

COMBATTING OLD AND NEW SOCIAL RISKS EVELYN HUBER AND JOHN D. STEPHENS pdf

1: Table of contents for The politics of post-industrial welfare states

Huber, Evelyn; Stephens, John D. / Combating old and new social risks. The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States. The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, pp.

We would like to thank the participants in these conferences for feedback on those drafts. Journalistic commentators, primarily those with a neoliberal bent, claim that it is too expensive, no longer affordable under conditions of slower economic growth, and that it needs to be greatly cut back in order to stimulate economic growth. Political commentators on the left and academics worry that expenditures are misallocated and privilege some groups at the expense of others, and they argue that the welfare state needs to be thoroughly restructured Esping-Andersen , ; Pierson a. The modal and model client of the old welfare state is seen as a male bluecollar production worker who is the breadwinner for the family. The family is protected through the entitlements of the main breadwinner. There is no real modal client of the new welfare state, and it certainly is not the male family breadwinner. Individuals can be clients of the new welfare state at different stages of the life cycle, be it as children of working parents, as adolescents in training, as adults in retraining, as working parents with small children, or as elderly in need of care. This distinction between old and new welfare states is valid and captures the need for important adaptations of welfare state structures to changing economic, demographic, and social structures. However, two caveats are in order. First, there is a danger of underestimating the continued importance of old social risks. People still become sick, disabled, and unemployed and need income support in those cases. Moreover, people not only still get old, but they are getting older and older, spending more time in retirement and thus needing income support for longer. Thus, welfare state adaptations have to include reforms of these income support systems to put them on a firm financial basis. Second, the debate about old versus new welfare states overlooks important differences between welfare state regime types. The characterization of the old welfare state fits the continental European welfare states, or the Christian democratic regime type, best. It also fits the Anglo-Saxon welfare states, or the liberal regime type, though at a much lower level of comprehensiveness and generosity. In contrast, the Nordic welfare states, or the social democratic regime type, have incorporated essential elements of the new welfare state for decades. They have been oriented towards supporting training and retraining since the early post-WW II period, and since the s they have expanded the provision of social services, prominently in the area of care for children and the elderly, which has facilitated the entry of women into the labor force Huber and Stephens ,

At the same time, they have maintained transfers to prevent people from falling into poverty due to sickness, unemployment, or old age. The affinity between the social democratic welfare state regime type and the concept of the new welfare state, of course, does not mean that these welfare states have necessarily found the right balance in allocating welfare state resources among competing needs. Here as well as in Christian democratic welfare states, the question is whether some risks and groups are privileged over others and whether “ in the era of slow growth and highly limited possibilities for welfare state expansion ” expenditures might need to be reallocated across programs. Essentially, these are empirical questions, in part to be answered by comparing groups exposed to old and new risks. If we assume that a common goal of old and new welfare states is to minimize poverty, a comparison of poverty rates among various population groups can tell us how effective welfare states are in dealing with old and new risks. Given that social democratic welfare state regimes have already acquired traits of the new welfare state, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the causal dynamics behind the expansion and adaptation of the social democratic welfare state regimes are also operating to some extent in the transformation of old into new welfare states. However, regime legacies are clearly of crucial importance here. In many ways, it was easier to incorporate programs to deal with what is now called new social risks during the phase of welfare state expansion, as the Nordic countries did. We would expect that the continental European countries with the most generous welfare states, of the Christian democratic variety, would have the most difficulties to adapt Scharpf and Schmidt a, b;

