

1: Internal conflict in Myanmar - Wikipedia

Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion (Nick Cheesman and Nicholas Farrelly*, eds.) is the most recent output of the continuing Myanmar Update (formerly Burma Update) conference series run by Australia National University. The volume offers seventeen chapters written by native Myanmar and non.

The volume offers seventeen chapters written by native Myanmar and non-Myanmar scholars selected from the participants at Myanmar Update. War, Politics, Religion joins a array of edited volumes that have appeared in the past few years. Mikaela Gravers and Flemming Ytzen, eds. Edited volumes are useful in terms of providing readers a survey of perspectives on a topic that exemplify the state of scholarship at a particular moment in time. In addition, they allow audiences to note issues deemed to be significant by experts in the field. War, Politics, Religion fulfils both these functions, with the chapters serving as a representation of empirical research on major Myanmar conflicts. As a result, it offers appeal to Myanmar scholars intent on staying abreast of events in the country as well as broader audiences seeking to learn more about the forces affecting Myanmar government and society. Edited volumes are not without challenges. Projects involving multiple authors are vulnerable to two major issues: In responding to the issue of incoherence, Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion follows the approach of other edited volumes by applying a thematic focus that ties its chapters to a common concern. This provides a framework that places the chapters as differing perspectives on the topic of conflict in Myanmar. It is with respect to the issue of quality, however, that Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion is perhaps distinguished from other edited works covering Myanmar. As an outcome of Myanmar Update, the book ties to an ongoing series of conferences that follow an underlying strategy of nurturing scholarship, both for Myanmar as an academic field of inquiry and for Myanmar academics as scholars of standing in global academia. As a consequence, since its origin in Myanmar Update has accumulated a body of work spanning scholars inside and outside the country able to conduct research of increasing rigor and insight. War, Politics, Religion carries the Myanmar Update tradition, with its assembly of contributions constituting a body of empirical studies informed by field work, such that the chapters display an in-depth understanding arising from the immersive experiences of their authors in Myanmar. There are possible areas of improvement that should be observed for similar compilations on Myanmar in the future. First, there is a question of internal consistency, in that Myanmar Update ostensibly has a goal of encouraging native Myanmar scholars as a means of capacity-building for an endemic scholarly community seeking to connect to international academia. War, Politics, Religion contains four chapters that were authored or co-authored by native Myanmar scholars. This compares with six chapters involving Myanmar scholars in the Myanmar Update volume, Debating Democratisation in Myanmar, and two in the Ruling Myanmar: From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections. Second, empirical studies by their nature are tied to observations and interpretations of real-world phenomenon. This is useful for identifying and understanding what is happening in a place like Myanmar, but it risks placement of Myanmar scholarship within the confines of descriptive studies. The growth of research on Myanmar into a dedicated field of Myanmar Studies calls for an enrichment in perspectives that can be facilitated by greater engagement with theory. More connection with theory would provide greater integration for Myanmar scholarship into concurrent work in international and comparative studies being done in the law and social sciences, both in terms of potentially deepening analysis of the country as well as offering opportunities for interventions into existing theoretical literature in law and social sciences. The integration of empirical and theoretical approaches require lengthier exposition than possible within the confines of a chapter in Conflict in Myanmar: In sum, Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion is a useful ensemble of works that can inform readers and enrich other studies of Myanmar. It serves as a model for other edited volumes on Myanmar in terms of empirical research, thematic organization, and scholarly quality. As such, it should be seen as a necessary addition in any library seeking to promote Myanmar Studies as a field, and as a valuable addition to anyone seeking to improve their understanding of a country still in the process of re-engaging with the world.

2: Religion and Conflict - Luc Reyckler

"Conflict in Myanmar is a timely collection of first-rate essays, looking in-depth at the dynamics of war and peace, identity, religion, and nationalism that are re-fashioning the country today. The old Myanmar story of dictators versus democrats is quickly fading.

Religion and Violence 1. Religious Wars Since the awakening of religion, wars have been fought in the name of different gods and goddesses. Still today most violent conflicts contain religious elements linked up with ethno-national, inter-state, economic, territorial, cultural and other issues. Threatening the meaning of life, conflicts based on religion tend to become dogged, tenacious and brutal types of wars. When conflicts are couched in religious terms, they become transformed in value conflicts. Unlike other issues, such as resource conflicts which can be resolved by pragmatic and distributive means, value conflicts have a tendency to become mutually conclusive or zero-sum issues. They entail strong judgments of what is right and wrong, and parties believe that there cannot be a common ground to resolve their differences. Religious conviction is, as it has ever been, a source of conflict within and between communities. It should, however, be remembered that it was not religion that has made the twentieth the most bloody century. Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao Tse-tung, Pol Pot and their apprentices in Rwanda maimed and murdered millions of people on a unprecedented scale, in the name of a policy which rejected religious or other transcendent reference points for judging its purposes and practices Weigel, Those policies were based on an ideology having the same characteristics as a religion. In a world where many governments and international organizations are suffering from a legitimacy deficit, one can expect a growing impact of religious discourses on international politics. Religion is a major source of soft power. It will, to a greater extent, be used or misused by religions and governmental organizations to pursue their interests. It is therefore important to develop a more profound understanding of the basic assumption underlying the different religions and the ways in which people adhering to them see their interests. It would also be very useful to identify elements of communality between the major religions. The major challenge of religious organizations remains to end existing and prevent new religious conflicts. In Europe there were only two: Yugoslavia and Northern Ireland. No religious wars were registered in the Americas See Table 2. These wars could be further classified by distinguishing violent conflicts within and between religions and between religious organizations and the central government. In Europe, Bosnian Muslims have, for more than two years, been brutally harried by Serbs who are called Christians. Northern Ireland Catholic vs. Philippines Mindanao Muslims vs. Bangladesh Buddhists vs. Lebanon Shiites supported by Syria Amal vs. Shiites supported by Iran Hezbollah 7. Ethiopia Oromo Muslims vs. India Punjab Sikhs vs. Mali-Tuareg Nomads Muslims vs. Azerbaijan Muslims vs. India Kashmir Muslims vs. Central government Hindu Indonesia Aceh Muslims vs. Central government Muslim Iraq Sunnites vs. Yugoslavia Croatia Serbian orthodox Christians vs. Roman Catholic Christians Yugoslavia Bosnia Orthodox Christians vs. Afghanistan Fundamentalist Muslims vs. Tadjikistan Muslims vs. Egypt Muslims vs. Central government Muslim Muslims vs. Tunisia Muslims vs. Algeria Muslims vs. Uzbekistan Sunite Uzbeks vs. India Uttar- Pradesh Hindus vs. Sri Lanka Hindus vs. Islam, as Samuel Huntington has put it, has bloody borders Huntington, It was Huntington who recently provided the intellectual framework to pay more attention to the coming clash of civilizations. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most importantly, religion. He expects more conflicts along the cultural-religious fault lines because 1 those differences have always generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts; 2 because the world is becoming a smaller place, and the increasing interactions will intensify the civilization- consciousness of the people which in turn invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep in history; 3 because of the weakening of the nation-state as a source of identity and the desecularisation of the world with the revival of religion as basis of identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations; 4 because of the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at the peak of its power. At the same time, it is confronted with an increasing desire by elites in other parts of the world to shape the world in non-Western ways; 5 because cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily

compromised and resolved than political and economic ones; 6 finally, because increasing economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. It is the correlation with other integrating or disintegrating pressures which will determine the dynamics of a conflict. There is a need for a more sophisticated typology. For each conflict in which religion is involved, a cross-impact analysis is necessary of at least six variables which together could reinforce a constructive or a destructive conflict dynamic See the Figure 1. Low-Intensity Violence To further their interests religious organizations make also use of low-scale violence, political repression and terrorism. Salmon Rushdie or Taslima Nasrin in Bangladesh were forced into hiding from Muslim fundamentalists who want to punish them with death. Each religion has its fanatic religious fundamentalists. The Kach Party, which was led by Rabbi Meir Kahane until his death in November, used tactics of abusing and physically attacking Palestinians. Kahane believed in a perpetual war and preached intolerance against the Arabs. Christian fundamentalists in the US cater a "Manifest Theology", a fundamentally Manichean worldview in which "we" are right, and all civil and aggressive intentions are projected to "them" Galtung, Structural Violence Several religious organizations also support structural violence by endorsing a centralized and authoritarian decision-making structure and the repression of egalitarian forces. Churches have sympathized with authoritarian government. The concord of the Vatican with Portugal in 1941, the agreement with Franco in 1941, and the support of authoritarian regimes in Latin-America were clear statements. Recently, the Vatican disapproved the candidacy of Aristide for President in Haiti. On the contrary, it recognized the military regime. Cultural Violence One of the major contributions of Johan Galtung to the understanding of violence is his exposure of cultural violence or the ways and means to approve or legitimize direct and indirect violence. Cultural violence could take the form of distinguishing the chosen from the unchosen, or the upper-classes being closer to God and possessing special rights from the lower classes. John Paul II, opening the Santo Domingo meetings, warned the Latin American bishops to defend the faithful from the "rapacious wolves" of Protestant sects. His language dealt a blow to 20 years of ecumenical efforts Stewart-Gambino, Cultural violence declares certain wars as just and others as unjust, as holy or unholy wars. In July 1945, Kurt Waldheim was awarded a papal knighthood of the Ordine Piano for safeguarding human rights when he served with the United Nations. His services in the Balkans for the Nazis were seemingly forgiven. Both were made religious role models. It is clear that the causes of religious wars and other religion related violence have not disappeared from the face of the earth. Some expect an increase of it. Efforts to make the world safe from religious conflicts should then also be high on the agenda. Religious actors should abstain from any cultural and structural violence within their respective organizations and handle inter-religious or denominational conflict in a non-violent and constructive way. This would imply several practical steps, such as a verifiable agreement not to use or threaten with violence to settle religious disputes. It must be possible to evaluate religious organizations objectively with respect to their use of physical, structural or cultural violence. A yearly overall report could be published. Power also corrupts religious organizations. In addition, depoliticisation of religion is a major precondition for the political integration of communities with different religions. Very important is the creation of an environment where a genuine debate is possible. Extremist rhetoric flourishes best in an environment not conducive to rational deliberation. Needless to say, extremist rhetoric is very difficult to maintain in a discursive environment in which positions taken or accusations made can be challenged directly by rebuttal, counter propositions, cross-examinations and the presentation of evidence. Without a change in the environments of public discourses within and between religious organizations, demagoguery and rhetorical intolerance will prevail. Religious Bystanders Religious organizations can also influence the conflict dynamics by abstaining from intervention. During the Second World War, the Vatican adopted a neutral stand. To secure its diplomatic interests, Rome opted for this prudence and not for an evangelical disapproval. The role of bystanders, those members of the society who are neither perpetrators nor victims, is very important. Their support, opposition, or indifference based on moral or other grounds, shapes the course of events. An expression of sympathy or antipathy of the head of the Citta del Vaticano, Pius XII, representing approximately million Catholics, could have prevented a great deal of the violence. The mobilization of the internal and external bystanders, in the face of the mistreatment of individuals or communities, is a major challenge to religious organizations. To realize this, children and

adults, in the long run, must develop certain personal characteristics such as a pro-social value orientation and empathy. Religious organizations have a major responsibility in creating a worldview in which individual needs would not be met at the expense of others and genuine conflicts would not be resolved through aggression. Fein, Peace-Building and Peace-Making Religious organizations are a rich source of peace services.

