

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY) pdf

1: Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy - Noah M. Lemos - bÃ¶cker () | Adlibris Bokhandel

Noah Lemos' An Introduction to Theory of Knowledge is a very useful introduction of the philosophy branch of Epistemology. What makes Lemos' introduction useful is he focuses on the general and important philosophical positions in epistemology and evaluates those arguments in "pros" and "cons", or in other words evaluating the strengths and.

K K_s, c_p for any s and c . Hereinafter, we will take it as understood that the principles apply to all subjects and all circumstances in which they might find themselves. The principle of Logical Omniscience is clearly an idealization, in that there are infinitely many provable propositions in S_4 , so that no actual epistemic subject in no actual circumstance is aware of them all. A second principle is a form of detachment that is adapted to epistemic logic. According to Closure under Detachment, my knowing in my present circumstances that Davis is in California and also knowing that if Davis is in California, then Davis is in the United States implies that I know in my present circumstances that Davis is in the United States. Here, there once again is an idealization. Closure Under Detachment is typical of a whole class of closure principles of epistemic logic. Such principles begin with implications in non-epistemic logic and apply them to epistemic logic. For illustration, we will apply closure to the other three kinds of implication described above. Simplification gives us an implication: This gives us a specific instance of closure under implication. Then one might want to say that this knowledge implies that I know in my present circumstances that Davis is in California as well as that I know in my present circumstances that California is in the United States. It is not open, so to speak, for me not to know that Davis is in California or for me not to know that California is in the United States, given that I know the conjunction. Closure Under Simplification, like all other versions of closure, involves an idealization. It may be that S has always thought of p and q together, but never separately, in which case it could be asked whether S really knows the conjuncts individually. The idealization can be seen more clearly in the case in which S knows that p and S knows that q , in the same circumstance. Now perhaps p and q are unrelated propositions that S has never considered in relation to one another. It seems an idealization to say that S knows the conjoined proposition. This type of closure seems even more of an idealization than is Closure Under Conjunction. Suppose S knows in some circumstances that Davis is in California. If we are inclined not to attribute knowledge, we must give up closure for this specific form of logical implication. Each of the cases of Closure given above are instances of a more general principle, that of Closure Under Implication. If a set of propositions p_1 through p_n implies q according to the rules of K , then knowledge of p_1 through p_n implies knowledge of q . Once again, this principle is best regarded as an idealization, as real epistemic subjects presumably are not aware of all of the infinitely many implications of the system. Before leaving system K , we will consider briefly an issue regarding Closure Under Detachment. Although the principle itself seems quite plausible, especially as an idealization, epistemologists are deeply divided about its acceptability. This issue will be discussed at length later in the course, but for now an example will do. Suppose that you know that you are looking at your two hands and that if you are looking at your two hands, then you are not asleep. Do you thereby know that you are not asleep? Some would say that you must know this, and others that in fact you do not know this. One reason for the denial of knowledge is that you have had vivid dreams in which you apparently were looking at your hands but were not doing so, and you could not tell at the time that you were deceived. And if you cannot tell whether you are deceived by a dream, you do not know that you have two hands. A version of this case was originally raised by Descartes in his First Meditation in the seventeenth century. One might wonder whether there is a further principle of K which is a modification of Closure Under Detachment, where the conditional whose antecedent is detached may not be known. The principle would look like this: The answer which will not be proved here is that there is no such implication in K . One may know that p and not know that q even though it is a fact that if p then q . We might say that this principle would require more than merely logical omniscience on the part of the subject, but rather omniscience with respect to

