

# A CLUE TO UNDERSTANDING THE BASIC EXPERIENCE OF SEIN UND ZEIT pdf

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*On Heidegger's Being and time. to understanding the basic experience of sein und zeit --The enigmatic a A clue to understanding the basic experience of.*

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: The present introduction is intended to indicate how this description might be understood. The title of the projected but unpublished division 3 of part 1 of *Being and Time* was "Time and Being," which Heidegger explained as "the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being. However, *Basic Problems* contains more than this explication of time as transcendental ontological horizon. In the original design, *Being and Time* was to have consisted of two parts, of which the second was to have contained the main features of a "phenomenological destruction of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality as clue. *Sein und Zeit*, 8th ed. Max Niemeyer, , p. Macquarrie and Robinson used the 7th edition of *Sein und Zeit*, the first of the so-called later editions, but preferred the readings of the 8th edition, and their marginal numberings and cross-references follow its pagination. All further references to *Being and Time* or *Sein und Zeit* in the present volume will be to the German pagination of the 8th edition, as given marginally also in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation. There are editions described as "unaltered" later than the 8th, down to the 11th edition Tübingen: Illustrative details and references regarding both errors and actual textual changes are given in Thomas Sheehan, "Caveat Lector: A re-translation of *Sein und Zeit* by Joan Stambaugh, to be published by Harper and Row, has not yet appeared at the time of the preparation of this note. *Sein und Zeit*, p. For an explanation of the term "Temporality," see the *Lexicon*. *Basic Problems* contains a significant portion of this destructive examination of traditional ontology. Heidegger now takes Kant rather than Descartes before him, or Hegel after him, as the most suitable representative of the problem. Since the chapter on the distinction of *res extensa* and *res cogitans* is preceded by a chapter on the medieval distinction, derived from Aristotle, between *essentia* and *existentia*, we are actually given more than had been projected in the original design as far as the history of ontology is concerned, for the extremely important topic of essence and existence as articulation of being has been brought into the picture. This medieval distinction is "destroyed" and the path opened for a more assured notion of the articulation of being. The third division of part 2 of *Being and Time* was to have contained a discussion

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## 2: Project MUSE - Being, Man, and Death

*A Clue to Understanding the Basic Experience of Sein und Zeit 2. The Enigmatic Apriori 3. How the Enigmatic Apriori Changes the Basic Experience of Sein und Zeit 4.*

In terms of structure, *Being and Time* remains as it was when it first appeared in print; it consists of the lengthy two-part introduction, followed by Division One, the "Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein," and Division Two, "Dasein and Temporality. Heidegger calls this being Dasein an ordinary German word literally meaning "being-there," i. Dasein is not "man," but is nothing other than "man" – it is this distinction that enables Heidegger to claim that *Being and Time* is something other than philosophical anthropology. From there he raises the problem of "authenticity," that is, the potentiality or otherwise for mortal Dasein to exist fully enough that it might actually understand being. Heidegger is clear throughout the book that nothing makes certain that Dasein is capable of this understanding. Time[ edit ] Finally, this question of the authenticity of individual Dasein cannot be separated from the "historicality" of Dasein. On the one hand, Dasein, as mortal, is "stretched along" between birth and death, and thrown into its world, that is, thrown into its possibilities, possibilities which Dasein is charged with the task of assuming. Nevertheless, Heidegger concludes his work with a set of enigmatic questions foreshadowing the necessity of a destruction that is, a transformation of the history of philosophy in relation to temporality – these were the questions to be taken up in the never completed continuation of his project: The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Dasein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being? Whereas a theoretical understanding of things grasps them according to "presence," for example, this may conceal that our first experience of a being may be in terms of its being "ready-to-hand. Only a later understanding might come to contemplate a hammer as an object. Hermeneutics[ edit ] The total understanding of being results from an explication of the implicit knowledge of being that inheres in Dasein. Philosophy thus becomes a form of interpretation, but since there is no external reference point outside being from which to begin this interpretation, the question becomes to know in which way to proceed with this interpretation. This is the problem of the "hermeneutic circle," and the necessity for the interpretation of the meaning of being to proceed in stages: Destruction of metaphysics[ edit ] As part of his ontological project, Heidegger undertakes a reinterpretation of previous Western philosophy. He wants to explain why and how theoretical knowledge came to seem like the most fundamental relation to being. This explanation takes the form of a destructuring Destruktion of the philosophical tradition, an interpretative strategy that reveals the fundamental experience of being at the base of previous philosophies that had become entrenched and hidden within the theoretical attitude of the metaphysics of presence. This use of the word Destruktion is meant to signify not a negative operation but rather a positive transformation or recovery. In later works Heidegger uses this approach to interpret the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Plato, among others. The publication in of the early lecture course, *Platon: Prolegomena*, was something like an early version of *Being and Time*. Although Heidegger did not complete the project outlined in *Being and Time*, later works explicitly addressed the themes and concepts of *Being and Time*. Most important among the works which do so are the following: It was followed by a seminar on the lecture, which took place at Todtnauberg on September 11 – 13, a summary of which was written by Alfred Guzzoni. Schmidt praises the "range and subtlety" of *Being and Time*, and describes its importance by quoting a comment the writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe made in a different context, "from here and today a new epoch of world history sets forth. University of California Press, , p.

