

CITIZENSHIP, RIGHTS, AND TONY BLAIRS DOCTRINE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COLIN TYLER pdf

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Citizenship, Rights and Tony Blair's Doctrine of International Community. Colin Tyler. Chapter 7 in Globalisation, Citizenship and the War on Terror, from Edward Elgar Publishing.

It is a great privilege to be here today at the Bush Presidential Library before such a distinguished audience, and let me begin by paying tribute to two of the most distinguished members. First, to you, Mr President. It is quite something to raise the son who goes on to be US president. To do so having been president yourself, one with a proud record of leadership and achievement, is quite another. I want to thank you for inviting me, thank you for being here, and thank you for your steadfast friendship of Great Britain. And Jim Baker was one of the most remarkable secretaries of state the US has ever had during a remarkable period of your history, and I am honoured that a statesman of his standing should be present to hear my speech on issues he has studied for far longer than I have. The only purpose of being in politics is to strive for the values and ideals we believe in: These are the decent democratic values we all avow. But alongside the values we know we need a hard headed pragmatism - a *realpolitik* - required to give us any chance of translating those values into the practical world we live in. The same tension exists in the two views of international affairs. The other is Utopian: Today I want to suggest that more than ever before those two views are merging. I advocate an enlightened self interest that puts fighting for our values right at the heart of the policies necessary to protect our nations. Engagement in the world on the basis of these values, not isolationism from it is the hard-headed pragmatism for the 21st century. In part it is because the countries and people of the world today are more interdependent than ever. That calls for an approach of integration. When I spoke about this issue in Chicago in and called it a doctrine of international community, people hesitated over what appeared to be Panglossian idealism. At the time, the major international crisis we faced was Kosovo, where a brutal dictator, Slobodan Milosevic, was embarked upon a programme of ethnic cleansing of innocent people - in this case, Muslims - the likes of which Europe had not seen since the Nazis. Yet we were told: Today thousands of refugees have gone back. Kosovo has held its first elections. Montenegro and Serbia are being reconciled. Milosevic is on trial charged with war crimes. There is a democratic government in Belgrade and the whole region, despite the massive problems which still exist, is on a path, albeit slowly, towards the EU. In truth, it is very rare today that trouble in one part of the globe remains limited in its effect. Not just in security, but in trade and finance - witness the crisis of which began in Thailand and ended in Brazil - the world is interlocked. This is heightened by mass communications and technology. Their very visibility, immediate and in technicolour, inflame feelings that can spread worldwide across different ethnic, religious and cultural communities. So today, more than ever, "their" problem becomes "our" problem. Instability is contagious and, again today, more than ever, nations, at least most of them, crave stability. What brings nations together - what brought them together post-September 11 - is the international recognition that the world needs order. Disorder is the enemy of progress. The struggle is for stability, for the security within which progress can be made. Of course, countries want to protect their territorial integrity but few are into empire-building. For 2, years Europe fought over territory. Today boundaries are virtually fixed. Governments and people know that any territorial ambition threatens stability, and instability threatens prosperity. And of course the surest way to stability is through the very values of freedom, democracy and justice. Where these are strong, the people push for moderation and order. Where they are absent, regimes act unchecked by popular accountability and pose a threat; and the threat spreads. So the promotion of these values becomes not just right in itself but part of our long-term security and prosperity. Not all the wrongs of the world can be put right, but where disorder threatens us all, we should act. Like it or not, whether you are a utilitarian or a Utopian, the world is interdependent. One consequence of this is that foreign and domestic policy are ever more closely interwoven. It was September 11 that brought these thoughts into sharper focus. Watching the horror unfold, imagining the almost unimaginable suffering of the thousands of innocent victims of the terror and carnage, the dominant emotion after the obvious feelings of