3: Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics and Religion - Myanmar Research Centre - ANU

In many deeply divided polities and war-torn societies, conflict is a normal occurrence that challenges state-building, nation-building, and peace-building efforts. The various causes of conflict are influenced by the complexity of majority-minority and center-periphery politics and the long.

The year-old from the Rohingya minority says all his relatives were shot by government troops who opened fire on the Muslims during running battles with the Buddhist Arakanese. Alam arrived at the Thae Chaung refugee camp after fleeing his home town of Kyaukphyu when several hundred houses were burned by local Buddhists. Hundreds of Muslim Rohingya people have been killed and tens of thousands displaced in recent weeks in renewed clashes with the Arakan Buddhists. But where there is conflict there are always two sides to the story. Ko Aye, 14, a Buddhist from Yaithein village, last saw his year-old friend lying on the ground, bleeding from a sword wound just below his neck. A mob had descended on his village, razing the homes of the largely Buddhist community. A state of emergency has been in place since the summer, and access to affected areas is difficult. The Guardian was denied permission to visit Yaithein village, where witnesses of the violence tell of beheadings and incinerated bodies, and where a heavy troop presence blocks accurate assessment of the magnitude of the situation. Tensions between Buddhists and Muslims have festered for decades here: Arakanese blame aggressive attempts to stamp a Burman identity on the state as reason for a fierce nationalism. The target of this has often been the Rohingya, whom both Arakanese and the government claim are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Historical references, such as a study of dialects by ethnographer Francis Buchanan which refers to the "Rooinga", are dismissed by Arakanese, and anti-Rohingya sentiments have conspired to render the group stateless: Aung Mingalar is the last surviving Muslim district in Sittwe, and in many ways embodies the dark heart of the conflict. Barbed wire barricades manned by soldiers mark the entrance to this ghetto. Few of its 8, inhabitants, mostly Rohingya, dare to leave, while Arakanese taxi drivers go only as far as the checkpoints. Aung Htay, from the Rakhine Nationalities Development party, which has 35 seats in parliament, said the aggression from Arakanese was needed to retain a hold on the state. They add to the nearly , Rohingya living stateless in Bangladesh, and countless thousands more in countries such as Malaysia and Thailand. Such is the intensity of the latest campaign that observers are debating whether ethnic cleansing is under way. Attacks from Buddhist mobs in recent weeks have widened to include Kaman Muslims, who are distinct from the Rohingya and have citizenship. Until October they had lived relatively harmoniously with the Buddhist population. Smith says that this factor, coupled with a grenade attack on a mosque in Karen state, eastern Burma, raises the possibility that a religious war is unfolding. It was nearby villages such as Yaithein that fell victim to grisly retaliatory attacks from Muslim groups. But restrictions on movement by the authorities, coupled with a climate of fear among Buddhists and Muslims, has impeded investigation of both sides of the violence. A commission set up by the government to look into the unrest has already met with obstacles. Zarganar, a popular comedian and member of the commission, lamented last month that local leaders from both sides were not co-operating in the investigation. The feeling here is that deep-seated animosities will take years to resolve. Both Arakanese and Rohingya say they have cut all contact with long-time friends from the now rival communities. In downtown Sittwe, shops that had belonged to Muslims have been appropriated by the authorities; their former owners do not risk the journey out of Aung Mingalar to work. The future of the state hangs in the balance. Past experiences with the Burmese government cast doubt on the official death toll of "it may be that the scale of the violence is far greater than outsiders have been led to believe. He has already lived as a stateless Rohingya in a country growing increasingly hostile to Muslims, and bitterness now pervades both sides. The fear now is that this conflict has gone beyond being merely one over ethnic identity.

4: Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion - New Mandala

Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing--Yusof Ishak Institute [Myanmar/Burma Update Conference Series], , xiv + pp. ISBN price: 38,99 euro. This book is based on the Myanmar/Burma Update Conference held at the Australian National.

Karen people[edit] Ethno-linguistic map of Burma. The Karen live in the southern Irrawaddy river delta and along the border with Thailand. The Karen people are one of the largest ethnic groups in Southeast Asia. The Karen constitute a population of 5 to 7 million and around twenty different Karen dialects are recognised of which Sgaw and Pwo Karen are the two most widely spoken. The term Karen was never used by the people who are referred to by the term today. The Karen are not a homogenous group. Some Karen fulfilled functions as ministers in urbanised kingdoms like the Pegu kingdom in the sixteenth century. Other Karen developed a subsistence way of living in the forests bordering Thailand and some Karen still practice this way of life. The Bama Kayin or Sgaw Karen were either absorbed into Burmese society or pushed towards the mountains bordering Thailand in the east and Southeast of Burma by the Burmese population. The hill Karen communities developed a subsistence way of life. Karen communities are religiously, linguistically, culturally separated and geographically dispersed. In the nineteenth century certain Karen hill tribes were Christianized by American missionaries. During the conquering of Burma in the nineteenth century the British made use of the existing antagonism between Burmans and Karens. Karen assisted British armies in the Anglo-Burmese wars. Through Christian education the Karen were taught English and how to read and write. Exclusion of ethnic Burmese from the army and other colonial state bodies had a big impact on Burmese resisting the colonial state. The first Karen was converted to Christianity on 16 May. The Pwo Karen had just been converted to Buddhism en masse before the arrival of the missionaries. To convert more Karen the missionaries learned Karen. Subsequently, they modernised the Karen script using the Burmese alphabet. Jonathan Wade was involved in producing dictionaries and establishing grammar rules for both the Pwo and Sgaw Karen dialects. Francis Mason published the first bible in the Sgaw Karen Language. A Pwo Karen bible was also published by reverend D. In the period - many Karen were converted to Christianity. Schools were built and through education the Christian Karen learned English. This group of Karen were thus able to improve their economic, educational and social situation. By this process the missionaries created the category of Karen and Karen history and traditions. The modernisation of the Karen script and the growth in literacy among Sgaw Karen led to a stimulation of secular Karen literature and journals. This in turn led to a Karen national consciousness. The loyalist relationship which subsequently developed between the British and these groups of Karen also stemmed from the position these Karen held within Burmese history. Never before had these hill tribe Karen developed their own kingdom or gained any political or economical influence. Aligning themselves with the British was seen as an opportunity to improve their lives. Otherwise they would apply to other missionary churches. At the same time the authority of the Burmese state in the nineteenth century pushed the Karen more towards the British. Britain did not control the whole of Burma before. In Burmese controlled territory Karen were not allowed to educate themselves at these American Baptists established schools. Many Karen were tortured and killed. The Karen who allied themselves to the British and helped them to gain total control of Burma in. At the same time Christian missionaries taught these people to be Karen and thus not Burman. The primary result of the Christianization of the Sgaw Karen is the construction of a Karen identity and their political influence over other Karen groups. Due to their improved economical and social status the Sgaw Karen were the first group of Karen to develop a feeling for a Karen nation. It was this group who created the first Karen political organisations and therefore always dominated the Karen nationalist movement and its organisation. The Karen provided important military support for the British in these Anglo-Burmese wars. In the first Anglo-Burmese war in to Karen provided guidance to British armies. Burmese authorities tried to punish the involved Karen for this. Some Karen fled to areas now occupied by the British or put up some form of resistance. After the British conquered the territory which was to be the future state of Burma the British colonial state had a hard time pacifying the country. Burmese resisted the authority

