

## 1: A Normative Approach to War - Onuma Yasuaki - Oxford University Press

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The first issue to be considered is what is war and what is its definition. The student of war needs to be careful in examining definitions of war, for like any social phenomena, definitions are varied, and often the proposed definition masks a particular political or philosophical stance paraded by the author. This is as true of dictionary definitions as well as of articles on military or political history. Cicero defines war broadly as "a contention by force"; Hugo Grotius adds that "war is the state of contending parties, considered as such"; Thomas Hobbes notes that war is also an attitude: For example, the notion that wars only involve states-as Clausewitz implies-belies a strong political theory that assumes politics can only involve states and that war is in some manner or form a reflection of political activity. This captures a particularly political-rationalistic account of war and warfare, i. We find Rousseau arguing this position: The military historian, John Keegan offers a useful characterization of the political-rationalist theory of war in his *A History of War*. It is assumed to be an orderly affair in which states are involved, in which there are declared beginnings and expected ends, easily identifiable combatants, and high levels of obedience by subordinates. The form of rational war is narrowly defined, as distinguished by the expectation of sieges, pitched battles, skirmishes, raids, reconnaissance, patrol and outpost duties, with each possessing their own conventions. As such, Keegan notes the rationalist theory does not deal well with pre-state or non-state peoples and their warfare. If war is defined as something that occurs only between states, then wars between nomadic groups should not be mentioned, nor would hostilities on the part of a displaced, non-state group against a state be considered war. An alternative definition of war is that it is an all-pervasive phenomenon of the universe. Accordingly, battles are mere symptoms of the underlying belligerent nature of the universe; such a description corresponds with a Heraclitean or Hegelian philosophy in which change physical, social, political, economical, etc can only arise out of war or violent conflict. Heraclitus decries that "war is the father of all things," and Hegel echoes his sentiments. Interestingly, even Voltaire, the embodiment of the Enlightenment, followed this line: All animals are perpetually at war with each other Air, earth and water are arenas of destruction. Alternatively, the Oxford Dictionary expands the definition to include "any active hostility or struggle between living beings; a conflict between opposing forces or principles. This perhaps indicates a too broad definition, for trade is certainly a different kind of activity than war, although trade occurs in war, and trade often motivates wars. The OED definition also seems to echo a Heraclitean metaphysics, in which opposing forces act on each other to generate change and in which war is the product of such a metaphysics. So from two popular and influential dictionaries, we have definitions that connote particular philosophical positions. The plasticity and history of the English language also mean that commonly used definitions of war may incorporate and subsume meanings borrowed and derived from other, older languages: Such descriptions may linger in oral and literary depictions of war, for we read of war in poems, stories, anecdotes and histories that may encompass older conceptions of war. Both could recognize the presence or absence of war. War certainly generates confusion, as Clausewitz noted calling it the "fog of war", but that does not discredit the notion that war is organized to begin with. The Latin root of bellum gives us the word belligerent, and duel, an archaic form of bellum; the Greek root of war is polemos, which gives us polemical, implying an aggressive controversy. An alternative definition that the author has worked on is that war is a state of organized, open-ended collective conflict or hostility. This is derived from contextual common denominators, that is elements that are common to all wars, and which provide a useful and robust definition of the concept. This working definition has the benefit of permitting more flexibility than the OED version, a flexibility that is crucial if we are to examine war not just as a conflict between states that is, the rationalist position, but also a conflict between non-state peoples, non-declared actions, and highly organized, politically controlled wars as well as culturally evolved, ritualistic wars and guerrilla uprisings, that appear to have no centrally controlling body and may perhaps be described as emerging spontaneously. The political issue of defining war poses the first philosophical problem, but once

that is acknowledged, a definition that captures the clash of arms, the state of mutual tension and threat of violence between groups, the authorized declaration by a sovereign body, and so on can be drawn upon to distinguish wars from riots and rebellions, collective violence from personal violence, metaphorical clashes of values from actual or threatened clashes of arms. For example, if it is claimed that man is not free to choose his actions strong determinism then war becomes a fated fact of the universe, one that humanity has no power to challenge. The implication is that man is not responsible for his actions and hence not responsible for war. Wherein lies its cause then becomes the intellectual quest: Some seek more complicated versions of the astrological vision of the medieval mind e. In a weaker form of determinism, theorists claim that man is a product of his environment-however that is defined-but he also possesses the power to change that environment. Again, the paradoxes and intricacies of opinions here are curiously intriguing, for it may be asked what permits some to stand outside the laws that everybody else is subject to? But thinkers here spread out into various schools of thought on the nature of choice and responsibility. Such concerns obviously trip into moral issues to what extent is the citizen morally responsible for war? Descriptive and normative problems arise here, for one may inquire who is the legal authority to declare war, then move to issues of whether that authority has or should have legitimacy. Here, some blame aristocracies for war e. Vico, *New Science*, sect. These may be divided into three main groupings: Example theories include those that claim man to be naturally aggressive or naturally territorial, more complex analyses incorporate game theory and genetic evolution to explain the occurrence of violence and war cf. Richard Dawkins for interesting comments on this area. The problem leads to questions of an empirical and a normative nature on the manner in which some societies have foregone war and on the extent to which similar programs may be deployed in other communities. For example, what generated peace between the warring tribes of England and what denies the people of Northern Ireland or Yugoslavia that same peace? To some this is a lament-if man did not possess reason, he might not seek the advantages he does in war and he would be a more peaceful beast. To others reason is the means to transcend culturally relative differences and concomitant sources of friction, and its abandonment is the primary cause of war cf. John Locke, *Second Treatise*, sect. Proponents of the mutual benefits of universal reason have a long and distinguished lineage reaching back to the Stoics and echoing throughout the Natural Law philosophies of the medieval and later scholars and jurists. It finds its best advocate in Immanuel Kant and his famous pamphlet on *Perpetual Peace*. In every man, of course, a beast lies hidden-the beast of rage, the beast of lustful heat at the screams of the tortured victim, the beast of lawlessness let off the chain, the beast of diseases that follow on vice, gout, kidney disease, and so on. In other words, human biology can affect thinking what is thought, how, for what duration and intensity, and can accordingly affect cultural developments, and in turn cultural institutions can affect biological and rational developments e. Students of war thus need to explore beyond proffered definitions and explanations to consider the broader philosophical problems that they often conceal. Hobbes is adamant that without an external power to impose laws, the state of nature would be one of immanent warfare. That is, "during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. Communitarians of various hues reject the notion of an isolated individual pitted against others and prompted to seek a contract between themselves for peace. For instance, the communitarian view of war implies that Homeric war is different from war in the Sixteenth Century, but historians might draw upon evidence that the study of Greek warfare in the *Iliad* may influence later generations in how they conceive themselves and warfare. Others reject any theorizing on human nature. Kenneth Waltz, for example argues: This danger here is that this absolves any need to search for commonalities in warriors of different periods and areas, which could be of great benefit both to military historians and peace activists. However, once the student has considered, or is at least aware of the broader philosophical theories that may relate to war, an analysis of its ethics begins with the question: Again, due notice must be given to conceptions of justice and morality that involve both individuals and groups. War as a collective endeavor engages a co-ordinated activity in which not only the ethical questions of agent responsibility, obedience and delegation are ever present but so too are questions concerning the nature of agency. Similarly, should individual Field Marshalls be considered the appropriate moral agent or the army as

