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## 1: Cuba – Soviet Union relations - Wikipedia

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*Needler, M. C. Preface. Herman, D. L. Introduction. Alexander, R. J. Impact of the Sino-Soviet split on Latin-American Communism. Oswald, J. G. Soviet diplomatic.*

That indeed happened, but success of Sino-Soviet cooperation was short-lived. Already in the late s relations between the two countries deteriorated and by the early s the so called Sino-Soviet split occurred. Historians are still trying to explain why, in the times of a bi-polar world, a split between two great powers within one ideological bloc occurred. This essay will mainly focus on the causes of the Sino-Soviet split. First, it will present a short historical background of the split for a clearer understanding of events that led to distortion of Sino-Soviet relations. Next part of the essay will introduce and analyse circumstances that led to the split. It will analyse political circumstances, ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union and a structural nature of the communist bloc in the s. The essay will determine which of the above was the main cause for the Sino-Soviet split, if there even was one, and it will answer whether the split could have been avoided. Prior to the war, China had been treated by the USA as a great power, however, its status declined after the Civil War, mainly due to Communist triumph. So the First Five Year Plan began. Roberts argues that Soviet support to China in this period was crucial 2. China selected a development model that gave priority to heavy industry, which involved construction of large-scale and technologically advanced plants. It is arguable whether China was ready for such a step at the time. Its agriculture could not provide enough food for all new factory workers and support industrialisation. However China had little choice, it had to follow the path recommended by Lenin, implemented by Stalin and dictated by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union provided China with funds and expertise for industrialisation, even though China may not had been ready for it at the time. Soviet influence was also felt in education, especially in higher education on college and university level. Russian advisors helped with planning courses and Russian textbooks were widely used. In the earlier times, influence from the West Britain and the US was prevailing in Chinese higher education<sup>3</sup>. Soviet Union sent specialists to China in order to educate them in key sciences for heavy industry, such as e. One of those specialists, Mikhail Klochko, remembered the time of working in the Soviet Union with great nostalgia. He said that the Chinese had treated the specialists very well and that he had a feeling the Chinese and the Russians had been like brothers 4. Around 10, Soviet citizens served in China as specialists, of whom taught in Chinese universities 5. Klochko said that it was the biggest effort ever by a developed country in aid of an underdeveloped one 6. However, one must also take into account a vast loan the Soviet Union lent to China<sup>7</sup>. Year was a turning point for both China and Sino-Soviet relations. The Korean War that happened to present a great financial burden to China ended in that year. Also, negotiations with the Soviet Union for economic aid were concluded successfully, which meant that the First Five Year Plan got approved<sup>8</sup>. Lastly, another event that shaped Sino-Soviet relations happened in 1953. Stalin died in March and Nikita Khrushchev became his successor. That created disagreements between the Soviet Union and China<sup>9</sup> Other scholars would take year as the year of the Sino-Soviet split. Dallin argues that in both China and the Soviet Union reassessed their military capabilities and compared them to the ones of the US. The Soviet Union determined that its power is comparable to the US and that acted as a deterrent force, which discouraged both sides of attacking each other. The Soviet Union was to, therefore, stop increasing military power and seek a peaceful coexistence with the West. China, on the other had military capabilities substantially inferior to the West and wanted to further develop its arsenal. Nejc Seretinek However, most scholars would agree on the crucial years of the split being 1953-1960. The aim of the campaign was to rapidly transform mainly agrarian China into a socialist society through rapid industrialisation and collectivisation. However, Khrushchev accused Mao for not thinking this move through. Evidence of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations became known to the outside world in 1960 at the Romanian Communist Party Congress meeting where Mao and Khrushchev openly insulted each other<sup>13</sup> Soon after, specialists were fully withdrawn from China. Because of ideological similarities and a common enemy â€œ

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capitalism” their relations were flourishing. However, by the end of the decade, differences and disagreements between the two became too great and the communist bloc divided with the USSR on one side and China on the other. There are disagreements between historians and other scholars upon when exactly did the split happen and what was the trigger of the split. From that, one can only conclude that exact date of the split cannot be determined and that it is only safe to assure it happened between and . It seems like no single event led to the split, but it was rather a series of events that happened during those years that caused the Sino-Soviet split. As for the causes of the split, they will be more thoroughly analysed in next part of the essay. Causes of the Sino-Soviet split In the same manner as the exact timing of the Sino-Soviet split cannot be determined, the same can be said about the reasons that caused the split. Most historians would argue that it was a series of events mentioned in the previous part of the essay that led to the split. Lastly, there are also theories, which will be discussed later on in the essay, that attribute greater weight to the structure of the Communist system in s, rather than its politics or ideology. This part of essay will analyse four possible reasons that caused the split: Political and economic causes for the split Some of the political and economic circumstances have already been mentioned in the previous part of the essay, therefore, this part will focus more on the analysis and evaluation of the circumstances. Because China became a communist state, it had next to no choice, but to accept aid offered by the Soviet Union. Without the Soviet support China would have remained an underdeveloped country. In addition to that, the Soviet Union had substantial rights of operation in Chinese Manchuria. If Mao had angered Stalin, Manchuria would have probably remained under Soviet domination The USSR was willing to provide financial help and specialists. While China was seeking to become an equal partner in relations and a great power, the USSR probably perceived it as an unequal partner in Sino-Soviet relations. Once China reached a considerable economic and political power, it probably wanted to be treated in accordance to it. Mao, however, still saw the US as an enemy with whom peaceful coexistence was not an option. At this point Khrushchev reassessed their military capabilities and decided it would be beneficial for both the US and the USSR to stop rapid development of military technology and follow a path of peaceful coexistence On the other hand, Mao saw this as an opportunity for communism prevailing over capitalism. He thought that the East was gaining a momentum in development of technology and that it should soon overtake the West. It seems that many scholars would agree that different policy towards the US was too great to overcome and, therefore, it was an important factor behind the Sino-Soviet split. First Five Year Plan was an economic programme, based upon the one that had been completed in the Soviet Union 21 years before. Its aim was to increase Chinese economic growth and it was a stunning success. The Chinese managed to devote nearly 48 percent of their public investment to industrial development whereas comparable Soviet figure was under 42 percent With this economic miracle, Mao thought that the country is ready for a transition to communism and, therefore, he mobilized the country in the so-called Great Leap Forward. Soviet Union opposed the move arguing that China is neither socially nor economically prepared for such a campaign and that transition to communism should take many decades As it turned out, the Soviets were right; the Great Leap Forward was a failure and it led to great famine in China. From all the incidents in Sino-Soviet relations, Roberts argues that the Great Leap Forward was the most significant of them. However, even if the Great Leap Forward had been a successful campaign, it is possible that Sino-Soviet relations would have even worsened. In this case, the Sino-Soviet relations would have probably been even worse. Ideological causes of the split Besides Soviet Union and China sharing the Marxist-Leninist ideas about socialism and communism, they were also ideologically different. Those differences did not occur in the s, they had been present long before. During that period Soviet influence had an impact on development of Chinese Revolution and Chinese Communism. However, contrary to popular belief that the Soviet Union would support the Communist in China because of the shared Marxist-Leninist ideology, Mark argues that Stalin did not support Chinese Revolution because he thought it was leading to establishing socialism, but rather because he thought it was leading to national unity in China. According to Mark, it was more important to Stalin to have China united and allied with the Soviet Union than the fate of Chinese Revolution. This