of the colonial state on a continual basis. After the Burmese capital of Mandalay was conquered by the British in the Third Anglo-Burmese War in with help of some Karen, Burmese in the southern delta started a rebellion. During this crucial period in which the British proclaimed martial law, American missionaries successfully lobbied to recruit more Karens as auxiliaries to put down Burmese rebellions throughout the colony. The success surprised the British and the missionaries proudly commented on the results. The riverplains of Burma were used for the production of agricultural products, while the hill areas surrounding these river plains were of much less economic value to the British. The colonial policy based these two political entities developed. Central Burma was governed through direct rule and the frontier area, where most ethnic minorities lived and still live was governed through indirect rule. The Karen helped to repress this rebellion. Other rebellions Christian and other Karen helped to suppress were the student strike and the general strike of Burma was not to be governed from India from that point onwards. Finally a space was created to include Burmese people into the colonial administrative and military bodies. This Christian organization trained Karen at conferences which were attended by Karen who had rarely left their village. The KNA aimed to represent all Karen regardless of language, religion or location. Pwo Buddhists resisted the efforts of Christian Karen to represent them in any political organization. In the s the Karen nationalist movement and at the same time the Burmese nationalist movement gained momentum. In a Karen flag was created, thus symbolising the Karen peoples as a nation. The colonial government appointed the inauguration day of this flag as a public holiday. The British colonial government endorsed the Karen view of their history by these event. The Karen identified themselves as the first inhabitants of Burma. A claim which has had a variation of political consequences in modern-day Burma. Running the area of what is known as Karen State practically as a government, including levying taxes. Most Karen actually lived outside KNU dominated territory in the past six decades. This fact has always been the main problem for the unification of the Karen in one Karen State. Each unit of the KNU was self-supporting. Not only the armed units, but also the hospitals and schools were self-supporting. The strength of this strategy is that it is hard to erase such a movement since it is very spread out and lacks a centre. Before the outbreak of World War II the Karen nationalist movement was moving completely opposite of the Burmese nationalist movement. The Karen were imagined to be Christian and loyal to Britain. The Burmese nationalist movement was anti-imperialist and Buddhist. Ethnic Burmans only made up This means that the recruitment of Karen per head of the population was much higher than the recruitment of Burmans. For the first time ethnic Burmans were allowed to form a political and military institute. This helped to strengthen Burmese nationalist discourse. One characteristic of the BIA is that they excluded all ethnic minorities because they were associated with the British colonial government. The first Karen battalion was only established in The Karen were of particular importance for British units for their knowledge of the jungle and their bravery. Under guidance and with support of the British a Karen resistance army was built in the eastern hills of Burma. By their numbers would reach This Karen army was trained to fight the Japanese and thus the Burmans who cooperated with them. Some British officials made promises to Karen leaders that after the war they would gain independence. These trained Karen established a resistance network with the Karen in the river delta to fight the Japanese. The Japanese discovered this and heavily punished the Karen. During the retreat of the Japanese army in December , Karen armed units were crucial in the defeat of the Japanese at Taungoo. In the Dawna Range the Karen managed to resist Japanese war efforts for a long time. The sense among Karen veterans that they deserved at least self-determination explains partly the failure of later peacetalks between the KNU and the Tatmadaw. Four hundred villages were destroyed and the violence is estimated to have resulted in as much as deaths. This event exacerbated the existing tension between ethnic Karen and ethnic Burmans, which Aung San himself tried to smooth out in later years. But the British returned to a devastated Burma. State institutions were destroyed, the agricultural sector was in ruins and there was no central authority. Burma was ruled by local warlords and a wide variation of armed groups. To merge the different factions Lord Mountbatten proposed the creation of a two wing army. One wing would consist of Burmans and the other wing of non-Burmans, both would be under the command of a British officer. Eventually the army which was established in mid in reality were two armies.

5: Myanmar: Conflict and peace | Peace Insight

As Myanmar's military adjusts to life with its former opponents holding elected office, Conflict in Myanmar showcases innovative research by a rising generation of scholars, analysts and practitioners about the past five years of political transformation.