Scharpf In the Anglo-Saxon countries, where the welfare state has not grown to limits in comparative perspective, there should be more room for maneuver. On the other hand, to the extent that the factors that kept the liberal welfare states from expanding remain unchanged, we would expect them to obstruct successful adaptation and reduction of poverty resulting from new social risks as well. New versus Old Social Risks New social risks can be conceptualized in a variety of ways. Bonoli in his introductory chapter takes a broad view and includes five kinds of difficult situations brought about by the transition to post-industrialism and the massive entry of women into the labor force. Here, we take a narrower view and concentrate on poverty. Prominent among these changes are the reduction in stability of family patterns, which in turn is related to increasing divorce rates and greater female labor force participation. Accordingly, the proportion of households headed by single mothers has increased, and thus the proportion of households in danger of being poor Kilkey and Bradshaw This in turn has increased the probability for children to live in poverty. Other changes are the decrease in stability of career patterns, the demand for higher skill levels for most jobs in the information society, the trend towards greater wage inequality at least in some countries and the increase in overall levels of unemployment, which work together to increase the likelihood of individuals to experience unemployment and thus the risk of poverty during working age Gallie Whereas poverty due to unemployment is an old risk for lower skilled blue-collar workers, it has intensified for them in the information society, and it has come to affect also employees with higher skill levels and in white-collar jobs. This contrasts sharply with the experience of the past two decades in which double digit unemployment rates have not been unusual. Thus, poverty among the working age population can be regarded as a new social risk, in so far as the risk group unemployed of working age has grown. The increase in poverty risk among the working age population also contributes to a higher probability for children to live in poverty. Other than accident insurance for workers, pensions were the first social programs introduced Hicks Even here, though, one might argue that demographic changes, namely the increase in life expectancy on the one hand and the declining fertility rates on the other, have increased the size of the risk group as a percentage of the population and thus turned it partly into a new social risk. Nevertheless, we will go with convention and treat poverty among the elderly as an old social risk. Our analysis, then, will focus on poverty among four groups: The first we treat as an old social risk, the other three as new social risks. We will first look at overall trends in the occurrence of these risks and then at how well welfare states deal with new and old social risks by protecting these different groups from falling into poverty. In the case of the working age population, single mothers, and children, we will analyze a two-step process. We will analyze the determinants of poverty among these groups before taxes and transfers, and we will then analyze the reduction of poverty among these groups effected by taxes and transfers. In the case of the elderly, we will analyze post-tax and transfer poverty only, because pre-tax and transfer poverty is greatly inflated in countries with generous public pension systems. Since the public pension systems in these countries guarantee almost all retirees an adequate retirement income, few pensioners have significant alternative sources of income and thus almost all elderly fall below the poverty line when transfers are not counted. Thus, pre tax and transfer poverty is an almost meaningless figure in such countries. Unfortunately, the small numbers of observations for this group in the LIS data make the data too unreliable and thus prevent us from exploring this issue. Welfare State Regime Types and New vs Old Social Risks Table 1 offers a summary overview of trends in pre and post tax and transfer poverty among different social groups. We compare the average for the period up to and the period after We use data from the Luxembourg Income Study data base, which are available in waves from the late s to the late s [http:](http://) We choose as the dividing year rather than an earlier date closer to what is generally considered the onset of the period of welfare state retrenchment, because we would lose Denmark and Finland if we chose an earlier point for comparison, as their first LIS surveys were carried out in that year. The pre period, then, covers roughly 13 years from the mids on plus one survey in Canada in and one in Germany in , and the post period roughly the following 13 years. We also have to exclude Austria, Ireland, and Italy, because we have no data for pre tax and transfer income for these countries for the earlier or the entire period. The mean for all countries shows

