

### 1: Is Patriotism a Virtue?

*If you are searched for the ebook A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire (Empires in Perspective) by J. Lee Thompson in pdf format, then you have come on to faithful website.*

Personal patriotism is emotional and voluntary. The patriot adheres to certain patriotic values, such as respect for the flag. They may insist that the entire citizenry shares adherence to these values, or that they be legally enforced, see Flag Desecration Amendment. Governments promote an official patriotism which has a high symbolic and ceremonial content. It is a logical consequence of the state itself, which derives legitimacy from being the expression of the common good of the political community. National monuments, and veterans days and commemoration ceremonies are typical examples. Often official patriotism is highly regulated by protocol, with specific methods for handling flags, or specific pledges and displays of allegiance. Symbolic patriotism in wartime is intended to raise morale, in turn contributing to the war effort. Peacetime patriotism can not be so easily linked to a measurable gain for the state, but the patriot does not see it as inferior. Levels of patriotism vary across time, and among political communities. Typically, patriotic intensity is higher when the state is under external threat. Patriotism is selective in its altruism. Criticism of patriotism in ethics is mainly directed at this moral preference: Paul Gombert compared it to racism. Patriotism implies a value preference for a specific civic or political community. Universalist beliefs reject such specific preferences, and there may be an alternative, wider, community. In the European Union, thinkers such as Habermas, however, have advocated a European-wide patriotism, but patriotism in Europe is usually directed at the nation-state and often coincides with Euroscepticism. Some Islamists despise patriotism as un-Islamic: Supporters of patriotism in ethics regard it as a virtue. In his influential article "Is patriotism a virtue? MacIntyre constructs an alternative conception of morality, that he claims would be compatible with patriotism. Charles Blattberg, in his book *From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics*, has developed a similar conception of patriotism. A problem with treating patriotism as a virtue is that patriotisms often conflict. Soldiers of both sides in a war may feel equally patriotic, creating an ethical paradox. If patriotism is a virtue, then the enemy is virtuous, so why try to kill them? Within nations, politicians may appeal to patriotic emotions in attacking their opponents, implicitly or explicitly accusing them of betraying the country. Minorities may reject a patriotic loyalty and pride, which the majority finds unproblematic. They may feel excluded from the political community, and see no reason to be proud of it. The Australian political conflict about the Black arm band theory of history is an example. Conservative Prime Minister John Howard, who would undoubtedly describe himself as an Australian patriot, said of it in *In the United States*, patriotic history has been criticised for de-emphasising the post-Colombian depopulation, the Atlantic slave trade, the population expulsions and the wars of conquest against Native Americans. Was Lafayette an American patriot, or the Philhellenes Greek patriots? Alasdair MacIntyre would claim that they were not; that these and similar cases are instances of idealism, but not of patriotism. Under this view, Lafayette was only devoted to the ideals of political liberty that underlay the American Revolution, but was not specifically patriotic for America. Why do so many people experience intense patriotic feelings? The idea that feelings of loyalty to the group are favoured by natural selection was expressed by Charles Darwin in *A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection. This explanation is speculative and disputed, and no explicit genetic basis for patriotism has been evidenced. The theory is disputed: The controversy hinges on what numerical values are to be plugged into the generally accepted equations of W. Hamilton that govern kin selection. For them, their religious beliefs explain why the human character is the way it is. Depending on whether they see patriotism as good or bad, they would attribute it to a free will choice for good or evil. Others accept the theory of evolution in general, but reject efforts to invoke it in the explanation of human behaviour. Other related articles can be found at the Politics Portal.*

### 2: A Wider Patriotism : J. Lee Thompson :

*When Alfred Milner was knighted, he took as his motto *Communis Patria*, 'patriotism for our common country'. This is the study of Milner, which takes his politics, or 'constructive' imperialism as its primary theme.*

