

## 1: Political Theory/Empirical and Normative Theories - Wikibooks, open books for an open world

*Political theory is the study of the concepts and principles that people use to describe, explain, and evaluate political events and institutions. Traditionally, the discipline of political theory has approached this study from two different perspectives: the history of political thought, and.*

I will treat the two parts here separately. The Methodological Preliminaries section is considered a classic in the field of linguistics. Here is an early formulation of the poverty of the stimulus argument. Chomsky uses this as the basis of his argument that syntax is innate. The child already knows grammar and so can abstract the system from the noise rather easily. And so any truly scientific treatment of syntax would need to account not just for how a language is acquired but also how universal underlying, deep, subconscious, innate grammar is manifested in each and every language. First, language is throughout a messy business, and any attempt to find an aesthetically pleasing, balanced, and elegant system in the language of adults OR of children will run aground on the data. The idea of a well formed competence was invented by some very non-reflexive university professors who were blind to their own prescriptive biases. Talk to the woman or man on the street and you will see something very different from underlyingly elegant and beautiful talk. The uneducated have their own systems of grammar and rhetoric which look nothing like a system of competence but these systems do display a competence sui generis. Second, there is no essence to syntax that reveals itself in all human languages. I seriously doubt that any substantive universal has been discovered. There are enough languages out there that any property of universal grammar will be overturned by a counterexample. This has nothing to do with race, but it has everything to do with history. Humboldt whom Chomsky fails to understand long ago made it clear that the creativity of language will in time sediment into a bedrock of constraining tradition. I personally believe that this variance at the hands of history will make languages eventually appear as unique as snowflakes or clouds. After that nebulous thought, I turn to the better part of the book, the part that discusses how English syntax works. Although this array of machinery was almost entirely jettisoned with the advent of X-Bar, Theta Theory, or government and binding, the questions and problems he faced in did not go away. We still cannot, at least for English, dispense with notions such as phrase structure, semantic selection, syntactic subcategorization, etc. Today, the nuts and bolts of his theory turn out to be less rusty than his methodological preliminaries. If someone asked me to recommend a readable work by Chomsky that addressed empirical issues with a formalist method, I would recommend either *Aspects of THE Theory of Syntax* or possibly *Remarks on Nominalization*. But first I would try to talk her out of reading Chomsky at all. *Aspects* is not a good starting point for an exploration of linguistics. It is more like a place where thinking goes to die. Even if you dislike his writing, you must admire the elegance of his work in context.

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The natural law concept existed long before Locke as a way of expressing the idea that there were certain moral truths that applied to all people, regardless of the particular place where they lived or the agreements they had made. The most important early contrast was between laws that were by nature, and thus generally applicable, and those that were conventional and operated only in those places where the particular convention had been established. This distinction is sometimes formulated as the difference between natural law and positive law. Natural law is also distinct from divine law in that the latter, in the Christian tradition, normally referred to those laws that God had directly revealed through prophets and other inspired writers. Thus some seventeenth-century commentators, Locke included, held that not all of the 10 commandments, much less the rest of the Old Testament law, were binding on all people. Thus there is no problem for Locke if the Bible commands a moral code that is stricter than the one that can be derived from natural law, but there is a real problem if the Bible teaches what is contrary to natural law. In practice, Locke avoided this problem because consistency with natural law was one of the criteria he used when deciding the proper interpretation of Biblical passages. In the century before Locke, the language of natural rights also gained prominence through the writings of such thinkers as Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. Whereas natural law emphasized duties, natural rights normally emphasized privileges or claims to which an individual was entitled. They point out that Locke defended a hedonist theory of human motivation Essay 2. Locke, they claim, recognizes natural law obligations only in those situations where our own preservation is not in conflict, further emphasizing that our right to preserve ourselves trumps any duties we may have. On the other end of the spectrum, more scholars have adopted the view of Dunn, Tully, and Ashcraft that it is natural law, not natural rights, that is primary. They hold that when Locke emphasized the right to life, liberty, and property he was primarily making a point about the duties we have toward other people: Most scholars also argue that Locke recognized a general duty to assist with the preservation of mankind, including a duty of charity to those who have no other way to procure their subsistence Two Treatises 1. These scholars regard duties as primary in Locke because rights exist to ensure that we are able to fulfill our duties. Simmons takes a position similar to the latter group, but claims that rights are not just the flip side of duties in Locke, nor merely a means to performing our duties. While these choices cannot violate natural law, they are not a mere means to fulfilling natural law either. Brian Tienrey questions whether one needs to prioritize natural law or natural right since both typically function as corollaries. He argues that modern natural rights theories are a development from medieval conceptions of natural law that included permissions to act or not act in certain ways. There have been some attempts to find a compromise between these positions. Adam Seagrave has gone a step further. God created human beings who are capable of having property rights with respect to one another on the basis of owning their labor. Another point of contestation has to do with the extent to which Locke thought natural law could, in fact, be known by reason. In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke defends a theory of moral knowledge that negates the possibility of innate ideas Essay Book 1 and claims that morality is capable of demonstration in the same way that Mathematics is Essay 3. Yet nowhere in any of his works does Locke make a full deduction of natural law from first premises. More than that, Locke at times seems to appeal to innate ideas in the Second Treatise 2. Strauss infers from this that the contradictions exist to show the attentive reader that Locke does not really believe in natural law at all. Laslett, more conservatively, simply says that Locke the philosopher and Locke the political writer should be kept very separate. Many scholars reject this position. That no one has deduced all of natural law from first principles does not mean that none of it has been deduced. The supposedly contradictory passages in the Two Treatises are far from decisive. While it is true that Locke does not provide a deduction in the Essay, it is not clear that he was trying to. Nonetheless, it must be admitted that Locke did not treat the topic of natural law as systematically as one might like. Attempts to work out his theory in more detail with respect to its ground and its content must try to reconstruct it from

