DES BOSSES TO LEIBNIZ, 20 JULY 1715 pdf

1: The Leibniz-Des Bosses correspondence | Arlington Public Library

Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 July ; Leibniz to Des Bosses, 19 August The Leibniz-Des Bosses correspondence by: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von.

In my view, the vinculum substantiale and scientia visionis do not represent rival strategies, as they have been recently portrayed in the literature; rather, they work together. But scientia visionis, when applied to questions of ontology, gives us a rather vacuous kind of reality, while the vinculum substantiale represents a much more significant, albeit problematic, account of the nature of substance. The backdrop for this paper is a recent article by Donald Rutherford, in which it is argued that Leibniz gives his best account of the reality of bodies in the theory of scientia visionis. In my view, however, the vinculum substantiale and scientia visionis work together in the correspondence with Des Bosses, scientia visionis accounting for the reality of any aggregate of monads that appears as a body or phenomenal unity, the vinculum substantiale accounting for the genuine unity of an organism. The vinculum substantiale, on the other hand, is concerned with a strong notion of reality and ensures that a being is a genuine unity. I should like to argue that scientia visionis, when applied to questions of ontology or the reality of the constituents of the world, can at best give us only a vacuous kind of "reality," while the vinculum substantiale represents a much more significant, albeit problematic, account of the composition of the world. Scientia Visionis and the Vinculum Substantiale The doctrine of scientia visionis was certainly not new to Leibniz. Indeed, it was an essential part of the Scholastic theory of divine foreknowledge, being distinguished typically from scientia simplicis intelligentiae. In the notes to his letter of February , Leibniz says, If bodies are phenomena and judged in accordance with how they appear to us, they will not be real since they will appear differently to different people. And so the reality of bodies, of space, of motion, and of time seem to consist in the fact that they are phenomena of God, that is, the object of his knowledge by intuition [scientia visionis] Indeed, God sees things exactly as they are in accordance with geometrical truth, although he also knows how everything appears to everything else, and so he eminently contains in himself all other appearances. Only insofar as God perceives bodies-and by His very nature, He perceives them as they truly are-can they be said to be real or said to be in a certain way. And in a letter sent from Vienna on 24 January , Leibniz writes the following: If monads are not substantial parts of bodies, however, and composite beings are mere phenomena, it would have to be said that the substances of bodies consist in true phenomena-phenomena, namely, which God himself perceives in them through intuition [scientia visionis], as do also angels and the blessed, to whom it is given to see things truly. The only similarity between this idea of scientia visionis and the traditional Scholastic notion seems to be just this: He invokes scientia visionis in the notes to his February letter in an attempt to work out the consequences of the claim in the body of the letter that "either bodies are mere phenomena In other words, the problem that leads Leibniz to invoke a doctrine of scientia visionis is how to explain "reality" of phenomena when we have only the varying perceptions of different observers. The other "method" Leibniz has for establishing the reality of phenomena is that of the vinculum substantiale, the substantial bond of monads that, through its addition to the monads of a composite, essentially bonds them together, rendering the monads of a composite a real unity. In the February letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz says the following: If that vinculum substantiale of monads did not exist, all bodies, together with all of their qualities, would be nothing but well-founded phenomena, like a rainbow or an image in a mirror, in a word, continual dreams perfectly in agreement with one another, and in this alone would consist the reality of those phenomena. And it is here that Leibniz invokes the vinculum substantiale, not the doctrine of scientia visionis. He fails to invoke scientia visionis, I believe, because scientia visionis answers a different kind of problem about "reality"-namely, the sense in which the phenomena of bodies, perceived differently by different observers, may be said to be real. The vinculum substantiale, on the other hand, gives unity and hence reality to a corporeal substance, and it serves to ensure that the phenomena of the natural world are indeed real-where "real" means that what is a phenomenal unity is a genuine unity a unity per se as well. Unity and Reality Within the correspondence with Des Bosses, Leibniz uses the phrase "real phenomenon" equivocally, thus causing some confusion with respect to the interpretation

of scientia visionis and the vinculum substantiale. But when Leibniz is speaking of the vinculum substantiale, real phenomena will be phenomenal unities whose unity is made real by the vinculum substantiale. In other words, the vinculum will guarantee that the phenomenon of unity in a body is in fact a genuine unity; the vinculum will somehow unify those beings that would otherwise be only phenomenal unities; and in this consists the realization or reification of phenomena. In this sense, then, the contrast will be between real phenomena and mere phenomena. And scientia visionis can be said to reify the actual relations between substances precisely because it applies solely to the actual objects of the world. In this way, Leibniz can avoid the relations that exist between objects in other possible or potential worlds. Therefore, both scientia visionis and the vinculum substantiale account in some sense for the reality of corporeal phenomena. And it might seem, therefore, that they represent competing strategies. After all, God created the universe and is omniscient. And when Leibniz says that "the reality of bodies, of space, of motion and of time seems to consist in this, that they are the phenomena of God, or the object of scientia visionis," GP II one wonders how much explanatory force this view actually has. For example, let us consider an aggregate, like a herd of sheep, and a genuine unity, like a human being. God, according to Leibniz, will understand the relations that exist between the genuine individuals in an aggregate, for example, spatial proximity, and those that exist between the simple substances of the composite substance or animal, for example, spatial proximity and the relation between dominant and subordinate monads. But the important relation that exists between the simple substances of the composite, the relation that makes them a genuine unum per se, will be something determined by the natures of the simple substances themselves. If it is the case, as I have suggested here, that scientia visionis is used to answer a skeptical challenge, then it seems unlikely that this idea could truly compete with the idea of the vinculum substantiale as a means to reify the phenomena. Two issues here need to be properly delineated; namely, the explanation of the unity of composite substances and the explanation of the reality of composite substances. In my view, scientia visionis provides us only with a guarantee of the reality of composite substance, and this is done primarily on an epistemological level: On the other hand, scientia visionis does not guarantee the unity of composite substances because it is at best a reflection of the way the world is. Does scientia visionis bring about the unity of an aggregate? In other words, we may say that scientia visionis guarantees the reality of an aggregate; but it does not in fact act to unify any particular aggregate of monads. This is done by the relation of dominant monad and its subordinate monads and, perhaps, the vinculum substantiale. Thus, the unity and reality of bodies will ultimately be explicated on very different levels. Much of the difficulty involved in the correspondence with Des Bosses rests in the fact that Leibniz seems at times to lump the category of composite substances i. Of course, on one level, there is little difference between my perception of a table and my perception of an animal-both will be phenomenal unities. But, if we assume that a certain being has a mind, an internal unifying principle, then that being, that animal, will possess genuine unity as well. A more helpful picture of the Leibnizian world would therefore be the following:

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2: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - Wikipedia

Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 July Leibniz to Des Bosses, 19 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 13 January Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May

