

1: Plato's Ethics and Politics in The Republic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

-- A saying beyond assertion -- Plato's dialogues and Heidegger's leap -- Heidegger and the dialogue form -- Redefining hermeneutics -- Back to the beginning with dialectic and dialogue -- Conclusion: Dialectic versus sophia again -- 7 dialectic and phenomenology in "Zeit und Sein": a pivotal chapter in Heidegger's confrontation with Plato.

The Question and the Strategy 1. After Socrates asks his host what it is like being old and rich and rather rude, we might think Cephalus says that the best thing about wealth is that it can save us from being unjust and thus smooth the way for an agreeable afterlife. This is enough to prompt more questions, for Socrates wants to know what justice is. Predictably, Cephalus and then Polemarchus fail to define justice in a way that survives Socratic examination, but they continue to assume that justice is a valuable part of a good human life. Thrasymachus erupts when he has had his fill of this conversation, and he challenges the assumption that it is good to be just. The strong themselves, on this view, are better off disregarding justice and serving their own interests directly. See the entry on Callicles and Thrasymachus. The brothers pick up where Thrasymachus left off, providing reasons why most people think that justice is not intrinsically valuable but worth respecting only if one is not strong enough or invisible enough to get away with injustice. They want to be shown that most people are wrong, that justice is worth choosing for its own sake. More than that, Glaucon and Adeimantus want to be shown that justice is worth choosing regardless of the rewards or penalties bestowed on the just by other people and the gods, and they will accept this conclusion only if Socrates can convince them that it is always better to be just. So Socrates must persuade them that the just person who is terrifically unfortunate and scorned lives a better life than the unjust person who is so successful that he is unfairly rewarded as if he were perfectly just. The challenge that Glaucon and Adeimantus present has baffled modern readers who are accustomed to carving up ethics into deontologies that articulate a theory of what is right independent of what is good and consequentialisms that define what is right in terms of what promotes the good Foster, Mabbott, cf. Prichard. But the insistence that justice be shown to be beneficial to the just has suggested to others that Socrates will be justifying justice by reference to its consequences. In fact, both readings are distortions, predicated more on what modern moral philosophers think than on what Plato thinks. At the beginning of Book Two, he retains his focus on the person who aims to be happy. But he does not have to show that being just or acting justly brings about happiness. The function argument in Book One suggests that acting justly is the same as being happy. But the function argument concludes that justice is both necessary and sufficient for happiness, and this is a considerably stronger thesis than the claim that the just are always happier than the unjust. After the challenge Glaucon and Adeimantus present, Socrates might not be so bold. Even if he successfully maintains that acting justly is identical to being happy, he might think that there are circumstances in which no just person could act justly and thus be happy. This will nonetheless satisfy Glaucon and Adeimantus if the just are better off, that is, closer to happy than the unjust in these circumstances. See also Kirwan and Irwin. He suggests looking for justice as a virtue of cities before defining justice as a virtue of persons, on the unconvincing grounds that justice in a city is bigger and more apparent than justice in a person, and this leads Socrates to a rambling description of some features of a good city. This may seem puzzling. The arguments of Book One and the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus rule out several more direct routes. But Book One rules this strategy out by casting doubt on widely accepted accounts of justice. Socrates must say what justice is in order to answer the question put to him, and what he can say is constrained in important ways. Most obviously, he cannot define justice as happiness without begging the question. But he also must give an account of justice that his interlocutors recognize as justice: Moreover, Socrates cannot try to define justice by enumerating the types of action that justice requires or forbids. We might have objected to this strategy for this reason: But a specific argument in Book One suggests a different reason why Socrates does not employ this strategy. When Cephalus characterizes justice as keeping promises and returning what is owed, Socrates objects by citing a case in which returning what is owed would not be just. Wrongful killing may always be wrong, but is killing? Just recompense may always be right, but is recompense? So Book One makes it