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indicates that from the very start, Chinese communists did not have support from the Soviet Union because of a shared ideology. Nejc Seretinek and it raises a question of how much of the ideology did the Soviet Union and Chinese communists really share in the s. In addition to that, there was another feature that distinguished the beginning of Chinese and Russian communism. While the revolution in Russia was a revolution of mainly urban workers, the one in China was a peasant revolution. There was also one other ideological difference between Chinese and Soviet communism that became evident after communism had been established in China. Russians Communist ideology represents a system of universal applicability, but for the Chinese communism meant a general approach which had to be concretized in line with the conditions in a particular country. Therefore, for the Chinese, Soviet communism was not universally applicable to other communist states. With those differences rooted deeply in the very core of Communism in both countries it was hard to tell to which point will the differences be tolerated or when they will become too great to overcome. As early as , when Sino-Soviet relations were thriving, Mark was aware that the differences between Soviet and Chinese communism are too great and it was just a matter of time for harmonious relations between the two countries will cease to exist. Truly, the differences between the two countries only increased. Mao accused Khrushchev of being a revisionist and this debate about revisionism seemed to be the most heated debate in the Communist bloc from the late s onward. They published a book titled Long Live Nejc Seretinek Leninism, which attacked the theory of peaceful coexistence espoused by the Soviet Union. One of the main emphasises of the book was the critic of revisionism, however, calling it a declaration of independence from the Soviet Union would be jumping to conclusions. Authors of the book are mainly critical of Yugoslavian revisionism and they actually praise the Soviet Union for all the actions it had done towards establishing communism. The authors only indirectly criticized Soviet politics of peaceful coexistence by paraphrasing Lenin when said that: Even though a direct critic of the Soviet Union or Khrushchev was avoided, the book did point out some fundamental ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union that led to disagreements in foreign politics between the two countries and consequently the Sino-Soviet split. Structuralism One scholar, Jan F. Triska, took a completely different approach to explaining the Sino- Soviet split. He was an expert in communism in Eastern Europe and respected for keeping his Nejc Seretinek research free from ideology. According to him, a major mistake to make is perceiving all communist states to share 4 features in common: These for elements are not universal for all communist states; he argues that the communist party in a state is not all mighty and lacks executive powers for rule-making or policy-articulating. When, for example, an economic, political or functional conflict occurs, communist party is not the only actor in resolving it.

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## 3: Soviet Union - Wikipedia

*This study of relations between Latin America and the Third (Communist) International or Comintern examines the rather patchy start the organisation made in the region and analyses the definitely and, for some Latin American Communists, rather humiliatingly, peripheral position occupied by Latin America in the organisation's doctrinal formulations.*

Executive Summary In the communist world was struck with a seemingly major setback in their monolithic unity in the form of the Sino-Soviet split. In the eyes of U. In light of the communist Chinese-Russian Federation alliance and their strategic, deleterious influence within the U. Such analysts need honestly review the evidence as to whether: Based on the evidence presented in this essay, one can come to the following conclusions: However, the actual historical record in the s illustrated that trade, military, and some party to party ties were maintained by China and the Soviet Union. Both states were irrevocably committed to the defense of each other and the expansion of world communism. Mao noted to Khrushchev in a meeting that: I said that, when the war begins, we would have to use the coast widely, including Vietnam. I already said that, in case of war, the Soviet Union will use any part of China, [and] Russian sailors will be able to act in any port of China. I would not speak about Russian sailors. Joint efforts are needed if war breaks out. Perhaps Chinese sailors would act, perhaps joint efforts would be necessary. But we did not raise the question about any territory or our base there. Overall, the international situation is favorable for the socialist camp, underlined Mao Tse-Tung. They have serious internal contradictions. A rapid swell in the anti-imperialist liberation movement is occurring in Africa and Latin America. As far as Asia is concerned, continued Mao Tse-Tung, here on the surface there is a certain decline [in the movement], explainable by the fact that in many countries of Asia the national bourgeoisie has already taken power. This has not taken place in Africa and Latin America. These two continents present for the USA, England, and France a source of trouble and tasks which are difficult to solve. The conversation between Mao and Khrushchev indicated approval for the political warfare conducted by the Soviet dictator against the United States and noted that the West in faced with threats emanating from Third World terrorist movements. This started a long time ago. Our parties have cooperated and will cooperate. In this situation, what is of decisive significance for the international cause of the proletariat as a whole is the struggle against imperialism headed by the United States and the support for the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—It is the common desire of the people of China and the Soviet Union, of all the people in the socialist camp of the communists of all countries and of all the oppressed nations and people of the world over to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp and especially to strengthen the unity of our two parties and countries. Those with such ideas will certainly be disappointed. On the contrary, if any act of aggression occurs against any Socialist country this would be an act of aggression against the whole Socialist camp. It would be impossible not to give support. If a country refused to give support, it would not be a Socialist country. The Soviet people may rest assured that once the Soviet Union meets with imperialist aggression and puts up resolute resistance, China will definitely stand side by side with the Soviet Union and fight against the common enemy. Any relatively minor, publicized differences between the USSR and the PRC on the tactics of burying the West are supplanted in favor of the common goal of destroying world capitalism. The Chinese and Soviets continued to publically declare that, in the event of a world war, they would lend the entire socialist camp mutual assistance. Recently declassified conversations between Chinese and Soviet bloc leaders lend credence as to the sincerity of the above mentioned quotes highlighting Sino-Soviet solidarity. Deng Xiaoping and Romanian Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu echoed the unity of the entire communist bloc during a worldwide conflict with the capitalist world in Of course, we understand that in case of a war against imperialism we will have to act in common, but these actions — which require the mobilization of the whole people — must be performed on the basis of a close cooperation, with the independence of each country being observed, and the

