

1: Contradictory Promises, by Peter A Shambrook | The Balfour Project

Arab nationalism acknowledged them as fellow Arabs, but it glorified precisely that "golden age" of Arab history that the Shi'ites mourned as disastrous, during which their heroes were martyred by the very same caliphs lionized in Arab nationalist historiography.

There Aflaq analyses his nationalism and its opposition to Marxist philosophy. The Arab Nation is not a small nation of secondary importance that can adopt a message other than its own, walking in the steps of another nation and feeding from its scraps. Marxist doctrine is a danger for the Arabs because it threatens to make their national character disappear, and because it imposes a partisan, tendentious, and artificial point of view on modern Arab thought, destroying the freedom and completeness of this thought. It limits itself to organizing the economy for the purpose of redistributing the wealth of the Arab world, laying the foundations of an economy that guarantees justice and equality between citizens and promoting a revolution in production and the means of production. Our socialism is impregnated with a philosophy that arises from the Arab milieu which has its own needs, historical conditions, and particularities. We want to raise man to his supreme dignity. This goal is only realizable in a national framework. Man is only fully himself within the nation. The nation is the theater inside of which man plays the role of his individual destiny. Suppress the theater and there is no longer a role. Suddenly, man crumbles, stripped of meaning. The reality is a bit different as the Arabs have added to the permanent hostility of Islam towards Marxist materialism, the discovery of a Soviet imperialism as heavy as those which preceded it. Even at the time of the first flirtation between Arab nationalists and the Soviet Union, the leaders had already made clear distinction between the USSR and the Arab Communist parties. The Arabs see no reason to oppose a great state like the Soviet Union, that since its formation, has shown sympathy for countries that fight for their independence. Our goal is to establish amicable relations with the Soviet Union by the means of official and inter-governmental treaties and not by the intermediary of the local Communist party. The triumphs of Communism here are due to a weakness of spirit. But a well informed Arab cannot be a Communist without abandoning his Arabism, the two are incompatible; Communism is foreign to that which is Arab. It will be the greatest danger to Arab nationalism if the latter is incapable of giving a systematic definition of its goals. Hence the efforts of Aflaq to give his party a coherent ideological apparatus capable of being a response to the Marxist challenge. It is a simple projection of nationalism, a means of making this nationalism realizable, as Aflaq explicitly recognizes: Said otherwise, we think that the Arabs can only realize their rebirth if they are convinced that their nationalism means justice, equality, and dignified life in society. The restrained role that it played did not prevent it from being forbidden by the dictatorship of colonel Shishakli in April ; it would be authorized again in September and undertake a process of unification with a small related party: During the free elections of , the little party only obtained four seats, on the other hand the unified party would assure itself very solid positions during those in , after the fall of the dictato, winning 16 seats. Thirty two seats the great winner of the elections , National Party: The latter attempted a coup on July 18th , which failed miserably. Hafez then sought rapprochement with the Nasserist unionists and freed the imprisoned in July General Hafez, in December , dissolved the Regional Command and replaced the leftist Zouayyen by the rightist Bitar. But, on February 23rd , Jadid, in a coup, arrested Hafez while Aflaq fled to Lebanon the eternal asylum territory for Arab politicians unfortunate enough to be forced to flee their country. At the start of September , the National Command mounted a counter-coup relying on the Special Forces of colonel Salim Hatum, but the putsch was aborted. All these quarrels took place within a minuscule party: On the other hand the figure of seven thousand militants, given in Syrie Editions Rencontre by Simon Jargy at the start of s is certainly exaggerated. Religious disagreements played a large role in these quarrels, the Sunnis were rather moderate, while the dissident Alawite sect rather ranked among those favorable to left wing extremists. Two of the most energetic army generals were then in prison: Likewise, colonel Hatum, specialist of commando operations, who returned from his Jordanian exile in order to fight the Israeli army, would soon be arrested and executed under the pretext of conspiracy. Assad did not support them. Jadid and Zouayyen, held responsible for the piteous failure endured,

were removed from the government and Assad henceforth controlled the situation. In an effort to democratize his regime, Assad organized more or less free elections, after having concluded an accord with Communist Party and Nasserist elements. One hundred eleven seats, Communist Party: The opposition was limited to four camouflaged Muslim Brothers. The Syrians, energetically led, were those who obtained the most dangerous results for the Zionist entity by taking a large part of the Golan Heights over three days. Even if the powerful Israeli counter-attacks ended in the retreat of the Syrian Army, it gloriously redeemed its failures from Its new prestige reinforced the position of Assad who accomplished the task of which the ultra-left always spoke, without ever trying to embody it. From the end of the hostilities, Assad practiced a very flexible policy in order to avoid being cut off from Egypt, but he had to face a renewed opposition on the part of his left wing enemies, who were forced to appeal to Iraq, where they organized the Front of Exiles, charged with regrouping all the Arabs hostile to a peaceful compromise with Israel. Thus, the fate of Assad and his tendency is directly linked to the success or failure of the Kissinger Plan in the Middle East. It entered into struggle at the advent of the new regime against the three parties then representing the popular support of Kassem: The popular militias and the Communist Party which held its congress in the city at the time played a large role in the crushing of the unionist putsch and thus extended their influence. Zaim Leader Kassem was accumulating failures, failing to annex Kuwait in June , then he had to face the revolt of Mullah Barzani, in Kurdistan, where his army was bogged down without results. They only had weak support: This National Guard, formed from the youth massacred the communists and progressives who, after, after a moment of hesitation which would be their fatal flaw rushed to the aid of the Zaim. On July 14th , it formed an Arab Socialist Union of Iraq, destined to be the only party in the country, on the model of the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt, and created a singular Political Command with Egypt in October , which hardly had any concrete results, so Arif did not succeed in regulating the Kurdish problem, hesitating between war and negotiation. Arif died in a mysterious helicopter accident more likely sabotage on April 13th His brother succeeded him but he had none of his qualities and the regime became, very quickly, incapable of facing the rising discontentment. It was also by terror that the minuscule party could stay in power, a few hundred members at most still less, doubtlessly, than in Syria that we can legitimately, perfectly believe was cut off from the masses. The regime, at first very poor in their relations with the Communists and the USSR, ended up the resolving their contentions with the Russo-Iraqi treaty and by the entry of two Communist ministers into the progressive coalition government in May In effect, the conservatives, notably the military, put responsibility for the past events on the left " in particular Saddam Hussein. The latter would now require effective participation in the exercise of power, a reorientation of internal politics in the sense of firmness regarding communists and Kurdish autonomists, as well as in foreign policy, considered too favorable to the Soviet Union. Iraq leads the Front of Exiles and appears as the center of resistance to negotiations with Israel. Aflaq and his friends have not openly said their last word in Iraq. However, they pursue clandestine action there. There also exist small clandestine groups in Egypt. To this day there are no formations in the Palestinian Resistance that are not divided by this rivalry, for either one there are at least: Its importance remains very limited, but we can believe that it may rapidly increase its number of effective members, because of its decidedly oppositional positions to the negotiation processes underway.

2: Nationalism as a cause of World War I

Most isms ultimately lead to war, and Arab nationalism is no exception. Nationalist movements have an in-built tendency towards extremism and xenophobia, towards self-righteousness on the one hand and demonising the enemy on the other. History is often falsified and even fabricated to serve a.