a corporate body? Just war theory begins with an assessment of the moral and political criteria for justifying the initiation of war defensive or aggressive, but critics note that the justice of warfare is already presumed in just war theory: Thus the initial justice of war requires reflection. Pacifists deny that war, or even any kind of violence, can be morally permissible, but, as with the other positions noted above, a variety of opinions exists here, some admitting the use of war only in defense and as a last resort defencists whereas others absolutely do not admit violence or war of any sort absolutist pacifists. Moving from the pacifist position, other moralists admit the use of war as a means to support, defend, or secure peace, but such positions may permit wars of defense, deterrence, aggression, and intervention for that goal. Beyond what has been called the pacificistic morality in which peace is the end goal as distinct from pacifism and its rejection of war as a means, are those theories that establish an ethical value in war. For example, as a vehicle to forge national identity, to pursue territorial aggrandizement, or to uphold and strive for a variety of virtues such as glory and honor. In this vein of thought, those who are now characterized as social darwinists and their intellectual kin may be heard extolling the evolutionary benefits of warfare, either for invigorating individuals or groups to pursue the best of their abilities, or to remove weaker members or groups from political ascendancy. The morality of war traipses into the related area of political philosophy in which conceptions of political responsibility and sovereignty, as well as notions of collective identity and individuality, should be acknowledged and investigated. Once war commences, whatever its merits, philosophers disagree on the role, if any, of morality within war. Many have claimed morality is necessarily discarded by the very nature of war including Christian thinkers such as Augustine, whereas others have sought to remind warriors both of the existence of moral relations in war and of various strictures to remain sensitive to moral ends. Sociologically, those going to and coming back from war often go through rites and rituals that symbolize their stepping out of, or back into, civil society, as if their transition is to a different level of morality and agency. For the ethicist, questions begin with identifying morally permissible or justifiable targets, strategies, and weapons-that is, of the principles of discrimination and proportionality. Writers disagree on whether all is fair in war, or whether certain modes of conflict ought to be avoided. The reasons for maintaining some moral dimensions include: A useful distinction here is between absolute war and total war. Total war, on the other hand, describes the absence of any restraint in warfare. Moral and political responsibility becomes problematic for proponents of both absolute and total war, for they have to justify the incorporation of civilians who do not work for the war effort as well as the infirm, children, and the handicapped and wounded who cannot fight. Supporters of absolute warfare may argue that membership of a society involves responsibilities for its protection, and if some members are literally unable to assist then all other able-bodied civilians have an absolute duty to do their part. The literature of war propaganda relates well here, as does the penal morality for those who refuse and the definitional politics of the wide range of people who may not wish to fight from conscientious objectors to traitors. Similar issues dog those who support total warfare in which the military target traditionally sacrosanct people and entities: Supporters may evoke the sliding scale that Michael Walzer describes in *Just and Unjust Wars*, in which graver threats to the body politic may permit the gradual weakening of moral constraints. Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, sect. Others merely state that war and morality do not mix. Summary The nature of the philosophy of war is complex and this article has sought to establish a broad vision of its landscape and the connections that are endemic to any philosophical analysis of the topic. The subject matter lends itself to metaphysical and epistemological considerations, to the philosophy of mind and of human nature, as well as to the more traditional areas of moral and political philosophy. To begin a philosophical discussion of war draws one onto a long and complex intellectual path of study and continual analysis; whereas a cursory announcement of what one thinks on war can be, or points to, the culmination of thoughts on related topics and a deduction from one to the other can and should always be made.

### 2: A normative approach to preventing cyberwarfare | Asia Times

*A Normative Approach to War: Peace, War, and Justice in Hugo Grotius by Yasuaki Onuma, Onamu Hugo Grotius the great Dutch international lawyer and theorist, is often portrayed as a man who, in his most famous work De Jure Belli ac Pacis, indulged a passion for the abstract by constructing a theoretical model of international law and.*

Defining democracy[ edit ] Democracies have been defined differently by different theorists and researchers; this accounts for some of the variations in their findings. Doyle requires 1 that "liberal regimes" have market or private property economics, 2 they have policies that are internally sovereign, 3 they have citizens with juridical rights, and 4 they have representative governments. He allows greater power to hereditary monarchs than other researchers; for example, he counts the rule of Louis-Philippe of France as a liberal regime. This definition excludes long periods often viewed as democratic. For example, the United States until , India from independence until , and Japan until were all under one-party rule, and thus would not be counted under this definition Ray , p. Many researchers have instead used more finely grained scales. One example is the Polity data series which scores each state on two scales, one for democracy and one for autocracy, for each year since ; as well as several others. Some researchers have done correlations between the democracy scale and belligerence; others have treated it as a binary classification by as its maker does calling all states with a high democracy score and a low autocracy score democracies; yet others have used the difference of the two scores, sometimes again making this into a binary classification Gleditsch Young democracies[ edit ] Several researchers have observed that many of the possible exceptions to the democratic peace have occurred when at least one of the involved democracies was very young. Many of them have therefore added a qualifier, typically stating that the peacefulness apply to democracies older than three years Doyle , Russett , Rummel , Weart Rummel argues that this is enough time for "democratic procedures to be accepted, and democratic culture to settle in. Mansfield and Snyder , , while agreeing that there have been no wars between mature liberal democracies, state that countries in transition to democracy are especially likely to be involved in wars. They find that democratizing countries are even more warlike than stable democracies, stable autocracies or even countries in transition towards autocracy. So, they suggest caution in eliminating these wars from the analysis, because this might hide a negative aspect of the process of democratization. A review Ray cites several other studies finding that the increase in the risk of war in democratizing countries happens only if many or most of the surrounding nations are undemocratic. Defining war[ edit ] Quantitative research on international wars usually define war as a military conflict with more than killed in battle in one year. This is the definition used in the Correlates of War Project which has also supplied the data for many studies on war. It turns out that most of the military conflicts in question fall clearly above or below this threshold Ray , p. Some researchers have used different definitions. For example, Weart defines war as more than battle deaths. Such a conflict may be no more than military display of force with no battle deaths. Wars are relatively rare. An average ratio of 30 MIDs to one war provides a richer statistical environment for analysis. Very few researchers have supported the monadic peace, that democracies are more peaceful in general. There are some recent papers that find a slight monadic effect. List of wars between democracies Some scholars support the democratic peace on probabilistic grounds: The total number of cases suggested in the literature is at least The data set Bremer was using showed one exception, the French-Thai War of ; Gleditsch sees the somewhat technical state of war between Finland and UK during World War II , as a special case, which should probably be treated separately: However, the UK did bomb Finland, implying the war was not only on paper. Page Fortna discusses the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the Kargil War as exceptions, finding the latter to be the most significant. However, the status of these countries as being truly democratic is a matter of debate. Similarly, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus occurred only after the Cypriot elected government was abolished in a coup sponsored by the military government of Greece. Limiting the theory to only truly stable and genuine democracies leads to a very restrictive set of highly prosperous nations with little incentive in armed conflict that might harm their economies, in which the theory might be expected to hold virtually by definition. One advocate of the democratic peace explains that his reason to choose a definition of democracy