Special reasons have persuaded Baron Leibniz to refute Mr Bayle. The second wife of the late King of Prussia, 1 a Princess of distinguished ability, took pleasure [p] in reading the Critical Dictionary; 2 Mr Leibniz, whom this Princess knew and held in high regard, and with whom she loved to discuss the most difficult subjects, informed her that he had views very much at odds with those of Mr Bayle on several points which concern religion; she urged him to put them in writing. The illustrious author has had other opportunities to go further into these difficulties; these opportunities have finally resulted in the book he gives us. It contains a curious preface, a preliminary discourse on the conformity of faith and reason, essays on the goodness of God, the freedom of man, and the origin of evil, divided into three parts, an abridgement of the controversy reduced to syllogistic form, reflections on the dispute between Hobbes and the Bishop of Derry about freedom, necessity, and chance, and remarks on the book about the origin of evil, whose author is Lord King, Archbishop of Dublin. In the preliminary discourse, the illustrious author gives us a [p] very detailed history of the disputes about the opposition of reason and faith, and about the use that can be made of reason in matters of religion. A sect of Italian Philosophers, cleaving to the impious sentiments of Averroes, maintained that what appeared to be false to reason could be true according to faith. With this distinction they sought to shield their dangerous opinions about the mortality of the soul and the eternity of the world. Protestant theologians have spoken like these philosophers about reason and faith, with the aim of decrying the philosophy of the School. He declares that by "reason" he understands only the linking together of truths; 4 other meanings can and are given to this word, but he says it should be understood as he understands it if we want to remove the ambiguities of which the present question is full. He maintains that there cannot be any real and solid opposition between faith and reason taken in this sense, that [p] the opposition between them can only be apparent, and that false appearances intrude upon the human mind only when it does not use all of its powers. Moreover, he does not believe that one is obliged to examine all possible objections and to retain some fear of being mistaken until one has exhausted all the difficulties of an opinion; sure of the demonstration that we have well understood, we must despise false subtleties, such as are the difficulties that are laid against the truths of religion. Mr Bayle [p] has proposed nothing more confidently than this axiom: We can attain what is above us not by penetrating it but by supporting it It is not necessary that to answer the objections we subjugate the mysteries and submit them to a comparison with the first principles that spring from common notions. For if he who answers the objections had to go so far, he [p] who proposes the objection would have to do it first. In the preliminary discourse there is a curious digression into the passive and active understanding of the Peripaticians, and into the so-called soul of the world. Will they not be sick of this opinion when they find out it is not new? Extract from the first part of the Essays The illustrious author first explains, without concealing anything, the strongest objections against the freedom of man drawn from the determination of future contingencies, from prescience, decrees, the concourse of God, the necessity of grace, and from the strength of the inclinations. He relates with the same precision all the contradictions that impiety tries to identify between the goodness of God and his conduct towards men, and he undertakes to resolve all these objections and make God appear supremely lovable. Therefore, the reason for the existence of the world must be sought in the substance which contains within it the reason for its existence, and which is consequently necessary and eternal. Also, this cause must be intelligent, for as this world is contingent and as an infinity of other worlds are equally possible and equally lay claim to existence, so to speak, the cause of the world must have determined one of them to exist. He is able to do nothing, but if he decides to do something, [p] he will do the best he can do. He therefore chose from all the possible worlds the one which, all things considered, was the most perfect. This great philosopher excludes all absolute necessity from the infallible choice of the best to which he subjects God, but if this infallibility of choice comes from the nature of [p] God, a natural determination to always choose the best, can it be compatible with freedom? Let us not impute consequences

to the illustrious author that he disavows. If everything he says about the infallible choice of the best is collected up, we will see that he says nothing which should frighten theologians keen to preserve free will. He claims that the will is not determined without motive, that the will of an infinitely wise God always follows the motives most in conformity with his infinite wisdom; that the miser acts like a miser, the liberal man as a liberal man, unless they change their inclination. And he repeats a hundred times that the will is not necessitated to follow the inclination it follows, that it can always resist it, destroy it, and change it; it is not driven by the inclination, it gives itself to it very freely; the prevailing inclination is the motive which causes it to act, but it is the will itself, it is its entirely free choice that makes this inclination prevail over all [p] the others. If there is in this determination some necessity, it is consequent; the author gives it this name. Mr Leibniz admits that it is difficult to prove in detail how the existing world prevails over the possible worlds. The system of an astronomical theology that he inserted among these remarks, without naming its author, and about which he makes fun, is apt to put an end to the astonishment into which the oddity of the visions of ancient heretics sometimes throws us. His ingenious system of pre-established harmony is not of this number; if we do not entirely accept it, we are at least convinced that it is very favourable to freedom. This part [of the book] ends with a reflection worthy of the author. To show their weakness is to be entirely victorious over him; we cannot refuse the glory of victory to our illustrious author. He relates these maxims, then makes an analysis of them capable of disabusing Mr Bayle himself, if he were still alive. His general remark on these nineteen maxims contains the substance of [p] his responses, and of this second part [of the book]: God wants to save all men: And he is not obliged or led by his wisdom 23 to always overcome their evil will. Yet sometimes he does so, when his wisdom demands. God offers 25 remedies even when he knows they will be rejected Shall God prevent the Sun from shining All the comparisons Mr Bayle gives of a doctor, 28 a father, a tutor, 29 a minister of state, and a prince, are not suitable, 30 because we know their duties, and everything that can and should be the object of their cares: What temerity, or rather, what absurdity! The objections presume what is false; it is ridiculous to pass a legal judgement when one does not know the facts. To say with St Paul, O altitudo! But it is to admit our ignorance of the facts, of the relations, of the duties which result from this immensity; We cannot admire enough the beauty and the artifice of [p] its structure. But when we see some broken bone, The very nature of things implies that this order of the City of God, which we do not yet see here on earth, should be the object of our faith and of our hope If there are some who think otherwise, so much the worse for them: We do not dwell on the ingenious conjecture, supported with a great deal of erudition, on the good and bad God of the Persians, Hormazd and Ahriman, whom the Author suspects to have been two Princes; Hormazd, King of part of Asia, a just and peaceful Prince; Ahriman, or Hermann, conqueror from Germany by Sarmatia, adored ever since by the Germans under the name of Irmin. Mr Leibniz defends himself skilfully, but he avoids being defeated only by considerably softening this sentiment; fortunately the cause of God does not depend on this particular opinion. Extract from the third part of the Essays, on the origin of physical evil Mr Leibniz warns at the beginning of this third part that the cause of physical evil is found when the cause of moral evil has been found, and that the objections drawn from physical evil [p] will not detain him. Physical evil is either a natural defect that God allows in his work or punishment for sin; 41 also, there are fewer evils than we think, it being our false ideas which magnify their number. The false reasonings of some authors on this matter collapse when it is pointed out that continuous creation is not a new creation and that God continues to create the substance but does not create its actions. This is where the author explains himself more clearly than elsewhere on moral necessity. The necessity contrary to morality, he says, which would make punishment unjust, is an insuperable necessity, which renders all opposition useless; the determination to the best is not a necessitation; it is certain to he who knows everything that the effect will follow this inclination, but this effect does not follow from it by a necessary consequence; grace and temptation are never irresistible. Suppose the greatest possible passion; the soul can find some reason to resist it, even if it were only that of showing its power. He says, moreover, that this moral determination is called necessity because, among the wise, what is necessary and what is owing are equivalent things, and that it always has its effect in the perfect sage, that is, in God. The second addition contains remarks on the book on the origin of the evil by Mr King, Archbishop of Dublin. Mr Leibniz attacks this sentiment with great passion,

but in the end it would not be difficult to reconcile him with Mr King. Mr Leibniz, as we have seen, excludes all necessity, and he fights only vague indifference; he claims that the will is not determined without motive and without reason to act. Mr King does not deny that the will, when it acts, has a motive to act, that it consults reason, but he claims that it always remain master of its action, even after having consulted reason, even in the most [p] lively movement of inclination, that in a word its choice comes from itself and is truly free. Mr Leibniz does not deny this. The third addition is a very methodical Latin abridgement of the whole book entitled Causa dei asserta. That is, Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia An allusion to 1 Timothy 2. A slight misquoting of Romans

