

# CONTEMPORARY MINORITY MIGRATION, EDUCATION, AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA pdf

## 1: Ethnic minorities in China - Wikipedia

*Rural-urban migration is an important aspect in the development of countries. Until the late s China was one of the few countries that controlled population movement both directly and indirectly through policies of economic and social control.*

Finally, the article poses the query whether ethnic minority status continues to hold a meaningful category of analysis in contemporary China. The problem was that no one was quite clear who constituted the minorities and how numerous they were. Mullaney's early attempt at collecting ethnicity data yielded an unexpectedly large and considered unmanageable set of over 500 ethnic groups. In response, the Communist Party of China CPC commissioned a large-scale project to categorize, delineate, and meaningfully formulate a smaller number of ethnic groups. Another 16 ethnic groups were recognized by the CPC, and the most recent was added in 2011. While the notion of the Han ren person has existed since the time of the Han dynasty BC–AD, the Han nationality is an entirely modern phenomenon, which arose with the shift from Chinese empire to modern nation-state. Fighting for survival against both the GMD and the Japanese, the communist leaders developed their minority policies strategically. They made promises of special treatment, recognition, and the establishment of autonomous regions for minorities – notably the Miao, Yi, Tibetans, Mongols, and Hui – in exchange for their support. Snow and Mullaney reports that those guidelines declared the equality of all ethnic groups and a theory of regional autonomy to be enacted in minority-rich areas. Thus, the Chinese leadership committed itself to the concept of China as a multiethnic nation. Projecting an image of Han superiority proved useful for the Communists who incorporated it into a Marxist ideology of progress. Ethnic minorities were thus encouraged to follow the Han example. That process was abruptly halted by the Cultural Revolution, in which extremists targeted many ethnic minority communities for their traditional practices. Beijing Minority Rights Protection Policies public policies. Regional autonomy is given in areas heavily populated by ethnic minorities. Moreover, autonomous cities, prefectures, and municipalities exist where minority nationalities are territorially concentrated. In practice though, the system remains subject to the political control of the CPC see Hasmath; Hasmath and Hsu. The main logic for this stance is that the economic cost of maintaining preferential treatment would potentially rise with an increase in the ethnic minority population. However, it was determined by CPC researchers that the Chuanqing Blacks were not a separate nationality, but rather descendants of Han garrison troops who intermarried with the local population during the Ming dynasty. Thus, they were categorized as Han Chinese. In a contrasting example, in 2011, 30 Fujianese who no longer practice Islam were recognized as members of the Hui Islamic nationality using historical records of foreign ancestry. Gladney's practice would appear to create precedence for many groups to seek nationality recognition based on historical records of foreign ancestry. Analytical queries The issues addressed thus far collectively beg the question whether ethnic minority status continues to hold a meaningful category of analysis in modern-day China. The advantaged position of interethnic children is robust across each of the major minority groups included in their study. However, the likelihood of interethnic marriage and thus interethnic children varies considerably by ethnicity. Based on detailed semi-structured interviews, they report that less than 10 percent of the ethnic minority individuals in their study found work by means of their social connections and networks, which stands in marked contrast to the experience of the Han, the vast majority of whom found their work through such connections. Gustafsson and Yang explore ethnic boundary crossing in a more literal sense. They report that in most cases, ethnic minorities with rural hukou rural household registration are less likely to migrate than the Han. In contrast, Korean and Hui have higher probabilities of migration than the majority, indicating a higher rate of potential integration. The migration patterns of ethnic minority holders of urban hukou are similar to those of rural residents with respect to many demographic variables. Their ethnic status, however, is much less likely to be a determining factor in terms of reducing the propensity to migrate. When ethnic minorities do migrate, pulled by better

## CONTEMPORARY MINORITY MIGRATION, EDUCATION, AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA pdf

employment and wage prospects, there may be a residual effect on the co-residency patterns of the rural elderly minority population. Their analysis reveals the large role cultural norms play in determining coresidency, as evidenced by differences across ethnic groups. Of particular interest is their comparison of coresidency patterns across ethnic groups with respect to both individual and regional degrees of assimilation versus isolation. Their study 6 M. Hasmath strongly suggests elder ethnic minorities who do not speak Mandarin have higher rates of coresidency than those who do. Additionally, those who live in counties with low rates of intermarriage and intergroup friendships are also more likely to coreside. For the purpose of this article, the three terms will be used interchangeably. He argues that fertility trends were such that an increase of only 10 million was expected. In two extreme cases, the populations of the Manchu and Tujia more than doubled between these two censuses. The New Politics of Difference. Muslims, Minorities, and other Subaltern Subjects. University of Chicago Press. Hasmath, Reza, and Jennifer Hsu. Eurasian Geography and Economics 7 Heberer, Thomas. China and its National Minorities: An Explanation using Data from the and Census Enumerations. The Search for Dignity and Gain. Sociological Study of Ethnic Relations. Coming to Terms with the Nation: University of California Press. The Case of Xinjiang. Red Star over China:

# CONTEMPORARY MINORITY MIGRATION, EDUCATION, AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA pdf

## 2: HKU Scholars Hub: Contemporary Minority Migration, Education and Ethnicity in China,

*Downloadable! Rural-urban migration is an important aspect in the development of countries. Until the late s China was one of the few countries that controlled population movement both directly and indirectly through policies of economic and social control.*