difficult for Socrates to take justice for granted. What is worse, the terms in which Socrates accepts the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus make it difficult for him to take happiness for granted. If Socrates were to proceed like a consequentialist, he might offer a full account of happiness and then deliver an account of justice that both meets with general approval and shows how justice brings about happiness. But Socrates does not proceed like that. He does not even do as much as Aristotle does in the *Nicomachean Ethics*; he does not suggest some general criteria for what happiness is. He proceeds as if happiness is unsettled. But if justice at least partly constitutes happiness and justice is unsettled, then Socrates is right to proceed as if happiness is unsettled. In sum, Socrates needs to construct an account of justice and an account of happiness at the same time, and he needs these accounts to entail without assuming the conclusion that the just person is always happier than the unjust. Socrates can assume that a just city is always more successful or happy than an unjust city. The assumption begs no questions, and Glaucon and Adeimantus readily grant it. If Socrates can then explain how a just city is always more successful and happy than an unjust city, by giving an account of civic justice and civic happiness, he will have a model to propose for the relation between personal justice and flourishing. There must be some intelligible relation between what makes a city successful and what makes a person successful. It works even if it only introduces an account of personal justice and happiness that we might not have otherwise entertained. Although this is all that the city-person analogy needs to do, Socrates seems at times to claim more for it, and one of the abiding puzzles about the *Republic* concerns the exact nature and grounds for the full analogy that Socrates claims. At other times Socrates seems to say that the same account of justice must apply in both cases because the F-ness of a whole is due to the F-ness of its parts. Again, at times Socrates seems to say that these grounds are strong enough to permit a deductive inference: At other times, Socrates would prefer to use the F-ness of the city as a heuristic for locating F-ness in persons. Plato is surely right to think that there is some interesting and non-accidental relation between the structural features and values of society and the psychological features and values of persons, but there is much controversy about whether this relation really is strong enough to sustain all of the claims that Socrates makes for it in the *Republic*. Williams, Lear, Smith, Ferrari. Rather, it depends upon a persuasive account of justice as a personal virtue, and persuasive reasons why one is always happier being just than unjust. What Justice Is 2. So his account of what justice is depends upon his account of the human soul. According to the *Republic*, every human soul has three parts: This is a claim about the embodied soul. In Book Ten, Socrates argues that the soul is immortal and says that the disembodied soul might be simple, though he declines to insist on this and the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus* apparently disagree on the question. At first blush, the tripartition can suggest a division into beliefs, emotions, and desires. But Socrates explicitly ascribes beliefs, emotions, and desires to each part of the soul. In fact, it is not even clear that Plato would recognize psychological attitudes that are supposed to be representational without also being affective and conative, or conative and affective without also being representational. The *Republic* offers two general reasons for the tripartition. First, Socrates argues that we cannot coherently explain certain cases of psychological conflict unless we suppose that there are at least two parts to the soul. The core of this argument is what we might call the principle of non-opposition: Because of this principle, Socrates insists that one soul cannot be the subject of opposing attitudes unless one of three conditions is met. One soul can be the subject of opposing attitudes if the attitudes oppose each other at different times, even in rapidly alternating succession as Hobbes explains mental conflict. One soul can also be the subject of opposing attitudes if the attitudes relate to different things, as a desire to drink champagne and a desire to drink a martini might conflict. Last, one soul can be the subject of opposing attitudes if the attitudes oppose in different respects. Initially, this third condition is obscure. The way Socrates handles putative counter-examples to the principle of non-opposition might suggest that when one thing experiences one opposite in one of its parts and another in another, it is not experiencing opposites in different respects. Stalley; Bobonich, 31; Lorenz, 23. That would entail, apparently, that it is not one thing experiencing opposites at all, but merely a plurality. The most natural way of relating these two articulations of the principle is to suppose that experiencing one opposite in one part and another in another is just one way to experience opposites in different respects. But however we relate the two articulations to each other, Socrates clearly concludes that one soul can experience simultaneously opposing

attitudes in relation to the same thing, but only if different parts of it are the direct subjects of the opposing attitudes. Socrates employs this general strategy four times. In Book Four, he twice considers conflicting attitudes about what to do. First, he imagines a desire to drink being opposed by a calculated consideration that it would be good not to drink *a*€”d. We might think, anachronistically, of someone about to undergo surgery. This is supposed to establish a distinction between appetite and reason. Then he considers cases like that of Leontius, who became angry with himself for desiring to ogle corpses *e*€”b. These cases are supposed to establish a distinction between appetite and spirit. In Book Ten, Socrates appeals to the principle of non-opposition when considering the decent man who has recently lost a son and is conflicted about grieving *e*€”b cf. Austin and when considering conflicting attitudes about how things appear to be *c*€”b cf. Moss and Singpurwalla. These show a broad division between reason and an inferior part of the soul Ganson ; it is compatible with a further distinction between two inferior parts, spirit and appetite. In the Protagoras, Socrates denies that anyone willingly does other than what she believes to be best, but in the Republic, the door is opened for a person to act on an appetitive attitude that conflicts with a rational attitude for what is best. How far the door is open to *akrasia* awaits further discussion below. First, what kinds of parts are reason, spirit, and appetite? Some scholars believe that they are merely conceptual parts, akin to subsets of a set Shields , Price. They would object to characterizing the parts as subjects of psychological attitudes. At face value, Socrates offers a more robust conception of parts, wherein each part is like an independent agent. Indeed, this notion of parts is robust enough to make one wonder why reason, spirit, and appetite are parts at all, as opposed to three independent subjects. But the Republic proceeds as though every embodied human being has just one soul that comprises three parts. No embodied soul is perfectly unified: She must, as we shall see, in order to be just. But every embodied soul enjoys an unearned unity: It is not as though a person is held responsible for what his reason does but not for what his appetite does. There are questions about what exactly explains this unearned unity of the soul see E.

CONCLUSION: LEAPING BEYOND PLATO pdf

2: SparkNotes: Plato (c. 427–347 c. B.C.): Meno

E. Conclusion: Leaping Beyond Plato. Brach's book on Plato and Heidegger focuses on showing the role played by the course on Plato's Sophist in.

Plato claimed that knowledge gained through the senses is no more than opinion and that, in order to have real knowledge, we must gain it through philosophical reasoning. It goes like this: **The Cave** Imagine a cave, in which there are three prisoners. The prisoners are tied to some rocks, their arms and legs are bound and their head is tied so that they cannot look at anything but the stonewall in front of them. These prisoners have been here since birth and have never seen outside of the cave. Behind the prisoners is a fire, and between them is a raised walkway. People outside the cave walk along this walkway carrying things on their head including; animals, plants, wood and stone. **The Shadows** So, imagine that you are one of the prisoners. You cannot look at anything behind or to the side of you – you must look at the wall in front of you. When people walk along the walkway, you can see shadows of the objects they are carrying cast on to the wall. If one of the prisoners were to correctly guess, the others would praise him as clever and say that he were a master of nature. **The Escape** One of the prisoners then escapes from their bindings and leaves the cave. He is shocked at the world he discovers outside the cave and does not believe it can be real. As he becomes used to his new surroundings, he realizes that his former view of reality was wrong. **The Return** The prisoner returns to the cave, to inform the other prisoners of his findings. They do not believe him and threaten to kill him if he tries to set them free. In essays and exams, whoever is marking it expects you to have a deeper understanding of the meaning of the theory. You can then use these to think about criticisms and then to form your own opinion. **The Shadows** The Shadows represent the perceptions of those who believe empirical evidence ensures knowledge. If you believe that what you see should be taken as truth, then you are merely seeing a shadow of the truth. Plato is demonstrating that this master does not actually know any truth, and suggesting that it is ridiculous to admire someone like this. **The Escape** The escaped prisoner represents the Philosopher, who seeks knowledge outside of the cave and outside of the senses. **The Sun** represents philosophical truth and knowledge His intellectual journey represents a philosopher's journey when finding truth and wisdom **The Return** The other prisoners reaction to the escapee returning represents that people are scared of knowing philosophical truths and do not trust philosophers. It is always recommended that you read the original text by Plato to reach the top grades.