sufficiently restrictive to exclude all wars between democracies are what "might be disparagingly termed public relations": One problem with the research on wars is that, as the Realist Mearsheimer , p. Democracies have been very rare until recently. Freedom House finds no independent state with universal suffrage in Studying lesser conflicts[ edit ] Many researchers have reacted to this limitation by studying lesser conflicts instead, since they have been far more common. There have been many more MIDs than wars; the Correlates of War Project counts several thousand during the last two centuries. A review Ray lists many studies that have reported that democratic pairs of states are less likely to be involved in MIDs than other pairs of states. When examining the inter-liberal MIDs in more detail, one study Wayman finds that they are less likely to involve third parties, and that the target of the hostility is less likely to reciprocate, if the target reciprocates the response is usually proportional to the provocation, and the disputes are less likely to cause any loss of life. The most common action was "Seizure of Material or Personnel". Studies find that the probability that disputes between states will be resolved peacefully is positively affected by the degree of democracy exhibited by the lesser democratic state involved in that dispute. Disputes between democratic states are significantly shorter than disputes involving at least one undemocratic state. Democratic states are more likely to be amenable to third party mediation when they are involved in disputes with each other Ray In international crises that include the threat or use of military force, one study finds that if the parties are democracies, then relative military strength has no effect on who wins. This is different from when nondemocracies are involved. Similarly, a study of the behavior of states that joined ongoing militarized disputes reports that power is important only to autocracies: Conflict initiation[ edit ] According to a review study, "there is enough evidence to conclude that democracy does cause peace at least between democracies, that the observed correlation between democracy and peace is not spurious. In many conflicts both sides argue that the other side was initiator. Even so, several studies have examined this. Reiter and Stam argue that autocracies initiate conflicts against democracies more frequently than democracies do against autocracies. Personalistic and military dictatorships may be particularly prone to conflict initiation, as compared to other types of autocracy such as one party states, but also more likely to be targeted in a war having other initiators. One study found that democracies are no less likely to settle border disputes peacefully than non-democracies. However, there is also evidence that democracies have less internal systematic violence. For instance, one study finds that the most democratic and the most authoritarian states have few civil wars , and intermediate regimes the most. The probability for a civil war is also increased by political change, regardless whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Intermediate regimes continue to be the most prone to civil war, regardless of the time since the political change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the process of democratization Hegre et al. Abadie study finds that the most democratic nations have the least terrorism. Harff finds that genocide and politicide are rare in democracies. Rummel finds that the more democratic a regime, the less its democide. He finds that democide has killed six times as many people as battles. Davenport and Armstrong lists several other studies and states: Statistically, a MENA democracy makes a country more prone to both the onset and incidence of civil war, and the more democratic a MENA state is, the more likely it is to experience violent intrastate strife. Moreover, anocracies do not seem to be predisposed to civil war, either worldwide or in MENA. Note that they usually are meant to be explanations for little violence between democracies, not for a low level of internal violence in democracies. Several of these mechanisms may also apply to countries of similar systems. The book Never at War finds evidence for an oligarchic peace. Another that a belief in human rights may make people in democracies reluctant to go to war, especially against other democracies. Bruce Russett , p. In addition, he holds that a social norm emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century; that democracies should not fight each other, which strengthened when the democratic culture and the degree of democracy increased, for example by widening the franchise. Increasing democratic stability allowed partners in foreign affairs to perceive a nation as reliably democratic. The alliances between democracies during the two World Wars and the Cold War also strengthened the norms. He sees less effective traces of this norm in Greek antiquity. He refers in particular to the Swiss practice of participatory democracy. Mousseau , argues that it is market-oriented development that creates the norms and

values that explain both democracy and the peace. In less developed countries individuals often depend on social networks that impose conformity to in-group norms and beliefs, and loyalty to group leaders. When jobs are plentiful on the market, in contrast, as in market-oriented developed countries, individuals depend on a strong state that enforces contracts equally. Cognitive routines emerge of abiding by state law rather than group leaders, and, as in contracts, tolerating differences among individuals. Marketplace democracies thus share common foreign policy interests in the supremacy and predictability of international law over brute power politics, and equal and open global trade over closed trade and imperial preferences. When disputes do originate between marketplace democracies, they are less likely than others to escalate to violence because both states, even the stronger one, perceive greater long-term interests in the supremacy of law over power politics. Braumoeller argues that liberal norms of conflict resolution vary because liberalism takes many forms. By examining survey results from the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the author demonstrates that liberalism in that region bears a stronger resemblance to 19th-century liberal nationalism than to the sort of universalist, Wilsonian liberalism described by democratic peace theorists, and that, as a result, liberals in the region are more, not less, aggressive than non-liberals. Democratic political structures[ edit ] The case for institutional constraints goes back to Kant , who wrote: Among the latter would be: This monadic theory must, however, explain why democracies do attack non-democratic states. One explanation is that these democracies were threatened or otherwise were provoked by the non-democratic states. Doyle also notes p. One explanation is that democracies, for internal political and economic reasons, have greater resources. This might mean that democratic leaders are unlikely to select other democratic states as targets because they perceive them to be particularly formidable opponents. One study finds that interstate wars have important impacts on the fate of political regimes, and that the probability that a political leader will fall from power in the wake of a lost war is particularly high in democratic states Ray Survey results that compare the attitudes of citizens and elites in the Soviet successor states are consistent with this argument Braumoeller Moreover, these constraints are readily apparent to other states and cannot be manipulated by leaders. Thus, democracies send credible signals to other states of an aversion to using force. These signals allow democratic states to avoid conflicts with one another, but they may attract aggression from nondemocratic states. Democracies may be pressured to respond to such aggression perhaps even preemptively through the use of force. In disputes between liberal states, the credibility of their bargaining signals allows them to negotiate a peaceful settlement before mobilization. An explanation based on game theory similar to the last two above is that the participation of the public and the open debate send clear and reliable information regarding the intentions of democracies to other states.

### 3: Holdings : A Normative approach to war : | York University Libraries

*This work presents a scholarly commentary and critique of Hugo Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis. It shows that, far from being a bookish theoretician indulging in the construction of an abstract system, Grotius ultimately aimed to create a practically oriented treatise focusing on regulating and restraining war.*

With the end of the Cold War, the political map of the world has changed dramatically; new normative issues have emerged; the old ones have come to the fore in world politics. While discussing why Normative Theory has had a marginal position in the discipline of IR, the article also examines its content. With his approach, Frost attempts to reconcile the two settled norms of international relations, namely rights and sovereignty. Moreover, Frost emphasises that the IR theorists and academicians have to take normative positions and make them explicit since the original commitment of the discipline is normative itself. Theory, normative theory, constitutive theory, international norms, international relations. In the last two decades we have been witnessing the resurgence of normative theory in IR coinciding with the rise of post-positivist and reflectivist theoretical approaches to the discipline. Normative theorists attempt to clarify basic moral issues and dilemmas of international relations. Nevertheless, the centrality of normative issues has been now more widely acknowledged in world politics. In doing so, Frost attempts to reconcile state sovereignty with the individual rights. Firstly, I will briefly look at what normative theory attempts to do and which issues it takes as its subject of inquiry. Secondly, I will outline the arguments against normative theory, which all had been obstacles for the development of normative theorising in IR. In other words, normative theory addresses the ethical nature of the relations within the state-centric global practice in a wide context of liberty, distributive justice, sovereignty, violence, just war, human rights and so on. Hence, the main question of normative theory is how to link the ethical values of individuals to social institutions in which they live within, such as family, civil society, religious formations, the state, and the system of sovereign states. Moreover, normative theory has a central concern with how to relate the core normative concepts such as freedom, equality, justice, democracy, state autonomy, the meaning of war, etc. Normative theory always presupposes that actors in the practice of international relations do have alternatives and real choices, and can change their conduct. The debates on ethical issues in IR have been brought under two main approaches in order to provide background foundations for normative theories. According to the communitarian approach, the autonomy of states is derived from the nature of individuals as being a member of a community. That is to say, individuals gain their status as a result of their membership of a particular community. The communitarians assert that the state, the only legal representative of a community, has an absolute right to autonomy. Thus, the individuals must accept and live according to the limitations that are determined by this highest authority, namely, the state. Nevertheless, the cosmopolitan approach rejects such an understanding and puts forward a universalist notion. They suggest that the autonomy of states is derived from the nature of individuals as a member of humankind. According to the cosmopolitans, all individuals are a part of the humanity and they are born with certain natural rights, which are applied to any human beings on an equal basis. As a result, the universal rights possessed by the individual override the state autonomy. In other words, the autonomy of a state can be limited by the universal rights. On human rights issues, for communitarians, individuals do not exist as autonomous entities but they receive their identities as a result of being a member of community. Therefore, each community has a right to develop its own social, political, or economic system, and individuals can not make claims beyond the limits of these systems. Cosmopolitans take an universalist position advocating that human rights are possessed by individuals as autonomous moral agents, rather than as members of a community. For them, rights are gained by an individual because of his own status, and therefore they are independent from any particular system of community. Whereas communitarians adopt the norm of non-intervention underpinning order in international society, cosmopolitans accept intervention only if it is justified under specific conditions such as in the preservation of human rights and social justice. On the other hand, communitarians do not accept such a global approach to the environmental issues: Therefore, environmental issues are to be considered one of the aspects of state interests. In sum, normative theory faces