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3: Review of Leibniz's "Theodicy" (July)

This volume is a critical edition of the ten-year correspondence () between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, one of Europe's most influential early modern thinkers, and Bartholomew Des Bosses, a Jesuit theologian who was keen to bring together Leibniz's philosophy and the Aristotelian philosophy and religious doctrines accepted by his order.

For Her Royal Highness has not found it overly obscure. It is true, as he very rightly says, that it would not be reasonable "to mesure the extent of her Royal Highnesses abilities by the common standard". And it is like this everywhere where terms of art are used. One cannot say that these are words devoid of sense, "mere jargon, empty words", for intelligible definitions of them have been given. And he who would desire to avoid terms of art would become more obscure because he would become too long-winded, and the reader would lose his way in the multitude of words. It is as if instead of saying "two", "three" and "four", one wanted always to substitute "one and one", and "one and one and one" and "one and one and one and one". I admit that the passages in which I use some physical and mathematical notions, and rely on what I have said elsewhere, cannot fail to be obscure to the majority of readers, though they can skip these passages without detriment. Yet they are useful for those who want to want to go considerably deeper into the matter, and who profess to be devoted to research. For it was thought that they would find some new insights in them. But besides the fact that it is not normal practice to do this, there is perhaps no such passage in which one cannot find something clear and useful, and even in their difficult parts, the attentive reader will perhaps not fail to catch a glimpse of a half light, the consideration of which he will not regret. I use the example of the inertia of matter in order to explain, by comparison, the privative nature of evil. A reader who is neither a philosopher nor a mathematician will find that difficult. But if he wanted to take the trouble to think hard about what I say, he will not regret it. As for my digressions, perhaps they are not long enough to lose the thread of the main subject, and it is easy to get back to it. Far from complaining about my digressions, others have been grateful to me for them. They have been delighted that I have livened up the matter a bit. And that has led to the book being recently reprinted in Paris, notwithstanding that I spoke in it as a Protestant. It seems he believes there are objections I have still not resolved. I have endeavoured not to leave any out, and I will always be obliged to those who advise me of new ones. But one should not count as objections the oft-made complaints about the obscurity of the interior of things. For example, when reducing the objection against the permission of evil into form and responding to it, it is enough to show that God can have, and even does have, just reasons to permit it, but it is not necessary to explain these reasons in detail; and to exaggerate the extent of its impenetrability is not to make an objection. Every objection can be reduced into good form, and to give a form to this so-called objection, one would have to start with this false maxim: I am delighted to learn of the passage in which the late Bishop of Canterbury, Tillotson, spoke of the matter I deal with, 8 and I will look it up. I recall having seen in the hands of Madam the Electress a sermon by the late Mr Sharp, Bishop of York, delivered if I am not mistaken to the court and published as a pamphlet, which benefited me greatly. But it was lost. Steiner, , the appendix is Acta Eruditorum March , , and April , pp. However the Theodicy was not reviewed in this journal. Leibniz himself complained of this to correspondents; see e. Leibniz to Grimarest, 4 June , in Dutens V, Nouvelles de la Republique des lettres September , ; October , Memoirs of Literature LX 30 April , pp. London, , VII:

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4: G. W. Leibniz resources

Auto Suggestions are available once you type at least 3 letters. Use up arrow (for mozilla firefox browser alt+up arrow) and down arrow (for mozilla firefox browser alt+down arrow) to review and enter to select.

The Ideal Form of Metaphysics Leibniz conceived of metaphysics as an a priori demonstrative science. Leibniz thought that truth consisted in conceptual containment: This implies that all metaphysical truths are conceptual truths. Leibniz thought that a concept could be defined by analyzing it into simpler component concepts. The universal characteristic would allow one to express in a purely formal manner the composition of any concept on the basis of a set of primitive concepts. He made impressive progress on the project during his career, though he fell well short of attaining his lofty ideal. Leibniz then argues in the voice of The Philosopher: If all happiness is harmonious as demonstrated , and all harmony is known by God by the definition of God , and all experience of harmony is a delight by the definition of delight , it follows that all happiness is pleasing to God. Therefore by the definition of love assumed previously God loves everyone, and, accordingly by the definition of the just God is just A VI. These texts include definitions of key metaphysical concepts and many informal demonstrations of metaphysical propositions. In Leibniz quickly composed a work that was closer to the ideal of a demonstrative science of metaphysics than anything he had written to date De Affectibus AVI. It contained a long list of definitions of key terms along with some demonstrations of metaphysical principles and theses. By Leibniz had developed a logical calculus for expressing identity and inclusion relations among concepts. Around this time, however, Leibniz began to doubt whether it was possible to discover absolutely primitive concepts. He also did not succeed in developing his purely formal system of representation, the universal characteristic. Without primitive concepts or the universal characteristic it was not possible for Leibniz to attain his ideal of a fully demonstrative metaphysics. It is plausible to think that Leibniz could nevertheless have completed a work that was an approximation of the ideal, written in Latin and using non-primitive concepts. Leibniz insisted throughout his later years that he could complete a work along these lines. And in Leibniz writes to Biber: But Leibniz never did unfold his entire system, even in this less ambitious form. In one of his earliest philosophical works, a very opinionated preface to an edition of a book by Marius Nizolius, Leibniz distinguishes between esoteric and exoteric modes of philosophizing. In this text he claims that the notion of demonstration provides the line of demarcation between the esoteric and exoteric modes. In this and other texts Leibniz equates the esoteric mode of philosophizing with the geometrical model of demonstration, as briefly described above. We have already seen that Leibniz never completed a work in metaphysics that was in strict accordance with the geometrical model of demonstration. It is important to recognize, however, that there are degrees of exoteric discourse. Esoteric Form and Esoteric Content Leibniz advocated the geometrical model of demonstration as the ideal form for metaphysics throughout his career. He claimed later in his career that he had all the materials at hand to compose a work that was a close approximation of the ideal. Yet such a work he did not compose. Why did Leibniz not make more progress on this task, which would seem to be of such great importance? Leibniz often mentioned his lack of free time as the reason for not completing an esoteric treatise. But this seems to provide an incomplete explanation of the situation. Though his extra-philosophical duties were numerous and burdensome, he made the time to write quite a lot on metaphysical subjects. If he thought that the geometrical model of demonstration was indeed the ideal form for metaphysics, one cannot help but wonder why he did not find the time to begin composing such a work. It is likely that there were several additional factors that led Leibniz to compose exoteric rather than esoteric works. The remarks occur in the context of a discussion of the precision or lack thereof in natural language: If anyone wants to write like a mathematician in metaphysics or moral philosophy there is nothing to prevent him from rigorously doing so; some have announced that they would do this, and have promised us mathematical demonstrations outside mathematics, but it is extremely seldom that anyone has succeeded. I believe that people are repelled by the amount of trouble they would have to take for a tiny number of readers: Yet I think that if anyone did go about it in the right way, he would have no reason to regret his labour. I have been tempted to try it myself RB: In this intriguing text Leibniz through