In my second book, *Les mythes fondateurs du Choc des civilisations* [1], I devote a chapter to the endogenous causes of the political and religious crisis plaguing this civilization the latter having caused the former, by diagnosing the historical consequences of such movements as Islamic reformism, Wahhabism and Arab nationalism, whose origins I outline in *Occident and Islam*. The Muslim world does not fully grasp these historical paths nor their roots, which now drive modern ideologies. Thinkers from the Muslim world do not seem to not want to study or question modern ideologies; and this reluctance is devastating because it prevents us from curing the cancer that is driving the Muslim world towards collapse. I will attempt here to provide an explanation and historical interpretation based on my own research. Religion and Civilization As the anthropologist and psycho-sociologist Gustave Le Bon so aptly explains: They alone can inspire faith and create a sense of duty. A country conquered by Arabs will soon be in ruins. The Arabs are a savage nation, fully accustomed to savagery and the things that cause it. Savagery has become their character and nature. They enjoy it, because it means freedom from authority and no subservience to leadership. Their individual aspirations rarely coincide with the good of the nation. A nation dominated by the Arabs is in a state no different from anarchy, where everybody is set against the others. Such a civilization cannot last and goes quickly to ruins, as would be the case in a state of anarchy. But when there is religion among them through prophecy or sainthood, then they have some restraining influence in themselves. The qualities of haughtiness and jealousy leave them [3] Both the Prophet Muhammad and the Muslim religion put an end to this tribal anarchy by unifying nomadic and sedentary Arabs around the concept of divine uniqueness tawhid. The deeply tribal culture of the Arabs had relatively undermined the Muslim world. Imperialists tried to use both as leverage against the Ottoman Empire, and against the Arabs themselves which they failed to comprehend. General Napoleon Bonaparte tried to apply this strategy during his military campaign in Egypt, by calling for more Arab patriotism from Egyptians, but to no avail because Egyptians did not understand this modern Western concept. In hindsight, history and the present situation both prove that this great visionary was correct. The First Breakdown of the Middle East During the nineteenth century, and before the emergence of Arab nationalism, Britain, France, Germany and Russia all destabilized the Middle East to gain control of the region by pitting communities against each other in an external conflict conducted by proxy. Each foreign power based its influence on a community living in the Ottoman Empire and used that community as a strategic and geopolitical tool [8]. By encouraging autonomism and Arab independence, which would later turn into Pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism, the Brits and Zionists pitted not only the Arabs against the Ottoman Empire, but also the different Arab communities against each other. For example, Zionists isolated Palestinians by promoting dialogue with Arabs living outside of Palestinian territory; and this policy remains firmly in place today [10]. Zionists sought to push Arabs, including Syrian residents of Egypt, to revolt against the Ottoman Empire; they wanted to instill in Arabs the desire to expel the Ottoman Empire from Palestine, without the consent of Palestinians. In other words, they applied the age-old divide and conquer tactic. In , Britain encouraged the creation of a new secret society founded by Aziz Ali al-Misri which recruited Arab officers from the Ottoman army [11] to destroy the Empire from within. In turning autonomism into Pan-Arab nationalism, the Brits aroused, and widely used, a nascent Arab nationalism to dismantle the Ottoman Empire. They managed to do so by promising Arabs the chimera of a large and independent Arab state. The British made this unfulfilled promise to mobilize naive Arabs against the Ottomans. The Young Turks seized power due to the support of European Masonic lodges established in Turkey [15]. The abolition of the Caliphate did not just mark the destruction of a religious institution to bring the Muslim world into the Messianic Age; it was also a highly strategic act. After the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the division of the Middle East due to the Sykes-Picot secret agreement, and the reactivation of Arab tribalism, the abolition

of the Caliphate ensured the Muslim world remained perpetually divided. It also removed any prospect of rebuilding a united Muslim peoples especially in the Middle East around the only institution capable of politically unifying these ethnically diverse populations. Political Islam works symbiotically with Arab nationalism beyond all appearances, for both movements are historically and organically linked [17]. Therefore, ontologically-speaking, Arab nationalism is the fruit of division, which Arab leaders were never able to overcome, and for which people today are paying a high price. And as a result of this strategy implemented by Zionists, Brits, and then Americans, the Arab world was neutralized throughout the course of the 20th century. There are plenty of examples to back this idea: Arab nationalism has made it impossible for Arab nations to form any real global, long-term strategic alliances. This fundamental division greatly facilitates the task of foreign powers, especially Israel, which explains why the Arab world is the helpless witness of its decay in favor of the Israeli plan. The Abolition of the Caliphate and the Birth of Political Islam

The abolition of the Caliphate in the aftermath of WW1, which precipitated the breakdown of the Muslim world, had already been prepared from within by reformist movements [19]. After the abolition of the traditional Islamic regime i. Reformers had to use high-level sophistries to justify an act considered to be high treason, and thus deceived Muslims of the time as well as present-day Muslims. This manifesto was written by secular Turkish scholars and was translated into Arabic in It aimed to first strip the caliph of all temporal powers to leave him only a symbolic and spiritual character, before abolishing the Caliphate altogether. The main argument advanced by the authors is that the Caliphate is the product of a set of conceptions derived from human reason and constructed from sacred texts; therefore, according to them, Muslims need an institution that allows power to rest with the people. Immediately after this manifesto was published in Arabic, there emerged an Egyptian reformist theologian who endorsed the abolition of the Caliphate by borrowing the arguments of secular Turks and orienting them to extreme ends. This reformist, who went by the name of Ali Abderraziq , was a scholar at the University of Al-Azhar as well as a judge â€ To grasp the underlying reasons and motivations behind his position, we must consider his family background as well as the ideological current to which he belonged. Ali Abderraziq came from a wealthy family known for its commitment to the liberal current in Egypt. His father, Hassan Pasha Abderraziq, who co-founded the Al-Umma party and then became one of the historic leaders of the Liberal-Constitutional party, was close to two famous reformist figures: Muhammad Abduh and Lotfi Al-Sayyid Ali Abderraziq was largely influenced by modern Western thought â€ after all, his purpose in attacking the Caliphate was to push Muslim countries to embrace modern Western ideologies and political regimes â€ and he was especially influenced by those Western Orientalists he met during his studies at an Egyptian university, and perhaps even more so after spending nearly two years in England to pursue secular studies. In , one year after the abolition of the Caliphate, Ali Abderraziq published his book *Islam and the Foundations of Power*, in which he went so far as to question the religious legitimacy of the Caliphate. His stance caused a great deal of controversy, but was not foreign to the Egyptian political situation, because, after all, he was trying to discredit the caliphal institution on theological grounds in favor of the Egyptian Liberal Constitution, for which his family had militated [23]. It is safe to say here that we are not dealing with a disinterested intellectual approach devoid of ideological intention. Two dates are often highlighted: Such a coincidence is indeed remarkable. His interpretation is not as simple as it seems. Should it be understood in a strictly causal sense, wherein the excess of Ali Abderraziq, the vigor of his office against an institution that symbolized the continuity of the Islamic entity for centuries, provoked an opposite reaction: Hamid Enayat is a specialist on modern Islamic political thought. He affirms without hesitation: The caliphate crisis had a subsidiary doctrinal result: Indeed, the disappearance of the Caliphate left fallow the religious terrain that so-called fundamentalist movements of political Islam immediately came to occupy â€ nature abhors the void â€ starting with the Muslim Brotherhood, which manipulated Islam for political gains. This historical sequence confirms my thesis on the historical dialectic of the destruction of Islam, whose two main drivers are Islamic reformism and Wahhabism, and of which the Muslim Brotherhood organization is the synthesis [28]. Ultimately, every reformist idea that favors the abolition of the Caliphate and political movements â€ e. Prophet Muhammad echoes this idea: There will come in the last days some impostors and liars who will bring narrations never heard by you and your

forefathers, so beware of them lest they misguide you and afflict you with tribulation. The Caliphate is much more than a mere institution: The discord exacerbated by jealous Arab tribalism has turned into a nationalism of rivalry and opposition. To march forward, the Israeli project must depend precisely on this division. Thinkers and strategists from Europe and the Muslim world lack such a long-term vision; and this idea explains why the Jewish messianic project, which gave rise to Zionism, took so long to implement. After delivering this analysis, Oded Yinon wrote 35 years ago: In the long run, this world will be unable to exist within its present framework in the areas around us without having to go through genuine revolutionary changes.