3: Project MUSE - Hedonism in the Protagoras

"A study of Martin Heidegger's engagement with the philosophy of Plato. Examines how Heidegger's understanding--and misunderstanding--of Plato can help in assessing Heidegger's own philosophical program"--RÃ©sumÃ© de l'Ã©diteur.

Is something good because it is approved, because it benefits someone, or because it has the intrinsic qualities of goodness? Something is good because it is approved. Something is good because it benefits someone. Something is good because it is intrinsically good. Next, I will explain the difference between "the gods loving the pious because it is pious" and "the pious being pious because the gods love it". Finally, I will give my opinion as to what I think the pious can be explained as. Source The Form of Piety and Holiness: Eidos To begin, Socrates urges Euthyphro to examine his ideals of what piety or holiness are. Euthyphro concludes that what is holy is what all gods agree upon, and that which is not agreed upon is unholy. This, however, perplexes Socrates, because it seems that there are disputes among the gods as to what is deemed right or pious. What Socrates wants to understand is the form of holy. The form of holy would have to be the same in all instances. After, Euthyphro needs further explanation. Socrates explains the difference by stating that being approved is an example either of coming to be so or of being affected by something. So, if the gods unanimously agreed on one thing being holy, it would be holy because they say so, not because it is holy in form. On the other hand, there can be something that is holy, yet all of the gods might not agree upon it. In this case, those who do not agree would be mistaken, since they would be rejecting the true form of holy; a form outside of the gods themselves. Source Do the Gods Benefit from Piety? After some thought, Euthyphro comes up with a response to what Socrates has just posited. Euthyphro says that holiness is the part of justice which looks after the gods. So, Socrates then makes the comparison and analogy of other services, such as shipbuilders achieving the creation of boats. This shows that services create a multitude of good things for those who partake in such endeavors. Socrates points out that this may also be a problem, because it is not the fact that whenever you do things that are holy, you are improving the gods in some way. Euthyphro sees this problem, and then chooses to say that while the gods get no benefit from our services, they do get gratification. When understanding gratification, Socrates suggests that explaining holiness in terms of gratification of the gods is similar to explaining it in terms of their approval. With this, Socrates must have chuckled, because we are now back to the statement that what is holy is what is approved by the gods. In such an instance, Socrates would have merely had to suggest, as he did, that the gods quarrel and often times do not conclude the same rulings as each other. So, it seems, knowledge of the form of holy is what remains most important. Form is not something that can be taken from or added to. If I were to debate in relational terms to the ancient greek gods, I would say that piety is a form outside of the gods, and that the gods recognize this form to be an unchanging truth that comes from outside themselves and thus accept it as such. It is not something that comes about because of its approval, it is something that just is, and the approval can be something that can be said for it. God does not approve piety, for piety is this God. Instead, humans say that God approves the piety, just as we say anything else. For, in human reality, all things appear separate, and we thus attribute things in relation to this appearance of separateness. So, when we say that God approves pious actions, we are deceiving ourselves unless we truly mean that God is all pious actions that can come about. I say my arm, but I mean my body. We considered the differences between gods creating the pious with their approval and the gods loving the pious because it is pious. Finally, we examined what the opposing arguments would have looked like had the opposing statement been made, along with my personal opinion on all matters of piety and other such matter as these.

4: Ackrill essays on plato and aristotle images

The Greek Experience of the Open: A Saying That Points and Hints Versus the "Leap" E. Conclusion: Leaping Beyond Plato Part 3: Opportunities for a Dialogue with Plato in the Late Heidegger 6. Calculative Thinking, Meditative Thinking, and the Practice of Dialogue A.

When does Craft become Art? Art is craft that leaps into a metaphor. True art evokes meanings and emotions far beyond what the viewers observe. Craft remains the underlying basis of art, but no matter how well done, is merely what it looks like. I discovered this distinction while preparing my newspaper columns for publication in book form. While every article contains factual information about local history, some remained at that level. Fortunately, most of them distinguished themselves by leaping into metaphors. For example, old ruins became poignant metaphors for aging. Census data recorded over two centuries were not just statistics; they became numerical portraits of our dynamic society. Old abandoned cemeteries became philosophical hot beds of being, nothingness, and theology. Every article has an accompanying photograph, which assisted the leap into metaphor. What amazed me in hindsight was that I did not consciously intend such results. I just wanted to take some good pictures that illustrated the point. After this enlightening experience I now approach my drawings with newfound zeal. When I notice that a work is standing still instead of leaping, I cast it aside and begin a new one, striving for that magic leap into a metaphor. Windsor lives in Norwich NY. Ginger Lee Hendler responds: Windsor, I thank you for your response to my article. It follows the gun that was so lovingly crafted to perfection, weaving the events leading to the ultimate tragedy. I use this as an analogy to your metaphor. The gun is more than a finely crafted weapon. Is it a work of art? Does it fulfill the conditions necessary to make it a work of art? Perhaps it fulfills the definition by Plato, in that it has the power to stir the emotions. What is the metaphorical leap here? Another question that we can ponder "ad infinitum."