with a wide range of ethical questions to deal with such as: Do human rights override state autonomy? What is our responsibility for preserving human rights and justice? What kinds of wars are just? What are the justifications for intervention? To what extent is environmental issues a global concern? We can add many more to these. Walzer, Michael, *Just and Unjust Wars: The Ethics of Globalization*, New Haven: Examining the second alternative, which takes international ethics as a fad, Brown discusses two possible theses on how ethics has shifted from the margins of the field to a closer place of the centre: Is the revival of normative theory a response to the decline of American hegemony, or is it a result of post-Cold War politics? According to Brown, the latter is more plausible. He claims that international ethics has not fulfilled the requirements of being a field yet, and it is not possible to be sure about its future. In this positivist formulation of theorising, normative theory has been neglected in IR for a number of different reasons, which involve the predominance of positivism in social sciences, the dominance of realism in the discipline of IR, and the blocking effects of the Cold War politics. The predominance of the positivist approach to the study of IR has invalidated the recognition of the ethical grounds of several issues. A Pragmatic Approach, Cambridge: Primarily, researchers using a positivist approach within the study of IR have to choose a research field as well as a theory in order to examine the topic they have chosen. Moreover, the theory which social scientists use to explain their research topic is already embedded in certain normative preferences. So the chosen theory determines the facts, which will be taken into account according to its mainstream assumptions. In the next stage, in order to explain the issue faced with, it is required to make an interpretation viewing from the each side of the problem. In order to do this, the observer or the investigator must engage in normative theory. Another reason, which contributed to keep normative theory in the margins of the discipline, has been the dominance of realist theory in the field of IR. In , Peter Winch combined the insights of these earlier theorists and published his conclusions in his work called *The Idea of a Social Science*. The rational-actor model, which is central to realist thinking, is not value-free itself. Firstly, determining the national objectives requires value choices; and secondly, the means, which will be used to achieve these goals, has to be chosen according to the decision on which one is the best or more efficient. This type of decision-making underlines a value choice. Additionally, Frost claims that the primary actor-state, in its origin, has built into certain normative implications. Frost draws attention to the deep value commitments such as sovereignty and the right to self-determination that have been claimed by states: Participating in a social practice be it a game or a political arrangement like the state or the system of states requires that the participants recognise themselves as bound by a set of rules; that is as bound by certain norms. Thus where a state exists there must be a group of people who see themselves as constituting a state through their mutual recognition of a specified set of rules. According to Frost and Brown, another reason that has invalidated normative theory is the Cold War system itself. In the Cold War period, it was meaningless to make ethical claims within a bipolar system of power and nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the end of the Cold War, the emergence of new states bringing new ethical problems, and the rise of ethical concerns in world politics paved the way for normative theory to flourish in the last two decades. This entails, according to Frost, the construction of a background theory for the institution within which the hard case in question arises. In his construction of a normative theory of international relations, Frost identifies the following steps: First, we must list all those norms in international relations that are considered settled in terms of the modern state domain of discourse. Second, we must attempt to construct the best possible background justification for this settled body of norms. Third, following through on step two, we must apply the procedure of reflective equilibrium. Therefore, Frost offers a list of the settled norms in IR. However, that does not mean that he proposes that most people or states do in fact obey the norm. But rather it means that the states attempt to provide special justifications for their non-compliance with the norm. The settled body of norms in international relations within the modern state domain of discourse is introduced by Frost under four main headings: The list of these settled norms within the modern state domain of discourse, as identified by Frost, is as follows: It is settled that the following are goods: The preservation of the society of states. The balance of power. Economic sanctions under specified circumstances. Democratic institutions within states. Human rights Frost, a: In order to elucidate his point, he offers a neo- Hegelian account of how not only individuals within societies, but also individual states within the society of states play mutually constitutive roles,

establishing, Frost believes, a meaningful link between constituted individuality and the society of states. Although all social theorists as well as IR scholars have to take normative positions, Frost believes that these are always kept implicit because of the shadow of positivism. This is due to the very fact that every person, every citizen, every family and every state make ethical claims and they take certain ethical stances when they face with normative questions in everyday life. Like them, IR theorists as being human-beings, citizens of a state, members of the global civil society and actors in world politics via their theorising, also find themselves to hold ethical beliefs about typical kinds of issues such as terrorism, war, human rights, environmental problems, migrants, economic and social distributions of food, water, housing education, health care, etc. So far, normative theory has been ignored in the field of IR until the recent changes, which occurred both in the order of political system i. These developments both in theory and practice have given way to the revival of normative theory gaining a place much closer to the centre than a decade ago. In the highlighting of these changes, Neufeld suggests that IR theory must move in a non-positivist direction, and should commit itself to human emancipation. Neufeld takes recent developments such as postmodernist, feminist and normative approaches as evidence of such a current shift in the discipline. In this respect, normative theory provides a crucial account of how we should understand world politics and how the distinct claims in terms of main themes of international relations sovereignty, freedom, human rights, humanitarian intervention, justice, etc. Although it seems hard not to agree with the suggestion that normative theory is not still central to the discipline, and it does not form a unified field of opinions on academic studies; it does not require to ignore the fact that it is necessary to the study of world politics. Since several normative issues and ethical considerations have emerged in the post-Cold War politics, normative theory has an inevitable task to provide theoretical grounds to the practice of world politics. Thus, by setting forth a fundamental attempt to reconcile the morality of individuals and the morality of political communities, Mervyn Frost takes his place amongst the most influential normative theorists. A Handbook of Current Theory London: Fad, Fantasy or Field? New Normative Approaches London: A Pragmatic Approach Cambridge: The Eighty Years Crisis University of Kent at Canterbury.

### 4: Normative Ethics - Philosophy - Oxford Bibliographies

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But, despite this initial success, the GGE has limitations. The participants are technically advisers to the UN Secretary-General rather than fully empowered national negotiators. Although the number of participants has increased from the original 15 to 25, most countries do not have a voice. But there is a larger question lurking behind the GGE: Most experts agree that a global cyberspace treaty currently would be politically impossible though Russia and China have made such proposals at the UN. But, beyond formal treaties, normative constraints on states also include codes of conduct, conventional state practices, and widely shared expectations of proper behavior among a group which create a common law. In scope, these constraints can vary from global, to plurilateral, to bilateral. So what can history tell us about the effectiveness of normative policy instruments? In 1954, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told President Dwight Eisenhower that the defense of Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam and of offshore islands near Taiwan would require the use of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower rejected the advice. Over time, the development of an informal norm of non-use of nuclear weapons changed this. The Nobel laureate economist Thomas Schelling argued that the development of the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons was one of the most important aspects of arms control over the past 70 years, and it has had an inhibiting effect on decision-makers. But for new nuclear states like North Korea, one cannot be sure that the costs of violating the taboo would be perceived as outweighing the benefits. Similarly, a taboo against using poisonous gases in warfare developed after World War I, and the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons. Two treaties in the 1920s prohibited the production and stockpiling of such weapons, creating a cost not only for their use, but also for their very possession. Verification provisions for the Biological Weapons Convention are weak merely reporting to the UN Security Council, and such taboos did not prevent the Soviet Union from continuing to possess and develop biological weapons in the 1950s. Similarly, the Chemical Weapons Convention did not stop either Saddam Hussein or Bashar al-Assad from using chemical weapons against their own citizens. Nonetheless, both treaties have shaped how others perceive such actions. Such perceptions contributed to the justification of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and to the international dismantling of most Syrian weapons in 2015. With countries having ratified the Biological Warfare Convention, states that wish to develop such weapons must do so secretly, and face widespread international condemnation if evidence of their activities becomes known. Normative taboos may also become relevant in the cyber realm, though here the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon depends on intent, and it would be difficult to forbid "the design, possession, or even implantation for espionage of particular computer programs. In that sense, efforts to prevent cyber conflict cannot be like the nuclear arms control that developed during the Cold War, which involved elaborate treaties and detailed verification protocols. A more fruitful approach to normative controls on cyberwarfare may be to establish a taboo not against weapons but against targets. This approach to norms has been adopted by the GGE. The taboo would be reinforced by confidence-building measures such as promises of forensic assistance and non-interference with the workings of Computer Security Incident Response Teams. The GGE report of July focused on restraining attacks on certain civilian targets, rather than proscribing particular code. The attack on the Ukrainian power system occurred in December 2015, shortly after the submission of the GGE report, and in 2016, Russia did not treat the US election process as protected civilian infrastructure. The development of normative controls on cyber weapons remains a slow "and, at this point, incomplete" process.