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revulsion, sympathy and anger, was determination. The guts and spirit of the people of New York and America in the aftermath of that terrible day were not just admirable, they were awesome. They were the best riposte to the terrorists that humanity could give and you should be very proud of that. I want you to know too that the British people were with you from the first moment, and we will always be with you at times like those. We are not half-hearted friends and we never will be. But the determination must be not just to pursue those responsible and bring them to justice but to learn from September. For years Afghanistan was ruled by the Taliban. For years it nurtured the al-Qaida terrorist network. For years it lived off terror and the drugs trade, a failed state purveying religious and political extremism, with its people ground under the heel of the fanatic. What erupted on the streets of New York on September 11 was not an attack on America alone. It was an attack on us all. But prior to September 11, our people would probably have known Afghanistan chiefly from history books and for many the Taliban might as well have been a rock band. Fortunately, in this case, the world stood firm. America took the lead, but it led a coalition of extraordinarily wide international proportions. Countries queued up to help. We acted with care, under the clear and courageous leadership of President Bush. The Taliban are gone as a government. The Afghan people feel liberated not oppressed and have at least a chance of a better future. But I want to give this warning. There is a real danger we forget the lessons of September. Human beings recover from tragedy and the memory becomes less fraught. That is a healthy part of living. But we should learn from our experience. The most obvious lesson is indeed our interdependence. For a time our world stood still. Quite apart from our security, the shock impacted on economic confidence, on business, on trade and it is only now with the terrorist network on the run, that confidence is really returning. Every nation in the world felt the reverberation of that fateful day. There is no escape from facing them and dealing with them. But what are the policy positions that should guide us in doing so? First, the world works better when the US and the EU stand together. There will be issues that divide - issues of trade, most recently over steel, for example. But on the big security issues, the common interests dwarf the divide. Forget the talk of anti-Americanism in Europe. Yes, if you call a demonstration, you will get the slogans and the insults. We have so many shared values. We are strong democracies. If we stand together, no one else feels they can play us off against each other. Complaining about each other is fashionable in some circles. But the only people really rejoicing at a falling out, are the bad guys. He is in my view a bold and immensely capable leader, moving his country into a new and cooperative partnership with us. Nato is the cornerstone of the transatlantic US-EU relationship. Now we envisage a new Russia-Nato relationship where certain questions are determined at 20, by the 19 Nato members and Russia. In Afghanistan we worked with Russia in a way that would have had the old hands of the Cold War days frozen in disbelief. But the truth is Russia today has as much interest in defeating terrorism as we have. In our different ways, but compatibly, we can develop relations with China and India, two nations about whom the only question is not whether they will be huge powers in the world, but how huge, and how that power will be used. And we both already have strong ties with Japan. We need to use those ties both to encourage Japan towards vital economic and structural reforms and also to bind the EU, the US and Asia closer together. It is fascinating too, to see both the US and the EU strengthening enormously their political as well as economic links with South America. The point I am making is simply this. There are no Cold War battles to play to. A series of interlocking alliances with a common agenda on issues of security, trade and stability should replace old rivalries. The international coalition matters. Where it operates, the unintended consequences of action are limited, the diplomatic parameters better fixed. The US and EU together is a precondition of such alliances.

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The authors contend that citizenship does not obey a static definition, and that its meaning is located in changing economic, social and political contexts. Equally, civil, political and social rights are continually being politically defined.