5: Jumping to Conclusions

We speak of "Plato's Theory," and let me now say something about www.enganchecubano.com chief sources are, to be sure, the works of Plato, and he is its ultimate master.[1] Yet within his works, the Dialogues, it is not Plato but his teacher Socrates who originates and maintains the theory.

To us, at a distance, it had always seemed amazing that people never tired of imputing to you a negative attitude toward the history of previous thinking, while in fact you strive only for an original appropriation. Whose success can and should be disputed. Hertz *On est pris entre deux feux*. But such a characterization would say both too little and too much. In other words, his reading of Plato will often be criticized on purely philological grounds. The avowed goal of his interpretation is not accurately to represent and thereby retrieve the past, but to reawaken future possibilities for thought that remain unsaid in the texts of the past. By identifying Plato with Platonism and the metaphysics of presence, Heidegger was able to make Plato a chapter in his history of being and transform Plato into his mere opposite, against which he could define himself. The present critique of Heidegger can therefore be characterized as a Heideggerian critique: Neither Heideggerianism nor anti-Heideggerianism is worthy of the task of thinking. These observations explain the plan of the present book. The texts to be considered in this part therefore make only passing and often cryptic reference to Plato. That might seem to put them outside the aim of the present book. There are also in these later texts indications of surprising affinities between Plato and Heidegger, which, if pursued, could have led Heidegger in a very different direction. Heidegger himself, as will be seen, expressed during the s a desire to read Plato anew and to rework in particular his course on the Sophist. Heidegger never followed through on this desire, and the general goal of part 3 is to show what was thereby lost. Because key texts have not been published until fairly recently, such an examination was for a long time impossible. The books by H. Boutot, and even S. Rosen which has such an assessment as at least part of its aim fall far short for the simple reason that the most important Heideggerian texts were not yet published at the time they were written. The mentioned Sophist course, the only text in which Heidegger interprets a Platonic dialogue at length, was not published until GA If this important course has itself been largely neglected in the literature, that is in part because it was not translated into English until ET. Furthermore, the course contains an extraordinary reading of the Theaetetus that Heidegger completely drops from the essay and that all subsequent scholars, following suit, have simply ignored. The critique carried out in the Sophist course cannot be fully understood without the context of other courses from the s, also published only recently. One very important course on Aristotle that immediately preceded the Sophist course and was billed by Heidegger as preparation for it was published as recently as GA *Toward Dialogue HPD* , makes some useful contributions that will be cited in the course of this book. There is nothing wrong with a critique that focuses exclusively on hermeneutical principles: The point is only that it cannot go far enough. Though he does not explicitly assert this, Hyland must apparently assume that the reason is a purely contingent one: A critique of this misreading of Plato therefore cannot avoid being a critique of the thought that needs this misreading. In the ways indicated, then, the present book covers new ground and therefore asks to be excused for adding to the already huge literature devoted to either Heidegger or Plato. With what success the book traverses this often perilous ground is left to the reader to decide.

6: Scientific Method (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Learn exactly what happened in this chapter, scene, or section of Plato (c. c. B.C.) and what it means. Perfect for acing essays, tests, and quizzes, as well as for writing lesson plans. An Easier Way to Study Hard.

Share via Print Our solar system might have once ejected a giant planet that now wanders among the stars, much like the lonely world illustrated here. Crater-ridden surfaces, misaligned planetary orbits and streams of interplanetary debris are the cosmic equivalents of blood spatters on the wall and skid marks from a getaway car. These and other clues tell of a chaotic beginning for our planetary family. Buried in those clues are hints of a lost sibling: Today, the outer solar system is dominated by four giant worlds: Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune. Beyond them lies the Kuiper belt, a field of icy debris that counts Pluto among its residents. The early migration of the giant planets is recorded in the way that debris clumps together in the Kuiper belt, a ring of icy objects illustrated here that encircles the orbit of Neptune. Using complex computer simulations, researchers had assembled a narrative in which the infant planets formed relatively close together and then jockeyed for position, alternately gliding and leaping from one orbit to another. Those simulations explained many of the minute details about how the planets, asteroids and comets orbit the sun today. Except there was one problem. But a fifth giant planet, many researchers suspect, could be the hero that this mystery needs, and a critical missing player in the history of the solar system. A phantom planet To re-create these ancient scenes, astronomers rely on computer simulations to generate thousands of different solar systems in thousands of different ways. In lines of code, they lay out the laws of physics and the starting lineup of any planetary arrangement they can imagine. The researcher sets the stage—drop a planet here, sprinkle some asteroids there—then steps back and lets simulated nature take its course. After a couple of weeks in the real world—in which millions of years play out in the simulation—the astronomer peeks inside to see how the solar system turned out. The closer it is to the real thing, the better. He was playing around with virtual solar systems, trying to figure out a way to save virtual Uranus and virtual Neptune from a one-way trip into virtual deep space. The problem was Jupiter. The giant planet is a bully, whose gravity can reach far and wide to push around smaller worlds and assorted debris. In the most successful simulations of the time, Jupiter and one of the two outermost planets ricocheted off each other and eventually settled into their modern orbits. But that only occurred about one percent of the time. In the other 99 percent of cases, Jupiter flung Uranus or Neptune so hard that they left the solar system, never to return. So he kept tinkering. After a year of trying countless different scenarios, he started playing with the idea of adding martyr worlds: The best scenario—the one that reproduced a solar system that most closely resembles the real one—was one with an extra planet that lived between the original orbits of Saturn and Uranus. The world was roughly as massive as Uranus and Neptune, or about 16 times as massive as Earth. In a computer simulation, the orbits changed slowly for the first few million years, then a close encounter between Saturn green and an extra planet purple leads the orbits to jump and wobble. The dashed lines mark the modern sizes of the orbits. Repeated simulations of this setup worked only about five percent of the time. But it was a significant improvement over the one-percent success rate of simulations that included only the four giant planets we know and love today. Turns out, the planets left behind plenty of battle scars from their youth for planetary detectives to try to interpret. This realization was quite recent, though. For most of history, stargazers assumed that the planets had always followed their existing orbits. But in the early s, researchers realized that something was amiss in this scenario. Just past the orbit of Neptune lies the Kuiper belt, a splash of icy debris encircling the sun. The arrangement of the Kuiper belt objects led researchers to an inescapable conclusion: Neptune had to have formed closer to the sun than it is today. Many of the objects in the Kuiper belt clump together in concentric orbits, vaguely resembling the grooves in a record. It and a couple hundred of its known companions go around the sun exactly twice for every three trips that Neptune makes. If, however, Neptune formed closer to the sun and then moseyed outward, its gravity would have acted like a net, trapping nearby interplanetary debris in these special orbits and bringing it along for the ride. This simulation shows how a compact configuration for the outer planets left might evolve over time. Jupiter and Saturn sync their orbits middle , which causes the orbits of all the planets

