

1: Essentially contested concept - Wikipedia

'Contested Social Orders and International Politics' posits an international system that consists not of competing state but of social orders among which there exist varying degrees of compatibility and rivalry.

Lerche III We live in a world that is simultaneously shrinking and expanding, growing closer and farther apart. National borders are increasingly irrelevant. And yet globalism is by no means triumphant. Tribalisms of all kinds flourish. Irredentism abounds. Attali, Because of the great increase in the traffic in culture, the large-scale transfer of meaning systems and symbolic forms, the world is increasingly becoming one not only in political and economic terms. This, however, is no egalitarian global village. Hannerz, The pace of global change is extremely rapid, and even those trained to track and analyze it have difficulty keeping up with new developments. However, trends are regularly observed and named, and these new terms become "buzz words" in the lexicons of governments, academia and the media. Such a term is globalization. All levels of society are being reshaped by this process: At the moment there is a serious contradiction between the fact that globalization is in full swing, and the fact that existing processes of global governance lack sufficient power, authority and scope to regulate and direct this process toward beneficial ends. As a result globalization is often disruptive and inequitable in its effects. It has also posed new challenges for existing public institutions while at the same time weakening their autonomy and support; and, paradoxically, provided the means for those it excludes culturally or economically to organize against its subordinating and homogenizing force. Many analysts have pointed to the turbulent nature of this planetary process and to the increasing frequency and variety of reactions to it. Drawing on this literature, this paper first attempts to clarify various aspects of globalization and then considers its potential for generating social conflict and unrest. Subsequently, human needs theory, as developed and applied by John Burton, is used to explore some of the roots of these conflicts and, finally, globalism is put forth as a positive, and potentially corrective, dimension of globalization.

A Closer Look Definitions There are a variety of definitions and descriptions of globalization, which, though overlapping in many respects, do emphasize different dimensions of the process. Globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole. Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very distanced relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalisation as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space. Giddens, However, it is in regard to business and economics that the term "globalization" is most frequently invoked. What is referred to here is: The primary vehicles for this process have been the increasing transnationalization of production, and the resulting rise in influence of multinational enterprises, and even more importantly, the explosion in the volume and scope of transactions on international financial markets. In this regard, consider the following commentary on contemporary change in the banking industry: Banking is rapidly becoming indifferent to the constraints of time, place and currency. And one of its most often noted effects is the homogenization of consumer markets around the world, at least in certain areas--the so-called "McDonaldization" of global consumption. Critiques Though often touted as representing the height of economic rationality, globalization has also been portrayed as having a very dark side. Critics repeatedly point out that the contemporary form of globalization, driven by economic power, clearly promotes the hegemony of Western culture and corporations; puts jobs and communities at risk in the rich countries and exploits cheap labor in the poorer countries; increases threats to the environment; and undermines the foundations of democracy and social stability by subjecting national political institutions to forces of economic change beyond their control. It produces concentrations and deprivations which, in the aggregate, constitute an increasingly well-defined global power structure. Claude Ake, a leading African critical thinker, has argued in this regard that: Economic forces are constituting the world into one economy and, to a lesser extent, one political society. Nations participate in global governance according to their economic power, which is coextensive with their rights. Critics also argue that there is a

neo-liberal ideology of globalization which serves to "normalize" the process - to make it seem natural, inevitable and beneficial. Thus, while it is clearly in the particular interest of big multinational and global corporations to be free to move money, factories and goods around the planet seeking access to the cheapest factors of production, the most congenial regulatory environments and the most lucrative markets, the ideology of globalization promotes the belief that the interests of humanity and even of the earth itself will also be best served if world markets are "... Greater income inequality is not the only social failure generated by the success of globalization generally and by NAFTA particularly. Environmental destruction is surely exacerbated with the success of globalization. The greater mobility of capital makes it more and more difficult for citizens of any one political unit to organize and use their government to impose regulations on polluting firms MacEwan, Though one should not necessarily take all this criticism at face value, it does reflect what can go wrong as corporations and capital have acquired the means to move and operate on a much broader scale. Furthermore, it conveys a sense of alarm that the nation-state as an institutional structure cannot cope effectively with these new developments, and, in fact, finds its own priorities and policies heavily influenced, if not dictated, by them. The question then arises, who will articulate and defend the public interest against the global reach of private financial and commercial interests, when the latter go too far? For instance, all but the most laissez-faire of economic thinking argue that governments must intervene to protect the public when markets fail, i. However, efforts to implement such a strategy at the global level, through various multilateral and international institutions, have achieved little. Consequently, world markets have become increasingly concentrated in major sectors. Furthermore, while there is a case to be made for reducing expensive and inefficient government regulatory structures, the lack of adequate regulatory standards applying across borders does provide an incentive for multinational firms to choose less-regulated operating environments, and involves countries seeking foreign investment in a "race for the bottom" competition to see who can provide the most "free" and least regulated business environment The Economist, July In summary, there does appear to be at least "a kernel of truth" in the negative characterization of globalization, and this judgment becomes even more plausible when globalization is evaluated as an "engine" of social conflict. Globalization and Conflict Though the previous discussion is suggestive, the link between globalization and conflict requires further explication. Much of the literature distinguishes between conflicts which focus on issues of culture and identity, and others which appear to be primarily economic, and the discussion that follows adopts this approach while acknowledging that in practice the two elements are interrelated. Conflicts of world views and interests should not, however, be seen as inherently threatening or negative. Indeed many of the tensions of social change are largely unavoidable, and some are undoubtedly creative in their effects. At the same time, however, the analysis which follows suggests that if the human needs and rights issues involved are not adequately addressed, the incidence and intensity of social conflict associated with globalization are likely to increase steadily in the years ahead. The Pace and Scope of Change Social change, in and of itself, has historically been associated with increasing levels of conflict. This has been explored in great depth by P. His study of twelve European countries and empires over the period B. Such periods of change are, by definition, transitional, and are characterized by conflicts of values and interests, which have become widespread and violent. One of the few points of agreement among globalization commentators as diverse as Richard Barnett Barnett and Cavanagh, and Ruud Lubbers Lubbers, is that the spreading and acceleration of globalization is generating change on an unprecedented scale. Following Arnold Toynbee Toynbee, it could be further argued that the conflicts generated by globalization represent a significant early challenge to what he himself saw as an emerging world civilization Toynbee, The Paradox of Reflexivity Several analysts have argued that one of the effects of rapid changes in societies around the world is to increase reflexivity, which, in turn, contributes to the incidence of conflict. Consider this passage from Waters: Social activity is constantly informed by flows of information and analysis which subject it to continuous revision and thereby constitute and reproduce it. The particular difficulty faced by moderns is that this knowledge itself is constantly changing so that living in a modern society appears to be uncontrolled, like being aboard a careening juggernaut These expert systems have, for instance, given rise to a technocratic style of civil administration. Growing reflexivity is, however, undermining trust in expert systems around the globe. In regard to more and more issues there is a feeling that