### 5: NORMATIVE THEORY IN IR: FROST'S CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH | Zerrin Ayar - Zerrin Ayar

*Arms and judgment: law, morality, and the conduct of war in the twentieth century / Sheldon M. Cohen. JX C64 Cross, crescent, and sword: the justification and limitation of war in Western and Islamic tradition / edited by James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay.*

Study of Politics Various Approaches Article shared by: From the days of ancient Greek political thought scholars, philosophers and political scientists have analysed, investigated various types of political issues and incidents from the standpoint of their own perspective and on the basis of the study they have arrived at conclusions and prescribed recommendations. This has inevitably led to the emergence of a number of approaches to the study of political science. Now we shall first of all try to analyse various aspects of each approach but before that we shall define approach. In the opinion of Van Dyke, approach means criteria. A criterion is used to explain or analyse the political questions and data. Since the questions and data are very great in number and varied in nature each political scientist or philosopher analyses them in his own way by applying his own standpoint and method. In physical or chemical science there exists an agreed method and more or less all researchers and scientists apply those agreed methods. But there is hardly any place of broad based agreement in political science as to the method and approach. Another aspect of approach is methods employed by political science for its study cannot be distinguished from the methods used by other branches of social science. So also the approaches of political science are not different from other approaches. However, this general observation is not hundred percent correct. Sometimes the approaches employed by political scientists differ in content from the approaches used by other social scientists. Thus variety of approaches for the study of political science is a central aspect of the subject. Again from the past history of political science we gather the idea that at different periods different approaches have gained importance. In other words, the rise and fall in the importance of approaches is a noticeable characteristic. Approach, we can say, is a scientific way of studying a subject. The students will have to analyse and categorize data, facts, events, problems etc. The point to note is that they cannot do it unscientifically or proceed haphazardly. To be precise, for a balanced and effective analysis and promising investigation analysts must proceed in a systematic way and for that purpose the students or analysts must apply a method or criterion and we call it approach. Therefore, approach is a way to analyse a subject or what may suitably be called a discipline. It is believed by many that the application of an approach considerably enhances the importance and credibility of the analysis as well as discipline. So without an approach the analysis of the subject may not be in a position to receive wide support from the readers and also their credence. The approaches employed by political scientists for the study of politics have been classified by Wasby in the following way: This leads to the division of classification into normative approach and empirical approach. The other classification is based on the objective of study of political science. That is, in this approach the political scientists want to stress the specific purposes of studying and investigating politics. This broad group can again be subdivided into philosophical, ideological, institutional and structural approaches. Some scholars are of opinion that Wasby-proposed classification of approaches is generally traditional in nature. Modern political scientists have made a broad classification of the approaches. On the one hand there is normative approach which to some extent liberal bias and on the other hand Marxist approach. In the second half of the last century a large number of political scientists of America and later on other countries began to analyse political issues, incidents and behaviour from the standpoint of behaviour particularly the political behaviour of the individuals. David Easton championed this approach. In formal language it is called behaviouralism or political behaviour and after very few years this behaviouralism landed on post-behaviouralism. Recently some scholars have attempted to analyse political science in a feminist way and it is called feminist approach. The Meaning and Origin of Normativeness: The word norm means usual, typical or standard thing. Normative relates to norm or standard. The central idea of normative approach is "the subject is viewed and analysed normatively that is there are certain standards, rules and precepts which must find their application in political science. Again, political science means in its operative aspects. When the state starts its operation its primary

objective would be to achieve the above-noted norms, standards and precepts. The success and failure will determine the nature, credibility, acceptability of the state or government. Hence norms are several principles which an authority cannot deny. The accountability of the authority is also based on these norms and principles. It means that the authority should do it or adopt such and such policy or decision. Or it ought to do it. Therefore, normativeness talks about preference. The word preference is not different from should and ought. To sum up, the objectives and functions of state are judged in the background of preference, should and ought. Origin of the Approach: Normative approach to the study of politics owes its origin to the political philosophy of Greek philosopher Plato. He said that any state or society ought to be or should be ideal or good and he has elaborated the criteria of good or ideal in his *The Republic*. But he firmly believed that a state ought to have these eternal values and he also said that in order to be an ideal state all individuals must be ideal that is they must possess virtues such as morality and various ethical qualities. His great disciple Aristotle followed the footsteps of Plato and elaborated the ideal state. In latter periods we come across a number of philosophers who emphasised the normative approach of politics and the great contractualist Rousseau is a prominent figure. The normative approach stressed by Plato, Aristotle, and Rousseau etc has assumed the form and colour of Utopia. Utopia means something which has no practical foundations and it is not supported by reasons. Large number of philosophers began to scan the existing systems by Utopian criteria. Again with the help of this standard existing situations are to be judged. Thomas More imagined of a Utopia or an imaginary state. His famous book *Utopia* was published in and here he depicted the picture of an ought to be state. He disapproved the drawbacks that characterised the prevailing state of his time and that led him to think of an ought to be state. Central Idea of Normative Approach: The central idea of the normative approach to the study of politics is politics or analysis of state or the functions of state are to be viewed in the light of what ought to be rather than what they are. The normativeness wants to give preference to should and ought to be. It wants the realisations of certain universal values, norms or principles through, the machinery of state. It is assumed by some that since normative principles relates to what should be or ought to be these principles can easily be ignored. But the great adherents of the approach declare unambiguously that norms, or principles are not to be ignored but they are to be implemented. Thus we can say that values, principles or eternal ideas relating to politics or function of state constituted the central idea of normative approach to the study of politics. In other words, this approach says that norms or principles are to be followed in practice and the aim of such norms is to make the political organisation acceptable to all or majority people. Components of the Normative Approach: In the normative approach there is an emphasis on what is good and what is not good. It says that when a policy-maker proceeds to formulate policy or adopt a decision he must see that to what extent the policy or decision will produce desired results. The concept of goodness is linked with expectation. The members of political organisation want to fulfill their manifold desires and they expect that the authority shall act accordingly. It may be that the expectations do not always tally the real results. But that does not matter. Good also relates to the attainment of welfare objectives of the state. The term good starts to scan the policy, decision and function of authority. The normative approach establishes the concept of responsibility. If certain norms and principles are put forward and if they are made binding on the authority, people can judge the success or failure of the authority. In other words, norms are easy of locating the responsibility. Normative approach stipulates that norms or principles are of immense value and importance so far as the determination of policy and decision and their implementation are concerned. Normative approach envisages of striking a balance or equilibrium between what is or what happens and ought to be or should be. Any biasness will invariably plague the proper functioning of state as well as decision making process. An authority aiming at the attainment of general welfare objectives cannot take the risk of neglecting either ought to be or what is. The balancing process is not a stable one. It is always in an unstable condition. It moves from one stage to another. Normative approach never thinks of anything settled. That is normative approach though pays heavy emphasis on norms it proceeds with the change. In every age certain norms, values and principles are given more importance and they are given priority. Importance of Normative Approach: It is now evident that in normative approach there is lot of importance of norms, values, ideals, ideas. It further believes that they have got relevance in the study of politics. It is a fact that all these cannot be translated into reality. But

on this ground the norms, values, etc. They have importance and a large number of political scientists and statesmen still believe that the norms have immense importance. The normative approach criticises the functions, principles and policies of the existing states as did Plato in his *The Republic*.