to change. In this particular run, Uranus and Neptune swap places. Over time, right debris scatters, some of it settling in the Kuiper belt, as the planets head toward their modern orbits. This matched what some simulations hinted at the decade before. Planet formation was a messy business that left debris scattered all over the solar system. Since every action has an equal and opposite reaction, each time Neptune nudged a fragment, the planet would have been pushed in the opposite direction. Over time Neptune would have crawled slowly away from the sun. After all, Jupiter, Saturn and Uranus were plowing through the same field of debris and dealing with similar gravitational interactions. If Neptune moved, then all the giant planets had to have moved. The giant planets instead travel on orbits that are slightly elongated and askew. Jumping Jupiter By , researchers had uncovered a culprit. The most likely source seemed to be a series of close encounters between Saturn and either Uranus or Neptune a. As the wayward world approached, its gravity pulled back on Jupiter, slowing down the giant planet and dropping it to a lower orbit. But Jupiter pulled on the encroaching planet just as hard. The ice giant, being much lighter, sped up far more than Jupiter slowed down, redirecting it away from the sun. This altercation was like a gravitational wallop to the solar system. Jupiter jumped inward while the rest of the outer planets leaped outward. This kick would have contorted the orbits of the giant planets into their modern poses. It also would have saved the inner solar system—Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars and the asteroid belt—from being messed up by prolonged gravitational meddling from both Jupiter and Saturn, another problem that had arisen in earlier simulations. Which brings us to the removal of Uranus or Neptune. He reasoned that this supposed planet, on its way out of the solar system, would have messed up a part of the Kuiper belt known as the cold classical belt. If the Kuiper belt were a donut, Batygin says, the cold classical belt would be the chocolate filling—a family of objects whose orbits lie nearly flat within the Kuiper belt. A passing planet should have stirred up those orbits, or so Batygin and colleagues thought. Their computer simulations showed that it did no such thing. To their surprise, an ejected planet would not have destroyed the cold classical belt. Could this planet have left a more direct signature? Or back to the crime scene analogy, are there any skid marks? Its origin is a bit of a mystery. Simulations showed that the gravitational kick that made Jupiter jump and tossed out the extra planet would have happened at the right time to whack Neptune as well. In recent years, astronomers have found a handful of rogue planets adrift between the stars, most likely ejected from their homes. And those are just the ones as large as Jupiter. Our rogue was likely smaller, about the size of Neptune, and we have no idea how many of those are roaming the galaxy. But we do know that the universe tends to favor small things over large things. Plus astronomers have discovered thousands of planetary systems in the Milky Way, and many of them show signs of dustups far more dramatic than our own. Sign up for the newsletter.

7: Works by Francisco J. Gonzalez - PhilPapers

Plato's allegory of the cave is one of the best-known, most insightful attempts to explain the nature of reality. The cave represents the state of most human beings, and the tale of a dramatic.

Overview and organizing themes This entry could have been given the title Scientific Methods and gone on to fill volumes, or it could have been extremely short, consisting of a brief summary rejection of the idea that there is any such thing as a unique Scientific Method at all. Both unhappy prospects are due to the fact that scientific activity varies so much across disciplines, times, places, and scientists that any account which manages to unify it all will either consist of overwhelming descriptive detail, or trivial generalizations. The choice of scope for the present entry is more optimistic, taking a cue from the recent movement in philosophy of science toward a greater attention to practice: To some extent, different scientists at different times and places can be said to be using the same method even though, in practice, the details are different. For most of the history of scientific methodology the assumption has been that the most important output of science is knowledge and so the aim of methodology should be to discover those methods by which scientific knowledge is generated. Science was seen to embody the most successful form of reasoning but which form? Section 2 surveys some of the history, pointing to two major themes. One theme is seeking the right balance between observation and reasoning and the attendant forms of reasoning which employ them ; the other is how certain scientific knowledge is or can be. Section 3 turns to 20th century debates on scientific method. In the second half of the 20th century the epistemic privilege of science faced several challenges and many philosophers of science abandoned the reconstruction of the logic of scientific method. Views changed significantly regarding which functions of science ought to be captured and why. For some, the success of science was better identified with social or cultural features. Historical and sociological turns in the philosophy of science were made, with a demand that greater attention be paid to the non-epistemic aspects of science, such as sociological, institutional, material, and political factors. Even outside of those movements there was an increased specialization in the philosophy of science, with more and more focus on specific fields within science. The combined upshot was very few philosophers arguing any longer for a grand unified methodology of science. Sections 3 and 4 surveys the main positions on scientific method in 20th century philosophy of science, focusing on where they differ in their preference for confirmation or falsification or for waiving the idea of a special scientific method altogether. In recent decades, attention has primarily been paid to scientific activities traditionally falling under the rubric of method, such as experimental design and general laboratory practice, the use of statistics, the construction and use of models and diagrams, interdisciplinary collaboration, and science communication. Sections 4â€”6 attempt to construct a map of the current domains of the study of methods in science. As these sections illustrate, the question of method is still central to the discourse about science. Scientific method remains a topic for education, for science policy, and among scientists. It arises in the public domain where the demarcation of science is at issue. Some philosophers have recently returned, therefore, to the question of what it is that makes science a unique cultural product. This entry will close with some of these recent attempts at discerning and encapsulating the activities by which scientific knowledge is achieved. Aristotle to Mill Attempting a history of scientific method compounds the vast scope of the topic. This section briefly surveys the background to modern methodological debates. What can be called the classical view goes back to antiquity, and represents a point of departure for later divergences. Perhaps the most serious inhibition to the emergence of the history of theories of scientific method as a respectable area of study has been the tendency to conflate it with the general history of epistemology, thereby assuming that the narrative categories and classificatory pigeon-holes applied to the latter are also basic to the former. Histories of theories of method would naturally employ the same narrative categories and classificatory pigeon holes. An important theme of the history of epistemology, for example, is the unification of knowledge, a theme reflected in the question of the unification of method in science. Those who have identified differences in kinds of knowledge have often likewise identified different methods for achieving that kind of knowledge see the entry on the unity of science. Related to the diversities of what is known, and how, are differences over