experts have either failed, or do not have the public interest at heart. Spybey, for instance describes how in "late modern society" there is a: He goes on to state: If, in the nineteenth century, those people who understood it and had access to its benefits rejoiced in the bounty of modernity and its scientific-technological wonders, the people of late modernity are cultured to expect mass consumption but are increasingly sufficiently well informed to develop doubts about its benefits. This is self-reflexivity and it is stimulated by negative experiences shared on a global scale, like for instance the Chernobyl disaster. It is individualism, enabled by mass education and encouraged by posts permissiveness and self-awareness. In a similar vein, James Rosenau has written at length about what he calls the "global authority crisis" and his analysis provides insight into the nature and scope of political conflict in a world of globalized "postinternational politics. If leaders are not able to find more effective means to gather support, people " He goes on to illustrate how crises of this kind interact and "cascade" around the planet: By virtue of the information flows and of the interaction engendered by refugees, traders, terrorists, and other boundary-spanning individuals and groups, authority crises overlap and cascade across collectivities, forming linkages among them on an issue or regional basis *ibid*. Giddens and Rosenau describe a world in which people are more aware, and to some extent more empowered by their access to information and their increased ability to analyze the events shaping their lives. In this picture, populations have become less compliant and more demanding at precisely the time when national political institutions, as described below, are in many cases reducing their budgets and programs. But reflexivity, while aided and stimulated by globalized media and information technology, is also threatened by these same forces. Increasingly powerful media giants diffuse the ideology of globalization, with the effect that: Global marketing, international stock markets, and the availability of nomadic world-wide venture capital complete the scene for the rise of a global market value system. No culture is protected by topography, tradition or just plain disinterest--essentially nobody is out of reach of the extended arm of Globalization. Steingard and Fitzgibbons, Thus, globalization both enlightens and pacifies, both widens horizons and narrows vision. However, it does seem that the globalization narrative of the media is vulnerable to increasing cognitive dissonance as its utopian image of widening prosperity is subverted by images of deprivation and marginalization, and by a rising tide of insecurity and anxiety. Globalization and Identity Another paradoxical effect of intensifying globalization, is that while it seeks to homogenize, is also increases awareness of social heterogeneity. Groups whose identity and solidarity is based on race, ethnicity, religion, language have become increasingly vocal and have used the global media to make their discontent known. This contemporary "ethnic revival" was to some degree "unleashed" by the end of the Cold War. These minorities often see the state as no longer a promoter and protector of domestic interests, but rather a collaborator with outside forces Scholte, The overall effect of these developments has been to increase the salience of cultural diversity issues, both within and across borders, for all the major players in world politics. Several prominent political analysts have argued variations on this theme. Samuel Huntington, for instance, has put forth inter-civilizational conflict as the new "danger" to the dominant powers in world affairs, stating that " Globalization in its contemporary form is the carrier of values which are essentially Western and liberal in character, but they are being aggressively promoted internationally as universal values, the inherent worth of which should be obvious to all right-thinking people. Huntington is explicit about debunking the globalization myth that world culture is Western culture, and argues further that: Such cultural anxieties are welcome fuel to more radical political groups that call for cultural authenticity, preservation of traditional and religious values, and rejection of the alien cultural antigens. Big Macs become in-your-face symbols of American power--political, economic, and military--over weak or hesitant societies and states Fuller, Fuller also argues that, on a shrinking planet, the West cannot escape the secondary effects of these conflicts: Chaos and turmoil in various regions create serious ripple effects that will not leave the rest of the globe untouched: Wars, refugees, embargoes, sanctions, weapons of mass destruction, radical ideology, and terrorism all emerge from the crucible of the failing state order The West will not be able to quarantine less-developed states and their problems indefinitely, any more than states can indefinitely quarantine the dispossessed within their own societies--on practical as well as moral grounds , Fundamentalisms of various kinds are prominent in the conflicts of "cultural reaction. They feel even more threatened now as their national institutions are

undermined by the international pressures described earlier.

2: IGS Article - Theoretical & methodological challenges of neo-Gramscian IPE

Get this from a library! Contested social orders and international politics. [David Skidmore:] -- The organizing principle of this volume is a focus on how the domestic social order affects a country's foreign relations.