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## 3: Project MUSE - The Basic Problems of Phenomenology

*In the more critical part of the paper, I try and show precisely how this notion of the enigmatic a priori changes the basic experience of understanding Sein und Zeit. I explore this in relation to three examples from Division II: death, conscience and temporality.*

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: After the detailed discussion of Sein und Zeit we now turn to the subsequent writings in order to work out the development of our theme. Since death is spoken of only incidentally in these texts, the principal significance of this stage of the investigation lies in the unfolding of the thematic of being which forms the remote context of the theme of death. The present chapter will focus upon four works dating from the years and The unity of these four writings lies not merely in their contemporaneity but, more importantly, in their content. Finite Transcendence Sein und Zeit was chiefly concerned with working out the presupposition for the question of being. To that end, an analysis of Dasein as the locus of the preontological understanding of being was undertaken. The being of Dasein revealed itself as temporality, the three dimensions of which achieve their concretion in the triple structure of being-unto-death, existential guilt, and existing in a situation. Since this finitely structured being is marked by its understanding of being and its inquiring about the meaning of being, the question arises: This, however, presupposes the prior, not yet fully elaborated question: The writings now to be discussed treat of the temporal understanding of being, or the question of finite transcendence. The clarification of the relationship between finitude and transcendence in Dasein will more adequately equip us to ask the question of the meaning of being itself. The book gives clear evidence that Heidegger has not lost sight of the question of being as the basic philosophical question, despite his apparent preoccupation with the analysis of Dasein. In the study of Kant, as in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger is concerned with "fundamental ontology," the analysis of Dasein for the sake of the correct posing of the question of being. Heidegger finds this intention anticipated in Kant. Instead of viewing the Critique of Pure Reason as an epistemological treatise, as so many Kantian scholars do, Heidegger sees it as a search for the foundation of metaphysics, a quest for the clarification of the basis of ontology, which is the science of being. Thus Kant himself writes: Metaphysics stands or falls. Insofar as these judgments are antecedent to all other knowledge, as the prerequisites which make it possible, they constitute pure, nonempirical, ontological knowledge. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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## 4: Table of contents for On Heidegger's Being and time

*In the more critical part of the paper, I try and show precisely how this notion of the enigmatic apriori changes the basic experience of understanding Sein und Zeit.*

The Unanswered Question of Being Published: May 31, Lee Braver ed. It is this omission which is philosophically more significant. Thanks to published texts such as the Kant book, Ga3, and the many historically focussed lecture courses, we have a good idea of what Part 2 might have looked like. However, as we will see, matters are not so simple. There are deep internal problems with Ga24 itself. Reconstructing Division III is thus not simply a matter of piecing together what it might have contained, but of making sense of why it failed to appear, and why, how and when Heidegger realised that it could no longer function as originally envisaged. Given all this, the book under review is extremely welcome. It brings together some of the most prominent Heideggerian commentators to discuss Division III "and the implications both of its absence and of its potential reconstruction. There are sixteen essays and I learnt something new from every one. Nelson, Richard Polt and Katherine Withy "are worth the admission price by themselves. Given the space available I am not going to be able to discuss each contribution, but the quality is exceptionally high throughout. Some of the essays inevitably draw on broader, longstanding research programmes particularly those by Graham Harman and Thomas Sheehan but they remain accessible. If I have one complaint, it is that, infuriatingly, there is no common reference system, with some chapters citing a varied range of English translations rather than the German: This is annoying, but it is not a serious problem. Take the example of subjectivity. Yet by the s subjectivity is viewed by Heidegger as deeply problematic " this growing suspicion underpinned his concerns surrounding humanism. How, for example, does it connect to notions like the transcendental or the universal or to particular views of the self or of the entities experienced by such a subject? So I want instead to focus on two key issues which structure the collection and which might help the reader to locate some of the positions discussed there. The first is time and the second is metaphysics. This famously closes with a series of unanswered questions: How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality Zeitigungsmodus der Zeitlichkeit to be interpreted? Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of being? Thus Braver in his Introduction: This means that the understandability of being must be temporal, or, put another way, time is the meaning of being. For example, Iain Thomson states " surely correctly " that: But how exactly should it be understood? Consider the following case. Suppose, like many philosophers, one is impressed by the idea that our life has a narrative structure defined by our self-identity, our goals and our history, a narrative structure in which the present is a function of the past and the future. For example, Daniel Dennett holds that: We try to make all of our material cohere into a single good story. And that story is our autobiography. The chief fictional character. But it is also a familiar philosophical position: This combination of views, both temporal and propositional, seems perfectly possible. And it remains perfectly possible even once you start to add in trademark Heideggerian ideas about the nature of time: We still do not have any tension in the view: In short, we have a position that combines, through the idea of narrative, the temporal and the propositional. But is this because of some separate aspect of his thought or is it because my example does not really push the idea of time far enough? The main obstacle to this approach is providing the necessary details: But I have argued elsewhere Ch3 But whatever stance one takes here, the basic question is a useful one " what does it mean to take time as fundamental to experience? How much does that imply? The second issue I want to flag, again one in terms of which the arguments in this volume might be usefully located, is the status of metaphysics. Yet this is not all he is unhappy with: As he puts it himself: Thus Thomson talks of how: We can note some immediate concerns. If the issue is framed as an explanation of how one understanding of being comes to replace another, then it is hard to see how Heidegger can offer anything but a deeply compromised answer. The question of how the medieval vision gave way to the modern one is surely better approached by