what can be known. E distinguished the realms of things into the visible and the intelligible. Only the latter, the Forms, could be objects of knowledge. The intelligible truths could be known with the certainty of geometry and deductive reasoning. What could be observed of the material world, however, was by definition imperfect and deceptive, not ideal. The Platonic way of knowledge therefore emphasized reasoning as a method, downplaying the importance of observation. E disagreed, locating the Forms in the natural world as the fundamental principles to be discovered through the inquiry into nature. Aristotle is recognized as giving the earliest systematic treatise on the nature of scientific inquiry in the western tradition, one which embraced observation and reasoning about the natural world. In the *Prior and Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle reflects first on the aims and then the methods of inquiry into nature. A number of features can be found which are still considered by most to be essential to science. For Aristotle, empiricism, careful observation but passive observation, not controlled experiment, is the starting point, though the aim is not merely recording of facts. The aims of discovery, ordering, and display of facts partly determine the methods required of successful scientific inquiry. Also determinant is the nature of the knowledge being sought, and the explanatory causes proper to that kind of knowledge see the discussion of the four causes in the entry on Aristotle on causality. In addition to careful observation, then, scientific method requires a logic as a system of reasoning for properly arranging, but also inferring beyond, what is known by observation. Methods of reasoning may include induction, prediction, or analogy, among others. In the *Organon* reasoning is divided primarily into two forms, a rough division which persists into modern times. The basic aim and method of inquiry identified here can be seen as a theme running throughout the next two millennia of reflection on the correct way to seek after knowledge: The Aristotelian corpus provided the framework for a commentary tradition on scientific method independent of the science itself its physics and cosmos. In analysis, a phenomena was examined to discover its basic explanatory principles; in synthesis, explanations of a phenomena were constructed from first principles. During the Scientific Revolution these various strands of argument, experiment, and reason were forged into a dominant epistemic authority. The 16th–18th centuries were a period of not only dramatic advance in knowledge about the operation of the natural world—advances in mechanical, medical, biological, political, economic explanations—but also of self-awareness of the revolutionary changes taking place, and intense reflection on the source and legitimation of the method by which the advances were made. The struggle to establish the new authority included methodological moves. The *Book of Nature*, according to the metaphor of Galileo Galilei or Francis Bacon, was written in the language of mathematics, of geometry and number. This motivated an emphasis on mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important aspects of scientific method. Through figures such as Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, a neo-Platonic emphasis on the importance of metaphysical reflection on nature behind appearances, particularly regarding the spiritual as a complement to the purely mechanical, remained an important methodological thread of the Scientific Revolution see the entries on Cambridge platonists; Boyle; Henry More; Galileo. In *Novum Organum*, Bacon was critical of the Aristotelian method for proceeding too quickly and leaping from particulars to universals, largely as dictated by the syllogistic form of reasoning which regularly mixed those two types of propositions. Bacon aimed at the invention of new arts, of principles, of designations and directions for works. The community of scientists could then climb, by a careful, gradual and unbroken ascent, to reliable general claims. Whewell would later criticize Bacon in his *System of Logic* for paying too little attention to the practices of scientists. It is to Isaac Newton, however, that historians of science and methodologists have paid the greatest attention, by far. Given the enormous success of his *Principia Mathematica* and *Opticks*, this is understandable. This was viewed mainly on the continent as insufficient for proper natural philosophy. The *Regulae* counter this objection, re-defining the aims of natural philosophy by re-defining the method natural philosophers should follow. No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena. Therefore, the causes assigned to natural effects of the same kind must be, so far as possible, the same. Those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted and that belong to all bodies on which experiments can be made should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally. In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses,

