

1: Admiral Murray's Account - USS Missouri

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Rather there was a long series of defeats leading to a war they could not win. Two major blows hammered the point home and a year of even greater insanity the invasion of Japan was avoided. The question of surrender was hotly debated for months within the Japanese military and government really the same thing prior to the Soviet invasion or atomic bombs, and still debated afterwards. The situation Japan was facing in August was dire. Everywhere they were in retreat. Everywhere there were shortages of fuel, equipment, and trained men. It was a distant blockade where ships were sunk in transit rather than close to shore, but it crept ever closer with more and more aircraft joining in. Unlike the Allies, the Japanese never figured out how to defend their sea lanes, curious for an island nation dependent on shipping. US and British Navies and Air Forces had whittled the Japanese merchant fleet down to a quarter of what they had when the war started. Unlike the Allies, they did not have the capacity to build more ships. No merchant navy meant no supplies to or from Japan. No shipments of fuel. No rice from China. No replenishment for their far flung island defense ring. Their population and military would figuratively and literally starve. I have another answer which examines this in more detail. Industry Destroyed Like Germany, Japan was being "bombed back to the stone age". Unlike Germany, they did not have a strong industrial economy to begin with, and they never performed the same miracles of reorganization to mitigate the bombing and keep production going. While new designs, new ships, new planes, new upgrades, and new tanks were all designed, most never got out of the prototype stage as production increasingly turned to producing enough of what they had to make good on their increasing loses. As production and supply problems got desperate, corners were cut and quality plummeted. In contrast the avalanche of Allied supplies and ships coming at them were of increasing quality and effectiveness. No Fuel Japan was reliant on imported fuel. Domestic supply was a single digit percentage of what a hungry war machine needs. The fuel shortage was so desperate, they sent the battleship Yamato to defend Okinawa with only enough fuel to get there. The mightiest battleship in the world sent on a suicide mission. It was sunk by the blockade well before reaching its target. No Training No fuel means no fuel for training. This is often not appreciated. Training a good pilot means dozens or hundreds of hours of flying time. Training and working up a ship means sailing around for hundreds of miles with fuel gulping turbines. Japanese naval and pilot training went from some of the best in the war to some of the worst in a couple years because of an inefficient training program, and an increasingly dire lack of fuel. Lopsided air battles such as the Marianas Turkey Shoot would be the norm from mid onward. The Allies demonstrated again and again the importance of training on all theaters as they learned to use the advantages of their own equipment against the disadvantages of the enemy. No Navy No fuel means no navy. No navy means no way to conduct offensive operations in the far flung Pacific theater. No offensives means no way to win the war. High performance navy turbines are fuel hungry beasts. Even though the Japanese navy had capital assets available, they had to be husbanded for lack of fuel. Outdated Equipment While the Allies continuously upgraded their equipment and devised new models, the Japanese ended the war with basically the same equipment as they started with. The Japanese started the war with some impressive technological advantages in the air and at sea, and some breathtaking disadvantages on the ground which were never made good. On the ground, Japanese tanks and rifles were fine against the Chinese, but appallingly bad against what the Allies were fielding. Long, bolt action Arisaka rifles vs semi-automatic M1 Garands. Paper, leather, and cloth equipment that would disintegrate in the hot, humid jungle. Light tanks sporting small guns against the relatively heavily armed and armored Sherman. While better tanks were available, like the Type 3 Chi-Nu, less than were made. Quality problems, inexperience, and Allied air supremacy would have made them little more than a nuisance. In the air they had the Mitsubishi A6M Zero. In skilled hands it dominated early war Allied fighters who had never seen anything so maneuverable. Something to keep in mind about WWII is many air forces were fielding their first all-metal

monoplane fighters and thought that was pretty cool. The F4F Wildcat had previously been a pudgy biplane! But while the Zero was top of the line in , it was never upgraded in significant numbers. The Allies got newer and more powerful aircraft. Their existing aircraft got upgraded engines, and more guns. An F6F Hellcat sported a HP engine to haul around armor, six 50 cal machine guns, and two 20 mm cannon at knots. Increasingly unskilled pilots were being sent into battle against increasingly skilled Allied pilots in an increasingly obsolete aircraft. At sea a similar problem, while the US sported new fast battleship and carrier designs bristling with new radar and more powerful anti-aircraft armaments, the Japanese navy basically ended the war with the same navy it started with No wonder weapons Unlike the Germans, the Japanese did not place their faith in technology but in the bravery of their soldiers. As such, they had no wonder weapons to give them hope of victory. No dreams of Japanese jets to sweep the sky of Allied bombers. No Japanese super tanks to roam the countryside blasting Shermans. No Japanese super submarines to roam indefinitely underwater and attack Allied shipping. While the Japanese continuously defeated the Chinese, there was still no end in sight. By they were increasingly fought to a stalemate or defeated by combined Chinese and Allied forces. Even the hope of holding onto territory in China was fading and still draining ever tightening resources. Now they were retreating through southeast Asia. Supply lines to China were reopened making the situation in China even worse for the Japanese. Burma had fallen , and Indonesia aka the Dutch East Indies was threatened. Indonesia was the major Japanese source of fuel Without Indonesia, there would be no fuel. Americans on Okinawa With Okinawa captured , the Allies had a large base of operations within just miles of the mainland. This allowed more of their bombers to reach more of Japan with larger payloads. It allowed them to be escorted by fighters. It gave them shorter trips to make more sorties. It gave the US Navy an anchorage close to the mainland for supply, refueling, and repair. It gave the Allies a huge base to build up troops and supplies for the inevitable invasion of Japan. With this supremacy they could bomb and strafe troop concentrations, transport, and industry. The Japanese army would be immobilized by the threat of destruction from the air if they left their fortifications. Fortifications, tanks, and artillery could all be destroyed with impunity from the air. And unlike on Pacific islands, they did not have a jungle canopy to hide under. Germany surrendered Their one remaining ally, Germany, had surrendered in May There would be no wonder weapons from Germany. No supplies of know-how and strategic materials. The Allies would no longer be distracted by a fight in Europe, they could turn everything against Japan, and they were. Allies showing the will to invade The war started with the presumption that the Allies would not have the will to fight a long, protracted war against dug in Japanese defenses. This was proven wrong again and again. The hope that the Allies would not have the will to invade the home islands and take casualties was an increasingly forlorn one. Watching the Allies fight Germany to the bitter end must have given even the most staunch believers in repelling an invasion pause. Watching them take Okinawa despite fighting to the last, must also have strained the Japanese belief they could stop an Allied invasion. Fears of a revolt In February , the Prince and the Emperor discussed the possibility of civil unrest and the possibility of being overthrown in a revolt. The idea that Japan would collapse in on itself was so humiliating that surrender was mooted as a means to save face. Kamikaze tactics were not working Japan had one great tactical innovation, if human bombs can be termed so benignly, in late WWII and that was the kamikaze. Using humans as smart bombs meant they could drive home their attack with an accuracy and durability that an untrained pilot in an outdated bomber could not. A diving aircraft with a suicidal pilot could sustain damage that would normally throw a bomber off its course and still reach its target. While this increased the effectiveness of Japanese air forces, it did not deter the Allies. They responded by increasing their anti-aircraft defenses. More guns firing bigger shells to knock aircraft out of the sky rather than simply fill it full of holes. The invention and use of the precious VT proximity fuse for anti-aircraft shells made Allied firing even more deadly to increasingly inexperienced kamikaze tactics. And through it all, the Allies kept advancing. No path to winning the war What this all adds up to is in August , Japan had no path to winning the war.