the voice of Theophilus notes that few people have tried to write in the esoteric mode, and even fewer if any have succeeded in the endeavor. He also suggests several reasons that authors avoid esoteric expositions. Esoteric texts are both difficult to compose and unlikely to attract readers, presumably because of their intimidating formal apparatus. And what is the point of writing a text that no one is going to read? This point is also emphasized by Leibniz in a letter to Burnett: He does, however, provide some important additional remarks on esoteric philosophy earlier in the text. In the Preface he points out some key differences between his philosophy and the philosophy of Locke: His is closer to Aristotle and mine to Plato, although each of us parts company at many points from the teachings of both of these ancient writers. He is more popular [populaire] whereas I am sometimes forced to be a little more esoteric [acroamatique] and abstractâ€”which is no advantage for me, particularly when writing in a living language Preface to the New Essays, RB: The ordinary person, for example, is unlikely to believe that bodies are aggregates of an infinity of immaterial mind-like entities a thesis that Leibniz affirms on a number of occasions. This puts Leibniz at a significant disadvantage when it comes to presenting his philosophy to the general public. In some of his letters to trusted correspondents Leibniz makes this point in even stronger terms. Consider, for example, what Leibniz writes to Pierre Bayle in For I write not so much to make an impression as to investigate the truth, which it is often useless, and even harmful, to publishâ€”on account of the uninitiated [des profanes], who are incapable of appreciating it, and quite capable of taking it the wrong way G 3: These are striking words. His point, as additional texts will make clear, is that he thinks it is often useless and harmful to straightforwardly present the content of his metaphysics to the public and even to trusted correspondents. He thought that the ideal form for metaphysics was the esoteric mode of presentation. However, he knew that few people were inclined to read texts presented in the esoteric mode due to their daunting formal structure. Even worse, Leibniz thought that the content of his philosophy was such that most people were likely to misunderstand it in fundamental ways. How then would it be possible for him to communicate his views to the public? An answer to this question is suggested in some unpublished remarks appended to metaphysical notes that Leibniz wrote in I have divided it into several parts for ease of reference: For thus this metaphysics will be able to be received. Leibniz suggests a strategy of selective omission, not to permanently hide the controversial features of his philosophy, but as part of a longer-term strategy of preparing his readers to understand his most esoteric doctrines. In [d] he suggests a complementary strategy of supplementation. In subsequent works he can explicitly draw the conclusions that may have only been implicit in the initial text. Consider, for example, what he writes to Fontenelle in The true metaphysics, or philosophy, if you will, does not appear to me any less important than geometry, especially if there is also a way of introducing into it demonstrations, which until now have been entirely excluded from it, along with the calculus that will be necessary in order to give them all the entry they need. However, it is necessary to prepare readers with exoteric writings. The journals have served me well until now FC 1: Consider what Leibniz writes to correspondent Nicolas Remond in In the Leipzig journal [Acta Eruditorum] I adapt myself to the language of the schools, in the others I adapt myself more to the style of Cartesians, and in this latest piece I try to express myself in a way that could be understood by those who are not yet very accustomed to the style of one or the other G 3: He thinks that using language that is familiar with his readers is a good way to make his views seem not too far removed from received opinions. This is not merely a feature of his published writings. Leibniz tailors his writings in a similar way in his private correspondences. For example, in his correspondence with Jesuit theologian Bartholomew Des Bosses he frequently employs scholastic terminology, and in his correspondence with largely Cartesian physicist Burcher de Volder he sometimes presents his views with a Cartesian slant. To use a more concrete example, early in the correspondence with de Volder, Leibniz appeals to the doctrine of continued divine creation, which he Leibniz regards as a central Cartesian tenet. Although he initially presents the doctrine in a way that makes it seem like this is a point of common doctrine between him and the Cartesians, it emerges later in the correspondence that Leibniz only affirms the doctrine in a qualified sense for a detailed discussion of this issue see Whipple The general strategy here is to use language that is familiar to the reader or correspondent and to emphasize initial points of agreement. Fine-grained differences and esoteric implications are typically avoided at the initial stages of engagement. The received opinions of a

Cartesian and the opinions of someone who was committed to a version of Aristotelian Scholasticism would be different in fundamental respects. When it comes to exoteric philosophy, one size does not fit all. Different strategies are required for people with different backgrounds and views. Eclecticism and Exoteric Philosophy Leibniz is sometimes described as being an eclectic philosopher. There are different ways of understanding eclecticism, but the basic idea is that an eclectic philosopher is one who incorporates ideas from a wide range of sources. In certain places Leibniz characterizes himself as proceeding along these lines. He famously writes to Remond, for example, that: It is undeniable that Leibniz read from an extraordinary range of sources and that his thought was influenced by a number of these texts. Nuanced differences and radical implications may be left implicit or omitted entirely in his more exoteric works. One might put the point as follows. Leibniz is not merely finding ideas in other philosophers and incorporating them whole cloth into his philosophical system. In some cases, at least, Leibniz develops distinctive philosophical views and then seeks out similar ideas in his predecessors as a strategy for presenting his views to the public see Schepers and Mercer, This essay was published in in the Journal des savants. He prefaces the essay in the following way: Finally, since some important persons have desired to see my opinions further clarified, I have risked publishing these meditations, even though they are not at all popular [populaires], nor can they be appreciated by all sorts of minds. I have decided upon this mainly to profit from the judgments of persons enlightened in these matters, since it would be too troublesome to seek out and call individually upon all those who would be disposed to give me instructionâ€”which I shall always be glad to receive, provided that it contains the love of truth, rather than a passion for preconceived opinions G 4: First, the essay is clearly not written in accordance with the formal apparatus of definitions and demonstrations that is required in a strictly esoteric presentation. Second, and perhaps more significantly, Leibniz purposefully omits some of the most controversial features of his philosophical system in this essay. Leibniz wrote the Discours in It is best known for presenting the complete concept theory of substance.

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5: Bartholomew Des Bosses - Wikipedia

68 Des Bosses to Leibniz 20 July (pp.) Most Distinguished Sir, Most Esteemed Patron, I received late and am sending even later the response of the.