Jonathan Liljeblad 22 May, Conflict in Myanmar: The volume offers seventeen chapters written by native Myanmar and non-Myanmar scholars selected from the participants at Myanmar Update War, Politics, Religion joins a array of edited volumes that have appeared in the past few years. Mikaela Gravers and Flemming Ytzen, eds. Edited volumes are useful in terms of providing readers a survey of perspectives on a topic that exemplify the state of scholarship at a particular moment in time. In addition, they allow audiences to note issues deemed to be significant by experts in the field. War, Politics, Religion fulfils both these functions, with the chapters serving as a representation of empirical research on major Myanmar conflicts. As a result, it offers appeal to Myanmar scholars intent on staying abreast of events in the country as well as broader audiences seeking to learn more about the forces affecting Myanmar government and society. Edited volumes are not without challenges. Projects involving multiple authors are vulnerable to two major issues: In responding to the issue of incoherence, Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion follows the approach of other edited volumes by applying a thematic focus that ties its chapters to a common concern. This provides a framework that places the chapters as differing perspectives on the topic of conflict in Myanmar. It is with respect to the issue of quality, however, that Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion is perhaps distinguished from other edited works covering Myanmar. As an outcome of Myanmar Update, the book ties to an ongoing series of conferences that follow an underlying strategy of nurturing scholarship, both for Myanmar as an academic field of inquiry and for Myanmar academics as scholars of standing in global academia. As a consequence, since its origin in Myanmar Update has accumulated a body of work spanning scholars inside and outside the country able to conduct research of increasing rigor and insight. War, Politics, Religion carries the Myanmar Update tradition, with its assembly of contributions constituting a body of empirical studies informed by field work, such that the chapters display an in-depth understanding arising from the immersive experiences of their authors in Myanmar. There are possible areas of improvement that should be observed for similar compilations on Myanmar in the future. First, there is a question of internal consistency, in that Myanmar Update ostensibly has a goal of encouraging native Myanmar scholars as a means of capacity-building for an endemic scholarly community seeking to connect to international academia. War, Politics, Religion contains four chapters that were authored or co-authored by native Myanmar scholars. This compares with six chapters involving Myanmar scholars in the Myanmar Update volume, Debating Democratisation in Myanmar, and two in the Ruling Myanmar: From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections. Second, empirical studies by their nature are tied to observations and interpretations of real-world phenomenon. This is useful for identifying and understanding what is happening in a place like Myanmar, but it risks placement of Myanmar scholarship within the confines of descriptive studies. The growth of research on Myanmar into a dedicated field of Myanmar Studies calls for an enrichment in perspectives that can be facilitated by greater engagement with theory. More connection with theory would provide greater integration for Myanmar scholarship into concurrent work in international and comparative studies being done in the law and social sciences, both in terms of potentially deepening analysis of the country as well as offering opportunities for interventions into existing theoretical literature in law and social sciences. The integration of empirical and theoretical approaches require lengthier exposition than possible within the confines of a chapter in Conflict in Myanmar: In sum, Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion is a useful ensemble of works that can inform readers and enrich other studies of Myanmar. It serves as a model for other edited volumes on Myanmar in terms of empirical research, thematic organization, and scholarly quality. As such, it should be seen as a necessary addition in any library seeking to promote Myanmar Studies as a field, and as a valuable addition to anyone seeking to improve their understanding of a country still in the process of re-engaging with the world. Nicholas Farrelly, one of the editors of the volume, is a co-founder and editor of New Mandala.

6: Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion | Din Merican: the Malaysian DJ Blogger

Get this from a library! Conflict in Myanmar: war, politics, religion. [Nicholas Farrelly; Nick Cheesman;] -- As Myanmar's military adjusts to life with its former opponents holding elected office, Conflict in Myanmar showcases innovative research by a rising generation of scholars, analysts and.

For additional information about this book <https://www.amazon.com/Conflict-Myanmar-war-politics-religion-Nicholas-Farrelly/dp/1107000000>: This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. How do they relate to border administration, and how do the security echelons operating on either side of the border perceive threats? Do these assessments come from physical, tangible elements of fear? Or do they draw from intangible and often imperceptible fear factors like religion, ethnicity, cultures, and languages of the bordering people? Since a number of scholars have delved into ethno-religious issues Siddiqui , socio-political affairs Shwe Lu Maung , and non-traditional security matters Ahmed relating to the Rohingya, in this chapter I focus on two aspects of traditional security: Drawing examples from past conflicts along the border and juxtaposing them with findings from the field I question the way borders are typically managed and the threats constructed. My experiences of past service in this borderland region with the Bangladesh Army in the early years of the twenty-first century in areas opposite north-western Rakhine State and subsequently with the Border Guards during the close of its first decade in areas west of River Naaf help me in this assessment. The discussion is in three sections. The first introduces the borders and hinterlands between Myanmar and Bangladesh and highlights their geopolitics as well as the bilateral relations between these two countries. Threat perception is introduced in the second section, where I look at the traditional ways of identifying threat by the security units and other authorities at the border. In the third section I offer a few practical recommendations in light of the study and also in light of my personal knowledge of the area and of the people whom I was lucky to have met in the recent past. This kilometre borderline west of the Arakan Yoma one of the two mountain ranges that separates the western coastal strip of Myanmar from the central plains links with River Naaf at the south for 64 kilometres as it extends into the Bay of Bengal. The international boundary runs along the mid-stream of the river, which flows through the townships of Teknaf on the Bangladesh side, and Maungdaw of Myanmar on the other. Post-independence relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh stagnated. Similarly, on the Myanmar side, state-level visits took place in , , , and also four in total, and with a similar period of abstention twenty-two years, between and The diplomatic dexterity that saw through successful negotiations in 1979 between two generals Ziaur Rahman for Bangladesh and Ne Win for Burma to affect a full repatriation of the Rohingya people who flocked to Bangladesh due to military oppression in Arakan somehow lost its impetus along the way Haque , pp. The countries have not fared better on the trade and business front either. The crisis deepened when Myanmar also initiated troop movements in Rakhine and Chin States opposite the Bangladesh border and which, in turn, triggered war-like deployments of the Bangladesh Army and Border Guards. In recent times relations between the two countries have improved. Apart from diplomatic visits at the top levels, businesspeople have been frequenting both countries relatively easily, thanks to better access due to new air routes offered by several airlines. This remains true even when the threat is misperceived and proved at a later stage to be without basis. As has been the case with incidents at the Myanmar-Bangladesh border in the past, measures taken on one side out of a perfect or imperfect understanding of threats have direct effects on perceptions of the problem on the other side, and affect countermeasures. The classical or neo-classical realist school may encourage modern nation-states to view their neighbours as the closest possible threat and to develop defence plans accordingly Lobell , pp. Threat perceptions appear to be in play behind certain actions and counteractions at the Myanmar-Bangladesh border as well. It is important that this cognitive play in decision-making is recognized and addressed accordingly Karakul and Qudrat-Ullah , p. The domestic view of threat, on the other hand, tends to regard inbound people that is, immigrants from other countries as potential sources of problems and conflict Werz and Conley , pp. Thus the borders also find a prominent place in this threat narrative. Identifiable threats along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border include social and sociopolitical threats to territory. The two countries