2: Mitsumasa Yonai - Wikiquote

*Behind Japan's Surrender: The Secret Struggle That Ended an Empire [Lester Brooks] on www.enganchecubano.com
FREE shipping on qualifying offers. The intricacies, the paradoxes, the might-have-beens of history never cease to fascinate.*

It was a classic piece of understatement. Nearly three million Japanese were dead, many more wounded or seriously ill, and the country lay in ruins. To most Japanese - not to mention those who had suffered at their hands during the war - the end of hostilities came as blessed relief. Yet not everybody was to lay down their arms. Other, smaller groups continued fighting on Guadalcanal, Peleliu and in various parts of the Philippines right up to But the most extraordinary story belongs to Lieutenant Hiroo Onoda, who continued fighting on the Philippine island of Lubang until 9 March - nearly 29 years after the end of the war. Yokoi still had his Imperial Army issue rifle, but he had stopped fighting many years before. When questioned by the local police, he admitted he knew the war had been over for 20 years. He had simply been too frightened to give himself up. Lieutenant Onoda, by contrast, doggedly refused to lay down his arms until he received formal orders to surrender. He was the sole survivor of a small band that had sporadically attacked the local population. Top A worthy enemy? After early attempts to flush them out had failed, humanitarian missions were sent to Lubang to try to persuade Lieutenant Onoda and his companions that the war really was over, but they would have none of it. Even today, Hiroo Onoda insists they believed the missions were enemy tricks designed to lower their guard. As a soldier, he knew it was his duty to obey orders; and without any orders to the contrary, he had to keep on fighting. To survive in the jungle of Lubang, he had kept virtually constantly on the move, living off the land, and shooting cattle for meat. Japanese fighting men did not surrender, even in the face of insuperable odds. Before hostilities with the Allies broke out, most British and American military experts held a completely different view, regarding the Japanese army with deep contempt. Since Japan was having such difficulties in China, the reasoning went, its armed forces would be no match for the British. The speed and ease with which the Japanese sank the British warships, the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, off Singapore just two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor - followed by the humiliating capture of Singapore and Hong Kong - transformed their image overnight. From figures of derision, they were turned into supermen - an image that was to endure and harden as the intensity and savagery of fighting increased. Top Total sacrifice Although some Japanese were taken prisoner, most fought until they were killed or committed suicide. In the last, desperate months of the war, this image was also applied to Japanese civilians. To the horror of American troops advancing on Saipan, they saw mothers clutching their babies hurling themselves over the cliffs rather than be taken prisoner. Not only were there virtually no survivors of the 30, strong Japanese garrison on Saipan, two out of every three civilians - some 22, in all - also died. The other enduring image of total sacrifice is that of the kamikaze pilot, ploughing his plane packed with high explosives into an enemy warship. When Japan began its military adventures in China in , it was a society in turmoil. Less than 80 years previously, it had been forced out of two-and-a-half centuries of self-imposed seclusion from the rest of the world, when the Tokugawa Shogunate was overthrown, and Japan embarked on rapid modernisation under Emperor Meiji. But as shockwaves of the Great Depression reached Japanese shores at the end of the s, democracy proved to have extremely shallow roots indeed. The military became increasingly uncontrollable, and Japan was gripped by the politics of assassination. Top Bushido Nationalists and militarists alike looked to the past for inspiration. Delving into ancient myths about the Japanese and the Emperor in particular being directly descended from the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, they exhorted the people to restore a past racial and spiritual purity lost in recent times. They were indoctrinated from an early age to revere the Emperor as a living deity, and to see war as an act that could purify the self, the nation, and ultimately the whole world. Within this framework, the supreme sacrifice of life itself was regarded as the purest of accomplishments. Do not live in shame as a prisoner. Die, and leave no ignominious crime behind you. Its basic thesis is that only a samurai prepared and willing to die at any moment can devote himself fully to his lord. Although this idea certainly appealed to the ideologues, what probably motivated Japanese soldiers at the

more basic level were more mundane pressures. Apart from the dangers of battle, life in the Japanese army was brutal. He argues that the attack on Pearl Harbor provoked a rage bordering on the genocidal among Americans. It noted that the unwillingness of Allied troops to take prisoners in the Pacific theatre had made it difficult for Japanese soldiers to surrender. The same cannot be said of the Special Attack Forces, more popularly known as kamikaze. Although presented in poetic, heroic terms of young men achieving the glory of the short-lived cherry blossom, falling while the flower was still perfect, the strategy behind the kamikaze was born purely out of desperation. But to anyone who believes the kamikaze were mindless automatons, they have only to read some of the letters they left behind. The year-old Ichizo Hayashi, wrote this to his mother, just a few days before embarking on what he knew would be his final mission, in April I am pleased to have the honour of having been chosen as a member of a Special Attack Force that is on its way into battle, but I cannot help crying when I think of you, Mum. When I reflect on the hopes you had for my future I feel so sad that I am going to die without doing anything to bring you joy. Selfless sacrifice, for whatever purpose, was present on all sides in the conflict.

