

## 1: Farrell's \$ Million Dollar Bridgehampton Dream House | Real Estate | Top Stories

*Kay Farrell, a stylish society woman who made golf the focus of a glamorous life as wife, mother, hostess, committee woman and volunteer, died July 12 at her home in the Village of Golf. She was.*

February 16, 2 No. These cases involve defendants who wish to pursue appeals as of right to the Appellate Division from denials, in post-judgment collateral proceedings, of vacatur of final criminal adjudications of guilt. The Legislature in curtailed such appeals as of right, restricting their availability only to a permissive procedure involving review and allowance by a single Justice of the Appellate Division before a full panel could review the merits CPL. Specifically, in the companion cases before us, we are faced with the denial of motions to vacate criminal judgments of conviction premised on 1 alleged prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct CPL. Consequently, we uphold the respective orders of the Appellate Division in each case because the Legislature did not violate the article VI restraint. The Appellate Division modified the judgment only by reducing the sentence and otherwise affirmed AD2d. In a Per Curiam opinion, we ruled that defendant had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that counsel had acted less than adequately under the circumstances *People v Rivera*, 71 NY2d , The motion was denied, and plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Also by motion, plaintiff sought leave to appeal the Supreme Court order denying his motion to vacate judgment to the Appellate Division and reserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of CPL. Counsel was subsequently informed by the Appellate Division that the briefs were rejected for lack of a jurisdictional predicate, but no formal court adjudication in this respect or order was rendered. None of those determinations are procedurally appropriate for us to review or are before us. Plaintiff finally commenced the instant action seeking a judgment declaring CPL. The Appellate Division affirmed AD2d , finding that: The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to this Court, and we co-calendared this appeal with that in *People v Farrell*, now decided together because of the common issue. Denials of motions to vacate judgments made pursuant to CPL. Appellants respectively claim, in their discrete procedural channels, that CPL. As of its effective date, the provision "permits the Legislature to expand the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division but not contract it, except with regard to appeals from nonfinal orders" *People v Pollenz*, supra, at [emphasis added]. Appellants Farrell and Rivera, respectively, build their argument on a first foundational leg that an appeal as of right existed in from the denial of the equivalent of a motion to vacate a judgment on the grounds of prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. A second, equally necessary, foundational leg of their argument is that the denial of the CPL. In support of their finality argument, appellants liken such post-judgment motions to habeas corpus proceedings. They assert that the better-late-than-never, off-the-record facts situations in collateral proceedings render those matters "special proceedings," and that orders concluding them constitute final determinations. On these premises, appellants seek a declaration that CPL. We conclude that a post-judgment motion to vacate a criminal adjudication, whose direct appeal track has run its course, is not a special proceeding. Coram nobis and its statutory look-alikes are tails to the criminal proceeding comet and are explicitly governed by the CPL. Due to the successory and necessarily interrelated nature of the order deciding the CPL. It bears emphasizing that the Legislature did not eliminate such appeal opportunities, but merely interposed judicial screening reviews to allow permissively only those appeals that merit further full Court examination. The general nature of both a post-judgment motion to vacate a judgment of conviction and an order denying such a motion have previously been considered by this Court *People v Gersewitz*, NY , , cert dismissed US , supra. *Gersewitz* was decided before the enactment of CPL. Considering the traditional, historical and functional features of habeas corpus, we clearly distinguished between habeas corpus proceedings and the post-judgment collateral proceeding avenue seeking vacatur of judgment in *Gersewitz id*. We reasoned that habeas corpus proceedings were indeed special proceedings given that 1 they were classified by statute as separate civil proceedings; and 2 in a habeas corpus proceeding, a defendant seeks to invoke the power of a court other than the original court in which the prosecution was had and the conviction rendered *id*. On these significant distinctions, we treated orders in habeas corpus proceedings as final for purposes of jurisdictional and appellate analysis. Using these guideposts, we found a

post-judgment motion to vacate a conviction to be markedly different from habeas corpus id. A motion collaterally attacking a judgment of conviction was not defined by statute to be a separate special proceeding id. Moreover, we noted that a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction invoked only those powers of the same court in which the original prosecution and judgment of conviction was had id. The motion was, therefore, directly derived from and connected to the criminal proceeding id. Thus, statutorily and functionally, we found the post-judgment motion to vacate to be distinguishable from a habeas corpus proceeding id. Our reasoning and result in *People v Gersewitz* is still substantively sound and relevant to resolving the central issue in the cases at bar. Thus, the *People v Gersewitz* rationale, which focuses on coram nobis proceedings, applies with equal analytical and jurisprudential force in the CPL. A motion to vacate a judgment of conviction bears none of the indicia of a special proceeding see, CPLR ; *Alexander, Supp.* The motion to vacate the judgment of conviction 1 does not seek a judgment; 2 is not commenced by filing notice of petition or an order to show cause; 3 does not require service of process and a pleading; and 4 is not designated by specific statutory authority contrast CPLR ; see, *Alexander, Supp.* The post-judgment motion to vacate has no independent juridical function or existence and is inextricably tied to and incident to the original, seminal, finalized criminal proceeding that already ran its direct procedural appellate course *People v Gersewitz, NY* , , cert dismissed *US* , supra; see, *People v Scanlon, supra*. Opinion by Judge Bellacosa. Order modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.

### 2: Goethe's Elegiac Sabbatical | Joseph Farrell - [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com)

*Joseph P. Farrell, [www.enganchecubano.com](http://www.enganchecubano.com) (Oxon.) Prolegomena The theological analysis of the filioque contro-versy, an issue of great complexity which has re-curred throughout Christian history since the ninth century, has brought forth many different assess-ments.*

