

1: Social Epistemology and Embodied Cognition | Pedro Saez Williams - www.enganchecubano.com

In "Embodiment and Epistemology," Louise Antony considers a kind of "Cartesian epistemology" according to which, so far as knowing goes, knowers could be completely disembodied, that is, pure Cartesian egos.

Cognitive Science and Human Experience pages 6-7” The Varela enactive definition is broad enough to overlap the views of extended cognition and situated cognition, and indeed, these ideas are not always carefully separated. Explaining the Computational Mind, p. In philosophy of mind, the idea that cognition is embodied is sympathetic with other views of cognition such as situated cognition or externalism. This is a radical move towards a total re-localization of mental processes out of the neural domain. For example, when participants hold a pencil in their teeth engaging the muscles of a smile, they comprehend pleasant sentences faster than unpleasant ones, while holding a pencil between their nose and upper lip to engage the muscles of a frown has the reverse effect. This was extended into the audio-visual domain by the "talking heads" approach of Eric Vatikiotis-Bateson, Rubin, and other colleagues. Visual search[edit] Graph of the visual search task results showing that participants made less object orientation errors when grasping than pointing. One embodied cognition study shows that action intention can affect processing in visual search, with more orientation errors for pointing than for grasping. There were randomized numbers of distractors as well 0, 3, 6, or 9, which differed from the target in color, orientation, or both. A tone sounded to inform participants which target orientation to find. Participants kept their eyes on a fixation point until it turned from red to the target color. The screen then lit up and the participants searched for the target, either pointing to it or grasping it depending on the block. There were 2 blocks for pointing and 2 for grasping, with the order counterbalanced. Each block had 64 trials. A control group walked across campus but did not wear a costume. At the conclusion of the experiment, each participant completed a survey which asked them to estimate the distance they walked. Researchers have found that when making judgements about objects in photographs, people will take the perspective of a person in the picture instead of their own. For example, if the 2 objects were an apple and a banana, the participants would have to respond to a question about the location of the apple compared to the banana. The photographs either had no person, a person looking at the object, in this case the banana, or a person reaching for the banana. The photograph and question appeared in a larger set of questionnaires not related to the study. Embodied language processing Some researchers extend embodied cognition to include language. Participants had a significantly larger change for "performable" sentences than "inanimate" sentences and swinging only. In the control condition, participants swung the pendulum without performing the "sentence judgement task. The "plausible" sentences made sense semantically, while the "implausible" ones did not. The "performable" sentences could be performed by a human, while the "inanimate" sentences could not. Participants responded by saying "yes" to the "plausible" sentences. Trofimova, who first described this phenomenon in her experiments, called it "projection through capacities". Females with stronger social or physical endurance estimated social attractors in more positive terms than weaker females. Capacities related to the tempo of activities also appeared to impact the perception of lexical material: Memory[edit] A study examining memory and embodied cognition illustrates that people remember more of the gist of a story when they physically act it out. Participants were given 5 minutes to read the monologue twice, unaware of a future recall test. In the "Read Only" condition participants filled out unrelated questionnaires after reading the monologue. In the "Writing" condition participants responded to 5 questions about the story from the perspective of the character in the monologue. They had 6 minutes to answer each question. They were also given 6 minutes per question and everyone participated in answering each question. The "Independent Discussion" condition was the same as the "Collaborative Discussion," except 1 person answered each question. In the "Improvisation" condition participants acted out 5 scenes from the monologue in groups of 5 women. The researchers suggest that this condition involves embodied cognition and will produce better memory for the monologue. Every participant played the main character and a supporting character once. Participants were given short prompts from lines in the monologue, which were excluded from the memory test. Participants had 2 minutes to choose characters and 4 minutes for improvisations. The recall test was the

