1: Walton's Argumentation Schemes - Reasoninglab

and arguments that proceed from a definition to a verbal classification. Section 6 analyses the argumentation in the Pluto case, using the argumentation schemes from the previous section.

Equivocation â€" the misleading use of a term with more than one meaning by glossing over which meaning is intended at a particular time. The arguer advances the controversial position, but when challenged, they insist that they are only advancing the more modest position. See also the if-by-whiskey fallacy, below. Ecological fallacy â€" inferences about the nature of specific individuals are based solely upon aggregate statistics collected for the group to which those individuals belong. Related to the appeal to authority not always fallacious. False dilemma false dichotomy, fallacy of bifurcation, black-or-white fallacy â€" two alternative statements are held to be the only possible options when in reality there are more. Historical fallacy â€" a set of considerations is thought to hold good only because a completed process is read into the content of the process which conditions this completed result. Explains without actually explaining the real nature of a function or a process. Instead, it explains the concept in terms of the concept itself, without first defining or explaining the original concept. Explaining thought as something produced by a little thinker, a sort of homunculus inside the head, merely explains it as another kind of thinking as different but the same. Incomplete comparison â€" insufficient information is provided to make a complete comparison. Inconsistent comparison â€" different methods of comparison are used, leaving a false impression of the whole comparison. Intentionality fallacy â€" the insistence that the ultimate meaning of an expression must be consistent with the intention of the person from whom the communication originated e. Mind projection fallacy â€" subjective judgments are "projected" to be inherent properties of an object, rather than being related to personal perceptions of that object. Moralistic fallacy â€" inferring factual conclusions from purely evaluative premises in violation of factâ€"value distinction. For instance, inferring is from ought is an instance of moralistic fallacy. Moralistic fallacy is the inverse of naturalistic fallacy defined below. Moving the goalposts raising the bar â€" argument in which evidence presented in response to a specific claim is dismissed and some other often greater evidence is demanded. Nirvana fallacy perfect-solution fallacy â€" solutions to problems are rejected because they are not perfect. Onus probandi â€" from the Latin onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non ei qui negat the burden of proof is on the person who makes the claim, not on the person who denies or questions the claim. It is a particular case of the argumentum ad ignorantiam fallacy, here the burden is shifted on the person defending against the assertion. Also known as " shifting the burden of proof ". Proving too much â€" using a form of argument that, if it were valid, could be used to reach an additional, invalid conclusion. Referential fallacy [36] â€" assuming all words refer to existing things and that the meaning of words reside within the things they refer to, as opposed to words possibly referring to no real object or that the meaning of words often comes from how they are used. Reification concretism, hypostatization, or the fallacy of misplaced concreteness â€" a fallacy of ambiguity, when an abstraction abstract belief or hypothetical construct is treated as if it were a concrete, real event or physical entity. In other words, it is the error of treating as a "real thing" something that is not a real thing, but merely an idea. Retrospective determinism â€" the argument that because an event has occurred under some circumstance, the circumstance must have made its occurrence inevitable. Special pleading â€" a proponent of a position attempts to cite something as an exemption to a generally accepted rule or principle without justifying the exemption. Begging the question petitio principii â€" providing what is essentially the conclusion of the argument as a premise. For example, an organic foods advertisement that says "Organic foods are safe and healthy foods grown without any pesticides, herbicides, or other unhealthy additives. Fallacy of many questions complex question, fallacy of presuppositions, loaded question, plurium interrogationum â€" someone asks a question that presupposes something that has not been proven or accepted by all the people involved. Faulty generalizations[edit] Faulty generalization â€" reach a conclusion from weak premises. Unlike fallacies of relevance, in fallacies of defective induction, the premises are related to the conclusions yet only weakly buttress the conclusions. A faulty generalization is thus produced. Accident â€" an exception to a