Introduction Inter-ethnic violence has been on the rise in mainland China. Chinese state media alleged that Uyghur militants were the assailants in both cases. This followed two separate outbursts of reported violence in Xinjiang between Uyghurs and the Han the national majority, but one of the many regional minorities in XUAR on 26 and 28 June , when 35 people were killed in total. All Party members and employees on the state payroll are forbidden to wear religious attire such as Islamic head scarves and coverings including the doppa cap for males , CONTACT Reza Hasmath rhasmath gmail. The study of religious texts is permitted only in designated state schools Hasmath a. There are documented accounts of govern- ment informers regularly attending gatherings, sermons or prayers in local churches, temples and mosques Fuller and Lipman ; Tam and Hasmath Furthermore, Chinese authorities have slowly phased out the use of ethnic-minority languages as the primary medium of instruction in the majority of schools, replacing them with Mandarin Chinese as the dominant working language Schluessel The reaction by some members of the Uyghur community in Xinjiang is one of resistance, even to the extent of potential violence. State authorities generally respond that the shift to a near-universal use of Mandarin Chinese in schools ensures that ethnic minorities can compete on an equal footing with the Han in the labour market, and relatedly, to maximize their educational potential. Whether this strategy has been successful is another narrative, with mixed results regard- ing returns on education reported in the literature see Hasmath , , , b; Howell ; Hasmath and Ho ; Cheng, Hasmath, and Ho ; MacDonald and Hasmath A lack of meaningful exposure to ethno-cultural group practices at a young age is likely to encourage ethnic minorities to adopt the secular ideology of the Chinese state, rather than to practice ethno-cultural group practices in adulthood Zang Split labour market theory highlights how competition for jobs leads to friction between, and hence the political crystallization of, particular groups Bonacich ; Wilson It is worth- while to test whether current labour market processes “ involving agency e. Of the estimated The state has also provided preferential policies in education for ethnic minorities, which consist of bursaries, scholarships, and university admissions based on lower examination scores Hasmath a; Hasmath and MacDonald For the latter point, forging ethno-reli- gious connections has been a starting point in other jurisdictions to foster a collective con- sciousness that creates division, ultimately leading to potential political mobilization Giuliano ; Posner The Chinese state is keen to eliminate this possibility in Xinjiang. The hard policy approach is fundamentally a security apparatus. In practice, there is no conformity in terms of how surveillance is conducted. It depends on the area. At the very least, Party members have relatively sophisticated technologies at their disposal if they elect to use them “ and these seem to be employed more readily in urban areas. This may involve using riot-proof HD cameras, policing boxes, and hour inspec- tion routes. As Gladney astutely noted two decades ago but is equally applicable today, Uyghurs subscribe to certain identities under highly contextualized moments of social relations. For example, the close link between Muslim and Uyghur identity has meant that any shifts by state authorities in regulating ethno-cultural practices, via varying soft or hard policies, has been a source of contention for Uyghurs. Smith Finley goes a step further than Gladney, outlining six ways ethno-cultural consciousness manifests on the ground: First, there was unsustain- able expansion of industry and accompanying urbanization. The Chinese have historically controlled Xinjiang through the construction of garrisons and urban settlements by encouraging Han migration Gaubatz ; Van Wie Davis In this tradition, the CPC have continued to use such methods of control in tandem with agricultural settlements, taking the form of the still active Xinjiang Production and Con- struction Corps XPCC or Bingtuan, established in , originally to employ demobilized troops. In , it was elev- ated to the same political status as the Xinjiang government see Seymour for details. For example, in the