monologue with 96 words or phrases missing. Participants had to fill in the blanks as accurately as possible. They scored significantly lower than the other groups, which indicated that guessing was not easy. The combination of "Verbatim" and "Gist" was called "Total Memory. It has been shown that bodily activity can be used to enhance learning in several studies. For example, although most individuals recruit visual processes when presented with spatial problems such as mental rotation tasks [38] motor experts favor motor processes to perform the same tasks, with higher overall performance. In research focused on the approach and avoidance effect, people showed an approach effect for positive words. In the "negative toward condition," participants moved negative words toward the center and positive words away. Participants were given feedback about their accuracy at the end of each of the 4 experimental blocks. In the first experiment the word at the center of the screen had a positive valence, while in the second experiment the central word had a negative valence. In the third experiment, the center of the screen had an empty box. In the "control" condition, participants were instructed to simply observe the product. The "correction" condition involved the same instructions as the approach condition, except participants were told that the body can affect judgment. In the "approach information" condition, participants had to list 5 reasons why they would obtain the product. After viewing a picture of an aversive product, participants rated on a scale of 1 to 7 how desirable the product was and how much they approached of or avoided the product. They also provided how much they would pay for the product. There were no differences between the "avoidance," "control," "correction," and "approach information" conditions. Simulation of approach can affect liking and willingness to pay for a product, but the effect can be reversed if the person knows about this influence. The participants were then asked to fill out donations to Haiti for the Red Cross in sealed envelopes. They were told to return the envelope regardless of whether they donated. They also filled out questionnaires about their feelings about the Red Cross, their tendency to donate, their feelings about Haiti, what they thought the purpose of the study was, etc. As the researchers predicted, the "muscle-firming" condition helped participants get over their physical aversion to viewing the devastation in Haiti and spend money. Muscle-firming in this experiment may also be related to an increase in self-control, suggesting embodied cognition can play a role in self-regulation. In Study 1, participants primed with dryness-related concepts reported greater physical thirst and tiredness and lower subjective vitality. In Study 2, participants who were physically thirsty were less persistent in investing effort in an unsolvable anagram task. In Study 3, images of arid land influenced time preference regarding when to begin preparation to make a monetary investment. Finally, in Studies 4a and 4b, exposure to the names of dryness-related products influenced impressions of the vitality of a target person. Some judgments, such as the emotion of a face, are detected more quickly when a participant mimics the facial expression that is being evaluated. Goal-relevant actions may be encouraged by embodied cognition, as evidenced by the automated approach and avoidance of certain environmental cues. If one moves in a way previously associated with danger, the body may require a greater level of information processing than if the body moves in a way associated with a benign situation. Some social psychologists examined embodied cognition and hypothesized that embodied cognition would be supported by embodied rapport. The evolutionary perspective cites language, both spoken and written, as types of embodied cognition. Technical aspects of written language, such as italics, all caps, and emoticons promote an inner voice and thereby a sense of feeling rather than thinking about a written message. Lakoff argues that all cognition is based on knowledge that comes from the body and that other domains are mapped onto our embodied knowledge using a combination of conceptual metaphor, image schema and prototypes. Conceptual metaphor Lakoff and Mark Johnson [50] showed that humans use metaphor ubiquitously and that metaphors operate at a conceptual level. Lakoff and his collaborators have collected thousands of examples of conceptual metaphors in many domains. It is used in such expression as: In cases like these, something complex a love affair is described in terms of something that can be done with a body travel through space.

2: Faith and Place: An Essay in Embodied Religious Epistemology | Carol Wayne White - www.enganchec.com

embodied knowing as pragmatic, as describing a way of knowing which does not explicitly involve the body, and therefore is mistaken, though the body's implicit involvement, being fundamentally inseparable from mind, is inevitable.