United States[edit] Alfred Thayer Mahan and sea power[edit] Alfred Thayer Mahan " , a frequent commentator on world naval strategic and diplomatic affairs, believed that national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea"and particularly with its commercial use in peace and its control in war. He proposed six conditions required for a nation to have sea power: Advantageous geographical position; Serviceable coastlines, abundant natural resources, and favorable climate; Extent of territory Population large enough to defend its territory; Society with an aptitude for the sea and commercial enterprise; and Government with the influence and inclination to dominate the sea. Mahan regarded those countries, located between Britain and Russia, as if between "Scylla and Charybdis". Of the two monsters " Britain and Russia " it was the latter that Mahan considered more threatening to the fate of Central Asia. Therefore, he found it necessary for the Anglo-Saxon "sea power" to resist Russia. The "fatal" relationship of Russia, Japan, and Germany "has now assumed through the urgency of natural forces a coalition directed against the survival of Saxon supremacy. He thought the Anglo-Saxons faced certain disaster from their militant opponents. He later revised it to mark Northern Eurasia as a pivot while keeping area marked above as Heartland. He saw navy as a basis of Colombian era empire roughly from to the 19th century , and predicted the 20th century to be domain of land power. Not only was the Periphery noticeably smaller than the World Island, it necessarily required much sea transport to function at the technological level of the World Island"which contained sufficient natural resources for a developed economy. Mackinder posited that the industrial centers of the Periphery were necessarily located in widely separated locations. The World Island could send its navy to destroy each one of them in turn, and could locate its own industries in a region further inland than the Periphery so they would have a longer struggle reaching them, and would face a well-stocked industrial bastion. Mackinder called this region the Heartland. It essentially comprised Central and Eastern Europe: Ukraine , Western Russia , and Mitteleuropa. Who rules Central and Eastern Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-Island commands the World. Spykman is both a follower and critic of geostrategists Alfred Mahan , and Halford Mackinder. He extends this to include the unity of the air. Spykman suggested this required that attempts by Heartland nations particularly Russia to conquer ports in the Rimland must be prevented. Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world. Following Mackinder he suggested an alliance with the Soviet Union and, advancing a step beyond Mackinder, added Japan to his design of the Eurasian Bloc. Both continued their influence on geopolitics after the end of the Cold War, [28] writing books on the subject in the " Diplomacy Kissinger and The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. Kissinger argued against the approach that with the dissolution of the USSR hostile intentions had disappeared and traditional foreign policy considerations no longer applied. During the Cold War, Kissinger argues, both sides of the Atlantic recognized that, "unless America is organically involved in Europe, it would be obliged to involve itself later under circumstances far less favorable to both sides of the Atlantic. That is even more true today. Germany has become so strong that existing European institutions cannot by themselves strike a balance between Germany and its European partners. Nor can Europe, even with Germany, manage by itself [] Russia. They would raise fears of condominium. Cold War or no Cold War. For such a grouping would have the capacity to outstrip America economically and, in the end, militarily. That danger would have to be resisted even were the dominant power apparently benevolent, for if the intentions ever changed, America would find itself with a grossly diminished capacity for effective resistance and a growing inability to shape events. Now, however, he stressed on the beginning of the Cold War: Living with China, Europe, and Russia. It follows that" American foreign policy must"employ its influence in Eurasia in a manner that creates a stable continental equilibrium, with the United States as the political arbiter. German geopolitics develops the concept of Lebensraum living space that is thought to be necessary to the development of a nation like a favorable natural

environment would be for animals. Ratzel published several papers, among which was the essay "Lebensraum" concerning biogeography. Ratzel created a foundation for the German variant of geopolitics, geopolitik. Influenced by the American geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, Ratzel wrote of aspirations for German naval reach, agreeing that sea power was self-sustaining, as the profit from trade would pay for the merchant marine, unlike land power. The geopolitical theory of Ratzel has been criticized as being too sweeping, and his interpretation of human history and geography being too simple and mechanistic. Critically, he also underestimated the importance of social organization in the development of power. States have, Haushofer argued, an undeniable right to seek natural borders which would guarantee autarky. Popular views of the role of geopolitics in the Nazi Third Reich suggest a fundamental significance on the part of the geo-politicians in the ideological orientation of the Nazi state. Bassin reveals that these popular views are in important ways misleading and incorrect. Despite the numerous similarities and affinities between the two doctrines, geopolitics was always held suspect by the National Socialist ideologists. This was understandable, for the underlying philosophical orientation of geopolitics did not comply with that of National Socialism. These differences led after to friction and ultimately to open denunciation of geopolitics by Nazi ideologues. The resultant negative association, particularly in U.S. This has been observed in particular by critics of contemporary academic geography, and proponents of a "neo"-classical geopolitics in particular. These include Haverluk et al. However, this negative association is not as strong in disciplines such as History or Political Science, which make use of geopolitical concepts. Classical Geopolitics forms an important element of analysis for Military History as well as for subdisciplines of Political Science such as International Relations and Security Studies. This difference in disciplinary perspectives is addressed by Bert Chapman in *Geopolitics: A Guide To the Issues*, in which Chapman makes note that academic and professional International Relations journals are more amenable to the study and analysis of Geopolitics, and in particular Classical Geopolitics, than contemporary academic journals in the field of Political Geography. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. May Learn how and when to remove this template message

French geopolitical doctrines broadly opposed to German Geopolitik and reject the idea of a fixed geography. It also relies on the consideration of long time periods through a refusal to take specific events into account. This method has been theorized by Professor Lacoste according to three principles: Representation; Diachronie; and Diatopie. In *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu outlined the view that man and societies are influenced by climate. He believed that hotter climates create hot-tempered people and colder climates aloof people, whereas the mild climate of France is ideal for political systems. Alike Ratzel, he considers geography through a global vision. His marginal political views resulted in his rejection by academia. This method was inspired by the French geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache who in turn was influenced by German thought, particularly that of Friedrich Ratzel whom he had met in Germany. Due to the influence of German Geopolitik on French geopolitics, the latter were for a long time banished from academic works. This book—which is very famous in France—symbolizes the birth of this new school of geopolitics if not so far the first French school of geopolitics as Ancel was very isolated in the 1940s. Initially linked with communist party evolved to a less liberal approach. While rejecting the generalizations and broad abstractions employed by the German and Anglo-American traditions and the new geographers, this school does focus on spatial dimension of geopolitics affairs on different levels of analysis. This approach emphasises the importance of multi-level or multi-scales analysis and maps at the opposite of critical geopolitics which avoid such tools. Lacoste proposed that every conflict both local or global can be considered from a perspective grounded in three assumptions: Each group or individuals is the product of an education and is characterized by specific representations of the world or others groups or individuals. Thus, basic societal beliefs are grounded in their ethnicity or specific location. The study of representation is a common point with the more contemporary critical geopolitics. Conducting an historical analysis confronting "long periods" and short periods as the prominent French historian Fernand Braudel suggested. Conducting a cartographic survey through a multiscale mapping. He coined various neologism among them: Neologism that describes the concept of studying the birth of borders, Dyade: Michel Foucher is an expert of the African

Union for borders affairs. Thual was a French expert in geopolitics, and a former official of the Ministry of Civil Defence. Thual taught geopolitics of the religions at the French War College, and has written thirty books devoted mainly to geopolitical method and its application to various parts of the world. He is particularly interested in the Orthodox, Shiite, and Buddhist religions, and in troubled regions like the Caucasus. Thual, Aymeric Chauprade, former professor of geopolitics at the French War College and now member of the extreme-right party "Front national", subscribes to a supposed "new" French school of geopolitics which advocates above all a return to realpolitik and "clash of civilization" Huntington. The thought of this school is expressed through the French Review of Geopolitics headed by Chauprade and the International Academy of Geopolitics. Chauprade is a supporter of a Europe of nations, he advocates a European Union excluding Turkey, and a policy of compromise with Russia in the frame of a Eurasian alliance which is en vogue among European extreme-right politists and supports the idea of a multipolar worldâ€”including a balanced relationship between China and the U. , which analyzes the international and domestic situations and develops geopolitical doctrine. The Geopolitical Future of Russia " in , which has had a large influence within the Russian military, police, and foreign policy elites. Meta-geopolitics defines seven key dimensions of state power that include social and health issues, domestic politics, economics, environment, science and human potential, military and security issues, and international diplomacy. Furthermore, while this analytical grid is relevant for states, it also applies to private and transnational entities, which are playing an increasingly important role in contemporary geopolitics.