scattered passages in many different texts. Unless these positions are maintained, the voluntarist argues, God becomes superfluous to morality since both the content and the binding force of morality can be explained without reference to God. The intellectualist replies that this understanding makes morality arbitrary and fails to explain why we have an obligation to obey God. With respect to the grounds and content of natural law, Locke is not completely clear. On the one hand, there are many instances where he makes statements that sound voluntarist to the effect that law requires a law giver with authority Essay 1. Locke also repeatedly insists in the Essays on the Law of Nature that created beings have an obligation to obey their creator ELN 6. On the other hand there are statements that seem to imply an external moral standard to which God must conform Two Treatises 2. Locke clearly wants to avoid the implication that the content of natural law is arbitrary. Several solutions have been proposed. One solution suggested by Herzog makes Locke an intellectualist by grounding our obligation to obey God on a prior duty of gratitude that exists independent of God. A second option, suggested by Simmons, is simply to take Locke as a voluntarist since that is where the preponderance of his statements point. A third option, suggested by Tuckness and implied by Grant , is to treat the question of voluntarism as having two different parts, grounds and content. With respect to content, divine reason and human reason must be sufficiently analogous that human beings can reason about what God likely wills. Others, such as Dunn, take Locke to be of only limited relevance to contemporary politics precisely because so many of his arguments depend on religious assumptions that are no longer widely shared. At times, he claims, Locke presents this principle in rule-consequentialist terms: At other times, Locke hints at a more Kantian justification that emphasizes the impropriety of treating our equals as if they were mere means to our ends. Waldron, in his most recent work on Locke, explores the opposite claim: With respect to the specific content of natural law, Locke never provides a comprehensive statement of what it requires. In the Two Treatises, Locke frequently states that the fundamental law of nature is that as much as possible mankind is to be preserved. Simmons argues that in Two Treatises 2. Libertarian interpreters of Locke tend to downplay duties of type 1 and 2. Locke presents a more extensive list in his earlier, and unpublished in his lifetime, Essays on the Law of Nature. Interestingly, Locke here includes praise and honor of the deity as required by natural law as well as what we might call good character qualities. At first glance it seems quite simple. On this account the state of nature is distinct from political society, where a legitimate government exists, and from a state of war where men fail to abide by the law of reason. Simmons presents an important challenge to this view. Simmons points out that the above statement is worded as a sufficient rather than necessary condition. Two individuals might be able, in the state of nature, to authorize a third to settle disputes between them without leaving the state of nature, since the third party would not have, for example, the power to legislate for the public good. Simmons also claims that other interpretations often fail to account for the fact that there are some people who live in states with legitimate governments who are nonetheless in the state of nature: He claims that the state of nature is a relational concept describing a particular set of moral relations that exist between particular people, rather than a description of a particular geographical territory. The state of nature is just the way of describing the moral rights and responsibilities that exist between people who have not consented to the adjudication of their disputes by the same legitimate government. The groups just mentioned either have not or cannot give consent, so they remain in the state of nature. Thus A may be in the state of nature with respect to B, but not with C. According to Simmons, since the state of nature is a moral account, it is compatible with a wide variety of social accounts without contradiction. If we know only that a group of people are in a state of nature, we know only the rights and responsibilities they have toward one another; we know nothing about whether they are rich or poor, peaceful or warlike. Instead, he argued that there are and have been people in the state of nature. How much it matters whether they have been or not will be discussed below under the topic of consent, since the central question is whether a good government can be legitimate even if it does not have the actual consent of the people who live under it; hypothetical contract and actual contract theories will tend to answer this question differently. There are important debates over what exactly Locke was trying to accomplish with his theory. One interpretation, advanced by C. Macpherson, sees Locke as a defender of unrestricted capitalist accumulation. Macpherson claims that as the argument progresses, each of these restrictions is transcended. The spoilage restriction ceases to be a meaningful

restriction with the invention of money because value can be stored in a medium that does not decay. The sufficiency restriction is transcended because the creation of private property so increases productivity that even those who no longer have the opportunity to acquire land will have more opportunity to acquire what is necessary for life. The third restriction, Macpherson argues, was not one Locke actually held at all. Locke, according to Macpherson, thus clearly recognized that labor can be alienated. He argues that its coherence depends upon the assumption of differential rationality between capitalists and wage-laborers and on the division of society into distinct classes. Because Locke was bound by these constraints, we are to understand him as including only property owners as voting members of society. Alan Ryan argued that since property for Locke includes life and liberty as well as estate Two Treatises 2. The dispute between the two would then turn on whether Locke was using property in the more expansive sense in some of the crucial passages. While this duty is consistent with requiring the poor to work for low wages, it does undermine the claim that those who have wealth have no social duties to others. Previous accounts had focused on the claim that since persons own their own labor, when they mix their labor with that which is unowned it becomes their property. Robert Nozick criticized this argument with his famous example of mixing tomato juice one rightfully owns with the sea. When we mix what we own with what we do not, why should we think we gain property instead of losing it? Human beings are created in the image of God and share with God, though to a much lesser extent, the ability to shape and mold the physical environment in accordance with a rational pattern or plan. Only creating generates an absolute property right, and only God can create, but making is analogous to creating and creates an analogous, though weaker, right. Since Locke begins with the assumption that the world is owned by all, individual property is only justified if it can be shown that no one is made worse off by the appropriation. Where this condition is not met, those who are denied access to the good do have a legitimate objection to appropriation. Once land became scarce, property could only be legitimated by the creation of political society. Waldron claims that, contrary to Macpherson, Tully, and others, Locke did not recognize a sufficiency condition at all. Waldron takes Locke to be making a descriptive statement, not a normative one, about the condition that happens to have initially existed. Waldron thinks that the condition would lead Locke to the absurd conclusion that in circumstances of scarcity everyone must starve to death since no one would be able to obtain universal consent and any appropriation would make others worse off. In particular, it is the only way Locke can be thought to have provided some solution to the fact that the consent of all is needed to justify appropriation in the state of nature. If others are not harmed, they have no grounds to object and can be thought to consent, whereas if they are harmed, it is implausible to think of them as consenting. Sreenivasan does depart from Tully in some important respects. The disadvantage of this interpretation, as Sreenivasan admits, is that it saddles Locke with a flawed argument. Those who merely have the opportunity to labor for others at subsistence wages no longer have the liberty that individuals had before scarcity to benefit from the full surplus of value they create.

## 3: Equality: Meaning, Aspects and Theories

*The social contract theory makes a distinct contribution to making rights as part of political theory. It was assumed that the people of the state of nature, by virtue of the prevalence of natural law, enjoyed natural rights.*

The Question and the Strategy 1. After Socrates asks his host what it is like being old and rich and rather rude, we might think Cephalus says that the best thing about wealth is that it can save us from being unjust and thus smooth the way for an agreeable afterlife. This is enough to prompt more questions, for Socrates wants to know what justice is. Predictably, Cephalus and then Polemarchus fail to define justice in a way that survives Socratic examination, but they continue to assume that justice is a valuable part of a good human life. Thrasymachus erupts when he has had his fill of this conversation, and he challenges the assumption that it is good to be just. The strong themselves, on this view, are better off disregarding justice and serving their own interests directly. See the entry on Callicles and Thrasymachus. The brothers pick up where Thrasymachus left off, providing reasons why most people think that justice is not intrinsically valuable but worth respecting only if one is not strong enough or invisible enough to get away with injustice. They want to be shown that most people are wrong, that justice is worth choosing for its own sake. More than that, Glaucon and Adeimantus want to be shown that justice is worth choosing regardless of the rewards or penalties bestowed on the just by other people and the gods, and they will accept this conclusion only if Socrates can convince them that it is always better to be just. So Socrates must persuade them that the just person who is terrifically unfortunate and scorned lives a better life than the unjust person who is so successful that he is unfairly rewarded as if he were perfectly just. The challenge that Glaucon and Adeimantus present has baffled modern readers who are accustomed to carving up ethics into deontologies that articulate a theory of what is right independent of what is good and consequentialisms that define what is right in terms of what promotes the good Foster, Mabbott, cf. Prichard and But the insistence that justice be shown to be beneficial to the just has suggested to others that Socrates will be justifying justice by reference to its consequences. In fact, both readings are distortions, predicated more on what modern moral philosophers think than on what Plato thinks. At the beginning of Book Two, he retains his focus on the person who aims to be happy. But he does not have to show that being just or acting justly brings about happiness. The function argument in Book One suggests that acting justly is the same as being happy. But the function argument concludes that justice is both necessary and sufficient for happiness, and this is a considerably stronger thesis than the claim that the just are always happier than the unjust. After the challenge Glaucon and Adeimantus present, Socrates might not be so bold. Even if he successfully maintains that acting justly is identical to being happy, he might think that there are circumstances in which no just person could act justly and thus be happy. This will nonetheless satisfy Glaucon and Adeimantus if the just are better off that is, closer to happy than the unjust in these circumstances. See also Kirwan and Irwin He suggests looking for justice as a virtue of cities before defining justice as a virtue of persons, on the unconvincing grounds that justice in a city is bigger and more apparent than justice in a person, and this leads Socrates to a rambling description of some features of a good city. This may seem puzzling. The arguments of Book One and the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus rule out several more direct routes. But Book One rules this strategy out by casting doubt on widely accepted accounts of justice. Socrates must say what justice is in order to answer the question put to him, and what he can say is constrained in important ways. Most obviously, he cannot define justice as happiness without begging the question. But he also must give an account of justice that his interlocutors recognize as justice: Moreover, Socrates cannot try to define justice by enumerating the types of action that justice requires or forbids. We might have objected to this strategy for this reason: But a specific argument in Book One suggests a different reason why Socrates does not employ this strategy. When Cephalus characterizes justice as keeping promises and returning what is owed, Socrates objects by citing a case in which returning what is owed would not be just. Wrongful killing may always be wrong, but is killing? Just recompense may always be right, but is recompense? So Book One makes it difficult for Socrates to take justice for granted. What is worse, the terms in which Socrates accepts the

challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus make it difficult for him to take happiness for granted. If Socrates were to proceed like a consequentialist, he might offer a full account of happiness and then deliver an account of justice that both meets with general approval and shows how justice brings about happiness. But Socrates does not proceed like that. He does not even do as much as Aristotle does in the *Nicomachean Ethics*; he does not suggest some general criteria for what happiness is. He proceeds as if happiness is unsettled. But if justice at least partly constitutes happiness and justice is unsettled, then Socrates is right to proceed as if happiness is unsettled. In sum, Socrates needs to construct an account of justice and an account of happiness at the same time, and he needs these accounts to entail without assuming the conclusion that the just person is always happier than the unjust. Socrates can assume that a just city is always more successful or happy than an unjust city. The assumption begs no questions, and Glaucon and Adeimantus readily grant it. If Socrates can then explain how a just city is always more successful and happy than an unjust city, by giving an account of civic justice and civic happiness, he will have a model to propose for the relation between personal justice and flourishing. There must be some intelligible relation between what makes a city successful and what makes a person successful. It works even if it only introduces an account of personal justice and happiness that we might not have otherwise entertained. Although this is all that the city-person analogy needs to do, Socrates seems at times to claim more for it, and one of the abiding puzzles about the *Republic* concerns the exact nature and grounds for the full analogy that Socrates claims. At other times Socrates seems to say that the same account of justice must apply in both cases because the F-ness of a whole is due to the F-ness of its parts. Again, at times Socrates seems to say that these grounds are strong enough to permit a deductive inference: At other times, Socrates would prefer to use the F-ness of the city as a heuristic for locating F-ness in persons. Plato is surely right to think that there is some interesting and non-accidental relation between the structural features and values of society and the psychological features and values of persons, but there is much controversy about whether this relation really is strong enough to sustain all of the claims that Socrates makes for it in the *Republic*. Williams, Lear, Smith, Ferrari. Rather, it depends upon a persuasive account of justice as a personal virtue, and persuasive reasons why one is always happier being just than unjust. What Justice Is 2. So his account of what justice is depends upon his account of the human soul. According to the *Republic*, every human soul has three parts: This is a claim about the embodied soul. In Book Ten, Socrates argues that the soul is immortal and says that the disembodied soul might be simple, though he declines to insist on this and the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus* apparently disagree on the question. At first blush, the tripartition can suggest a division into beliefs, emotions, and desires. But Socrates explicitly ascribes beliefs, emotions, and desires to each part of the soul. In fact, it is not even clear that Plato would recognize psychological attitudes that are supposed to be representational without also being affective and conative, or conative and affective without also being representational. The *Republic* offers two general reasons for the tripartition. First, Socrates argues that we cannot coherently explain certain cases of psychological conflict unless we suppose that there are at least two parts to the soul. The core of this argument is what we might call the principle of non-opposition: Because of this principle, Socrates insists that one soul cannot be the subject of opposing attitudes unless one of three conditions is met. One soul can be the subject of opposing attitudes if the attitudes oppose each other at different times, even in rapidly alternating succession as Hobbes explains mental conflict. One soul can also be the subject of opposing attitudes if the attitudes relate to different things, as a desire to drink champagne and a desire to drink a martini might conflict. Last, one soul can be the subject of opposing attitudes if the attitudes oppose in different respects. Initially, this third condition is obscure. The way Socrates handles putative counter-examples to the principle of non-opposition might suggest that when one thing experiences one opposite in one of its parts and another in another, it is not experiencing opposites in different respects. Stalley; Bobonich, 31; Lorenz, 23. That would entail, apparently, that it is not one thing experiencing opposites at all, but merely a plurality. The most natural way of relating these two articulations of the principle is to suppose that experiencing one opposite in one part and another in another is just one way to experience opposites in different respects. But however we relate the two articulations to each other, Socrates clearly concludes that one soul can experience simultaneously opposing attitudes in relation to the same thing, but only if different parts of it are the direct subjects of the opposing

attitudes. Socrates employs this general strategy four times. In Book Four, he twice considers conflicting attitudes about what to do. First, he imagines a desire to drink being opposed by a calculated consideration that it would be good not to drink –d. We might think, anachronistically, of someone about to undergo surgery. This is supposed to establish a distinction between appetite and reason. Then he considers cases like that of Leontius, who became angry with himself for desiring to ogle corpses –b. These cases are supposed to establish a distinction between appetite and spirit. In Book Ten, Socrates appeals to the principle of non-opposition when considering the decent man who has recently lost a son and is conflicted about grieving –b cf. Austin and when considering conflicting attitudes about how things appear to be –b cf. Moss and Singpurwalla. These show a broad division between reason and an inferior part of the soul Ganson ; it is compatible with a further distinction between two inferior parts, spirit and appetite. In the Protagoras, Socrates denies that anyone willingly does other than what she believes to be best, but in the Republic, the door is opened for a person to act on an appetitive attitude that conflicts with a rational attitude for what is best. How far the door is open to akrasia awaits further discussion below. First, what kinds of parts are reason, spirit, and appetite? Some scholars believe that they are merely conceptual parts, akin to subsets of a set Shields , Price. They would object to characterizing the parts as subjects of psychological attitudes. At face value, Socrates offers a more robust conception of parts, wherein each part is like an independent agent. Indeed, this notion of parts is robust enough to make one wonder why reason, spirit, and appetite are parts at all, as opposed to three independent subjects. But the Republic proceeds as though every embodied human being has just one soul that comprises three parts. No embodied soul is perfectly unified: She must, as we shall see, in order to be just. But every embodied soul enjoys an unearned unity: It is not as though a person is held responsible for what his reason does but not for what his appetite does. There are questions about what exactly explains this unearned unity of the soul see E.