June 16, Andrea Aurichio Print Article Brokers often say the best house to buy is the house a builder builds for himself. Photos courtesy of Gary DePersia and Farrell Construction Bridgehampton - Joe Farrell built a hundred homes in the Hamptons before he started work on the largest project he has ever undertaken, his new 30, square-foot home on Halsey Lane in Bridgehampton. You can also climb a rock wall in the basement inching your way up one hand and one foot at a time until you reach the ceiling complete with a specially designed padded floor to cushion your fall should you miss one of the protruding ledges on your way up or way down. You can play a few rounds of virtual golf and skate board on a specially designed indoor half pipe. After that you can relax in a massage room, soak in a hot tub or hit the Jacuzzi and sauna after you work out in the gym. No expense has been spared in creating this full home spa that rivals many professional operations. Clearly this is no ordinary house but then Farrell is no ordinary builder. Brokers often say the best house to buy is the house a builder builds for himself. The detailing is meticulous right down to the decorative moldings and tile work. The house has nine bedrooms and 11 and half baths. One of the highlights of the first floor is the seat mini-movie theater complete with interactive seats for family members and guest who tire of watching one of the many flat screen televisions. The walk-in refrigerator makes large scale entertaining easy. The kitchen is to die for even if all you do is boil water. The pool house befits the 60 by 20 foot heated gunite pool complete with electric pool cover and underwater stereo system. The set up gives new meaning to sitting by the pool on hazy summer days when the ocean is too dangerous and the bay is filled with jellyfish. The house alas, is no where near the ocean or the bay, a factor that does not seem to deter Farrell or the enthusiastic brokers who want to sell this house as the Farrells get comfortable enough to enjoy a July barbeque or two. He also hired an architect who worked on the Ritz Carlton in Palm Beach to come in and create the spectacular playroom area in the basement. A man crew worked six days a week for a year-and-a-half to complete the understated manse that sits on an He is as enthusiastic about the house as its builder. It is a beautiful home. The year-old former Wall Streeter who once worked on the commodities exchange explained he had always wanted to be a builder. I needed the money to buy land, so I made a lot of money so I could afford to buy land. Then I started building, Farrell said. I followed my heart. The wind on the beach is bad in the winter. Completed on May 1, the family moved in shortly after that. The house went on the market a few weeks later as word spread among the real estate community. It takes four or five years to build a house like this. These are people who know they are not going to outlive their money. So if they see something they like and they want it, they will buy it. Collectors of fine wine will have plenty of room to store their stash in this house where the open floor plan makes entertaining easy. Devotes of the Home Shopping Network and other shoppers will love the package room. This is where the Fed-Ex guy and the UPS man can drop off packages without entering the house stowing them safely in a small storage area accessible by its own outside door. The 2, square foot master suite on the second floor is a perfect retreat when you tire of the seductively paneled library on the first floor. You can sit upstairs and watch the impressive train set, the kind that bedazzles hobbyists who spend hours in their basements playing with their railroad cars, miniature houses, depots, trees and assorted street props that populate a miniature city, on television in the living room if the luxurious basement bores you or you want to join the rest of the family as they huddle around the fire. Control the lights and temperature in the house from a computerized touch pad on the walls in most of the rooms. He is not worried about selling it. I enjoy the bowling alley. We had eight couples over for dinner the other night and we went bowling. I love to play squash. These are all the things I wanted to have in a house. DePersia is as enthusiastic about the property as its owner-builder. The secret to his success as a builder? I am the fastest payer in the industry," Farrell surmised. I get it done," he said. Farrell broke ground on Halsey Lane on Nov. No job is to big or too small for Farrell Construction which recently completed a 2, square-foot house

in Southold.

## 3: St. Photios the Great – The Life and Work of Joseph P. Farrell

*Dr. Joseph P. Farrell takes us on a breath-taking ride through ancient sites, secret and advanced technologies, and explore the topological metaphors behind the physics of the "pyramid peoples."*

God, History, and Dialectic: First, these essays are not an attack on Western European civilization. They are rather an analysis of the roots of that civilization, and of its origin in a theological heresy and of the cultural and moral crisis that heresy has sired. For this reason, these essays are a spiritual effort, akin to the process of self-examination before confession. I believe that I have managed to surpass intuition in these pages, but it would indeed be presumptuous for me to claim that argument has been achieved, or that an exhaustive articulation of what is a very complex hypothesis has been accomplished. I do not, however, seek the ultimate causes for this crisis in material, and for that reason, superficial causes. The crisis is not founded on any merely economic, political, scientific, or legal basis. It is in large measure attributable to a constellation of theological and philosophical paradigms which, once adopted, worked themselves out in the History of Christian Civilization itself. They are an examination of my own spirit, both as one raised and at home in that Western European civilization, and as one who, as an Eastern Orthodox Christian, lives every day confronted by the tragedy of the Schism between Eastern and Western Europe. These essays are an attempt to resolve a profoundly internal and personal struggle. These essays argue that these different and mutually exclusive presuppositions and methods have permeated every facet of legal, social, and cultural conventions. Let multiculturalists or conservatives still misunderstand, this may be plainly stated: That the Second Europe came eventually to regard itself as the canonical measure of Christendom, with all the tragic implications that this pretense engendered, is, in large measure, the task of these pages to elucidate. When the main thesis of this work is posed in this manner, certain obvious questions and dilemmas present themselves, with the First Europe and Russia in the foreground, exposing the insufficiency of any merely secular, political, economic or sociological approach to a historiographical analysis of the crisis. Why is this so? Because having assumed its own cultural canonicity, the historiography of the Second Europe cannot contend with the sharp and cumbersome edges that Byzantium and Russia offer for analysis; they cannot be squeezed and moulded into the paradigms appropriate to Western European Scholasticism or feudalism. Russia possessed nothing analogous to the classical pagan inheritance possessed both by Byzantium and the Latin West. Orthodoxy was both father, mother, and mid-wife to Russian nationhood. If Russia therefore be an enigma or a mystery or a riddle to the Second Europe, it is not because Russia is Russia but because it is Orthodox. Thus, we draw nearer to the task of these essays if we but appreciate one rather obvious, though overlooked, fact about intellectual and cultural history: But the First Europe never misplaced him, and Russia never had him to begin with. This highlights another important cultural phenomenon: The East Roman Empire never lost the Aristotle that became so important for theology in the West, and indeed, did not regard Aristotle, or any other philosopher, as having all that much to do with theology. What presuppositions were present in Byzantine and Eastern Christian thought, then, that impelled the Eastern Church not to transmit this part of its heritage to Russia in its first exportation of Orthodox culture to the Slavs? Whatever they were, those presuppositions are already vastly different than those operative in the West, where for a lengthy period it became functionally impossible to do theology without Aristotle, and, indeed, without philosophy at all. In these essays, then, I propose to acquaint the reader as thoroughly as possible with the Patristic theology of the Orthodox Catholic East, and, on that theological basis, to examine the theological foundations of the Second Europe, and the cultural effects of those foundations. This may seem to be a cumbersome, and lengthy, method, but even this is an implication of the thesis driving the work: In short, ex oriente lux. These essays are about the Two Europes and the Three Trinities on which they are based. As the first term of the second Trinity is St. This transubstantiation of the Trinity from a revealed Mystery to a dialectical deduction, and finally, to a dialectical process at work within History is simply unintelligible without Augustine. This contrast is clear and acute, for at the core of the Second Europe is the Second, and Augustinian, Hellenization of the Gospel, and its deliberate, explicit, and formal acceptance by the Western Church and the schismatic and heretically based