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matters of fact. What gets detached is a strong, logically provable, conditional, so we may call this principle one of Strong Detachment. Closure Under Strong Detachment: The reason this principle holds is that the knowing subject is presumed by Logical Omniscience to have knowledge of all provable conditionals. Since both the antecedent and the conditional are known, the consequent is known as well by the Principle of Detachment. Again we see the idealization embodied in Logical Omniscience and Closure Under Implication that is required to make the system at all plausible. The addition of this principle to the system K results in a stronger system D. In semantic terms, the principle states that if proposition p is known, then it is true. The addition of this principle to system D yields as system generally known as T, though some call it M. Note that the principles generating systems D and T do not seem to be idealizations as much as descriptions of what is required for any subject to have knowledge in any circumstances. The system resulting from adding KK to T is known as S4. The motivation for the S4 principle is that if one is in a strong enough epistemic position with respect to p , then one is in a strong enough epistemic position to tell that one is in a strong enough epistemic position with respect to p . The S4 or KK principle has been contested throughout the history of epistemology. It has been asked why the strength of the epistemic position with respect of a state of affairs about the world for example must be automatically available to the knower. It seems, for example, that we know many things about which we have not reflected. I might know that the color of my computer is black but never have given the matter a second thought. I might not know how or why it is that I know it: I just know it because I see it. But then can I be said to know, in the same circumstances, and hence without reflection, that I know that my computer is black? Some systems even stronger than S4 have been suggested as the best systems for the representation of knowledge, but we will end our presentation of the systems here. The subject of epistemic logic is worthy of a great deal more discussion. It will not be pursued further, except with respect to the questions that arise regarding Closure Under Detachment. For a sophisticated discussion of closure principles in epistemology, see the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A very sophisticated treatment of epistemic logic in general can be found on this Stanford Encyclopedia page. Austin, who was strongly influenced by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. The speaker is indicating that he may be held responsible if he turns out to be incorrect. More recently, much attention has been devoted to the context of knowledge attribution. It has been pointed out by contextualists that different speakers, armed with exactly the same information about a given person, are inclined to differ in their attributions or denials of knowledge. This is taken as a datum to be explained. The contextualist explanation for the difference is to be found in variability of epistemic standards or the strength of epistemic position required for warrant based on the context of attribution or denial. It seems that certain contextual factors, such as the practical consequences of being wrong, affect the strength of the epistemic position that people require for attributing knowledge. As will be seen, there is a good deal of disagreement about which contexts are crucial in knowledge attribution and exactly what role the context plays. The Analytic Project Thus far, almost nothing has said about what knowledge is, except that it is something that meets some standards or other, or that it requires that the knower be in an epistemic position of some strength or other. Since the beginnings of epistemology in Plato, philosophers who think there is such a thing as knowledge have been inquiring into its nature. As will be seen, it is not easy to determine what knowledge might be or even whether there might be different kinds of knowledge that must be understood differently from one another. It is not even clear what one is doing in trying to determine what knowledge is. The traditional approach follows Aristotle and consists in attempts to give a definition of knowledge. One might say, inspired by Descartes, that knowledge is belief that is certain and unshakable. Ramsey in defined knowledge as belief that is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process. More recently, Timothy Williamson defines knowledge as a specific kind of non-belief mental state. This account will be discussed in a later module. The standard approach, however, is to attempt to give a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing. One finds this approach turning up in the mids in the writings of A. A Philosophical Study, According to this approach, if one knows, he must satisfy each of the conditions, and if one satisfies all the conditions, then one does know. The kind of implication that is characteristic of an

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analysis may be stronger than logical implication. Thus, we will use a different symbol to indicate it. If C is a condition thought to be necessary for S to know that p, we may express this by writing: Conditions for Knowing It is generally, though not universally, agreed that in order for any subject to know that p, it must be true that p, or it must be the case that p, or there must be an existing state of affairs represented by the proposition p. But even this condition can be controversial, particularly because there is substantial disagreement about what it is for a proposition to be true. Others dispute the condition itself. Since it is generally acknowledged that: This condition is captured in epistemic logic by the T principle: A second widely-accepted condition for knowledge is that S believe or accept that p. Broadly speaking, the idea is that for S to have knowledge that p, S must in some way be committed to the truth of p. Yet despite the widespread agreement that there must be some kind of strong commitment for there to be knowledge, there is a good deal of disagreement about the exact nature of the commitment that is required for knowledge. One area of dispute concerns the kind of cognitive activity that is required for knowledge. Some hold that one must be committed intellectually to the truth of p, while others hold that that one need only be committed in a way that disposes him to act as if p were true. A person talking on a mobile phone while driving might be too distracted to make an intellectual commitment to the truth of the proposition that there is a car in front of him in his lane. Yet in some way he is really committed to its being there, as evidenced by the fact that he maintains a uniform distance behind that car, etc. A further complication is the fact that we often conceive of belief as coming in degrees. That is, one may believe more or less strongly that p, and if so, then the degree of belief required for knowledge becomes an issue.

2: Editions of An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge by Noah Lemos

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5: William & Mary - Noah Lemos

20 Most Beautiful Royal Women of the World, Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge, Charlene, Princess of Monaco, HRH Princess Ameerah bint Aidan bin Nayef Al-Taweel The Dead Files S04E12 - Lethal Waters - Cambridge Springs, Pa.

6: UC Davis Philosophy , Theory of Knowledge: Introduction to Theory of Knowledge (Spring,)

In this textbook, Michael Morris offers a critical introduction to the central issues of the philosophy of language. Each chapter focusses on one or two texts which have had a seminal influence on work in the subject, and uses these as a way of approaching both the central topics and the various.

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