Situated Knowers Feminist epistemology conceives of knowers as situated in particular relations to what is known and to other knowers. What is known, and the way that it is known, thereby reflects the situation or perspective of the knower. Here we are concerned with claims to know, temporarily bracketing the question of which claims are true or warranted. Situated knowledge in general. Consider how people may understand the same object in different ways that reflect the distinct relations in which they stand to it. People experience the world by using their bodies, which have different constitutions and are differently located in space and time. People have first-personal access to some of their own bodily and mental states, yielding direct knowledge of phenomenological facts about what it is like for them to be in these states. Third parties may know these states only by interpreting external symptoms, imaginative projection, or obtaining their testimony. Emotions, attitudes, interests, and values. People often represent objects in relation to their emotions, attitudes and interests. A thief represents a lock as a frustrating obstacle while its owner represents the lock as a comforting source of security. Personal knowledge of others. People have different knowledge of others, in virtue of their different personal relationships to them. Such knowledge is often tacit, incompletely articulated, and intuitive. Like the knowledge it takes to get a joke, it is more an interpretive skill in making sense of a person than a set of propositions. The German language usefully marks this as the distinction between Erkenntnis and Wissenschaft. Because people behave differently toward others, and others interpret their behavior differently, depending on their personal relationships, what others know of them depends on these relationships. People have different skills, which may also be a source of different propositional knowledge. An expert dog handler knows how to elicit more interesting behavior from an a dog than a novice does. Such know-how expresses a more sophisticated understanding of dogs on the part of the expert, and also generates new phenomena about dogs for investigation. People have different styles of investigation and representation. What looks like one phenomenon to a lumper may look like three to a splitter. Background beliefs and worldviews. People form different beliefs about an object, in virtue of different background beliefs. Differences in global metaphysical or political worldviews naturalism, theism, liberalism, marxism may also generate different beliefs about particulars on a more comprehensive scale. Relations to other inquirers. People may stand in different epistemic relations to other inquirers—for example, as informants, interlocutors, students—which affects their access to relevant information and their ability to convey their beliefs to others. These kinds of situatedness affect knowledge in several ways. Feminist epistemology focuses on how the social location of the knower affects what and how she knows. It is thus a branch of social epistemology. Partly in virtue of their different ascribed identities, individuals occupy different social roles that accord them different powers, duties, and role-given goals and interests. They are subject to different norms that prescribe different virtues, habits, emotions, and skills that are thought to be appropriate for these roles. They also acquire different subjective identities. One may simply know oneself to have certain ascribed identities. One may accept or endorse these identities, actively affirming the norms and roles associated with them. Gender as a mode of social situation. Most feminist theorists distinguish between sex and gender. Sex comprises the biological differences between males and females. Gender is what societies make of sexual differences: Gender thus has several dimensions Haslanger Men and women are assigned to distinct social roles. For example, most societies reserve political and military offices mostly for men, and assign women most childrearing responsibilities. Men and women are expected to comply with different norms of behavior and bodily comportment. For example, men are expected to be assertive and athletic; women, deferential and modest. Gender norms are tailored to gender roles: Gendered traits and virtues. The man who avoids tenderly comforting a crying baby in the presence of women may do so when alone. Masculinity and femininity can be seen as contrasting styles of performance in almost any role. Subjective gender identity includes all of the ways one might understand oneself to be a man, a woman, both, or neither. One could identify with any subset of gender norms, roles, and traits ascribed to the