One of them was xenophobic, hostile, and downright plug-ugly. The other was hopeful, inclusive, and cheerful. Yet both visions share something that I find troubling. Two stories explain why I think so. A few years back, I was teaching and doing random I. Many students were of Afro-Caribbean descent. In an earthquake of 7. The devastation was unimaginable. The death toll was between , to , souls. Collapsed buildings, destroyed infrastructure, mass graves – all were elements of the horror. He spoke Kreyol to the students – despite my shaky French, I could really only decipher a word here and there, but his somber tones conveyed the point. It is a sad history that would dishearten anyone. Yet my colleague exuded what can only be understood as a keen, steadfast love of Haiti through his sadness. That love was palpable. And the love had nothing to do with visions of Haitian grandeur. He loved Haiti because he was Haitian. He loved his country Haiti, and mourned its losses, because it was his. Another event convinced me that many Americans, perhaps even most, mistake patriotism for a false simulacrum, an expression of nationalism, of exceptionalism, of unalloyed righteousness and majesty. It expresses a conviction that The United States of America is worth loving because, maybe only because, it is great beyond measure. On May 2, , I was watching a baseball game on television for me, the only sport that matters. It was probably the Mets for me, the team that matters most , but I forget whether it actually was the Mets or not, or what city in which the game was played. I do vividly recall this: Osama Bin Laden was a mass-murderer by any standard, and whether the actual assassination was morally justified or permissible under the standards of international law I have my doubts , he was not the kind of person whose demise was to be regretted. Their results, when successful, may be occasion for relief and even thanksgiving. But the assassination of the Al Qaida chieftain was not, on any understanding, analogous to the Mets winning the National League pennant. That was what the reaction of the crowd sounded like. But in these circumstances a more somber, even solemn reaction was called for. But that does not make her any less your mother. But secondly – and this is much more important – I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests. Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. Both words are normally used in so vague a way that any definition is liable to be challenged, but one must draw a distinction between them, since two different and even opposing ideas are involved. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. Patriots may think that or not, but it is irrelevant: Perhaps Trump is not a true nationalist, although his rhetoric seems to put the lie to that. Through an interesting mash-up of Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel, and Marx, MacIntyre makes a powerful case for patriotism as a virtue by arguing that in a way it is inevitable. The idea of rooting morality in impersonal principles, available to and justified by a universal rationality-as-such, ignores our historicity, and thus is both futile and unnecessary. It is unnecessary, because the kind of pernicious relativism this seems to invite is only apparent. First, he assumes that political liberals, such as Rawls and Nozick in philosophy, or Galbraith and Friedman in economics, contend that their different variants of liberalism rest on neutrality between moral-political visions of the good and the institutionalized ways such visions are put into practice. Liberalism, for MacIntyre, is necessarily a self-consuming tradition that denies, in a form of false consciousness, its own traditionality. But MacIntyre fails to show that this is the only kind of liberalism, or that all kinds of liberalism are therefore incoherent. His argument employs the same kind of immanent critique that MacIntyre maintains is the only kind of political argument available to those who acknowledge the historicity of rationality. Richard Rorty goes even further than Stout: Thus certain kinds of liberal democracies or social democracies have no problem making their peace with *Sittlichkeit*. Loyalty to that project as it exists, or as it once was but is no longer, or as something to be born in the future, is what makes one a patriot. One can be a patriotic revolutionary or reactionary as easily as a patriotic defender of the established order. But here, however, MacIntyre buys consistency at the price of the empty formalism he is trying to avoid. If almost

everyone is a patriot, no one is. I am a Quirk, a Long Islander, a one-time resident of Brooklyn and Queens, a New Yorker, a US Citizen, a human, and an inhabitant of planet Earth not to mention a teacher and scholar of philosophy, an information technologist, a musician, etc. All of these have a claim on my loyalties for the very reason MacIntyre cites: They need not come into conflict, but there is no reason why they might not conflict at a given point in my history. It is not clear how MacIntyre could supply the conceptual tools to resolve these potential conflicts; nor is it clear how he could account for their occasionally smooth coexistence. An example of the inability of MacIntyre to reconcile the potential conflicts would be the work of theologian Stanley Hauerwas. Habermas does not ignore the particular when he thinks politically. Its arrogance is revealed in strange amalgamation of universalism that it is built on values and virtues that are valid for all people in all times and a particularism that holds that only the United States stands as an exemplar of these universal values and virtues. It deflects love of country into false and destructive paths. Patriotism has its limits, and one can understand what Samuel Johnson meant when he proclaimed patriotism to be the last refuge of scoundrels.

### 3: Nationalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire (Empires in Perspective) ABC of Arterial and Venous Disease (ABC Series) Abraham Lincoln's DNA and Other Adventures in Genetics.*

In what is still the sole book-length philosophical study of the subject, Stephen Nathanson, 34–35 defines patriotism as involving: There is no great difference between special affection and love, and Nathanson himself uses the terms interchangeably. Although love or special affection is usually given expression in special concern for its object, that is not necessary. But a person whose love for her country was not expressed in any special concern for it would scarcely be considered a patriot. Therefore the definition needs to include such concern. Such identification is expressed in vicarious feelings: This is only a definition. A fuller account of patriotism is beyond the scope of this article. Many authors use the two terms interchangeably. Among those who do not, quite a few have made the distinction in ways that are not very helpful. George Orwell contrasted the two in terms of aggressive vs. Nationalism is about power: While nationalism is accordingly aggressive, patriotism is defensive: When these are exhibited in a reasonable degree and without ill thoughts about others and hostile actions towards them, that is patriotism; when they become unbridled and cause one to think ill of others and act badly towards them, that is nationalism. Conveniently enough, it usually turns out that we are patriots, while they are nationalists see Billig, 55– There is yet another way of distinguishing patriotism and nationalism – one that is quite simple and begs no moral questions. Both patriotism and nationalism involve love of, identification with, and special concern for a certain entity. Thus patriotism and nationalism are understood as the same type of set of beliefs and attitudes, and distinguished in terms of their objects, rather than the strength of those beliefs and attitudes, or as sentiment vs. To be sure, there is much overlap between country and nation, and therefore between patriotism and nationalism; thus much that applies to one will also apply to the other. But when a country is not ethnically homogeneous, or when a nation lacks a country of its own, the two may part ways. Normative issues Patriotism has had a fair number of critics. The harshest among them have judged it deeply flawed in every important respect. In the 19th century, Russian novelist and thinker Leo Tolstoy found patriotism both stupid and immoral. It is stupid because every patriot holds his own country to be the best of all whereas, obviously, only one country can qualify. Some of these objections can easily be countered. However, there is another, more plausible line of criticism of patriotism focusing on its intellectual, rather than moral credentials. This suggests that patriotism can be judged from the standpoint of ethics of belief – a set of norms for evaluating our beliefs and other doxastic states. Simon Keller has examined patriotism from this point of view, and found it wanting. Accordingly, she forms beliefs about her country in ways different from the ways in which she forms beliefs about other countries. Moreover, she cannot admit this motivation while at the same time remaining a patriot. This leads her to hide from herself the true source of some of the beliefs involved. This is bad faith. Bad faith is bad; so is patriotism, as well as every identity, individual or collective, constituted, in part, by patriotic loyalty. This portrayal does seem accurate as far as much patriotism as we know it is concerned. Yet Keller may be overstating his case as one against patriotism as such. This might not be a very satisfactory answer; we might agree with J. But however egocentric, irrational, asinine, surely it qualifies as patriotism. In a later statement of his argument, 80–81, Keller seems to be of two minds on this point. They also consider patriotism an important component of our identity. Some go further, and argue that patriotism is morally mandatory, or even that it is the core of morality. There is, however, a major tradition in moral philosophy which understands morality as essentially universal and impartial, and seems to rule out local, partial attachment and loyalty. A related objection is that patriotism is exclusive in invidious and dangerous ways. It tends to encourage militarism, and makes for international tension and conflict. What, then, is the moral status of patriotism? The question does not admit of a single answer. We can distinguish five types of patriotism, and each needs to be judged on its merits. This may or may not be relevant to the question of patriotism, depending on just what we take the point of princely rule to be. This type of patriotism is extreme, but by no means extremely rare. Not much needs to be said about the moral standing of this type of patriotism, as it amounts to rejection of morality. On