A note on the text and translation. The role of correspondences. Leibniz and the Jesuits: China and the universal church. The union of soul and body. Composition and the unity of corporeal substance. The problem of transubstantiation. Leibniz on transubstantiation and the vinculum substantiale. The Leibnizdes- Bosses correspondence. Des Bosses to Leibniz, 25 January Leibniz to Des Bosses, 2 February Des Dosses to Leibniz, 12 February Leibniz to Des Bosses, 14 February Des Dosses to Leibniz, 2 March Leibniz to Des Bosses, 11 March Des Bosses to Leibniz, 21 May Leibniz to Des Bosses, 11 July Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 1 September Des Bosses to Leibniz, 17 September Leibniz to Des Bosses, 20 September Des Bosses to Leibniz, 29 September Leibniz to Des Bosses, 4 October Des Bosses to Leibniz, 14 October Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 October Leibniz to Des Bosses, 5 February Des Bosses to Leibniz, 25 June Leibniz to Des Bosses, 21 July Leibniz to Des Bosses, 3 September Leibniz to Des Bosses, 12 September Des Bosses to Leibniz, 5 October Leibniz to Des Bosses, mid-October Des Bosses to Leibniz, 14 February Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 March Des Bosses to Leibniz 22 April Leibniz to Des Bosses, 30 April Des Bosses to Leibniz, 30 July Leibniz to Des Bosses, 31 July Des Bosses to Leibniz, 6 September Leibniz to Des Bosses, 8 September Des Dosses to Leibniz, 18 January Des Dosses to Leibniz, 25 March Leibniz to Des Bosses, 2 May Des Bosses to Leibniz, 14 June Leibniz to Des Bosses, 2 July Des Bosses to Leibniz, 18 July Leibniz to Des Bosses, 4 August Des Dosses to Leibniz, 11 October Leibniz to Des Bosses, 7 November Des Bosses to Leibniz, 6 January Leibniz to Des Bosses, 8 February Des Bosses to Leibniz, 25 April Leibniz to Des Bosses, 8 July Des Bosses to Leibniz, 18 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 7 September Des Bosses to Leibniz, 28 January Leibniz to Des Bosses, 15 February Des Dosses to Leibniz, 20 May Leibniz to Des Bosses, 26 May Des Bosses to Leibniz, 12 June Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 June Des Bosses to Leibniz, 28 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 10 October Des Bosses to Leibniz, 12 December Leibniz to Des Bosses, 24 January Des Bosses to Leibniz, 8 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 23 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 10 January Des Bosses to Leibniz, 22 March Leibniz to Des Bosses, 21 April Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 September Leibniz to Des Bosses, 15 March Des Bosses to Leibniz, 6 April Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 April Leibniz to Des Bosses, 30 June Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 July Leibniz to Des Bosses, 19 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 13 January Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May Few of the letters have been translated into English before.

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6: Table of Contents: The Leibniz-Des Bosses correspondence /

I. Introduction. Leibniz's correspondence with Des Bosses presents students of his thought with a problem: it contains some of Leibniz's longest and most detailed discussions of the nature of substance, all in the last years of his life, while at the same time it introduces two concepts into Leibniz's metaphysics that continually baffle commentators-scientia visionis and the vinculum substantiale.

Gregory Brown and Yual Chiek eds. Leibniz on Compossibility and Possible Worlds Published: July 11, Gregory Brown and Yual Chiek eds. Reviewed by Jeffrey K. McDonough, Harvard University The old chestnut asks: Why birds and bees and sunshine in the meadows? God creates because it is good that there are birds and bees and sunshine in the meadows. The old query is answered but a new one emerges. Why not mountains of gold and rivers of chocolate? Leibniz maintains that God does not actualize all possibilities because not all possible substances are compossible. That is to say, he insists that God cannot create all possible substances together. Three broad interpretations have emerged in answer to this question. In what follows, I highlight those three broad interpretations and indicate how the essays in this volume develop and criticize them. I conclude with a brief assessment of the volume as a whole. Logical interpretations suggest that incompossibility is ultimately grounded in logical inconsistency. The core idea rests on three points. First, each possible substance is defined by a complete concept in the divine intellect. There is, for example, a complete concept of Caesar in the divine intellect that is tantamount to a blueprint for creating Caesar in every detail. Second, the complete concept of each substance has logical implications concerning other possible substances. Third, two possible substances are compossible if and only if their complete concepts are mutually consistent; they are incompossible if and only if they are logically inconsistent. The worry here is both philosophical and textual. Textually, there are numerous passages in which Leibniz implies that God could create any substance without any of its worldmates. He insists that, absolutely speaking, God could create one actual substance without any others even if he is prevented from doing so by his decision to "act always most wisely and most harmoniously" LDB Harmer, for example, develops a distinction between what he calls "basic" and "strict" ontological independence. For if Leibniz were committed only to basic but not strict ontological independence, he could maintain that while Caesar can exist without any other substances, no substance that is not a Caesar-worldmate can exist with Caesar. A nice result, if you can get it. Lawful and cosmological interpretations typically assume that possible substances are logically independent of one another. Strictly speaking, at one extreme, God could create a single substance alone. At the other extreme, God could create all possible substances together. They standardly suggest that God is precluded from instantiating non-realized possible substances by some extra-logical constraint. Cosmological interpretations maintain that God is precluded from creating other substances by the goal, or demand, of instantiating a world as opposed to a mere collection of substances. Opponents of lawful and cosmological interpretations raise three main worries. First, Leibniz is committed to the view that existence itself is good. In contrast to logical interpretations, lawful and cosmological interpretations grant that God could create more. Why does God favor elegant laws, or a single world over the existence of more substances or more worlds? Second, lawful interpretations have typically suggested that God faces a trade-off. God could create more substances at the expense of less elegant laws, or more elegant laws at the expense of fewer substances. Leibniz appears to hold that the actual world contains both the most being and the most elegant laws A. There is no trade-off. Third, cosmological interpretations rely heavily upon the notion of a world as opposed to a mere collection of substances. But what exactly is a world for Leibniz? What conditions must be satisfied in order for a collection of substances to merit the apparently vaunted status of being a world? Several essays develop key ideas related to lawful and cosmological interpretations. These three faculties are governed by three corresponding principles: Substances that are not mutually harmonious do not satisfy the demands of divine wisdom and the principle of sufficient reason and so are not compossible. On the one hand, Leibniz holds that existence itself is good so God has a reason for instantiating every possible substance. What then should God do? Absent an independent constraint, if God does not instantiate every possible substance, he violates the