3: Algerian nationalism - Wikipedia

Ba'athism is based on principles of Arab nationalism, pan-Arabism, Arab socialism as well as social progress and it is a secular ideology. A Ba'athist state supports socialist economics to a varying degree and supports public ownership over the heights of the economy, but opposes the confiscation of private property.

Algerian nationalism[edit] A new generation of Muslim leadership emerged in Algeria at the time of World War I and grew to maturity during the 1920s and 1930s. Some of these people were members of the few wealthy Muslim families that had managed to insinuate themselves into the colonial system in the 19th century and had with difficulty succeeded in obtaining for their sons the French education coveted by progressive Algerians. Others were among the about 100,000 Algerians who had served in the French army during World War I or the several hundred thousand more who had assisted the French war effort by working in factories. Many Algerians stayed on in France after the war, and sent the money they earned there to their relatives in Algeria. In France they became aware of a standard of living higher than any they had known at home and of democratic political concepts, taken for granted by Frenchmen in France, which colonial soldiers, and bureaucrats had refused to apply to the Muslim majority in Algeria. Some Algerians also became acquainted with the pan-Arab nationalism growing in the Middle East. If, however, the state granted the Muslims full citizenship, the petition went on, opposition to conscription would be dropped. In 1930, in addition to demanding preferential treatment for "the intellectual elements of the country", the group called for an end to unequal taxation, broadening of the franchise, more schools, and protection of indigenous property. The Young Algerians added a significant voice to the reformist movement against French colonial policy that began in 1919 and continued until the outbreak of World War I. In part to reward Muslims who fought and died for France, Clemenceau appointed reform-minded Charles Jonnart as governor general. Reforms promulgated in 1931 and known as the Jonnart Law expanded the number of Muslims permitted to vote to about 100,000. The most popular Muslim leader in Algeria after the war was Khalid ibn Hashim, grandson of Abd al Qadir and a member of the Young Algerians, although he differed with some members of the group over acceptance of the Jonnart Law. Some Young Algerians were willing to work within the framework set out by the reforms, but Emir Khalid, as he was known, continued to press for the complete Young Algerian program. He was able to win electoral victories in Algiers and to enliven political discourse with his calls for reform and full assimilation, but by he tired of the struggle and left Algeria, eventually retiring to Damascus. The group was originally a solidarity group formed in 1919 in Paris to coordinate political activity among North African workers in France and to defend "the material, moral, and social interests of North African Muslims". The leaders included members of the French Communist Party and its labor confederation, and in the early years of the struggle for independence the party provided material and moral support. In addition to independence from France, the Star called for freedom of press and association, a parliament chosen through universal suffrage, confiscation of large estates, and the institution of Arabic schools. Its newspaper, El Ouma, reached a circulation of 43,000. Influenced by the Arab nationalist ideas of Lebanese Druze Shakib Arslan, Messali turned away from communist support to a more nationalist outlook, for which the French Communist Party attacked the Star. For Messali Hadj, who ruled the PPA with an iron hand, these aims were inseparable from the struggle for an independent Algeria in which socialist and Islamic values would be fused. The reformers favored the adoption of modern methods of inquiry and rejected the superstitions and folk practices of the countryside, actions that brought them into confrontation with the marabouts. The reformers published their own periodicals and books, and established free modern Islamic schools that stressed Arabic language and culture as an alternative to the schools for Muslims operated for many years by the French. Although their support was concentrated in the Constantine area, the AUMA struck a responsive chord among the Muslim masses, with whom it had closer ties than did the other nationalist organizations. As the Islamic reformers gained popularity and influence, the colonial authorities responded in 1935 by refusing them permission to preach in official mosques. This move and similar ones sparked several years of sporadic religious unrest. European influences had some impact on indigenous Muslim political movements because Ferhat Abbas and Messali Hadj even with opposite views, essentially

looked to France for their more secular ideological models. Ben Badis, however, believed that "Islam is our religion, Arabic our language, Algeria our fatherland. However, Ben Badis responded that he, too, had looked to the past and found "that this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France, and does not want to be France" [but] has its culture, its traditions and its characteristics, good or bad, like every other nation of the earth. Reaction in Paris to the nationalists was divided. The colons also had powerful allies in the French National Assembly, the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the business community, and were strengthened in their resistance by their almost total control of the Algerian administration and police. Viollette Plan [edit] The mounting social, political, and economic crises in Algeria for the first time induced older and newly emerged classes of indigenous society to engage from to in numerous acts of political protest. The government responded with more restrictive laws governing public order and security. Blum and Viollette gave a warm reception to a congress delegation in Paris and indicated that many of their demands could be met. Meanwhile, Viollette drew up for the Blum government a proposal to extend French citizenship with full political equality to certain classes of the Muslim "elite", including university graduates, elected officials, army officers, and professionals. Messali Hadj saw in the Viollette Plan a new "instrument of colonialism" to split the Algerian people by separating the elite from the masses". The components of the congress—the ulema, the FEI, and communists—were heartened by the proposal and gave it varying measures of support. Not unexpectedly, however, the colons had taken uncompromising exception to the Blum-Viollette proposal. Colon administrators and their supporters threw procedural obstacles in the path of the legislation, and the government gave it only lukewarm support, resulting in its ultimate failure. While the Viollette Plan was still a live issue, however, Messali Hadj made a dramatic comeback to Algeria and had significant local success in attracting people to the Star. A mark of his success was the fact that in the government dissolved the Star. Although Messali Hadj spent many years in jail, his party had the most widespread support of all opposition groups until it was banned in His more immediate goal was greater political, social, and economic equality for Muslims with the colons. By the cooperation among the parties that made up the congress began to break up. The Algerian administration vigorously enforced the anti-Semitic laws imposed by Vichy, which stripped Algerian Jews of their French citizenship. Potential opposition leaders in both the European and the Muslim communities were arrested. Allied landings were made at Algiers and Oran by 70, British and United States troops on November 8, , in coordination with landings in Morocco. Eisenhower, Algiers and Oran were secured two days later after a determined resistance by French defenders. Algeria provided a base for the subsequent Allied campaign in Tunisia. After the fall of the Vichy regime in Algeria, General Henri Giraud, Free French commander in chief in North Africa, slowly rescinded repressive Vichy laws despite opposition by colon extremists. He also called on the Muslim population to supply troops for the Allied war effort. Ferhat Abbas and twenty-four other Muslim leaders replied that Algerians were ready to fight with the Allies in freeing their homeland but demanded the right to call a conference of Muslim representatives to develop political, economic, and social institutions for the indigenous population "within an essentially French framework". Giraud, who succeeded in raising an army of , men to fight in the Italian campaign, refused to consider this proposal, explaining that "politics" must wait until the end of the war. In March, Abbas, who had abandoned assimilation as a viable alternative to self-determination, presented the French administration with the Manifesto of the Algerian People, signed by fifty-six Algerian nationalist and international leaders. Outlining the perceived past and present problems of colonial rule, the manifesto demanded specifically an Algerian constitution that would guarantee immediate and effective political participation and legal equality for Muslims. It called for agrarian reform, recognition of Arabic as an official language on equal terms with French, recognition of a full range of civil liberties, and the freeing of political prisoners of all parties. The French governor general created a commission composed of prominent Muslims and Europeans to study the manifesto. This commission produced a supplementary reform program, which was forwarded to General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French movement. De Gaulle and his newly appointed governor general in Algeria, General Georges Catroux, a recognized liberal, viewed the manifesto as evidence of a need to develop a mutually advantageous relationship between the European and Muslim communities. Catroux was reportedly shocked by the "blinded spirit of social conservatism" of the colons, but he did not regard the