generalization is ignored. It happens when a conclusion is made of premises that lightly support it. Misleading vividness â€" involves describing an occurrence in vivid detail, even if it is an exceptional occurrence, to convince someone that it is a problem; this also relies on the appeal to emotion fallacy. Overwhelming exception â€" an accurate generalization that comes with qualifications that eliminate so many cases that what remains is much less impressive than the initial statement might have led one to assume. Questionable cause[edit] Questionable cause - Is a general type error with many variants. Its primary basis is the confusion of association with causation. Either by inappropriately deducing or rejecting causation or a broader failure to properly investigate the cause of an observed effect. The cause is said to be the effect and vice versa. Fallacy of the single cause causal oversimplification [51] â€" it is assumed that there is one, simple cause of an outcome when in reality it may have been caused by a number of only jointly sufficient causes. Furtive fallacy â€" outcomes are asserted to have been caused by the malfeasance of decision makers. If a fair coin lands on heads 10 times in a row, the belief that it is "due to the number of times it had previously landed on tails" is incorrect. In anthropology , it refers primarily to cultural beliefs that ritual, prayer, sacrifice, and taboos will produce specific supernatural consequences. In psychology , it refers to an irrational belief that thoughts by themselves can affect the world or that thinking something corresponds with doing it. Regression fallacy â€" ascribes cause where none exists. The flaw is failing to account for natural fluctuations. It is frequently a special kind of post hoc fallacy. Relevance fallacies[edit] Appeal to the stone argumentum ad lapidem â€" dismissing a claim as absurd without demonstrating proof for its absurdity. In the general case any logical inference based on fake arguments, intended to replace the lack of real arguments or to replace implicitly the subject of the discussion. See also irrelevant conclusion. Ad hominem â€" attacking the arguer instead of the argument. Circumstantial ad hominem - stating that the arguers personal situation or perceived benefit from advancing a conclusion means that their conclusion is wrong. Easily confused with the association fallacy "guilt by association" , below. Appeal to authority argument from authority, argumentum ad verecundiam â€" an assertion is deemed true because of the position or authority of the person asserting it. Appeal to accomplishment â€" an assertion is deemed true or false based on the accomplishments of the proposer. Appeal to consequences argumentum ad consequentiam â€" the conclusion is supported by a premise that asserts positive or negative consequences from some course of action in an attempt to distract from the initial discussion. Pooh-pooh â€" dismissing an argument perceived unworthy of serious consideration. Appeal to novelty argumentum novitatis, argumentum ad antiquitatis â€" a proposal is claimed to be superior or better solely because it is new or modern. Opposite of appeal to wealth. Argumentum ad baculum appeal to the stick, appeal to force, appeal to threat â€" an argument made through coercion or threats of force to support position. This fallacy relies on the implied expertise of the speaker or on an unstated truism. The assumption that if the origin of an idea comes from a biased mind, then the idea itself must also be a falsehood. First World problems are a subset of this fallacy. This is the inverse of the naturalistic fallacy. Naturalistic fallacy â€" inferring evaluative conclusions from purely factual premises [96] [97] in violation of factâ€"value distinction. Naturalistic fallacy in the stricter sense defined in the section " Conditional or questionable fallacies " below is a variety of this broader sense. Naturalistic fallacy sometimes confused with appeal to nature is the inverse of moralistic fallacy. Isâ€"ought fallacy [98] â€" statements about what is, on the basis of claims about what ought to be. Naturalistic fallacy fallacy [99] anti-naturalistic fallacy [] â€" inferring an impossibility to infer any instance of ought from is from the general invalidity of is-ought fallacy, mentioned above. For instance, is P.

Using tools from argumentation and AI, it is shown how argumentation schemes, in particular argument from verbal classification and argument from definition to verbal classification, apply to cases of scientific argumentation.

Ecological fallacy[edit] An ecological fallacy is committed when one draws an inference from data based on the premise that qualities observed for groups necessarily hold for individuals; for example, "if countries with more Protestants tend to have higher suicide rates, then Protestants must be more likely to commit suicide. For a given fallacy, one must either characterize it by means of a deductive argumentation schema, which rarely applies the first prong of the fork or one must relax definitions and add nuance to take the actual intent and context of the argument into account the other prong of the fork. Nevertheless, informal fallacies apply to both deductive and non-deductive arguments. Though the form of the argument may be relevant, fallacies of this type are the "types of mistakes in reasoning that arise from the mishandling of the content of the propositions constituting the argument". Here the most important issue concerns inductive strength or methodology for example, statistical inference. In the absence of sufficient evidence, drawing conclusions based on induction is unwarranted and fallacious. With the backing of empirical evidence , however, the conclusions may become warranted and convincing at which point the arguments are no longer considered fallacious. Hasty generalisation often follows a pattern such as: X is true for A. X is true for B. Therefore, X is true for C, D, etc. While never a valid logical deduction, if such an inference can be made on statistical grounds, it may nonetheless be convincing. This is because with enough empirical evidence, the generalization is no longer a hasty one. Relevance fallacy[edit] The fallacies of relevance are a broad class of informal fallacies see the navbox below , generically represented by missing the point: Presenting an argument, which may be sound , but fails to address the issue in question. Argumentum ex silentio[edit] An argument from silence features an unwarranted conclusion advanced based on the absence of data. Examples of informal fallacies[edit] Main article: Assuming that because B comes after A, A caused B. Slippery slope[edit] Definition: The arguer claims that a sort of chain reaction, usually ending in some dire consequence, will take place, but in fact there is not enough evidence for that assumption. Where mathematical fallacies are subtle mistakes in reasoning leading to invalid mathematical proofs, measurement fallacies are unwarranted inferential leaps involved in the extrapolation of raw data to a measurement-based value claim. The ancient Greek Sophist Protagoras was one of the first thinkers to propose that humans can generate reliable measurements through his "human-measure" principle and the practice of dissoi logoi arguing multiple sides of an issue. Knowledge value measurement fallacy[edit] Increasing availability and circulation of big data are driving proliferation of new metrics for scholarly authority, [29] [30] and there is lively discussion regarding the relative usefulness of such metrics for measuring the value of knowledge production in the context of an "information tsunami". For example, limitations of the journal impact factor JIF are well documented, [32] and even JIF pioneer Eugene Garfield notes, "while citation data create new tools for analyses of research performance, it should be stressed that they supplement rather than replace other quantitative-and qualitative-indicators. A naturalistic fallacy can occur for example in the case of sheer quantity metrics based on the premise "more is better" [31] or, in the case of developmental assessment in the field of psychology, "higher is better. For example, the Scopus and Web of Science bibliographic databases have difficulty distinguishing between citations of scholarly work that are arms-length endorsements, ceremonial citations, or negative citations indicating the citing author withholds endorsement of the cited work. This creates a possibility that low productivity measurements using the tool may constitute argument from silence fallacies, to the extent that such measurements are supported by the absence of book citation data. Ecological fallacies can be committed when one measures scholarly productivity of a sub-group of individuals e. In any context, including academic debate, a conversation among friends, political discourse, advertising, or for comedic purposes, the arguer may use fallacious reasoning to try to persuade the listener or reader, by means other than offering relevant evidence, that the conclusion is true. Examples of this include the speaker or writer: Groucho Marx used fallacies of amphiboly , for instance, to make ironic statements; Gary Larson and Scott Adams employed fallacious reasoning in many of their