that pre tax and transfer poverty increased for all of our new risk groups. It also shows that the percentage of households headed by single mothers increased steeply. So, more women and children live in female-headed households, and a greater percentage of these households are poor. Table 1 also shows, though, that there are some systematic differences among welfare state regime types in the risk of poverty for the different groups grouped by welfare state type. The size of the risk group of female headed households is roughly similar in the social democratic and the liberal welfare states, but female headed households in social democratic welfare states have a significantly lower probability of being in poverty than their counterparts in liberal welfare states, a difference of roughly 19 percentage points. For children living in the two welfare state regime types, the difference in the incidence of poverty is 8 to 10 percentage points. For both risk groups, poverty in Christian democratic welfare state regimes is closer to the social democratic than the liberal regime type; for single mother households, poverty is some 5 percentage points higher than in social democratic welfare state regimes, for children 1 to 2 percentage points lower. As we will explain more fully below, these differences are partly due to non-transfer aspects of the welfare state, particularly social services that facilitate the pursuit of paid work for mothers with pre- and school-age children Meyers, Gornick, and Ross In part, these differences are also due to the production regimes in which the different welfare state regimes are embedded. In the coordinated production regimes of the Nordic countries with social democratic welfare state regimes and the Northern continental countries with Christian democratic welfare state regimes, high union density, high contract coverage, and high coordination in wage setting produce lower wage dispersion and higher minimum incomes Kenworthy ; Rueda and Pontusson ; Wallerstein, so single mothers who do work are more likely 2 These differences also serve as a general reminder that the pre tax and transfer income distribution is not the same as a pre welfare state income distribution. Among the working age population, the incidence of pre tax and transfer poverty is roughly similar across the three regime types, particularly for the later period. The countries with social democratic welfare state regimes had a some 4 percentage points lower incidence of poverty in the earlier period, but with the economic crisis of the early s unemployment and thus pre tax and transfer poverty increased more rapidly than in the other countries and caught up to the level of countries with Christian democratic welfare states. The countries with liberal welfare state regimes remained some 2 percentage points higher in their level of pre tax and transfer poverty. As one would expect, it is in the incidence of post tax and transfer poverty that big differences between welfare state regime types emerge. Table 1 shows that social democratic welfare state regimes performed best in handling the new social risks for every one of the risk groups, and the liberal welfare states worst, with the Christian democratic welfare states somewhat closer to the former than the latter. Furthermore, the social democratic welfare states managed to lower poverty or at least keep it constant for the working-age population, single mother households, and children, despite the fact that pre tax and transfer poverty had increased in every one of these groups. In the liberal and Christian democratic regime types poverty increased among all the risk groups, with the only exception of single mother households in liberal welfare states, where poverty was held constant, but at a level four times higher than in the social democratic welfare states 44 percent compared to 11 percent. The picture for the old social risk group of the elderly looks very different. Their level of poverty was reduced in every single welfare state regime type, and the social democratic and Christian democratic regime types achieved roughly similar results. The level of poverty among the elderly was 2 percentage points higher in the earlier period in the social democratic than in the Christian democratic welfare state regimes, but brought down to the same level in the later period. Though the average level of poverty among the elderly was also reduced in liberal welfare states from the earlier to the later period, it was twice as high as in the social democratic and Christian democratic welfare states in the later period. The figures in Table 1 underestimate the degree of change over the past few decades because they are averages for almost a decade and even more in some cases. We can produce estimates of the change over the period to within the regime types with simple regression analysis. For each welfare state regime, we regressed our dependent variables on time, to obtain a measure for the average change of the dependent variable over a ten-year period in a given welfare state regime type. Then

we took the intercept as an indicator of the level of the dependent variable in because time was specified as 0 in Table 2 summarizes the results, which are entirely consistent with the results derived from our inspection of averages in Table 1. The size of the new risk group of single mothers increased in every welfare state regime, though the level in was only about half in the Christian democratic welfare state regimes. Pre-tax and transfer poverty also increased in every new risk group single mothers, children, working age population and every welfare state regime type. Pre-tax and transfer poverty among the working age population increased most rapidly in Christian democratic welfare states, but at the same time they kept the increase of poverty among single mothers comparatively low. The figures from our regressions for post tax and transfer poverty confirm the findings in Table 1 that the elderly are the only risk group whose poverty rate has been lowered in all three regime types, and that the social democratic regime type is the only one to have lowered the poverty rate of all four risk groups. Post tax and transfer poverty increased for all three new risk groups in the Christian democratic and liberal welfare states, with the exception of single mothers in liberal welfare states, whose comparatively very high poverty rate was reduced very marginally. However, post tax and transfer poverty increased at a lower rate than pre tax and transfer poverty in every risk group in Christian democratic and liberal welfare states alike, with the exception of single mothers in Christian democratic welfare states. This indicates that all three welfare state regime types successfully dampen increases in poverty resulting from the increase in new social risks, but that they do so with different degrees of success. A comparison of levels in also shows that social democratic welfare state regimes had built up the most effective poverty prevention and poverty reduction programs among new risk groups by that point in time. Characteristics of Welfare State Regimes and Labor Market Regimes The next step towards understanding what makes some welfare state regimes more effective than others in preventing and lowering poverty is an analysis of the key characteristics of the different regime types. Here we have to look both at overall generosity of the welfare states and at their structure in terms of composition of welfare state programs. By the mids, countries with both social democratic and Christian democratic welfare states on average spent over half of their GDP in total expenditures. In line with overall significantly lower levels of revenue and expenditures in liberal welfare states, these welfare states have the lowest levels of transfer and non-transfer expenditures, and of pension spending per aged person, indicating a highly limited role in providing income support and social services. Christian democratic and social democratic welfare state regimes both have high levels of expenditure, but a systematically different pattern of allocation. Essentially, Christian democratic welfare state regimes emphasize transfer payments in their allocation of expenditure, whereas social democratic welfare state regimes emphasize social services. The most telling difference that illustrates the importance of social services is in civilian government employment, which accounts for