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The theory of the pentarchy and Byzantine arguments against the Roman primacy a The pentarchy Apart from traumatic experiences of this kind, however, and the rancour they engendered, there were, as we have already seen in part, theoretical considerations which led to estrangement. One of the most significant of these arose from conflicting ideas concerning the organization and administration of the Church. The theory of the pentarchy underwent considerable revision in the course of time, and reached its highest development in the period from the eleventh century to the middle of the fifteenth. Like the five senses of the human body, the Byzantines maintained, none of which has ascendancy over the rest, the five patriarchates were entirely independent of each other. Decisions were to be rendered by majority vote, and no binding oecumenical rulings could be made, Theodore the Studite and others had declared, except in this way. With the passage of time, as tension between the two sees grew, and bitterness increased, Byzantine polemicists went still further and denied that Peter had been the chief korymbos of the Apostles all of whom they deemed to have been equal in rank or had ever been bishop of Rome. Even when they did not question the Roman traditions concerning Peter, however, some Byzantine theologians refused to concede that the popes were entitled to any kind of primacy whatsoever. This they did for a number of reasons. According to one argument, which goes back in essence as far as John Philoponus, the monophysite scholar of Alexandria fl. But nearly all of the Byzantine writers who dealt with this subject assumed that the Church of Constantinople held the highest rank among the patriarchates, and had the right to govern them. This assumption was the inevitable consequence of Byzantine political theory. For it seemed only logical that the ruler of the entire inhabited world, as the Byzantine emperor never ceased to regard himself, should have the major Church of Christendom over which to preside. Confidence in the supremacy of the see of Constantinople was promoted also by the Arab invasions of the seventh century, which had overrun the lands of the eastern patriarchates Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem and left Constantinople as the chief custodian of their authority and influence. In addition, the natural inclination of Byzantine theologians to exalt the bishopric of Constantinople over the other patriarchates was encouraged by reflection on the numerous barbarian invasions of Italy and the fall of the western Roman Empire in . Similar tendencies were encouraged by the anti-Latin fervour that arose in the course of doctrinal disputes with Rome and as an aftermath of the sack of Constantinople in . Even long before , Byzantine writers had been convinced that the removal of the imperial capital from Rome to Constantinople had involved a simultaneous transfer of primacy in the Church. This proposition, which goes back, in embryo, to John Philoponus, was first enunciated in its most advanced form by the Patriarch Photius, and was enthusiastically adopted afterwards by his successors. Similar views were expressed by many others, including Nilus Doxapatris ca. But many, like Nilus Doxapatris, name Andrew, the "first-called" of the Apostles, as the founder of the bishopric of Constantinople, without drawing any connection between its apostolic foundation and the privileges assigned to it. Despite grandiose claims to universal jurisdiction made in behalf of the Church of Constantinople, there is no evidence that the Byzantine emperors or their patriarchs attempted to legislate on ecclesiastical matters for Rome and the West after the Seventh Oecumenical Council. Some would argue that the Patriarchs Photius and Michael Cerularius did attempt to exert control over Rome. Government of the entire Church of the Empire, East and West, fell, of course, within the jurisdiction of the Byzantine emperors, as they understood it, and as, it is important to emphasize, the popes of Rome during the period of the oecumenical councils themselves usually felt constrained to admit. Nor did they in general concern themselves with affairs that were of interest only to Rome. The major acts of imperial interference with Rome were confined to the years between and . Thereafter, as a result of the fall of Ravenna in and the expulsion of Byzantine forces from Italy in , the popes became progressively less tolerant of the kind of restraint which Byzantine political theory involved. Simultaneously, the Byzantine emperors lost the means, formerly

available to them, of imposing their will upon Rome. They then withdrew almost entirely from the West, and abandoned such efforts as they had once made to enforce in Rome or the West the Byzantine concept of imperial supervision of the Church. But they continued to assert dominion, so far as they were able, usually through the patriarch of Constantinople, over the three eastern patriarchates and the churches that had arisen in the Slavic lands. Doxapatriis insists strongly on the primacy of the Church of Constantinople, which he regards as inherited from Rome because of the transfer of the capital and because Rome had fallen into the hands of the barbarians. But he expressly restricts Byzantine authority to the three eastern patriarchates, as does the Patriarch Callistus about two hundred years later. In the first place, the Constantinopolitan patriarchs were content, as they still are, to remain supreme within their own realm including the Slavic churches, and did not seek to bring the Church of the West under their domain. But the Roman popes have never been satisfied with divided rule of this sort, and have never ceased to press for one, unified Church, obedient to Rome. Secondly, the Byzantine Church was never able to liberate itself from dependence upon the emperor. Vancourt, "Patriarcats," DTC, 11, 2, ff. Jugie, *Theologia dogmatica*, 4, f. Nicetas Seides early 12th c. *Theodorum Studitum*, *Acta Academiae Velehradensis*, 7, , reprinted in idem, *Studia orientalia liturgico-theologica* Rome, , Mesarites cited in note 49 above, Theodore Balsamon, in his commentary on the twelfth canon of the Second Council of Antioch, PG, , DA, rejects the view that appeals could be carried from one patriarchate to another according to the rank thereof. In practice, of course, the emperor could always interfere with the patriarchal administration of justice whenever he wished. Nilus Doxapatriis and Callistus in note below, who attribute to the patriarch of Constantinople the right to review and supervise all decisions of the patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. He insists that the pope was not superior to the patriarch of Constantinople, and had no right to appoint bishops outside the lands subject to him or patriarchs so also Barlaam of Calabria, in the fourteenth century: But Mesarites concedes that so far as the appeal of a patriarch against his own synod was concerned, the pope was, perhaps *isus*, more privileged than the other patriarchs. In context, however, the implication was that this advantage had been vitiated by the heresies of Rome. On Anastasius see summaries and bibliographies by L. Ueding, LThK, 1, f. Mesarites cited in note 49 above, 54 f. See an anonymous text of the early thirteenth century, ed. Arsenii, Three works by an unknown Greek writer of the beginning of the thirteenth century Greek text, Russian trans. Moscow, , ff. Petersburg, , f. On Barlaam, see note below Meyendorff and Giannelli, locc. On notes, cf. Archbishop Nicetas of Nicomedia to Anselm of Havelberg, as reported by the latter in *Dialogi*, 3, 9, PL, , , although Nicetas perhaps, prepared to yield on this point; *ibid.* Arsenii note above, ff. Jugie, *Theologia dogmatica*, 4, n. Gordillo see note above, Mesarites, and Pseudo-Photius, ed. *Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense, Etudes et documents*, 4 [Louvain, ], He says that the canons of and made Constantinople second to Rome: But he also states unequivocally that Constantinople had the same rights as Rome, in all respects: Polakes, "Historical presuppositions of the primacy of the bishop of Constantinople" in *Greek*, *Theologia*, 23, , , ; 24, , ; 25, , , who deals chiefly with the fourth and fifth centuries. He then argues that Rome had no basis for primacy in the apostolic authority of Peter. Besides, he adds, in Rome, Peter gained primacy over the other churches "by a certain custom, because of the imperial authority and the importance of Rome: This is all the more remarkable because, as a monophysite, he was in conflict with Constantinople and the imperial theology. Pitra, *Iuris ecclesiastici Graecorum historia et monumenta*, 2 Rome, , f. Loparev, *VizVrem*, 14, , n. He then acknowledges that the royal power was bestowed upon the emperor not only for the government of the world but also as a bulwark for the Church: For a valuable collection of texts in which Leo assigns a superhuman status to the emperor, see Stockmeier, *Leo I, des Grossen Beurteilung der kaiserlichen Religionspolitik* cited in note 75 above, , n. See notes 64 and 75 above, and cf. Achrida, Bulgarien, Serbia, etc. Francis Dvornik, *The Slavs: Their early history and civilization* Boston,