the liberal view, where and from whom I learn the principles of morality is just as irrelevant to their contents and to my commitment to them, as where and from whom I learn the principles of mathematics is irrelevant to their contents and my adherence to them. For MacIntyre, where and from whom I learn my morality is of decisive importance both for my commitment to it and for its very contents. There is no morality as such; morality is always the morality of a particular community. Moral rules are justified in terms of certain goods they express and promote; but these goods, too, are always given as part and parcel of the way of life of a community. The individual becomes a moral agent only when informed as such by his community. He also lives and flourishes as one because he is sustained in his moral life by his community. If I can live and flourish as a moral agent only as a member of my community, while playing the role this membership involves, then my very identity is bound up with that of my community, its history, traditions, institutions, and aspirations. Therefore, if I do not understand the enacted narrative of my own individual life as embedded in the history of my country – I will not understand what I owe to others or what others owe to me, for what crimes of my nation I am bound to make reparation, for what benefits to my nation I am bound to feel gratitude. Understanding what is owed to and by me and understanding the history of the communities of which I am a part is – one and the same thing. To that extent, this type of patriotism is critical and rational. This account of patriotism is exposed to several objections. One might find fault with the step from communitarianism to patriotism: Even if his communitarian conception of morality were correct and even if the process of moral development ensured that group loyalty would emerge as a central virtue, no conclusion would follow about the importance of patriotism. The group to which our primary loyalty would be owed would be the group from which we had obtained our moral understanding. This need not be the community as a whole or any political unit, however. The nation need not be the source of morality or the primary beneficiary of our loyalty. Nathanson, Yet another objection would focus on the fundamentally irrational character of robust patriotism: If so, this type of patriotism would seem to involve the rejection of such basic moral notions as universal justice and common human solidarity. This is not a fair objection to patriotism as such. But the objection is pertinent, and has considerable force, when brought up against the type of patriotism advocated by MacIntyre. If justice is understood in universal, rather than parochial terms, if common human solidarity counts as a weighty moral consideration, and if peace is of paramount importance and war is morally permissible only when it is just, then this kind of patriotism must be rejected. There is considerable middle ground between these extremes. Exploring this middle ground has led some philosophers to construct positions accommodating both the universal and the particular point of view – both the mandates of universal justice and claims of common humanity, and the concern for the patria and compatriots. Baron argues that the conflict between impartiality and partiality is not quite as deep as it may seem. Morality allows for both types of considerations, as they pertain to different levels of moral deliberation. At one level, we are often justified in taking into account our particular commitments and attachments, including those to our country. At another level, we can and ought to reflect on such commitments and attachments from a universal, impartial point of view, to delineate their proper scope and determine their weight. In such a case, partiality and particular concerns are judged to be legitimate and indeed valuable from an impartial, universal point of view. This means that with respect to those matters and within the same limits, it is also good for a Cuban to judge as a Cuban and to put Cuban interests first, etc. Actually, this is how we think of our special obligations to, and preferences for, our family, friends, or local community; this kind of partiality is legitimate, and indeed valuable, not only for us but for anyone. By doing so, she argues, our patriotism will leave room for serious, even radical criticism of our country, and will not be a force for dissension and conflict in the international arena. A good example is provided by the Ten Commandments, a major document of Western morality. It is not unbridled: It acknowledges the constraints morality imposes on the pursuit of our individual and collective goals. For instance, it may require the patriot to fight for his country, but only in so far as the war is, and remains, just. Adherents of both extreme and robust patriotism will consider themselves bound to fight for their country whether its cause be just or not. Extreme patriots will also fight for it in whatever way it takes to win. Moderate patriotism is not exclusive. Its adherent will show special concern for his country and compatriots, but that will not prevent him from showing concern for other countries and their inhabitants.