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participation of each army as an independent army, as a national force. This will ensure that the effort of each country will really be an effort from all viewpoints. We wholly agree with your opinion. We acted like that during the war in Korea. We can tell you that, together with the Korean comrades, we drew up a battle plan, but on the basis of the principles put forward by comrade Ceausescu just now. We cannot admit the fact that Vietnam and Korea be subordinated to our country because China is a bigger country. We know that you have fought and think that there are many people who agree with you. How would the WUO be aware of such sensitive communist strategy by various foreign, hostile powers? A logical and sensible invasion and occupation strategy of the United States as briefly laid out by Grathwohl can only come through cooperation with China and the USSR. In this lecture, Shelepin allegedly explained that a contrived split could be created to provide strategic disinformation to Western audiences. The feigned disunity of the communist world promotes real disunity in the noncommunist world. Each blade of the communist pair of scissors makes the other more effective. The militancy of one nation helps the activist detente diplomacy of the other. Mutual charges of hegemonism help to create the right climate for one or the other to negotiate agreements with the West. False alignments, formed with third parties by each side against the other, make it easier to achieve specific communist goals, such as the acquisition of advanced technology or the negotiation of arms control agreements or communist penetration of the Arab and African states. In Western eyes the military, political, economic, and ideological threat from world communism appears diminished. In consequence Western determination to resist the advance of communism is undermined. The Chinese would then have influence in these nations and be able to acquire valuable technology from them. At an opportune moment, Golitsyn then stated the secret Sino-Soviet alliance would then become open: The element of apparent duality in Soviet and Chinese policies will disappear. The hitherto concealed coordination between them will become visible and predominant. The Soviets and the Chinese will be officially reconciled. Convergence would not be between two equal parties, but would be on terms dictated by the communist bloc. The argument for accommodation with the overwhelming strength of communism would be virtually unanswerable. Traditional conservatives would be isolated and driven toward extremism. They might become the victims of a new McCarthyism of the left. The Soviet dissidents who are now extolled as heroes of the resistance to Soviet communism would play an active part in arguing for convergence. Their present supporters would be confronted with a choice of forsaking their idols or acknowledging the legitimacy of the new Soviet regime. As events unfolded in the s, the Chinese and Soviets openly moved towards rapprochement, then a military, and political alliance which threatened the West. Both communist powers and their allies acquired massive infusions of technology and capital from businessmen and political elites in the capitalist world. Large multinational corporations and their globalist allies in the political class assumed that they could moderate or soften the attitudes of the international communist world through trade and the policy of differentiation i. The USSR and China also hoped that this split would also convince the West that the bloc threat weakened as a result of ideological discord. This misperception would then convince Western governments to scale back military production and preparedness. Voices in the Wilderness: Free World Voices Suspicious of the Sino-Soviet Split A number of commentators, military, political, and intelligence personalities in the Free World voiced their suspicions on the veracity of the split between Moscow and Beijing. There the Chinese and Soviets are exploiting huge uranium deposits. General Lane explained the rationale behind the joint Chinese-Soviet deception strategy: It employs the discipline and flexibility of communist organizationâ€The communists, emerging from a very inferior power position and facing a long climb to parity with the democracies, needed a deception plan which would support continuous attack without ever alerting the defenses of the West. It would not do to grab a few gains and then face unyielding hostility, as Stalin did with Truman after Potsdam. The answer was the Jekyll and Hyde routine. This double image would keep the free world from focusing on the true nature and purposes of communism. It would cater to the bourgeois preconception that communist purposes could be moderated by cooperation to reach accommodation with the free world. It would provide an opiate to soothe the victim through the sequence of disasters which would attend his declining power. Republican Presidential Candidate

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Ronald Reagan noted in an interview that: During the s, there were elements who analyzed the actual trends in Sino-Soviet relations. Deng recently sent Vice-Premier Li Peng, educated in Moscow, to see Mikhail Gorbachev to urge improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, as he said, between "the two great neighbors and socialist countries. These analysts were concerned that the two communist powers were drawing together in a world that was seen to be democratizing rapidly. We should stop smiling bravely and pretending that our hand is stronger without the China card in it. Safire concluded by stating: Only in that unlikely case would it not be detrimental to our interests. I believe we will see relations between them going back to the close harmony they enjoyed before the great split of They have a lot in common. They are the two lawless states left in the world. They live in a world that is more dominated by the United States than either of them are comfortable with. Neither government really approved of U. Collaboration continued on the military, ideological, and economic fronts. During the bona fide split in Tito and Stalin , collaboration of any type would be non-existent. However, Sino Soviet cooperation continued after This state of affairs begs the question as to: Would two enemies still supply military equipment, important economic assistance, and pronounce ideological solidarity with each other? These are the questions that historians and policy makers needed to heed when analyzing the truthfulness of the Sino-Soviet split and formulating Western policies as a result of this supposed change in relations with the two communist giants. It should be noted that cobalt in atomic bombs would serve to greatly enhance the firepower and destructive capacity of such weapons. Despite the split, it is interesting to observe that such collaborators with China found it comfortably convenient to use Eastern European countries as conduits for the transferring of sensitive atomic bomb technology and materials to China. A North Korean Colonel noted in that: There is no reason to keep your program secret. Information exchange on these research programs would be of use to both our countries.

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### 4: Monographs | Rowman & Littlefield - Rowman & Littlefield

*The Sino-Soviet split () was the breaking of political relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), caused by doctrinal divergences arising from each of the two powers' different interpretation of Marxism-Leninism as influenced by the national interests of each country during the Cold War.*