manifesto as a satisfactory basis for cooperation because he felt it would submerge the European minority in a Muslim state. Instead, the French administration instituted a reform package, based on the Viollette Plan, that granted full French citizenship to certain categories of "meritorious" Algerian Muslims—military officers and decorated veterans, university graduates, government officials, and members of the Legion of Honor—who numbered about 60. By this time, over , Algerian Muslims out of a total Algerian Muslim population of nine million were working in France to support their relatives in Algeria, and many thousands more worked in towns. Messali and his PPA still rejected anything short of independence. Social unrest grew in the winter of 1945, fueled in part by a poor wheat harvest, shortages of manufactured goods, and severe unemployment. On May Day, the clandestine PPA organized demonstrations in twenty-one towns across the country, with marchers demanding freedom for Messali Hadj and independence for Algeria. Violence erupted in some locations, including Algiers and Oran, leaving many wounded and three dead. Nationalist leaders were resolving to mark the approaching liberation of Europe with demonstrations calling for their own liberation, and it was clear that a clash with the authorities was imminent. The tensions between the Muslim and colon communities exploded on May 8, V-E Day, in an outburst of such violence as to make their polarization complete, if not irreparable. They ignored the warnings, the march began, and gunfire resulted in which a number of police and demonstrators were killed. Marchers rampaged, leading to the killing of Europeans. Word spread to the countryside, and villagers attacked colon settlements and government buildings. The army and police responded by conducting a prolonged and systematic ratisage literally, raking over of suspected centers of dissidence. In addition, military airplanes and ships attacked Muslim population centers. According to official French figures, 1, Muslims died as a result of these countermeasures. Other estimates vary from 6, to as high as 45, killed. Abbas deplored the uprising but charged that its repression had taken Algeria "back to the days of the Crusades". However some ex-PPA members convinced that independence could only be obtained by military means, continued to operate clandestinely and maintain cells in the Aures Mountains and Kabylie while maintaining membership in the MTLD. Their goal was to conduct terrorist operations since political protest through legal channels had been suppressed by the colonial authorities. This law called for the creation of an Algerian Assembly with one house representing Europeans and "meritorious" Muslims, and the other representing the remaining more than 8 million Muslims. The statute also replaced mixed communes with elected local councils, abolished military government in the Algerian Sahara, recognized Arabic as an official language with French, and proposed enfranchising Muslim women. Muslim and colon deputies alike abstained or voted against the statute but for diametrically opposed reasons: At the first session of the colon-controlled Algerian Assembly, an MTLD delegate was arrested at the door, prompting other Muslim representatives to walk out in protest. A request by Abbas to gain the floor was refused. Frustrated by these events, the nationalist parties, joined by the PCA, formed a common political front that undertook to have the results of the election voided. New elections in were subject to the same sort of rigging that had characterized the voting. Internal divisions and attacks by the authorities severely weakened the MTLD, draining its energies. Colon extremists took every opportunity to persuade the French government of the need for draconian measures against the emergent independence movement. Ben Bella created a new underground action committee to replace the OS, which had been broken up by the French police in Between March and October, the CRUA organized a military network in Algeria comprising six military regions referred to at the time as wilayat; singular: The leaders of these regions and their followers became known as the "internals". Algerianism[edit] The term Algerianism has had two meanings in history, one during the French colonial era, and another one after the independence of Algeria. It has for "purpose to safeguard the cultural heritage born from the French presence in Algeria. The modern Arabic language actually has two distinct words which can be translated into English as "nationalism": The word qawmiyya has been used to refer to pan-Arab nationalism, while wataniyya has been used to refer to patriotism at a more local level sometimes disparaged as "regionalism" by those who consider pan-Arabism the only true form of Arab nationalism. History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria. Cambridge University Press,

4: Review: Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century by Adeed Dawisha | Books | The Guardian

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Efraim Perlmutter 16 December This is an attempt to survey Zionist attitudes towards the Middle Eastern population, in the midst of which a state for the Jewish people was established. In both camps, there were competing notions about what constituted the group and which identity it should be based on. One element of one sector of the Jewish people will be examined here: The reader should be advised that many differing opinions have been expressed by many more individuals. Even though I present what I think are ideas representative of mainstream Zionists at the time, in reality far less than one percent of the historical material will be cited. One common factor underlying all of these early proto-Zionist writings is the absence of any thought about the contemporary residents of the territory upon which the Jewish nation would be constituted. This situation was changed by Theodore Herzl, who in the popular mind is identified as the father of Zionism. As a literary device in this utopian novel, all but one issue had been settled. The burning issue of what role non-Jews, including Arab residents, would have in the new state. However, several notable Zionist figures took exception to this idea. He proposed establishing not a state in the formal sense, but a series of intellectual enterprises that would work towards the spiritual revival of the Jewish people. He was very critical of Jewish attitudes towards, and the treatment of, Arabs in the Jewish agricultural colonies that had been founded before and after the first Zionist Congress. He had written scathingly about it and some of his writings are still quoted in Arab propaganda today. Nevertheless, the general idea that improving the condition of Arabs would eventually bring them around to the Zionist point of view remained dominant in Zionist thinking. This was particularly the case among socialist Zionists, who held most leadership positions until Jabotinsky was far from a socialist and as a consequence did not share the faith in the power of economics that was held by Zionists on the left. Instead, he stressed the power of nationalism and recognized the existence of nationalist sentiments among the Arabs. His proposal was to encourage the British to defend the Zionist enterprise from Arab nationalism and to construct a Jewish state behind a British iron wall so strong that Arab nationalism would recognize the reality and, out of practical and national considerations, would establish normal non-hostile relations with the Jewish state. Jabotinsky and his revisionist followers contested but they never gained leadership of the Zionist movement. However, as the relationship with both the British and the Arabs deteriorated, the Zionist left lost its faith in the power of economics and the Revisionists lost confidence in the British to fulfil their obligations to the Zionist movement. The Middle East is nothing but a factory mass-producing irony. At the Tel Aviv Art Museum a few years ago, Jews were shown working in agriculture wearing traditional Middle Eastern clothing in an exhibit of motifs employed in Zionist posters and advertisements. This was shown in the work of Jewish artists of the time. From then on Jewish workers in JNF posters wore shorts, shirts with rolled up sleeves and Tembel hats. There was a corresponding symbiosis in the attitude of Zionists towards Arabs. In many respects the Holocaust, and the lack of response to it by allies, was a terrible confirmation of early Zionist ideologues. Another consequence was that Arabs, in Zionist view, took the role of Jewish oppressors on from the Nazis, which goes all the way back to the Amalekites of the bible. This was prior to the establishment of the Israeli State. These statements might have previously been considered examples of Middle Eastern hyperbole. It made no difference, whether it was true or not. The threats of the Holocaust and the Arabs changed the Zionist view of Arabs in two fundamental ways. First, it dashed all hope of peace, even to those Zionists who were actively seeking an accommodation between the two peoples. Second, and even more central to the subject of this essay, the Arabs became symbols of the historic oppressors. Between and , when Israeli Jews fought against the Arabs in several military engagements, they were triumphant not only against their contemporary Arab enemies, but triumphant over Jewish history as well. To understand this one has to remember that Jewish history, by and large, is a narrative of repeated persecutions, massacres and dispersions over two millennia. That particular narrative was decisively ended in