culture she influenced and created. Rather, there was within two segments of a unified Christian Church a simultaneous movement toward, and away from, Hellenization. The task of these essays is therefore to expose the specifically Augustinian dialectical formulation of Trinitarian doctrine as the root of these two very different historical movements, and to demonstrate the Augustinian departure from traditional doctrine, and to trace the departure in its cultural effects in the development of law, science, and philosophy. Thus the thesis of this work is quite simple: This may seem a surprising, perhaps even an irreverent, assertion, until one recalls why the doctrine of God is so significant. The differences in the theological formulation of that doctrine therefore reflect, illuminate, and cause the difference of the Two Europes. We may highlight the seriousness of that development by asking some rather obvious, though deeply serious, questions. Why did the western half of Christendom split along so cleanly dialectical lines during the Protestant Reformation and Catholic Counter-Reformation? Why, for example, is it not only convenient but possible to describe that split by a series of polar oppositions: It has its secular counterparts as well: Empiricism versus Rationalism, Materialism versus Idealism, Science versus Religion, Creation versus Evolution, hard versus soft disciplines, and so on. One could cite an endless litany of similar oppositions. Indeed, theologians, philosophers, and historians of the Second Europe have long written about this or that pair of these either-or polarities, but astonishingly, have either done so in isolation of an examination of the paradigm of dialectical opposition itself, or they have accepted that paradigm as an inevitability of Christian theology or of Judeo-Christian civilization itself. The phenomenon of this acceptance is therefore deeply rooted, and must be accounted for. But the movement from the specifically Augustinian formulation of the Trinity to these cultural consequences is certainly not an easy one to recount, and thus, many theologians—those most adequately equipped to undertake the task—fail to do so, for they view the original dispute between the East and West over that formulation as a dispute about words. The troublesome questions multiply: Why did a Church and a culture, which believed absolutely in the complete union in Christ of the utterly spiritual and the completely material, without separation and without confusion, lose sight of the implications of that belief in the movements of the dialectical deconstruction of its thought and institutions? We may inject the First Europe into this series of questions to ask a new series even more profoundly disquieting: Why did the First Europe not go through the Reformation? Or because of the Mongol invasion and conquest of Russia? Or is the lack of the dialectical movement of Reform and Counter-Reformation to be explained on the basis of something much more fundamental and spiritually rooted? Thus we arrive at a corollary to our thesis. For those who prefer Ockhamist lucidity: I argue that Western Christian civilization is bound with dialectical inevitability to misinterpret both itself, the Eastern European Christian civilization, and the antiquities common to both; only that First European civilization and its theological paradigm are adequate to undertake a genuinely comprehensive and universal History of Christendom. Theology—not philosophy, literature, geography, economics, politics, law, art, music, or science—was and is the mainspring of our culture and history. It is that which set it in motion, and maintained its cohesion and harmonious movement. This *Geistesgeschichte* is therefore an unabashedly theological work based upon traditional Eastern Orthodox dogmatics. But this should not be taken to mean that it is merely about theology. It is rather about the consequences of theology, both heretical and Orthodox, in all areas of culture: Such a conclusion could only be derived by massive over-simplification of the evidence. As we shall see, the First Hellenization did occur in the Eastern Roman Empire in the first three centuries of Christianity, but at no time, nowhere, was it ever universally accepted in its totality. There were dissenting voices, even among those engaged in the process of Hellenization. For the First Europe, philosophy not only is not the handmaiden of theology, it is not even on the staff of servants. For the Second Europe, as almost everyone knows, philosophy is the handmaiden of theology. In the ironies of historical development, one encounters the Two Hellenizations being formally adopted and accepted by the Two Europes at approximately the same time, in the ninth century. In that space and in that time, they clash openly for the first time, and the ikon of that clash, with all its attendant historiographical implications, is the coronation of Charlemagne by Pope Leo III in A. We will fail entirely to understand the alarm of a St. Photius later in that century, or the careful diplomacy of a Leo III at the beginning of it, or the monumental hubris of a Pope Nicholas I, if we do not penetrate to their ultimate theological origins. Even the massive historical

systems of a Hegel or Toynbee are the products of this assumption. Thus, by adopting the First Europe rather than the Second as the canonical measure of Christian civilization, I mean to do more than merely Orthodox dogmatic evaluations of the civilization and culture of Western Europe. The canonicity of the Orthodox East has been assumed both as the result of my personal commitments to it, but also for the sake of comprehensive elucidation. And hovering constantly in the background, like a scrim or a basso ostinato, is Rome. The question is almost so simple and obvious that one almost hesitates to ask it. But to leave it unasked would justifiably relegate this work to the dustbin. Because the Two Europes and Two Hellenizations that lie at their core are the result of an even deeper, underlying, and unifying conflict. For long before the Empire or Philosophy embraced the Church, the Church was already an Empire, metastasizing subversively like a tumor in the body politic of pagan imperial Rome. The basic historio-graphical and theological significance of this fact, however, is often overlooked. In short, she possessed all the elements not only of government, but of society, and of culture. She was culturally autonomous from all that surrounded her. This fact made her the enormous danger that the pagan Romans, with much more intelligence than most moderns, saw in her. Thus, long before the Empire and the Church embraced, they were at war. And even the embrace was less a peace settlement or a surrender of one to the other, than it was an armistice. As the First Europe is the historical and cultural actualization of the process represented by the First Hellenization, the First Europe therefore constitutes herself spiritually and theologically as a rupture, as something ultimately and culturally discontinuous with the Graeco-Pagan universe of thought and culture in which it, to the Second European observer, apparently moves. The First Europe at its core is discontinuous with the Hellenistic intellectual world of ancient Rome; but it is continuous with that early Hebrew and Christian cultural autonomy of the Apostles and Apostolic Fathers. The Greek philoso-phical idiom of that First Europe serves only to confuse Second European interpreters such as a von Harnack. Orthodox Christian Tradition is its core essence, and because of that cultural autonomy, it is able to transplant itself into a variety of vernaculars. It is able therefore to create in Russia a nation whose origins and national culture do not depend on the simultaneous transmission of Graeco-pagan culture in any sense, even in the sense of the transmission of that pagan heritage that became typical of the Second Europe after Augustine and down to our own day. Perhaps the best and simplest way of putting this complexity, however, is to point out the fact that St. Thus the ambiguities of Augustine and Augustinism are at the core of the histori-ographical task to be performed by these essays. For Augustine the bishop and Augustinism the system are two different things. Augustine the bishop insisted, no less vigorously than his great counterparts in Cappadocia—Sts. Basil of Caesaria, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus—on the direct continuity of the Church with the ancient Hebrews and with the cultural autonomy conferred on them by God. That marriage of Theology and Philosophy occurred not at some secondary level of doctrine, but at the core, at the height, of all Christian belief, the doctrine of God Himself. So long as this cohabitation went undetected and unchallenged, so long did its hidden implications take root, grow, and eventually overwhelm and choke the Christian component. Our current moral and spiritual crisis is the result of that marriage, and will not be resolved until the churches which persist in it, beginning with Rome, repent and recant the error. For Augustine saw discontinuity with that Graeco-pagan world, but the theologians, philosophers, and humanists who came after him and who were the heirs of his system, came increasingly to see continuity. Thus, at its core the Second Europe is pagan, for it worships a pagan definition of God, pagan, for it is crumbling from within, overladen [sic. From the standpoint of the First Europe, then, the Second is in the continual process of actualizing the unwitting, but nevertheless, great apostasy contained in the system of Augustine.