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Combating Old and New Social Risks Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Revised version of a paper delivered at the 14th International Conference of.

The Politics of Liberalisation: I would like to thank the chairs and participants of these workshops and seminar as well as two anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. I would like to thank the chairs and participants of these workshops and seminar as well as two anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. Jeremy Richardson who hosted and supported my research and a Marie Curie Fellowship made this research a feasible enterprise. Show Context Citation Context Unlike the Latin American countries, fourteen of the sixteen European countries studied here liberalised their industries in the context of the EU policy process. The political economy of imprisonment in affluent western democracies by John R. Sutton - American Sociological Review , " Over the last three decades, the busiest line of empirical research on imprisonment has treated incarceration rates as a function of macroeconomic trends. This research builds on a Marxian theoretical foundation laid in the s by Rusche and Kirchheimer Rusche ; Rusche and Kirchheimer , This research builds on a Marxian theoretical foundation laid in the s by Rusche and Kirchheimer Rusche ; Rusche and Kirchheimer , who argued that the function of prisons in capitalist societies is to manage surplus labor. Since the s, dozens of studies have tested the derivative hypothesis that the imprisonment rate moves inversely with the business cycle, rising during recession and declining during economic expansion. Others are skeptical, arguing that tests of RK are based on narrow samples or misspecified statistical models e. If an empirical association exists between recession and imprisonment rates, it is by no means clear how it should be interpreted. Scholars in the RK tradition have suggested that recession may be linked to imprisonment rates as a result of increased crime unemployed people steal , by the legitimating function of the state unemployed people make revolutions , or by the agency of official decision makers judges give harsher sentences to unemployed people. I find three chronic weaknesses in the RK literature that call not just for skepticism, but for Toward a unified theory of causality by James Mahoney - Comparative Political Studies , " In comparative research, analysts conceptualize causation in contrasting ways when they pursue explanation in particular cases case-oriented research versus large populations population-oriented research. With case-oriented research, they understand causation in terms of necessary, sufficient, I With population-oriented research, by contrast, they understand causation as mean causal effects. This article explores whether it is possible to translate the kind of causal language that is used in case-oriented research into the kind of causal language that is used in population-oriented research and vice versa. The article suggests that such translation is possible, because certain types of INUS causes manifest themselves as variables that exhibit partial effects when studied in population-oriented research. The article concludes that the conception of causation adopted in case-oriented research is appropriate for the population level, whereas the conception of causation used in population-oriented research is valuable for making predictions in the face of uncertainty. Determinants of Social Spending in Latin America. Stephens , " We examine the determinants of social expenditure in an unbalanced pooled time series analysis for 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries for the period to The data are from a new data set assembled by the co-authors and collaborators. The social spending data are calculated from IMF s The social spending data are calculated from IMF sources and allow us to separate out education and health spending from social security and welfare spending. We extend the Coppedge coding of Latin American parties to a wider set of countries and years. We also code constitutions in order to develop an adapted Huber and Stephens constitutional structure veto points measure. Thus, for the first time, we present an analysis of social spending in Latin America and the Caribbean with a full complement of partisanship, state structure, economic, and demographic variables that have been employed in studies of advanced industrial countries. We find that seat share of right-wing parties in the legislature is a highly significant predictor of social security spending,