Maxim Litvinov , Soviet ambassador to the U. Soviet planners, resigned to U. Though there was no talk yet of military assistance. Castro asked for help from the Soviets and in response Khrushchev approved the temporary purchase of Cuban sugar in exchange for Soviet fuel. This deal was to play a part in sustaining the Cuban economy for many years to come. Following the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of , Fidel Castro announced publicly that Cuba was to become a socialist republic. Khrushchev sent congratulations to Castro for repelling the invasion, but privately believed the Americans would soon bring the weight of their regular army to bear. The defense of Cuba became a matter of prestige for the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev believed that the U. Cuban Missile Crisis Main article: Cuban Missile Crisis Khrushchev agreed on a deployment plan in May chiefly in response to NATO positioning their nuclear missiles in Turkey in , and by late July over sixty Soviet ships were in route to Cuba, some of them already carrying military material. U-2 flight on the morning of October 14 photographed a series of SAM surface-to-air missile sites being constructed. In a televised address on October 22, U. Kennedy announced the discovery of the installations and proclaimed that any nuclear missile attack from Cuba would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union and would be responded to accordingly. Khrushchev sent letters to Kennedy on October 23 and 24 claiming the deterrent nature of the missiles in Cuba and the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. On October 26, the Soviets offered to withdraw the missiles in return for a U. This deal was accepted and the crisis abated. The missile crisis had a significant impact on the countries involved. While it led to a thaw in U. It allowed the Soviets to monitor all U. Castro also spoke about the development of Soviet agriculture, repeatedly emphasizing the necessity for using Soviet experience in solving internal tasks of socialist construction in Cuba. Castro asserted that the Soviet people "expressed by their deeds their love for and solidarity with Cuba". On the trip Castro and Khrushchev negotiated new sugar export deals and agricultural methods to solve the main problem in increasing the output of sugar. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia Edit On 23 August Castro made a public gesture to the Soviet Union that reaffirmed their support in him. Two days after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to repress the Prague Spring , Castro took to the airwaves and publicly denounced the Czech rebellion. He called the leaders of the rebellion "the agents of West Germany and fascist reactionary rabble. The relationship was for the most part an economic one, with the Soviet Union providing military, economic and political assistance to Cuba. In , Cuba gained membership into the Council of Mutual Economic Aid CMEA , which enhanced strong cooperation in the realm of national economic planning and gave Moscow increasingly more economic control over Cuba. Heightened tensions best characterize diplomatic relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union throughout the Gorbachev era. The transition during perestroika towards market reforms weakened Soviet currency, resulting in a reduction of basic subsidies and widespread shortages of basic goods, a loss of jobs, and decreased productivity. Castro intended for these reforms to forestall or eradicate any reformist ideas spreading in Cuba prompted by radical political and economic reforms in the U. The effects of glasnost on political criticism and discussion in the U. Critical articles in Soviet newspapers soon emerged, focusing on the lack of efficiency of the Cuban economy and the illogical nature of the terms of trade. They are for the ideas of imperialism, change and the counter-revolution. Gorbachev was only the second Soviet leader to visit Latin America, and rather than resolve the increasing tensions between the two nations, the visit was mostly a symbolic gesture. While in they had paid over 11 times the world price for Cuban sugar, in they only paid three times the price. Then, in June , the Soviets disbanded CMEA, a huge basis for their allyship in the past, further straining the economic situation in Cuba. Soviet foreign policy took on a new orientation that stressed international independence, non-offensive

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defense, multilateral cooperation, and use of the political process to solve security issues. After the failed coup attempt on August 1, Cuban leaders, feeling they had less to lose, began to openly criticize the reforms in the U.S. These positions have resulted in the development of these events. After Castro publicly criticized Soviet reformism, yet he hoped Soviet communism would survive perestroika. Dissolution of the Soviet Union Edit The subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 had an immediate and devastating effect on Cuba. Cuba lost valuable aid and trading privileges after the fall of the Soviet Union, soon after entering a fiscal crisis. Oil imports dropped from 13 million tons in 1989 to about 3 million tons in 1991 from Russia.

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### 5: Sino Soviet split | Revolvry

*Causes of the Sino-Soviet split In the same manner as the exact timing of the Sino-Soviet split cannot be determined, the same can be said about the reasons that caused the split. Most historians would argue that it was a series of events mentioned in the previous part of the essay that led to the split.*

The CCP set out to revolutionize the countryside south of the Yangtze river. This meant land reform and educating the peasants to support the revolution. At this time, peasants were given land. In some cases, they also killed their landlords, but this was a more general occurrence in the second, more radical wave of land reform that took place after. It is estimated that one million were killed. In the first phase, the rich peasants were allowed to keep their land, or most of it, in order to help restore food production and avoid alienating them from the new regime. At the same time, party committees were established in every village to help the peasants carry out the reform and maintain party control over the process. In the cities, which were new territory for the CCP, Mao followed a policy of "alliance" with the intellectuals and middle class, including the merchants. Again, the goal was to restore production and avoid alienation. The state took possession of heavy industry, banking and transport but private enterprise was allowed both in the towns and in the countryside. In general, the PRC economic policies and political toleration of the first two or three years resembled the NEP period in Soviet Russia, as well as the first postwar years in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. The goal was the same, i. Europe, this did not mean that the communists gave up their goal of creating a "socialist" society. One radical reform introduced in was the new marriage law, giving women freedom of choice. As mentioned earlier ch. It was embraced by the May 4th movement of and then taken up by the CCP. The marriage law was a break with the past; it was also the first step in the CCP policy of undermining the traditional power of the family in China. Terry Weidner for his help in revising this chapter, Oct. Before the Korean War, Mao showed great interest in establishing friendly relations with the United States, provided it recognized the territorial integrity of China, including Taiwan, and thus gave up its support of Chiang Kai-shek, who had established his government as the Republic of China Free China in Taiwan. Thus, when Mao invited J. From the perspective of time, this policy seems unwise. We must, however, bear in mind that it was formulated in the atmosphere of the Cold War. American opinion was deeply affected by the expansion of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and its threat to Western Europe the Berlin Blockade, As we know, NATO was the response there. The communist victory in China created the fear of communist expansion in Asia, which was heightened by the French Indochina War, and then the Korean War. This political climate prevented the establishment of good U. Furthermore, Stalin made it clear to Mao, that he did not want him to risk a war with the United States. Mao paid a long visit to Moscow in late and early. Finally, he had to recognize the existence of Soviet Mongolia. These were bitter pills for the Chinese, but they needed Soviet economic aid so they accepted them. Recently published Chinese documents as well as recently declassified Russian documents allow a comparison of the two records of the Mao-Stalin conversations in Moscow in December January. It also suggests that Stalin deliberately left Mao to cool his heels in a "dacha" country house near Moscow between the first conversation of December 16, and the second on January 22, , when Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai was also present. Perhaps Stalin wanted to teach Mao a lesson? Whatever the case may be, Mao resented this treatment deeply. Perhaps the second version is nearer to the truth; if so, it would explain why Stalin kept Mao waiting 5 weeks between the two conversations. The Impact of the Korean War. We know a great deal more about the origins of this war since the opening of Russian documents on this subject in summer. It is also clear why Mao at first followed a cautious policy - he did not want to risk a war with United States. Finally, under pressure from Stalin - who also wanted to avoid a war with the U. S - fearing that U. Therefore, in early November, Chinese troops launched some attacks on U. This warning was also conveyed to the U. The Chinese troops had massed in the difficult mountainous terrain on their side of the Yalu river. But they were so well camouflaged that they were not be detected by U. Forces, Korea, , after