### 5: Locke's Political Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*A Theory of Aspects: Media Participation and Political Theory Davide Panagia* The concept of an aspect is akin to the concept of an image.

Definition, Nature and Different Aspects Article shared by: Rights in Political Theory: The rights of human beings or the rights of the individuals have long been a subject of political theory. If we look at the history of western political thought we shall find that in ancient Greek city-states the rights as such had no existence. But the ruling class and upper classes of the city-states were not unaware of rights and this is manifest from the concept of citizenship. In the city-states only a handful of persons were fortunate to be citizens and they enjoyed certain privileges which were rights. The vast majority of the population were not citizens and had no rights. The concept of rights first appeared in the theory of natural law which existed in the state of nature. In the state of nature people enjoyed certain rights sanctioned by natural law. The natural law, in fact, ruled the society and nobody had any power to violate the natural rights and natural law. It was also maintained that both natural law and natural rights were based on morality. In other words, both were moral order. Any human authority, what we now call state or government, had no power to curtail the natural rights or interfere with the natural law. In this way concept of rights came to be associated with political theory because state or government was the part of politics. The social contract theory makes a distinct contribution to making rights as part of political theory. It was assumed that the people of the state of nature, by virtue of the prevalence of natural law, enjoyed natural rights. But due to certain unavoidable circumstances the control of which was beyond their ability they could not make proper utilisation of these rights. A decision was taken that a civil authority was to be set up whose, inter alia, function would be to take steps for the protection of the natural rights. This approach received further importance in the hands of Locke who assumed that rights were to be viewed in the context of civil society. The main function of the authority of civil society is to protect the rights. Though natural rights were able to draw attention of large number of people but it received a setback at the hands of utilitarians and Marxists. The utilitarian philosopher had no faith on the theory of natural rights. Every right must be viewed in the background of society, state and politics. The utilitarians thus made rights as part of the state. They also thought that it was the duty of state to protect rights or to make arrangements for the protection of the rights. The Marxists have stepped forward. Rights can only be understood within the context of particular economic and social circumstances. With the rise of the complexities of social structure, its administration and the relation between individuals and state, rights ultimately became integral parts of political theory and prime concern of the state. Specially the latter was the consequence of the rapid growth of democracy. Today we cannot separate rights from state and politics. The intimate relationship between right, state and law was stridently argued by the philosophers of utilitarianism and this approach laid the foundation of the concept- rights and political theory. From the middle of the nineteenth century this tendency has become prevalent. There are many definitions of rights and for our purpose some are stated. One such definition is rights are legal or moral recognition of choices or interests to which particular weight is attached. A person is faced with a number of alternatives or choices and he is to select one or two of them. This freedom is the central idea of rights. The individual shall have the full freedom to select the required number of alternatives. The second definition is that rights can be called justified and recognised expectation. It is justified in the sense that when one claims rights there shall be sufficient justification behind the claims and, at the same time, the claims should be recognised. The claims have been termed by L. It is so people expect them for their betterment. Justification and recognition have landed the expectation or rights on a different level. Green defines rights in the light of idealism since he was the doyen of English idealist philosophy. He defines the concept of rights: Andrew Heywood Political Theory calls rights as entitlements emphasis added. Rights are entitlements to act or be treated in a particular way. Modern political thinkers are accustomed to treat rights mainly as entitlements. It is a type of entitlement in the sense that an individual has rights means that he is entitled to have something. In the present day situation rights have been regarded as rational claims. The environmentalists have challenged the traditional concept of rights. They forcefully argue that every claim

made by the individuals must be based on rationality. Human beings cannot kill animals indiscriminately or destroy forest for their own benefit. These two acts may satisfy their needs but at the same time the killing of animals or destroying forest shall cause an imbalance in nature and ultimately society and succeeding generations will suffer. So the idea of entitlement shall be viewed from modern and wider perspective. Again, in the age of globalisation the concept of rights is to be properly viewed. While claiming to enjoy rights one must see that whether that claim is about to jeopardise the interests of the other people of the globe. Hence the narrow concept of rights, in modern day, is irrelevant. There are several features of rights as a concept of political theory: Let us quote him: Claim-rights entitle their holder to limit the liberty of another person. A has a right against B, deriving either from moral or legal rule, which puts B under a duty. The claim-rights do not depend upon the mercy of another person. For one reason or other individuals claim rights which means that others will not create any obstructions on the way of enjoying the claim-rights. The implication of this right is individuals claim-right on the ground that the rights are indispensable for the development of personality and the authority is bound to provide such right. There is a general and popular view that rights imply duties. Rights, in this sense, are correlative to duties or functions. But when rights are interpreted in the background of liberty the doing of duty does not arise at all. For example, an individual has right of the freedom of speech means that the individual has liberty to open his mouth and mind and if he does so he will face no problem. When rights are understood as liberties, the possession of rights by one person does not entail the restrictions on liberty of another or in the sense of being under a correlative duty. This concept of right denies the traditional relation between right and duty. In the period of monarchical absolutism people claimed the right to freedom of speech because it was drastically curtailed by the absolute kings. Not only freedom of speech, but also freedom of thought and action were demanded by people. In the middle Ages there were conflicts among the various religious groups and in that period many people claimed the right to practise any religious belief and faith. In the nineteenth century, individualism dominated the political scene and rights were viewed negatively. It was the negative approach to rights. In the modern age positive ideas cloaked the idea of rights. It means that Individuals will enjoy rights but at the same time the state should do for the realisation of welfare objectives. It was also felt that this could be done by both the state and the general public. Both should act in tandem. For example, the revolutionaries of American Revolution and French Revolution demanded that they were fighting for the general rights of general public. But after the revolutions it was found that only limited people were able to enjoy the rights. In all class societies only handful of persons enjoys all sorts of rights and majority is deprived of basic rights. In many states special rights are recognised for particular sections of people. For example, in India the scheduled caste, scheduled tribes and other backward classes enjoy special rights and Constitution recognises these special provisions. We may call this system as special rights for special classes. Side by side there are general rights for general classes or all persons of the state. The state must create an atmosphere in which all the individuals will have opportunities to enjoy rights. But the state can do this only on condition that the rights are recognised by the state. Whether the state recognises or not rights are always rights. But this is the conceptual sense of rights. In reality, people will be in a position to enjoy rights if the state comes forward for their realisation. No rights can exist beyond the jurisdiction of state. People of the state of nature had natural rights, but all of them had not the opportunities to enjoy rights because the state of nature had no enforcing organ. Recognition of rights by the state has opened the scope of lot of discussion. Why should the state recognise rights? What rights are recognised? Should rights depend on the recognition of state? All these show that recognition by the state is a complicated issue. The state is the enforcing authority and law is the mechanism or instrument.