whereas seat share of left-wing parties is a significant predictor of health and education spending. Veto points depress health and education but not social security spending. The Question Posed At the beginning of the 21 st century, most social scientists agree that investment in human capital is necessary for economic and social development. Stephens - In Armingeon, K , " For roughly two decades now, commentators from different political camps have pronounced the welfare state in crisis. Journalistic commentators, primarily those with a neoliberal bent, claim that it is too expensive, no longer affordable under conditions of slower economic growth, and that it needs Journalistic commentators, primarily those with a neoliberal bent, claim that it is too expensive, no longer affordable under conditions of slower economic growth, and that it needs to be greatly cut back in order to stimulate economic growth. Political commentators on the left and academics worry that expenditures are misallocated and privilege some groups at the expense of others, and they argue that the welfare state needs to be thoroughly restructured Esping-Andersen , ; Pierson a. The modal and model client of the old welfare state is seen as a male blue-collar production worker who is the breadwinner for the family. The family is protected through the entitlements of the main breadwinner.

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Politics of new social risk -- New social risks and the politics of post-industrial social policies / Giuliano Bonoli -- Political parties and new social risks: the double backlash against social democracy and Christian democracy / Hans Keman, Kees van Kersbergen and Barbara Vis -- New social risk a.

Early life Wilson c. His mother was born in Carlisle , England, the daughter of Rev. There his father grew up and published a pro-tariff and anti-slavery newspaper, The Western Herald and Gazette. Joseph Wilson owned slaves, defended slavery , and also set up a Sunday school for his slaves. Wilson would forever recall standing for a moment at General Robert E. He became minister of the First Presbyterian Church in Augusta, Georgia , and the family lived there until , when Wilson was He later blamed the lack of schools. Wilson attended Davidson College in North Carolina for the "74 school year, cut short by illness, then transferred as a freshman to the College of New Jersey now Princeton University. He graduated in , a member of Phi Kappa Psi fraternity. In his second year, he studied political philosophy and history, was active in the Whig literary and debating society, and wrote for the Nassau Literary Review. While there, he enjoyed frequent trips to his birthplace of Staunton. He visited with cousins, and fell in love with one, Hattie Woodrow, though his affections were unrequited. After less than a year, he abandoned the practice to pursue his study of political science and history. Both parents expressed concern over a potentially premature decision. He studied history, political science and the German language. A Study in American Politics, [22] and received a Ph. While there he met and fell in love with Ellen Louise Axson , the daughter of a minister from Savannah, Georgia ; he proposed to her and they became engaged in Asheville. After graduation, she pursued portrait art and received a medal for one of her works from the Paris International Exposition. She happily agreed to sacrifice further independent artistic pursuits in order to keep her marriage commitment, and in she and Wilson married. He next taught at Bryn Mawr College from until , teaching ancient Greek and Roman history; while there, he refused offers from the universities of Michigan and Indiana. Their second child, Jessie, was born in August. Both parties claimed contract violations and the matter subsided. Wilson favored a parliamentary system for the United States and in the early s wrote, "I ask you to put this question to yourselves, should we not draw the Executive and Legislature closer together? Should we not, on the one hand, give the individual leaders of opinion in Congress a better chance to have an intimate party in determining who should be president, and the president, on the other hand, a better chance to approve himself a statesman, and his advisers capable men of affairs, in the guidance of Congress. He critically described the United States government, with frequent negative comparisons to Westminster. Critics contended the book was written without the benefit of the author observing any operational aspect of the U. Congress, and supporters asserted the work was the product of the imagination of a future statesman. The book reflected the greater power of the legislature, relative to the executive, during the post-bellum period. His third book, entitled Division and Reunion, was published in and considered an outstanding contribution to American historical writing. If government behaved badly, Wilson queried, "How is the schoolmaster, the nation, to know which boy needs the whipping? These petty barons, some of them not a little powerful, but none of them within reach [of] the full powers of rule, may at will exercise an almost despotic sway within their own shires, and may sometimes threaten to convulse even the realm itself. Wilson also hoped that the parties could be reorganized along ideological, not geographic, lines. He wrote, "Eight words contain the sum of the present degradation of our political parties: No leaders, no principles; no principles, no parties. Saunders, seemed to indicate that Wilson "was laying the groundwork for the modern welfare state. He thought such attitudes represented the requirements of smaller countries and populations. By his day, he thought, "it is getting to be harder to run a constitution than to frame one. By contrast, he thought the United States required greater compromise because of the diversity of public opinion and the difficulty of forming a majority opinion; thus practical reform of the government was necessarily slow. Yet Wilson insisted that "administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics" [58] and that "general