And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Those who employ the idea focus on one or more of these wide ranging threats to individuals and frequently emphasize quite different means by which security should be attained. Despite the diversity, McDonald Human security seems capable of supporting virtually any hypothesis – along with its opposite – depending upon the prejudices and interests of the particular researcher. More generally, if human security means almost anything, then it effectively means nothing. Canadians emphasize the importance of states protecting individuals from fairly direct threats. States should establish an international normative order built upon treaties and institutions. Once embedded in this new international order, states can then utilize tools such as preventive diplomacy, peace-building and economic development to address various threats. For Canada, human security is sometimes described as a value orientation informing its worldview of security McDonald In this paper, I examine the concept of human security primarily as it has been employed by Canada and other nation-states. Moreover, the overlap among the various contested definitions suggests that human security might be viewed best as an overarching frame see Payne used by like-minded advocates to build support for specific national and international policy prescriptions. I am most interested in the US position s directed towards both the frame and the specified policy prescriptions. How might the US view of security affect its ongoing relations with other states, especially its western allies like Canada who have apparently prioritized human security in their own foreign policies? The first section following this one identifies the various key states that have embraced human security and overviews their central aims for reshaping world order. Then, the second section discusses the US view of security and highlights apparent conflicts between specific US security policies and the policies pursued by states embracing the human security frame. The third section briefly explains why that divide between the US and other states potentially threatens the unity of the international community. The explanation is grounded in constructivist international relations theorizing, which emphasizes social purpose rather than material causality see Ruggie The concluding section sketches some practical reasons for hope about the 3 long-term survival of the western security community. Even if states disagree about the hierarchy of security priorities and the implementation of specific policy proposals, they may nonetheless find a reasonable modicum of common ground. State Advocates of Human Security Over the past decade, many nation-states have publicly committed to the pursuit of human security in their individual and collective foreign policy-making. EU Ministers seem quite comfortable employing this framework. The Human Security Network HSN is a group of like-minded states that has met regularly since to identify potential areas for collective action. Moreover, these states have pursued national policies that yielded other tangible and significant changes, such as increases in foreign assistance budgets, generous debt relief packages, and support for various peace operations. Both are aimed at protecting innocent civilians against violence. More recently, the like-minded states and their NGO allies have sought international agreements to limit the proliferation of small arms and to ban child soldiers. These states and groups have also pursued global mechanisms to provide relief for war-affected children and internally displaced persons. However, some states view human security issues in broader terms, framing even the global negotiations about climate change the Kyoto Protocol and specific nonproliferation accords the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in this way. It is worth noting that other prominent middle powers, such as Australia, Britain, and Germany have typically embraced these relatively innovative policies promoting world order for reasons that are generally consistent with the aims of human security. On occasion, leaders of these states even use the phrase, though they may prefer some other description of their policy choices. In all, Canadian and European leaders have often acted as innovative

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policy entrepreneurs see Ingebritsen, , promoting wider international community and world order. On an ad hoc basis, member states of the HSN joined forces with literally dozens of like-minded states to craft norms and organizations like the Mine Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol. Altogether, these institutions reflect shared concerns about a number of key threats to human security. The ongoing negotiations about child soldiers and small arms suggest that their efforts continue to have policy momentum. Human Security and the U. Some scholars of international relations Mearsheimer argue that the U. During the Clinton administration, however, U. Of course, anyone paying attention to American foreign policy actions and statements since September 11, , likely realizes that the United States seems now to embrace traditional notions of national security rather than human security. This is readily demonstrated. They were acts of war. This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. Bush warned that the U. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. On March 19, , together with some key coalition partners, U. Rhodes and Zakaria have separately argued that the Bush administration has embraced crusading Wilsonian values in its national security strategy.. It promises preemptive American military attacks if not preventive war against terrorists and the states that harbor them, especially if these parties are allegedly armed with weapons of mass destruction. This strategy was heatedly debated during the buildup to war against Iraq. My concern is that, if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force, with or without justification. Yet, as McDonald The current President Bush has moved the US even further than his predecessor, Bill Clinton, away from the positions shared by the like-minded states. The US now frequently acts to ignore and sometimes even to undercut a variety of multilateral normative initiatives aimed at resolving threats to human security. Of course, numerous states and even more NGOs were unhappy with the US for its failings in the s. The Clinton administration declined to submit the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for possible ratification, believing it could negotiate changes in the agreement that would either place 9 Searches conducted February 21, Clinton was also unable to convince the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in after he had signed on in The US obviously supported the bombing campaign against Serbia to protect Kosovo, but then-NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark and others have often complained about the numerous operational problems caused by the allied endeavor. Moreover, it now seems as if the precedent value of this war has been lost. I would caution against any such sweeping conclusions. Every circumstance is unique. Decisions on the use of force will be made by any President on a case-by-case basis after weighing a host of factors. Bush essentially repudiated the doctrine altogether Payne b. Now, if the US ratified the Protocol, it would have sufficient coverage of greenhouse gas emissions to go into effect. The US has additionally negotiated bilateral agreements with other states round the world to exempt US nationals from future potential prosecution by the ICC. In February , the Bush administration also announced a new policy that will ban only certain kinds of land mines after , but will allow the deployment of even more sophisticated new mines. The previous policy, established by the Clinton administration, had established a target of for stopping the US use of antipersonnel mines. The US opposed, for example, a comprehensive ban on arms exports to rebel groups. Meanwhile, as part of its war on terror, US small arms exports have increased to some dubious regimes. On a wide range of international security issues, the US and many of its long-time and closest allies seem to be at odds over priorities and policies. The following section considers the potential implications of these differences. The Future of the Western Security Community In , during the run-up to the latest Iraq war, it appeared as if several longstanding international institutions were in major trouble because of deep divisions among the member-states. If the UN failed to live up to its obligations, he declared, it would become irrelevant. The power disparities are certainly noticeable. The neorealist Mearsheimer long ago predicted the demise of NATO and has been arguing for years that the US and Europe face numerous conflict of interest over very important political issues. Moreover, the realists acknowledge that the US is willing to