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landing troops at Inchon, approached the bridges on the Yalu, the Chinese attacked on November 26th and drove back the American and ROK troops. MacArthur had the agreement of President Harry S. Truman. However, they did not agree to his suggestions of bombing China, including use of the atomic bomb. President Truman dismissed him in April. The result was the existence of two Koreas: It is worth noting that during the war the Soviets sent the PRC a great deal of military equipment, such as artillery and MIG fighter planes - but the Chinese had to pay for the Soviet arms they obtained. Furthermore, Soviet pilots flew MiGs against U.S. forces. However, it is clear that Stalin was just as unwilling to become involved with the United States in a war over Korea as Truman was to become involved there in a war with the USSR. In fact, Truman not only opposed using the atomic bomb against China, but also opposed sending U.S. troops to the Korean War. The Korean War led to more radical reforms in China. Terror and coercion were used to eradicate all opposition. In the first campaign against "counter-revolutionaries," which began in February, an estimated 1 to 3 million people were killed. The next campaign was a purge of the party bureaucracy. It targeted the 3 antis: The aim was to rid the party of many allegedly unreliable members who had jumped on the bandwagon in and after 1949. Next came a campaign against the former ally of the PRC, the Chinese middle class. The slogan was now the 5 antis: Since there was no definition of what constituted a government secret, it was easy to accuse anyone viewed as an enemy, or potential enemy of the regime. In fact, the campaign was designed to break the middle class, make them give up their property, and agree to become salaried managers in state enterprises. They were forced to "confess" their misdeeds in front of their former employees. This was designed to humiliate them and make them pliant tools of the regime. Those who refused were often given long terms of imprisonment, which many did not survive. The first FYP was launched in 1953, with the aim of developing the Chinese economy on the Soviet model. This was quite logical, for the USSR was the only existing communist economic system and was the only source of technical aid for the PRC. The first FYP gave priority to heavy industry. Indeed, China was far more backward economically in 1953 than the USSR had been in 1928, when Stalin launched his industrialization and collectivization drive. Soon, all private property was abolished as well. Thus, he began with the establishment of semi-socialist peasant cooperatives whose members were paid according to the amount of land and capital they brought in, as well as according to their work. At this time, Mao made a speech calling for a sharp increase in collectivization and rapid acceleration followed. However, this drive slowed down in 1956, partly because of peasant resistance, and partly because of a poor harvest. The Background to the Sino-Soviet Split. Shortly after the speech, Mao's support went further than historians suspected. A recently discovered document in the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives shows that on October 3, 1956, Soviet and Japanese diplomats reached an agreement that stipulated: Still, the agreement seemed to preserve some space for the CCP in provinces close to the border of Soviet Mongolia - even though the Japanese did not control these areas either! As far as Khrushchev was concerned, he sometimes supported the PRC and at other times considered it an obstacle to his policy of coexistence with the United States. Already in 1956, he told Western statesmen that China was a liability to the Soviet Union because of the danger of a conflict between the PRC and the U.S. Moreover, it was also at this time that the PRC began to compete with the Soviets for the leadership of the Third World. They often treated the Chinese communists as somewhat backward and wayward younger brethren, who had to be kept in their place and follow the Soviet lead. Worse still, Khrushchev not only set out to destroy the Stalin myth, but also attacked the "personality cult" as alien to communist practice -- and there was, after all, a growing Mao cult in China. He said that such a war would not be the end of the world, because half its population would survive. From other statements by Mao, it is clear he thought that a large part of the huge Chinese population would survive an atomic war. However, both leaders tried to keep up an appearance of good relations. The first open Sino-Soviet clash over foreign policy came in 1959. However, three days later, when Khrushchev was on a visit to Beijing, he withdrew the conference proposal, probably to conciliate Mao. It is clear from recently published Chinese documents that Mao launched the attack on purpose to show his independence of the USSR. Khrushchev wrote a letter to President Eisenhower supporting China and even brandishing the nuclear threat. In fact, he did what he could to defuse the crisis. In any case, the show of U.S. In

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September , there were border clashes between the PRC and India, and the Soviets called on both sides to desist, which Mao saw as a betrayal. During a formal banquet in his honor, Khrushchev attacked those who wanted to test the stability of the capitalist system - meaning a war with the United States. Also, Khrushchev now supported the seating of both Chinas in the United Nations: To add insult to injury, at the Romanian Party Congress in Bucharest in June , Khrushchev openly attacked the PRC leaders as "madmen" who wanted to unleash nuclear war. In July, he decided to withdraw all Soviet experts from China. As we know, this included the experts who were helping the PRC develop its own nuclear bomb.

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### 6: Did Africa have any significance in the Cold War? : AskHistorians

*Editor's Note: This forum offers a range of perspectives on Lorenz Lüthi's book *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, which reassesses the sharp divide that emerged between the Soviet Union and China in the late 1950s and 1960s.*