cartoons. Wes Boyer and Samuel Stoddard have written a humorous essay teaching students how to be persuasive by means of a whole host of informal and formal fallacies. However, even more worryingly, in other instances it is a tactic or ploy used inappropriately in argumentation to try to get the best of a speech part unfairly. The dialogue framework required to support the pragmatic theory of fallacy is built on the presumption that argumentative dialogue has both an adversarial component and a collaborative component. A dialogue has individual goals for each participant, but also collective shared goals that apply to all participants. A fallacy of the second kind is seen as more than simply violation of a rule of reasonable dialogue. It is also a deceptive tactic of argumentation, based on sleight-of-hand. Aristotle explicitly compared contentious reasoning to unfair fighting in athletic contest. But the roots of the pragmatic theory go back even further in history to the Sophists. The pragmatic theory finds its roots in the Aristotelian conception of a fallacy as a sophistical refutation, but also supports the view that many of the types of arguments traditionally labelled as fallacies are in fact reasonable techniques of argumentation that can be used, in many cases, to support legitimate goals of dialogue. Hence on the pragmatic approach, each case needs to analyzed individually, to determine by the textual evidence whether the argument is fallacious or reasonable.

ARGUMENT FROM VERBAL CLASSIFICATION pdf

Argument from verbal classification concludes that a particular thing has a certain property on the grounds that this thing can be classified under a general category of things that have this.

Join our facebook group to connect with the experts. As most of you already know, half of the GRE verbal section comprises the much-dreaded reading comprehension. While ETS does not make any classification regarding the types of passages, there is one distinct type that very visibly stands out from the regular passages. This distinct type is informally referred by different names in different resources e. This is what these passages are all about: Given below is an introduction of the argument-based passage and how it is constructed. Premise is a fact stated in the passage. Something deduced or inferred by the author on the basis of the stated facts or premises. An assumption or a logical gap is something that the conclusion does not take into account. It is an unstated fact on which the validity of the whole argument rests. If the assumption is not true, the conclusion falls apart. Also take note that there can be multiple assumptions on which an argument rests. Over the last few years, Country A has suffered a pest infestation which has resulted in huge losses in agricultural yield. Therefore, Country A will continue to import more than it did before the infestation started, and this will remain so until the infestation ends. The above passage can be broken down as follows: In the passage above, two facts are stated: Over the last few years, Country A has suffered a pest infestation, and as a result, has experienced major losses in agricultural yield. The conclusion of the given passage is: One of the assumptions on which the conclusion of the given passage rests is: Infestation is the only factor that can cause an increase in the amount of imports.

Walton's Argumentation Schemes. The Argumentation Schemes below are taken from Argument from Verbal Classification. Argument from Vagueness of a Verbal.