3: International Security & Foreign Policy - SRF

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The evidence is pervasive and clear, however, that religion has disappeared nowhere but changed everywhere. For those expecting its attenuation to accompany modernization, religion remains surprisingly vibrant and socially salient. This is particularly true in America, but in much of the rest of the world as well, where religion continues to be a potent factor in the emerging global order and its conflicts. It is in parts of Western Europe where individual religiosity has been radically transformed that the secularization thesis seems to work the best. Religion is a significant factor in voting patterns, ideology about public policy, and political careers. But pervasive evidence also exists for changes that many observers see as religious decline: Tolerance of "other religions" grows along with declines in specific confessional and denominational loyalties. Responding to religious persistence as well as perceived declines, social scientists have created neosecularization perspectives, ostensibly faithful to contemporary facts as well as classical theory. They understand modernization not to involve the actual disappearance of religion, but perhaps as attenuation and certainly as changing religious forms in relation to other institutions. From the assumed benchmark of unitary religion in medieval Europe, scholars have argued variously that secularization involved the differentiation of religion from other institutional realms, the privatization of religious belief and experience, desacralization and the declining scope of religious authority, and the "liberalization" of religious doctrine. See Dobbleare, ; Chaves, ; Hadden, ; Hammond, ; Wald, ; and Wilson, Secularization theory, including its amended forms, has yielded many fruitful observations, and the secularization debate continues with great vigor about both the reality and the usefulness of its perspectives. See, for instance, Lechner, ; Stark and Iaconne, ; Yamane, While we do not disparage its usefulness, we think that contested issues have narrowed so that, increasingly, facts are less in question as much as are definitional, methodological, and epistemological issues or perhaps attachment to received social science traditions. In this paper we consider the relationship between social change and religion using perspectives other than secularization. Specifically, we utilize perspectives from 1 broad currents of world-historical change, 2 communication and media studies, and 3 postmodernism. We assume that like other institutional realms, religion is embedded in a broad process of sociocultural change, and that in this process religion is not passive, as so often depicted in secularization or modernization theory. Like other spheres, it is a partly autonomous force, reflexively shaping and being shaped by that large-scale transformation. This paper does not offer either new empirical observations or different causal explanations of large-scale change patterns. Rather it uses contemporary analytic frameworks to develop a broad overview of religious change, while suggesting parallel changes in other social spheres that are all embedded in the large-scale sociocultural transformation now occurring. We are more interested in the last part of this trichotomy, even though its contours, salient features, and the very terms to describe it are less clear. e. Pre-modern Traditional societies Spanning most of human history from roughly 8, B. Such local communities tightly bound space and time to particular places. In relatively self-contained communities, knowledge and beliefs were transmitted by oral traditions and strongly rooted in personal and local experience. Innis, ; Ong, Such communities were highly aware of being surrounded by very different "others" in different villages and other places. People understood that human life and nature were ruled by powerful natural and supernatural external forces, but spheres of social life like religion were still relatively fused and unitary, as were other institutional spheres like the family, work, medicine, or politics. The masses of ordinary villagers only dimly recognized religion or much else as distinct from a seamless web of personal and social life. Religio-magical ceremonies, ritual, and practice were personally conducted between, and strongly identified with, known and intimate others. Indeed, there is little evidence that abstract somethings called religion, religious faith, or different religions existed as words or ideas before the s. Historical research suggests that people in traditional societies rarely understood themselves as participating in something that scholars of later centuries would

label as religion, and particularly not as Christianity, Hinduism, or Buddhism Smith, To ask pre-moderns about most of the sociocultural forms we associate with religion today would simply be an unintelligible question. Much of the usual history of traditional societies is written about their integrative systems of empire, where legitimacy was conferred by oral vows of loyalty, and about their differentiated panoply of dynastic rulers, soldiers, scribes, priests, merchants, and sorcerers. This controlling layer maintained itself by coercively expropriating the wealth of rural village communities, but otherwise left the inhabitants of these villages free to control their daily lives and to participate directly in their more immediate political, sociocultural, and religious spheres. Early modernity Modern sociocultural systems originated in post Feudal Europe in the commercial and industrial revolutions, when centers of economic production gradually shifted from the countryside to burgeoning cities. Separate pre-modern communities began to form broader integrated market systems, as competitive production for commodity exchange gradually replaced production for consumption. Industrial capitalism, driven by trade and colonialism, began its slow world-wide diffusion. Midth century social theory described emergent modernity in terms of the progressive growth in scale and differentiation of social institutions and the compartmentalization and specialization of the social roles of persons Parsons, ; Smelser, --also the touchstones of neosecularization theory. More recent analyses of modernity emphasize: Two pervasive mechanisms drove these processes: Expert systems reflected the central ethos of the European Enlightenment, that scientific knowledge and rationality would tame the natural world and overcome the dogmas of tradition Giddens, Organizations became the emblematic social forms of modernizing systems, particularly the nation state, as face-to-face feudal relations gave way to nationalism, changing the boundaries of "us" and "others. Over several hundred years, organizations proliferated and became more distinct, and, as Foucault observed, the boundaries or "membranes" around prisons, hospitals, military barracks, factories, and schools thickened People were increasingly separated from households into groups with homogenous purposes and identities. Print communication, later augmented by electronic media like radio and television, fostered far broader solidarity than could the oral media of traditional societies. Printed texts increasingly shaped intellectual worldviews and national myths, as printed constitutions and laws literally helped constitute nations, laws, and national myths Meyrowitz, Like learning and work, worship and religious devotion became increasingly separate and distinct. Religion in larger organizations was distinguished from the shared worship with those one could see, hear, and touch, as in more traditional orders. People increasingly understood religion as activities, organizations, and beliefs as distinct from other institutional spheres, and by the 14th or 15th century it was possible for many Europeans to speak of my religion, religion in general, and other religions Smith, ; Meyrowitz, As with other institutions in modern systems, organizations or organized religion, as constituted by churches, denominations, and sects, provided the context in which to understand religious belief and practice. Modern religious organizations could unify people across broader spans of time and space utilizing printed holy texts of religious literature and doctrine, or expert systems of special religious knowledge created by theologians, clergy, and bishops. Religious belonging increasingly became a matter of accepting formalized religious doctrines, creeds, and confessional statements e. Our point is that much of the current controversy concerning religion is about changes in the on-going fates of the predominant social forms of religion, that emerged in modern societies as late in human history as the s. Late or High Modernity Early modernity carried the seeds of its own transformation. In our view such large-scale transformations are typically gradual and continuous with the past, rather than discontinuous, sudden, apocalyptic, or revolutionary. Electronic communication media continues to augment print, thereby facilitating globalization by making all nations and regions informationally permeable e. TVs, satellite communication, personal computers, and web pages Meyrowitz, Giddens contends that globalization is inherent in the fundamental social processes of modernism. The emergence of global-scale economies and institutional connections, however rational to those enterprises themselves, vastly increase the separation of time and space and the disembedding of social relations, often rendering social life incomprehensible to ordinary persons Even though a variety of expert systems dominate the production of knowledge and policy in modern societies, the dream of the Enlightenment, to replace irrational dogmas and superstitions of traditional societies with rational certainty, has failed abysmally. Because expert knowledge, including that of