### 4: Joseph P. Farrell, Prolegomena to "God, History, and Dialectic"

*This week on The Solari Report, Dr. Joseph Farrell joins me to discuss his new book *Microcosm and Medium: The Cosmological Implications and Agenda of Mind Control*. It's time for America to break free from its mind control trance.*

A small, but notable data point, because it extends further into the future. All the way into the present, in fact. From there, the author continues with various examinations into the Nazi connection with corporations, spearheaded by the notorious I. Farben and its penetration of big banks, to the growth of the Nazi postwar network lead by Bormann. In conjunction with that, Farrell lays down many of the intricacies that allowed the Nazis not only to survive in a post-WW2 environment, but to actually thrive. That is a rather disturbing prospect indeed. Farrell notes many of the points that are pointed out in a particular article which helps him sift through and narrow down what the probable truth might have been. That is rather intriguing as it would literally change history in more ways than people could imagine. But the possibility of the boss "the very Nazi symbol" also making it through? Not only is Hitler addressed, but his second in command, Martin Bormann is also all over this book. Farrell from there does a compelling job of addressing what the actual postwar Nazi plans were, many of which serve not only to enrich them, but which helped further their power structure. This arguably has probably continued to this day, which is quite distressing. If such is the case, the whole Muslims-are-terrorist meme needs to be examined with precision, because behind the scenes much of what seems to be one element, might just be another. The surge of terrorism that has ensued since must be questioned given how much it has served to fracture how the US is seen in the world, how much profits the military industrial complex has achieved, and how much control over the region has been established in the Middle East and beyond. However, who drives those actions is just as, if not more important because that would be the root cause, rather than one addressing the symptom by only focusing on Muslims. This book will make the reader see history from a few different lenses, much different than what conventional historians would have you even consider. Mainstream history must fit in a box, especially since the lot of it is manufactured by the victors. This book serves to do just that. That alone is worth the price of the book. But when you couple all of the above to the fact that people with the same Nazi-like mindset are still around [think of the Bushes, and the many corporate connections in America that took place during WW2 for starters] and share the same ideals et al. Full of detail and connecting the dots once again.

**5: Joseph P. Farrell, "A Theological Introduction to the Mystagogy of Saint Photios"**

*Posts about St. Photios the Great written by romeosyne. In , the same year he completed his Doctorate of Philosophy at Oxford, Joseph Farrell published a translation of Saint Photios the Great's Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit [1].*

Holy Cross Orthodox Press, , Prolegomena The theological analysis of the filioque contro-versy, an issue of great complexity which has re-curred throughout Christian history since the ninth century, has brought forth many different assess-ments. These assessments have ranged the whole spectrum: For some Western theologians, the statements of Alan Richardson may be used as a paradigm: In the West it became customary to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, because it was felt that the Spirit, though proceeding from the Father as the source of all being, was given to the world by Jesus Christ, and because the New Testament itself speaks of Him as the Spirit of Jesus as well as the Spirit of the Father. But the Eastern Church never accepted this usage, although it was mainly a matter of words and termino-logy, no vital theological issue being involved. His response was no less than a sweeping indictment of the filioque. All these things, according to Photios, are implications of the filioque doctrine. The very fact of their mention or implication in the Mystagogy indicates that the treatise itself is an historically informed response. Well aware of these historical parallels of the filioque, Photios likewise based his reply to the double procession on earlier precedents, among them the writings of Saints Athanasios, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa. It would not be going too far to say that the Mystagogy must form the theological and historical point of departure for any Orthodox examination of Augustinism. Our concern in this theological introduction to the Mystagogy will thus be synoptic. We shall seek to place the Mystagogy within a broad historical context that begins with Plotinos and ends with Aquinas, a period of roughly one thousand years. As we shall see, the work of Saint Photios was to exert a tremendous influence, not only on subsequent Ortho-dox theology, but to some extent on subsequent Western formulations. As a consequence of our synoptic view of the filioque problem, we shall not be able to examine every text related to the subject, but will only be able to portray in very broad strokes the progress of Neoplatonic simplicity and its accompanying dialectic through the history of Western trinitarian thought. In so doing, a particular interpretation of the history of Augustinism emerges as a consequence of our theological examination. It is thus hoped that the reader will be able to see the uncanny logical accuracy of Saint Photios, at times predicting some conclusions which the West would only arrive at or respond to centuries later. This introduction thus attempts to vindicate the sweeping indictment of Saint Photios concerning the dual procession by demonstrating that the filioque shares common philosophical structures, commitments and ancestry with the great Christological and trinitarian here-sies. That shared philosophy is Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism and The Divine Simplicity Neoplatonism is a relatively easy philosophy to explain and a rather difficult one to evaluate. The whole development of Greek philosophy was from first to last a rational quest; it sought to explain reality through reason. This perfectly portrays the necessary tool for the classical philosophical mind, the dialectic of oppositions; something could be known only by some contrast to its opposite. Reality was treated in a very modern fashion, as if it were a gigantic binary system. The focus was always on either the heavenly and ideal or the material and the particular. Even infinity could only be infinity by opposition to the finite. Though philosophers before Plotinos considered the infinite to be beyond the powers of reasoned inquiry, strictly speaking there was no formal reason, given their presuppositions, why such a rational investigation of the infinite could not be undertaken. But for hundreds of years the Greek philosophers were content with exploring the problems associated with the finite side of the dialectical tension of the infinite and the finite. Why this is so is readily apparent. Nor had Aristotle posited an absolute genus in which all particulars could be comprehended. In his thought, philosophy had its first real impetus to explore the infinite in the context of a rational philosophical system. The fact that the One is no particular finite thing means also that it is defined by opposition to those very finite things,<sup>14</sup> and thus from a purely logical point of view, the One must always have finite things standing over against it in order to be so defined. It must always stand in some dialectical tension to something particular and finite. It is only One by its opposition to the many, simple and universal only by its opposition to the composite and particular, and infinite and absolute