3: Scholarly Article Review: "Why Japan Surrendered" | WORLD WAR II HISTORY

The surrender of Imperial Japan was announced on August 15 and formally signed on September 2, 1945, bringing the hostilities of World War II to a close. By the end of July 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was incapable of conducting major operations and an Allied invasion of Japan was imminent.

Formal Surrender of Japan in Images September 2, 1945. Army honor guard presents arms as representatives of the Allied Powers arrive at pierside to be taken to USS Missouri for the surrender ceremonies, 2 September 1945. Uniform patches and unit flag indicate that the honor guard is from the 11th Airborne Division Reconnaissance Battalion. She carried some of the dignitaries out to the Missouri. The framed flag in lower right is that hoisted by Commodore Matthew C. It had been brought from its permanent home in Memorial Hall at the U. Naval Academy for use during the surrender ceremonies. Standing in front are: Behind them are three representatives each of the Foreign Ministry, the Army and the Navy. They include, in middle row, left to right: In the the back row, left to right not all are visible: The representatives of the Allied Powers are behind him, including from left to right: Lieutenant General Richard K. Army, is just to the right of Air Vice Marshall Isitt. Framed flag in upper left is that flown by Commodore Matthew C. Lieutenant General Richard K. Army, watches from the opposite side of the table. Foreign Ministry representative Toshikazu Kase is assisting Mr. Watching from across the table are Lieutenant General Richard K. Representatives of the Allied powers are behind General MacArthur. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Standing directly behind him are left-to-right: Behind him are Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Percival, British Army, both of whom had just been released from Japanese prison camps. Helfrich signs the Instrument of Surrender on behalf of The Netherlands. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is standing beside him. Japanese Foreign Ministry representatives Katsuo Okazaki wearing glasses and Toshikazu Kase are watching from across the table. General Yoshijiro Umezu is in the center, saluting. Halsey and Vice Admiral John S. Names of the submarines present, their commanding officers and the commanding officers of SubRon20 and USS Proteus are printed at the bottom of the image. Wallet card souvenir of the occasion, issued to Lieutenant Robert L. These cards were designed by Chief Shipfitter Donald G. One was issued to each man who was on board the ship on 2 September 1945, when the surrender of Japan was formalized on her decks. The cards contain the facsimile signatures of Captain Stuart S. Nimitz and Admiral William F. Japanese locals help guide the Fleet in the following days. This collection represents a few images from that period. Her interest in military history, policy and fiction took root when she was a kid, traveling and living the life of an Army Brat, and continues today.

4: united states - What were the reasons for Japan's surrender in WWII? - History Stack Exchange

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Shigemitsu was [Foreign Minister] and representing the emperor of all the armed forces of the Japanese Empire. Then there would be three representatives of the civilian government of Japan. Three from the Imperial Army and three from the Imperial Navy. So it would be a total of eleven Japanese. We got that information. We also found out from what we had already known that Shigemitsu had a wooden leg; His leg had been blown off in Shanghai several years before. That presented a problem. Walking up a gangway, then across a deck, and then up another deck, and about twenty feet more to get into position, so the only way we figured we could do it was two parties. Well, we practiced this about twenty times—how long it took them to get them out of the boat from sitting in it, get up on the bottom platform for the forward gangway, come up the gangway then on to the ship, across the quarter deck to the ladder up to the verandah deck where the surrender would be signed, in front of my cabin. These sailors were pretty good. The average time was, in fact the slowest time in about twenty attempts was one and a half minutes, ninety seconds. I figured these sailors were more ambitious than the Japanese would be, so I doubled the time and figured that three minutes was the minimum time we had to allow. We thought we had that all set. They would come alongside about four minutes before nine, about 8: Well that was one of the things that we thought we had all set. The other thing was that we finally got the word on, on the 1st of September, I believe it was, anyway the night before that there were to be ties worn, no side arms of any sort or kind by anyone at the ceremonies, there would just be khaki with the collars open on the khaki shirts and overseas caps or regular caps at their discretion, although I think all wore caps. Then we had the list of who was coming except for one or two whom they said would come, at the last minute might come. And we could stick them in whenever a hole was available. In order to make room on the verandah deck on the starboard side, we found that we could train Turret 2, which was the high turret up forward. So that it was trained with guns pointing to the starboard bow and would make room for eight or ten more people to stand on the starboard side of the turret barbette. We fixed up a platform just forward of the surrender deck, as we got to call it, and I guess it still is, with planking to place about twelve or fifteen photographers who would be right on a level with the platform in that we made that level with the deck, so they would be right there in good position. We put another one, but smaller, to hold about eight or ten, on the starboard side of it. Then we fixed up the platform, or the gun mount rather, of the 40mm quad, which was on the starboard wing of the verandah deck by training the guns vertically and taking the ammunition boxes off we could get about six or eight more in there. The rest of the photographers were placed around in places above there. I was working more with Admiral Carney. No guard of honor of Marines and no playing of martial marches which are accorded under full-honors conditions. On marking all these circles for the various visitors and also for the correspondents and photographers, we suddenly received word that the Secretary of the Navy was sending out some visitors who would be there for the ceremony and he wanted them to have a good place. Altogether, with those and certain honored ones we were told to give special positions to — correspondents like Mr. Ash, I believe, and a few others with special distinction — we put them up there with the SecNavy guests. Where were they sent? So we put them up on top of Turret 2. We had about eight people up there, as I recall. They sat in chairs. They were safer if they sat, rather than try to stand up. There was one other little ticklish item. It seems a very minor thing, but minor things sometimes can take on bigger importance! Down in the lower right-hand corner, I signed as captain of the ship, as a kind of certification. We showed the proof of it to Admiral Halsey to get his okay. We showed them a sample with their signatures on it and we did not necessarily want them to sign anything else. I might add that after each person had been given his card as he came aboard, several asked me for some additional ones and I told them, no, only one person and no additional ones. That was it was worth an awful lot more to the individual. Then, after it was all finished, I took the die, or whatever you call the plate that the print shop had used and burned the whole thing up in an incinerator. The executive officer and two members of the crew, and the first