laws which direct these things to be done are as obviously outside of and above administration. Such a line of demarcation is intended to focus responsibility for actions taken on the people or persons in charge. As Wilson put it, "public attention must be easily directed, in each case of good or bad administration, to just the man deserving of praise or blame. There is no danger in power, if only it be not irresponsible. If it be divided, dealt out in share to many, it is obscured". President of Princeton University See also: The Princeton trustees promoted Professor Wilson to president in June , replacing Francis Landey Patton , whom the trustees perceived to be an inefficient administrator. The curriculum guidelines he developed proved important progressive innovations in the field of higher education. Students were to meet for these in groups of six with preceptors, followed by two years of concentration in a selected major. Wilson aspired, as he told alumni, "to transform thoughtless boys performing tasks into thinking men". Modern medical opinion surmises Wilson had suffered a stroke—he later was diagnosed, as his father had been, with hardening of the arteries. He took a vacation in Bermuda to convalesce. Their visits together became a regular occurrence on his return. Wilson in his letters home to Ellen openly related these gatherings as well his other social events. According to biographer August Heckscher , Ellen could sense a problem. It became the topic of frank discussion between them. Wilson historians have not conclusively established there was an affair; but Wilson did on one occasion write a musing in shorthand—on the reverse side of a draft for an editorial: He proposed moving the students into colleges, also known as quadrangles. Wilson persisted, saying that giving in "would be to temporize with evil". Wilson wanted to integrate a proposed graduate school building into the campus core, while West preferred a more distant campus site. From its outset, Wilson became disenchanted with resistance to his recommendations at Princeton; he ruminated on future political leadership. Prior to the Democratic presidential nominating convention in , Wilson had dropped hints to some influential players in the Democratic Party of his interest in the ticket. While he had no real expectations of being placed on the ticket, he did leave instructions that he should not be offered the vice presidential nomination. He then left for a vacation in Scotland. Party regulars considered his ideas politically as well as geographically detached and fanciful, but the seeds had been sown. Senator James Smith, Jr. Ross, and Richard V. The bosses had chosen their man, but his nomination was not a given—many, including organized labor, felt Wilson was an inexperienced newcomer. He submitted his letter of resignation to Princeton on October Lewis , the State Commissioner of Banking and Insurance. Wilson quickly shed his professorial style for more emboldened speechmaking and presented himself as a full-fledged progressive. He attributed the success of Wilson and others against the Taft Republicans in in part to the emergent national progressive message enunciated by Theodore Roosevelt after his presidency. When Martine won the seat, Wilson had positioned himself as a new force in the party in the state. The Geran bill, drafted by Elmer H. Geran, expanded public participation in primaries for all offices including party officials and delegates; it was thus directed at the power of the political bosses. It passed the state assembly, albeit by a narrow margin. Free dental clinics were established, a "comprehensive and scientific" poor law was enacted, and the usage of common drinking cups was prohibited. Trained nursing was also standardized, while contract labor in all reformatories and prisons was abolished, an indeterminate sentence act was passed, and regulation of weights and measures was carried out. Contract labor in penal institutions was abolished. In addition, a law was passed extending the civil service "to employees of the State, counties, and municipalities," [87] labor by women and children was limited, and oversight of factory working conditions was strengthened. In March , Wilson committed himself to try for the Democratic nomination for President when he spoke at an Atlanta meeting of the Southern Commercial Congress; afterwards he said: The establishment of rapport with Bryan, the most recent standard-bearer of the party, was a success. Wilson began a public campaign for the nomination in the South, with a speech to the Pewter Platter Club in Norfolk, Virginia. While he was received enthusiastically, the speech, reformist in nature, was considered provocative and radical by the conservative audience, making the visit on the whole less than positive. Wilson managed to maneuver through the complexities of local politics. For example, in Tennessee the Democratic Party was divided over Prohibition ; Wilson was progressive and sober, but not dry, and