until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. The scientist was not to invent systems but infer explanations from observations, as Bacon had advocated. This would come to be known as inductivism. In the century after Newton, significant clarifications of the Newtonian method were made. Colin Maclaurin ¹⁷, for instance, reconstructed the essential structure of the method as having complementary analysis and synthesis phases, one proceeding away from the phenomena in generalization, the other from the general propositions to derive explanations of new phenomena. The emphasis was often the same, as much on the character of the scientist as on their process, a character which is still commonly assumed. The scientist is humble in the face of nature, not beholden to dogma, obeys only his eyes, and follows the truth wherever it leads. It was certainly Voltaire ¹⁸ and du Chatelet ¹⁹ who were most influential in propagating the latter vision of the scientist and their craft, with Newton as hero. Scientific method became a revolutionary force of the Enlightenment. See also the entries on Newton , Leibniz , Descartes , Boyle , Hume , enlightenment , as well as Shank for a historical overview. Not all 18th century reflections on scientific method were so celebratory. Both Hume and Kant influenced the methodological reflections of the next century, such as the debate between Mill and Whewell over the certainty of inductive inferences in science. The debate between John Stuart Mill ²⁰ and William Whewell ²¹ has become the canonical methodological debate of the 19th century. Although often characterized as a debate between inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism, the role of the two methods on each side is actually more complex. On the hypothetico-deductive account, scientists work to come up with hypotheses from which true observational consequences can be deduced²²hence, hypothetico-deductive. Because Whewell emphasizes both hypotheses and deduction in his account of method, he can be seen as a convenient foil to the inductivism of Mill. Knowledge is a product of the objective what we see in the world around us and subjective the contributions of our mind to how we perceive and understand what we experience, which he called the Fundamental Ideas. Both elements are essential according to Whewell, and he was therefore critical of Kant for too much focus on the subjective, and John Locke ²³ and Mill for too much focus on the senses. An idea can be fundamental even if it is necessary for knowledge only within a given scientific discipline e. This distinguishes fundamental ideas from the forms and categories of intuition of Kant. Clarifying fundamental ideas is therefore an essential part of scientific method and scientific progress. The subjective plays a role through what Whewell calls the Colligation of Facts, a creative act of the scientist, the invention of a theory. A theory is then confirmed by testing, where more facts are brought under the theory, called the Consilience of Inductions. Whewell felt that this was the method by which the true laws of nature could be discovered: Down-playing the discovery phase would come to characterize methodology of the early 20th century see section 3. Mill, in his System of Logic, puts forward instead a narrower view of induction as the essence of scientific method. For Mill, induction is the search first for regularities among events. Among those regularities, some will continue to hold for further observations, eventually gaining the status of laws. One can also look for regularities among the laws discovered in one domain, i. These five methods look for circumstances which are common among the phenomena of interest, those which are absent when the phenomena are, or those for which both vary together. The methods advocated by Whewell and Mill, in the end, look similar. Both involve induction and generalization to covering laws. They differ dramatically, however, with respect to the necessity of the knowledge arrived at; that is, at the meta-methodological level see the entries on Whewell and Mill entries.

8: Allegory of the Cave by Plato - Summary and Meaning

Jumping to Conclusions (also known as: hasty conclusion, hasty decision, leaping to conclusions, specificity)

Description: Drawing a conclusion without taking the needed time to reason through the argument.

Synopsis of the Republic a. Socrates speaks to Cephalus about old age, the benefits of being wealthy, and justice ed. One would not claim that it is just to return weapons one owes to a mad friend c, thus justice is not being truthful and returning what one owes as Cephalus claims. The discussion between Socrates and Polemarchus follows db. So in what context is this the case? Thus, we may treat those whom we only think are our friends or enemies well or badly. Would this be justice? Discussion between Socrates and Thrasymachus follows bc. Thrasymachus defines justice as the advantage or what is beneficial to the stronger c. Justice is different under different political regimes according to the laws, which are made to serve the interests of the strong the ruling class in each regime, ea. Socrates requires clarification of the definition: Thrasymachus points out that the stronger are really only those who do not make mistakes as to what is to their advantage d. Socrates responds with a discussion of art or craft and points out that its aim is to do what is good for its subjects, not what is good for the practitioner c. Thrasymachus suggests that some arts, such as that of shepherds, do not do this but rather aim at the advantage of the practitioner c. He also adds the claim that injustice is in every way better than justice and that the unjust person who commits injustice undetected is always happier than the just person ec. The paradigm of the happy unjust person is the tyrant who is able to satisfy all his desires a-b. Socrates claims that the best rulers are reluctant to rule but do so out of necessity: Socrates offers three argument in favor of the just life over the unjust life: Socrates is dissatisfied with the discussion since an adequate account of justice is necessary before they can address whether the just life is better than the unjust life b. Book II Glaucon is not persuaded by the arguments in the previous discussion a. He divides good things into three classes: Socrates places justice in the class of things good in themselves and for their consequences. Glaucon gives a speech defending injustice: Socrates is asked to defend justice for itself, not for the reputation it allows for b. He proposes to look for justice in the city first and then to proceed by analogy to find justice in the individual ca. This approach will allow for a clearer judgment on the question of whether the just person is happier than the unjust person. Socrates begins by discussing the origins of political life and constructs a just city in speech that satisfies only basic human necessities bc. Socrates argues that humans enter political life since each is not self-sufficient by nature. Each human has certain natural abilities a and doing only the single job one is naturally suited for, is the most efficient way to satisfy the needs of all the citizens c. Socrates points out that the luxurious city will require an army to guard the city e. The army will be composed of professional soldiers, the guardians, who, like dogs, must be gentle to fellow citizens and harsh to enemies c. Poetry and stories need to be censored to guarantee such an education b. Book III Socrates continues the political measures of the censorship of poetry: Socrates moves on to discuss the manner in which stories should be told d. He divides such manners into simple narration in third person and imitative narration in first person, d. To keep the guardians doing only their job, Socrates argues that the guardians may imitate only what is appropriate for this ed. The just city should allow only modes and rhythms that fit the content of poetry allowed in the just city bc. Socrates explains how good art can lead to the formation of good character and make people more likely to follow their reason ec. Socrates turns to the physical education of the guardians and says that it should include physical training that prepares them for war, a careful diet, and habits that contribute to the avoidance of doctors cb. Physical education should be geared to benefit the soul rather than the body, since the body necessarily benefits when the soul is in a good condition, whereas the soul does not necessarily benefit when the body is in a good condition b-c. Socrates begins to describe how the rulers of the just city are to be selected from the class of the guardians: Socrates suggests that they need to tell the citizens a myth that should be believed by subsequent generations in order for everyone to accept his position in the city bd. The myth of metals portrays each human as having a precious metal in them: Socrates proceeds to discuss the living and housing conditions of the guardians: Book IV Adeimantus complains that the guardians in the just city will not be very happy a. Socrates points out that