only by its opposition to the finite and relative. Paradoxically, and almost ironically, Plotinos elevated the finite, relative and composite to the same logical status of the infinite, the very opposite! In other words, the dialectic of contrasts is very flexible, and will not always do what it was intended to do. A second observation must be made. Because the simplicity of the One is such that it includes rather than excludes all particulars, then it follows as a logical requirement of the system that all particulars exist only by the action of the One. However, this by no means affirms a creation of particulars in the Christian sense. In a very modern phrase, the One was the ground of all existence, even of its own existence. In practical terms, the assumption of the divine simplicity makes impossible the Christian view of a free and spontaneous creation by a God Who was not compelled to create from any internal necessity of nature or external necessity of logic. Creation was for Neoplatonists an absolute necessity; for Christians it was, rather, characterized as a divinely free act. This is an important point to remember in the ensuing discussion. The One, without any activity on its part, naturally produces the Nous. This Nous in turn produces the World-soul in company with the agency of the One. The Neoplatonic universe thus takes on a definitive, three-storied structural subordination. At the pinnacle is the One, acting as the Uncaused Cause of all. In an intermediary position comes the Nous mind, caused by the One and, along with the One, causing the World-soul. In the last position comes the World soul, emanating from both the Uncaused Cause and the Caused Cause. As a study of Aristotelian logic and physics, this subordination is classic: At this point it may be asked why the One stopped creating with the Nous and the World-soul, or why the World soul in turn did not cause something subordinated to it. And the answer is of course that there are no reasons, given the presuppositions and structure of Neoplatonism, why these suggestions could not be carried out. Indeed, the subsequent history of Neoplatonism shows exactly this tendency to multiply the structural components of the system. Clearly the structure and dialectic underlying it are quite basic and simple. The priority of unity over diversity, of simplicity over composition, may be unreservedly called the basic thrust of the system. This flexibility presents itself in two basic ways. If, because of its simplicity, all acts of the One are acts of Its essence, then how are we to distinguish between Its all-encompassing simplicity and the very particulars which, by logical contrast to it, define it? In other words, there is nothing to keep one from pantheism if the definition of simplicity is accepted as a definition of divine essence; for once any particular is asserted, it immediately collapses back into an indistinguishable unity with the One, its creator. On the other hand, once being, causal activity, and will have been identified, because of that very simplicity, then what is to keep one from affirming the eternity of particulars and multiplying these particulars to any number of beings, each causing, with the One, the being immediately subordinate to it? Once simplicity is asserted, It must, if It is to remain what It is, collapse into potentially infinite series of Ones, as in the system of Iamblichos. The seemingly straightforward system of Neoplatonism is only a deceptive appearance. As its subsequent history shows, it could unfold into a variety of positions, each claiming to derive logically from its presuppositions and method. This inherent ambiguity is further confounded when that definition itself is made to serve as the basis of trinitarian doctrine in the theology of Saint Augustine. The Filioque and Its Context in Augustinian Theology The filioque doctrine is ultimately derived from the philosophical definition and logical dynamics of the system that has just been surveyed. Each of the problems that attended that system—the identity of being and will; its consequence on an eternal divine creation; the flexibility of the logic; the definition of simplicity in collapsing into an infinite series of beings, or the tendency to erase all distinctions between particular beings; and the structural subordination of the system—all are to some extent involved in the controversy between the Carolingian West and Saint Photios over the double procession of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, the filioque itself, through the formidable mind of Saint Augustine, combines these features of Neoplatonism in to a single and concise expression. The doctrine of the dual procession cannot be properly understood without a correct evaluation of the impact of Saint the Blessed Augustine, nor can it be properly understood divorced from its context in the Augustinian program of theodicy. It is not difficult to multiply quotations regarding the significance of Saint Augustine. As such, Augustinism is but a particular method of handling the pivotal ideas of faith and reason. Thus Saint Augustine, seeking as he did. Thus, Augustinism is such a crucial watershed in the history of doctrine that one either is, or is not, an Augustinian. He found this common definition in the Neoplatonic simplicity of the One. The

dialectic of oppositions is already in evidence in this step. Two things occur because of it. First, the unity of God begins to be seen in impersonal, abstract, and philosophical terms, and does not find an ultimate referent in the monarchy of the Father. But more critical is the fact that the persons and the attributes, as pluralities opposed to the essence, are accorded the same logical status. Speaking of the Father, Saint Augustine says that He is called in respect to Himself both God, and great, and good, and just, and anything else of the kind; and just as to Him to be is the same as to be God, or as to be great, or as to be good, so it is the same thing to Him to be as to be a person. The essence and attributes of God are identified: Each attribute functions merely as a semantic label, as another alternative definition of the divine essence,<sup>40</sup> and thus each attribute can be identified with every other attribute. There were two significant effects resulting from this identity of attributes amongst themselves and with the essence. The first was a blurring of the distinction between theology and economy. The second was the filioque itself. It is the same thing to Him to be as to be a person. Having assumed an absolute simplicity, the persons can no longer be absolute hypostases, but are merely relative terms to each other, thus occurring on an even lower plane than the attributes proper. One no longer begins with the three persons and then moves to consider their relations, but begins with their relative quality, the relation between the persons, itself. In other words, there is an artificial opposition of one person to the other two. When Saint Augustine wrote his *On the Trinity*, he may have done so in part to combat the Arian heresy; but he tried to use the Arian logic itself as a tool in his refutation. The Arians define deity by confusing the hypostatic feature of the Father, causality, with the divine nature. Having thus defined deity, the Arians could deny the full deity of Christ because He did not cause the Father. Augustine replies by arguing, for the full deity of Christ by making Him the cause of another full divine person! But there is a new structural element in this confusion. It is the element of a subordination of the category of persons to that of attributes. The Son receives His causality from the Father, not on the basis of a direct deduction from the definition of simplicity, but by a more indirect reference to the simplicity on the basis of common interchangeable attributes. This fact sets up the *ordo theologiae* in which all Augustinian theology subsequently proceeds: Within the final level of discourse, the persons, the Holy Spirit is seen to proceed from an Uncaused Cause, the Father, and a Caused Cause, the Son, much as the Neoplatonic World-soul proceeded from both the One and the Nous. For we cannot say that the Holy Spirit is not life, while the Father is life, and the Son is life: It is precisely the Holy Spirit Who is the attribute common to both. Thus a person has been confused with a common attribute of all three persons. Having made the Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son because the Father and the Son share common attributes, since the essence is simple, the Spirit then becomes an attribute, He defines the essence and, indeed, is the essence, the unity of the Trinity: Because both the Father is a spirit and the Son is a spirit, and because the Father is Holy and the Son is Holy, therefore.