Such patriotism is compatible with a decent degree of humanitarianism. Finally, moderate patriotism is not uncritical, unconditional, or egocentric. For an adherent of this type of patriotism, it is not enough that the country is her country. She will also expect it to live up to certain standards and thereby deserve her support, devotion, and special concern for its well-being. When it fails to do so, she will withhold support. The latter type of patriotism need not conflict with impartial justice or common human solidarity. It will therefore be judged morally unobjectionable by all except some adherents of a strict type of cosmopolitanism. However, both Baron and Nathanson fail to distinguish clearly between showing that their preferred type of patriotism is morally unobjectionable and showing that it is morally required or virtuous, and sometimes seem to be assuming that by showing the former, they are also showing the latter. Yet there is a gap between the two claims, and the latter, stronger case for moderate patriotism still needs to be made. Gratitude is probably the most popular among the grounds adduced for patriotic duty. We owe our country our life, our education, our language, and, in the most fortunate cases, our liberty.

### 4: Is patriotism a virtue? | Coffee House

Read "A Wider Patriotism Alfred Milner and the British Empire" by J Lee Thompson with Rakuten Kobo. When Alfred Milner was knighted, he took as his motto *Communis Patria*, 'patriotism for our common country'.

Patriotism is one of a large class of words that are linked to the virtues of membership. To participate in relations of, for example, friendship, community, nationhood, citizenship, or marriage implies normative conventions. In other words, there are value expectations built into such membership. One important dimension of any membership relation is an expectation of loyalty. Fidelity or loyalty to a nation, community, friend, citizenship, marriage, or state is thus implied in the actual practice. To participate openly and self-consciously, therefore, in any of these membership practices involves adherence to loyalty-based virtue. In this context, the term patriotism usually denotes a specific loyalty virtue, consequent upon membership of a country or state. However, the term loyalty alone does not quite cover the range of values associated with patriotic membership. Patriotism also signifies a sense of personal identification with, and concern for, the well-being or welfare of that country or state. Further, it entails a readiness to make sacrifices for its defense or welfare. In addition, it provides for some the ground for all moral action—in the sense that morality, in itself, is seen to be, quite literally, premised on patriotic membership. Patriotism also indicates a special affection, feeling, or emotive response. This emotive response is commonly designated as a "love of country. The former is seen as an older usage, traceable back to the ancient Roman republic, while the latter is viewed as an eighteenth-century neologism. Patriotism, as in most ideological "isms," is therefore often considered a more recent word. However, the older term patriot still covers many of the conceptual aspects of patriotism. The term patriotism figured in European and North American political discussion and poetry over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, during the larger bulk of the twentieth century its academic usage diminished. Certainly up to the s it was considered, in academic debate, to be an antiquated term—particularly in liberal and Marxist political theory. However, there has been, over the last decade, a rediscovery of patriotism among other membership-related concepts within political theory and related disciplines. This rediscovery began in the s with communitarianism and then developed into a renewed academic interest in nationalism, multiculturalism, citizenship, and the like. Patriotism is one of the latecomers to this process. It should be stressed, though, that this academic interest, or lack of interest, has little bearing on the ordinary political usage of these terms. Patriotism, regardless of academic concerns, persisted in lay political vocabularies throughout the twentieth century. The deep roots of the word patriot lie in Roman antiquity, particularly in terms such as *patria* and *patrius*, which indicate fatherland, city, native, or familiar place. Familiar has links with the word family *familia*. In terms of the "role of father," *patria* and *patrius* have subtle connections with property, authority, and status. The word patriarch evolves from this dimension. The links between father, authority, family, property, and politics can be observed, for example, in the Roman patrician class, who possessed considerable wealth in land and were dominant in the older Roman political structure. Their property enabled wide-ranging political influence. This was also connected to the original use of the cognate terms patron and patronage. Early Roman political factions, as in later European monarchies, worked through powerful wealthy families. Loyalty to kin in politics was supremely important for survival and political success. Early Roman *pietas* was, therefore, originally loyalty to the family hearth. However, Roman republican writers, such as Cicero, also saw a wider *patria* in the *res publica* the public thing. The later Roman legal *Digesta* and *Institutiones* referred to two *patrias* affecting citizens: Under the later Roman Empire and again under later European absolute monarchies, this second *patria* became increasingly more abstract and legalistic. In effect, the highest *patria* status and estate became synonymous with the state. The state was, in a sense, paternal authority "writ large. The prince thus embodied the essence of the state. Traces of this can still be seen in eighteenth-century writings, such as Henry St. The opposition to this reading of the state also employed the language of patriotism. Yet it wanted to colonize the state with a different set of values. Thus, liberty under the law became a motif for a divergent set of arguments. Consequently, if republicans, dissenters, and revolutionaries absorbed the language of patriotism, they could claim to be struggling for the "real" rights