### 6: Political Theory/Empirical and Normative Theories - Wikibooks, open books for an open world

*The term normative theory gained currency in American political science in the post-World War II () period as a consequence of the behavioral revolution and the rise of positivist-empiricist political science.*

This is a clash between liberal universalism and authoritarian statism; the liberal international order and realpolitik. Russia supports anti-establishment forces in Europe because it lacks friends among establishments. Its use of unconventional methods is not a demonstration of creative strategy but an attempt to compensate for deficiencies. EU member states are remarkably united in their assessment of Russia, but they still need to translate this unity into a political strategy that reflects not just European values, but also Russian realities. With a smile, Putin approvingly declared that the far-right Le Pen represented a range of political forces gaining momentum across Europe. Just two months later, Putin stood uncomfortably in the Palace of Versailles next to Emmanuel Macron, the new pro-European French president who had just defeated Le Pen. Macron stated bluntly that Russian propaganda channels had spread false information during the election, but he did so in a matter-of-fact manner, without succumbing to the hysteria that so often characterises Western discussions on Russia in general and its meddling in particular. The French government had elegantly ignored a hacking attack on the eve of the election and Macron prevailed anyway. You have won this round. But there will be more. It is normative war, and neither side is ready to retreat. Domestic politics in Europe has become one of the front lines in this struggle. But these efforts, while state-approved in the broadest sense, do not necessarily amount to well-coordinated and meticulously planned operations with concrete political aims. Insiders confess that such operations often come from disparate agents of Moscow doing their routine work, and soldiers of fortune trying their luck in an improvised, ad hoc manner. Europeans need to be aware of such attempts, but obsessive attention to Russian efforts might prove counterproductive: The French experience shows the path. It kept an eye on Russia and its agents. This combination “keep an eye on Russia but focus on home” proved an effective way to both win French voters and handle Russian meddling. To be safe from Russian interference, Europe needs to concentrate on fixing the roof “but, to do so, it will need to keep the roof at least reasonably dry. This Power Audit of EU-Russia relations seeks to describe a path towards finding the appropriate balance between these two goals. Finally, the paper describes a long-term strategy for both dealing with Russian meddling and winning the broader normative struggle. A normative war Russia poses a multifaceted problem to Europe. However, all these clashes share a common thread “they are all rooted in a normative disagreement over the rules and taboos of the international order. This disagreement has been a long time in the making. In the early s, Moscow briefly tried to join the Western system as a rule-taker. The way Western norms blended with global power in the s left Russia with little choice “if it wanted a share of power, it had to be part of the West. But, underneath, Russia kept moving away from the West. Having emerged in the mids, managed democracy is rooted in the idea that elites need to control the electoral choices of the masses “lest elections have dangerous outcomes. Sovereign democracy is a twenty-first century concept largely authored by Kremlin aide Vladislav Surkov, and it goes a step further by limiting the list of elites who are eligible to steer the masses. Russia aspires to a position in which Moscow could dictate terms domestically, in the neighbourhood, and on a range of global issues, but where no one could dictate terms to Moscow. In creating this sphere, Moscow often relies on the elite-centric model it has at home. It props up elites it sees as friendly and assists them in their claim to power. For Moscow, state stability is more important than the Western notion that the murder of civilians must be punished. And Putin entered Syria with a clear intention of creating a normative precedent for similar occasions in future. Western investments are welcome in Russia, but the state is determined to keep control over what it considers to be strategically important industries. At the same time, Russia would not be against establishing monopolistic positions abroad “for example, as a gas supplier to Europe. Moscow fears Western influence in Russia, so it meddles in the West to send a signal: Russia clearly views influence as a weapon “as demonstrated by its proposal to the Trump administration to regulate the field in a way reminiscent of, say, arms control. In addition, Moscow lends its support to forces in the West that share its state-centric worldview, or are for other

reasons keen to erode the Western liberal order. Although it has largely waged this war from defensive positions, Russia increasingly views Western rules as not just harmful to its interests but simply unworkable: This view was clearly expressed for the first time by Putin in a speech in Munich: Europe, however, is deeply invested in the liberal order – in many ways, even more so than the US. The US may provide the military might to uphold the order, but Europe has made the principles of the liberal order a core part of its identity: Europe is thus condemned to a normative rivalry with Russia. Both will try to shape the very nature of international relations to reflect their own values. For Europe, the path to winning will not go so much through countering Russia – although this will be necessary, too – as through reinvigorating the Western model by addressing its domestic weaknesses and correcting flawed international practices. If Europe wants to set international norms, it needs to show that these norms are workable – in both its domestic and international practices. Today, for example, Russia and the West routinely clash over trade rules at the World Trade Organisation – something that would have been impossible during the cold war. Russia is now also much more motivated to fight on the normative front than it once was. Russia is doing to the West what it thinks the West has been doing to Russia. Many leaders in Moscow believe that the working methods of Western media outlets are no different from those of Russian propaganda channels RT and Sputnik. Certain things, however, are beyond doubt. The history of Russian interference shows how Russia has upgraded its efforts in the West after each major normative clash. The Soviet Union had its own traditions of interference, but for independent Russia everything started after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine – whose emotional impact on the Kremlin is hard to overestimate. In , the Kremlin launched a major counter-revolutionary offensive at home and, more quietly, also created a new subdivision of the Presidential Administration: This was the start of Russian state efforts to influence the discussion outside of its borders – initially in the former Soviet space, including Baltic states. The effort accelerated after the war in Georgia. Even though the war achieved its aim – namely, stopping the expansion of NATO – Russia realised that its military was underdeveloped, and that it had lost the information war. That led to an impressive military reform, and equally massive modernisation of propaganda outreach. After the war of , the then three-year-old Russia Today later RT found its true calling: Compensating for weakness Followers of Western media could be excused for thinking that, sometime between and , Russia invented a completely new destructive weapon – some powerful witchcraft that only Moscow has, and which it is using to subvert the world. Often, this witchcraft is thought to originate in the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine – an article by Russian General Valery Gerasimov that, far from being a Russian doctrine, discusses the perceived features of contemporary Western warfare from a mainly defensive viewpoint. Frequent government use of freelancers – be they criminal networks, activist oligarchs, or shady paramilitary units – also stems from deinstitutionalisation. While decision-making power is increasingly concentrated in the Presidential Administration, policy advice and execution often comes from sources outside established institutions, opening the door to various kinds of people who have unorthodox policy solutions. The quintessential example is the case of Viktor Bout, a man whose career spanned the worlds of crime, business, and intelligence work; and whose example illustrates the smooth and often imperceptible transition between official and non-official roles. At the same time, not all interference operations originate in the Kremlin. This is ideal for a Kremlin that places such a premium on plausible deniability. And while it is unlikely that something as sensitive as interference in US domestic politics could have happened without some form of approval by Putin, on other occasions he may well have been uninvolved. For example, Moscow insiders suspect that both Prigozhin and Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, who has allegedly financed interference in eastern Ukraine and Macedonia, have acted on their own initiative. But these activists most likely acted without receiving specific orders. And sometimes they get it. But in their overeagerness, they sometimes also get the Kremlin into trouble, and then they are reprimanded. Meanwhile, its policy benefits remain dubious, at best. As one affiliate of the foreign ministry interlocutor described it: No, of course not, they say. Do you then think you can change government there? So what is the aim of it? At which they look at me with wide eyes, without having an answer. This frustration is unlikely to cause them to lash out at the Kremlin, but they have been trying to send it a message: Russian historian Yuri Slezkine has described how, during a recent book tour, he encountered two radically different images of Russia in almost every European