### 6: Joseph Farrell - Concurrences

*Born and raised in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Joseph P. Farrell has a doctorate in patristics from the University of Oxford, and pursues research in physics, alternative history and science, and "strange stuff".*

It is not only that man is adapted to the universe. The universe is adapted to man. Imagine a universe in which one or another of the fundamental dimensionless constants of physics is altered by a few percent one way or the other? Man could never come into being in such a universe. That is the central point of the anthropic principle. According to this principle, a life-giving factor lies at the centre of the whole machinery and design of the world. Joseph Farrell joins me to discuss his new book *Microcosm and Medium*: Step one is to understand that mind control technologies are real " and they are deeply dangerous. Step two is to see the opportunity " the creative potential that is possible when we break free. With *Microcosm and Medium*, Farrell has written the best book I have read yet on the mind control being used to manipulate you and me. More than once, I had to put the book down to digest an entirely new insight. I was amazed to realize how much there was about this subject that I had not yet understood. Looking back over the descent of American politics and communities into madness, I gained new perspectives on how it happened. Joseph provides the kind of intelligence that infuses personal power that no one can take away from you. This is insight that can help you free your mind as well. The people in our governance structure that are delivering autism to our children and inequality to our economy are the very same that are delivering mind control to us through our smart phones and media. Their knowledge of physics and the deepest nature of our intelligence is profound. Subscribers can post your questions and recommended stories here. Talk to you Thursday!

**7: Sun Sentinel - We are currently unavailable in your region**

*Joseph Farrell Market data and participants' views in horizontal merger analysis May Merger analysis draws inferences from quantitative study of market data, and it does so in several ways whose contrasts are often stressed.*

Not only was his literary career a vast, sprawling thing in itself, but it was thoroughly intertwined with several others, including those of courtier, politician, diplomat, scientist and artist. Moreover, several of these callings interacted quite directly with his work as a writer. And let us admit this at once: In this respect he differs from Petrarch, Spenser, Marlowe, Milton and other poets who explicitly represent themselves as fashioning their careers after Virgilian, Horatian and Lucanian proto- types. All of this might seem to make Goethe an unpromising subject in the context of career studies. I take the opposite view. To date, career studies have flourished particularly in contexts where ingredients such as imperial patronage, epic pretensions and a strong sense of Classical precedent are found. But it is reasonable to investigate the applicability of the method to other literary systems, whether contiguous to or widely removed from the homeland. And it is especially worth trying it on some hard cases. Goethe lived and worked well after the Renaissance and in a very different literary culture from those that obtained for Virgil, Horace, Petrarch, Spenser or Milton. He lived a different life as well. This is perhaps a departure from the established paths of career studies, but I hope that my analysis will bear out the validity of the approach. Let me begin with a brief syllabus. Despite or because of his early success, he found himself at loose ends. Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. He was for most of his time in Weimar a member of the privy council, and he served various terms in other capacities – Director of Mines, Chair of the War and Highways Commissions, and, on an acting basis, Chancellor of the Exchequer. He did not entirely neglect his literary work: The edition thus had something of a memorial character, almost as a monument to promise unfulfilled. Goethe himself was well aware of this interpretation. Most immediately, after a dozen years as courtier and bureaucrat in Weimar, the sheer freedom from official duties presented a welcome opportunity to advance a number of literary projects. Goethe took good advantage of this. He states this very clearly in announcing to Carl August his approaching return from Rome: He is first and foremost an artist – by contrast with any other administrative tasks to which Carl August may choose, and is welcome, to direct him. And it is his time in Italy which has clarified what that vocation is. Certainly he confided his intentions to no one, even Carl August: At the same time, it was an officially sanctioned and limited, if indeterminate, leave of absence from the official duties to which Goethe eventually returned, even if in modified form. In short, it was a sabbatical, and in every respect a notably successful one. But there is an additional point. It was a period during which he tried in a number of ways to recreate aspects of his Roman sabbatical. The liaison with Christiane, especially in its initial stages, seems to fit very well into this pattern. The significance of the Elegies is acknowledged by all Goethe specialists. All, in addition, can be easily correlated with analogous features of Classical Roman love elegy. Gladly I find myself inspired upon Classical soil; past and present speak to me more clearly and charmingly. The *Reise* offers a fascinating gloss on this form of inspiration. *Fluctibus et fremitu assurgens, Benace, marinis.* This is the first line of Latin verse whose content has come to life before me, and which is as true at this moment, when the wind is growing ever stronger and the lake is casting higher waves against the landing place, as many centuries ago. Many things have changed, but the wind still churns the lake, and the sight is still ennobled by a line of Virgil. Heitner And without question in the *Journey* as a whole Classical poets serve as privileged interpreters of the landscape that Goethe was to explore over the next two years. So the similarities between these works are not negligible. But for our purposes the differences are much more striking. But the relatively unmediated appearance of the latter work is an illusion. The *Reise*, it is true, is based largely on letters that Goethe wrote and received during his Italian sojourn and on a journal that he kept at that time. It is true of course that the author of the journal, like the author of the elegies, is a poet. But in the journal, Goethe the poet is basically trying to finish off projects to satisfy his publisher back in Germany. Indeed, it contains much that is so foreign to the spirit of the elegies that one could wonder that they are the work of the same author. But in the *Italienische Reise* Goethe can never visit a place without remarking on its geological position, its wealth or poverty in mineral resources and