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something closer to a Foucauldian genealogy or even a straightforward historical research programme: Given that restriction, though, is it plausible that the canon has failed to address this – is such a project not just another turn on the transcendental wheel, albeit with the transcendental conditions cut free from the traditional model of the subject? As the volume illustrates, there are several alternative ways that that one might read Heidegger on these issues. We cannot account for the source of all appearing without appealing to apparent entities, which unhelpfully presupposes appearance. As with the big bang – which could only be explained by entities that it itself as the origin of all that is supposed to explain – all explanations come too late. Supporters of this reading need to explain why Heidegger has supposedly gone to such baroque lengths to draw our attention to a puzzle discussed ad nauseum in every introductory guide to philosophy. In conclusion, this is a rich and fascinating book. I have tried to suggest two paths along which one might approach it. My own view is that Heidegger abandoned Division III because he recognised, in the late s, that temporality was unable to do the strong transcendental work his system required of it, the work I sketched above. The recognition of this failure led him to seek an alternative: Robinson, Harper and Row, Aside from grossly flattering the significance of philosophy, this relies on a crudely mono-causal view of history which no historian would accept.

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## 5: 20th WCP: The Hermeneutic Conception of Culture

*Besides, his largest work, Sein und Zeit, was and will remain a torso. Yet it Yet it confronts its reader with a language and a style of thinking more.*

The Thinghood [Dinglichkeit] itself which such reification [Verdinglichung] implies must have its ontological origin demonstrated if we are to be in a position to ask what we are to understand positively when we think of the unreified Being of the subject, the soul, the spirit, the person. Heidegger, 42 1 1. Beyond Hegelian, Marxist accounts of alienation which objectify relations and otherness, according to Heidegger, it is only in light of the ontical-ontological difference brought about by Dasein as the formal-indicating unveiling of the meaning of Being that we can tackle this question and thus avoid the reification of beings and consciousness. And yet the existential, ontological categories of being-with, being-there with us, with one another and Dasein-with seem to fall short of any sociological or empirical account in social philosophy. If historicity is ultimately what makes human destination Schicksal, to render the Heraclitean daimon in its properly erratic ethos so peculiar to its own self-understanding, how can one avoid the performative contradiction of self-transcendence? One of the best clues to a Heideggerian response to this problem can be found in the articulation of his phenomenological, ontological critique of objectification and the formal, indicative approach to an existential analytic of Dasein. In his brief essay, I argue that the Heideggerian critique of reification thus conceived might indeed help us make sense of his conception of formal indication, within the semantic-ontological framework of his radical overcoming of metaphysics. Roughly speaking, we can hence assert that the reification of philosophical concepts in general and, in particular, of ontological and metaphysical conceptions, is what ultimately prevents us from understanding the question of the meaning of being and a non-reifying conception of human beings that are brought about by the formally indicated method of hermeneutic phenomenology. Hence what is hidden by the objectification and reification of the concept turns out to be revealed in their very unveiling in response to the Seinsfrage as applied to the Being of beings and especially to the mode of being of Dasein. As Brazilian phenomenologist E. Stein has pointed out, we may divide the general plan of Being and Time into six major theses that translate the hermeneutical turn of phenomenology, namely: The question of Being Seinsfrage which has today been forgotten is the question about the meaning of Being die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein ; 2. Dasein is thus properly understood as Being-in-the-world In-der-Welt-sein ; 4. Being-in-the-world is correlated to care Sorge qua the Being of Dasein. Care is temporal zeitlich , insofar as time is the transcendental horizon for the question of Being; 6. Since we can no longer resort to a religious, foundationalist account of humanity qua personhood in our post-secular, pluralist societies, and many philosophers avoid transcendental arguments that would take for granted the dignity and moral worth of the human species, it seems that hermeneutical, phenomenological accounts have become quite appealing in response to the normative challenges of naturalism and cultural relativism. The very fundamental, ontological structure of Dasein allows for such a semantic correlation, as intersubjectivity and language are tied in with social lifeworldly practices and self-understanding. Fundamental ontology Fundamentalontologie 2. Existential analytic of Dasein Fundamentalanalyse des Daseins 3. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities. Formal indication does precisely this unveiling of the conceptual limitations of traditional philosophy and language. Moreover, reification is not limited to a regional ontology, for example, to philosophical anthropology, theology, cosmology, or social relations of human beings. Milligan, edited by D. Struik, and on the German text of the Marx-Engels Werke edition. More specifically, it refers to the German gradual appropriation of the economic ideas advocated by Adam Smith,