Introduction The useful study of arguments from or to verbal classifications and definitions or redefinition of the term has in the past often been made to seem impossible because of a dichotomy about matters of definition. On the other hand, they have been portrayed by philosophers in the past as inquiries into the absolute essence of the concept to be defined, suggesting to many a metaphysical question with infinite answers Schiappa, , p. The examples studied in this paper show that this polarization can be overcome by showing how certain forms of argument called argumentation schemes that support definitions and verbal classifications of kinds commonly used in both law and science can be objectively identified, analyzed and evaluated. It is shown how a verbal classification based on a redefinition of a scientific concept can be extremely controversial, both within and outside the science in which the concept falls, and how the arguments both pro and contra can be modeled within argumentation theory is having a particular structure that is valuable for us to know about and study. It is important to recognize that such arguments can be extremely powerful and significant, because their consequences can be enormously important, not only in science, but in politics, business, national affairs and law. Arguments about definitions can be disputed at great length, and in some instances, at great cost, in the courts. In such cases especially, it is important to be aware that the method for analyzing and evaluating such arguments is to raise critical questions based on the argumentation scheme for argument from verbal classification. As a consequence of this new definition, Pluto was demoted to the status of being a dwarf planet. Many in the field of astronomy were unhappy with the new definition, and argued against it. Although the new definition has been now officially set in place by IAU rules, leading scientists have organized a petition against it, and argued that a better definition is needed. Section 1 is an outline of the Pluto case. Section 2 presents the standard classification of the main different types of definitions. Section 3 discusses the general pragmatic approach to argumentation employed in the following sections to analyze and evaluate arguments based on definitions and verbal classifications. Section 4 introduces the reader to argument from verbal classification by using some examples. Section 5 presents argumentation schemes for both arguments from classification and arguments that proceed from a definition to a verbal classification. Section 6 analyses the argumentation in the Pluto case, using the argumentation schemes from the previous section. Section 7 shows how new argumentation technology can be applied to some special features of arguments from verbal classification. Section 8 draws some conclusions about arguments based on definitions and verbal classifications, based on lessons drawn from the case. It is too faint to be seen without the aid of the telescope. This conventional view of our solar system was changed in when the International Astronomical Union IAU redefined the traditional concept of planet in a manner that excluded Pluto, leaving only eight planets. Because of the way it changed the conventional view, the IAU definition has attracted considerable interest and controversy, not only among astronomers and other scientists, but among the general public as well. The new definition has not been accepted by all astronomers, even though it was put in place by a majority vote at a Congress of the IAU, and groups of dissenters have offered criticisms and alternative definitions Cartlidge, , p. Thus this example remains a central case of argumentation from classification and definition and will continue to be controversial. The best source for precise information is the IAU website 1 , but in the FF FF summary account presented below an attempt is made to describe the main outlines of the redefinition in non-specialized terminology. These and other observations from telescopes on earth and in space led to growing concerns about the conventional definition. In particular, Eris, because it is larger than Pluto, would appear to deserve being classified as a planet, if Pluto is so classified. This led to a situation where, in order to preserve consistency, either these bodies would have to be classified as planets or Pluto would have to be reclassified as not being a planet. This was the controversy that led to a debate within the IAU. In the IAU presented a definition laying down three criteria for a celestial body to count as being a planet Soter, , p. First, it has to be in orbit around the sun the orbit

criterion. Second, it has to have sufficient mass so that it has formed into a nearly round shape the roundness criterion. Third, it has to have cleared the neighborhood 1 http: This definition itself has been subject to challenge because of the existence of brown dwarf planets that are too small to sustain hydrogen fusion, but have been granted star status on their ability to fuse deuterium Wikipedia, , p. A body fulfilling only the first two criteria, but not the third one, is reclassified by the new definition as a dwarf planet. In other words, according to the new definition, a dwarf planet is not a planet without qualifications , in the proper sense of the term. Of the over 9, members of the IAU, over 2, astronomers attended the conference, and about were present on the day the vote was taken, but when the count was taken, only votes were cast. Within five days of the acceptance of the new definition, a petition was signed by over scientists opposing the new definition Wikipedia, , p. The original definition that had been proposed during the debates before August 24 would have contained only the orbit criterion and the roundness criterion, but not the sufficient clearance criterion. There was considerable controversy in the IAU about this earlier definition Wikipedia, , p. This definition would have led to the acceptance of three other celestial bodies, as well as Pluto being recognized as planets, and a further twelve or more bodies were also possible candidates to join the list Wikipedia, , p. Some argued that the new definition was ambiguous, or was not necessary. The addition of the sufficient clearance criterion excluded these candidates, and became part of the new definition that gained the upper hand among the members attending before August As noted above, according to this new position there would only be eight major planets, and Pluto would be downgraded to a dwarf planet. There was also controversy about borderline cases of double planet systems. The debate was said to be still open, and private meetings were held before the final vote held on August 24 Wikipedia, , p. After the final vote on August 24, an IAU process was established for the purpose of assigning borderline objects into the dwarf planet category or other categories. The new definition has been criticized as arbitrary and confusing, and a petition has been circulated among astronomers who oppose it, arguing that it should be changed again. One of their arguments is that earth, Mars and Jupiter and Neptune have not properly cleared the neighborhoods around their orbit, and therefore should not properly be considered planets under the IAU definition. This objection can be countered by bringing in a 4 According to the IAU definition, a dwarf planet is a celestial body that is in orbit around the sun, has sufficient mass to overcome rigid body forces so that it assumes a nearly round shape, has not cleared the neighborhood around its orbit, and is not a satellite Wikipedia, , p. Consideration of planets in orbit around other stars was excluded as too complex an issue to be resolved by the congress. However, the proposed redefinition will need to accommodate new challenges posed by these planets eventually, showing that the new definition may still be a work in progress. Harold Weaver of the Johns Hopkins University put forward two arguments as objections Cartlidge, , p. One aspect of the case that is very interesting is that it is clear that the new definition is seen as subject to disputation. Indeed, the proposed definition is seen as defeasible, meaning that its acceptance is tentative, is subject to further argumentation, and could be overturned in the future. Under the IAU rules, the new definition will remain in place for at least the next three years, and its opponents are putting on an international online forum that they hope to lead to an alternative definition based on a consultation of scientists Cartlidge, , p. Types of definitions Distinctions are often drawn in logic textbooks between different kinds of definitions. One such textbook Hurley, , pp. However, Soter argued that the exact value of this cutoff is not critical, and other numerical values that could be specified would have the same effect. A stipulative definition is said to assigns a meaning to a word for the first time Hurley, , pp. A stipulative definition is one that is invented, as opposed to representing an established or widely accepting meaning Shepard, Or in economics, a recession may be stipulatively defined as two quarters of negative growth in GNP. A lexical definition is said to report the meaning that a word already has in a language Hurley, , p. For example, a dictionary definition reports or explains the meaning of an existing term used in a language. A theoretical definition assigns a meaning to a word by placing it within a theory, like a scientific theory. A persuasive definition assigns a value-laden meaning to a term in order to take a stance towards what is denoted by that term on an issue with two sides p. In such cases it is appropriate to bring in the notion of a persuasive definition. Defining a term can be seen as a special kind of speech act, often used to support or attack an argument, or series of arguments. In such cases the party who puts forward the definition does it in the