One might think that sympathy supposedly displayed as a consequence of Jewish suffering would be a desirable consequence. However, all the sympathy in the world falls very short of making up for the accompanying pain, both physical and psychological. In the case of the latter, the self-image of the eternally persecuted was not particularly attractive to Jews themselves. As a consequence, defeating the Arabs had great therapeutic effect on the Jewish psyche. One final element in the Israeli perception of Arabs remains to be described. During the first few months of the first Palestinian Intifada the Israeli image of Palestinian nationalism changed from viewing it as an anti-Israel propaganda tool, to a new but real nationalism that had to be accommodated if there was to be peace between Arabs and Jews. A great deal of Arab political behavior served to confirm this image in Zionist perception. In short, perhaps Arab nationalism, and certainly Palestinian nationalism, were fraudulent constructs of the enemy to justify hatred for the Jewish state. To conclude, today the Israeli perception of the Arab can be that of a partner, fanatic, traditional enemy, duped by a corrupt leadership or acting out of a frustrated national desire; all very much depending on how the Arabs choose to portray themselves combined with the psychological baggage that Jews carry as a consequence of historical experiences. About the author Efraim has been a resident of the western Negev, adjacent to the Gaza Strip, for almost 40 years. He has a Masters Degree from the University of Michigan in international relations and is both a farmer and an English teacher, and a teacher twice-retired, most recently from teaching English at a Bedouin High School.

5: How Arab nationalism was born as the Ottoman empire died - The National

In the Arabic-speaking Ottoman provinces, it was the empire's ill-starred decision to enter the war against Britain, France and Russia that gave Arab nationalism its chance.

Whilst Arab nationalism has died out with the end of wars with the Jewish state of Israel, the Arab Spring has revived this sentiment with pro-democracy movements replicating from the Atlantic to the desert of Syria. January 14 marks the two-year anniversary of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, the birthplace of the movement. It introduced major constitutional reforms in Morocco and Algeria. The movement also ignited deep divides within these countries, including a civil war that is still ongoing in Syria. Undemocratic Arab governments, in the past, have managed to establish some economic ties with other Arab countries through the Arab League. The question of whether the Arab Spring has reunited the Arab world and particularly the southern Mediterranean region has many sides to it. It is hard to take on. While the Arab Spring has blessed some countries with new regime changes and debatable democracies, monarchies of the Arab world are still reluctant to admit the change. They are averse to the slightest critiques and have already engaged in drastic oppressive measures to block out the spread of the protestation movements in their respective territories. In fact, popular sentiment in Arab Spring countries exclusively republics has turned against the Gulf. The two blocs share an old rivalry: Pan-Arabism secular, but anti-neocolonialist ideology vs. Pan-Islamism the forcible implementation of Islam as sole reference. Despite public and media support between Arab Spring countries and other Arab countries, diplomatic and trade relations have not changed over the past two years. Free movement in the Arab world is not nearly like the Schengen Area in Europe, not even one bit. Free labor and capital is still restricted. The Arab Spring has also drawn mixed reactions from different Arab states as to the fate of the Syrian political turmoil. Unlike past cases of civil wars and unrests in the region, the most powerful bloc in the Arab world, the Gulf, has no genuine interests to resolve the issue. Other states grew indifferent as few share formal economic trades with Syria. This is yet another mark of the disintegration of the Arab world. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring has some positive aspects for youth in the Arab world. Despite their large number everywhere, Arab youth still do not have any grip on power yet, not even made possible by the latest democratic elections. There are, now, different joint movements between youth from North Africa and the Middle East to unite efforts to break the ice between these two worlds. The ice is prejudice and a cultural divide between the two blocs. Examples are numerous, but perhaps the most prominent collaboration between Arabs is the new social media campaign The Uprisings of Women in the Arab World. The Facebook page has gathered more than 80, "likes," including many Westerners who support the movement as well. The page features pictures, articles, caricatures from many Arab countries, if not all. Texts are provided in every language and dialect spoken in the region and transcend religious affiliations too. Two other bloggers, Samia Errazouki , a Moroccan-American, and Mona Kareem, a Kuwaiti-born leader of Bedoon rights " a pro-citizenship movement for the stateless people of Kuwait " have started an intercultural blog as well. The aim of the blog is to break stereotypes between the Gulf and North Africa. The blog features insights from different influential activists and intelligentsia from both regions. It is one of the first collaborative works throughout the region. So, despite disintegration, Arab youth no longer hold on to faded or even racist ideologies such as Arab nationalism. The latter has proven to be completely useless. Arab youth are starting to take actions though social networks and collaborative intellectual ventures. The time will come when civil society and activists throughout the region will unite ties across countries; the reintegration process has already been launched.

6: Syria's Kurds : history, politics and society in SearchWorks catalog

Egypt's devastating defeat was Arab nationalism's mortal loss, for the fate of Arab nationalism during the struggles, triumphs, and reversals of the s and s was inexorably linked to Egypt and its charismatic president.