XGCC recruited approximately civil servant positions, of which were reserved for Han Chinese, were unrestricted by ethnicity, 11 were earmarked for Uyghurs and 2 were reserved for Kazakhs. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the increase in the Han urban population principally results from internal migration. The Han bias in urbanization is a key demographic and development issue in Xinjiang. As Hasmath and Hsu argue in the case of the Tibet Autonomous Region, the urgent development issue for minorities is not population dominance, but access to the privileges of urban development, such as higher income. In Xinjiang, regional and ethnic inequality are worsening. The Han population is disproportionately concentrated in locations where average income is highest. The division of labour The division of labour in Xinjiang is greatly shaped by migration and urbanization patterns. In particular, in the oasis settlements where the majority of Uyghurs reside, land is scarce, and the plots cultivated are too small to provide subsistence and work to the available labour force. As elsewhere in China, following the advent of the rural responsibility system, the agriculture sector was unable to absorb surplus labour see Lin ; Zhang for details. The structural forces underlying urbanization can be vividly illustrated by comparing GDP to labour share ratios. Table 2 illustrates the labour shares percentage of employed persons and GDP to labour share ratios in the primary, Table 1. Uyghurs Han Aqsu Thus, the relative GDP contribution of one worker in this industry is higher than in the primary and tertiary industries. The critical issue here is that while Uyghurs have a strong concentration in primary industries, Han dominate the secondary and tertiary industries Table 3. Put another way, key strategic resources of the region such as electricity, gas, and water are managed by Han Chinese odds ratio5: The Han have moved into the private sector “ where minorities are not faring well “ as the formal state and collective sector diminishes in economic importance. Total employment in work units has slumped drastically against a background where the total number of Xinjiang inhabitants of working age has grown. The minority share of employment in local state-owned enterprises At the most rudimentary level, one will expect more ethnic parity at the central state-owned enterprise level than the ratios reported. The most recent Han Chinese inter-provincial migrants are spontaneous, and not part of state-directed population transfers. Uyghurs Han Other Primary Calculated using Xinjiang Population Census As Table 4 illustrates, Han are over-represented in high-status and high-paying occupations: The transformation from a state-planned to a market-based economy in the s and early s slowly created an ownership structure in Xinjiang that shifted towards the private sector see Dreyer for details. Between and , the urban state sector in Xinjiang shed , jobs, and its share in overall urban employment dropped from By December , Xin- jiang had 36, siying qiye employing , persons. This amounted to a rise of The number of getihu also increased over the same twelve months, to , a 4. Uyghurs are faring relatively poorly in the private sector and are far less likely to be self-employed than Han. For this reason, one may be inclined to recommend that reducing the size of the XGCC would also reduce pressure on local employment by reducing the large population of itinerant Han migrant workers. While this recommendation might be fruitful, deeper processes linked to the marketization of the economy, and social networks that Table 4. This was the last publicly available data set to calculate occupational sector con- centration by ethnicity. Occupational categories are set by the National Bureau of Statistics. To attribute this reality entirely to state policy may not be entirely accurate. State policy does not overtly perpetuate an ethnic division of labour, notwithstanding the XGCC civil servant hiring practices. Indeed, there are numerous state preferential policies in school admissions Hasmath , b , which in theory could increase the chances of Uyghurs for higher-status and higher-paying occupations. Similar processes are at work in Xinjiang. However, by the late s and early s, after nearly a decade of market reforms, the job assignment system was abandoned. Individuals were now urged to create jobs for themselves and seek employment in an emerging private sector. A high-level investigation report of the Xinjiang CPC Committee candidly disclosed that the strategy of choosing from both sides [Han and Uyghurs] in hiring has been more chal- lenged following the establishment and perfecting of the market economic system. As demonstrated in Table 4, there is a tendency for Uyghurs to hold low-status and low-paying positions, particularly in the service sector, while Han occupy positions in high-wage, capital-intensive industries. For instance, many

## CONTEMPORARY MINORITY MIGRATION, EDUCATION, AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA pdf

Uyghurs conduct business only with fellow Uyghurs; and vice versa, Han with fellow Han. In this way, disproportionate access to the local economy as a result of market forces, migration patterns and social networks creates and reinforces spatial divisions, since wages can also determine residential location. Uyghurs and Han reside in relatively closed ethnic communities and seldom meaningfully interact with each other see Cao for discussion. Their living conditions are also poorer than those of Han, as a result of their lower incomes. As rapid urbanization continues, market relations could further precipitate a sectoral division of labour to the extent that the labour market is skewed towards Han domination of high-status and high-wage positions, and Uyghur domination of low-status and low-wage positions, in aggregate. The consequences of the rising ethno-cultural consciousness created by a split and segmented labour market can be understood in two ways. As Schein and Hsu and Hasmath note, the corporatist Chinese state is often conceived as much stronger than society. Everyday social processes such as ethnic divisions of labour and migration are given short shrift. Institutional changes have loosened peasants from their tie to the land of their birth and given rise to the rural-to-urban migration of Uyghurs and Han in disproportionate numbers. Amid such threatening developments, migrants rely on their group or hometown connections for an entry into urban life. They therefore sharpen divisions of labour and capital, perpetuating socio-cultural segregation in the urban space. On the one hand, Uyghur resentment is directed at what is perceived to be a largely Han state that is protectionist towards the Han majority – indeed, Han cadres outnumber minority cadres in Xinjiang. The same segregated and segmented labour markets bind Uyghurs together and arguably are part and parcel of the increasing Uyghur ethno-cultural consciousness. Ironically, economic incentives continue to be one of the main tools Chinese authorities use to manage the Uyghur population, a policy belied by their poor economic performance in the labour market compared to Han. This was one of the key aspects stressed in the Central Work Forum on Xinjiang in . However, complications arise – in spite of improved labour market performance among Uyghurs following market reforms – as this reality has not come to pass when using Han experiences as a gauge for success, which many Uyghurs do. Uyghurs continue to watch the better-paying jobs go to Han Chinese while the more labour-intensive, poorly paid positions are skewed towards Uyghurs. In the short term, ethnic tensions will be suppressed, as has been done in the past, through hard policies with a strong securitization bent. However, soft policies will eventually be re-employed. In the long term, neither the soft nor the hard policies currently practised will address the main reasons for the ethno-cultural tensions between Uyghurs and Han. The incident was only acknowledged by Chinese state media two months later, when it was reported by the Tianshan web portal that 16 people were killed and 18 others were injured. The legacy of the hukou household registration system, instituted in , must be factored in creating this demographic urban–rural discrepancy among Uyghurs. As a consequence, the hukou system has to a great extent controlled the frequency of rural-to-urban migration see Wu and Treiman for details. That is, there was under-utilization of labour on two fronts: However, this does not necessarily increase the odds of Uyghurs obtaining high-status and high-paying jobs. In fact, many Uyghurs are migrating out of Xinjiang to look for jobs elsewhere in China. Ordering Human Kinds in the Chinese Nation. The Split Labor Market. Beyond the Great Wall:

# CONTEMPORARY MINORITY MIGRATION, EDUCATION, AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA pdf

## 3: Naran Bilik (Author of Contemporary Minority Migration, Education, and Ethnicity in China)

*Contemporary Minority Migration, Education, and Ethnicity in China* [Robyn Iredale, Naran Bilik, Wang Su, Fei Guo, Caroline Hoy] on [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com) \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. Rural-urban migration is an important aspect in the development of countries.

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Yet, domestic economic disparities are becoming a major concern. The Gini coefficient rose from 0. Such inequality could derail gains in education, dampen economic growth, lead to a waste of human capital, and reduce social cohesion ADB If social inequalities are compounded by intercultural misunderstandings , they could fuel ethnic conflicts and weaken national integration. This is especially relevant in the Tibetan and Uyghur regions of western China where uprisings since caused many Han Chinese to become less sympathetic and more frustrated with ethnic minority demands. Government officials and scholars respond in different ways. A prominent scholar of ethnic minority relations highlighted the politicizing of ethnic issues in earlier decades and the establishment of ethnic autonomous regions, including Xinjiang and Tibet Ma In short, ethnic unity and national integration remain matters of national urgency. Despite the debates about how to best achieve it, both government and 1 Education and Cultural Diversity in Multiethnic China Gerard Postiglione 28 Gerard Postiglione academia agree that education in a multiethnic society has a major responsibility to moderate ethnic conflicts, promote interethnic trust, and ensure national unity. This essay raises three questions about education and national integration: How has the Chinese concept of ethnicity been affected by market reforms? How is education responding to the challenge of ethnic unity? Can a more multicultural form of education promote educational equality and national integration? Multiculturalism, Cultural Assimilation, and Education The concept of multicultural education has made little headway in China. The idea that multicultural education can promote national integration is often met with skepticism by political leaders, not only in China but elsewhere in the world. For Merkel, immigrants need to do more to integrate. The process for China is more akin to straight-line assimilation theories than contemporary multiculturalism Beckett and Postiglione You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

# CONTEMPORARY MINORITY MIGRATION, EDUCATION, AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA pdf

## 4: EconPapers: Contemporary Minority Migration, Education and Ethnicity in China

*Get this from a library! Contemporary minority migration, education, and ethnicity in China. [Robyn R Iredale; Naran Bilik; Wang Su; Fei Guo; Caroline Hoy] -- "The book concentrates on the migration of minorities from a social, economic and ethnic perspective and attempts to quantify the overall level of movement.*

Naming[ edit ] The Chinese-language term for ethnic minority is shaoshu minzu simplified Chinese: However, the Chinese word does not imply that ethnic minorities in China are not Chinese citizens, as in fact they are. Some scholars, to be even more precise, use the neologism zuqun Chinese: The self-conceptualization of Han largely revolved around this center-periphery cultural divide. Thus, the process of Sinicization throughout history had as much to do with the spreading of imperial rule and culture as it did with actual ethnic migration. This understanding persisted with some change in the Qing under the import of Western ideas up until the Communists took power in Stalinist thinking about minorities was that a nation was made up of those with a common language, historical culture, and territory. Each nation of these people then had the theoretical right to secede from a proposed federated government. The Stalinist model as applied to China gave rise to the autonomous regions in China; these areas were thought to be their own nations that had theoretical autonomy from the central government. It tackled the question of why Muslims who were Chinese were considered a different race from other Chinese, and the separate question of whether all Muslims in China were united into one race. The first problem was posed with a comparison to Chinese Buddhists, who were not considered a separate race. It also came to the conclusion that the Japanese military spokesman was the only person who was propagating the false assertion that Chinese Muslims had "racial unity", which was disproven by the fact that Muslims in China were composed of multitudes of different races, separate from each other as were the "Germans and English", such as the Mongol Hui of Hezhou, Salar Hui of Qinghai, Chan Tou Hui of Turkistan, and then Chinese Muslims. The Japanese were trying to spread the lie that Chinese Muslims were one race, in order to propagate the claim that they should be separated from China into an "independent political organization". The problem that they immediately ran into was that there were many areas of China in which villages in one valley considered themselves to have a separate identity and culture from those one valley over. In response, the social scientists attempted to construct coherent groupings of minorities using language as the main criterion for differentiation. This led to a result in which villages that had very different cultural practices and histories were lumped under the same ethnic name. The Zhuang is one such example; the ethnic group largely served as a catch-all collection of various hill villages in Guangxi province. Individual ethnic status was often awarded based on family tree histories. If one had a father or mother, for ethnic groups that were considered matrilineal that had a surname considered to belong to a particular ethnic group, then one was awarded the coveted minority status. This had the result that villages that had previously thought of themselves as homogenous and essentially Han were now divided between those with ethnic identity and those without. Many of those labeled as specific minorities were thus presented with images and representations of "their people" in the media that bore no relationship to the music, clothing, and other practices they themselves enacted in their own daily lives. Under this process, 39 ethnic groups were recognized by the first national census in This further increased to 54 by the second national census in , with the Lhoba group added in One of the favorite travel experiences of the wealthy was visits to minority areas, to see the purportedly exotic rituals of the minority peoples. In this way, the groups of people named Zhuang or other named minorities have begun to have more in common with their fellow co-ethnics, as they have adopted similar self-conceptions in response to the economic demand of consumers for their performances. After the breakup of Yugoslavia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union , there was a shift in official conceptions of minorities in China: The difference between "nationality" and "ethnicity", as Uradyn Erden-Bulag describes it, is that the former treats the minorities of China as societies with "a fully functional division of labor", history, and territory, while the latter treats minorities as a "category" and focuses on their