principle of sufficient reason. It is obvious that of the infinite combinations of possibilities and possible series, the one that exists is the one through which the most essence or possibility is brought into existence. There is, however, a certain procedure through which one can most easily fill the board. And so, assuming that at some time being is to prevail over nonbeing, or that there is a reason why something rather than nothing is to exist, or that something is to pass from possibility to actuality, although nothing beyond this is determined, it follows that there would be as much as there possibly can be, given the capacity of time and space that is, the capacity of the order of possible existence ; in a word, it is just like tiles laid down so as to contain as many as possible in a given area. They suggest that in deciding which substances to instantiate, God takes into account the intrinsic perfection of each substance together with the "cost" of creating it in terms of the other substances it would preclude. In creating the best of all possible worlds, God creates the unique collection of substances that optimizes perfection. There are at least two obvious worries that may be raised in connection with the packing interpretation. Granting that it is easy to see how the instantiation of some possible substances could preclude the instantiation of other possible substances in a finite space, one might still wonder if the instantiation of possible substances could be similarly precluded in an infinite space. If it is easy to see how one might optimize the laying of tiles on a finite board, it is much harder to see how one might optimize the laying of tiles on an infinite board. If one can see how the creation of some corporeal substances might preclude the creation other corporeal substances, it is much more difficult to see how the creation of some unextended minds might preclude the creation of other unextended minds. Although the packing interpretation is discussed in most of the essays in this volume, none of the authors rises to its defense. Brown argues that "any possible world, were it instantiated, would give rise to a well-founded plenum, that is, a phenomenal world, in which all spaces are filled with well-founded bodies" In their introduction, Brown and Chiek suggest that the same conclusion should apply mutatis mutandis to corporeal substance worlds. Any possible corporeal substance world, by their lights, would have to be a material plenum. So far, so good. But it is hard to see how this follows from their premises. Take a cubic meter of some possible world. Let it be a plenum. Let it be infinitely divided. Must it have an unbounded perfection density? The articles in this volume are uniformly of high quality with a welcome mixture of well-established scholars and new lights to the field. The introduction by Brown and Chiek provides a clear overview of the issues as well as the contents of the articles. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, eds. Reference is to series, volume, and page. Look and Donald Rutherford, ed. Yale University Press, Reference is to original language page. Reference is to volume and page.

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7: Project MUSE - Leibniz and the Substance of the Vinculum Substantiale

Philosophia peripatetica emendata. Leibniz and Des Bosses on the Aristotelian Corporeal Substance Lucian Petrescu Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 54, Number 3, July , pp.

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8: The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

An English translation of REVIEW OF LEIBNIZ'S THEODICY, from July letter to the Jesuit Father des Bosses, This may refer to Leibniz's letter of mid.

Friedrich noted in his family journal: On Sunday 21 June [NS: He was given free access to it from the age of seven. He also composed hexameters of Latin verse , in a single morning, for a special event at school at the age of He defended his Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui Metaphysical Disputation on the Principle of Individuation , [28] which addressed the principle of individuation , on 9 June He published and defended a dissertation Specimen Quaestionum Philosophicarum ex Jure collectarum An Essay of Collected Philosophical Problems of Right , [28] arguing for both a theoretical and a pedagogical relationship between philosophy and law, in December He next declined the offer of an academic appointment at Altdorf, saying that "my thoughts were turned in an entirely different direction". Many posthumously published editions of his writings presented his name on the title page as " Freiherr G. Leibniz then dedicated an essay on law to the Elector in the hope of obtaining employment. The stratagem worked; the Elector asked Leibniz to assist with the redrafting of the legal code for the Electorate. Although von Boyneburg died late in , Leibniz remained under the employment of his widow until she dismissed him in He published an essay, under the pseudonym of a fictitious Polish nobleman, arguing unsuccessfully for the German candidate for the Polish crown. Leibniz proposed to protect German-speaking Europe by distracting Louis as follows. France would be invited to take Egypt as a stepping stone towards an eventual conquest of the Dutch East Indies. In return, France would agree to leave Germany and the Netherlands undisturbed. In , the French government invited Leibniz to Paris for discussion, [40] but the plan was soon overtaken by the outbreak of the Franco-Dutch War and became irrelevant. Soon after arriving, he met Dutch physicist and mathematician Christiaan Huygens and realised that his own knowledge of mathematics and physics was patchy. With Huygens as his mentor, he began a program of self-study that soon pushed him to making major contributions to both subjects, including discovering his version of the differential and integral calculus. He met Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld , the leading French philosophers of the day, and studied the writings of Descartes and Pascal , unpublished as well as published. He met with the Royal Society where he demonstrated a calculating machine that he had designed and had been building since The machine was able to execute all four basic operations adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing , and the society quickly made him an external member. Leibniz promptly returned to Paris and not, as had been planned, to Mainz. In this regard, a invitation from the John Frederick of Brunswick to visit Hanover proved to have been fateful. Leibniz had declined the invitation, but had begun corresponding with the duke in In , the duke offered Leibniz the post of counsellor. Leibniz very reluctantly accepted the position two years later, only after it became clear that no employment in Paris, whose intellectual stimulation he relished, or with the Habsburg imperial court, was forthcoming. He left Paris in October House of Hanover, â€"[edit] This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. On the journey from London to Hanover, Leibniz stopped in The Hague where he met van Leeuwenhoek , the discoverer of microorganisms. He also spent several days in intense discussion with Spinoza , who had just completed his masterwork, the Ethics. Leibniz served three consecutive rulers of the House of Brunswick as historian, political adviser, and most consequentially, as librarian of the ducal library. He thenceforth employed his pen on all the various political, historical, and theological matters involving the House of Brunswick; the resulting documents form a valuable part of the historical record for the period. Leibniz began promoting a project to use windmills to improve the mining operations in the Harz Mountains. This project did little to improve mining operations and was shut down by Duke Ernst August in To each of these women he was correspondent, adviser, and friend. In turn, they all approved of Leibniz more than did their spouses and the future king George I of Great Britain. Leibniz played a role in the initiatives and negotiations leading up to that Act, but not always an effective one. For example, something he published anonymously in England, thinking to promote the Brunswick cause, was formally censured by the British