lieutenant witnessed the burning so there was no question as to what happened to it. The plate was ruined after it was burned and was absolutely unusable. We actually threw it out over the side. The cards were all burned up. That way we knew that no extras were being made unless some expert could go ahead and make his own from the one he personally had. I was wondering if you ever had. Late that night, on the 1st of September, we had the situation pretty well in control we thought- Q: Not exactly what you might call relaxed, because we knew there to many things hanging fire. The program was that the correspondents and photographers would come down from the Yokohama area on destroyers; we figured it would take two of them to bring them down, and they would arrive down at the MISSOURI about 7: Then General Mac Arthur would come down by destroyer and arrive about 8: So the next morning, the 2nd of September, since we had a lot to do and also we were missing these plus men and about twenty officers who were still ashore with the landing party, we had a very early reveille and started in on getting everything ready Q: Where was the location of your ship at this time? This was the spot we had anchored in there in Tokyo Bay, Off Yokosuka. The VIPs who were to watch the ceremonies and the signers started to arrive about from various places, depending on when their transportation could get them there. Some of them came in from the part of the Third Fleet that was still operating outside Tokyo Bay and others from the ships in that vicinity. So there was nothing special about them. Some of the articles in the history say this was the same flag that was flown on the White House or the National Capitol on 7 December , the attack on Pearl Harbor, and at Casablanca, and so forth, also MacArthur took it up to Tokyo and flew it over his headquarters there. The only thing I can say is they were hard up for baloney, because it was nothing like that. It was just a plain ordinary GI-issue flag and a Union Jack. The only special flag that was there was a flag which Commodore Perry had flown on his ship out in that same location 82 years before. It was flown out in its glass case from the Naval Academy Museum. An officer messenger brought it out. We put this hanging over the door of my cabin, facing forward, on the surrender deck so that everyone on the surrender deck could see it. It was facing the Japanese. I imagine that the Japanese looked at that when they came up. Just for the record, side honors that day, the officer of the deck would be standing on the upper platform of the ship, and then to his right would be the necessary number of side boys. I was standing one or two paces further inboard than the last side boy to greet them as they came down there. Did he have any comment that you recall? Not that I recall, other than "good morning. He probably said, "All set? The newspaper correspondents and the photographers arrived in their two destroyers at about 7: The photographers, the same thing. They were taken to their places. That was what we thought would happen, and our numbers and circles were very important. There was no argument. General MacArthur and his staff arrived on the destroyer about 8: Along with General MacArthur and his staff was an Army colonel from Washington who had flown out with the surrender papers. It was the first time we had seen them. They were to be signed by the Japanese first, of course, and then the allied powers. We had placed our beautiful mahogany table and its two nice chairs, the present of Admiral Frazer and the British fleet, on deck in the central spot and it looked very nice there. One look at these documents and, you might say, all hell broke loose! These documents were about 40 inches by 20 inches each and two of them had to be in line. Our beautiful mahogany table was 40 by 40! So I called the four nearest sailors and we headed for the wardroom, which was the deck below my cabin. Well, we got there and were going to grab the wardroom table and get it up there. The wardrobe table was bolted down "it should be, of course. The mess cooks had just finished cleaning up all the tables from the breakfast and were hanging their tables to the overhead to get them out of the way so they could watch the surrender ceremony from their place in the rear division. Well, on the way to the wardroom we knew we had to have a cover for that table, so I yanked a green table cover off the first wardroom table I came to and said to the guys out there on the deck to set up this mess table and spread the green cloth on it. It really looked very nice. The group was all aboard then. I noticed Admiral Nimitz by the time we got the table squared away- Q: Did he know the problem you were having? I did tell Admiral Nimitz about it later after it was over with. Someone remarked about it later. But that was the reason. No one was thinking about it then, least of all I. We had to have something and we had to have it in a hurry.

5: Japan: No Surrender in World War Two

To ask other readers questions about Behind Japan's Surrender, please sign up. Be the first to ask a question about Behind Japan's Surrender The author has an excellent summary of what was going on in Japan at the time: "The city itself was the heart of a country under siege. More efficiently and.