the aim is to make the whole city, and not any particular class, as happy as possible b. Socrates discusses several other measures for the city as a whole in order to accomplish this. There should be neither too much wealth nor too much poverty in the city since these cause social strife da. The just city should be only as large in size as would permit it to be unified and stable b. He suggests that they should only allow very limited ways by which innovations may be introduced to education or change in the laws be. The just city will follow traditional Greek religious customs b. With the founding of the just city completed, Socrates proceeds to discuss justice d. He claims that the city they have founded is completely good and virtuous and thus it is wise, courageous, moderate, and just e. Justice will be what remains once they find the other three virtues in it, namely wisdom, courage, and moderation a. The wisdom of the just city is found in its rulers and it is the type of knowledge that allows them to rule the city well b-d. The courage of the just city is found in its military and it is correct and lawful belief about what to fear and what not to fear ab. Socrates then proceeds to find the corresponding four virtues in the individual d. Socrates defends the analogy of the city and the individual a-b and proceeds to distinguish three analogous parts in the soul with their natural functions b. By using instances of psychological conflict, he distinguishes the function of the rational part from that of the appetitive part of the soul a. Then he distinguishes the function of the spirited part from the functions of the two other parts ee. The function of the rational part is thinking, that of the spirited part the experience of emotions, and that of the appetitive part the pursuit of bodily desires. Socrates points out that one is just when each of the three parts of the soul performs its function d. Socrates is now ready to answer the question of whether justice is more profitable than injustice that goes unpunished ea. To do so he will need to examine the various unjust political regimes and the corresponding unjust individuals in each c-e. Book V Socrates is about to embark on a discussion of the unjust political regimes and the corresponding unjust individuals when he is interrupted by Adeimantus and Polemarchus a-b. They insist that he needs to address the comment he made earlier that the guardians will possess the women and the children of the city in common b-d. Socrates reluctantly agrees ab and begins with the suggestion that the guardian women should perform the same job as the male guardians c-d. Some may follow convention and object that women should be given different jobs because they differ from men by nature a-c. Socrates responds by indicating that the natural differences between men and women are not relevant when it comes to the jobs of protecting and ruling the city. Both sexes are naturally suited for these tasks d-e. Socrates goes on to argue that the measure of allowing the women to perform the same tasks as the men in this way is not only feasible but also best. This is the case since the most suited people for the job will be performing it c. Socrates also proposes that there should be no separate families among the members of the guardian class: Socrates proceeds to discuss how this measure is for the best and Glaucon allows him to skip discussing its feasibility a-c. The best guardian men are to have sex with the best guardian women to produce offspring of a similar nature dd. Socrates describes the system of eugenics in more detail. In order to guarantee that the best guardian men have sex with the best guardian women, the city will have marriage festivals supported by a rigged lottery system ea. The best guardian men will also be allowed to have sex with as many women as they desire in order to increase the likelihood of giving birth to children with similar natures a-b. Once born, the children will be taken away to a rearing pen to be taken care of by nurses and the parents will not be allowed to know who their own children are c-d. This is so that the parents think of all the children as their own. Socrates recognizes that this system will result in members of the same family having intercourse with each other c-e. Socrates proceeds to argue that these arrangements will ensure that unity spreads throughout the city ad. Thereafter, Socrates discusses how the guardians will conduct war e. Glaucon interrupts him and demands an account explaining how such a just city can come into being c-e. Socrates admits that this is the most difficult criticism to address a. Then he explains that the theoretical model of the just city they constructed remains valid for discussing justice and injustice even if they cannot prove that such a city can come to exist bb. Socrates claims that the model of the just city cannot come into being until philosophers rule as kings or kings become philosophers c-d. He also points out that this is the only possible route by which to reach complete happiness in both public and private life e. Socrates indicates that they to, discuss philosophy and philosophers to justify these claims b-c. Philosophers love and pursue all of wisdom b-c and they especially love the sight of truth e. Philosophers are the only ones who recognize and

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find pleasure in what is behind the multiplicity of appearances, namely the single Form a-b. Socrates distinguishes between those who know the single Forms that are and those who have opinions d. Those who have opinions do not know, since opinions have becoming and changing appearances as their object, whereas knowledge implies that the objects thereof are stable ee. Book VI Socrates goes on to explain why philosophers should rule the city. They should do so since they are better able to know the truth and since they have the relevant practical knowledge by which to rule. Adeimantus objects that actual philosophers are either useless or bad people a-d. Socrates responds with the analogy of the ship of state to show that philosophers are falsely blamed for their uselessness ea. Like a doctor who does not beg patients to heal them, the philosopher should not plead with people to rule them b-c. Thus, someone can only be a philosopher in the true sense if he receives the proper kind of education.

9: Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue By Francisco J. Gonzalez

The 'Allegory Of The Cave' is a theory put forward by Plato, concerning human www.enganchecubano.com claimed that knowledge gained through the senses is no more than opinion and that, in order to have real knowledge, we must gain it through philosophical reasoning.

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