theologians, becomes more specified but about less and less, comprehending and living life becomes more and more difficult. Both larger systems and personal life become infused with uncertainty. Traditional life was more objectively hazardous and risky than life in the modern world but, ironically, expert knowledge and abstract systems have increased the awareness of uncertainties and risks. Matters are continually open to change and doubt, and have probabilistic outcomes. Ulrich Beck therefore characterized modern societies as "risk societies," in which individual action and organizational policy are driven not by a sense of certainty or fate but by calculating the odds. What are some basic social change processes of the transformation to late modernity? Thus dual processes, both integrating and fractionating, shape the current sociocultural transformation. These are analytic categories that express and summarize the cumulative effects of other diverse factors and processes. Integrating processes have their sources in the rise of new information technologies and in sociotechnical forces that facilitate the spatial spread of ideas, money, products, and human problems of many kinds. For particular organizations, integration is often accelerated by threats from a broader competitive climate and the necessity of organizations to protect their viability or profitability by growth, mergers, or alliances. These processes are associated with the emergence of broad but abstract cultural themes that may threaten particular other ones. In the transition to late-modernism, these forces effect organizations of all kinds: Everyday life becomes more ambiguous or hollowed out, and growing contingencies lead people to withdraw commitments and legitimacy from large systems. Integrating processes may also threaten the everyday life of persons as organizations seek to survive by the efficiency of removing the costs of labor. Thus, there is often a congruence among consciousness, ambiguity, and practical necessity that amplifies attempts to preserve, revive, or reconstitute relatively micro, private, local, or subnational spheres of both personal and social life. Featherstone, and Lasch, Next, we illustrate these processes with particular emphasis on religious change. We rely heavily on American evidence and case materials, but we think that the substance of our argument has wider implications. Growing large-scale relations in many spheres of social life began by the s, perhaps earlier. They accelerated and became more visible after World War II, understood as globalization by the s Robertson, Illustrations include the emergence of a world market system, multinational corporations, a world network of national governments and treaty organizations like N. Most of these are not religiously connected, but some are Boli and Thomas, Illustrating similar processes that elaborate broad religious structures across previously existing boundaries is not hard. Ecumenical ventures, like the National Council of Churches, represent a unifying effort, even it at times resorted to out of weakness. Such ventures, however, result in limited cross-boundary ties--given the extraordinary diversity of religious culture and doctrine in the United States. Organic mergers, such as that which gave rise to the United Church of Christ, have occurred, but are rare and usually viable only among organizations having common or compatible religious histories or cultures. Consultations, cooperation, and communion on practical, humanitarian, and even political matters--like the Christian Coalition--are more common, to which we would add new religious or quasi-religious enterprises like Promise Keepers and the Marriage Encounter Movement, which also transcend denominational boundaries. Wuthnow has documented the increasing organization and mobilization of religious resources across denominational lines, along with declining denominational conflicts and prejudices. Catholicism comes most easily to mind, and observers have noted both the strengthening of Papal supremacy, and the internationalization of Catholicism, so that it has not only "a structure centered on Rome, but also a remarkable increase in transnational Catholic networks and exchanges of all kinds that criss-cross nations and world regions, often bypassing Rome" Cassanova, ; see also Della Cava, In the shadow niches of Catholicism, both liberation theology base communities as well as Pentecostalism have become truly international, the one associated with radical politics and the other more apolitical Thomas, Even though formally apolitical, Pentecostalism, like other transnational Christian conservative movements, is neither escapist nor passive. Pentecostals use their religion to actively organize modern life and push for cultural transformations. In Latin America, for instance, while typically patriarchal, Pentecostalism stands staunchly against machismo culture. Turning to the non-Christian world, it is difficult to understand Islam as anything other than transnational. It dominates much of the world between Morocco and Mindanao, and it is the fastest growing religious affiliation in North America, perhaps in the world. We also note the enormous

popularity of Buddhism in the West, particularly among American intellectuals, among whom it resonates culturally with the renaissance of mystical religiosity and spirituality. Of the world religions, Hinduism and perhaps Judaism, are the remaining ones with distinct, though greatly contested, national bases. Truly cross boundary ecumenical relations also exist among formations within historic world religions, if not between them. There are, for instance, the loosely connected World Council of Protestant Churches, and other Christian ecumenical efforts: Lutheran-Catholic conversations, Catholic Anglican conversations, and ecumenical conversations between the Orthodox and Western Catholic Church. But there are still deep divisions between, for instance, evangelical and liberal Protestants, Sunni and Shia Muslims, and Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhists. We argue in this article that as religions become truly transnational, there is, with notable exceptions, a process of disestablishment, whereby religions relinquish the most particularistic claims to legitimacy and privilege, and mobilize to protect universal human rights and democratic civil society. Witness, for example, the warm reception of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause by both secular and religious leaders around the world, or the expansion of humanitarian or environmental INGOs that are not explicitly religious.