expectation of getting the other party to accept an argument based on the definition. However, the five different types of definition listed above show that the putting forward of definitions can be used to support argumentation in several different ways. There is not enough space here to show how each of the five types of definition contains problems and puzzles that need analysis as special types of speech acts that can be used to base arguments on. Stipulative definitions are often reasonable in science. For example, stipulative definitions are very common in mathematics. Some scientific terms would not appear to be definable in a purely Douglas Walton stipulative way, because substantive arguments, not only scientific ones but ones relating to values, financial matters and politics, have been marshaled for and against the proposed definition. It is not a lexical definition, either, although it may partly fit that category. Perhaps it fits into both of these categories. This approach has often been characterized as the quest for a real definition, because it attempts to define what things really are Robinson, The absolutistic metaphysical way of seeing definitions comes from our Platonic and Aristotelian heritage. On such a pragmatic account, the definition needs to be evaluated in light of the purpose for which it was put forward. It is an important corollary of this pragmatic approach that a legal definition, for example, might have a different purpose from a scientific definition of the same term, or that either of these might have a different purpose from the definition of the term in ordinary conversational usage, or for that matter, from a definition of it offered in a work of philosophy. Legal 6 Robinson , p. This view implies that definitions not only have argumentative force on issues subject to disputation, but are themselves based on arguments. For example, whether a given piece of land that developers want to build on can be classified as a wetland can have significant consequences, and both sides to such a case will marshal what they take to be strong arguments supporting their claims. There has been other work that supports the pragmatic viewpoint of these cases studies by studying the use of persuasive definitions in prominent public policy arguments Zarefsky, Tutzauer and Tutzauer, ; Zarefsky ; McGee, ; Titsworth, ; Walton These studies suggest that arguments from a definition to a verbal classification of a term are important to study, but before we can get a clearer and more accurate grasp of how such arguments work, and how they ought to be evaluated as weaker or stronger, we need to have some analysis of their logical form as inferences from premises to a conclusion. The pragmatic approach sees them as defeasible arguments, that is, as holding generally as reasonable arguments, but as subject to attack and even defeat by reasonable counter-arguments or critical questioning of the right kind. Argument from verbal classification Argument from verbal classification concludes that a particular thing has a certain property on the grounds that this thing can be classified under a general category of things that have this property. A simple example is the following argument. All dolphins are classified as mammals. Flipper is a dolphin. Therefore, Flipper is a mammal. In this case, the classification of dolphins as mammals is determined by the science of biology. To the extent that the classification of all dolphins as mammals is not subject to exceptions, or to borderline cases, the inference in this example may be classified as deductively valid. Obviously such insurance is a mighty poor buy. In contrast with a previous case, which appears to be deductively valid and have true premises, this example seems to be open to possible exceptions. What is or is not a poor return can vary considerably, depending on the economic circumstances of the time. Still, the argument given strongly suggests that buying voluntary health insurance does generally yield only a poor return as an investment. This example shows how additional arguments can back up a proposed classification on which the deriving of a conclusion depends. What is shown is how a proposed classification of one concept within another can be an essential part of the chain of argumentation in which several arguments are marshaled to prove a conclusion at issue. The example suggests how common such arguments are in reasoning about making financial and business decisions, and also that they are often not as straightforward or trivial as the dolphins example and others like it may appear to suggest.