and freedoms of the people, and consequently for the soul of the state. At this point in the argument, in the early nineteenth century, the language of patriotism began slowly to mutate into nationalist language. In summary, the qualities of "local familial or community loyalty" and an "impersonal abstract legal loyalty" have remained part of the vocabulary of patriotism to the present day. Local communal identification implies a more visceral loyalty, an attachment and love for the "familiar. Yet at the same time, the loyalty to the remote authoritative legal abstraction of the state or city-state embodies another important formal aspect of the legacy of patriotism. Objects of Patriotic Loyalty First, in the medieval period, the patria could be identified with a locality, hamlet, clan, village, township, or city. The patriot was one who submitted to the village or city and was prepared to defend it. Second, in terms of the feudal structure, defending homelands could also entail defending the lands of a local lord or prince. In this sense, feudal and vassal relations became integral to patriotic argument. Third, in Augustinian Christian thought the significant patria was the "city of God," which transcended all cities and states. During the later medieval period, Roman imperial thought was utilized by secularizing territorial states initially city-states in Europe. However, "abstract legal Rome" communis patria was a movable feast. It could apply equally to Venice, Florence, Paris, or London. Princes became, in effect, supreme lawmakers sovereigns and emperors in their own realms. The objects of patriotism thus became the new territorial states with their fatherly princes. From the twelfth century, the notion of patria often arose in the context of defense of a state territory. Defense of patria was a key ground for "just war. Thomas Aquinas" also touched on the issue of the religious duty of citizens to render themselves vulnerable to death for their patria"pro patria mori. Religious language was immensely important here. Death for patria and death for the Christian faith became virtually coeval by the late medieval and early modern period. The emotive religious memorials and formal recognition we still give to patriotic war dead are a testimony to how deeply this idea has permeated state theory. It is crucial to the understanding of patriotism to the present day. Finally, it is important to underscore the point that patriotism is formally compatible with any political creed or "object of attachment. Forms of Patriotism In contemporary discussion there have been a number of renderings of patriotism. These can be distinguished between two forms"strong and moderate patriotisms. The stronger version argues that patriotic loyalty is the sole source of any meaningful moral claims. The content of patriotism is therefore always particular or local. In this context, the loyalties demanded from the patriot are simply to whatever values are regarded as dominant within a state or community. The key critical opposition to this perspective comes from universalist forms of argument, such as universal human rights claims. However, the larger bulk of recent writings on patriotism have appeared within the moderate category. The moderate category tries to mediate between universalism and localism. The strong variant of patriotism does not have as many proponents as the moderate form. One key example of this is strong communitarian patriotism. In his essay, "Is Patriotism a Virtue? Morality is thus rooted within communal relations. For MacIntyre, morality is always learned from within a particular way of life. Goods are always the particular goods of communities. The morality of patriotism is therefore seen as perfectly natural to us as communal beings. Racial exclusivism or political authoritarianism could well be justified within this framework. The dangers implicit within this perspective are those of extreme exclusion and the lurking possibility of communal jingoism. In the twentieth century, strong variants of patriotism have been associated rightly or wrongly with the militaristic or bellicose stance of German national socialism and Italian fascism in the s. The more recent moderate account of patriotism contains four subtle variants. First, for neoclassical republicans the distinctive character of patriotism is its focus on political liberty and civic virtue. Love of country is not love of a language or ethnicity, but rather of political liberty. This is not a love of a particular liberty, but a generic nonexclusive liberty as embedded in law. It is seen essentially as a universalizing force. A republic is seen to embody a powerful sense of local solidarity contained within a universal vessel of liberty under law. For its proponents, republican language is thus a viable alternative to current liberal foundationalism, ethnic nationalism, and strong patriotic arguments. Second, for recent theorists such as Charles Taylor, moderate communitarian patriotism envisages a direct link between patriotism, republicanism although some would categorize it as civic humanism, and communitarian motifs. Communitarians are clearly not of one mind here. The distinction between strong and moderate patriotism has direct parallels with the distinction, made within

communitarian theory, between strong and moderate senses of community. Whereas MacIntyre sees a direct synonymy between nationalism and patriotism and adopts a narrower, stronger, and more exclusive sense of community, Charles Taylor seeks some separation between patriotism and nationalism and adopts a more differentiated view of community incorporating multicultural diversity. Further, whereas, for Taylor, moderate patriotism is a matter of self-conscious citizen identification with a polity, strong patriotism swims in murkier waters, usually envisaging patriotism as a prepolitical, nonintentional attachment. Moderate communitarian patriotism, for Taylor, has no "prepolitical" reference. It rather implies more intentional attachment to a country and its laws.