Contested Social Orders and overseas Politics therefore posits a global method that is composed now not of competing states yet of social orders between which there exist various levels of compatibility and contention.

What I want to demonstrate in this chapter is the challenge anarchism poses for the academic study of international relations and, potentially, political science more broadly. These two ambitions are linked, of course. The Political Discourse of Anarchy One of the main hurdles to an empowering praxis of international relations is the grip that common conceptions of anarchy in international relations have on the political imagination. The international anarchy between states, the lack of a world government and the problems of cooperation that allegedly emerge from a condition of anarchic self-help, is said to be the principal block to emancipatory politics. By most accounts, anarchy is the problem to be resolved, though few believe this to be possible and many see the international anarchy as a transhistorical fact of life. Order is not only possible in the international anarchy, but the norm. But how can this be so? They exist in anarchy. Why, then, are states not constantly at war with one another if there is no superior power to keep them all in awe? While anarchy is permissive of war, Waltz argues, the self-help structure that emerges between states forces them to balance against one another and avoid war wherever possible, mainly because of its costs. It is this defensive strategy and the relative benefits provided by a balance of power state autonomy that ensures order. Because no one is charged with protecting states, Waltz argues that states must become self-regarding power-maximizers, concerned with their own survival. Because they also cannot rely on the cooperation of other states, defection being a likely outcome if none are compelled to cooperate, each state is mutually vulnerable and deeply suspicious of the aggrandizing tendencies of other states. Because states might go to war at any time, preparing for it is vital. Nevertheless, most of the debate in IR over the past 50 years has surrounded precisely this image of world politics. This image corresponds to our inherited and largely intuitive ideas about world politics and it has formed the backbone of thinking about world politics for almost three centuries. An alternative way of seeing the international anarchy is to see states as ensconced in webs of institutional interdependence. International pluralism live and let live or the loose solidarity between like-minded states are both preferable to the universal dominium that the USSR threatened during the Cold War. But it is because Bull sees the institutions of diplomacy and trade and the shared norms that structure the relations between peoples in like-minded states as central to maintaining order, that the international anarchy is more like a society than the billiard ball model would suggest. By way of oversimplification, if what characterizes realism is the centrality of the state and anarchy to their theory, then what characterizes the critical literature, from liberal to feminist and Marxist, is that anarchy must be and is often transcended. First of all, liberals question the centrality of anarchy to world politics, arguing, like Bull, that interdependence is the analytically significant norm, that this supersedes anarchy in the contemporary world order and that the distinction between domestic and international is largely irrelevant in the contemporary globalized world order. To see the international anarchy as a transhistorical feature of world politics is to tacitly endorse masculine practices of world ordering. The anarchic system sustains patriarchy – undermine one and the other will necessarily decline. Surely the reimposition of new hierarchies and new notions of inside and outside will simply recast anarchy in other forms? By this image, anarchy exerts progressive, developmental pressures on political groups and actors. In true Kantian vein,¹¹ Waltz hinted that democratic states are best equipped to respond quickly to outside pressures and to develop domestically. Anarchy can also be seen as the framework for global peace rather than insecurity. Waltz and Wendt are both self-identifying statists, but an anarchist approach can build on Waltz or Wendt to undermine their obvious statism and invert it to anarchistic ends. Under this spell, we cannot see the possibilities inherent in the present and the limits of our own conceptual apparatus. A good place to start might be with the works of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon⁶⁵, the first self-identifying anarchist. Contrary to popular misconceptions, however, a close and contextual reading of these works shows his vision of republican, mutualist federalism to be relatively consistent over that time. While the emphasis may have changed, the underlying vision did not. I will now discuss each in turn.

Modernity is characterized by many things, but the emergence of the rational, sovereign individual is central to the transformation that took place in political thought between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries. As Richard Tuck has shown, the emergence of the individual was also coterminous with the emergence of the state, considered the social group par excellence. How can the autonomy of the individual be reconciled with that of the state and does the state supersede all other groups in society? Answers to this question form the canon of Western political thought, and like his contemporaries, Proudhon also approached the question of international politics in this frame. Thus, the state has no right to dominate all other groups. It is, inter alia, because the state dominates both individuals and groups that it is unjust. This political argument is important and is well known, but the theory of social groups that underpins it dramatically changes the way we understand international politics. As individuals co-act, they become a group. But be clear that this conversion does not lead to the condemnation of individuality; it presupposes it. Language is a good example of one aspect of this process. Without the group, language acquisition becomes impossible and the precise language individuals learn, the unique accent they adopt, is shaped by the groups they grow up in, the geographic moves they make during their youth and so forth. Direct democracy is an example of the influence going the other way. Group politics are shaped by the direct involvement of individuals and what a group decides is identifiably the result of individual input. But the outcome of both processes is irreducible to either group or individual. But where both agreed was that through the imposition of a universal law, an unavoidable degree of force, the mollifications of custom and the complex jiggery pokerey of modern democracy, the state was justified in arrogating to itself the right to direct and adjudicate between all individuals and to supersede all other groups. He argued that just as all individuals are inviolable, so too are all social groups equally sacrosanct. The autonomy of groups, like the autonomy of individuals is central to the possibility of either and to elide that through representation or superveneance allowing the state to supervene all other groups is to elide the very thing that gives associations and ultimately political community itself, dynamism; that is, the autonomy of groups. The state, shorthand for the government for our purposes here, is but one group among many, and is often itself divided between various factions or groups. Other groups might include the judiciary, the army, the police, unions, classes, workshops and so on. How these groups align with one another and whether these groups are autonomous from one another, is what gives a particular constellation its political character. Like in international relations and the balance of power, Proudhon recognized that force was central to politics. At the most basic level, even inanimate objects exert a force of resistance when you bump up against them. One acts against others. Social life is characterized by relations of force exerted by social groups upon one another. This is not to say that might makes right, only that might underpins all conceptions of right. Without force, there is no order as society would atrophy. Like international society, order is maintained and changes through emergent and transforming relations of group force. Whether a given alignment corresponds to classical theories of the state is an empirical question. It is my contention that the sort of total state or leviathan envisaged by Hobbes or Rousseau was, and remains, possible only in a condition of total war, when all social groups pull in the same direction, usually at gunpoint. What also characterizes and distinguishes one society from another is the way in which these underlying relations of social force are rationalized and given moral weight. Religion, liberalism, communism and so forth, all rationalize particular constellations of social force; that is, they rationalize a balance of power within and between the social groups that go to making up a given society. These rationalizations are also emergent systems of justice. For Proudhon Christianity or socialism, are both historically specific manifestations of justice, rationalizing, making sense of and legitimizing the realignment of social groups in relation to one another. For example, the premodern state was constituted by the warrior class, the most heavily armed group in society. Brute force led to the domination of this group over society but that domination was rationalized and legitimized as a manifestation of divine justice. Charlemagne, Alexander the Great and innumerable others embodied this link between divine and temporal power. Nowadays, with the military and the church nominally distinct from the government, different rationalizations of force are articulated through the plural discourses of liberalism, including individual rights, representative democracy, state autonomy and power and so forth, which reflect in and support our modern ideas of justice, order and international anarchy. If force is central to social order