Should we have dropped the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? To what extent does Japan owe an apology to China, Korea, and other countries its troops occupied and committed horrendous atrocities against their people? No longer would the fact that Japan was an island on the other side of the Pacific Ocean protect it. In November , American bombers began targeting Tokyo itself. Then on March 9, , the United States dropped 2, tons of incendiary bombs on Tokyo, setting fire to the millions of mostly-wooden buildings in the city, killing 80,, Japanese civilians and leaving the city in ruins. Still, Japan fought on, but as the Allies advanced its ability to do so was wearing out. By the end of July, the Japanese Navy had practically ceased to exist from a military perspective. Both the Allies and Japan were preparing for an invasion. Up until this point, the Soviets had been neutral in the Pacific theater of the war, but on August 8, two days after the destruction of Hiroshima, the Soviets declared war on Japan. Soviet troops invaded Japanese-occupied Manchuria , easily outmatching the Japanese troops stationed there. With this declaration of war, the Japanese leadership lost their last hope of an easy out. The so-called Kyujo incident began in the evening of August 14, mere hours after the Emperor made the formal decision to surrender, but before the decision had been publicly announced. They murdered the commander of one of the Imperial Guards divisions, and then forged fake orders commanding the palace police to let their soldiers through. The rebels never found their targets, who were hiding in a secret underground chamber. Indeed, other soldiers that were in on the conspiracy found that they had a similar lack of luck. The rebels went to seize the Prime Minister at his office, only to discover he was not there. This is why, rather than help the coup, the military moved to suppress it. One of the officials in the palace staff had tipped everyone off that the coup attempt was coming, so everyone had prepared for it. Within an hour, he and his men had given up. Hatanaka and the other coup leaders all committed suicide. A remake of the film is currently in the works, according to Variety magazine. This confused some of the soldiers, who continued fighting for several days. The last air battle between the Japanese and American air forces was on August The fighting between Japanese and Soviet forces lasted until August Of course, more followed; Gen. When Germany surrendered earlier that year, they had already lost everything. Adolf Hitler was dead , Soviet troops occupied Berlin , German forces across Europe were giving up by the millions , all that was left to do was sign a piece of paper to make the inevitable official. Japan, on the other hand, still occupied vast swathes of territory in China, southeast Asia, and the Pacific. The United States told the Japanese troops in China to only surrender to the Nationalists, but not every unit listened, in part because often the nearest Nationalist troops were hundreds of miles away and the Communists were right there. Japanese forces in southeast Asia surrendered in Singapore on September Japanese troops occupying Taiwan surrendered on October Still others decided that instead of surrendering, they would join up with whatever local wars were going on wherever they were stuck, fighting in guerrilla campaigns for various revolutionary movements. These holdouts kept coming out of the woodwork over the course of the next decade, and by most of them had surrendered or been killed in action. However, two soldiers were found on the island of Guam in May , and a third was captured in Still, rumors persisted about others, and in , two Japanese civilian contractors who had joined a Communist guerrilla terrorist group in Malaysia finally returned home after it had signed a peace agreement with Malay authorities. Of course, once the war was over, it was time to establish peace with Japan. In , the Treaty of San Francisco was signed by 48 countries, officially bringing the war to an end. India was the easiest of the three for Japan to deal with. It turned out India just wanted to meet Japan one-to-one as equals instead of imposing a treaty at a big conference. The matter of China was a bit trickier, though. That just leaves the USSR, and the really big sticking point. These islands, they claimed, were a part of the Kuril Islands that had once been under Russian rule and that the Allies explicitly agreed to give to the Soviets when the war ended. Japan claimed that these islands were not a part of the Kuril Islands, that they had always been

Japanese, and that the Soviet Union was therefore illegally occupying their territory. In , Japan and the USSR signed an agreement to officially declare that they were no longer at war, and agreed that they should conclude a peace treaty to resolve the dispute. This peace treaty never came. To this day, no peace treaty has ever been signed between Russia and Japan, who still dispute those islands. At least in that sense, it seems World War II never really ended after all.

6: Why did Japan surrender in World War II? | The Japan Times

Japan 's samurai heritage and the samurai code of ethics known as 'bushido' have a seductive appeal when searching for explanations for the wartime image of no surrender. The great classic of Bushido - ' Hagakure ' written in the early 18th century - begins with the words, 'Bushido is a way of dying'.

Japan campaign Allied landings in the Pacific Theatre of operations, August to August By , the Japanese had suffered a string of defeats for nearly two years in the South West Pacific , the Marianas campaign , and the Philippines campaign. The Allies captured the nearby islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa in the first half of With few natural resources, Japan was dependent on raw materials, particularly oil, imported from Manchuria and other parts of the East Asian mainland, and from the conquered territory in the Dutch East Indies. Production of coal, iron, steel, rubber, and other vital supplies was only a fraction of that before the war. As a result of the losses it had suffered, the Imperial Japanese Navy IJN had ceased to be an effective fighting force. Following a series of raids on the Japanese shipyard at Kure , the only major warships in fighting order were six aircraft carriers, four cruisers, and one battleship, none of which could be fueled adequately. We can no longer direct the war with any hope of success. Instead, everything was staked on the beachhead; more than 3, kamikazes would be sent to attack the amphibious transports before troops and cargo were disembarked on the beach. In the event of invasion, these caves, the Matsushiro Underground Imperial Headquarters , were to be used by the Army to direct the war and to house the Emperor and his family. General Korechika Anami Minister of the Navy: Nevertheless, from the Japanese Army and Navy held, effectively, a legal right to nominate or refuse to nominate their respective ministers, in addition to the effective right to order their respective ministers to resign their posts. Thus, the Army and Navy could prevent the formation of undesirable governments, or by resignation bring about the collapse of an existing government. For the Japanese, surrender was unthinkableâ€”Japan had never been successfully invaded or lost a war in its history. Although Suzuki might indeed have seen peace as a distant goal, he had no design to achieve it within any immediate time span or on terms acceptable to the Allies. His own comments at the conference of senior statesmen gave no hint that he favored any early cessation of the war They cite the Japanese concept of haragei â€”"the art of hidden and invisible technique"â€”to justify the dissonance between their public actions and alleged behind-the-scenes work. However, many historians reject this. While this judgment does not accord with the much-lauded character of Admiral Suzuki, the fact remains that from the moment he became Premier until the day he resigned no one could ever be quite sure of what Suzuki would do or say next. Their prewar planning expected a rapid expansion and consolidation, an eventual conflict with the United States, and finally a settlement in which they would be able to retain at least some new territory they had conquered. There were two camps: In February , Prince Fumimaro Konoe gave Emperor Hirohito a memorandum analyzing the situation, and told him that if the war continued, the imperial family might be in greater danger from an internal revolution than from defeat. At the Yalta Conference in February , the United States had made substantial concessions to the Soviets to secure a promise that they would declare war on Japan within three months of the surrender of Germany. Although the five-year Neutrality Pact did not expire until April 5, , the announcement caused the Japanese great concern, because Japan had amassed its forces in the South to repel the inevitable US attack, thus leaving its Northern islands vulnerable to Soviet invasion. Because anyone openly supporting Japanese surrender risked assassination by zealous army officers, the meetings were closed to anyone except the Big Six, the Emperor, and the Privy Sealâ€”no second- or third-echelon officers could attend. This policy was adopted by the Big Six on June 6. It should be clearly made known to Russia that she owes her victory over Germany to Japan, since we remained neutral, and that it would be to the advantage of the Soviets to help Japan maintain her international position, since they have the United States as an enemy in the future. We cannot be sure we will not share the fate of Germany and be reduced to adverse circumstances under which we will not attain even our supreme object of safeguarding the Imperial Household and preserving the national polity. Finally, Kido proposed that Japan disarm provided this not occur under Allied supervision and that Japan for a time be "content with minimum defense. Suzuki and Admiral Mitsumasa