Parliament. The Brunswicks tolerated the enormous effort Leibniz devoted to intellectual pursuits unrelated to his duties as a courtier, pursuits such as perfecting calculus, writing about other mathematics, logic, physics, and philosophy, and keeping up a vast correspondence. He began working on calculus in ; the earliest evidence of its use in his surviving notebooks is By he had a coherent system in hand, but did not publish it until That journal played a key role in advancing his mathematical and scientific reputation, which in turn enhanced his eminence in diplomacy, history, theology, and philosophy. The Elector Ernest Augustus commissioned Leibniz to write a history of the House of Brunswick, going back to the time of Charlemagne or earlier, hoping that the resulting book would advance his dynastic ambitions. From to , Leibniz traveled extensively in Germany, Austria, and Italy, seeking and finding archival materials bearing on this project. Leibniz never finished the project, in part because of his huge output on many other fronts, but also because he insisted on writing a meticulously researched and erudite book based on archival sources, when his patrons would have been quite happy with a short popular book, one perhaps little more than a genealogy with commentary, to be completed in three years or less. They never knew that he had in fact carried out a fair part of his assigned task: In , while traveling in northern Europe, the Russian Tsar Peter the Great stopped in Hanover and met Leibniz, who then took some interest in Russian matters for the rest of his life. In , Leibniz began a two-year residence in Vienna , where he was appointed Imperial Court Councillor to the Habsburgs. Even though Leibniz had done much to bring about this happy event, it was not to be his hour of glory. Despite the intercession of the Princess of Wales, Caroline of Ansbach, George I forbade Leibniz to join him in London until he completed at least one volume of the history of the Brunswick family his father had commissioned nearly 30 years earlier. Moreover, for George I to include Leibniz in his London court would have been deemed insulting to Newton, who was seen as having won the calculus priority dispute and whose standing in British official circles could not have been higher. Finally, his dear friend and defender, the Dowager Electress Sophia, died in Death[edit] Leibniz died in Hanover in Even though Leibniz was a life member of the Royal Society and the Berlin Academy of Sciences , neither organization saw fit to honor his death. His grave went unmarked for more than 50 years. Leibniz was eulogized by Fontenelle , before the French Academy of Sciences in Paris, which had admitted him as a foreign member in The eulogy was composed at the behest of the Duchess of Orleans , a niece of the Electress Sophia. Personal life[edit] Leibniz never married. In his diplomatic endeavors, he at times verged on the unscrupulous, as was all too often the case with professional diplomats of his day. On several occasions, Leibniz backdated and altered personal manuscripts, actions which put him in a bad light during the calculus controversy. On the other hand, he was charming, well-mannered, and not without humor and imagination. He never admitted the Protestant view of Pope as an Antichrist. Leibniz dated his beginning as a philosopher to his Discourse on Metaphysics , which he composed in as a commentary on a running dispute between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld. This led to an extensive and valuable correspondence with Arnauld; [56] it and the Discourse were not published until the 19th century. The Monadologie , composed in and published posthumously, consists of 90 aphorisms. Unlike Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz had a thorough university education in philosophy. He was influenced by his Leipzig professor Jakob Thomasius , who also supervised his BA thesis in philosophy. Leibniz was deeply interested in the new methods and conclusions of Descartes, Huygens, Newton, and Boyle , but viewed their work through a lens heavily tinted by scholastic notions. Leibniz variously invoked one or another of seven fundamental philosophical Principles: If a proposition is true, then its negation is false and vice versa. Two distinct things cannot have all their properties in common. If every predicate possessed by x is also possessed by y and vice versa, then entities x and y are identical; to suppose two things indiscernible is to suppose the same thing under two names. It has attracted the most controversy and criticism, especially from corpuscular philosophy and quantum mechanics. Natura non facit saltus [62] literally, "Nature does not make jumps". He proposes his theory that the universe is made of an infinite number of simple substances known as monads. These simple substances or monads are the "ultimate units of existence in nature". Monads have no parts but still exist by the qualities that they have. These qualities are continuously changing over time, and each monad is unique. They are also not affected by time and are subject to only creation and annihilation. Using the principle of reasoning, Leibniz concluded that the first reason of all things is God. The contingent

world must have some necessary reason for its existence. Leibniz uses a geometry book as an example to explain his reasoning. If this book was copied from an infinite chain of copies, there must be a some reason for the content of the book. The ontological essence of a monad is its irreducible simplicity. Unlike atoms, monads possess no material or spatial character. They also differ from atoms by their complete mutual independence, so that interactions among monads are only apparent. Instead, by virtue of the principle of pre-established harmony , each monad follows a preprogrammed set of "instructions" peculiar to itself, so that a monad "knows" what to do at each moment. By virtue of these intrinsic instructions, each monad is like a little mirror of the universe. Monads need not be "small"; e. Monads are purported to have gotten rid of the problematic: Theodicy and optimism[edit] Further information: Best of all possible worlds and Philosophical optimism The Theodicy [70] tries to justify the apparent imperfections of the world by claiming that it is optimal among all possible worlds. It must be the best possible and most balanced world, because it was created by an all powerful and all knowing God, who would not choose to create an imperfect world if a better world could be known to him or possible to exist. In effect, apparent flaws that can be identified in this world must exist in every possible world, because otherwise God would have chosen to create the world that excluded those flaws. Leibniz asserted that the truths of theology religion and philosophy cannot contradict each other, since reason and faith are both "gifts of God" so that their conflict would imply God contending against himself. Because reason and faith must be entirely reconciled, any tenet of faith which could not be defended by reason must be rejected. Leibniz then approached one of the central criticisms of Christian theism:

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9: Search results for `Gotfryd Wilhelm Leibniz` - PhilPapers

From the Letters to Des Bosses () Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason () The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology ()

Lucian Petrescu Philosophia peripatetica emendata. But I add them, with no detriment to the doctrine itself. You will hardly find another difference, even if you are bent on doing so. Atque ex hoc scrupulo meo consilium meum, quale sit, dispicis: As expected, Leibniz was delighted by the idea: Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. After all, his lifelong effort to reform the notion of substance envisioned a revival of the Aristotelian metaphysics of form and matter within a more defensible physics: For his part, Leibniz thought he was getting ever closer to Aristotelianism. This divergence suggests that they had different views either about Aristotelian metaphysics, or about Leibnizian metaphysics, or about both. I look here at the reasons for this divergence: This essay will concentrate on Des Bosses and his philosophical project. A better understanding of his thought will give us not only a better historical knowledge of the exchange with Leibniz, but also insight into how a Jesuit philosopher could approach Leibnizianism, i. Born in , Bartholomew Des Bosses studied humanities and philosophy and did his novitiate in Trier â€" He moved to Hildesheim in , on a chair of theological controversies. In , he went from Hildesheim to Hannover to find Leibniz, for unclear reasons, other than the admiration he professed in his letters. He continued his academic career in Cologne, where he died in His theological teaching duties explain perhaps why metaphysical subjects were not pursued with more drive, in spite of a manifest interest for them. His output is slim: Both Leibniz and Des Bosses came to their encounter in with their own baggage and with their own agendas. Leibniz was interested in Church affairs, intellectual gossip, the Jansenist controversy, privileged information on censorship, to compose a textbook on the model of the popular Summa philosophiae quadripartita of Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, the same model that Descartes had initially contemplated for his Principia philosophiae. Its Origins and Development; D. Des Bosses had, on the face of it, a genuine interest in Leibniz. His lifelong project appears to have been none other than to revive Aristotelian physics against that of the moderns, in a largely Thomist perspective according to Paquot , and to give a rational explanation of transubstantiation in the Eucharist. In short, I hold the following story. Both Leibniz and Des Bosses were preoccupied with saving the reality of extension as opposed to its phenomenality , but they had different understandings of how to do so and of why this was important. Des Bosses had one big idea: For Des Bosses, the vinculum proposed by Leibniz was nothing else than extension superadded to matter, and not a substance in its own right, as Leibniz wanted. In his bibliographical notes, Sommervogel mentioned a letter from to an unidentified Jesuit correspondent in which Des Bosses sketched the subject of his projected metaphysical treatise. Without going into the details of the text, I want to begin by dissociating two problems to which the vinculum substantiale is supposed to be a solution. Is extension a mere phenomenon, as Leibniz calls it, or can it be something physically real, grounded in substance itselfâ€"that is, in the monads? These two problems are closely connected by Leibniz in such a way that one cannot be dissociated from the other. The notion of a vinculum substantiale is meant to solve both of them. At the same time, this principle of unity, also called a realisans, endows corporeal substance with continuity and a principle of resistance necessary for extension. In other words, extension can only be made real if the corporeal substance is united. Whether the notion of the vinculum substantiale is coherent and successful in securing a notion of corporeal substance for Leibniz is not my main concern here. For an overview of the Anglo-Saxon debate over realism vs. The Aristotelian position on corporeal substance that Des Bosses would have inherited from his Jesuit sources is in stark contrast with that of Leibniz. According to the Aristotelian Thomist position, the composite of matter and form, which constitutes all corporeal substances, is a given; it is only through a secondary act of abstraction that we inquire into its composition e. In a letter from February 12, , Des Bosses expressed precisely this difference in the way the Aristotelians approach the corporeal substance, as opposed to Leibniz: The primary substances for an Aristotelian are the corporeal substances, while the primary substances for Leibniz are the monads. Des Bosses did not need the vinculum as a solution to the unity of the corporeal substance, because they are already united for him unum