### 6: Project MUSE - A Theory of Aspects: Media Participation and Political Theory

*John Locke's Political Philosophy, entry by Alexander Moseley, in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy John Locke Bibliography, maintained by John Attig (Pennsylvania State University). Images of Locke, at the National Portrait Gallery, Great Britain.*

The diversity of liberalism can be gleaned from the numerous adjectives that liberal thinkers and movements have attached to the very term "liberalism", including classical , egalitarian , economic , social , welfare state , ethical , humanist , deontological , perfectionist , democratic and institutional , to name a few. At its very root, liberalism is a philosophy about the meaning of humanity and society. Political philosopher John Gray identified the common strands in liberal thought as being individualist, egalitarian, meliorist and universalist. The individualist element avers the ethical primacy of the human being against the pressures of social collectivism , the egalitarian element assigns the same moral worth and status to all individuals, the meliorist element asserts that successive generations can improve their sociopolitical arrangements and the universalist element affirms the moral unity of the human species and marginalises local cultural differences. The moral and political suppositions of liberalism have been based on traditions such as natural rights and utilitarian theory , although sometimes liberals even requested support from scientific and religious circles. These ideas were first drawn together and systematized as a distinct ideology by the English philosopher John Locke , generally regarded as the father of modern liberalism. Employing the idea of a state of nature—a hypothetical war-like scenario prior to the state—he constructed the idea of a social contract that individuals enter into to guarantee their security and in so doing form the State, concluding that only an absolute sovereign would be fully able to sustain such a peace. Hobbes had developed the concept of the social contract, according to which individuals in the anarchic and brutal state of nature came together and voluntarily ceded some of their individual rights to an established state authority, which would create laws to regulate social interactions. Whereas Hobbes advocated a strong monarchical authority the Leviathan , Locke developed the then radical notion that government acquires consent from the governed which has to be constantly present for the government to remain legitimate. He concluded that the people have a right to overthrow a tyrant. By placing life, liberty and property as the supreme value of law and authority, Locke formulated the basis of liberalism based on social contract theory. To these early enlightenment thinkers, securing the most essential amenities of life—liberty and private property among them—required the formation of a "sovereign" authority with universal jurisdiction. Once humans moved out of their natural state and formed societies, Locke argued as follows: And this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world". One political scientist described this new thinking as follows: In the First Treatise, Locke aimed his guns first and foremost at one of the doyens of 17th century English conservative philosophy: Reinforcing his respect for consensus, Locke argued that "conjugal society is made up by a voluntary compact between men and women". For Locke, this created a natural right in the liberty of conscience, which he argued must therefore remain protected from any government authority. Three arguments are central: His central argument was that the individual is capable of using reason to distinguish right from wrong. To be able to exercise this right, everyone must have unlimited access to the ideas of his fellow men in " a free and open encounter " and this will allow the good arguments to prevail. In a natural state of affairs, liberals argued, humans were driven by the instincts of survival and self-preservation and the only way to escape from such a dangerous existence was to form a common and supreme power capable of arbitrating between competing human desires. Modern liberals claim that formal or official guarantees of individual rights are irrelevant when individuals lack the material means to benefit from those rights and call for a greater role for government in the administration of economic affairs. As heirs of the Enlightenment, liberals believed that any given social and political order emanated from human interactions , not from divine will. From the 17th century until the 19th century, liberals from Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill conceptualised liberty as the absence of interference from government and from other individuals, claiming that all people should have the freedom to develop their own unique abilities and capacities without being sabotaged by others. Classical liberals were committed to individualism,

liberty and equal rights. Writers such as John Bright and Richard Cobden opposed both aristocratic privilege and property, which they saw as an impediment to the development of a class of yeoman farmers. This new kind of liberty became known as positive liberty to distinguish it from the prior negative version and it was first developed by British philosopher Thomas Hill Green. Green rejected the idea that humans were driven solely by self-interest, emphasising instead the complex circumstances that are involved in the evolution of our moral character. If it were ever reasonable to wish that the usage of words had been other than it has been [ In a few years, this New Liberalism had become the essential social and political programme of the Liberal Party in Britain [64] and it would encircle much of the world in the 20th century. In addition to examining negative and positive liberty, liberals have tried to understand the proper relationship between liberty and democracy. Highlighting the confusion over the first principle, Voltaire commented that "equality is at once the most natural and at times the most chimeral of things". American philosopher John Rawls emphasised the need to ensure not only equality under the law, but also the equal distribution of material resources that individuals required to develop their aspirations in life.

### 7: Liberalism - Wikipedia

*Liberalism is a political and economic doctrine that emphasizes individual autonomy, equality of opportunity, and the protection of individual rights (primarily to life, liberty, and property), originally against the state and later against both the state and private economic actors, including businesses.*

Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism Paperback. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism", pp. Further reading[ edit ] Ashley, Richard K. Examines areas of both tension and overlap between the two approaches to IR theory. Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme. Oxford University Press, Utopian realism in theory and practice", International Affairs 67 3 , pp. Idealism and Realism in International Relations: Beyond the Discipline online edition Donnelly; Jack. Realism, Idealism, and International Politics: A Reinterpretation online edition Guilhot Nicolas, ed. The Invention of International Relations Theory: Neorealism and its Critics Lebow, Richard Ned. The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders. Cambridge University Press, The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics. University of Chicago Press. Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics. Keele University Press, Realism and Fear in International Relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered. Compares Reinhold Niebuhr , Hans J. Morgenthau , Walter Lippmann , George F. Realist Strategies of Republican Peace: Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent.

## 8: Holdings : Aspects of political theory : | York University Libraries

*Political science focuses on the theory and practice of government and politics at the local, state, national, and international levels. We are dedicated to developing understandings of institutions, practices, and relations that constitute public life and modes of inquiry that promote citizenship.*