appealed to both sides. They united behind him to win the presidential election in the state, but divided over state politics and lost the gubernatorial election. McCombs, who helped Wilson win the governorship, served as convention chairman. The Republicans had set the stage a week earlier at their convention, nominating incumbent William Howard Taft, with Theodore Roosevelt leaving to launch an independent campaign which would split the party vote. His assistant Tumulty "nearly collapsed" under the strain. The leading contender was House Speaker Champ Clark, a prominent progressive, strongest in the border states. Publisher William Randolph Hearst, a leader of the left wing of the party, supported Clark. William Jennings Bryan, the nominee in 1908, and Roosevelt, played a critical role in his declared opposition to any candidate supported by "the financiers of Wall Street". Marshall as his running mate. In order to further embolden Democrats, especially in New Jersey and New York, Wilson set out to ensure the defeat of local incumbent candidates supported by political machines: He succeeded in both of these efforts and thereby weakened arguments that party control resided with political bosses. His oratory style was, "right out of my mind as it is working at the time". He maintained towards his primary opponent Roosevelt a tone of humorous detachment, describing the Bull Moose party as "the irregular Republicans, the variegated Republicans". Wilson shunned the stump speech campaign routine, and initially was reluctant to conduct an extensive campaign tour, but this changed after Roosevelt went on the offensive. Brandeis, who promoted the concept that corporate trusts be regulated by the government. His campaign increased its focus upon the elimination of monopoly in all forms.

4: Woodrow Wilson - Wikipedia

Bernhard Ebbinghaus --Combatting old and new social risks / Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens --Patterns of policy adaptation --New social risks and pension reform in Germany and Sweden: the politics of pension rights for child care / Karen M. Anderson and Traute Meyer --New labour market risks and the revision of unemployment protection.

Four additional slave-holding states – Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina – declared their secession and joined the Confederacy following a call by U. President Abraham Lincoln for troops from each state to recapture Sumter and other seized federal properties in the South. The antebellum state governments in both maintained their representation in the Union. Efforts by certain factions in Maryland to secede were halted by federal imposition of martial law; Delaware, though of divided loyalty, did not attempt it. A Unionist government was formed in opposition to the secessionist state government in Richmond and administered the western parts of Virginia that had been occupied by Federal troops. The Restored Government later recognized the new state of West Virginia, which was admitted to the Union during the war on June 20, and re-located to Alexandria for the rest of the war. As Union forces moved southward, large numbers of plantation slaves were freed. Many joined the Union lines, enrolling in service as soldiers, teamsters and laborers. Internal movement became increasingly difficult for Southerners, weakening the economy and limiting army mobility. After four years of campaigning, Richmond was captured by Union forces in April. A few days later General Robert E. Lee surrendered to Union General Ulysses S. Grant, effectively signalling the collapse of the Confederacy. President Davis was captured on May 10, and jailed in preparation for a treason trial that was ultimately never held. It was formed by delegations from seven slave states of the Lower South that had proclaimed their secession from the Union. After the fighting began in April, four additional slave states seceded and were admitted. Later, two slave states Missouri and Kentucky and two territories were given seats in the Confederate Congress. Southern California, although having some pro-Confederate sentiment, was never organized as a territory. Many southern whites had considered themselves more Southern than American [13] [14] and were prepared to fight for their state and their region to be independent of the larger nation. That regionalism became a Southern nationalism, or the "Cause". For the duration of its existence, the Confederacy underwent trial by war. The convergence of race and slavery, politics, and economics raised almost all South-related policy questions to the status of moral questions over way of life, commingling love of things Southern and hatred of things Yankee the North. Not only did national political parties split, but national churches and interstate families as well divided along sectional lines as the war approached. Coski, The statesmen who led the secession movement were unashamed to explicitly cite the defense of slavery as their prime motive Acknowledging the centrality of slavery to the Confederacy is essential for understanding the Confederate. Douglas and John Bell. All had residents who cast significant numbers of Unionist votes in either the legislature, conventions, popular referendums, or in all three. Voting to remain in the Union did not necessarily mean that individuals were northern sympathizers. Once hostilities began, many of these who voted to remain in the Union, particularly in the Deep South, accepted the majority decision, and supported the Confederacy. Craven in , the Confederate States of America was created by secessionists in Southern slave states who believed that the federal government was making them second-class citizens and refused to honor their belief that slavery was beneficial to the Negro. House, Senate, and Presidency. Taney a presumed supporter of slavery was 83 years old, and ailing. During the campaign for president in , some secessionists threatened disunion should Lincoln who opposed the expansion of slavery into the territories be elected, most notably William L. Yancey toured the North calling for secession as Stephen A. A Lincoln victory presented them with a momentous choice as they saw it , even before his inauguration – "the Union without slavery, or slavery without the Union". American Civil War historian James M. McPherson suggested that, for the Southerners, the most ominous feature of the Republican victories in the Congressional and Presidential elections of was the magnitude of those victories. Republicans