Three lines of poetry plot the trajectory of Arab national consciousness. In the century that separated these two lines, millions of people gradually awakened and arose, insisting before the world and one another that they be written down as Arabs. Once half of Europe and a Superpower had admitted to living a lie for most of this century, the Arabs could not suppress their own doubt any longer. Their god had also failed, spectacularly so. It had been called Arabism, or Arab nationalism, or pan-Arabism, and by the time Qabbani posed his question, it had been in full retreat for a generation. At present, many Arabs have suspended their belief in the Arab nation, and now openly doubt whether there is a collective Arab mission. Those recently swept up by Islamic activism prefer to think of themselves first and foremost as Muslims, and do so without apology. Other Arabs plainly prefer to be known as Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians, Moroccans — citizens of over twenty independent states, each with its own flag and own interests. Some have even taken to referring to themselves as Middle Easterners, in anticipation of an Arab-Israeli peace and a new regional order of cooperation modeled on Europe. A few intellectuals keep the Arab flame alive. It has existed for as long as the Arabs have walked the stage of history, and it has been subject to negotiation by every generation for nearly a millennium and a half. All were anathema to Arab nationalism as it evolved over most of this century. Arab nationalism, a modern creation of this century, may well disappear altogether under their impact. But whatever the prospects of Arab nationalism, its history to this point represents one of the most remarkable instances of the rapid birth, rise, and decline of any modern nationalism. That history deserves a new telling, for it has not been invoked in the broader debate over the growing instability of identity that marks the end of this century. There was a time when Arab nationalism did enjoy a place of some prominence in the comparative study of nationalism, but later it became the domain of specialists, which was perhaps just as well. Arnold Toynbee and Hans Kohn, who first attempted to integrate Arab nationalism into some wider comparative framework, became its virtual partisans between the world wars despite their own reservations about nationalism in general. But even the comparativists who did know Arab nationalism quite well chose not to make it the pivot of their comparisons, perhaps for fear of losing the general reader in a labyrinth. The speakers of Arabic today number over million, in a zone stretching from the Atlantic shores of Morocco to the Arabian Sea — a region that extends parallel to all of Europe from the Atlantic seaboard of Iberia to the Urals. No European nationalism has claimed a potential constituency as large, as far-flung, or as fragmented. It has never been easy to document the historical evolution of political consciousness across this zone, and a thinness persists in its study. Nor did Arab nationalism originate as a straightforward reaction to Western imperial rule, of the kind familiar elsewhere in Asia and Africa. Some Arab peoples experienced over a century of direct Western rule, while others experienced none at all. As a result, Arab nationalism followed distinct courses of development in the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian peninsula, the Nile valley, and the North African coast. Each of these zones encountered the West on different terms, at different times. Many of these became rivals, even to the point of bloodshed. This has made it difficult to generalize about Arab nationalism, and treacherous to deploy such generalizations in the larger debate over nationalism. The purpose in the following pages is not to attempt the treacherous. It is to attempt what Emerson wished, as a prelude to comparison: It is the story of a nationalism that arose fitfully, spread dramatically, then faltered and failed. It is an account of how millions of people imagined themselves to be Arabs and then, as though in a case of mistaken identity, claimed to have been someone else all along. The Emergence of Arabism Arabism first arose in the nineteenth century not as a direct reaction to Western rule, but as a critique of the state of the Ottoman Empire, whose reach had extended over most of the Arabic-speaking peoples since the early sixteenth century. For nearly four hundred years, these Arabic speakers had been fully reconciled to their role in the Empire. The seat of the Empire was in Istanbul, and its vast domains were administered in Ottoman Turkish. But the Ottomans professed Islam, as did the overwhelming majority of their Arabic-speaking subjects. Those Muslims who spoke Arabic retained a

pride in their language: They also celebrated the history of the early Arab conquests, which carried Islam from the Oxus to the Pyrenees. And they took pride in their genealogies, which linked them to Arabia at the dawn of Islam. But that very fidelity to Islam bound them to Muslims who spoke other languages and prided themselves on other genealogies, and who brought new vitality to the defense and expansion of Islam. Since the fifteenth century, the Ottomans showed precisely this vitality, harnessed to an Islamic zeal that had carried Islam to the very gates of Vienna. All the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman house saw themselves as participants and beneficiaries in this shared Islamic enterprise, and they drew no distinction between Arab and Turk. But with the relative decline in Ottoman power, especially in the nineteenth century, the foundations of this symbiosis began to weaken. The great Ottoman carpet was being rolled up at both ends: The Ottomans embarked on a succession of Westernizing reforms but eventually lost their footing in the Balkans, the Caucasus, North Africa, and Egypt. First, there were the minority communities of Arabic-speaking Christians, much influenced by European currents, who worked to transform Arabic into a medium of missionary work and modern learning. From about the middle of the nineteenth century, their efforts did much to kindle interest in secular Arabic belles-lettres, through adaptation of Arabic to the modern conventions of the press, the novel, and the theater. The Arabic literary revival, centered in Beirut, did not translate immediately into Arab nationalism. But it did argue for the existence of a secular Arab culture, to which Christians and Muslims had supposedly contributed in equal measure. By elaborating upon this shared Arab legacy, the Christian minority sought to erode the prejudice of Muslim majority and to win Christians their full equality as fellow Arabs. Arabism also arose from a second source. Rivalries had always absorbed the Arabic-speaking Muslim elite, especially in the keen competition over appointments to Ottoman government positions and bureaucratic sinecures. The grievances of those passed over for such spoils by Ottoman governors occasionally turned into the demand that Istanbul accord the Arabic-speaking provinces more autonomy in the conduct of their own affairs. As the twentieth century opened, this Arabism spread to all the major cities of the Ottoman Empire where Arabic was spoken, but it centered upon Damascus, where its adherents began to organize. While the Arabism of Muslims resembled that of Christians in its pride of language, it differed fundamentally in its deep attachment to Islam. It appealed to Muslims by arguing that the greatness of the Arabs resided in their privileged understanding of Islam. The Arabs, acting in the name of Islam, had created a great empire and civilization, and only the Arabs could restore Islam to its pristine grandeur. There was nothing secular about this assertion of Arab genius, which became closely associated with Islamic apologetics and reformism. Ultimately it would defeat itself by its apologetic defense of tradition and religion. In the English traveler Gertrude Bell gave the commonplace assessment of these stirrings: Of what value are the pan-Arabic associations and inflammatory leaflets that they issue from foreign printing presses? The answer is easy: Turkification threatened the cultural status quo. The Turkish-speaking subjects of the Ottoman Empire had been exposed to European-style nationalism, largely through its penetration into the Balkans. This policy, never fully implemented, caused some apprehension in the Arab provinces on the eve of World War I, and may have helped to rally the supporters of cultural Arabism to a political purpose. Zionist settlement in Palestine threatened the political status quo. Ottoman authorities tolerated the influx of Jewish immigration in the belief that it would ultimately benefit the Empire, as it had in successive waves since the Spanish Inquisition. As the pace of Zionist immigration and settlement increased, their immediate neighbors grew apprehensive about the looming possibility of dispossession. From the turn of the century, Ottoman policy toward Zionism became a matter of growing debate and criticism in the Arabic press. Yet, while the Ottoman Empire lasted, this Arabism did not develop into full-fledged nationalism. Its adherents pleaded for administrative decentralization, not Arab independence, and they had no vision of a post-Ottoman order. They did not indulge in dreams of Arab power. After some hesitation, the Ottoman Empire entered the European war on the side of Germany, prompting Britain and France to fan every ember of dissent in the Empire. In , he finally raised the standard of revolt against Ottoman rule. The revolt thus made for a volatile mix, whose diverse participants dreamed the different dreams of Arab kingship, desert anarchy, liberal constitutionalism, and military dictatorship. While the revolt lasted, they suspended their differences in the drive for independence. Most notably, Britain had made wartime commitments to France and the Zionist movement.