gender of which one sees oneself as a member, while repudiating others. One could even repudiate them all, but still identify oneself as a man or a woman in terms of what one sees as distinct roles men and women ought to play in bringing about a just future one that may or may not include gender distinctions. Animals and inanimate objects may be placed in a gendered field of representation through conventional association, imaginative projection, and metaphorical thinking. Each mode of gendered knowledge raises new questions for epistemology. The phenomenology of gendered bodies. Once internalized, such norms profoundly affect the phenomenology of embodiment. One question these facts raise for feminist epistemology is to what extent dominant models of the world, especially of the relation between minds and bodies, have seemed compelling because they conform to a male or masculine phenomenology Bordo ; Young Gendered first-personal knowledge de se. It is one thing to know what sexual harassment is, and how to identify it in a case described in third-personal terms. The problems of de se knowledge are particularly pressing for feminist theory, because it is committed to theorizing in ways that women can use to improve their lives. Gendered emotions, attitudes, interests, and values. Feminist theory defines a representation as androcentric if it depicts the world in relation to male or masculine interests, emotions, attitudes or values. Such attitudes and interests structure the cognition of those who have them. A representation is gynocentric if it depicts the world in relation to female or feminine interests, emotions, attitudes or values. An interest, emotion, attitude, or value might be symbolically gendered even if men and women do not manifest it differently. It thus can qualify as a symbolically gynocentric perspective, even if men and women do not differ in their propensity to represent moral problems in its terms, and to act accordingly. Feminist epistemology raises numerous questions about these phenomena. Can situated emotional responses to things be a valid source of knowledge about them Diamond , Jaggar , Keller , Pitts-Taylor ? Do dominant practices and conceptions of science and scientific method reflect an androcentric perspective, or a perspective that reflects other dominant positions, as of race and colonial rule Merchant ; Harding , , , , ; Schiebinger ? Do mainstream philosophical conceptions of objectivity, knowledge, and reason reflect an androcentric perspective Bordo ; Code ; Flax ; Rooney ? How would the conceptual frameworks of particular sciences change if they reflected the interests of females Anderson b, Rolin , Wajcman , Waring ? Knowledge of others in gendered relationships. Gender norms differentially structure the social spaces to which men and women are admitted, as well as the presentation of self to others. Men manifest their male identity, and women their female identity, differently alone than in mixed company, and differently in these settings than in gender-segregated contexts. Male and female inquirers therefore have access to different information about others. Male and female ethnographers may be admitted to different social spaces. Even when admitted to the same social spaces, their presence has different effects on those being observed. Research that elicits information about others through personal contact between the researchers and the research subjects therefore raises the question of how findings might be influenced by the gendered relations between researchers and subjects, and whether gender-inclusive research teams are in a better position to detect this. Ethnography, which derives propositional knowledge of others from personal knowledge of native informants in long-term, often intimate relationships, raises these issues most acutely Bell et al ; Leacock Similar issues arise in survey research, clinical research, and human experimentation Sherif Some skills are labeled masculine or feminine because men and women need them specifically to perform their respective gender roles, and they are not generically useful for almost any role as walking, talking, and seeing are. It takes a particular knowledge of small children to know how to comfort them, a particular knowledge of soldiers to know how to whip up their morale. Although men and women alike may acquire these skills, they are considered the peculiar responsibility of one or the other gender. Men and women may therefore have differential access to such skill-based knowledge. This inability to self-identify with the task can impair performance. These phenomena raise various questions for epistemology. Some theorists believe that men and women have different cognitive styles Belenky et al ; Gilligan Whether or not this is true, cognitive styles are gender symbolized Rooney Argument is commonly cast as an adversarial mode of discourse, in which one side claims vindication by vanquishing the opposition. Such pursuit of dominance follows the competitive pattern of male gender roles in combat, athletics, and business. Its operations are more like love than war, and thereby follows a mode of persuasion thought more

suitable for women. These phenomena raise numerous epistemological questions: Gendered background beliefs and worldviews. We have seen above how men and women have access to different phenomenological knowledge, de se knowledge, know-how, and personal knowledge of others, in virtue of their gender. They also tend to represent the world in different terms, in virtue of their gendered interests, attitudes, emotions and values, and perhaps also although this is a matter of controversy among feminist theorists in virtue of different cognitive styles. These differences create different background beliefs, against which additional information may be processed. Representational schemes that are functional for different gender roles and gendered attitudes make different kinds of information salient. Besides making different kinds of information salient to men and women, their different background knowledge may lead them to interpret commonly accessed information differently. Such differences can spring from differential access to phenomenological knowledge. The male and female observers imaginatively project themselves into her situation, inferring her feelings from the feelings they think underlie her body language.

3: Phenomenology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Individual revelation is embodied epistemology, and so what follows from understanding this perfected revelation as individual is that "the essential essence of the revelation [of God] is in [the world of] Action" through embodied knowing. That is, the genuine revelation of God, the genuine knowing to which Bezalel was privileged, is an.

Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways: The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy: The historical movement of phenomenology is the philosophical tradition launched in the first half of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, et al. In that movement, the discipline of phenomenology was prized as the proper foundation of all philosophy—as opposed, say, to ethics or metaphysics or epistemology. The methods and characterization of the discipline were widely debated by Husserl and his successors, and these debates continue to the present day. The definition of phenomenology offered above will thus be debatable, for example, by Heideggerians, but it remains the starting point in characterizing the discipline. However, our experience is normally much richer in content than mere sensation. Phenomenology as a discipline has been central to the tradition of continental European philosophy throughout the 20th century, while philosophy of mind has evolved in the Austro-Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy that developed throughout the 20th century. Yet the fundamental character of our mental activity is pursued in overlapping ways within these two traditions. Accordingly, the perspective on phenomenology drawn in this article will accommodate both traditions. The main concern here will be to characterize the discipline of phenomenology, in a contemporary purview, while also highlighting the historical tradition that brought the discipline into its own. Basically, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, and are distinct from the things they present or mean. The basic intentional structure of consciousness, we find in reflection or analysis, involves further forms of experience. Furthermore, in a different dimension, we find various grounds or enabling conditions—conditions of the possibility—of intentionality, including embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context, language and other social practices, social background, and contextual aspects of intentional activities. Thus, phenomenology leads from conscious experience into conditions that help to give experience its intentionality. Traditional phenomenology has focused on subjective, practical, and social conditions of experience. Recent philosophy of mind, however, has focused especially on the neural substrate of experience, on how conscious experience and mental representation or intentionality are grounded in brain activity. It remains a difficult question how much of these grounds of experience fall within the province of phenomenology as a discipline. Cultural conditions thus seem closer to our experience and to our familiar self-understanding than do the electrochemical workings of our brain, much less our dependence on quantum-mechanical states of physical systems to which we may belong. The cautious thing to say is that phenomenology leads in some ways into at least some background conditions of our experience. The Discipline of Phenomenology The discipline of phenomenology is defined by its domain of study, its methods, and its main results. Phenomenology studies structures of conscious experience as experienced from the first-person point of view, along with relevant conditions of experience. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, the way it is directed through its content or meaning toward a certain object in the world. We all experience various types of experience including perception, imagination, thought, emotion, desire, volition, and action. Thus, the domain of phenomenology is the range of experiences including these types among others. Experience includes not only relatively passive experience as in vision or hearing, but also active experience as in walking or hammering a nail or kicking a ball. The range will be specific to each species of being that enjoys consciousness; our focus is on our own, human, experience. Not all conscious beings will, or will be able to,

practice phenomenology, as we do. Conscious experiences have a unique feature: Other things in the world we may observe and engage. But we do not experience them, in the sense of living through or performing them. This experiential or first-person feature—“that of being experienced”—is an essential part of the nature or structure of conscious experience: How shall we study conscious experience? We reflect on various types of experiences just as we experience them. That is to say, we proceed from the first-person point of view. However, we do not normally characterize an experience at the time we are performing it. In many cases we do not have that capability: Rather, we acquire a background of having lived through a given type of experience, and we look to our familiarity with that type of experience: The practice of phenomenology assumes such familiarity with the type of experiences to be characterized. Importantly, also, it is types of experience that phenomenology pursues, rather than a particular fleeting experience—“unless its type is what interests us. Classical phenomenologists practiced some three distinguishable methods. Thus, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty spoke of pure description of lived experience. In this vein, Heidegger and his followers spoke of hermeneutics, the art of interpretation in context, especially social and linguistic context. In the end, all the classical phenomenologists practiced analysis of experience, factoring out notable features for further elaboration. These traditional methods have been ramified in recent decades, expanding the methods available to phenomenology. What makes an experience conscious is a certain awareness one has of the experience while living through or performing it. Does this awareness-of-experience consist in a kind of inner observation of the experience, as if one were doing two things at once? Recent theorists have proposed both. Or is it a different form of inherent structure? Sartre took this line, drawing on Brentano and Husserl. These issues are beyond the scope of this article, but notice that these results of phenomenological analysis shape the characterization of the domain of study and the methodology appropriate to the domain. For awareness-of-experience is a defining trait of conscious experience, the trait that gives experience a first-person, lived character. It is that lived character of experience that allows a first-person perspective on the object of study, namely, experience, and that perspective is characteristic of the methodology of phenomenology. Conscious experience is the starting point of phenomenology, but experience shades off into less overtly conscious phenomena. As Husserl and others stressed, we are only vaguely aware of things in the margin or periphery of attention, and we are only implicitly aware of the wider horizon of things in the world around us. Moreover, as Heidegger stressed, in practical activities like walking along, or hammering a nail, or speaking our native tongue, we are not explicitly conscious of our habitual patterns of action. Furthermore, as psychoanalysts have stressed, much of our intentional mental activity is not conscious at all, but may become conscious in the process of therapy or interrogation, as we come to realize how we feel or think about something. We should allow, then, that the domain of phenomenology—“our own experience”—spreads out from conscious experience into semi-conscious and even unconscious mental activity, along with relevant background conditions implicitly invoked in our experience. These issues are subject to debate; the point here is to open the door to the question of where to draw the boundary of the domain of phenomenology. To begin an elementary exercise in phenomenology, consider some typical experiences one might have in everyday life, characterized in the first person: I see that fishing boat off the coast as dusk descends over the Pacific. I hear that helicopter whirring overhead as it approaches the hospital. I am thinking that phenomenology differs from psychology. I wish that warm rain from Mexico were falling like last week. I imagine a fearsome creature like that in my nightmare. I intend to finish my writing by noon. I walk carefully around the broken glass on the sidewalk. I stroke a backhand cross-court with that certain underspin. I am searching for the words to make my point in conversation. Here are rudimentary characterizations of some familiar types of experience. Each sentence is a simple form of phenomenological description, articulating in everyday English the structure of the type of experience so described. The verb indicates the type of intentional activity described: Of central importance is the way that objects of awareness are presented or intended in our experiences, especially, the way we see or conceive or think about objects. In effect, the object-phrase expresses the noema of the act described, that is, to the extent that language has appropriate expressive power. The overall form of the given sentence articulates the basic form of intentionality in the experience: Rich phenomenological description or interpretation, as in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty et al. But such simple descriptions bring out the basic form of