Bring fact-checked results to the top of your browser search. Total Cold War and the diffusion of power, 1945-1972 The concomitant arrival of the missile age and of an independent and restive Third World multiplied the senses in which politics had become global. Intercontinental rockets not only meant that the most destructive weapons known could now be propelled halfway around the world in minutes but also, because of the imminent nuclear standoff they heralded, that a Cold War competition would now extend into other realms—science and technology, economic growth, social welfare, race relations, image making—in which the Soviets or Americans could try to prove that their system was the best. At the same time, the decolonization of dozens of underdeveloped states in Asia and Africa induced the superpowers to look beyond the original front lines of the Cold War in Europe and East Asia. These technological and political revolutions would seem to have raised the United States and the Soviet Union to unequalled heights of power. By the mid-1960s the vigorous response of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to the Cold War challenge seemed to ensure American technological, economic, and military primacy for the foreseeable future. A mere five to seven years later, however, it became clear that the U.S., far from establishing an American hegemony, had in fact wrought a diffusion of world power and an erosion of the formerly rigid Cold War blocs. Western Europe and Japan, now recovered from the war, also achieved dynamic economic growth in the 1960s, reducing their relative inferiority to the United States and prompting their governments to exercise a greater independence. The Sino-Soviet split, perhaps the most important event in postwar diplomacy, shattered the unity of the Communist bloc, and Third World countries often showed themselves resistant to superpower coercion or cajoling. By the mid-1960s the world after Sputnik Soviet progress and American reaction Premier Khrushchev anticipated the new correlation of forces in his foreign policy address to the 20th Party Congress in 1961. In Leninist doctrine this last phrase implied a state of continued competition and Socialist advance without war. The immediate opportunities for Socialism, according to Khrushchev, derived from the struggle of the colonial peoples, which the U.S. Sputnik restored Soviet prestige after the embarrassment in Hungary, shook European confidence in the U.S. Eisenhower was apprised in advance of Soviet missile progress thanks in part to overflights of the U-2 spy plane. By the time of Sputnik the Pentagon already had several parallel programs for ballistic missiles of various types, including the advanced, solid-fueled Polaris and Minuteman. The great fleet of B-52 and B-36 intercontinental bombers already deployed also assured continued American strategic superiority through the early 1960s. The frugal Eisenhower thus tried to play down the importance of Sputnik and to discourage a race for arms or prestige, but he was frustrated by a coalition of Democrats, journalists, academics, and hawks of both parties who insisted that the United States not only leapfrog the Soviets in space and missiles but also increase federal support to education, extend more military and economic aid to the Third World, and expand social programs at home intended in part to polish the American image abroad—in short, pursue the Cold War more vigorously. Eisenhower conceded to this mood in 1961 by sponsoring creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and passage of the National Defense Education Act, accelerating weapons programs, and deploying intermediate-range missiles in England, Italy, and Turkey. He also acknowledged the expanded Soviet threat in his State of the Union address in 1961. The Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war. The Sino-Soviet split A still more energetic U.S. Western observers looked in vain for ways to split the Communist bloc. Russian leadership in the world Communist movement was thus challenged for the first time. Mao was a romantic revolutionary with an unquestionable bent for cruel or irrational theatrics on a gigantic scale. Large-scale industries and infrastructure collapsed, much to the disgust of Soviet guest engineers. By 1961 the economic chaos had become so severe that famine claimed 60 million lives. At a

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November summit Mao learned that the Soviets would insist on retaining control over any warheads sent to China and would not share missile technology. When the Soviets also failed to back the Chinese in their conflicts with Taiwan and India, Sino-Soviet tensions increased. On July 16, 1960, the U.S. The Sino-Soviet split shattered the strict bipolarity of the Cold War world though the United States would not take advantage of that fact for more than a decade and turned the U.S. The fundamental causes of the split must be traced to contradictions in the Soviet role as both the leader of the Communist movement and a great power with its own national interests. Before the U.S. This meant that the U.S. Accordingly, Khrushchev played a risky double game from 1956 to 1960, alternately holding out hope for arms control to the NATO powers and leveling demands backed by rocket-rattling. This initiative, like others before and after, was a no-lose stratagem for the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. NATO leaders resisted the Rapacki Plan but had immediately to deal with a March 1959 Soviet offer to suspend all nuclear testing provided the West did the same. Throughout the 1950s growing data on the harmful effects of nuclear fallout had been increasing pressure on the nuclear powers to take such a step. The United States and Britain were caught in the midst of testing warheads for the many new missiles under development, but a one-year test ban did go into effect in November 1963. With the Chinese making noises about a Soviet sellout to the West, however, Khrushchev immediately provoked a new crisis in Berlin, demanding that the Allies withdraw from West Berlin within six months. Khrushchev also indicated that the best way to solve the Berlin question would be to neutralize and disarm the two German states. In January 1960 the Soviets expanded their proposed nuclear-free zone to include East Asia and the whole Pacific Ocean area—a clear hint of their desire to prevent China from going nuclear. The Berlin deadline passed without incident as Khrushchev accepted an invitation to become the first Soviet premier to visit the United States. The increased recognition by the United States and the U.S. Peking may have hoped to force Moscow to support its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, while Chiang may have hoped to drag the United States into supporting an invasion of the mainland. Neither superpower, however, was willing to risk war. By September 1960, when Khrushchev arrived in the United States, Dulles had died, and Eisenhower was intent to use personal diplomacy in an attempt to put a cap on the arms race. The Chinese observer at a Warsaw Pact meeting in February 1960 declared in advance that any arms agreements reached at the U.S. On the eve of the Paris summit an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over the U.S. When Eisenhower refused to apologize for the incident and assumed personal responsibility, Khrushchev had little choice but to walk out. Decolonization and development Events in the other new arena of the post-Sputnik era—the Third World—likewise antagonized relations among the U.S. Critics insisted that the Marshall Plan was not a valid analogy for Third World aid because the former had been a case of helping industrial populations rebuild their societies, while the latter was a case of sparking industrial or even merely agricultural development in primitive economies. Foreign aid did not necessarily serve U.S. Proponents of aid replied that U.S. In the late 1950s, U.S. The Soviet line, by contrast, held that new nations would not be truly independent until they freed themselves from economic dependence on their former masters, but the Soviets invariably expected a political return for their own assistance. By it was already clear, however, that local politics and culture made every Third World situation unique. The Middle East had reached an unstable deadlock based precariously on the UN-administered cease-fire of 1948. In January 1958 the U.S. Congress authorized the President to deploy U.S. Khrushchev denounced the intervention, demanded that the U.S. His extension of an invitation to India, but not China, needlessly alienated Peking and signaled a new Soviet interest in relations with New Delhi. The climactic year of African decolonization was 1960, and the first Cold War crisis on that continent occurred when, in that year, Belgium hastily pulled out of the vast Belgian Congo now Congo [Kinshasa]. Tribal antagonisms and rival personalities made even the independence ceremonies a catastrophe, as the Congolese nationalist leader and first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, supported an insurrection by Congolese army units that involved the murder of whites and blacks alike. No sooner had Belgian troops returned to restore order than Moïse Tshombe declared the secession of the iron-rich Katanga province. The clumsy UN efforts did not prevent, and may have incited, the spread of civil war. Lumumba tried to establish his own secessionist state, but he then fell into the hands of the Congolese army headed by