Yonai , the Navy minister , were both cautiously supportive; each wondered what the other thought. The Battle of Okinawa was lost, and he learned of the weakness of the Japanese army in China, of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, of the navy, and of the army defending the Home Islands. The Emperor received a report by Prince Higashikuni from which he concluded that "it was not just the coast defense; the divisions reserved to engage in the decisive battle also did not have sufficient numbers of weapons. I was told that the iron from bomb fragments dropped by the enemy was being used to make shovels. This confirmed my opinion that we were no longer in a position to continue the war. Unusually, he spoke first: The Japanese hoped that the Soviet Union could be persuaded to act as an agent for Japan in negotiations with the United States and Britain. His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland. Although the directing powers, and the government as well, are convinced that our war strength still can deliver considerable blows to the enemy, we are unable to feel absolutely secure peace of mind It goes without saying that in my earlier message calling for unconditional surrender or closely equivalent terms, I made an exception of the question of preserving [the imperial family]. With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, The year-round ice-free areas of the Soviet Pacific coastlineâ€” Vladivostok in particularâ€”could be blockaded by air and sea from Sakhalin island and the Kurile Islands. Acquiring these territories, thus guaranteeing free access to the Soya Strait , was their primary objective. The Japanese would have to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies. To prolong the war, the Soviets opposed any attempt to weaken this requirement. Roosevelt warning him that the Germans might be researching the development of atomic weaponry and that it was necessary that the United States fund research and development of its own such project. Roosevelt agreed, [59] and the result was the Manhattan Project â€”a top-secret research program administered by Major General Leslie R. However, by this time it was increasingly obvious that Germany would be defeated before any bombs would be ready for use. Groves formed a committee that met in April and May to draw up a list of targets. One of the primary criteria was that the target cities must not have been damaged by conventional bombing. This would allow for an accurate assessment of the damage done by the atomic bomb. Stimson , who had visited the city on his honeymoon and knew of its cultural and historical significance. Wallace had been involved in the Manhattan Project since the beginning, [67] his successor, Harry S. Byrnes , George L. In a June 21 meeting, it reaffirmed that there was no alternative.

7: How We Bungled the Japanese Surrender

Slideshow by photo services "V-J Day" is a shortened form of "Victory over Japan Day." It refers to Japan's formal surrender to the Allies on August 14, , which signaled the effective.

Air Vice-Marshal Leonard M. Isitt for New Zealand 9: Truman in a formal White House ceremony the following day. The documents were then exhibited at the National Archives. The deck of the Missouri was furnished with two American flags. A commonly heard story is that one of the flags had flown over the White House on the day Pearl Harbor was attacked. So there was nothing special about them. Some of the articles in the history say this was the same flag that was flown on the White House or the National Capitol on 7 December , the attack on Pearl Harbor, and at Casablanca, and so forth, also MacArthur took it up to Tokyo and flew it over his headquarters there. The only thing I can say is they were hard up for baloney, because it was nothing like that. It was just a plain ordinary GI-issue flag and a Union Jack. The only special flag that was there was a flag which Commodore Perry had flown on his ship out in that same location 82 years before [sic: It was flown out in its glass case from the Naval Academy Museum. An officer messenger brought it out. We put this hanging over the door of my cabin, facing forward, on the surrender deck so that everyone on the surrender deck could see it. Photographs of the signing ceremony show that this flag is displayed backwardâ€”reverse side showing stars in the upper right corner. This was because American flags on the right of an object plane, ship, or person have the stars on the upper right corner, to look like the flag is heading into battleâ€”as if attached to a pole and someone is carrying it. Stars in the upper left of a flag displayed on the right side of the object would make the flag look like it was going away from battle. The cloth of the historic flag was so fragile that the conservator at the U. This replica is also placed in the same location on the bulkhead of the veranda deck where it had been initially mounted on the morning of September 2, , [16] by Chief Carpenter Fred Miletich. Differences between versions[edit] The Japanese left and Allied right copies of the Instrument of Surrender The Japanese copy of the treaty varied from the Allied in the following ways: The Allied copy was presented in leather and gold lining with both[which? The Canadian representative, Colonel Lawrence Moore Cosgrave , signed below his line instead of above it on the Japanese copy, so everyone after him had to sign one line below the intended one. This was attributed to Col. Cosgrave being blind in one eye from a World War I injury. When the discrepancy was pointed out to General Sutherland , he crossed out the pre-printed name titles of the Allied nations and rewrote by hand the titles in their correct relative positions. The Japanese initially found this alteration unacceptableâ€”until Sutherland initialed as an abbreviated signature each alteration. The Japanese representatives did not complain further. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. As witnesses, American general Jonathan Wainwright , who had surrendered the Philippines , and British lieutenant-general Arthur Percival , who had surrendered Singapore , received two of the six pens used by General MacArthur to sign the instrument. All of the pens used by MacArthur were black, except the last, which was plum-colored and went to his wife. A replica of it, along with copies of the instrument of surrender, is in a case on Missouri by the plaque marking the signing spot. Mount Fujiyama is in the background. Lieutenant General Richard K.

8: Anami Korechika

There is contentious debate among scholars about why Japan surrendered in World War II. Some believe the Aug. 15, , declaration was the result of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and.