intentionality. As we interpret the phenomenological description further, we may assess the relevance of the context of experience. And we may turn to wider conditions of the possibility of that type of experience. In this way, in the practice of phenomenology, we classify, describe, interpret, and analyze structures of experiences in ways that answer to our own experience. In such interpretive-descriptive analyses of experience, we immediately observe that we are analyzing familiar forms of consciousness, conscious experience of or about this or that. Intentionality is thus the salient structure of our experience, and much of phenomenology proceeds as the study of different aspects of intentionality. Thus, we explore structures of the stream of consciousness, the enduring self, the embodied self, and bodily action. Furthermore, as we reflect on how these phenomena work, we turn to the analysis of relevant conditions that enable our experiences to occur as they do, and to represent or intend as they do. Phenomenology then leads into analyses of conditions of the possibility of intentionality, conditions involving motor skills and habits, background social practices, and often language, with its special place in human affairs. The science of phenomena as distinct from being ontology. That division of any science which describes and classifies its phenomena. From the Greek *phainomenon*, appearance. In physics and philosophy of science, the term is used in the second sense, albeit only occasionally. In its root meaning, then, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: Yet the discipline of phenomenology did not blossom until the 20th century and remains poorly understood in many circles of contemporary philosophy. What is that discipline? How did philosophy move from a root concept of phenomena to the discipline of phenomenology? Immanuel Kant used the term occasionally in various writings, as did Johann Gottlieb Fichte. From there Edmund Husserl took up the term for his new science of consciousness, and the rest is history. Suppose we say phenomenology studies phenomena:

4: Embodied cognition - Wikipedia

embodied knowing, but currently remain embroiled in debate. Whereas feminist standpoint epistemologies assume there is an objective reality that we can know, some feminist postmodernists opine that such claims "rest upon.