and social change, and if it is through the confluence or conflict between groups that norms emerge, then for Proudhon the social state is a state of war: As societies become more complex, force is sustained without the need for direct violence, by complex juridical or cultural norms or economic interdependence, trust, cooperation and so forth. Moreover, Proudhon saw justice as immanent to and emergent from social conflict: Proudhon proposed federalism as a better way of organizing society. The federative principle was essentially designed to institutionalize the complex diversity of natural groups that go to make up a society without constraining the autonomy of groups or individuals to realign or change in whichever direction they choose. In the absence of formal hierarchy, where none is preponderant, pacts, contracts and treaties specify the status quo. Law should be seen in the same light; not as a universal standard, but as a codification of the political status quo. Federalism conceived as a pact, is a way of seeing the world as much as it is a theory for its reorganization. What it presupposes is the rejection of formal hierarchies and centres of power. Like the republican he was, Proudhon argued that all powers had to be divided. Once groups and powers had been divided, their relations were to be constitutionalized in terms of reciprocal mutuality. This meant that social groups should relate commutatively or horizontally, according to need, in recognition of their mutual vulnerability and interdependence, and on the basis of reciprocal equality of status derived from their natural autonomy. Individual rights would be enshrined in all groups by instituting direct democracy to govern their internal relations, giving each individual the formal right to express their individuality and thereby shape the identity of the group in ways that respected that individuality. Unlike Kant or Petit, Proudhon applied this republican impulse to the economy too. By democratizing property titles, the whims of the capitalist are similarly constrained. Democratizing capital would stop monopoly, would help regulate the relations of enterprises and workshops and would develop systems of regulation and governance that all would participate in willingly and have their voices heard democratically. Economic alienation and political alienation have the same cure – democratize the workplace! Needless to say, this is a million miles away from what we have today. Proudhon thus saw anarchy as the framework which best guaranteed the liberty of all groups, not just the government, and best ensured that groups mutually constrained and enabled one another. Regardless of the focus, however, the social equilibrium that emerges from this confluence of forces is best understood and developed in more just ways using the tools of philosophical anarchism. A World without Sovereigns? What sort of challenge does this pose? Secondly, we can see why talk of international relations is historically specific to a period in which nations went to war with one another and nationalism justified particular historical social relations. Thirdly, anarchy becomes the condition of politics as such. Just because some societies are relatively stable ought not to blind us to the fact that this stability is contingent on the relations of force between social groups holding in their current form. Force, be that violent or otherwise, and the rebalancing of power is the permanent condition of politics. This takes place in a wider and deeper anarchy than IR theorists have been willing to accept but which some anarchists have seen clearly for centuries. As Chris Rosedale, Uri Gordon and others have shown,²⁷ we can act directly in international politics if we rethink where international politics takes place. International politics happens in the realms of everyday life, we just have to see it like that and act accordingly.

5: The Conflicts of Globalization - Charles O. Lerche III; The International Journal for Peace Studies

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Yet, a persistent conventional wisdom suggests ethics are marginal to international relations. This conventional wisdom has two sources. After World War II, as the discipline of international relations was taking shape in the United Kingdom and the United States, a number of prominent scholars holding a realist view on questions of ethics came to dominate the field. Figures such as Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and E. Carr criticized what they saw as the misplaced moralism of earlier scholars who put their faith in the power of law and institutions to reform international relations. Not long after this move toward a realist paradigm that was skeptical of ethics, the discipline also began to focus on developing a value-free social scientific approach that rejected ethical questions as part of the study of international relations, especially in the United States. Yet, these two early shifts in the discipline obscure the fact that questions of ethics have always been part of the study of international relations. International relations, however, is concerned with political events and social forces that impact the lives of individuals, communities, and the human species as a whole, making ethical considerations inescapable. There is a long tradition of ethical reflection on international relations, stretching as far back as human beings have been concerned with intercommunal relations, but these reflections have been a secondary focus to the consideration of ethics and politics within communities. In part, this is why ethical questions about international relations come to the fore during periods of imperial expansion. Just War theory has its roots in St. International law developed as a way of justly dividing the world between sovereign states and savage peoples in need of civilization during the era of European colonialism, and human rights have taken center stage since the end of the Cold War, as the global influence of the United States reached its peak. Today, ethics are increasingly seen as a central part of the study of international relations. This shift has come about partly through the work of critical scholars working in a variety of traditions, who have rejected the long dominance of realism and the aspiration to a value-free social science. These critical voices include liberal political theorists, feminists, critical theorists, postmodernists, and postcolonialists. Along with this shift within the academic study of international relations, important changes have also taken place in the interactions between states. Without suggesting we have gone through an epochal change to a supposedly unprecedented era of globalization, it is clear that the traditional Westphalian state system has changed dramatically. There are more sovereign states than before with a greater equality of political and economic power between regions, while at the same time international institutions and global civil society have expanded, and individuals have more contact with each other outside of their national communities than was previously possible. Together with shifts in how we think about international relations, these social changes have put ethics back onto the agenda. As the current state of the field is defined by a diversity of perspectives and problems, this article is plural in the views represented and as wide ranging in its coverage as space will allow—although students should be aware that much more information is available. Hopefully, other scholars will appreciate that boundaries have to be drawn, and exclusions must be made.