Ricardo, and other Englishmen in a fast-industrializing society. The consolidation of European capitalism, the emergence of the working-class, and the social antagonisms of a bourgeois-dominated class society translated then the radical changes, which were taking place in the nineteenth century. It was in this context that Marx sought to integrate his critique of political economy with French-inspired socialist theories and with the philosophical criticism of his own compatriots notably Feuerbach and Young Hegelians. Marx explicitly seeks to start from the real, social condition of human alienation before outlining his own philosophical presuppositions. To be sure, the Hegelian and Feuerbachian terminologies employed in the Manuscripts betray the ideological motivations of his own overcoming of German idealism. Man is a species being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species [die Gattung] as his object [Gegenstand] his own as well as those of other things, but—and this is only another way of expressing it—also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal [universellen] and therefore as a free being [freien Wesen]. Activity and mind, both in their content and in their mode of existence [Existenzweise], are social [gesellschaftlich]: Marx, ; , f. In the Phenomenology, Hegel outlines the history of the alienation process in terms of consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason. Only here does nature exist as the foundation of his own human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural existence become man for him. Thus society is the unity of being of man with nature—the true resurrection of nature [die wahre Resurrektion der Natur]—the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature [Humanismus der Natur] both brought to fulfillment. As he puts it: In the sphere of political economy this realization of labour appears as loss of realization [Entwirklichung] for the workers; objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation. Marx, ; , Now, in order to produce anything, the worker needs nature. As free beings, human beings must be able to appropriate external, natural beings in such a way that this externalization will not imply any loss of their essential realization as human beings. Human labour appears thus as the master key to the humanization of nature. Marx criticizes thus political economy for inverting the autonomous category of universality into individualist existence, as the alienated worker is estranged from his production in a capitalist division of labour. Marx operates thus a reversal of the critical analysis employed by political economy, in that private property unveils the real essence of social alienation. To recover the truly human and social property, contradicted by the emergence of private property, human beings must overcome this contradiction by positively preserving labour as its subjective essence. Thus communism is invoked by Marx as the historical movement which resurrects the truly social nature and self-realization of human beings: Communism as the positive transcendence [Aufhebung] of private property, as human self-estrangement [menschlicher Selbstentfremdung], and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social i. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man—the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution. As Rahel Jaeggi has pointed out in her magnificent study on alienation, the Marxian conception of work is still essentialist and related to an Aristotelian view of ergon, which lacks the critical input of post-Hegelian reflections on autonomy, emancipation and liberation Jaeggi Moreover, as both Heidegger and Honneth rightly realized, a substantive philosophical anthropology underlies the Marxian semantic transformation of the Hegelian conception of the process of consciousness toward its material conditions in social existence, so as to regard objects that have value as objectified labour Gould I am relying on the original version Honneth and in vol. A New Look at an Old Idea, trans. Oxford University Press, According to Honneth, democratic societies evaluate their own social and political orders primarily in relation to standards of justice, because deliberations within the democratic public sphere are constantly confronted with issues and challenges that raise the question of whether particular social developments might be regarded as desirable beyond all consideration of what is just.

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My hope, however, is that social ontology can provide us with the means to understand and criticize the social developments described here, which would in turn enrich public discourse with solid arguments and stimulate it in the process. Honneth, If, on the one hand, we can easily understand that the formal indication of Dasein, as being in the world, points to a mode of being always already socialized, historicized, and linguistified, on the other hand, there remains the task of recovering the full sense of an ethics of finitude and of a normative pragmatism inherent in Heidegger. The problem of reification could serve in this case to indicate the way back from Frankfurt to Freiburg, dispelling misunderstandings and dialogues of the deaf engendered by endless quarrels involving neo-Kantian and neo-positivists in the reception of representatives of the first generation of the Institute for Social Research. The mode of Being of Dasein Seinsart, Seinsweise must indeed account for its being always already there as an entity, as facticity is understood as the fallen mode of Being in its thrownness *Befindlichkeit*, *Geworfenheit*, without being ever reduced to anything *vorhanden* or *zuhanden*, hence irreducible to any technique or instrumental action, let alone to mere means to meet worldly-determined ends, whether human or nonhuman. References Berger, Peter and Stanley Pullberg. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Translated by Frederick Lawrence. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. In *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Indiana University Press. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. State University of New York Press. *Phenomenology of the Religious Life*. *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. University of Utah Press. *Main Currents of Marxism. History and Class Consciousness*. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. *A Critique of Political Economy. The Process of Capitalist Production*. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of Milligan*, edited by D. Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. *Seis Estudos sobre Ser e Tempo*. A question of method in Being and Time. *A Philosophical History of German Sociology*.

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## 6: Being and Time - Wikipedia

*Understanding, Interpretation, Language 82 8. Care and Truth 96 If we are to arrive at the basic concept of 'Being' and to outline the 2 GA2 Sein und Zeit.*