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Each of these aspects requires elaboration. Although sovereignty is often taken to mean full statehood Gellner , ch. Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount of agreement about the historically paradigmatic form of nationalism. Territorial sovereignty has traditionally been seen as a defining element of state power and essential for nationhood. It was extolled in classic modern works by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and is returning to center stage in the debate, though philosophers are now more skeptical see below. Issues surrounding the control of the movement of money and people in particular immigration and the resource rights implied in territorial sovereignty make the topic politically center in the age of globalization and philosophically interesting for nationalists and anti-nationalists alike. This classical nationalism later spread across the world and still marks many contemporary nationalisms. In breaking down the issue, we have mentioned the importance of the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity. This point raises two sorts of questions. First, the descriptive ones: Second, the normative ones: Is the attitude of caring about national identity always appropriate? This section discusses the descriptive questions, starting with 1a and 1b. The normative questions are addressed in Section 3 on the moral debate. If one wants to enjoin people to struggle for their national interests, one must have some idea about what a nation is and what it is to belong to a nation. So, in order to formulate and ground their evaluations, claims, and directives for action, pro-nationalist thinkers have expounded theories of ethnicity, culture, nation and state. Their opponents have in turn challenged these elaborations. Now, some presuppositions about ethnic groups and nations are essential for the nationalist, while others are theoretical elaborations designed to support the essential ones. Since nationalism is particularly prominent with groups that do not yet have a state, a definition of nation and nationalism purely in terms of belonging to a state is a non-starter. This leaves two extreme options and a number of intermediates. The first extreme option has been put forward by a small but distinguished band of theorists, including Renan and Weber ; for a recent defense, see Brubaker and for a comparison with religion, Brubaker According to their purely voluntaristic definition, a nation is any group of people aspiring to a common political state-like organization. At the other extreme, and more typically, nationalist claims are focused upon the non-voluntary community of common origin, language, tradition and culture: Philosophical discussions centered around nationalism tend to concern the ethnic-cultural variants only, and this habit will be followed here. One cannot chose to be a member; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and early socialization. However, commonality of origin has become mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: This is the kind of definition that would be accepted by most parties in the debate today. So defined, the nation is a somewhat mixed category, both ethno-cultural and civic, but still closer to the purely ethno-cultural than to the purely civic extreme. The wider descriptive underpinnings of nationalist claims have varied over the last two centuries. For almost a century, up to the end of the Second World War, it was customary to link nationalist views to organic metaphors for society. Most contemporary defenders of nationalism, especially philosophers, avoid such language. The organic metaphor and talk about character have been replaced by one master metaphor: It is centered upon cultural membership, and used both for the identity of a group and for the socially based identity of its members, e. Various authors unpack the metaphor in various ways: Seymour have significantly contributed to introducing and maintaining important topics such as community, membership, tradition and social identity into contemporary philosophical debate. In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds of views. A volume dedicated to A. Smith debates his ethno-nationalism Leouss and Grosby, eds. The second are the modernist views, placing the origin of nations in modern times. They can be further classified according to their answer to an additional question: The modernist realist view is that nations are real but distinctly modern creations, instrumental in the genesis of capitalism Gellner , Hobsbawn , and Breuilly and The realist view contrasts with more radical antirealism. These divergent views seem to support rather divergent moral claims about nations: For an

overview of nationalism in political theory see Vincent and the encyclopedic volume edited by Delanty and Kumar. Indeed, older authors – from great thinkers like Herder and Otto Bauer to the propagandists who followed their footsteps – took great pains to ground normative claims upon firm ontological realism about nations: See, for instance, MacCormick ; Miller , ; Tamir , Gans , Moore , , Dagger and, for an interesting discussion, Frost. They point out that common imaginings can tie people together, and that actual interaction resulting from togetherness can engender important moral obligations. Let us now turn to question 1c about the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issue that has interested political and social scientists concerns ethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-national attitude. Is it as irrational, romantic and indifferent to self-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has divided authors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who try to explain it as being in some sense rational. Authors who see it as irrational propose various explanations of why people assent to irrational views. But where does such false consciousness come from? On the opposite side, the famous critic of nationalism Elie Kedourie thinks this irrationality is spontaneous. A decade ago Liah Greenfeld went as far as linking nationalism to mental illness in her provocative article; see also her book. On the opposite side, Michael Walzer has offered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion in his . Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeper explanations. For an overview of Marxist approaches see Glenn. Now we turn to those who see nationalist sentiments as being rational, at least in a very wide sense. Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to become nationalists. Hardin. Consider the two sides of the nationalist coin. On the first side, identification and cohesion within an ethno-national group relates to inter-group cooperation, and cooperation is easier for those who are part of the same ethno-national group. To take an example of ethnic ties in a multiethnic state, a Vietnamese newcomer to the United States will do well to rely on his co-nationals: Once the ties are established and he has become part of a network, it is rational to go on cooperating, and ethnic sentiment secures the trust and the firm bond needed for smooth cooperation. A further issue is when it is rational to switch sides; to stay with our example, when does it become profitable for our Vietnamese to develop an all-American patriotism? This has received a detailed elaboration in David Laitin , summarized in ; applied to language rights in Laitin and Reich ; see also Laitin , who uses material from the former Soviet Union. On the other side of the nationalist coin, non-cooperation with outsiders can lead to sometimes extreme conflict between various ethno-nations. Can one rationally explain the extremes of ethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do so in terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see the other as increasingly inimical. It then becomes rational to start treating the other as an enemy. Mere suspicion can thus lead by small, individually rational steps to a situation of conflict. It is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this general pattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts see also Wimmer. It has enabled the application of conceptual tools from game-theoretic and economic analyses of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior to the explanation of ethno-nationalism. It is worth mentioning, however, that the individualist rational-choice approach, centered upon personal rationality, has serious competitors. A tradition in social psychology, initiated by Henri Tajfel , shows that individuals may identify with a randomly selected group even when membership in the group brings no tangible rewards. Does rationality of any kind underlie this tendency to identification? They propose a non-personal, evolutionary sort of rationality: But cultural evolution has taken over the mechanisms of identification that initially developed within biological evolution. As a result, we project the sentiment originally reserved for kinship onto our cultural group. More detailed explanations from socio-biological perspectives differ greatly among themselves and constitute a wide and rather promising research program see an overview in Goetze. There is a growing literature connecting these issues with cognitive science, from Searle-White to Hogan and Yack. Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz express a common view when they write about belonging to a nation: One cannot choose to belong. Belonging brings crucial benefits: Why is national belonging taken to be involuntary? It is often attributed to the involuntary nature of linguistic belonging: All these are embedded in the language, and do not exist without it. Early socialization is seen as socialization into a specific culture, and very often that culture is just assumed to be a national one. The resulting belonging is then to a large extent non-voluntary. There are exceptions to this basically