maintenance of boundaries and their self-definition in relation to the majority group. These changes are reflected in uses of the term *minzu* and its translations. A good example is found in the designation of distinct languages: It is a language with distinct grammatical and phonological differences, such as Tibetan," and furthermore twenty-one ethnic minority groups have their own writing systems. List of ethnic groups in China

The Long-horn tribe, a small branch of ethnic Miao in the western part of Guizhou Province China is officially composed of 56 ethnic groups 55 minorities plus the dominant Han. However, some of the ethnic groups as classified by the PRC government contain, within themselves, diverse groups of people. Various groups of the Miao minority, for example, speak different dialects of the Hmongâ€™Mien languages , Taiâ€™Kadai languages , and Chinese , and practice a variety of different cultural customs. Many ethnic groups are described as having unique characteristics from other minority groups and from the dominant Han, but there are also some that are very similar to the Han majority group. Most Hui Chinese are indistinguishable from Han Chinese except for the fact that they practice Islam , and most Manchu are considered to be largely assimilated into dominant Han society. Only Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region have a majority population of official minorities, while all other provinces , municipalities and regions of China have a Han majority. Migration has also caused friction in some minority areas, such as Tibet and Xinjiang. Some studies find that urban minorities perceive lower wages compared to majority Han residents, or report difficulties either finding jobs or fitting into the workplace. Other studies find little or no evidence of wage gaps. They find that while ethnic minorities in aggregate do not appear to experience any wage gap, some outsider minorities, particularly Tibetans and Turkic groups, "have a percent wage penalty controlling for covariates [and that] these findings are robust across several different specifications. This is especially true when it comes to employment in high-wage, skilled jobs. This change proved challenging for ethnic minority jobseekers. In no small part because of their distinct cultural backgrounds and values, most of them were "educated" during the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, their secondary schooling was interrupted when they were mobilized to countryside villages for 5 to 10 years, and as such, most were not highly skilled or educated, and had difficulty finding employment when they returned to cities, despite the efforts of the central government to assign them positions and re-train them in employment centres. These measures, together with attempts to hold city job fairs for *xiagang* jobseekers, were not very successful. Muslim Association of Beijing, Tibetan Information Centre , as there is a prevailing belief in government circles that they are "there for malice. Despite longstanding government efforts to integrate ethnic minorities, Beijing has a long history "of strained ethnic relations and tensions, rather than a Confucian-inspired Socialist vision of harmony in ethnic interactions. They are suspected of a host of criminal activities, from promotion of the drug trade to incitement of "rebellious activities. Many of the elderly members of these communities assert that their children do not follow or adopt the Islamic culture; that they are Beijingers who have grown up and been educated in a Han-dominated community. As Hasmath illustrates, "their female children do not wear headscarves; the males do not wear Islamic topees. Nor do they eat traditional foods, except when going to "ethnic" restaurants, which are often not staffed or owned by minorities and which are becoming popular among Beijingers overall. Muslim interviewees perceive these shifts in cultural orientation as "products of education and employment systems that promote a Han-dominated culture. As the government often portrays itself as a benefactor of the minorities, those less willing to assimilate despite the offers of assistance are portrayed as masculine, violent, and unreasonable. Groups that have been depicted this way include the Tibetans , Uyghurs and the Mongols. This is a special situation for Taiwanese minorities, because indigenous Taiwanese comprise a number of different ethnic groups with somewhat different languages and cultures. According to the article "Taiwanese Aborigines â€™ the Natives of Taiwan", there are about , indigenous Taiwanese, accounting for 2. While many indigenous Taiwanese lived in the mountains many have since migrated to the cities. Taiwanese Aborigines also lived on the western plains. They were called Pingpu by Han settlers. They have been assimilated by them. The next largest ethnic groups in terms of population include the Zhuang 18 million , Manchu 15 million , Hui 10 million , Miao 9 million , Uyghur 8 million , Yi 7.