country: But when evening comes, I call Uber and go out to a pub and in this world, in the night-time Europe, most people think that Putin is great. Russian efforts to influence Europe capitalise on what already exists. Russia might resort to media manipulation, or even outright illegal activity such as hacking or bribery. But to convert this into real influence on European domestic politics, it needs to make use of pre-existing cleavages and shortcomings – be they neglected minorities, threatened majorities, biased media outlets, home-grown corruption, insufficient law enforcement, or disillusionment with politics. They regard Russia as having charmed some marginal groups, but not as having established considerable influence over the country as a whole. Events in – including the Lisa case, involving the spread of a fake anti-immigrant story in Germany, and Russian interference in the US election – served as a wake-up call. These high-profile incidents have raised the issue on the EU agenda, inspiring European governments to look at Russian influence in their countries and start – though unevenly and often clumsily – to work on countermeasures. There is some home-grown logic behind their stance and activities; Russia generally plays the role of an ally of convenience. While Europe worries about the effects of pro-Russian populism, to observers in Russia it is evident that European fringe parties have only limited pro-Russian influence. The view that Russia is an important global actor with which Europeans need to find agreement is shared by mainstream political forces in several European countries Austria and Italy, to name just two. In some states – including Slovenia, and parts of Bulgaria and France – Russia is seen as a counterweight to other powers, usually the US. But this more likely stems from condemnation of the US than praise of Russia. RT and Sputnik have only a minor impact. They enjoy some niche appeal among people who, for one reason or another, feel neglected by the mainstream media – such as Latin American audiences in Spain and some Scottish audiences in the lead-up to the Scottish referendum on independence, during which parts of the British mainstream media ridiculed and neglected the independence cause. Countries that have deep cultural and historical links to Russia, such as Italy and Bulgaria, are far from seeing contemporary Russia as a model for state governance. The prolific business links with Russia enjoyed by Austria, Italy, and Germany may have led to dissatisfaction with EU policies, but all these countries have refrained from serious efforts to break ranks on sanctions – so far, at least. Some European experts now believe that the necessary awareness has crossed over into unhelpful paranoia. In much of the media discussion, Russia plays a prominent role in almost every bit of ill-fortune that has befallen the West – from the refugee crisis to the rise of populism to the independence referendum in Catalonia. In December , for instance, elections in Bulgaria and Moldova coincided with a change in government in Estonia – prompting the media to briefly interpret all three as victories for Russia.

### 7: A Normative approach to war : peace, war, and justice in Hugo Grotius in SearchWorks catalog

*-Where the exchange approach saw the nature of social interaction entirely from the point of view of benefit or utility to the individual, the normative approach implicates the individual in something outside of oneself in ways that potentially limit self-interest or the pursuit of the satisfaction of human appetites.*

Feminism international relations Feminist IR considers the ways that international politics affects and is affected by both men and women and also at how the core concepts that are employed within the discipline of IR e. Feminist IR has not only concerned itself with the traditional focus of IR on states, wars, diplomacy and security, but feminist IR scholars have also emphasized the importance of looking at how gender shapes the current global political economy. From its inception, feminist IR has also theorized extensively about men and, in particular, masculinities. Many IR feminists argue that the discipline is inherently masculine in nature. For example, in her article "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" *Signs*, Carol Cohn claimed that a highly masculinized culture within the defence establishment contributed to the divorcing of war from human emotion. Feminist IR emerged largely from the late 1970s onwards. The end of the Cold War and the re-evaluation of traditional IR theory during the 1990s opened up a space for gendering International Relations. However, the growing influence of feminist and women-centric approaches within the international policy communities for example at the World Bank and the United Nations is more reflective of the liberal feminist emphasis on equality of opportunity for women. It makes the assumption that the economy trumps other concerns; allowing for the elevation of class as the focus of study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. Thus, colonialism brought in sources for raw materials and captive markets for exports, while decolonialization brought new opportunities in the form of dependence. A prominent derivative of Marxian thought is critical international relations theory which is the application of "critical theory" to international relations. Their emphasis on the "critical" component of theory was derived significantly from their attempt to overcome the limits of positivism. Modern-day proponents such as Andrew Linklater, Robert W. Cox and Ken Booth focus on the need for human emancipation from the nation-state. Hence, it is "critical" of mainstream IR theories that tend to be both positivist and state-centric. Further linked in with Marxist theories is dependency theory and the core-periphery model, which argue that developed countries, in their pursuit of power, appropriate developing states through international banking, security and trade agreements and unions on a formal level, and do so through the interaction of political and financial advisors, missionaries, relief aid workers, and MNCs on the informal level, in order to integrate them into the capitalist system, strategically appropriating undervalued natural resources and labor hours and fostering economic and political dependence. Marxist theories receive little attention in the United States. It is more common in parts of Europe and is one of the more important theoretic contributions of Latin American academia to the study of global networks. Examples of interest groups include political lobbyists, the military, and the corporate sector. Group theory argues that although these interest groups are constitutive of the state, they are also causal forces in the exercise of state power. Strategic perspective[ edit ] Strategic perspective is a theoretical[ citation needed ] approach that views individuals as choosing their actions by taking into account the anticipated actions and responses of others with the intention of maximizing their own welfare. Inherent bad faith model[ edit ] Further information: They are dismissed as propaganda ploys or signs of weakness. Post-structuralism explores the deconstruction of concepts traditionally not problematic in IR such as "power" and "agency" and examines how the construction of these concepts shapes international relations. The examination of "narratives" plays an important part in poststructuralist analysis; for example, feminist poststructuralist work has examined the role that "women" play in global society and how they are constructed in war as "innocent" and "civilians". See also feminism in international relations. Post-structuralism has garnered both significant praise and criticism, with its critics arguing that post-structuralist research often fails to address the real-world problems that international relations studies is supposed to contribute to solving. Levels of analysis[ edit ] Systemic level concepts[ edit ] International relations are often viewed in terms of levels of analysis. The systemic level concepts are those