The first, the so-called Sykes-Picot agreement, secretly recognizing most of the northern Levant as a zone of French privilege; the second, the Balfour Declaration, publicly supporting a Jewish national home in Palestine. Britain also had strategic and economic interests in the territories demanded by the Sharif Husayn and his sons. On the basis of these agreements, French forces drove Faysal and his followers from Damascus in a brief battle in July, and imposed French rule on Syria that would last for a quarter century. At the same time, Britain began to fulfill its commitment under the Balfour Declaration by opening Palestine to more extensive Zionist immigration and settlement. Arab violence against Jews first broke out in April, presaging the strife between Arab and Jew that would become a fixture of the British mandate for Palestine. In June, a widespread insurrection against the British broke out in Iraq, which British forces suppressed by force. Increasingly, Arab nationalists charged that Ottoman rule had been replaced by British and French imperialism, government even more alien than its Muslim predecessor. Britain did move to compensate the leaders of the Arab Revolt in But the Arab nationalists now nursed a deep grievance against Britain and France over the partition of the territories they wanted, and the denial of independence in Palestine and Syria, which they believed had been promised to them. The Arab nationalist lament against the arbitrary partition of the Fertile Crescent had much validity. None of the new states was commensurate with a political community. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine, Lebanon – these names derived from geography or classical history, and their borders largely reflected the imperial jostling for strategic position or oil. But the Maronites were too few, and the borders of Lebanon drawn in by the French at Maronite insistence included large numbers of Muslims. It satisfied the makers and backers of the Arab Revolt, who regrouped in Iraq after their flight from Syria, and there established another Arab nationalist state. But in the fragmented societies of the Fertile Crescent, few persons were accustomed to regarding themselves as Arabs. As in Ottoman times, most continued to classify themselves by religion, sect, and genealogy. They did not wish to be ruled by foreigners from over the sea. But neither did they desire to be ruled by strangers from across the desert, even if those strangers spoke Arabic. During the war, some of them had made their own diplomacy, to secure separate independence. The Arab nationalist state under Faysal in Damascus proved to be chaotic, and his subsequent reign in Iraq rested on the bayonets of the British. Faced with masses of people who had not chosen to be Arabs, the Arab nationalists developed a doctrine that denied them any other choice. Between the wars, the Arab nationalists progressively discarded the French idea of the nation as a voluntary contract, formed by individuals to secure their liberty. Increasingly their nation resembled the German Volk, a natural nation above all human volition, bound by the mystery of language and lore.

7: Arab Nationalism is Spreading On Two Year Anniversary of the Arab Spring

Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century: From Triumph to Despair by Adeed Dawisha pp, Princeton, £ Most isms ultimately lead to war, and Arab nationalism is no exception.

Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century: Nationalist movements have an in-built tendency towards extremism and xenophobia, towards self-righteousness on the one hand and demonising the enemy on the other. History is often falsified and even fabricated to serve a nationalist political agenda. It is interesting to note how frequently the phrase "forging a nation" is used, because most nations are forgeries. Indeed, some nations are based on little more than a mythological view of the past and a hatred of foreigners. Arab nationalism shares some of these negative traits with other nationalist movements, but there is one basic difference: Adeed Dawisha has given us a timely, illuminating and highly readable overview of the history of the Arab national movement, from its origins in the 19th century to the present. His book combines an analysis of the ideas of Arab nationalism and their roots in European thought, with a fast-moving political narrative, full of dramatic ups and downs. Dawisha is a professor of political science at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. He grew up in Iraq during the heyday of Arab nationalism, and he brings to his task a rare personal insight, as well as mastery of the voluminous Arabic sources on the subject. In the debate on the origins of Arab nationalism, Dawisha sides with the revisionists against the more conventional historians, led by George Antonius. In *The Arab Awakening*, Antonius articulated the orthodox view that, during the 19th century, a national identity took root among the Arabic-speaking populations of the Ottoman empire, and that during the first world war this idea developed into a fully fledged revolutionary movement. Dawisha argues that the Arab revolt against the Ottoman empire was originally proclaimed in the name of Islam, not in the name of Arabism or the Arab nation. Religious identity was more important than national identity. The Arab revolt therefore ought to be excised from the chronicles of Arab nationalism. It was only in the aftermath of the first world war that the "Arab nation" emerged as a pertinent concept and Arab nationalism gradually took the form of a political movement. Education played a vital part in glorifying the past, in raising political consciousness and in kindling a nationalist spirit in a generation of young Arabs. Intellectuals rather than politicians were at the forefront of the movement. They borrowed the nationalist idea from Europe and they used it to try to chart a new path for the Arab nation. But the Arab national movement did not sweep all before it. There were formidable obstacles along its path. First, there were conflicting identities and competing loyalties to tribe, sect, region, and religion. Second, there was always tension between Iraqi, Syrian, Egyptian and other regional identities, and the larger, all-encompassing Arab identity. The third and perhaps most ironic obstacle to the concept of a coherent Arab nation was the linguistic diversity in the land of Araby. The most powerful competing alternative to the idea of a secular Arab nation was the concept of a united Muslim umma or community. Islam was the other great supranational ideology with a claim to the allegiance of the great majority of Arabs. Islam had a broader catchment area than pan-Arabism, because it did not differentiate between Arab and non-Arab. The Muslim umma was a unity in which ethnicity played no part. Iraq in the inter-war era was in the vanguard of the movement towards Arab unity. Yet Iraq itself was a severely fragmented country. It was an artificial state, cobbled together by Britain out of three ex-Ottoman provinces, and bereft of any ethnic or religious rationale. Iraq lacked the essential underpinnings of a national bond. The Kurds in the north aspired to political independence in Kurdistan. Being non-semitic and speaking an Indo-European language, the Kurds had little in common with the Arabs of Iraq, apart from their Sunni Muslim faith. It was impossible to bring them under the umbrella of "the Arab nation", because they considered themselves ethnically distinct from the Arabs. In their struggle for independence, however, they were repeatedly frustrated because they had no friends but the mountains. The Shiites in the south tended to view Arab nationalism as a Sunni project designed to reduce them to an insignificant minority in an expanded Sunni Arab domain. Over half the population was Shiite, yet the politically dominant group were the Sunnis, who constituted barely a third of the population. Iraq thus provided a foretaste of the problems that were to dog the Arab national movement throughout its history. In the face of such deep and pervasive divisions, it

was a well-nigh impossible task to achieve the two basic objectives of the Arab national movement: A third objective was added in the aftermath of the second world war: The first Arab-Israeli war in was the crucial phase in the struggle for Palestine. Arab unity, it was hoped, would be forged on the anvil of war against the common enemy. It was the great test for the newly independent Arab states, and they failed it miserably. The inability of these states to coordinate their diplomatic and military moves was in itself a major factor in the loss of Palestine. The hopes that shone so brightly when the Arabs embarked on this "battle of destiny" against the Zionist intruders gave way to disillusion and despair over the dismal wreckage of Arab Palestine. It was the first time that the Arab states let down their Palestinian brothers, but it was by no means the last. If was the nadir of Arab nationalism, in the movement reached its highest peak. On July 14, a bloody military coup destroyed the monarchy in Iraq and transformed the country into a radical republic. Iraq was expected to join the UAR. The pro-western regimes in Jordan and Lebanon teetered on the brink of collapse. For a brief moment, the jubilant masses believed that those they considered to be the enemies of Arab nationalism were about to fall like a row of dominoes. It was a revolutionary moment in the Middle East, but the revolution did not spread. With hindsight, was the great turning-point in Middle East history in which history failed to turn. Since , it has been downhill all the way. The power generating Arab nationalism was eventually turned off in June The armies of the confrontation states were roundly defeated in the six-day war, their territory was occupied, their economies were in ruins and the bluster of Arab nationalism was completely deflated; 35 years on, the Arabs have not yet fully recovered from the crushing defeat they suffered in the second "battle of destiny". Nor have the Israelis recovered from the spectacular military victory that launched them on a course of territorial expansion. Hence the impasse on the Arab-Israeli front today. After tracing the rise and fall of Arab nationalism in the 20th century, Dawisha passes his final verdict. It is characteristically balanced and fair-minded. There are lights as well as shadows in the picture he paints. On the one hand, he recognises the contribution that pan-Arabism, in its heyday, made to the regeneration of Arab self-confidence and sense of dignity after long years of subjugation to colonial rule. On the other hand, he notes that by the end of the 20th century little was left of the goal of Arab unity but the debris of broken promises and shattered hopes. Israel and the Arab World Penguin Topics.