## CONTEMPORARY MINORITY MIGRATION, EDUCATION, AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA pdf

Minority populations are growing fast due to their being unaffected by the One Child Policy. Additionally, ethnic minorities enjoy other special exemptions which vary by province- these include lower tax thresholds and lower required scores for entry into university, as well as funding enabling them to "express their cultural difference through the arts and sports. Some ethnic minorities in China live in what are described as ethnic autonomous areas. These "regional autonomies" guarantee ethnic minorities the freedom to use and develop their ethnic languages, and to maintain their own cultural and social customs. In addition, the PRC government has provided preferential economic development and aid to areas where ethnic minorities live. Furthermore, the Chinese government has allowed and encouraged the involvement of ethnic minority participation in the party. Even though ethnic minorities in China are granted specific rights and freedoms, many ethnic minorities still have headed towards the urban life in order to obtain a well paid job. In this programme, local officials employ a great deal of street-level discretion in selecting recipients. As such, the selection process for participants in the dibao programme has generated a perception among observers of the scheme that this programme and "other forms of discretionary government attention" to residents have been used to mitigate dissent and neutralize any threat to the government that could lead to unrest- including negative performance evaluations of local officials. Hasmath and MacDonald further found evidence to suggest that officials "use discretionary welfare measures to buy off potentially troublesome poorer minority households at a higher rate than Han households. Undistinguished ethnic groups in China "Undistinguished" ethnic groups are ethnic groups that have not been officially recognized or classified by the central government. The group numbers more than , people, and would constitute the twentieth most populous ethnic group of China if taken as a single group. The vast majority of this group is found in Guizhou Province. These "undistinguished ethnic groups" do not include groups that have been controversially classified into existing groups. For example, the Mosuo are officially classified as Naxi , and the Chuanqing are classified as Han Chinese , but they reject these classifications and view themselves as separate ethnic groups. Citizens of mainland China who are of foreign origin are classified using yet another separate label: However, if a newly naturalized citizen already belongs to a recognized existing group among the 56 ethnic groups, then he or she is classified into that ethnic group rather than the special label. Religions and their most common affiliations[ edit ].

## 5: Project MUSE - Minority Education in China

*China's internal migration is often compared to international migration in the sense that internal migrants are subject to substantial institutional constraints similar to crossing national.*

Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice. The concept of a multiethnic Chinese state derived from Qing ideology and policy in the 18th century, when the Qianlong emperor realized his vision of universal rulership by expanding the Qing empire deep into Central Asia. During the nation-building period of the first half of the 20th century, the imperial geobody was reconstituted as a Sinocentric and multiethnic nation-state. Ideological rivals the Guomindang and the Communist Party both pursued hegemonic strategies of national unity by constructing a new myth of national belonging firmly rooted in history. The minorities were integrated into the unitary Chinese nation and granted only regional autonomy. Although the autonomous regions produced expectations of belonging among their titular nationalities, the official minority policy was strongly assimilationist in the s and s, generating centrifugal forces of ethnic resistance. Since the s, a popular nationalism stoked by the central government has been expanding into a broader sense of Chineseness in a globalizing world. Both notions emerged in Western intellectual debates of the 19th century. They were soon adopted in China, where they encountered a society that possessed a centuries-old tradition of esteeming culture wenhua. Culture was conceptualized without any connotation of race zhongzu. Nevertheless, every ruler had to decide how to deal with ethnocultural differences. A rarely questioned stereotype developed to the effect that all who practiced Chinese mores and customs were supposed to be part of the Chinese civilization, whereas everyone else was considered uncivilized, barbaric, and alien. On this model, Chinese state-building was described as a process of expansion from the core to the peripheral areas through political overlordship and cultural diffusion, Sinicizing, over at least two millennia, all those who came into contact with the radiating center. Confucianism, the central force of Chinese culture, emphasized cultural universalism rather than ethnic distinction. The two conquest dynasties, the Mongolian Yuan “ and the Manchu Qing “ , mainly reordered the cultural hierarchies during their periods of rule. Although the Yuan emperors preferred Muslims, Tibetans, and other non-Han groups to expand and administer their empire, the Manchu monarchs cultivated close relationships with Mongolian tribes in a loose nomad-style confederation of Manchu, Mongol, Han, Tibetan, and Muslim constituencies. In both cases, the formation of ethnic identities was directly connected to the rise of a new political power. In the case of the Manchu, even the Mongols and the Han Chinese, who had submitted to their rule at an early stage, were included. Both elite groups set up ethnic hierarchies to rule over the multicultural world of imperial China. Although the Mongols introduced a territorial system of provinces to China, they preferred a hierarchy of four classes, in which only the two lower classes of northern Chinese and southern Chinese were categorized according to territorial divisions. The Manchus, for their part, divided their empire into the Chinese heartland and the frontier region. Because they were vastly outnumbered by their Chinese subjects, the Manchus strengthened the internal cultural boundaries by imposing different and specific regional governance and legal structures, collecting genealogical records and instrumentalizing cultural practices, especially religion. The distinct ethnic communities were separated from each other and, ultimately, governed by the universal Qing monarch, who mediated between them with the support of the imperial state bureaucracy. This manifested itself in different ways: The multicultural empire was stabilized by differentiated methods of rule over the Chinese and the various non-Chinese groups. Ethnic boundaries between these groups were reinforced under Qing supremacy. In the heyday of the dynasty, the Qianlong emperor r. In their efforts to tighten their grip on the frontier peoples, the Manchu rulers had recourse to the traditional Chinese precept of controlling the various peoples of the empire by making use of their own cultural characteristics yinsu erzhi. In the different parts of the Qing frontier zone, local religion served to strengthen imperial control. In the case of Tibet and Mongolia, Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism represented a most effective means of