In terms of structure, *Being and Time* remains as it was when it first appeared in print; it consists of the lengthy two-part introduction, followed by Division One, the "Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein," and Division Two, "Dasein and Temporality. With that said, the basic idea of *Being and Time* is extremely simple: That is, what it means for a human being to be is to exist temporally in the stretch between birth and death. Being is time and time is finite, it comes to an end with our death. At the same time, there is no access to being other than via beings themselves—hence pursuing the question of being inevitably means asking about a being with regard to its being. Heidegger calls this being Dasein an ordinary German word literally meaning "being-there" i. Dasein is not "man," but is nothing other than "man"—it is this distinction that enables Heidegger to claim that *Being and Time* is something other than philosophical anthropology. From there he raises the problem of "authenticity," that is, the potentiality or otherwise for mortal Dasein to exist fully enough that it might actually understand being. Heidegger is clear throughout the book that nothing makes certain that Dasein is capable of this understanding. Time Finally, this question of the authenticity of individual Dasein cannot be separated from the "historicality" of Dasein. On the one hand, Dasein, as mortal, is "stretched along" between birth and death, and thrown into its world, that is, thrown into its possibilities, possibilities which Dasein is charged with the task of assuming. Nevertheless, Heidegger concludes his work with a set of enigmatic questions foreshadowing the necessity of a destruction that is, a transformation of the history of philosophy in relation to temporality—these were the questions to be taken up in the never completed continuation of his project: The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Dasein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being? The central Husserlian concept of the directedness of all thought—Cura, care or concern. However, for Heidegger, theoretical knowledge represents only one kind of intentional behaviour, and he asserts that it is grounded in more fundamental modes of behaviour and forms of practical engagement with the surrounding world. Whereas a theoretical understanding of things grasps them according to "presence," for example, this may conceal that our first experience of a being may be in terms of its being "ready-to-hand. Only a later understanding might come to contemplate a hammer as an object. Hermeneutics The total understanding of being results from an explication of the implicit knowledge of being that inheres in Dasein. Philosophy thus becomes a form of interpretation, but since there is no external reference point outside being from which to begin this interpretation, the question becomes to know in which way to proceed with this interpretation. This is the problem of the "hermeneutic circle," and the necessity for the interpretation of the meaning of being to proceed in stages: Destruction of metaphysics As part of his ontological project, Heidegger undertakes a reinterpretation of previous Western philosophy. He wants to explain why and how theoretical knowledge came to seem like the most fundamental relation to being. This explanation takes the form of a destructuring Destruktion of the philosophical tradition, an interpretative strategy that reveals the fundamental experience of being at the base of previous philosophies that had become entrenched and hidden within the theoretical attitude of the metaphysics of presence. This Destruktion is not simply a negative operation but rather a positive transformation, or recovery. In *Being and Time* Heidegger briefly undertakes a destructuring of the philosophy of Plato, among others. Translations So far, there are complete translations of *Sein und Zeit* in numerous languages: The publication in of the early lecture course, *Platon: Prolegomena*, , was something like an early version of *Being and Time*. Although Heidegger did not complete the project outlined in *Being and Time*, later works explicitly addressed the themes and concepts of *Being and Time*.

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Most important among the works which do so are the following: It was followed by a seminar on the lecture, which took place at Todtnauberg on September 11â€”13, , a summary of which was written by Alfred Guzzoni. Heidegger has become common background for the political movement concerned with protection of the environment, and his narrative of the history of Being frequently appear when capitalism, consumerism and technology are thoughtfully opposed. Zimmerman writes in Heidegger and Deep Ecology: Retrieved 26 February On Time and Being. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Heidegger and Deep Ecology. University of Colorado Boulder. Retrieved May 24, Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. State University of New York Press, The Art of Existing New Jersey: Cambridge University Press, A Thing of This World: University of Toronto Press, Jacques Derrida , "Ousia and Gramme: University of Chicago Press, Hubert Dreyfus , Being-in-the-World: Cornell University Press, , expanded edn. University of California Press, The Phenomenology of Ecstatic Temporality London: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory Albany: State University of New York Press, , ch. Stanford University Press, Through Phenomenology to Thought. External links Being and time, excerpts on Google books Arne D.

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## 7: Being and Time by Martin Heidegger

*BEING AND TIME MARTIN HEIDEGGER Sein und Zeit (Seventh edition, Neomarius Verlag, Tiibingen) time, and thus with whatever understanding of Being it may possess.*