Daive Panagia A Theory of Aspects: Political Theory Beyond the Treatise My aim in this essay is to begin to elaborate a mode of political theorizing that does not rely on epistemic argument as the *sensus communis* for political thinking. Though the making of arguments and their justification is the privileged mode of political theory, the practices of reading, writing, and thinking—practices that involve citations, cutting and pasting, and poaching snippets of authoritative texts and insights, as well as engaging various media such as a pen or a PC which help and hinder the practices of justificatory discourse—seem to complicate the sense of continuity that the criteria for legitimate epistemic argument at once expect and project. The theory of aspects that I propose in this essay, then, begins from the Humean idea that we cannot overcome ontological discontinuity, but at best can devise practices of assembly and partake in technological equipment that enable the sense of continuity we wish to engender. Namely, what aspects participate in theoretical experiments and how do those things influence theorizing? There are many answers to these questions, and each is compelling in its own way. My approach begins by inviting readers to take into account a diversity of mediatic forms—beyond scriptural media—that are entangled with, and enabling New Literary History, . The ambition is to develop an approach to the study of political theory that is not exclusively interested in intelligibilities and their understanding, but is nonetheless committed to the realizations of worlds, of collectivities, and of politics. My approach is necessarily programmatic and critical in that I develop a theory of aspects that shows the limits of the hermeneutic turn in the human and social sciences. My further provocation is to affirm that political theorists have overinvested in the orthodoxy of the scriptural. The result of such overinvestment is that our pictures of theorizing are preoccupied with justifying the criteria in and by which things, peoples, utterances, judgments, arguments, and so forth are said to make sense. And these sensibilities ultimately determine the nature and validity of political speech and action. The assumption that writers in the past wrote to convey meaning through the propositional content of words, for instance, is a thoroughly modern assumption about the relationship between reading, writing, and meaning. Such technical objects as the printing press, the quill, quick-drying ink, and paper are crucial to our appreciation of the micro-discontinuities and micro-pauses of thought in any account of the coherence of a work. Take, for instance, the all-too-common experience of losing work because a software program or PC motherboard crashes. Along with the frustration and disappointment that such moments of Heideggerian conspicuousness when equipment breaks afford,<sup>11</sup> we also discover a world of technical objects literally at our fingertips, whose circadian rhythms are complicit and entangled with the more familiar practices of theorizing like note-taking and essay-writing. The computer crash is an event of interruption of the technical object that partakes in an undeterminable manner in theoretical experimentation and concept creation. In this example there is no doubt that the PC influences political theory, but the concept of influence here is far from linear, direct, or even obvious. To ask what partakes in political theorizing is not just an empirical question, though the empirical is inescapable. It is also a question about the nature of influence, the relationship between media and the affects of influence, and the limits of the causal account of transmission of mediatic effects. The issue of partaking in political theory thus involves at once a division and a distribution: The result is that exploring a work in terms of the aspects it animates offers a compellingly different sensibility for political theorizing than the one conventionally tethered to the orthodoxy of scriptural theory. That sensibility is one captured new literary history by the experience of moving images as complicit with our appreciations of what collective action looks and feels like. Aspects are the no-part of thinking; they are those imagistic partialities that advene and bear upon our sensorial attentions in a precarious manner. A theory of aspects thus calls for a curatorial disposition attentive to the moments of sensorial capture when the allure of an aspect is handled with the kind of lustful curiosity admonished by St. Augustine in his Confessions. This essay is comprised of three

sections. The first engages three thinkers of the interpretive turn in political theory: The second section assembles three images of thought drawn from three different expressions of three diverse thinkers: Though seemingly unrelated, I propose each phrase as entangled with and influencing the others, and I assemble them as one might assemble three images in a slide projector, with the hope that by streaming through them an animated image of thought emerges. That image of thought is what I call a theory of aspects. In the third section I depart from the theoretical experimentation and interpretive work I do in the previous sections in order to redirect attention to the mediaticity of technical objects a theory of aspects complicit with a theory of aspects. If, as I suggest, political theorists are consumers of media, then it is relevant to think about the nature of media themselves, their archaeologies, and their agential partaking with the practices of theorizing. The Interpretive Turn in Political Theory One of the most exciting developments in the study of political theory throughout the 1970s and 1980s was the pluralisation of methodological vocabularies that extolled the role of humanistic inquiry in the social sciences. Inspired by debates in literary studies and philosophical hermeneutics, as well as treatises on the nature of social science inquiry,<sup>16</sup> political theorists accepted the challenge of defending the particularity of political theory inquiry in the face of the positivist turn in the social sciences, and especially in political science. The approach championed to defend the virtue of political theory and humanistic inquiry in general was the critical analysis of the role and function of meaning in our interactions with the world. In this section, I elaborate some of the arguments developed by Taylor, Quentin Skinner, and Tully that address and defend practices of sense-making in political theory and show how their distinct approaches to a critical hermeneutics in the social sciences are bound to the project of epistemic validation for understanding. What concerns Taylor most is the treatment of politics as something that could be understood in abstraction from the conditions of its emergence. But, Taylor retorts, it is not possible to understand behavior without attending to the practices and institutions within which behaviors or political actions take place. This means that, to the extent that they are human, positivist political scientists are not extraneous to the circumference of the hermeneutic circle. To claim otherwise—that is, to claim precisely what positivist political scientists want to claim regarding the detached predictability quotient of observed data—means, for Taylor, to claim that they are inhuman. This is present throughout the essay in various formulations but also in the ontological claim that it is impossible for humans qua humans to experience anything as unmediated. Thus, a defense of the hermeneutical turn in the social sciences is not simply a critique of the insufficiency of behavioural social science, it is also a pedagogical insistence that the human sciences are the cornerstone of all inquiry. For Skinner, as for Taylor, the principal medium of political theory is language. But whereas for Taylor, language describes political action *in*. Moreover, Skinner also defends the idea that meaning emerges from a web of speech acts, that authors are also readers responding to other authors, and that the fact of responsiveness as a condition for speaking and writing helps us get at what an author was doing in communicating. In short, what seems crucial to Skinner is that any stated or written word is first and foremost an act of communication rather than an experience, and that to appraise an understanding of acts of communication, one must be willing to do the work of ascertaining the communicative framework within which such utterances are expressed. In fine, the history of ideas, including the history of political thought, cannot exist without the datum of the written word. That is, the conveyance of meaning through interpretation produces the meaningful claims that an author makes, and such meaningful claims can only count as meaningful if they are understandable epistemically. Thus, though Taylor and Skinner are not impressed by the constraining fallacies of positivism, they both limit their orientations to exploring the propositional content of language. My concern with each of these authors is that the hermeneutic picture of theorizing they propose treats meaning and understanding as identifiable in exactly the same way that the positivist treats data as identifiable, though with different methods of identification. In each of their critiques, both Taylor and Skinner end up espousing specific sensorial practices that allow one to identify the data of political inquiry *in*. Crucial to his efforts is the remarkable break he makes with both Taylor explicitly and Skinner implicitly. To grasp a practice, or a sign, or an aspect, is to affront a practice, or a sign, or an aspect with a certain kind of unmediated nakedness. Thus, two repercussions ensue. The first is that interpretation and understanding are not coeval, but that interpretation is a practice we invoke when understanding fails us.