so on. A great pity that the excavation was not systematically carried out by German miners: In sharp contrast, the elegies open suddenly with the poet simply in Rome: Ehret, wen ihr euch wollt! Nun bin ich endlich geborgen! Flatter all you want! Now I am finally safe! Fair ladies and you fine gentlemen of the beau monde! Ask about your old aunts and uncles and cousins, and let the unhappy game follow the elegant talk. And farewell to you too, who have often driven me almost mad with your social circles great and small! Repeat, politically and vainly, that opinion which the traveller angrily flees right across Europe. Ob denn auch Werther gelebt? Now ask all you want, you will never get near me, you fair ladies and you fine gentlemen of the beau monde: In which town did dear Lotte actually live? Had Werther been my brother and I had killed him, his unhappy ghost would hardly have haunted me so vengefully. The Werther phenomenon, as I noted before, greatly oppressed him; and in the light of his complaints about this oppression, the refuge that he finds in the bosom of his beloved takes on a significant meta-literary aspect. The move to Rome and to elegy amounts to a metamorphosis by which the author of Werther recreates himself as a poet of love in the mould of the ancient elegists. Many scholars think that this is the real name of the woman with whom Goethe actually had his Roman fling – namely one Faustina di Giovanni Antonini who, like the Faustine of the elegies, was a young widow who had a son. Propertius and Tibullus in his first book of elegies followed the founder of the genre, Cornelius Gallus, whose works did not survive antiquity, by giving their mistresses names that allude to cult titles of Apollo, the god of poetry Cynthia, Delia and Lycoris, respectively. The proto-elegist Catullus, and Ovid, the last member of the elegiac canon, opted for names, Lesbia and Corinna, that allude to two of the great women poets of Greece, Sappho of Lesbos and Corinna of Thebes. Goethe takes a different and more self-referential tack. Many precise details regarding the long genesis of this work cannot be established with confidence, but for our purposes the main outlines of the process are clear enough. But any invocation of the Virgilian rota merely confirms my earlier point about the inadequacy of prefabricated schemes. But as I have said, the biographical record makes it very clear that escape from his official duties at court was a crucial factor as well. The elegies do not allude directly to the third element, duties at court. Amor tends the lamp and recalls the times when he did the same service for his own Triumvirs. Abrams uses to suggest the difference between Classical and Romantic imitatio. At the same time, he revels in the fact that his erotic adventures are also reworkings of highly overdetermined, conventional subjects that had been the defining material of Classical love poetry. A triumvir is of course, in ancient Roman terminology, a member of a board of three appointed by the government for some specific purpose. But the word gained a defining resonance from the activity of a specific board of three, Caesar Octavianus, Marcus Antonius and M. These triumviri wielded extraordinary powers, quarrelled and bargained, and made war upon one another, until one of them, Octavian, got the better of his colleagues and became the sole leader of the Roman state for the remaining forty-five years of his life. From this historical episode the word triumvir acquired its associations with extraordinary power, and did so in the context of the turbulent transition from Roman Republic to Roman Empire – which happens to be the setting in which the genre of elegy took shape as well. These points might have little relevance to my argument were it not for the fact that the relationship of poetry to power was a stock theme of ancient elegy. Permutations in the treatment of this theme are many and complex, but a few general tendencies can be stated. In ancient elegy, the poet wields no political power. He has in effect renounced political ambition altogether. The canonical ancient elegists are all clear and insistent on this point. When he left Weimar, Goethe was at the apex of his political power. As acting president of the privy council, he was the highest authority in Weimar after the prince himself. But in any case, I think it certain that he was attracted to the elegiac genre in part by the generic inheritance that involves these themes. The tenth elegy expresses the typical elegiac attitude towards these things: Alexander and Caesar and Henry and Frederick, the great ones, would gladly give me half of their fame if I could grant them to lie in this camp for one night. Before closing, I want to return as promised from the connotative to the denotative range of the expression triumviri Amoris. In one sense it is not important to whom exactly the phrase refers. If we ask about the poets whom Goethe actually names in the elegies, we find that there are three, but that they are Propertius Erot. Propertius of course is a canonical elegist; more on him in a moment. Many others could be named to whom Goethe alludes not for purposes of establishing the elegiac ambience of the cycle, but his conception of antiquity, while

centred on elegy, expands far beyond the normal boundaries of the genre; and of course, though it sounds paradoxical to say it this way, aficionados will recognize this as a tendency of Classical elegy itself. Their rather slender collective output made inclusion of all their works within a single volume very common, both in manuscripts and in printed books, at least from the later middle ages onward. There is no difficulty in mustering evidence, internal and external, to lend credibility to this theory. In one sense, this has been a non-problem: Ovid, though a canonical elegiac poet, was also more than that; one might say that he was also a distinctly non-canonical elegiac poet whose career conformed to established patterns, which generally involve some sort of generic differentiation, more than is true of Catullus, Propertius and Tibullus. But the issue of Propertius seems to me less than straightforward. The literature on the relationship is large: On the other hand, perhaps we should regard Goethe as having adopted a more restrictive conception of ancient elegy than Ovidian exuberance and experimentation would allow, and thus of Ovid rather than Propertius as casting his particular spell over not the elegies, but the *Reise*.

### 8: The Cosmic Implications of Mind Control with Dr. Joseph Farrell – Solari Report

*They were the golden couple of golf, and a striking study in contrasts. He was John Joseph Farrell, the darkly handsome son of poor Irish immigrants. She was Catherine Marie Theresa Alice Hush.*