Heidegger, the founder of the hermeneutic paradigm, rejected the traditional account of cultural activity as a search for universally valid foundations for human action and knowledge. His main work, *Sein und Zeit*, develops a holistic epistemology according to which all meaning is context-dependent and permanently anticipated from a particular horizon, perspective or background of intelligibility. The result is a powerful critique directed against the ideal of objectivity. Gadamer shares with Heidegger the hermeneutic reflections developed in *Sein und Zeit* and the critique of objectivity, describing the cultural activity as an endless process of "fusions of horizons. On the other hand, however, this concept is an attempt to cope with the relativity of human existence and to avoid the dangers of a radical relativism. In fact, through an endless, free and unpredictable process of fusions of horizons, our personal horizon is gradually expanded and deprived of its distorting prejudices in such a way that the educative process *Bildung* consists in this multiplication of hermeneutic experiences. Gadamer succeeds therefore in presenting a non-foundationalist and non-teleological theory of culture. The so-called "hermeneutic turn" is unquestionably one of the major events that took place in the contemporary philosophical scene, and its impact goes beyond the boundaries of any academic discipline, embracing the whole field of the human sciences. For this reason, the word "hermeneutics" refers today not only to a philosophical movement, but also to a cultural paradigm. So, the question immediately arises: In order to answer this question, I will evaluate the significance of the work of Heidegger and Gadamer the two leading representatives of the hermeneutic movement to a new theory of culture. In his magnum opus of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger criticizes and sets aside some of the fundamental themes and concepts of modern philosophy, i. In fact, we may say, adopting an expression coined by Richard Bernstein, that Heidegger puts an end to the "cartesian anxiety", the desperate search for solid grounds both in the ethical and epistemological field. An illustration of this point can be found in the severe criticism that Heidegger addresses to the notion of subject and to the epistemological ideal of objectivity. In what concerns the first aspect, Heidegger replaces the word "subject" with the word "Dasein" or, translating literally this German expression, "being-there". By saying that a human being is not primarily a "being-conscious" but a "being-there", Heidegger rejects the well-known description of human beings in terms of autonomous, unified and selftransparent subjects. As a result, the way we project ourselves is to a large extent dictated by our context. One of his favourite maxims was, indeed: The analysis of the hermeneutic circle and the fore-structure *Vor-Struktur* of the understanding illustrates the scope and meaning inherent to the above mentioned critique. According to Heidegger, the meaning we attribute to any being results always from the projection upon our experience of a certain background of expectations or, in other words, from the integration of beings in some horizon of intelligibility. Our access to reality is consequently always mediated by a linguistic and conceptual grid. This anticipation structure that characterizes the process of understanding is the basic feature of the ontological reinterpretation of the hermeneutic circle proposed by Heidegger. This notion refers traditionally to the constant confrontation that an interpreter must operate between each individual part of a text and a previous grasp of the whole text until he reaches a full understanding. According to Heidegger, however, such a projection of a previous set of expectations is a permanent and unavoidable factor, and it embraces not only the interpretation of texts, but also all experience of meaning, constituting an ontological structure of *Dasein*. We must not therefore evaluate the hermeneutic circle as a deficiency and an imperfection of our knowledge; on the contrary, "in the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing". *Sein und Zeit* criticizes consequently one of the most important touchstones of the western philosophical tradition, the correspondence theory of truth. Indeed, from an hermeneutic point of view, the correspondence between propositions and things is neither linear nor universally valid, but depends on a horizon, an opening or a background of theories and

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practices within which any verification or falsification of propositions becomes possible. What consequences flow from these premises at the level of a theory of culture? An hermeneutic conception of culture cannot provide what traditional theories of culture are expected to provide: Quite on the contrary, hermeneutics teaches us that all meaning is context-dependent and therefore unstable. The resulting conception of culture is thus poetic and creative rather than ethical or epistemological. In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger proposes a destruction of the history of ontology in order to dissolve the "concealments" brought about by our "hardened tradition" and to return to the "primordial experiences" which constitute its source. Heidegger prevents us from this mistake through another key concept closely related to his ideal of destruction: The destruction involves, indeed, a retrieval of some aspects of our cultural tradition, but to retrieve must be understood here as a creative and active process: To preserve a problem means, however, to release and to keep awake the interior forces, located at the ground of its essence, that make it possible as a problem". Heidegger had already stated in *Sein und Zeit* that interpretation is not "the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding", 7 and his conception of destruction and retrieval constitutes precisely a reflex of the hermeneutic move towards a conception of culture as a realm of unstable and indeterminate possibilities waiting for further exploration and new interpretative horizons. The cultural tradition is conceived as a reservoir of living forces that can be experienced only if we free them from the petrification exercised during the centuries. The distinction between creation and interpretation may be inclusively considered, from an Heideggerian point of view, as a matter of degree. After *Sein und Zeit* or, more precisely, after the famous "turning" in his thought, Heidegger starts a new and somehow mystical reflexion on Being, according to which the different cultural horizons and historical epochs are considered not as a mere product of human efforts, but primarily as something which is given us and sent by Being itself. The history of mankind and particularly the history of thought are consequently conceived as a co-production of man and Being, although the primacy seems to belong to Being. But just as in the period of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger remains faithful to the perspectivism inherent to the hermeneutic paradigm, i. As a result, a background of indetermination accompanies all the works of the great thinkers, and a trace of the mysterious source of human thought is always inscribed in its expressions. In an analogous way, the Heideggerian notion of "recollection", exposed for instance in *Was hei t Denken* and in *Der Satz vom Grund*, expresses the necessity to return to past works in order to think anew what in these works remains unthought. From an Heideggerian perspective, culture must not be considered as an activity directed towards the discovery of pre-existing structures and objective meanings, but as a creative process directed towards the exploration of the possibilities opened up by past works or, adopting a formulation closer to the second Heidegger, the exploration of the deep dimension i. This suggestive conception of culture as a creative rather than discovering process shared also by other influential philosophical movements, such as neopragmatism and deconstruction is, however, affected by three basic limitations. Firstly, Heidegger dedicates an almost exclusive attention to the past and to our tradition, neglecting the contact with other cultural universes. Finally, human action is clearly devaluated by Heidegger, because the real actor of history is Being itself; as it is clearly stated in the *Der Spiegel* interview, human agency is irrelevant as far as the transformation of the world is concerned. He is, indeed, more interested in listening to Being than to other men. The above mentioned limitations can be however surpassed within the hermeneutic movement, as the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer clearly shows. This follower of Heidegger provides the hermeneutic paradigm with a theory of culture faithful to the most important insights of Heideggerian thought without remaining hostage of its limitations. As Gadamer states in his magnum opus, *Wahrheit und Methode*, "all understanding is ultimately self-understanding. If all understanding involves an anticipation of meaning, its goal does not consist in the elimination of all prejudices in this point the Enlightenment thinkers were mistaken , but rather in the discrimination between false and true prejudices. And according to Gadamer, the truth of our prejudices is verified through their ability to produce a coherent and harmonious picture of the whole that is offered to our understanding. On the contrary, the inability to produce a coherent interpretation of the interpretandum reveals the falsehood of our prejudices.