share a few threats – un-demarcated land boundaries and cross-border movements by insurgents, for example – where coordination and cooperation is generally easier evident by the success in maritime boundary delimitation in or in launching combined operations to support each other along the border. But some threats are more severe for one side than the other – for example, the Rohingya influx, or drug trafficking; issues that arguably affect Bangladesh more than Myanmar. In such cases, appropriate identification of the threat as well as a sympathetic understanding of the mutual value in cooperatively addressing the threat becomes important. How do the security systems of Myanmar and Bangladesh locate, and deal with, such threats? In addressing this question, the following section will draw from the recent history of conflicts in the region but will restrict itself to bilateral affairs only. Discussion of security related to any third country – for example, the growing Indo-Myanmar military relations and its attendant security impact on Bangladesh – is not included.

Threat perception in Myanmar In maintaining its western gateway with Bangladesh, Myanmar seems to employ an enhanced level of security and often resorts to unusual levels of action or counteraction, not all of which appear to be well planned. Some observers maintain that the crisis between Myanmar and Bangladesh might have been an outcome of unintended actions by Myanmar, which were followed by equally unprecedented countermoves in the form of troop deployment by Bangladesh. With such a level of investment, the region would have to enjoy increased security attention. The town of Sittwe, the Rakhine State capital, is also in the region. Sittwe has characteristics that make it an important strategic location in the eyes of any government at Naypyitaw. Firstly, it provides the main communication line through the Bay of Bengal to Maungdaw, the township nearest to the Bangladesh border where the largest number of Rohingya live. Secondly, besides its importance as a military base, Sittwe has an airport and a seaport the latter developed by India under an agreement ;8 the city is also home to the University of Sittwe, a location for potential anti-government dissent. Starting from the s, these largely indigenous movements went through an apparent lull in insurgency; however, in recent times there have been reports of fresh attempts to ignite insurgency in the state, especially by the Arakan Army AA and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation RSO. Although religion does not appear to be the key issue in this motivation, the ensuing persecution by the armed forces nonetheless affect the Buddhists and Muslims in the state alike Karim , p. The actions by the RSO, on the other hand, may be based not only on their need for self-esteem, but also to salvage their Islamic identity, which helps them stand out – perhaps also to acquire a global appeal – as they strive for equal rights alongside Buddhists. Consequently, their struggles to achieve these rights lead to religious repercussions and, since all too often such interests do not converge, put the two into conflict. With the large Rohingya population in this border area, however, Threat perceptions in the Myanmar-Bangladesh borderlands additional complications also arise. The Myanmar government and the Rakhine administration identify the Rohingya as a threat to their demographic map Ahmed ; Morshed Alongside the infamous Burma Citizenship Law of , several other discriminatory instruments – the Rakhine Action Plan ,11 for example – also have been used to target the endangered community Norwegian Burma Committee On 11 July , the Myanmar president even suggested solving the Rohingya problem by expelling all Rohingyas or by having the United Nations resettle them – a proposal that a United Nations official quickly rejected Al-Mahmood This is a serious allegation, but no field data were provided by Myanmar sources to substantiate it.

Threat perception in Bangladesh Bangladesh remains one of the few countries in the world facing triangular problems of refugees, non-voluntary migration, and displacement – both environmental and man-made. Following this legacy, Bangladesh has over the years maintained a largely humanitarian approach in dealing with the Rohingya, and has exercised restraint in measures and counter-measures involving their exodus along Myanmar borders Morshed It indicates how, during and after the major incidents, the Bangladeshi authorities tried to solve the crises through bilateral meetings, first with their Myanmar counterparts and, only when those measures failed, by resorting to seeking international support. Also, unlike occasional digressions by their Myanmar counterparts, the Bangladeshi forces have not been reported for border violations or any such provocative incidents along the Myanmar borders. But while there are the usual concerns regarding the possibility of mass infiltration, decisions are occasionally made to serve intricate political equations as well. It is alleged that the huge deployment of Bangladeshi troops along the Myanmar borders in – although reportedly in response to