Maximus the Confessor, South Canan, Pennsylvania, , Joseph Farrell advances a novel and intriguing interpretation of the metaphysics of St. Whereas the dominant paradigm tends to interpret his metaphysics as more closely aligned with those of St. Farrell finds in them a harbinger of St. Although this interpretation is unusual, I found myself largely in agreement with the words of Bishop Kallistos Ware , who writes in his introduction to the book that Dr. Farrell possesses a penetrating and creative mind, and he is gifted with unusual powers of analysis and insight. Certainly the crucial word here is "creative", but one cannot help but admire Dr. According to Farrell, St. Maximos draws a metaphysical distinction between Person, Energy, and Essence, and, as Farrell puts it: These categories are not mere conventions of speech for St. Maximus, but rather correspond to distinct metaphysical realities. They are not therefore each names for the same, absolutely simple "Something. As Farrell notes, St. In bringing about this break from the pagan metaphysics within which the terminology had its origins, St. Maximos really is closer to Palamas, whose own work was rather representative of what the Byzantine philosophy of his day was capable of. Thomas, by contrast, writing a full two generations before Gregory was even born, manages to present a brilliant little treatise on the distinction between being and essence that preserves the connection between metaphysics and predication while at the same time managing to captivate both friends and critics to this day. For Maximos, by contrast, the human will achieves its deified aspect in Christ, which has the effect of ensuring that the saints in heaven will choose only the good for all eternity while maintaining their freedom. It is the dogmatization of the Dynamic of Cyrillic Chalcedonianism, a dynamic [that] permits the use of christological terminology in a triadological context. It is thus possible to speak of a real distinction not only between the divine essence on the one hand and the divine energies on the other, but also the divine energies amongst themselves. In the case of the early Ecumenical Councils what is not said is often as important as what is said. Farrell appears to think that in permitting certain forms of language and theological speculation the Council was at the same time dogmatizing them. In other words, Farrell interprets the Council as doing something that I have suggested ought not to be done: It seems unlikely to me that this is, in fact, what the Council was doing, particularly in light of the historical context of political rivalry and social upheaval in which the Council had its origins. As a method for disambiguating certain concepts and helping us to make some sense some sense of a very difficult theology, a variety of metaphysics can be very useful, but by itself it cannot settle such theological disputes once and for all. However, surely Farrell is right to see in the definitions of the Council the theological contributions of St. Maximos, since this serves to place the work of the Council in the broader context of the debate with the Monothelites, which was also a central concern of St. For Farrell, however, St. Maximos represents, in his doctrine of free choice among the saints in heaven, a genuine departure from the theological analysis of St. Augustine on the matter of free choice and predestination, and it is to this topic that I will turn in my next post in this thread.

### 9: Hellenic/Greek philosophy – “The Life and Work of Joseph P. Farrell”

*About Joseph P. Farrell* Joseph P. Farrell has a doctorate in patristics from the University of Oxford, and pursues research in physics, alternative history and science, and "strange stuff".

As we will see, this background turns out to be Greek philosophy as it developed from its Presocratic beginnings to its full articulation in Plotinus and his followers. Though there are innumerable variations on the pattern, it could be argued that there is a worldview shared by many of the most prominent Greek philosophers, since certain salient features of the Hellenic mind persist in the centuries between Parmenides and Plotinus. Greek Philosophy on God, Man and Cosmos: The One Is Not? The latter was conceived, not as a personal savior, but rather as an unmoved, incorrupt principle of Unity. Typically, this Being was seen as heading up a plurality of immutable forms or archetypes. Plotinus has as his goal not only to demonstrate the good, but to demonstrate that the demonstrations themselves are a means of attaining the Good. Plotinus wished to hold his One apart from all plurality, change, and composition; the One is utterly and completely simple. However, this radically simple Principle was at the same time the source of all plurality, change, and composition. In other words, the One Being must contain all beings in some sense to remain the unique, simple source of existence. In his contest with Arius, St. Athanasius upholds the traditional Christian teaching that the generation of the Son from the Father in the Trinity is according to essence since the Father is the source of the being of His Son while the creation of the world takes place according to the divine will common to the Trinitarian persons. The result, for Arius, is a Father who generates a subordinate Son and a doubly subordinate Holy Spirit. Farrell emphasizes that this impersonal Arian God – “producer of highborn demigods who, though created, can somehow save creation” – contrasts with the Holy Trinity worshiped by St. Maximus; God, History, and Dialectic, etc. The Church Father knows by his own experience that the source of his inspiration and salvation is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Farrell emphasizes that the Patristic that is, Orthodox method for approaching theological questions is, in part, a faithful following of the correct order in which the theological questions themselves are posed. Orthodox Fathers of the Church begin with the persons Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; through his experience of God the illumined Father understands that he has not merged with the divine essence, because he knows he is in communion with a loving God; he has not become God. The worshiper participates in the Holy Trinity, not according to essence as St. John Zizioulas, but according to the uncreated energies of God. The notion of an *ordo* of theological questions bears directly upon the teaching about Christ, for over the course of the doctrinal disputes surrounding the Ecumenical Councils the central issue was how to properly formulate and so preserve the Orthodox teaching that Christ is one person with two sets of operations or energies – “one divine and uncreated, one human and created” – which correspond to two natures. Origen, Arius, Eunomius, Augustine, and all who follow them in the Christian West begin, not with persons, but with a consideration of the divine nature as simplicity. For the pagan Plotinus, whose system can be considered a kind of summation of Greek philosophical theology, there is no real distinction between what God is essence, what He does energy, and who He is person. This confusion of categories occurs because, instead of beginning with the Tri-personal and thus ecclesial revelation of a divine Word to man, Plotinus turns inward in an effort to define god as utterly transcendent because definitionally simple. Who is the One for Plotinus? Henceforth, the structure of human consciousness is taken to be a self-revelation of ultimate reality, or *gnosis*. Man believes that he can, through his own meditative or social efforts, separate absolutely his thoughts. For, to speak generally, no existent thing is known or defined through comparison with its opposite. Otherwise, [the two] things will be found to cause each other reciprocally. For if, because divine movement is an energy, human movement is possible then certainly it follows that because divine nature is good, human nature is therefore evil. And the exact opposite may likewise be said: If we can define a being through its dialectical opposite, then we are perhaps unwittingly positing a causal symmetry between the components. That is, the divine and human wills are mutually caused. In order that the One be free of all plurality and composition, the One must have already always had all divine and created pluralities standing apart from It; otherwise, Plotinus would have had to admit a creation from

nothing, but then what would have been the motivation of the perfect One willingly and thus essentially! At any rate, the dialectic of divine versus human impels one to posit that both have the same logical and ontological statusâ€”God needs man just as man needs God, since one cannot be shown with logical consistency to precede the other. These tremendous confusions may be said to occur because a method of thinking dialectic of oppositions is applied to the three primordial categories without following the Patristic *ordo theologiae*. The consequence of the dialectic for God and creation? A dualism in which God both creates evil and is caused or conditioned by His evil creation. The consequence of the dialectic for Christology? Holy Cross Orthodox Press, Kelley, internet video conference interview with Joseph P. Farrell, 16 August, University of California Press, Romanides, *The Ancestral Sin: Zephyr*, , Origen and the Crisis of the First Hellenization of the Gospel: Notes and Outlines by Joseph P. Farrell, *God, History, and Dialectic: Seven Councils Press*, , The citation of St. Basil is from his *On the Holy Spirit* 18, translated by P. Verily we see ourselves as made, nay, as being, God himself. Then it is that we are kindled. But when we again sink to earth, we are, as it were, put outâ€”. Farrell in *Free Choice in St.*

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