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Since the hermeneutic paradigm is characterized by holism and contextualism, the notion of horizon, as a background of intelligibility, plays naturally a very important role. Such an integration means, on the one hand, that our own horizon is transformed and, on the other hand, that the other horizon, being illuminated by a new perspective, transfigures itself. Understanding consists therefore in a process of fusions of horizons. If all meaning in the field of the Geisteswissenschaften results from a fusion of horizons, then the ideal of objectivity is undermined, and the limitations of a methodologically controlled knowledge become manifest. In fact, the Geisteswissenschaften are more than knowledge, they constitute an irreplaceable means at the service of human formation and education. According to Gadamer, the most important dimension of human sciences is not its methodological dimension, but its relevance from the point of view of the humanistic ideal of Bildung. It corresponds, to some extent, to the greek word paideia, and Rorty translated it as "edification" in his book *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Quite on the contrary, for Hegel as for Gadamer, the essence of experience lies in the negation of our horizon of expectations and in a reversal of conscience; experiences offer refutation instead of confirmation, they confront us with irregularity instead of regularity. Every genuine experience refutes previous expectations, being therefore "painful" and "uncomfortable". Gadamerian Bildung, in fact, has nothing to do with traditional and teleological approaches to the educative process. In such a perspective, paideia presupposes a pre-established model that each individual must interiorize and accomplish. Gadamer criticizes this teleological conception of Bildung, and considers the educative process as an unpredictable and endless series of fusions of horizons; in his perspective, human formation is simply human transformation. The analysis of the concept of Bildung that Gadamer offers us in the opening pages of *Wahrheit und Methode* makes this point quite clear. This notion lost gradually its earlier theological connotations and received a humanistic meaning, designating since Herder the "rising up Emporbildung to humanity". Thus, the elevation to universality that Hegel ascribes to Bildung corresponds to the correction of prejudices that takes place whenever a fusion of horizons occurs; in fact, whenever I try to understand a particular work or cultural production, I must reformulate my grid of prejudices in order to overcome the strangeness of a different cultural horizon. Through this process, my background of expectations is expanded, the meaning I ascribe to the world is revised, and my ability to understand the otherness of the other is improved. The other is the only antidote to my prejudices and a ladder to universality. The cultivated gebildet and experienced erfahren person is someone who is permanently looking for new hermeneutic experiences and different cultural horizons alienation in order to integrate them return in the particular context and background that makes the understanding possible. In other words, understanding is an act of appropriation that is possible only through an act of expropriation. The Gadamerian conception of Bildung is probably the touchstone of *Wahrheit und Methode*; it constitutes not only the nucleus of his account of the Geisteswissenschaften, but also of his entire philosophical project. In the first place, Gadamer conceives of culture as a game. Bildung, he says, has not any purpose outside itself, 15 evoking thus the Kantian definition of game as a "purposiveness without purpose". This conception of culture as a game reflects the radically non-teleological nature of the educative process; human edification as Rorty would say does not aim neither at the accomplishment of objective norms nor at the interiorization of some well-definite model, but rather at an endless fight against the limitations of our prejudices or, in equivalent terms, it consists only in an absolute openness to new hermeneutic experiences and fusions of horizons. Actually, we could add that the game works also as an excellent model for the fusion of horizons, as we can see in the pages that Gadamer dedicates in *Wahrheit und Methode* to the analysis of art: As Gadamer likes to say, understanding is understanding differently. In the second place, culture is based on the model of translation. According to Gadamer, "being that can be understood is language". Understanding consists in translating something said in another horizon or language game into our own horizon or language game. If all meaning is context-dependent, then translating, as a recontextualization process, involves inevitably a production of new meaning. For this reason, Gadamer declares that the situation of the translator and the interpreter is fundamentally the same. In *Wahrheit und Methode*, the author declares: The Gadamerian thesis that metaphoricity is a fundamental feature of language

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should not surprise us. Since Aristotle, the European culture defines metaphor as a transference epiphora of a name from his usual context to a strange one, within which it acquires new expressive possibilities. This operation of recontextualization, characteristic of metaphor, constitutes, as we have just seen, the essence of translation and understanding. Therefore, we may easily conclude that both language and understanding have a metaphorical character. And given that the educative process, *Bildung*, consists in understanding the other, i. From a Gadamerian perspective, we could compare each individual to a literal word locked in a particular context and define the cultivated in the sense of *gebildet* person as someone who makes a permanent effort to recontextualize itself through an indefinite process of fusions of horizons, along which it expands and broadens its existential possibilities. His description of cultural activity in terms of fusions of horizons is a consequence of the hermeneutical strategy of his predecessor; both authors reject the ideality and objectivity of meaning, and emphasize its dependence on the interpreter. And since all cultural realities are submitted to constant and unpredictable reinterpretations, hermeneutics demands a non-foundationalist conception of culture. Thus, the model of the fusion of horizons is not restricted to past horizons and to our traditions; on the contrary, it can be applied to all cultural universes without exception. Instead of listening to the mysterious "voice of Being", Gadamer listens to other men. The most fundamental aspect of his theory of culture is, in fact, the passion for the other. It is through the contact with the otherness of the other that our prejudices are gradually overcome and deprived of their distorting character. It is also thanks to the other that the cultivated individuals reinvent themselves and discover hitherto unnoticed and unexplored possibilities. Gadamerian *Bildung*, as a non-foundationalist and non-teleological *paideia*, is unquestionably one of the major contributions made by contemporary philosophy to the theory of culture.