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pursue its international security agenda unilaterally see White House " and this fact is more-and-more viewed as divisive and perhaps dangerous even by long-time American allies Evans, The neo-conservative writer Robert Kagan And these disagreements reflect, above all, the disparity of power. Some Europeans, Kagan asserts First, despite its tremendous power advantage, the US is unable to stop the formation of meaningful multilateral initiatives addressing human security, international community, or similar goals. Some of the new norms and institutions, such as the ICC, can directly affect US policymaking even if the US refuses to partake in its ongoing construction and attempts to limit its intended jurisdiction. In that case, US leaders appear to realize that the Rome statute applies to everyone, not merely to the states that ratify it. Second, the US often actually purports to support the ideals expressed by those advocating alternative notions of world order, even if it typically seeks to carve out exceptions for its own behavior that conflict with the relevant norms and institutions. This point will be examined in more detail in the conclusion. Third, though many like-minded states oppose US policy positions and embrace alternative security understandings, they are not overtly attempting to balance US power. The widely opposed US war in Iraq was nonetheless supported by willing coalition partners, including such middle powers as Australia, Britain, Italy, Spain, and Poland. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the policy differences between the US and middle powers arguably reflect genuine disagreement about social purpose. Indeed, Charles Kupchan and numerous other scholars and analysts have recently argued that the US and its allies are deeply divided by political culture. What Kagan says of Europeans seems true of the like-minded states who favor human security " they most commonly pursue negotiation, diplomacy political engagement , commercial ties and inducements. Americans, Kagan writes, see the world in terms of stark choices between good and evil, and favor coercive strategies, military force and punitive sanctions to eliminate clear threats in world affairs. The US is quite willing to act unilaterally, and is increasingly skeptical about the value of international law, the United Nations and other cooperative measures. What can be made of these apparent ideational divisions? They emphasize see Wendt , in other words, the binding power of collectively held ideas, which are often more meaningful than material or instrumental causes. Much of this research demonstrates that the United States, Canada, and Western European states constructed a common identity. Risse argues, for instance, that the US continues to cooperate with its allies via extensive international trade and that many ideals are clearly shared " a commitment to democracy, anti-terror goals, etc. Risse does acknowledge that the US and its closest allies seem to disagree about the need for genuine multilateralism, but he claims that this can be explained by recent changes in domestic political coalitions within the US. If shared social purpose explains the development and strength of western security cooperation and community , then major disagreements among the states " such as those mentioned above concerning the nature of security " are quite worrisome. A security community might not be long sustained if the members do not share the same basic understandings about the nature of world order, perceived threats, and the most appropriate tools of foreign policy. These like-minded states, along with numerous transnational NGOs, have worked vigorously to construct important new international norms and institutions that reflect the human security agenda. Ongoing efforts seek new norms to limit child soldiers and the small arms trade.

3: EconPapers: Citizenship, Rights and Tony Blair's Doctrine of International Community

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5: "Human Security and American Foreign Policy" | Rodger A. Payne - www.enganchecubano.com

Colin Tyler of University of Hull, Kingston upon Hull with expertise in: History of Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy and Political Theory. Read 64 publications, and contact Colin Tyler.

6: Tony Blair - Wikipedia

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