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Joseph Mobutu later Mobutu Sese Seko, a former sergeant, and was murdered by the Katangese in January. The Katangan revolt was not quelled until. In Southeast Asia the Geneva Accords disintegrated rapidly after American advisers tried vainly to arrest the disintegration of South Vietnam with advice on counterinsurgency and state-building techniques. In neighbouring Laos the Communist Pathet Lao took control of the two northernmost provinces of the country in defiance of the neutral government under Prince Souvanna Phouma agreed upon after Geneva. Those provinces sheltered the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply route bypassing the demilitarized zone between the two Vietnams. When a new, assertive Laotian government sent troops to enforce its authority over the provinces in 1959, civil war appeared inevitable. Nixon during his trip to Caracas and Lima alerted Washington to the dangers inherent in neglecting the genuine needs of the region. The United States agreed to fund an Inter-American Development Bank, while the State Department sought to avoid too close an association with unpopular, authoritarian regimes. Whatever the overall merits of such a policy, it had immediate and disastrous effects in Cuba. Fulgencio Batista established a corrupt dictatorship in Cuba, and four years later a young revolutionary named Fidel Castro took to the Sierra Maestra with comrades and made pretensions of fighting a guerrilla war. Contrary to his image as a populist and democrat, Castro made himself the new dictator, nationalized hundreds of millions of dollars worth of American property, and declared that he was and always had been a Marxist. His actions gradually alienated whatever sympathy he had in the United States. Eisenhower instructed the CIA to explore means of removing Castro, who made Cuba into an immensely valuable Soviet satellite 90 miles from the United States. By, therefore, the post-Sputnik world posed new challenges for the Western alliance stretching from outer space to Third World jungles. Kennedy as president of the United States infused American foreign policy with new style and vigour. The Kennedy advisers had also been highly critical of the policy of reliance on massive retaliation and determined to make the United States capable of flexible response by expanding conventional armed forces as well. The new attitude toward the Third World was perhaps the clearest break in American diplomacy. Basing its policy on W. Instead, aid money often fed corruption, bolstered power-hungry leaders or Socialist bureaucracies, or helped to finance local conflicts. What was more, the Soviets had some natural advantages in dealing with such leaders, since they offered no moralistic advice about democracy and human rights, while their own police-state methods served the needs of local despots. On the other hand, sustained world economic growth and measures to stabilize commodity prices helped the developing countries to achieve an average annual growth rate of 5 percent during the 1950s compared with 5. But the crushing rate of Third World population growth 2. The CIA had trained Cuban exiles in Guatemala and flown them to Florida, whence they were to stage an invasion of Cuba in expectation of a popular revolt there. Instead, the landing at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961, was a fiasco. No coordination had been achieved with dissidents inside Cuba, while the failure to provide U. Kennedy had to content himself with a promise to resist any efforts by Castro and the guerrilla leader Che Guevara to export revolution elsewhere in Latin America. Kennedy and Khrushchev held a summit meeting in Vienna in June 1961. With Berlin and the Third World uppermost in his mind, Kennedy proposed that neither superpower attempt to upset the existing balance of power in any region where the other was already involved. Khrushchev evidently considered the young president to be weak and on the defensive and tried to intimidate him with a new ultimatum, threatening to turn over control of West Berlin to the East German government. Khrushchev was being pressured by the East German leader Walter Ulbricht to stem the tide of thousands of skilled workers who were fleeing across the zonal boundary into West Berlin. Kennedy responded by pledging to defend West Berlin and calling up 150,000 reservists.

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7: Cubaâ€™Soviet Union relations | Military Wiki | FANDOM powered by Wikia

*Other studies of Latin American communism Robert J. Alexander con-tributes a chapter on "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split on Latin.*

Africa is a very large continent as such there were many different reasons that different areas of Africa were significant throughout the cold war. As such this is going to be quite a long answer. I will explain the significance of Africa in the cold war through a few of the countries of the continent in order to give some structure to the answer. If you would like to know the history of certain country please say so. In Some Respects, Africa had caught the attention of revolutionary Marxists long before the Cold War "proper"; Lenin, after all, had regarded imperialism as the "highest stage of capitalism", and also its weakest link in that it was colonialism which would engender a death struggle between the capitalist-imperialist nations, culminating in their mutual destruction. Britain tried to present empire in an appeal to the USA as a Bulwark against communism. With the collapse of empire, the USA took a more direct approach. Decolonisation Firstly to understand the Cold Wars effect on Africa some information on decolonization. Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal were the main powers involved with the German and Ottoman African empires having been abolished after World War 1. After World War 1 it became increasingly evident that colonialism was no longer possible to Britain, France and Belgium notably not Portugal. The two World Wars had cost the European nations a lot economically and in terms of manpower, important resources for maintaining a colonial empire. These former colonies now had independence and resources that they hoped to sell to solidify their place in the global economy. I am going to deliberately ignore Ethiopia and Liberia in this part these two are anomalous to the norm in African Decolonization. Egypt the first African Decolonization The first nation on the African continent to gain independence was the Egypt. The final act that solidified independence was the Egyptian revolution of in which the Free Officers Movement overthrew King Farouk a very pro-British monarchy which eventually lead to Gamel Abdul Nasser rising to power. Nasser received support from the USSR both light and heavy armaments. Algeria The Algerian war far independence from France began in and ended in The main revolutionary organisation in Algeria was the FLN who followed a similar Arab Socialist ideology as the Egyptians did, albeit with an Algerian flavor of nationalism. His aim was to create a Pan-African state in Africa in the wake of declining European colonialism. Officially Ghana was a non-aligned Marxist state. There is no way to half do socialism. South Africa South Africa was very different from the previous mentioned areas due to the fact that it was a white minority rule state. Mozambique and Angola became Peoples Republics heavily influenced by the USSR and it was hoped South Africa could prevent more countries falling under the influence of communism. The conflict took place in what is now Namibia, Angola and Zambia. The crux of the conflict was that the African nations wanted independence from colonialism and white minority rule. The White Minority rule countries the status quo, while the superpowers wanted as much influence with their respective dependents. This is really just scratching the surface of a very broad topic that has many books written on it. If you want to read more I reccomend:

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### 8: Sino-Soviet split - Wikipedia

*The Sino-Soviet armed confrontation on the Ussuri River in March increased Romania's anxiety and reinforced Ceaușescu's determination to prevent the Soviet Union from involving the Warsaw Pact in disputes with China.*