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### 8: Heidegger, Reification and Formal Indication | Nythamar De Oliveira - [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com)

*Being and Time (German: Sein und Zeit)* is a book by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, in which the author seeks to analyse the concept of [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com)ger maintains that this has fundamental importance for philosophy and that, since the time of the Ancient Greeks, philosophy has avoided the question, turning instead to the analysis of particular beings.

Sein und Zeit was originally intended to be in two parts, of three divisions each, but it was published with just the first two divisions. Heidegger needed to publish something substantial to get promoted in the German academic world. After much delay he published this work in Today it is considered by many to be the most important philosophical work of the 20th century. The book has two introductions. At the end of the second introduction, Heidegger lays out the plan for the entire work. Part One has three divisions 1. Dasein and temporality; 3. Part Two likewise has three divisions 1. Dasein is not an attribute or property of a human entity. In anxiety one feels uncanny. Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: But here uncanniness also means not-being-at-home. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential mode of the not-at-home. Nothing else is meant by our talk about uncanniness. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as long as there is an understanding of Being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that in this case entities will still continue to be. But is not this a highly arbitrary way to define "truth"? By such drastic ways of defining this concept we may succeed in eliminating the idea of agreement from the conception of truth. But while our definition is seemingly arbitrary, it contains only the necessary Interpretation of what was primordially surmised in the oldest tradition of ancient philosophy and even understood in a pre-phenomenological manner. Philosophy is primordial rhetoric. Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth. Disclosedness is a kind of Being which is essential to Dasein. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed. Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness, cannot be. To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws become true; and with them, entities become accessible in themselves to Dasein. Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were. Does this relativity signify that all truth is subjective? Only so can these entities themselves be binding for every possible assertion - that is, for every possible way of pointing them out. And if any sceptic of the kind who denies the truth, factually is, he does not even need to be refuted. In so far as he is, and has understood himself in this Being, he has obliterated Dasein in the desperation of suicide; and in doing so, he has also obliterated truth. Because Dasein, for its own part, cannot first be subjected to proof, the necessity of truth cannot be proved either. In that case, readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand have not yet been distinguished; still less have they been conceived ontologically. But if Dasein is to be able to have any dealings with a context of equipment, it must understand something like an involvement, even if it does not do so thematically: Space is not interrupted by these; but neither does it arise from them by way of joining them together. Though it is differentiated by differentiable points which are space themselves, space remains, for its part, without any differences. The differences themselves are of the same character as that which they differentiate. Nevertheless, the point, in so far as it differentiates anything in space, is the negation of space, though in such a manner that, as this negation, it itself remains in space; a point is space after all. The point does not lift itself out of space as if it were something of another character. Space is the "outside-of-one-another" of the multiplicity of points [Punktmannigfaltigkeit], and it is without any

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differences. In this translation was reprinted in paperback by Harper Perennial Modern Classics, with a helpful introduction by Taylor Carman. The pagination remains the same. Being and Time GA 2. The new, in , translation. This translation includes marginal notes Heidegger wrote in his copy of Sein und Zeit. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, revised by Dennis J. Errors have been emended. The German is included after words whose original meaning is ambiguous in English. Greek passages in the original now appear in Greek. Dasein is printed without a hyphen, as in Sein und Zeit. The font is easier. Books about Being and Time Being-in-the-World: Raymond Tallis, Palgrave, Basingstoke, William Blattner, London, Continuum, This book reinforces that trend. The exposition is excellent and easy to read--as explanations of Heidegger go--and there are many analogies and examples that will appeal to contemporary students. Then Being and Time is explained by examining five major themes. Study aids in the back include a glossary and a section on further reading that does a good job of summarizing related lectures and essays by Heidegger, and the most popular books in the secondary literature. The fact that I speak English rather than Japanese, can be an astronaut but not an Aztec warrior, for example, is all part of facticity. The ontological basis of facticity is thrownness, whose temporal horizon is the past. Heidegger originally conceived of Being and Time as a work in two parts, with the published volume containing only two thirds of the first part. In this function, Temporality is "the most original temporalizing of temporality as such". But in Heidegger hesitates to push forward into the concealed depths of temporality, "above all with regard to its Temporality," and even to enter "the problem of the finiteness of time". The failure of this conjunction is now attested to indirectly in that Heidegger in his later self-critique repudiates the derivation of space from the temporality of Dasein and instead ascribes it to time as a movement in the "event of appropriation" or "enowning" Ereignis. He thereby breaks apart the temporality of Dasein and the Temporality of Being--contrary to the programs of Being and Time. The failure to unite these two sides is nothing other than the failure of the completion of Being and Time. Magda King, New York, Dell, The first commentary in English. Mainly about Division I. Stephen Mulhall, London, Routledge, His writings are notoriously difficult; they both require and reward careful readings. Include your email address so that I can reply.

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