non-voluntaristic view: Strict and Wide We pointed out at the very beginning of the entry that nationalism focuses upon 1 the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and 2 the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve or sustain some form of political sovereignty. The politically central point is 2: To these we now turn, beginning with sovereignty and territory, the usual foci of a national struggle for independence. They raise an important issue: The classical answer is that a state is required. A more liberal answer is that some form of political autonomy suffices. Once this has been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues: Consider first the classical nationalist answer to 2a.

### 6: Patriotism | [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com)

*A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire (Empires in Perspective) Published September 30th by Routledge Kindle Edition, pages.*

See Article History Patriotism, feeling of attachment and commitment to a country, nation, or political community. Greek and especially Roman antiquity provide the roots for a political patriotism that conceives of loyalty to the patria as loyalty to a political conception of the republic. This classical Roman meaning of patria reemerges in the context of the Italian city republics of the 15th century. While this love of the city is typically intermixed with pride in its military strength and cultural superiority, it is the political institutions and way of life of the city that form the distinctive focal point of this kind of patriotic attachment. While Rousseau advocated the love of the nation and the celebration of national culture, he believed that national culture is valuable primarily because it helps foster loyalty to the political fatherland. A more explicit link between nationalism and patriotism can be found in the work of German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder. In this context, fatherland becomes synonymous with the nation and its distinct language and culture, which give it unity and coherence. Freedom is equated not with the fight against political oppression but with the preservation of a unique people and patriotic sacrifice with the desire to secure the long-term survival of the nation. More sympathetic approaches to patriotism have sought to ground it in new forms of loyalty that are compatible with universal values, respect for human rights, and tolerance of ethnic and national differences. At the heart of this renewed interest in patriotism lies the belief that to be stable, democratic societies require a strong sense of allegiance on the part of their citizens. Not only does the high degree of pluralism that characterizes contemporary societies potentially give rise to tensions and disagreements among citizens that may destabilize the polity, modern democratic states committed to a degree of equality rely on the willingness of citizens to make sacrifices for the common good, be it in terms of the everyday redistribution of income to meet welfare needs or the provision of collective goods and services such as education or health care. Hence, in the eyes of advocates of new forms of patriotism, stable democratic societies require a strong sense of solidarity. To ensure that citizens who subscribe to different cultural, ethnic, and religious forms of life can coexist in and identify with their own country on equal terms, Habermas argues that the modern constitutional state must ensure that its political culture does not favor or discriminate against any particular subculture. To achieve this, it is vital to differentiate the majority culture from a shared political culture grounded in respect for fundamental constitutional principles and basic law. On this account, membership of a nation of citizens no longer rests on an appeal to a shared language or a common ethical and cultural origin but merely reflects a shared political culture based on standard liberal constitutional principles. Advocates of forms of constitutional patriotism often cite the United States as an example of a nonnational polity held together by an expressly political patriotism. Another strand of contemporary thought appeals to the classical republican principles of love of liberty, active citizenship, and self-sacrifice for the common good in their attempt to formulate new forms of solidarity that do not depend on the idea of a prepolitical, ethnically homogeneous nation. However, critics of such attempts to generate new, nonexclusionary forms of solidarity have expressed doubts about the extent to which patriotic sentiments can be reconciled with a commitment to universal principles. According to Canovan, not only is the patriotic virtue celebrated in the classical republican tradition primarily a military virtue, the republican preoccupation with the education and socialization of citizens to systematically instill loyalty and commitment to the state is liable to be seen by many contemporary liberals as an unacceptable form of manipulation and indoctrination. Furthermore, advocates of both constitutional and modern republican patriotism typically presuppose the existence of established political boundaries and common political institutions that have their origins in the rise and consolidation of the nation-state. Thus, the extent to which patriotism can be reconciled with a commitment to universal values, respect for human rights, and tolerance of ethnic and national differences remains contested.

### 7: Patriotism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*A Wider Patriotism by J. Lee Thompson, , available at Book Depository with free delivery worldwide.*