per se. There are several ways in which Leibniz explains how the monadology For the Thomist position, see e. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human nature, ch. Hoc mihi certum est: Relationes enim, uti alia accidentia substantiam jam constitutam supponunt. Quare dicendum mihi videtur, hoc quidquid est quod praeter animam et corpus substantiam individuam constituit ipsam esse existentiam ab- solutam totius substantiae concretae quam Aristoteles et S. Thomas a materia et forma quae scilicet substantiae essentia sunt distinctam, unamque utrique communem statuunt. It refers hereafter to the view that the ultimate elements of reality are simple substances, and that there is nothing ontologically real in the external world over and above the monads. In this sense, Leibniz writes to Des Bosses, If you deny that what is superadded to monads in order to make a union is substantial, then a body cannot be said to be a substance, for in that case it will be a mere aggregate of monads, and I fear that you will fall back on the mere phenomena of bodies. Each [monad] is, as it were, a certain world apart, and they harmonize with each other through their phenomena, and not through any other intrinsic intercourse and connection. For it should no more be said that monads are parts of bodies, that they touch each other, that they compose bodies, than it is right to say this of points and souls. Leibniz develops this idea in an interesting passage from a supplementary study to the letter to Des Bosses from February 15, He suggests in this passage that, in order to secure the phenomenal unity of disparate perceptions, we should consider God as the ultimate perceiver. If bodies are phenomena, and are judged by our appearances, they will not be real, since they will appear differently to others. Thus, the reality of bodies, space, motion, and time seems to consist in this: And the difference between the appearance of bodies with respect to us and their appearance with respect to God is in some way like the difference between a drawing in perspective and a ground plan. For whereas drawings in perspective differ according to the position of the viewer, a ground plan or geometrical representation is unique. God certainly sees things exactly such as they are according to geometrical truth, although likewise he also knows how each See Garber, Leibniz. Body, Substance, Monad, ch. He explained at one point that the notion of extension is derivative in the same sense in which the notions of space and time are derivative: Des Bosses was willing to send the treatise to Leibniz for comments January 28, , LDB , but Leibniz did not wait for the text and offered his own thoughts on the matter. It was obvious for Leibniz that such a dissertation could not work with the phenomenal conception of extension he had laid out, which had little to do with peripatetism. Nevertheless, he was intrigued by the idea of forging a peripatetic notion of corporeal substance in Leibnizian terms: I shall read with great pleasure your dissertation on corporeal substance. If corporeal substance is something real over and above monads, as a line is taken to be something over and above points, we shall have to say that corporeal substance consists in a certain union, or rather in a real unifier superadded to monads by God, and that from the union of the passive powers of monads there in fact arises primary matter, LDB â€” Sed puto monadas ipsas, de quibus sermo erat, ut meras Materiae modificationes aut terminationes considerari non posse, cum potius principia sint et fundamenta massae sive ex- tensionis, imo potius extensio juxta te est modificatio monadum seu substantiarum. Sed et monades continuitatem habent, extensio enim et continuatio ex repetitione substantiae oritur. In laying out this proposal, Leibniz distinguished two separate metaphysical paths: He will bring a number of clarifications to the notion of the vinculum substantiale throughout the correspondence. An important change appears in August , when Des Bosses points out that there is no reason to think of the unifier as ephemeral. Leibniz agrees and grants a permanent status to the substantial bond. Although the insufficiency of the pre-established harmony to explain the union of body and soul is in the background of the discussion, it is not the main concern for the introduction of the substantial bond. Body, Substance, Monad, â€”82 , who also views the doctrine of the correspondence as a search for an alternative to phenomenalism, and Robinet Architectonique disjonctive, 84â€”85 , who rightfully points out that the vinculum is an avatar of the scholastic forma cor- poreitatis, a notion that Leibniz had discussed with Arnauld. And so body, since it superadds to the monads nothing except this absolute thing, will superadd only an accident to them. And as we are discussing modes, I am eager to know what you think about the quantity of mass or extension that you somewhere say is nothing but the continuation or diffusion of the already presupposed striving and resisting, or resistance, of a substance. Is this very continuation or diffusion only a mode of substance, or is it something that is more than modally distinct from it, that is, an absolute accident? He admitted only a distinction between substances and their modes, with

no middle entity. He held extension to be a mode: Traditionally, the separation between extension as a real accident and the substance to which it is attached was needed by the Thomist explanation of the Eucharist: A real accident of the kind that Des Bosses has in mind has a middle status between a substance and a mode. For Des Bosses, extension has an accidental status because it presupposes the existence of a substance that is continued. It is a continuation of something. He wrote to Leibniz in I am confirmed in the view accepted far and wide among us, namely, that extension is a real accident and not just a modal one. It is indeed an accident because it presupposes a primary being or substance that is already constituted, and it does not constitute a substance as matter and entelechy do. On the other hand, it is real and not modal because, just as nothing that is not active in itself can become active by a modification alone, so I cannot conceive how that which is not extended in itself as matter and forms are not extended in themselves could have the power to become extended from a mode alone. If you will concede that this one accident is real and coeval with matter, I shall not fear relegating the rest to the level of modes. Starting with , Leibniz held that corporeal substances must consist in the substantial bond itself, and the connection between the monads and the substantial bond started to become more and more loose. I should think that composite substance, or that thing that produces a bond of monads, since it is not a mere modification of monads or something existing in them as subjects for the same modification could not be in many subjects at the same time , depends upon monads. This is not a logical dependence that is, such that it cannot be supernaturally separated from them but only a natural one, namely, such that it requires that they unite in a composite substance, unless God wills otherwise. This evolution presents serious consequences for Des Bosses. On the one hand, severing the ties between the corporeal substance and the monads undermined the only argument that Des Bosses had for positing extension as a superadded accident: The bond unites the monads physically, but not logically; as a substance, it can exist on its own, without the monads. The metaphysical independence of the vinculum is restated a number of times until the end of the correspondence. Interim vinculum hoc substantiale naturaliter non essentialiter vinculum est. Exigit enim monades sed non essentialiter involvit, quia existere potest sine monadibus, et monades sine ipso. From this point on, the dispute over the modal or accidental status of extension is moved over to the vinculum. Until the end of the correspondence, the positions remain unchanged: Des Bosses holds the vinculum to be an accident because it presupposes the monads, while Leibniz maintain that it is a substance on its own that does not need the monads.

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