by destructive emotions. As Wallace points out, the important issue is not what emotions are, but what triggers their manifestation and whether they are constitutive of human nature.

One of our most basic responsibilities as caring people is to alleviate the human costs of such Out-of control emotions. Buddhism and science are not conflicting perspectives on the world, but rather differing approaches to the same end: In Buddhist training, it is essential to investigate reality, and science offers its own ways to go about this investigation. While the purposes of science may differ from those of Buddhism, both ways of searching for truth expand our knowledge and understanding. The dialogue between science and Buddhism is a two-way conversation. But scientists may also be able to utilize some insights from Buddhism. There are many fields in which Buddhism can contribute to scientific understanding, and the Mind and Life dialogues have focused on several. On the other hand, Buddhism can learn from science as well. We should always adopt a view that accords with the facts. If upon investigation we find that there is reason and proof for a point, then we should accept it. However, a clear distinction should be made between what is not found by science and what is found to be nonexistent by science. An example is consciousness itself. In modern society, science has become a primary force in human and planetary development. In this way, scientific and technological innovations have been responsible for great material progress. However, science does not have all the answers, any more than religion did in the past. The more we pursue material improvement, ignoring the contentment that comes of inner growth, the faster ethical values will disappear from our communities. Then we will all experience unhappiness in the long run, for when there is no place for justice and honesty in people's hearts, the weak are the first to suffer. When it comes to the human problems presented by our destructive emotions, Buddhism has much to say to science. A central aim of Buddhist practice is to reduce the power of destructive emotions in our lives. Such scientific assessment was one result. I am glad to say that the Mind and Life discussion reported in this book was more than a meeting of minds between Buddhism and science. I invite readers of this book to share in our explorations of the causes and cures for destructive emotions, and to reflect on the many questions raised that have compelling importance for us all. The Western Perspective Presenters:

3. THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE PRESENTERS, ALAN WALLACE, OWEN FLANAGAN pdf

6: Can we overcome our destructive emotions? - READING is THERAPY

The Western Perspective Presenters: Alan Wallace and Owen Flanagan A Buddhist Psychology Presenter: Matthieu Ricard The Anatomy of Mental Afflictions Presenters: Alan Wallace and Thupten Jinpa DAY TWO: FEELINGS IN EVERYDAY LIFE The Universality of Emotion Presenter: Paul Ekman Cultivating Emotional Balance Presenter: The Venerable Kusalacitto.

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Anachronism and Ethnocentrism Suppose we permitted ourselves this luxury: Some say anachronism is bad, even that it is not allowed. Next imagine responding to the anachronistic answers of our respected ancestors with our own reflective standards of cogency, wisdom, and breadth and depth, feeling free to judge their answers as helpful or inadequate for our problems in our time. It is temporally different but logically identical to judging the ideas and ways of other contemporary peoples as well suited for us or not suited for us, as good for us or not good for us in our time. Some say ethnocentrism is bad, even that it is not allowed. Comparative, Fusion, and Cosmopolitan Next, consider three styles of doing philosophy. First there is comparative. Regarding ethics, Confucians say that filial piety xiao is a mandatory virtue. For Buddhists, compassion karuna is the first and highest virtue; for citizens of contemporary liberal societies, left or right, individual compassion is an optional virtue while justice or fairness, at both the personal and political levels, holds pride of place as a constraint on the exercise of otherwise unlimited freedom. Buddhism Naturalized 2 Introduction is fusion. Is it an interesting, appealing mix or not? Could such a mixture work to improve our culture, say, by making the youth more respectful and society more orderly? The cosmopolitan is a listener and a speaker, an anachronistic and ethnocentric one, he or she compares and contrasts, is willing to try fusions of silly and safe sorts, but mostly likes living at the intersection of multiple spaces of meaning, waiting and seeing and watching whatever happens happen. This is an interesting development. Historically Buddhism is atheistic or quietistic when it comes to a creator God. But Buddhism is opulently polytheistic insofar as spirits, protector deities, ghosts, and evil spirits abound Collins , Buddhists in East and Southeast Asia believe in rebirth in about the same proportions as most North Americans believe in heaven. Amusingly, many believers in heaven find belief in rebirth superstitious and thus silly, whereas from a reflective naturalistic perspective both are silly. Is a fully secular, naturalistic understanding of Buddhism possible? Are Quakers and Unitarians Christians? Are secular, naturalistic Buddhists really Buddhists? What there is, and all there is, is natural stuff, and everything that happens has some set of natural causes that produce it although we may not be able to figure out what these causes are or were. Why be a naturalist? Naturalism is a good bet. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

7: - NLM Catalog Result

THE DALAI LAMA. Foreword. Much human suffering stems from destructive emotions, as hatred breeds violence or craving fuels addiction. One of our most basic responsibilities as caring people is to alleviate the human costs of such Out-of control emotions.

8: 16 results in SearchWorks catalog

Atman, Aporia, and Atomism: A Review of B. Alan Wallace's Meditations of a Buddhist Skeptic. By Tom Pepper. By any measure, we would have to acknowledge that B. Alan Wallace is a major player in Western Buddhism.

9: Search results for `Christopher Owen` - PhilPapers

3. THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE PRESENTERS, ALAN WALLACE, OWEN FLANAGAN pdf

We kick off with a general assessment of phenomenology and naturalist ethics, and Flanagan provides such a plethora of great insights that the regular PEL crew continued the discussion (without Owen) in Ep.

3. THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE PRESENTERS, ALAN WALLACE, OWEN FLANAGAN pdf

A general summons from the authority of truth, unto all ecclesiastical courts and officers American women in World War II The God who communicates The Horticulture Gardeners Guide Winter Garden (Horticulture Gardeners Guides Series) Sidesplittin, Butt Kickin, Tear Droppin Times (N) Shanyi Goes to China (Children Return to their Roots) Satellite spin-off Part 3 : What Aneth saw. Healing fats and the human diet Prenatal cytogenetics Linda Marie Randolph A survey of mass communication Nice men finish last Inductive and Deductive Methods 233 Singer 974 sewing machine manual Cuthbert and the good ship Thingamabob LETTERS AND LIFE IN THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD South Carolina votes for independence Nicotinoid insecticides and the nicotinic acetylcholine receptor Metrology handbook the science of measurement Chelsea and Sally Parts of mouse and its function Lynchburg College Symposium Readings Volume 1 The Emerald Horizon Proceedings of the 5th Canadian Conference on General Relativity and Relativistic Astrophysics, Universit If Its Not One Thing, Its Another Murder Nikrovas passion The Doctor Looks at Life and Death Monograph of the Isoetaceae Making corn silage The bottom of the plate Reel 472. November 14-December 31, 1883 A proposition or message sent the 31 of Decemb. 1641 to His Majestie, by the House of Commons for a guard Wood Finishing (Drakes Home Craftsmans Series) Academics and the Real World Machiavellis new modes and orders Create editable as form The all-time baseball teams book The childs treasury Justice and truth U00c6lfric as adviser of the episcopacy and nobility