The speed and ease with which the Japanese sank the British warships, the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, off Singapore just two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor - followed by the humiliating capture of Singapore and Hong Kong - transformed their image overnight. From figures of derision, they were turned into supermen - an image that was to endure and harden as the intensity and savagery of fighting increased. Total sacrifice. Although some Japanese were taken prisoner, most fought until they were killed or committed suicide. In the last, desperate months of the war, this image was also applied to Japanese civilians. To the horror of American troops advancing on Saipan , they saw mothers clutching their babies hurling themselves over the cliffs rather than be taken prisoner. Not only were there virtually no survivors of the 30, strong Japanese garrison on Saipan , two out of every three civilians - some 22, in all - also died. The other enduring image of total sacrifice is that of the kamikaze pilot, ploughing his plane packed with high explosives into an enemy warship. Less than 80 years previously, it had been forced out of two-and-a-half centuries of self-imposed seclusion from the rest of the world, when the Tokugawa Shogunate was overthrown, and Japan embarked on rapid modernisation under Emperor Meiji. But as shockwaves of the Great Depression reached Japanese shores at the end of the s, democracy proved to have extremely shallow roots indeed. The military became increasingly uncontrollable, and Japan was gripped by the politics of assassination. Bushido Nationalists and militarists alike looked to the past for inspiration. Delving into ancient myths about the Japanese and the Emperor in particular being directly descended from the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, they exhorted the people to restore a past racial and spiritual purity lost in recent times. They were indoctrinated from an early age to revere the Emperor as a living deity, and to see war as an act that could purify the self, the nation, and ultimately the whole world. Within this framework, the supreme sacrifice of life itself was regarded as the purest of accomplishments. Die, and leave no ignominious crime behind you. Its basic thesis is that only a samurai prepared and willing to die at any moment can devote himself fully to his lord. Although this idea certainly appealed to the ideologues, what probably motivated Japanese soldiers at the more basic level were more mundane pressures. Do not live in shame as a prisoner. Apart from the dangers of battle, life in the Japanese army was brutal. He argues that the attack on Pearl Harbor provoked a rage bordering on the genocidal among Americans. It noted that the unwillingness of Allied troops to take prisoners in the Pacific theatre had made it difficult for Japanese soldiers to surrender. Although presented in poetic, heroic terms of young men achieving the glory of the short-lived cherry blossom, falling while the flower was still perfect, the strategy behind the kamikaze was born purely out of desperation. But to anyone who believes the kamikaze were mindless automatons, they have only to read some of the letters they left behind. The year-old Ichizo Hayashi, wrote this to his mother, just a few days before embarking on what he knew would be his final mission, in April I am pleased to have the honour of having been chosen as a member of a Special Attack Force that is on its way into battle, but I cannot help crying when I think of you, Mum. When I reflect on the hopes you had for my future I feel so sad that I am going to die without doing anything to bring you joy. Selfless sacrifice, for whatever purpose, was present on all sides in the conflict.

9: Behind Japan's Surrender: The Secret Struggle That Ended an Empire by Lester Brooks

The Japanese Instrument of Surrender was the written agreement that formalized the surrender of the Empire of Japan, marking the end of World War II. It was signed by representatives from the Empire of Japan, the United States of America, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Commonwealth of Australia, the

How we could have avoided the final agonies of the war in the Pacific is told here for the first time. Everybody remembers the outward signs of the Japanese collapse. All at once, the Japanese will to fight seemed to evaporate. But the truth is that a plan was evolved under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, as early as February, 1945, to bring Japan to her knees without firing a single shot. In the muddle of wartime Washington, however, the plan was blocked on every side. We had to go through the final excruciating months of fighting until the war came to an end almost of its own accord. It need never have happened that way. We knew quite definitely by the end of 1944, as I described in the last issue of Look, that important elements in Japan were ready to sue for peace. Unmistakable information on that score had come to the Office of Naval Intelligence ONI through the most reliable intelligence channels. The first chance to act on the information came in February, 1945, when Secretary Forrestal returned to the United States from Iwo Jima. I was stationed in San Diego, as chief of staff of the 11th Naval District. But as former deputy director of ONI, I had a special concern in the developing climax of the Pacific war. On December 16, 1944, I had outlined in detail a plan to conduct an intensive campaign of psychological warfare against the enemy, on the basis of the information we had on the faltering Japanese will to fight. My first job was to draft an Estimate of the Situation for Mr. Forster. I was allowed access to top-secret decisions reached at Yalta; some of which, I was surprised to learn later, had been withheld even from War Mobilization Director James Byrnes and Vice President Truman. One such decision was the one to let Stalin have the Kurile Islands outright in exchange for Russian participation in the Pacific war. I outlined in detail the strategic significance of the Kuriles to us in a postwar world. Secretary Forrestal accepted my estimate in full. He did everything in his power to have our commitments to Russia canceled and to persuade our leaders to release Stalin from his "obligation" to join us in the Pacific war. But the Pentagon thought otherwise and urged Truman to sustain the Yalta decision. This upset was the start of a two-front war I had to fight for the ensuing months before the war with Japan did finally end. On the one hand, I fought the Japanese, using all means of propaganda and secret intelligence available to a man in my position. On the other hand, I fought against a Washington bureaucracy that failed to comprehend the nature of my mission and simply could not fathom the fact that wars could be waged without battleships and planes, guns and A-bombs-but in the intellectual sphere alone, by outthinking the enemy and persuading him to act according to our will. Plan Was Two-Fold Our plan, consistently opposed, was two-fold: Conduct an open campaign by press and radio, by leaflets and other overt media of psychological warfare, to provide the necessary arguments for members of the growing Tokyo peace party and, indeed the Emperor himself. Utilize covert or clandestine methods to gain Japanese surrender by all means of secret intelligence and secret diplomacy, with no holds barred, and enlist the active collaboration of all the secret operatives whose contributions made it possible for us to deploy our invisible forces for our campaign. As we prepared our campaign, several forces appeared behind the scenes to co-operate with us. One of the first such moves, proving we were on the right track, came when the Emperor of Japan asked the Holy See to intervene with us on his behalf and seek out our terms in preparation for formal peace negotiations with Pope Pius XII himself acting as intermediary. If we still needed evidence that Tokyo was actually suing for peace, the appeal to the Vatican provided it for us. Unfortunately, nobody outside the Navy Department and the O. In fact the State Department discouraged it altogether and told the O. Here, however, the obstacle was that the Soviet never acted on the request, in fact it never advised us of the Japanese move. We had to learn about it in a roundabout way. Our next step in the Office of Naval Intelligence was to prepare for the event predicted in a report received from a top-ranking diplomatic representative of a neutral country in Tokyo. This materialized on April 5, 1945, when Emperor Hirohito dismissed General Koiso as Premier, naming in his place Admiral Suzuki, whose job would be to explore the