broad concepts that define and shape an international milieu, characterized by anarchy. Focusing on the systemic level of international relations is often, but not always, the preferred method for neo-realists and other structuralist IR analysts. Westphalian sovereignty Preceding the concepts of interdependence and dependence, international relations relies on the idea of sovereignty. While throughout world history there have been instances of groups lacking or losing sovereignty, such as African nations prior to Decolonization or the occupation of Iraq during the Iraq War , there is still a need for sovereignty in terms of assessing international relations. Power international relations The concept of Power in international relations can be described as the degree of resources, capabilities, and influence in international affairs. It is often divided up into the concepts of hard power and soft power , hard power relating primarily to coercive power, such as the use of force, and soft power commonly covering economics , diplomacy and cultural influence. However, there is no clear dividing line between the two forms of power. Core or vital interests constitute the things which a country is willing to defend or expand with conflict such as territory, ideology religious, political, economic , or its citizens. Peripheral or non-vital are interests which a state is willing to compromise. For example, in the German annexation of the Sudetenland in a part of Czechoslovakia under the Munich Agreement , Czechoslovakia was willing to relinquish territory which was considered ethnically German in order to preserve its own integrity and sovereignty. Rather, it is the presence of non-state actors, who autonomously act to implement unpredictable behaviour to the international system. Whether it is transnational corporations , liberation movements , non-governmental agencies , or international organizations , these entities have the potential to significantly influence the outcome of any international transaction. Additionally, this also includes the individual person as while the individual is what constitutes the states collective entity, the individual does have the potential to also create unpredicted behaviours. Al-Qaeda , as an example of a non-state actor, has significantly influenced the way states and non-state actors conduct international affairs. During the Cold War , the alignment of several nations to one side or another based on ideological differences or national interests has become an endemic feature of international relations. Unlike prior, shorter-term blocs, the Western and Soviet blocs sought to spread their national ideological differences to other nations. Truman under the Truman Doctrine believed it was necessary to spread democracy whereas the Warsaw Pact under Soviet policy sought to spread communism. After the Cold War, and the dissolution of the ideologically homogeneous Eastern bloc still gave rise to others such as the South-South Cooperation movement. Polarity international relations Polarity in international relations refers to the arrangement of power within the international system. The concept arose from bipolarity during the Cold War , with the international system dominated by the conflict between two superpowers , and has been applied retrospectively by theorists. However, the term bipolar was notably used by Stalin who said he saw the international system as a bipolar one with two opposing powerbases and ideologies. Consequently, the international system prior to can be described as multipolar, with power being shared among Great powers. Empires of the world in The collapse of the Soviet Union in had led to unipolarity, with the United States as a sole superpower, although many refuse to acknowledge the fact. Several theories of international relations draw upon the idea of polarity. The balance of power was a concept prevalent in Europe prior to the First World War , the thought being that by balancing power blocs it would create stability and prevent war. Here, the concepts of balancing rising in power to counter another and bandwagoning siding with another are developed. Hegemony is the preponderance of power at one pole in the international system, and the theory argues this is a stable configuration because of mutual gains by both the dominant power and others in the international system. This is contrary to many neorealist arguments, particularly made by Kenneth Waltz , stating that the end of the Cold War and the state of unipolarity is an unstable configuration that will inevitably change. It suggests that while hegemony can control the occurrence of wars, it also results in the creation of one. Its main proponent, A. Organski , argued this based on the occurrence of previous wars during British, Portuguese, and Dutch hegemony. Interdependence[ edit ] Many advocate that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependence; the mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Advocates of this point to growing globalization , particularly with international economic interaction. The role of international institutions, and widespread acceptance of a number of operating

principles in the international system, reinforces ideas that relations are characterized by interdependence. NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan

Dependency theory is a theory most commonly associated with Marxism, stating that a set of core states exploit a set of weaker periphery states for their prosperity. Various versions of the theory suggest that this is either an inevitability standard dependency theory, or use the theory to highlight the necessity for change Neo-Marxist. Systemic tools of international relations[ edit ] Diplomacy is the practice of communication and negotiation between representatives of states. To some extent, all other tools of international relations can be considered the failure of diplomacy. Keeping in mind, the use of other tools are part of the communication and negotiation inherent within diplomacy. Sanctions, force, and adjusting trade regulations, while not typically considered part of diplomacy, are actually valuable tools in the interest of leverage and placement in negotiations. Sanctions are usually a first resort after the failure of diplomacy, and are one of the main tools used to enforce treaties. They can take the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions and involve the cutting of ties and imposition of barriers to communication or trade. War, the use of force, is often thought of as the ultimate tool of international relations. A popular definition is that given by Clausewitz, with war being "the continuation of politics by other means". There is a growing study into "new wars" involving actors other than states. The study of war in international relations is covered by the disciplines of "war studies" and "strategic studies". The mobilization of international shame can also be thought of as a tool of international relations.

### 8: Study of Politics (Various Approaches)

*Get this from a library! A Normative approach to war: peace, war, and justice in Hugo Grotius. [Yasuaki ÅCEnuma:] -- Based on the editor's Japanese work entitled: Senso to heiwa no ho (The Law of war and peace).*

While meta-ethics focuses on foundational issues concerning the semantics of moral utterance and how our moral views fit more broadly into a general conception of reality, normative ethics focuses on the major theoretical approaches to the content of moral reflection. It is shaped by the historical inheritance of the tradition of moral philosophy in the West in its focus on deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics as the major forms of normative ethical theory. These standard theories have been more recently complemented by the new field of feminist ethics, and innovations in ethical theory have added hybrid theory and contractualism to the list. All of these views continue to be the subject of intense debate and further refinement.

**General Overviews** Given the range and diversity of the field, there is no single article that can comprehensively survey normative ethics. This suggests two alternative routes into the subject. Because of the role played by history in contemporary normative ethics, one route to an overview of the subject is via a historical study such as MacIntyre. It is a strength, not a weakness, of this recently republished classic that the author has a very engaged point of view on his subject matter. More up to date and more comprehensive is the three-volume study consisting of Irwin, Irwin, and Irwin. Alternatively, the second route into the subject draws on individual entries in the main reference overviews of moral philosophy. Comprehensive and very helpful recent reference overviews are Singer, LaFollette, Copp, and Skorupski. These reference overviews are divided fairly evenly between meta-ethical and normative topics. The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study. It includes three chapters that are thematic overviews of trends in recent moral philosophy. The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. A Short History of Ethics: A second edition of a book from that is the best concise, single-volume history of ethics. A Companion to Ethics. The Routledge Companion to Ethics.

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*Just War Theory: Normative (what should happen) not international law, but a series of moral and ethical precept about how actors should behave in the context of war - does not argue that all war is immoral in fact sometimes argues that war is a necessary moral act - Just war is about satisfying certain ethical responsibilities in the context.*

Under this theory the mass media are the children as well as tools of government, the government is still responsible in deciding what should be the actions of the media thus enhancing the service of the media to the top personalities in government rather than the whole public. There seems to be a confusion because the first owes its formulation to McQuail while the former to Siebert. Are they the same? And is there any correlation between this theory and Nigeria? How can it be applied to our contemporary society? Please I need answer to all these questions, thank you. To what benefits are the Normative theory of the press to the promotion of peace and justice in the society. The four theories of the press were originally developed by Peterson, Siebert and Shramm: Theory is defined and means different things to different people, Theory is said to be a plan formulated in the mind. With theory comes hypothesis, a theory cannot be said to be a theory without being tested. Hypothesis enables one to get the right and proper result, whatever it may be theory the facts remain that theories are crucial analytical tools for understanding, explaining and making predictions about a given subject or subject matter. However, there are different types and categories that make up theory. Katherine Miller, a communication theorist, argues that the theories share a commitment and they are; Goals and objectives, Ontology, Epistemology, Axiology. Goals and objectives are the aims that the theory strives to attain. Ontology deals more with reality and how the theory perceives reality. Epistemology seeks to gain more knowledge from the theory. Axiology then lays more emphasis on value and the value the theorist places on his theory. Moreover, it is Normative we are to dwell upon, Normative theory deals more on ideal standards of or models or being based on what is considered to be the normal or correct way of doing things. Normative perceives that things as to be normal, human being and even the things of the world should be normal. Therefore Normative theory is all about normality. I am informed that normative theories are to explain press operations in relation to the society they are in. Normative theories are proposed based on the widely accepted fact that media does not operate in isolation or without interaction with a social world. Mass media is affected and influenced by the social and political actions of the society it operates in. A normative theory describes the ideal way for a media system to be controlled and operated, their functions defined by the government, authority, leader and public. They focus on the relationship between the press and the government, ownership of the media and who controls press or media in the country. I have also been to understand that according to authoritarian theory, the media is controlled and censored by the elites and ruling class in the country but libertarian is fully free without any intervention of any authority or government, Social responsibility theory advocates press freedom in one hand but on the other hand there is self-regulation and the public controls the press by raising questions and in Soviet media theory, the whole control of the media is under the leader of the nation. I am very grateful for your expository take on the topic.

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