5: Analogy and Analogical Reasoning (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Most importantly the argumentation schemes for argument from definition to verbal classification and argument from criteria to verbal classification were shown to have a precise logical structure showing the premises and conclusion of each type of argument.

Douglas Walton Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation SUMMARY Critical argumentation is a practical skill that needs to be taught, from the very beginning, through the use of real or realistic examples of arguments of the kind that the user encounters in everyday life. In this introductory textbook of critical argumentation an example-based method of teaching is therefore used. All points covered are introduced and illustrated through the use of examples representing arguments, or problems of various kinds that arise in argumentation, of a kind that will be quite familiar to readers from their own personal experiences. Exercises appended to each section of the book are designed to give practice in putting these skills to work. Questions and Statements 4. A More Detailed looks at Arguments in Dialogues 5. Chaining of Arguments 7. Criticizing by Questioning or Rebuttal 8. Criticizing and Argument by Asking a Question 9. Disputes and Dissents Three Kinds of Arguments 3. Probability and Inductive Argument 7. Arguments and Explanations 9. Appeal to Expert Opinion 2. Argument from Popular Opinion 3. Argument from Analogy 4. Argument from Correlation to Cause 5. Argument from Consequences and Slippery Slope 6. Argument from Sign 7. Argument from Commitment 8. Ad Hominem Arguments 9. Argument from Verbal Classification Single and Linked Arguments 2. Serial and Divergent Arguments 4. Distinguishing Between Linked and Convergent Arguments 5. Cleaning Up a Text of Discourse 8. Commitment in Dialogue 3. Other Types of Dialogue 4. Simple and Complex Questions 5. Responding to Tricky Questions 7. Relevance of Questions and Replies 8. Point of View and Burden of Proof 3. Lexical, Stipulative and Persuasive Definitions 6. Philosophical and Scientific Definitions 7. Normal and Troublesome Bias 8. Relevance in Meetings and Debates 4. Relevance in Legal Argumentation 5. Fear Appeal Arguments 6. Threats as Arguments 7. Appeal to Pity 8. Shifts and Relevance 9. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 3. Taking Consequences into Account 5. The Closed World Assumption 7. Lack of Knowledge Inferences 8. Real World Situations 9.

An argumentation scheme from Hastings is used to analyze argument from verbal classification as a form of inference used in rational argumentation. The Toulmin-style format is compared to more recently developed ways of modeling such cases that stem from advances in argumentation technology in artificial intelligence.

In general, judgments of plausibility are made after a claim has been formulated, but prior to rigorous testing or proof. The next sub-section provides further discussion. Note that this characterization is incomplete in a number of ways. The manner in which we list similarities and differences, the nature of the correspondences between domains: Nor does this characterization accommodate reasoning with multiple analogies i. To characterize the argument form more fully, however, is not possible without either taking a step towards a substantive theory of analogical reasoning or restricting attention to certain classes of analogical arguments. An assertion of plausibility within the context of an inquiry typically has pragmatic connotations as well: On both points, there is ambiguity as to whether an assertion of plausibility is categorical or a matter of degree. These observations point to the existence of two distinct conceptions of plausibility, probabilistic and modal, either of which may reflect the intended conclusion of an analogical argument. On the probabilistic conception, plausibility is naturally identified with rational credence rational subjective degree of belief and is typically represented as a probability. There can be no doubt that every resemblance [not known to be irrelevant] affords some degree of probability, beyond what would otherwise exist, in favour of the conclusion. The meaning, roughly speaking, is that there are sufficient initial grounds for taking p seriously, i. There is no assertion of degree. The intent is to single out p from an undifferentiated mass of ideas that remain bare epistemic possibilities. The set of epistemic possibilitiesâ€"hypotheses about electrostatic attraction compatible with knowledge of the dayâ€"was much larger. Individual analogical arguments in mathematics such as Example 7 are almost invariably directed towards prima facie plausibility. The modal conception figures importantly in some discussions of analogical reasoning. But in order that a theory may be valuable it must â€¦ display an analogy. The propositions of the hypothesis must be analogous to some known lawsâ€¦. Some analogy is essential to it; for it is only this analogy which distinguishes the theory from the multitude of othersâ€¦ which might also be proposed to explain the same laws. Possible defeaters might include internal inconsistency, inconsistency with accepted theory, or the existence of a clearly superior rival analogical argument. The point is that Campbell, following the lead of 19th century philosopher-scientists such as Herschel and Whewell, thinks that analogies can establish this sort of prima facie plausibility. Snyder provides a detailed discussion of the latter two thinkers and their earlier ideas about the role of analogies in science. In general, analogical arguments may be directed at establishing either sort of plausibility for their conclusions; they can have a probabilistic use or a modal use. Examples 7 through 9 are best interpreted as supporting modal conclusions. In those arguments, an analogy is used to show that a conjecture is worth taking seriously. To insist on putting the conclusion in probabilistic terms distracts attention from the point of the argument. The conclusion might be modeled by a Bayesian as having a certain probability value because it is deemed prima facie plausible, but not vice versa. Example 2 , perhaps, might be regarded as directed primarily towards a probabilistic conclusion. There should be connections between the two conceptions. Indeed, we might think that the same analogical argument can establish both prima facie plausibility and a degree of probability for a hypothesis. But it is difficult to translate between modal epistemic concepts and probabilities Cohen ; Douven and Williamson ; Huber ; Spohn , We cannot simply take the probabilistic notion as the primitive one. It seems wise to keep the two conceptions of plausibility separate. Further discussion of this point is found in section 5. Schema 4 is a template that represents all analogical arguments, good and bad. It is not an inference rule. Despite the confidence with which particular analogical arguments are advanced, nobody has ever formulated an acceptable rule, or set of rules, for valid analogical inferences. There is not even a plausible candidate. This situation is in marked contrast not only with deductive reasoning, but also with elementary forms of inductive reasoning, such as induction by enumeration. Of course, it is difficult to show that no successful analogical inference rule will ever be proposed. But consider the following candidate, formulated