8: The death of Arab secularism - The National

In addition to what Dr. Grover mentioned above, opposition to Israel was one the main goals of Nasserite Arab Nationalism. Further, Nasserism was mainly in Egypt and Syria but Baath party has.

Hazem Saghieh 18 April The Arab revolutions of have disproved one argument about the Arabs only to raise another, says Hazem Saghieh. After the democratic victories won in east-central Europe and Latin America in the post years, a new term was coined: It signified the notion that Arabs are different: Instead they launch military coups and palace conspiracies, and demonstrate for quasi-nationalist and religious causes: The Egyptian army officer Gamal Abdel Nasser is the emblematic figure in this regard: But in this edifice of received wisdom has been turned upside down. Arabs, after all, do revolt against poverty and authoritarian rule to demand bread and freedom. In Tunisia and Egypt, they managed to overthrow tyrannical regimes; in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria they are exerting themselves to the utmost against despotic leaders. Arabs in all these countries have shown heroism; revealed the greatest readiness to sacrifice; practiced their peace-loving desires by the means they have used; and excelled in using modern instruments to advance their aims. But in clearing old ground, they also highlight a new and twofold challenge. First, can Tunisia and Egypt, where the nation-state weighs more than the pre-modern loyalties sects, tribes, ethnicities , build democratic republics without these falling into the hands of Islamists? The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries must now prove that these discredited rulers were liars as well as corrupt and oppressive. Second, can Libya , Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, where the nation-state is fragile, avoid anarchy and civil war along sectarian or tribal or regional lines? The ruling groups in these countries still present these outcomes as a threat and a propaganda weapon, even though they themselves are responsible for weakening and dividing an already frayed national fabric. The revolutionaries of Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria must now prove that political change can pass the test of national unity. The other exception The wider context of this twofold challenge lies in the fact that this part of the world succeeded in its crucial moments to produce two things: Islam, and the kinship system or blood-ties , whose elaborate expressions are sects and tribes. Modern ideologies, nationalism and socialism included, only appeared to thrive; much of their energy was artificial and was owed to the cold war, whose end brought Arabs once more face to face with the realities of Islam and blood-ties. The shrinkage of communist parties and leftist movements in general in the post-cold-war period reflects that shallowness. The Arab movement of thus brings a different Arab "exception" to the fore. It too demands to be disproved. The balance-sheet here is very mixed. The fact that anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment is being kept within very narrow margins is positive; the strength of the Islamists in Egypt, and the evident power of pre-modern structures in Libya and Yemen, is negative. This is a crucial moment for the Arabs. They have employed modern methods to make revolutions and build protest movements. So far these tools have been put to use in a skilful way. But different elements are needed to build democratic republics. The test of the other Arab exception is pressing.

9: Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity | Martin Kramer on the Middle East

The death of Arab secularism is the story of a country that no longer exists and a world almost impossible to imagine. That world can be glimpsed in old newsreels from the Arab cities of the s.

He was inspired by the French Revolution, the German and Italian unification movements and the Japanese economic "miracle". He insisted on the overthrow of the old ruling classes and supported the creation of a secular society by separating Islam from the state. Not all these ideas were his, but it was Aflaq who succeeded in turning these beliefs into a transnational movement. The ideology presented itself as representing the "Arab spirit against materialistic communism" and "Arab history against dead reaction". History was also another unifying feature, as it was the "fertile ground in which our consciousness took shape". This "future renaissance" would be a "rebirth", while the first Arab renaissance had been the seventh-century emergence of Islam, according to Aflaq. These problems, Aflaq believed, could only be resolved through a revolutionary process. A revolution could only succeed if the revolutionaries were pure and devoted nearly religiously to the task. Aflaq supported the Leninist view of the need of a vanguard party following a successful revolution, which was not an "inevitable outcome". The youth were open to change and enlightenment because they still had not been indoctrinated with other views. According to Aflaq, a major problem was the disillusionment of the Arab youth. Disillusionment led to individualism and individualism was not a healthy sign in an underdeveloped country, in contrast to developed countries, where it was a healthy sign. While the revolutionary party was numerically a minority, it was an all-powerful institution which had the right to initiate a policy even if the majority of the population were against it. He believed the ruling class, who supported the monarchy as the leaders of the Arab Revolt did, were synonymous with a reactionary class. Aflaq was bitterly opposed to any kind of monarchy and described the Arab Revolt as "the illusions of kings and feudal lords who understood unity as the gathering of backwardness to backwardness, exploitation to exploitation and numbers to numbers like sheep". This view put Aflaq at odds with some Arab nationalists who were Germanophiles. According to Aflaq, to copy the German example would be disastrous and would lead to the enslavement of the Arab people. The reactionary classes, who are content with the status quo, would oppose the "progressive" revolution. Even if the revolution succeeded in one "region" country, that region would be unable to develop because of the resource constraints, small populations and the anti-revolution forces held by other Arab leaders. For a revolution to succeed, the Arab world would have to evolve into an "organic whole" literally become one. In short, Arab unity is both the cause of the "progressive" revolution and its effect. Aflaq believed that the Arab League strengthened both regional interests and the reactionary classes, thus weakening the chance of establishing an Arab nation. Because of the world situation where the majority of Arab states were under the rule of the reactionary classes, Aflaq revised his ideology to meet reality. Instead of creating an Arab nation through an Arab-wide progressive revolution, the main task would be of progressive revolutionaries spreading the revolution from one Arab country to the next. Once successfully transformed, the created progressive revolutionary countries would then one by one unite until the Arab world had evolved into a single Arab nation. The revolution would not succeed if the progressive revolutionary governments did not contribute to spreading the revolution. Historian Paul Salem considered the weakness of such a system "quite obvious". Articulation of thoughts and the interaction between individuals were a way of building a new society. According to Aflaq, it was liberty which created new values and thoughts. According to Aflaq, liberty could not just come from nowhere as it needed an enlightened progressive group to create a truly free society. While believing that the concept would work for small and weak societies, the concept of dialectical materialism as the only truth in Arab development was wrong. Unlike Karl Marx, Aflaq was uncertain what place the working class had in history. In contrast to Marx, Aflaq also believed in nationalism and believed that in the Arab world all classes and not just the working class were working against "capitalist domination of the foreign powers". What was a struggle between various classes in the West was in the Arab world a fight for political and economic independence. While unity brought the Arab world together and liberty provided the Arab people with freedom, socialism was the

cornerstone which made unity and liberty possible as no socialism meant no revolution. Liberty meant little to nothing to the general poverty-stricken populace of Syria and Aflaq saw socialism as the solution to their plight. In other words, socialism was a system which freed the population from enslavement and created independent individuals. In short, if liberty was to succeed, the Arab people needed socialism. According to Aflaq, who was a Christian, the teaching and reforms of Muhammad had given socialism an authentic Arab expression. Socialism was viewed by Aflaq as justice and the reforms of Muhammad were both just and wise. She now knows that the strength of Islam which in the past expressed that of the Arabs has been reborn and has appeared in a new form: The key party document *Some Theoretical Propositions* states that "[s]ocialism is the true goal of Arab unity Arab unity is the obligatory basis for constructing a socialist society". Aflaq shared the sentiment by stating:

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