The second consequence is to liken interpretation to justification, both of which are critical activities that we enlist in moments of misunderstanding. His emphasis on immediacy implies that political theory need not have a necessary form of intelligence attached to it and that understanding articulated in terms of grasping need not be bound to epistemic verification. This means that practices of critical reflection might better attend to the immediacy of events and their impact upon us, rather than on the elaboration of criteria for judgment and understanding. What such moments of encounter afford is an untethering of those structures of mediation that we deem natural to our ways of understanding. But his attention to the immediacy and unmediatedness of grasping opens the door for such extensions. Such prolongations also raise these further questions: Can there be a mode of doing political theory that does not bind itself to the necessity of understanding? I keep these questions in mind as I elaborate a theory of aspects. A Theory of Aspects Here are three unrelated aspects that bear upon one another: The possibility of relating one aspect of a work, or experience, or thought to another relies on the absence of necessary criteria for assembly. This means that the force of relation is not antecedent to an assembly formation, but emerges out of the ensemble. And each utterance relates the experience of an intangible hapticity that triggers a kind of prurience that wants to scratch the source of a sensation so as to confirm the intensity, or rightness, or concreteness, of that experience for others. Each author, in other words, admits to the existence of an experience of conviction that disappoints the expectations of validation. Could this complicity with invalidity be the source of their aspectual relation? That perpetual dissatisfaction, it should be said, is a dissatisfaction in light of—or in the face of—the epistemic expectation of justification. But he does so indirectly, with his distinction between the punctum and the studium of the photograph. Recall that Barthes distinguishes between the representational properties of the photograph the studium and the presentational force that strikes the beholder the punctum. He knows painfully well that much of his previous work has kept him in the studium where he would focus on the semiotics of representation. This, he admits, has not allowed himself to remonstrate with his moods because the expectations of the studium were so demanding and unyielding; he was, we might say, bewitched by the studium. His disposition was one oriented to the signifying structures in a work, and not to the presentational force of a striking aspect of a work. What Barthes ultimately discovers by flipping through pictures is that he is, in fact, sliding between them—that he is handling them, that others have handled them too, and that the handling of images calls for a curatorial disposition not governed by an order of necessity. And what might ultimately be wounding about the punctum is precisely the self-realization that the critical energies expelled in the studium were premised on a necessary disavowal of his senses of attraction. The first *La Chanson de Roland* was written some time around the turn of the first millennium, while the second *For Whom the Bell Tolls* was written in the twentieth century. The relation is purely conjectural, but convincing to him nonetheless. It takes a remarkable effort of the imagination on the part of the reader to tether these works—they have neither author, nor time period, nor style, nor language, nor anything in common. And yet they are relatable for Cavell because they partake of one another. The result is a preponderance of imponderable evidence that is as convincing as convincing can be. That is, are you willing to bear this partaking? By confronting and affronting us with the relation that arises from the superimposition of these two aspects, Cavell is burdening us with a projection. It simply means that your archive of sensibilities does not render the relation, and you cannot or will not, or must not accept my invitation to endure the burden of this view. No doubt this inability or refusal comes with a cost. In other words, what Cavell does not expect in his projecting aspects is the yielding of acceptance. And yet, the projection holds—and it holds in the most untenable manner: A conclusion we may thus draw for our theory of aspects is this: No one may be a theory of aspects compelled to belong to an association. How might this be? By what transubstantiating incantation might aspects bear upon one another without a necessary quality of relation? What is it that we do when we grant an aspect the authority to qualify as necessary? The projected sense here is one of not being able to isolate any one part as indispensable to a work, as if there were one detail that could subsume any and all other details—in a painting, or a picture, or a text, or a tradition—so as to have that detail identify a work as a work. Discerning between the essential and the accessory is, in this respect, risky. Are you accepting the aspect as essential to the work? Or are you accepting my willingness to project an aspect? Or are you

accepting my eccentricity in thinking that there is such an aspect that stands in relation to a work, or in relation to other works?

### 9: Aspects of the Theory of Syntax by Noam Chomsky

*Avram Noam Chomsky is an American linguist, philosopher, political activist, author, and lecturer. He is an Institute Professor and professor emeritus of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

Political science focuses on the theory and practice of government and politics at the local, state, national, and international levels. We are dedicated to developing understandings of institutions, practices, and relations that constitute public life and modes of inquiry that promote citizenship. Some of the major subfields are described below.

**Political Theory** Political theory is concerned mainly with the foundations of political community and institutions. It focuses on human nature and the moral purposes of political association. To clarify these concepts, political theorists draw on enduring political writings from ancient Greece to the present and on various writings by moral philosophers. Political theory also focuses on empirical research into the way political institutions function in practice. Here political theorists subject beliefs about political life found in important political writings to re-examination in the light of ongoing human behavior. In either case, political theory seeks to ultimately deepen political thinking and to spur citizens to responsible and creative political action.

**POL S , Introduction to Political Theory**, provides students with an overview of the main lines of thought in political theory. Advanced courses focus on given concepts, topics, and thought in political theorizing.

**Comparative Politics** Comparative politics is a broad field with a variety of approaches and goals. Some scholars and researchers compare contemporary political systems in order to judge which types best provide particular values: Others suggest that the main purpose of comparative politics is to provide an understanding of how and why different societies develop different kinds of political institutions. Still others use comparative politics as a way of discovering general laws and theories that will explain human political behavior and its variability. Comparative politics courses are of two basic types. One offers comparisons of a particular set of problems or institutions in a number of different countries. The second type offers in-depth analyses of the basic political institutions and processes of a single country or group of countries in a world region. Most students will want to begin their study of comparative politics with the **Introduction to Comparative Politics POL S**, which combines the two main approaches by including comparative discussions of particular problems, issues, processes, and institutions in a wide variety of political settings as well as in-depth readings and lectures on some of the major countries in the contemporary world.

**International Relations** The field of international relations is concerned with developing an understanding of why states and non-state international actors, like the United Nations and multinational corporations, interact as they do. International relations is a diverse field both in terms of what kinds of behavior are studied and how they are studied. International conflict, particularly war, continues to be an important focus of the field. Why do wars start? Who wins and why? How can wars be prevented? What is the role of international law and organizations? As the world has become more interdependent, scholars have become more aware of the importance of international economic activity. As a result, scholars are analyzing world trade, communications, development, foreign investment, and international finance. How states make foreign policy decisions is another important area of study. National security policy, nuclear deterrence, arms control and defense spending decisions are typical examples of foreign policy decisions. This is the foundation for a wide variety of offerings at the and levels, such as American foreign policy, global environmental politics, international political economy, and international conflict.

**American Government and Politics** Students of American government and politics seek an understanding of politics as practiced in the United States. In addition to courses on the American presidency, the U. Congress, and the courts, the department offers specialized courses on such topics as the political role of mass media, the politics of race and ethnicity, constitutional law, policy formation, state politics, and American political thought. Some of the broad questions that concern students in this field are: How and why did American political institutions, ideas, and practices develop as they have? How does one go about evaluating them? Are American political institutions, ideas and practices unique, or are they similar to other societies? How might American politics be improved? To acquire first-hand experience with the American political system, students are encouraged to participate in

academic internships in Washington D. Political Methodology The subfield of political methodology is concerned with the philosophical bases of political science, social science, empirical research design and analysis, and practical field research experience. Courses in the political methodology field cover philosophical issues regarding the possibility of a science of politics, the similarities and differences between political science and other social sciences, alternative modes of explanation, and the truth of knowledge claims. They also examine the formulation of experimental and non-experimental research designs for making causal inferences about political processes and behavior and explore the. Students are also provided an opportunity to conduct individual and group research projects through seminars. The political methodology faculty have current research and teaching interests in such diverse topics as mass media, feminist theory, language politics, political economy, rational choice theory, and public policy.

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