using the concepts of schema 4 and taking us only a short step beyond that basic characterization. It is pretty clear that 5 is a non-starter. The main problem is that the rule justifies too much. The only substantive requirement introduced by 5 is that there be a nonempty positive analogy. Plainly, there are analogical arguments that satisfy this condition but establish no prima facie plausibility and no measure of support for their conclusions. Here is a simple illustration. Both relations are reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Yet it would be absurd to find positive support from this analogy for the idea that we are likely to find congruent lines clustered in groups of two or more, just because swans of the same color are commonly found in groups. The positive analogy is antecedently known to be irrelevant to the hypothetical analogy. In such a case, the analogical inference should be utterly rejected. Yet rule 5 would wrongly assign non-zero degree of support. To generalize the difficulty: Some similarities and differences are known to be or accepted as being utterly irrelevant and should have no influence whatsoever on our probability judgments. To be viable, rule 5 would need to be supplemented with considerations of relevance, which depend upon the subject matter, historical context and logical details particular to each analogical argument. To search for a simple rule of analogical inference thus appears futile. Norton , and â€"see Other Internet Resources has argued that the project of formalizing inductive reasoning in terms of one or more simple formal schemata is doomed. His criticisms seem especially apt when applied to analogical reasoning. If analogical reasoning is required to conform only to a simple formal schema, the restriction is too permissive. Inferences are authorized that clearly should not pass musterâ€¦ The natural response has been to develop more elaborate formal templatesâ€¦ The familiar difficulty is that these embellished schema never seem to be quite embellished enough; there always seems to be some part of the analysis that must be handled intuitively without guidance from strict formal rules. These local facts are to be determined and investigated on a case by case basis. To embrace a purely formal approach to analogy and to abjure formalization entirely are two extremes in a spectrum of strategies. There are intermediate positions. Most recent analyses both philosophical and computational have been directed towards elucidating general criteria and procedures, rather than formal rules, for reasoning by analogy. The next section discusses some of these criteria and procedures. Here are some of the most important ones: G1 The more similarities between two domains , the stronger the analogy. G2 The more differences, the weaker the analogy. G3 The greater the extent of our ignorance about the two domains, the weaker the analogy. G4 The weaker the conclusion, the more plausible the analogy. G5 Analogies involving causal relations are more plausible than those not involving causal relations. G6 Structural analogies are stronger than those based on superficial similarities. G7 The relevance of the similarities and differences to the conclusion i. G8 Multiple analogies supporting the same conclusion make the argument stronger. These principles can be helpful, but are frequently too vague to provide much insight. How do we count similarities and differences in applying G1 and G2? Why are the structural and causal analogies mentioned in G5 and G6 especially important, and which structural and causal features merit attention? More generally, in connection with the all-important G7: Furthermore, what are we to say about similarities and differences that have been omitted from an analogical argument but might still be relevant? An additional problem is that the criteria can pull in different directions. Each of the above criteria apart from G7 is expressed in terms of the strength of the argument, i. The criteria thus appear to presuppose the probabilistic interpretation of plausibility. The problem is that a great many analogical arguments aim to establish prima facie plausibility rather than any degree of probability. Most of the guidelines are not directly applicable to such arguments. In his theoretical reflections on analogy and in his most judicious examples, we find a sober account that lays the foundation both for the commonsense guidelines noted above and for more sophisticated analyses. Although Aristotle employs the term analogy analogia and talks about analogical predication , he never talks about analogical reasoning or analogical arguments per se. He does, however, identify two argument forms, the argument from example paradeigma and the argument from likeness homoiotes , both closely related to what would we now recognize as an analogical argument. The argument from example paradeigma is described in the Rhetoric and the Prior Analytics: Enthymemes based upon example are those which proceed from one or more similar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and then argue deductively to a particular inference. If then we wish to prove that to fight with the Thebans is an evil, we must assume that to fight against neighbours is an evil. Conviction of this