unilateral oil exploration attempts and excessive military movement by Myanmar may have been partly initiated out of political calculations by the then-caretaker government. Nonetheless a lack of field data and analysis causes speculation about decisions by the paramilitary command or even the political leadership concerning the bordering region from time to time. A degree of over-assessment of threat has also prevented humanitarian responses from the Bangladeshi border guards in dealing with refugees. Also, the Bangladesh government is increasingly assertive in its own territorial control in the hilly regions and hinterlands along the border. Between February and July, there were a number of military and paramilitary operations inside Bangladesh in areas west of the Arakan Yoma to weed out possible miscreants or insurgent hideouts. **Bandarban Bangladesh Source:** These are a bare minimum in number, and rather long- and medium-term in scope, but nevertheless important to consider for the security of the Myanmar-Bangladesh border region. Effective identification of people and control of the border The population either side of the international border both in Bangladesh and Myanmar should be readily identifiable. Procedures for identification should be periodically reviewed. Also, external controls at the border need to be accompanied by appropriate sets of internal controls, something the Bangladeshi authorities seem to lack. Freedom of action for local and international agencies The recent signs of democratic transition in Myanmar call for increased involvement by local and international agencies in strengthening an organized civil society, encouraging constructive dialogue, and overseeing long-term strategies that assist all population groups in Myanmar. **HEI** These agencies especially the UNHCR which has offices in both Maungdaw and Teknaf could be extremely useful in instilling confidence among the Rohingya people so that they do not seek relocation away from their ancestral lands in Rakhine State. This task will require cooperation from the respective authorities in Myanmar. While the Myanmar government needs to take the lead on this issue, other influential governments, INGOs, and the international community as a whole should also continue pursuing and motivating it towards sincere implementation. Looking at the Rohingya struggles at home and at the amount of outside support they are able to garner, it may be a befitting time for the Myanmar government to assist the community in achieving their democratic rights and rehabilitation, an exercise where they may seek appropriate support from donors and the international community. Proactive and precautionary measures need to be taken to monitor and curb excesses by the Burmese military and security agents along the border, especially against civilians. Need for more cross-border cooperation beyond the work of government Bangladesh has a big market and a middle class increasingly engaged in business and trade exchanges that is very much open to cooperating with Myanmar. The planned deep-sea port for Bangladesh at Sonadia is likely to grow into a communications hub which could provide Myanmar and other neighbouring countries with many gains. Finally, cooperation between Myanmar and Bangladesh should extend towards increasing contact between people through cultural exchanges, sport, education, and other mutually beneficial activities. Imperceptible elements of fear, like the ethno-religious identities of the bordering people, rather than the tangible perception of threats have been the main reasons for confrontations between these two countries for many years. On a brighter side, the people of these countries enjoy ties rooted in their shared histories and cultures. Recovering from a number of diplomatic lows in the 1980s and 1990s, they are now showing signs of improvement in their relations: Nearly seventy years since independence, the state of Myanmar continues to be a state in formation. It remains one of the most conflict-prone in Asia, but it has much to be optimistic about. A democratic framework that genuinely protects the human rights and equality of every citizen of Myanmar without any discrimination is what the people of Myanmar could now aim and strive for. Thanks in particular to the two editors of this volume Nick Cheesman and Nicholas Farrelly for bearing the brunt of my loose-knitted drafts. A note of gratitude finally to two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable suggestions of improvements in some cases which led to total revisions. They are an ethnic Muslim group in this majority Buddhist country. In it was the monks of Sittwe who were among the first to participate in anti-government protests. The Rohingya community believes it is directed against it since it would bar Rohingya subsequently from continuing their legal residency in Rakhine State. Such intentions were evidenced through further illegalization and disenfranchisement attempts by the central government since March, by forcibly confiscating the white cards the only documentation that a Rohingya usually had to prove

their residency from Rohingya and replacing them with new identification cards. The incident caused a diplomatic spat between the two countries, but did show that the Bangladeshi guards were not indifferent to border violations in general BBC ; Rahman Mahathir Mohammad, former prime minister of Malaysia, at a press conference in Oslo in May References Ahmed, Imtiaz, ed. The Plight of the Stateless Rohingyas: Responses of the State, Society and the International Community. University Press Limited, Accessed 21 June Accessed 11 April The Guardian, 7 August Accessed 8 July The Diplomat, 23 June Accessed 27 May

Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion As Myanmar's military adjusts to life with its former opponents holding elected office, Conflict in Myanmar showcases innovative research by a rising generation of scholars, analysts and practitioners about the past five years of political transformation.