Select Page Patriotism Speech The love for the country and that zeal to undergo any kind of hardships for the country is called patriotism. Patriotism teaches us to love our country and embrace the whole humanity. It enlightens people about their predominant duties towards the nation. Feeling of patriotism is the actual spirit that seeks happiness through supreme sacrifice for the country and enables us to step forward for doing our bit for our country. Here we are providing you four 4 speeches to help you attempt this topic at any event or occasion. So, make the best use of these speeches and come out with flying colours in yours studies. Today is the day when we had received our Independence from the British and our nation became the Independent country in Like every year, we have gathered here to celebrate the Independence Day and pay tribute to all those great people who have sacrificed and are still sacrificing their lives for guarding and securing the Independence. I am highly honoured to get an opportunity to deliver a speech on Patriotism. This topic is very sensitive for me because I love my nation, my country very much. We all know how much difficulties and hardships, freedom fighters have faced in order to make India free. The feeling and sensitivity of Patriotism is vital for the Freedom of any Country. Patriotism is one of the best qualities one can have. It is a pious feeling of the mind. Thankfully, we live in the Independent country unlike our great freedom fighters, who had to win it after a lot of struggle and sacrifice. So, remembering all those great people who have fought for our Independence, we are filled with feelings patriotism. It is only because of their noble cause that the world still remembers them. However, there are several anti-social elements in our society, who try to spoil the image of our country. Now-a-days, we see in news, etc that some section of young students from some universities speak against their country. Patriotism can be fulfilled through various other means. Not necessarily, everyone needs to be a freedom fighter or should be serving the Army, Navy or the Air Force. You may join non-government-organisations NGOs and help the needy people. In winters by distributing blankets or in summers by distributing water, you may display your love towards the mankind and thus show your true heroism and patriotism. Love your country and show it in your actions. And I, as the senior faculty member of our XYZ institution, have been chosen by our respected Principal to deliver a speech on patriotism. Rajendra Prasad, and many others. Their contribution towards attainment of the independence was immense and cannot be simply summed up in words. However, one thing that requires special mention and which we all should imbibe from them is their great patriotic fervour. When on the mere thought of bondage or slavery of British Raj and independence struggle, a shudder comes running through our whole body, imagine they all have literally lived it and fought against it. The trauma and trouble that Britishers inflicted on them is difficult to explicate. There is one thing in common in all of them that kept them united till their last breath during the freedom struggle was patriotism and sheer love for their motherland. So now, if I were to ask you what Patriotism is, then how many of you are willing to answer? Apparently, it may sound like an easy question for you, but trust me it has various ramifications. Remember that the very foundation of our country is founded on the principles of tolerance and compassion. Patriotism has no room for hatred or ill-feeling. Yet another way to show love for our country is by working towards its growth and development and taking effective measures to eradicate poverty, illiteracy, child labour, violence against women and other social evils from our society and making our country a better place to live in. So, think beyond yourself and your family. Cultivate national interest and spread the message of international brotherhood everywhere. Speech on Patriotism â€” 3 Good morning everyone. I welcome you all on this grand celebration of the Independence Day. My topic of discussion today is patriotism. For each one of us present here, this word has different implications. I will discuss my views on what patriotism means to me. A patriot is a person who intends to love and serve the country as a loyal citizen. A true patriot loves the country and is ready to sacrifice anything for his or her own country. A set of these people tend to inherit the feeling of patriotism. We, the citizens of India have been lucky to feel the proud heritage of the noblest patriots, who sacrificed all their belongings and even gave up their lives, for the cause of their motherland. Patriots go beyond limits of their character and morals to work

for the betterment of their country. These people have given their lives for the country and have always kept their country ahead themselves. These patriots are remembered with intense feelings and will always serve as examples for the generations to come. It majorly means we should have true love and feelings for the country and be passionate to work for its progress. For a patriot, motherland means much more than heaven. It is only due to the sacrifice, dedication and contribution of patriots that the nation develops and prospers. Patriotism is regarded as the stepping stone of nation building. A patriot is never selfish or self centred, instead is sane and sensible. Patriotism means we should have immense love and affection for our own country but it does not mean that we have any hatred for any other country. People should be capable of supporting their nation but not have ill feelings for other countries. One should not look down upon other countries. Every country has many patriots who sacrifice their self and put their country above everything. All great nations which built their name in history are proud to witness the services of their patriots. I on behalf of everyone would like to motivate you all to safeguard, develop and preserve the freedom of the country. People should work for their nation. Every nation needs a bunch of people who above and beyond their self interest work on building up their country. A true patriot always gets due respect, love and affection from other citizens of the country as well. Thank you for being a part and continue promoting patriotism. Speech on Patriotism – 4 Good morning, I welcome you all to this session. As you all are aware that we are gathered here to share our views about how important is it to keep our country on the top most priority for us. In order to address this topic, I would like to share my views on patriotism. Patriotism does not mean the instant feeling that you get when there is some debate going on India vs Pakistan. It is the vibe that is inherited in you to make your nation the best in the world. Many people from the earlier generations comment that in the existing youth and coming generations the feeling of patriotism is on the decline. The scope of patriotism includes building great technological infrastructure that enables our country to march ahead on the path of progress. Since childhood we have been taught about the great stories on instances faced by many patriots of our country, this has been done for building in the importance and spirit of patriotism within each one of us. We are obliged of those incredible people who have fought hard and helped the country achieve and protect its freedom. Patriotism is an inherited spontaneous feeling. A patriotic person always gets respect from other countrymen and never ending love, support and affection. This is not only because of their sacrifices but also for the love, care, dedication and affection they shower on the nation. Share the message of how patriotic people have helped us take forward our country and how we all owe this as our responsibility.

### 8: Patriotism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

*Note: Citations are based on reference standards. However, formatting rules can vary widely between applications and fields of interest or study. The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied.*

### 9: A Wider Patriotism, J Lee Thompson - Shop Online for Books in Australia

*Nationalism is a wider term than patriotism and subsumes it. Nationalism covers, a political ambition to unite a nation, rule by self determination (as opposed to someone else doing it for you like British did for India), forming a common nation.*

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