is obtained from similar cases, e. Since then to fight against neighbours is an evil, and to fight against the Thebans is to fight against neighbours, it is clear that to fight against the Thebans is an evil. The argument from example thus amounts to single-case induction followed by deductive inference. The first inference dashed arrow is inductive; the second and third solid arrows are deductively valid. The paradeigma has an interesting feature: Instead of regarding this intermediate step as something reached by induction from a single case, we might instead regard it as a hidden presupposition. This transforms the paradeigma into a syllogistic argument with a missing or enthymematic premise, and our attention shifts to possible means for establishing that premise with single-case induction as one such means. The argument from likeness homoiotes seems to be closer than the paradeigma to our contemporary understanding of analogical arguments. The most important passage is the following.

ARGUMENT FROM VERBAL CLASSIFICATION pdf

Why Logical Reasoning Verbal Classification? In this section you can learn and practice Logical Reasoning Questions based on "Verbal Classification" and improve your skills in order to face the interview, competitive examination and various entrance test (CAT, GATE, GRE, MAT, Bank Exam, Railway Exam etc.) with full confidence.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Argument from Analogy in Law, the Classical Tradition, and Recent Theories Fabrizio Macagno and Douglas Walton Argument from analogy is a common and formidable form of reasoning in law and in everyday conversation. Although there is substantial literature on the subject, according to a recent survey Juthe there is little fundamental agreement on what form the argument should take, or on how it should be evaluated. The lack of conformity, no doubt, stems from the complexity and multiplicity of forms taken by arguments that fall under the umbrella of analogical reasoning in argumentation, dialectical studies, and law. By clarifying the distinction between argument from example and argument from analogy, it is possible to advance a useful proposal for the treatment of argument from analogy in law. Analogy in Legal Reasoning Analogy is one of the most common forms of reasoning in law see Hage Through analogical reasoning, legal inference is drawn from one case [End Page] that has already been classified and is assessed to another case on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity. In other words, analogy is used to apply general legal rules to cases not directly falling under the classifications of the rule. The approaches examined in this section show that there are different types of analogy based on different logical structures, and these differences are key to evaluative strategies. While Klug distinguishes between different kinds of analogy, Alexy and Weinreb focus their studies on the species of analogical reasoning most common in law, namely the imperfect inference leading to presumptive conclusions. This kind of reasoning, according to Brewer for instance, is often formalized as a syllogistic argument; however, several other authors maintain that analogy cannot be reduced to a deductive form. This section shows that a defeasible approach to analogy in legal arguments is stronger than a deductive or inductive one. Some authors have identified all kinds of defeasible reasoning, that is, reasoning leading to merely plausible conclusions, with inductive reasoning see for instance Grennan , or with deductive reasoning see for instance Groarke On our view see Walton , defeasible reasoning should be clearly distinguished from induction and deduction. While apodeictic deductive reasoning is based on the passage from the universal to the particular, in default reasoning the link between premises and conclusion is not guaranteed by quantification. The premises are simply endoxical acceptable , and the reasoning is grounded on patterns of reasoning called maxims, and represented in modern argumentation theories as argumentation schemes. For instance, consider the following reasoning: Tweety is a bird. These rules of inference have been developed in modern argumentation theories in the so-called argument schemes, abstract argumentation patterns combining a semantic principle with a logical axiom see Walton, Reed, and Macagno For instance, the argument mentioned above can be analyzed using the argument from verbal classification Walton, Reed, and Macagno , chapter 9; for further discussions of this scheme see Hastings , 36â€"52; Kienpointner , â€"52; Walton , Definition Premise Conclusion a has property F. For all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having property G if G is a semantic property of F You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

Fallacy: Fallacy, in logic, erroneous reasoning that has the appearance of soundness. In logic an argument consists of a set of statements, the premises, whose truth supposedly supports the truth of a single statement called the conclusion of the argument.

This is the logical reasoning questions and answers section on "Verbal Classification Type 2" with explanation for

various interview, competitive examination and entrance test. Solved examples with detailed answer description, explanation are given and it would be easy to understand - Page 3.

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