consolidating Qing overlordship; in Eastern Turkestan, the local Muslim leadership was enlisted into service. The differences and boundaries within the empire were thus preserved by political, military, and religious means. The last dynasty in Chinese history promoted two elements that are essential for understanding the relationship between nationalism and minorities in modern China: When Qing rule broke down in and monarchical government in China came to an end, it was not least because of the emergence of two new historical forces: Both developed during the final stage of the Qing. A biological concept of race emerged in a strong anti-Manchuism among Chinese rebels and dissident scholars during the second half of the 19th century; this contributed decisively to the demise of the imperial state. The Republic of China “ was founded on two important rationales. First, the vast imperial frontier regions had to be integrated into what was seen as a new nation-state; second, anti-imperial nationalism was the only thing uniting the multicultural population. In the transition from dynastic rule to the nation-state, the traditional center-periphery relations of the old multicultural empire had to be translated into modern ethnic categories. Although a new slogan of an egalitarian union of five nationalities wuzuo gonghe was officially propagated, the category of ethnicity minzu remained useful in defining the minority status of all the marginalized and subaltern groups in a society that dominated by the Han Chinese. It served as a new perspective on the world and helped the Han Chinese make sense of their new place in the world. The political, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic boundaries between China and the outer world were delineated and symbolically charged by the ascending Chinese nationalists in order to create a Chinese collective imaginary. In the early Republican state, the Han majority served as a central component of the discursive construction of a unified and homogeneous nation. From onward, the Chineseness of Han Chinese citizens no longer depended on their loyalty to an emperor and commitment to traditional Confucian values. Opposition to foreign imperialism had made patriotism an important element of Chinese self-identification. Throughout the passage from dynastic empire to nation-state, the non-Han peoples had no political voice of their own. Only Outer Mongolia had their voice and left the Qing empire in the moment of collapse. In fact, the protagonists of nationalism and the modern state-building project were almost exclusively Han Chinese intellectuals. In his view, ethnicities constantly diverged and merged in history. Even the Han Chinese were not a static and undifferentiated entity but an amalgam of many peoples that had been formed through assimilation of multiple ethnic groups. He paved the way for a broader repositioning of the Han as the racial backbone guban of a multiethnic yet territorially limited Zhonghua minzu, which included Han and non-Han peoples alike. Zhang propagated the idea of the Han as an expression of a racial unity embodied in a common blood lineage that dated back to the mythical Yellow Emperor, around bc. His well-known and influential ideas illustrate that the concepts of race, ethnic minority, nation, or nationality are modern political constructs that emerged during the period of transition from the premodern empire to the modern nation-state. This territorially based motto was introduced in January by Sun Yatsen “ in his inaugural address as the provisional president of the Republic of China, and was the result of negotiations between the nationalists and Yuan Shikai, a central figure in the late Qing court. This is the big responsibility that we five nationalities take together. Outer Mongolia had declared its independence, with Russian support, in December , and in Lhasa, the thirteenth Dalai Lama ordered the expulsion of all Qing officials and troops from Tibet in early Both governments confirmed their decisions in January by signing the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Government of Mongolia and Tibet. Caught between competing great powers, such early expressions of nationalism were destined to be short-lived, especially for Tibet. Although the Chinese government demarcated its international borders in legally binding agreements, it lacked the military power and political will to incorporate the vast frontier regions and their non-Han inhabitants into the nation-state. The official line was partly supported by the newly emerging scientific disciplines of archaeology, history, anthropology and geography, which all felt called upon to construct a myth of Chinese national identity. Sun Yatsen used Zhonghua minzu in the s to identify a unified nation based on the assimilation of the five nationalities: We must facilitate the dying out of all names of individual peoples inhabiting China, i. He suspected that ethnicity was a centrifugal force threatening the overriding aim of