possibilities of ending the war. There was no time to lose. Radio Campaign Planned First, we planned a series of broadcast beamed directly to the Japanese High Command to provide it with reassurance that "Unconditional surrender" did not mean obliteration and to persuade the Japanese to "end the war before it was too late. What we tried to convey to the Japanese High Command with these words was the imminent danger of Soviet participation in the war. But far more vital than these broadcasts, we felt, was a series of ambitious plans we developed, all converging on the same goal. Four such plans were worked out. The purpose of the mission was to establish direct contact with a group of influential Japanese political leaders close to the Dowager Empress, who had indicated their willingness to discuss peace with us through a member of the Swedish Legation in Tokyo. He developed the plan on his own initiative as if desirous of ending his wartime career with a particularly gallant exploit. The men around the Dowager Empress were his friends and acquaintances, and he felt certain that he could persuade them to act on our behalf, to recruit others for the plot and to carry the conspiracy to a successful conclusion. Although prepared in minute detail and promising the results Mr. Fairbanks confidently expected, Plan One was vetoed as "fantastic" and "Buck Rogers stuff" by the men to whom it had to be submitted for approval. Fairbanks may be interested to learn now that we in OpW, the psychological warfare branch of O. We did our best to win approval of his plan, but the obstacles that blocked it in the myopic and pessimistic Washington of were insurmountable. We found him hiding in southern Germany and made preparations to "exploit" him. With great and difficult effort, we succeeded in persuading the Army that Oshima should be brought to the United States. When we contacted him, we found him most eager to join in our plot. Oshima would have been accompanied by Lt. Dennis McEvoy, one of my young aides in OpW, and I would have followed myself had my presence have become necessary in the course of the negotiations. When its details were communicated to certain Army representatives, General Oshima was moved from our reach and could never be found again until the end of the war. Plan Three foresaw the development of close contacts with enemy representatives through Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi and the Vatican. Even while the plan was being developed by us, more urgent messages reached us from the Holy See, conveying to us a truly desperate plea the Emperor had just flashed to the Pope through Archbishop Doi. It was the last "S. Shortly afterwards the Cardinal was told that "someone in Washington" was not looking favorably at his efforts. So this plan too had to be abandoned, despite the fact that it promised greater fruits without involving ourselves in the adventures of Plans One and Two. Plan Four was a flexible project to promote the whole complex of the Japanese peace campaign in every manner we could. It sought to use every single secret agent and follow every lead we developed anywhere in the world that promised results along the lines of our basic plan. We never received permission to execute this plan and could not persuade the other agencies of government. Better qualified than we were to carry out such a project, to take it over from us. Thus all our plans for direct action had to be discarded. We had failed to persuade the State Department to take part in the great diplomatic campaign then developing on three continents. We had tried to gain White House approval even for more limited objectives. We were left with the series of broadcasts we had originally planned. Only this least ambitious and unorthodox of our various plans were we allowed to execute. The series of broadcasts was to start at once. I was to address Japanese leaders in the royal family, navy and army with whom I had been on most friendly terms during former years in Washington and Tokyo. To strengthen the effect in the capacity of "official spokesman. From then on, we hoped to develop an even more realistic approach by devising means of achieving unconditional surrender. No such statement could be obtained, despite persistent efforts at the White House. So we drafted one ourselves entitled "Statement by the President of the United States. White House Is Cool But we could obtain no reaction whatsoever. The whole plan seemed to be heading for the limbo of Washington projects. White House attaches answered our persistent inquiries with a stereotyped "The President is in Hyde Park. He will take up the matter with you on his return to Washington. Roosevelt had arrived in town. We rushed to the White House to inquire about the fate of our drafted statement. The answer this time was, "The President has just left for Warm Springs. He will take up the matter upon his return to Washington. But while he was in Washington, en route from Hyde Park to Warm Springs, we learned later, he did peruse the draft and suggested one or two minor changes, though he postponed a decision on its use. He was still reluctant to "compromise" his well-known position on his

unconditional surrender formula. From then on, the radio war with Japan was on. After a few broadcasts, though, we began to run short of ammunition. No matter how we prodded our government to prepare a special policy for us, to grant us permission to goad the Japanese into negotiations through carefully worded invitations, we could not obtain anything even remotely resembling a policy. We were told in so many words that no one in high places really expected the Japanese to surrender especially "not in answer to a few broadcasts by a Captain of the United States Navy--my rank at the time. We were also told that the Pacific war would last until and even , and that we could make ourselves more useful by turning to tactical propaganda problems. Peace Moves Confirmed But then in late May, an intelligence report reached us that encouraged us to continue our work despite the cold shoulder we got in Washington. The report, confirmed in full when we occupied Japan, said the Supreme War Guidance Council, Japans highest authority, had accepted a resolution to seek ways and means to end the war. Shortly afterwards, on June 26, an Imperial Conference was called. The Emperor ordered his advisers to prepare immediate plans to end the war on whatever terms Japan could obtain from us. Besides that, various Japanese spokesmen approached me to inquire about the terms on which Japan could gain peace. We pleaded with the White House, with representatives of the Joint Chiefs, with the Pentagon and the State Department to give us terms for transmission to Japan. We assured our contacts in all those agencies that Japan was seriously seeking a way out. And we urged that a new military policy be introduced: We were turned down at all agencies and on all echelons. So we decided on a last rebellion. In retrospect I am surprised how we dared, in the midst of war, to devise a plan and carry it out almost single-handed.

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