The book comprises fifteen chapters arranged in three sections: In chapter one, Su Mon Thazin Aung writes about the roles of the Myanmar Peace Centre and its strategy for the peace process under the Thein Sein administration from to This is followed by two chapters on ethnic conflicts in Kachin. Costas Laoutides and Anthony Ware provide a powerful account that interprets the ethnic conflicts in Kachin state as a conflict on framing, distribution, and management of political power, rebutting arguments that hold the conflicts in Kachin are best understood in relation to resources and territorial control. Jenny Hedstrom then discusses the insecurity and violence faced by Kachin women, an area typically overlooked by researchers. Kachin is certainly not the only area in Myanmar where there are ongoing ethnic conflicts, and Ricky Yue provides an overview of the political actors of the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone in the southern Shan State. His chapter provides an important explanation of how ethnic groups have been incorporated into the nation-state building project led by the union government, while at the same time demonstrating how not all political groups aiming to represent ethnic populations can attain the same level of recognition and support from the broader populace or union government. Cathcart, looks at the problem of landmines as a form of community protection in eastern Myanmar. Michael Lidauer provides a detailed account on three clusters of conflicts impacting the electoral process, namely conflicts between ethnic armed groups and the military, anti-Muslim sentiment, and constitutional injustice, although the connections between these conflicts is not made entirely clear. Chaw Chaw Sein then investigates the roles that the Union Election Commission, international agencies, and the military played in the election and how each contributed to its success. He also cautions against dismissing entirely the influence on politics of ethnicity and religion in current-day Myanmar simply because these issues failed to dominate the election. The last two chapters of this section are concerned less with the election per se and more with the legislature and legal reforms. Melissa Crouch, in the final chapter, discusses the dual capacity of laws to both manage and engender conflict in Myanmar. Tamas Wells critically illustrates the contrasting narratives of democratization held by Western aid workers and local Burmese activists by examining their reactions to communal conflicts between Buddhists and Muslims. While this chapter does point out differences between Western and local actors in conceptualizing democratization, I would argue that a West-Myanmar dichotomy provides a false binary, and omits the presences of non-Western aid workers and agencies. Their chapter provides an additional account from the broader populace on the conceptualization of democracy and democratization in Myanmar. The next two chapters focus more on religious conflicts. Matt Schissler offers an explanation of how the idea of a so-called Muslim threat has been popularized in Myanmar, leading to Islamophobia and even holocaust denial. Gerard McCarthy then examines Buddhist charitable organizations in provincial areas and their role in supporting local social safety nets. In the final chapter, Helal Mohammed Khan examines governance along the fringe areas of Bangladesh and Myanmar in order to shed light on the attendant border management approaches employed by each. I found this chapter to be only tangentially related to religious conflict, but it is also the only one in the book that talks about border tensions and managementâ€”an important topic for a country that borders five others. He ends by tying the chapters together with the central question of what it means to be political in Myanmar after the end of the military dictatorship. This volume will prove useful in providing a broad, political economy perspective of conflict in Myanmar during recent years, although it remains important to remind ourselves that conflicts continue to evolve once described and there are still more worthy of attention than can be covered in one book. November 14, Pacific Affairs.

8: Why is there communal violence in Myanmar? - BBC News

Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion (Nick Cheesman and Nicholas Farrelly, eds.) is the most recent output of the continuing Myanmar Update (formerly Burma Update) conference series run by Australian National University.

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Burma's 21st century Congresses. Children clutching the lags of ethnic minority groups welcome a convoy of soldiers arriving in Laiza, Kachin State, for a gathering of non-state armed forces in The politics of policymaking in transitional government: Reexamining the centrality of ethnic identity to the Kachin conflict 47 Costas Laoutides and Anthony Ware 4. Landmines as a form of community protection in eastern Myanmar Gregory S. The elections and conflict dynamics in Myanmar Michael Lidauer 8. The election commission, international agencies, and the military Chaw Chaw Sein 9. The Hluttaw and conflicts in Myanmar Chit Win Making sense of reactions to communal violence in Myanmar Tamas Wells Public perceptions of a divided Myanmar: On Islamophobes and Holocaust deniers: Making sense of violence, in Myanmar and elsewhere Matt Schissler Commencing with a keynote address by the then-Speaker of the Upper House of the Myanmar legislature, U Khin Aung Myint, it brought together academics, researchers, policymakers and politicians from Myanmar and abroad for two full days of intense discussion and debate at a time of unprecedented political and economic change in Myanmar. To the great credit of the ANU, the Update was supported almost entirely by funding from within the University. The Update rested heavily on the organising skills of the Bell School events team, among whom Kerrie Hogan and Trish Sullivan deserve special mention for their tireless efforts and leadership. James Giggacher, the editor of the New Mandala website, handled media inquiries and podcasting with inesse. Luke Hambly put together the conference photo exhibit. They also especially acknowledge the xii Acknowledgements conference advisory panelists: This edited volume, and the series in which it is the latest installment, has been made possible only with the cooperation of many persons. Above all, the editors wish to thank Allison Ley for her dedicated work in laying out the text. The current volume is the largest and most ambitious to date, and we look forward to working closely with our colleagues at ISEAS towards even greater things in years ahead. Cathcart is an international development consultant specializing in community responses to landmine usage in Southeast Asia. Matt Schissler is a doctoral student in anthropology at the University of Michigan. Tamas Wells is a doctoral candidate in politics at the University of Melbourne. Reproduced from Conflict in Myanmar:

9: Karen conflict - Wikipedia

The internal conflict in Myanmar refers to a series of primarily ethnic conflicts within Myanmar that began shortly after the country, then known as Burma, became independent from the United Kingdom in The conflict has been labeled as the world's longest running civil war.

Music lovers treasury British political history, 1867-1990 Coevolution and Systematics (Systematics Association Special Volume) Agunes disappearing in / Spirit-Centered Wholeness Bible study: third Sunday of Advent Necessary roughness The World Market for Trunks, Suitcases, Vanity Cases, Executive Cases, Briefcases, and School Satchels Bernard Shaws The Black girl in search of God Lincoln reconsidered The soliloquy in German drama Future forest resources of western and eastern Europe A Biblical Approach to Personal Suffering Transforming Children into Spiritual Champions Thermodynamic Inequalities in Gases and Magnetoplasmas Fearne cotton cook eat love Conversations with Blacks in Evanston, Illinois Streetwise Toronto Financial intelligence for entrepreneurs Middle school ing how sailboats work Model ingredients : stellar spectral libraries The Analogy of Sales Collection to ICC Arbitral Awards 1991-1995/Recuel des Sentences Artibrates de La (Publications on Ocean Its fun to be an MK V. 1. From the year 1783 to the year 1804 Power of suggestion Building Queenslands heritage Index to Samuel T. Wileys History of Monongalia County, West Virginia (1883) Ratnavali, by Harsha. Christmas story in carols trinity ethodist church Oklahoma Trees and Wildflowers Profession in crisis Maine j courtney sullivan Virtuoso Fingerstyle Guitar (Acoustic Masters Series) Occupational therapy toolkit treatment guides and handouts torrent Rallying for immigrant rights Urban walks and town trails Rethinking the French Revolution The FBI Laboratory Building the American Dream