Maxim Litvinov, Soviet ambassador to the U. Soviet planners, resigned to U. Though there was no talk yet of military assistance. Castro asked for help from the Soviets and in response Khrushchev approved the temporary purchase of Cuban sugar in exchange for Soviet fuel. This deal was to play a part in sustaining the Cuban economy for many years to come. Following the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961, Fidel Castro announced publicly that Cuba was to become a socialist republic. Khrushchev sent congratulations to Castro for repelling the invasion, but privately believed the Americans would soon bring the weight of their regular army to bear. The defense of Cuba became a matter of prestige for the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev believed that the U. Cuban Missile Crisis[ edit ] Main article: Cuban Missile Crisis Khrushchev agreed on a deployment plan in May chiefly in response to NATO positioning their nuclear missiles in Turkey in 1961, and by late July over sixty Soviet ships were en route to Cuba, some of them already carrying military material. U-2 flight on the morning of October 14 photographed a series of SAM surface-to-air missile sites being constructed. In a televised address on October 22, U. Kennedy announced the discovery of the installations and proclaimed that any nuclear missile attack from Cuba would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union and would be responded to accordingly. Khrushchev sent letters to Kennedy on October 23 and 24 claiming the deterrent nature of the missiles in Cuba and the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. On October 26, the Soviets offered to withdraw the missiles in return for a U. This deal was accepted and the crisis abated. The missile crisis had a significant impact on the countries involved. While it led to a thaw in U. Castro was not consulted throughout the Kennedy-Khrushchev negotiations and was angered by the unilateral Soviet withdrawal of the missiles and bombers. It allowed the Soviets to monitor all U. The station was abandoned in 1962, but quietly reopened in 1964. Castro also spoke about the development of Soviet agriculture, repeatedly emphasizing the necessity for using Soviet experience in solving internal tasks of socialist construction in Cuba. Castro asserted that the Soviet people "expressed by their deeds their love for and solidarity with Cuba". On the trip Castro and Khrushchev negotiated new sugar export deals and agricultural methods to solve the main problem in increasing the output of sugar. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia[ edit ] On 23 August Castro made a public gesture to the Soviet Union that reaffirmed their support in him. Two days after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to repress the Prague Spring, Castro took to the airwaves and publicly denounced the Czech "rebellion". He called the leaders of the rebellion "the agents of West Germany and fascist reactionary rabble. The relationship was for the most part an economic one, with the Soviet Union providing military, economic and political assistance to Cuba. In 1960, Cuba gained membership into the Council of Mutual Economic Aid CMEA, which enhanced strong cooperation in the realm of national economic planning and gave Moscow increasingly more economic control over Cuba. Heightened tensions best characterize diplomatic relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union throughout the Gorbachev era. The transition during perestroika towards market reforms weakened Soviet currency, resulting in a reduction of basic subsidies and widespread shortages of basic goods, a loss of jobs, and decreased productivity. Castro intended for these reforms to forestall or eradicate any reformist ideas spreading in Cuba prompted by radical political and economic reforms in the U. The effects of glasnost on political criticism and discussion in the U. Critical articles in Soviet newspapers soon emerged, focusing on the lack of efficiency of the Cuban economy and the illogical nature of the terms of trade. They are for the ideas of imperialism, change and the counter-revolution. Gorbachev was only the second Soviet leader to visit Latin America, and rather than resolve the increasing tensions between the two nations, the visit was mostly a symbolic gesture. While in they had paid over 11 times the world price for Cuban sugar, in they only paid three times the price. Soviet foreign policy took on a new orientation that stressed international independence, non-offensive defense, multilateral

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cooperation, and use of the political process to solve security issues. After the failed coup attempt in August , Cuban leaders, feeling they had less to lose, began to openly criticize the reforms in the U. These positions have resulted in the development of these events. After Castro publicly criticized Soviet reformism, yet he hoped Soviet communism would survive perestroika. Dissolution of the Soviet Union[ edit ] The subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union in had an immediate and devastating effect on Cuba. Cuba lost valuable aid and trading privileges after the fall of the Soviet Union, soon after entering a fiscal crisis. Oil imports dropped from 13 million tons in to about 3 million tons in from Russia.

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### 9: The Communist tide in Latin America ( edition) | Open Library

*The Sino-Soviet border conflict was a seven-month undeclared military conflict between the Soviet Union and China at the height of the Sino-Soviet split in Although military clashes ceased that year, the underlying issues were not resolved until the Sino-Soviet Border Agreement.*

This article uses material from the Wikipedia article Sino-Soviet split , that was deleted or is being discussed for deletion, which is released under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3. In , relations only continued to improve. This is mainly through the increased economic and political cooperation as well as collaboration in international politics between the two countries. This led Mao to take a sharp turn to the left ideologically, which contrasted with the ideological softening of de-Stalinization. By the November Moscow Meeting of socialist countries in , relations between Mao and Khrushchev were quickly souring. Khrushchev ended up departing Beijing in early August with no agreement. While Mao had decided to start the conflict on August twenty-third in advance, he had decided to keep the information from Khrushchev. The crisis forced the Soviets to take a step back from their coexistence policy with the United States and declare their support for China. Khrushchev, however, was very surprised by the Chinese attack and was not happy about the Chinese not informing him of their plans, especially considering he had been in China less than a month preceding the crisis. The US had also threatened nuclear war over the conflict, which made Khrushchev very uneasy and angry over how easily the Chinese had forced the USSR to get involved. Both felt that the other could no longer be trusted, a sentiment that only increased during Onset "59 are often considered the key years in convincing Mao that the USSR was not to be trusted. The USSR was astonished by the Great Leap Forward ,[ citation needed ] had renounced aid to Chinese nuclear weapons development, and refused to side with them in the Sino-Indian War , by maintaining a moderate relation with India "actions offensive to Mao. Thereafter, he perceived Khrushchev as too tolerant of the West, despite the sometimes confrontational Soviet stance toward Western powers. Khrushchev demanded an official apology at the Paris Summit from Eisenhower, who refused. Mass rallies were held to demand that Khrushchev take action against the American aggressors. When Khrushchev did not respond with military force, his image in China as a Communist leader was wounded. By , their mutual criticism moved out in the open, when Khrushchev and Peng Zhen had an open argument at the Romanian Communist Party congress. Premier Khrushchev insulted Chairman Mao Zedong as "a nationalist , an adventurist, and a deviationist ". In turn, Mao called Khrushchev a Marxist revisionist , criticizing him as "patriarchal, arbitrary and tyrannical ". Khrushchev then denounced China with an eighty-page letter to the conference. Khrushchev materially responded to Mao by withdrawing around 1, Soviet experts and technicians from China, leading to the cancellation of more than scientific projects intended to foster cooperation between the two nations. Diplomatically, though, the damage had been done. In October , however, at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union they again had an open confrontation. Chairman Mao criticized Premier Khrushchev for withdrawing in the Cuban missile crisis , stating that "Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism". To curb the production of nuclear weapons in other nations, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the U. He was angered that Khrushchev had once again failed to deal aggressively with the U. He returned disappointed to China, reporting to Mao that the Soviets remained firm. China accused the Soviet Union of colluding with the United States. Johnson , for example, Radio Peking claimed that the two men discussed "a great conspiracy on a worldwide basis

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