## CONTEMPORARY MINORITY MIGRATION, EDUCATION, AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA pdf

national unification. In the context of the process of nationalization, the traditional center-periphery relationship was internalized within the Republican state. The Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission was established in to demonstrate the Nationalist disregard for Mongolian and Tibetan independence. The radical Guomindang concept of the Chinese nation was also reflected in the academic debates carried out by between the historian Gu Jiegang and the social anthropologist Fei Xiaotong “ on the question of the unity of the Chinese nation. The rich ethnographical studies on the southwestern frontier done in the late s and early s challenged the supposed unity of the Zhonghua minzu, and called for a complete re-evaluation of the origin, nature, and meaning of ethnic identity in China. Yet if the concentric imagery of imperial Chinese scholars positioned Chinese and barbarians within the same social order of tianxia, the early Marxist authors interpreted these differences as, above all, economic, as a contrast between a burgeoning capitalist China proper and a nomadic and primitive frontier. The term was originally used by the Comintern; it was introduced into the manifesto of the First United Front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party in to identify the various non-Han peoples and to incorporate them into the new, inclusive Zhonghua nation-state. A similar change is evident concerning the right of self-determination. This notion was transferred from the Leninist rhetoric in Soviet Russia to the debates in China by Mao Zedong “ From the beginning, the Han majority was seen as the most advanced of all the nationalities, the standard against which the minorities had to be evaluated. The Communist party-state adopted the former Republican-era narratives of a racially homogenous Zhonghua minzu for its own purposes. Hundreds of ethnologists, linguists, historians, sociologists, and archaeologists were divided into teams to examine the claims of over four hundred self-reported groups. The minority population was then divided according to the political interests of the Communist Party, which decided which groups were entitled to minority rights under Chinese law. The ethnic-identification campaign was followed by nationwide linguistic field studies to help the minorities create and reform their written languages. Hundreds of books on minority history and language were published to enforce the state-recognized ethnic structure. This regional nationality autonomy combined both territorial and ethnic principles, and thus incorporated Han Chinese who lived in the locality. Unlike in the Soviet Union, the legitimacy of secession was denied. The Communist party-state exercised leadership by classifying the ethnic groups: As part of the United Front Strategy, the Communists tried to get the minorities to recognize the new Chinese state. In sum, nationality was constructed as a relational identity in a system of differences. The new leadership offered them a trade: There was a second ethnic campaign in the s, when around five million people recovered or changed their minority status. Moreover, the violent introduction to socialism from the late s onward, which brought class struggle and the elimination of the upper classes to the autonomous regions, triggered vehement resistance, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang. Their critical geostrategic position within the Chinese polity, combined with their adherence to a world religion, made the Tibetans and Uyghurs a highly sensitive issue for the central government. Intragroup identity was mainly reduced to ethnic-language learning, religious practices, and exclusively ethnic-based marriages. In the post-Mao era an experimental process of reform and opening up dominated the state and society alike. It was reflected in vivid discourses about Chinese nationalism and identity, including new attitudes toward the question of ethnicity. The abandonment of a monolithic perspective on Chinese nationalism paved the way for an inclusive, multiethnic concept of Chinese history. Bai Shouyi “ was one of the historians who also advocated for an autonomous historiography of the minorities. In fact, the visibility of minority scholars increased in the last decade of the 20th century. At the same time, Han migration the increasingly threatened the cultural identity of minorities in the autonomous regions. The Han have outnumbered the local non-Han population nearly everywhere. As a result they interact with the Chinese government in different ways. With more than ten million members, they represent the largest group of all ten Muslim nationalities. Although the government in had created the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in the northwest, the Hui, unlike other minorities, are not territory-based but scattered all over China. Like the Manchus, they are strongly Sinicized. The cultural differences among Hui communities across the country are far greater than their distance from their local non-Hui neighbors.

## CONTEMPORARY MINORITY MIGRATION, EDUCATION, AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA pdf

Considering this experience of locally different social worlds and their commitment to various imagined communities, it is impossible to regard all Hui as a single ethnic group.

### 6: minority education in china | Download eBook pdf, epub, tuebl, mobi

*Contemporary minority migration, education, and ethnicity in China / Robyn Iredale, Naran Bilik, Wang Su ; with contributions from Fei Guo, Caroline Hoy. Access to this resource may be restricted to users from specific IU campuses.*

### 7: Minority Education In China | Download eBook PDF/EPUB

*The University of Chicago Press. Books Division. Chicago Distribution Center.*

### 8: Download [PDF] Minority Education In China Free Online | New Books in Politics

*China has been ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse. This volume recasts the pedagogical and policy challenges of minority education in China in the light of the state's efforts to balance unity and diversity.*

### 9: Nationalism and Minorities in China - Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History

*The Contemporary Ethnic Minority in China: An Introduction The migration patterns of ethnic minority holders of urban. "The Education of Ethnic Minorities in Beijing." Ethnic and.*

# CONTEMPORARY MINORITY MIGRATION, EDUCATION, AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA pdf

*Life in the Human Body (Microhabitats) Accounting information system chapter 7 Holt physics book Matthew gast 802.11 wireless networks the definitive guide Kick the junk food habit with snackers Banks, skating on thin ice. Abbreviations 213 Bedford introduction to literature 10th edition Medical Entomology for Students Auckland Unplugged, Coping with Critical Infrastructure Failure Pg trb maths study material Sino-Judaic studies Too much is not enough, theatrical public relations in the age of the Blackberry<sup>TM</sup> Adrian Br Fantasy nfl draft tracker Ten short novels, with general introduction and prefaces The Life and Times of Duke Ellington (Masters of Music) Some useful irreducibility criteria M2/M3 Bradley in action Game Aid for Jovian Chronicles (Gamemastering Made Easy) An overview of structured investment vehicles and other special purpose companies by Cristina Polizu The anatomy of some scientific ideas. Workbook to accompany Rendez-vous The War Against Gibeon Soviet transport aircraft since 1945. Schools, courts, and the law Fact versus fiction : bringing self-injury into the light Thermodynamics and the Design, Analysis and Improvement of Energy Systems (Advanced Energy Systems AES) Economic survey of madhya pradesh Cultural conflict Pressman software engineering 7th edition Towards authentic Christian spirituality Gifted adolescents Anti-cancer, heart attack, stroke diet Development of the vasculature Combat Conditioning The Mountain Poems of Meng Hao-Jan Lizzie Blakeston. The invention of Howard Johnsons restaurants Democracy, good governance and blame-avoidance Carrier 30gx chiller manual*