General Overviews Within the field of international relations, ethics took on a more prominent role starting in the s with the rise of feminist approaches, illustrated in edited collections by Narayan and Harding and Whisnant and DesAutels ; the emergence of critical theory, notably in Linklater ; and increasing interest in postmodernist ethics, discussed in the edited volume by Campbell and Shapiro , and traced with great clarity in Hutchings Further, a number of international relations scholars began reexamining the place of normative questions within the tradition of Western thought that forms the core of the discipline. Boucher traced the historical relationship between ethics and international politics, and Brown did similar work but focused on the re-emergence of ethical questions within the discipline of international relations. Keene provided a more focused intellectual history of international political thinking. *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present*. Oxford University Press, Columbia University Press, The core distinction between cosmopolitan and communitarian theories put forward in the book has been influential. Campbell,

David, and Michael J. Rethinking Ethics and World Politics. University of Minnesota Press, This edited collection draws together a number of postmodern thinkers from both international relations and political theory. It provides a good overview of approaches and issues in world politics covered by this tradition. Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era. A very clear account of the development of international political theory as a form of normative international theory or global ethics, which also highlights the contributions made by critical theorists, feminists, and poststructuralists. This text provides a history of political thought on international relations that focuses on conceptual changes in how relations between communities are conducted. It self-consciously avoids summarizing canonical thinkers and looks beyond the modern European state system. The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era. Narayan, Uma, and Sandra Harding, eds. Philosophy for a Multicultural, Postcolonial, and Feminist World. Indiana University Press, Whisnant, Rebecca, and Peggy DesAutels, eds. Feminist Ethics and Social Theory. Rowman and Littlefield,

6: James Nolt - World Policy

Introduction: Bringing Social Orders Back In, in David Skidmore (ed.), Contested Social Orders and International Politics, Vanderbilt University Press, Uploaded by David Skidmore.

And, although the notion could be misleadingly and evasively used to justify "agreeing to disagree", [7] the term offers something more valuable: Since its introduction by W. Gallie in , the expression "essentially contested concept" has been treated both as a challenge and as an excuse by social theorists. It has been treated as a challenge in that theorists consider their uses of terms and concepts to be in competition with the uses advocated by other theorists, each theorist trying to be deemed the champion. It has been treated as an excuse in that, rather than acknowledge that the failure to reach agreement is due to such factors as imprecision, ignorance, or belligerence, instead theorists point to the terms and concepts under dispute and insist that they are always open to contest "that they are terms and concepts about which we can never expect to reach agreement. He suggests three avenues whereby one might resolve such disputes: Discovering a new meaning of "work of art" to which all disputants could thenceforward agree. Convincing all the disputants to conform to one meaning. Declaring "work of art" to be a number of different concepts employing the same name. Otherwise, the dispute probably centres on polysemy. Has the term been incorrectly used, as in the case of mistakenly using decimated for devastated catachresis? Or, is it really the case that the term is an essentially contested concept? Contested versus contestable[edit] Clarke has made a valuable contribution to the overall debate by suggesting that, in order to determine whether a particular dispute was a consequence of true polysemy or inadvertent homonymy, one should seek to "locate the source of the dispute". This source might be "within the concept itself", or "[within] some underlying non-conceptual disagreement between the contestants". Clarke argued that to state that a concept is merely "contested" is to "attribute significance to the contest rather than to the concept". Yet, to state that a concept is "contestable" is to "attribute some part of any contest to the concept". In other words, this is "to claim that some feature or property of the concept makes it polysemantic, and that the concept contains some internal conflict of ideas"; and it is this fact that provides the "essentially contested concept" with its inherent potential for "generating disputes". The different constituent elements of that internally complex entity are initially variously describable. Psychological and sociological causes influence the extent to which any particular consideration is salient for a given individual, regarded as a stronger reason by that individual than by another, and regarded as a reason by one individual and not by another. Disputes centred on essentially contested concepts are "perfectly genuine", "not resolvable by argument", [31] and "nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence". Because the use of an essentially contested concept is always the application of one use against all other uses, any usage is intentionally aggressive and defensive. Because it is essentially contested, rather than "radically confused", the continued use of the essentially contested concept is justified by the fact that, despite all of their on-going disputation, all of the competitors acknowledge that the contested concept is derived from a single common exemplar. Concepts and conceptions[edit] Scholars such as H. From their work it is easy to understand the issue as one of determining whether there is a single notion that has a number of different instantiations, or whether there is more than one notion, each of which is reflected in a different usage. In a section of his article in *The New York Review of Books*, Dworkin used the example of "fairness" to isolate and elaborate the difference between a concept *suum cuique* and its conception various instantiations, for example utilitarian ethics. Therefore, he argues, his instructions do, in fact, "cover" this new case. Exploring what he considers to be the "crucial distinction" between the overall concept of "fairness" and some particular, and specific conception of "fairness", he asks us to imagine a group whose members share the view that certain acts are unfair. In these circumstances, says Dworkin, "the group has a concept of unfairness, and its members may appeal to that concept in moral instruction or argument. And, because each considers that certain principles "[which] must be relied upon to show that a particular division or attribution is unfair" are far a more "fundamental" sort of principle than certain other principles, it can be said that members of the group have different conceptions of "fairness". Consequently, those responsible for giving "instructions", and those

responsible for setting "standards" of "fairness", in this community may be doing one of two things: Appealing to the concept of "fairness", by demanding that others act "fairly". In this case, those instructed to act "fairly" are responsible for "developing and applying their own conception of fairness as controversial cases arise". It is important to recognize that rather than it just being a case of delivering two different instructions; it is a case of delivering two different kinds of instruction: In the case of the appeal to the concept of "fairness", one invokes the ideal and, implicitly, the universally agreed upon notion of "fairness"; and whatever one might believe is the best instantiation of that notion is, by and large, irrelevant. In the case of laying down a conception of "fairness", one specifies what one believes to be the best instantiation of the notion "fairness"; and, by this action, one specifies what one means by "fairness"; and whatever one might believe is the ideal notion of "fairness" is, by and large, irrelevant. As a consequence, according to Dworkin, whenever an appeal is made to "fairness", a moral issue is raised; and, whenever a conception of "fairness" is laid down, an attempt is being made to answer that moral issue. So long as contestant users of any essentially contested concept believe, however deludedly, that their own use of it is the only one that can command honest and informed approval, they are likely to persist in the hope that they will ultimately persuade and convert all their opponents by logical means. But once [we] let the truth out of the bag i.

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