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captured over 60 percent of the Northern vote, and won three-fourths of its Congressional delegations. The Southern press said that such Republicans represented the anti-slavery portion of the North, "a party founded on the single sentiment The "Black Republican party" could overwhelm conservative Yankees. The New Orleans Delta said of the Republicans, "It is in fact, essentially, a revolutionary party" to overthrow slavery. Historian Drew Gilpin Faust observed that "leaders of the secession movement across the South cited slavery as the most compelling reason for southern independence". For struggling yeomen and subsistence farmers, the slave society provided a large class of people ranked lower in the social scale than they. He found that Confederate diplomacy projected multiple contradictory self-images: Vice President Alexander H. Stephens declared that the "cornerstone" of the new government "rest[ed] upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery — subordination to the superior race — is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth". Georgia also claimed a general Federal policy of favoring Northern over Southern economic interests. Texas mentioned slavery 21 times, but also listed the failure of the federal government to live up to its obligations, in the original annexation agreement, to protect settlers along the exposed western frontier. Texas resolutions further stated that governments of the states and the nation were established "exclusively by the white race, for themselves and their posterity". They also stated that although equal civil and political rights applied to all white men, they did not apply to those of the "African race", further opining that the end of racial enslavement would "bring inevitable calamities upon both [races] and desolation upon the fifteen slave-holding states". Instead the Alabama ordinance stated "the election of Abraham Lincoln The ordinance invited "the slaveholding States of the South, who may approve such purpose, in order to frame a provisional as well as a permanent Government upon the principles of the Constitution of the United States" to participate in a February 4, convention in Montgomery, Alabama. Under the influence of men such as Texas Governor Sam Houston , delay would have had the effect of sustaining the Union. Governor William Henry Gist of South Carolina corresponded secretly with other Deep South governors, and most southern governors exchanged clandestine commissioners. The most influential were: The foreman of a jury refused the legitimacy of federal courts, so Federal Judge Andrew Magrath ruled that U. A mass meeting in Charleston celebrating the Charleston and Savannah railroad and state cooperation led to the South Carolina legislature to call for a Secession Convention. Senator James Chesnut, Jr. Kentucky declared neutrality, while Missouri had its own civil war until the Unionists took power and drove the Confederate legislators out of the state. The House approved it by a vote of to 65 and the United States Senate adopted it, with no changes, on a vote of 24 to It was then submitted to the state legislatures for ratification. The text was as follows: No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State. Had it been ratified by the required number of states prior to , it would have made institutionalized slavery immune to the constitutional amendment procedures and to interference by Congress.

5: New Social Risks and Welfare States: New Paradigm and New Politics? - Oxford Scholarship

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6: CiteSeerX — Combating Old and New Social Risks

The "old " welfare state is conceptualized as transfer-heavy, oriented towards covering risks from loss of earnings

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capacity due to old age, unemployment, sickness, and invalidity. The modal (and model) client of the old welfare state is seen as a male blue-collar production worker who is the breadwinner for the family.

7: Combating old and new social risks – University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Combating old and new social risks Huber, E. & Stephens, J. D. May 4 The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, p. 26 p.

8: John D Stephens – Publications – University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

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9: Confederate States of America - Wikipedia

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