Now, without opening your eyes, I want you to take that hand and touch your nose. It looks like that experiment was a success, and no-one had any problem finding their nose. Proprioception is a form of embodied knowledge, and actually experiencing it first hand is probably the best way to get a grip on understanding what I want to explore today. To understand why embodied knowledge is so important, we need to look briefly at more traditional notions of knowledge. The philosophy of knowledge, epistemology, rose to prominence largely through the influence of Descartes and Locke. This is a crucial point, because if embodied knowledge exists, then the Cartesian way of understanding the world is entirely wrong-headed. Enlightenment epistemology, which is heavily influenced by Descartes, is based on a dualistic notion of knowledge. But embodied knowledge upsets that duality. In the proprioception exercise we just did there is no separation between a subject that knows and an object that is known. There is just you - the knowing subject is also the known object. Descartes might argue that this is a special case. But the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that breaks down on examination, as we shall see as we delve into the subject a little more. Merleau-Ponty Most discussions of embodiment draw on the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. For him there is no such thing as the mind separate from the body. Thinking not a product of some disembodied mind located somewhere outside the physical, but is part of an active relationship between embodied humans and the world. Think about the last time that you used a computer: If I asked you to draw the keyboard layout for me, you would probably find it impossible. I had a good example of this kind of embodied knowledge recently when I needed to tell our computer technician what my log-in password was. In the end, I had to watch my hands as I typed it in, and then write down what I saw. This is a practical, embodied knowledge that is quite different from the discursive knowledge I can talk about. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, this "is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort. Some sociologists suggest that the same relationship occurs in social interaction. Our knowledge of how to function in society may be embodied. Games are a good example of how this might work. The rules of the game, strategies and complex physical movements combine in ways that mean a footballer often has no time to think thorough how to play. The principles of the game are embodied, and the full meaning can only be expressed in actions. Bourdieu and Foucault Peirre Bourdieu expresses this as the habitus, a set of dispositions that the body learns and can use given the right social context. Our social relationships create habitus, and so this process is bound up with relations of power. How a particular class or group physically carry themselves provides other people with an understanding of who they are. These behaviours are the product of embodied knowledge. The process by which power relations inscribe themselves onto individuals is clearly a form of embodied knowledge. Scientists drawing on several sources, but particularly neurobiology have concluded that the mind, our reasoning and our knowledge are embodied. They propose that our physical experience of the world - our spatial awareness, our bodily movement, and the way we manipulate objects - provide the pattern for how we reason about the world. Similarly, health and life are up and sickness and death are down. Lakoff and Johnson claim that this association arises from how we experience the world - like when we pour water in a glass and see the level rise, or that we lie down when we are sick. Some are expressed in grammar, others in gesture, art or ritual.

5: Embodiment and Epistemology - Oxford Scholarship

This paper suggests that the notion of an embodied mode of reflection is a useful way to conceive of the original contributions that Schon brings to understandings of reflective processes in professional education.

6: Epistemology | Definition of Epistemology by Merriam-Webster

EMBODIED EPISTEMOLOGY pdf

Embodied cognition is the theory that many features of cognition, whether human or otherwise, are shaped by aspects of the entire body of the organism. The features of cognition include high level mental constructs (such as concepts and categories) and performance on various cognitive tasks (such as reasoning or judgment).

7: Epistemology | Define Epistemology at www.enganchecubano.com

standpoint epistemology, we'll look at epistemologies of ignorance, and epistemologies of resistance. Students interested in embodied epistemologies as developed in feminism, phenomenology, queer theory.

8: Social Epistemology and Embodied Cognition 2 - www.enganchecubano.com

The themes of embodiment and embodied knowledge is a long exploration of the many different ways that knowledge is not well-explained by analytic models based on the philosophy of the Cartesian Split-- the idea that mind and matter (including body) are separate realms. If this dualism does not exist.

9: Notions of Embodied Knowledge

3 unable to visually recognize simple everyday objects, despite exhibiting a variety of perceptual, linguistic, and intellectual abilities. 2 Although the visual ability that makes possible object.

The jackdaw of Rheims Philosophical and sociological foundation of education book The Final Move Beyond Iraq Internal threats to revenue security Star Parents Training Manual Interview with Joss Whedon / The political economy of Cubans in south Florida My Animal Art Class (My Art Class) Where golfers buy their pants and other collected cartoons Knowing Jesus through the Old Testament Descriptive catalogue of rare engravings in first states and proofs forming the collection at 40, Grosven Ms excel 2003 tutorial History of Talbot County, Maryland, 1661-1861 Progressive Era America and the culture of the new unionism Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature) Letsvisit New Guinea Science projects for all students Machine generated contents note: 1 A Feminist History of Rape in U.S. Film, 1903-1979 Reinventing the Schools 31. Marburg and Ebola viruses, G. Lloyd Waltz kenneth n theory of international politics Glaciers of Glacier National Park : past, present and future Animal drawing books A history of esthetics Ethnic Groups in Motion President Lincolns cabinet Enlargement of the locks of the Erie and Oswego Canals. (to accompany bill H.R. no. 288.). Address delivered by Rev. Clement M. Butler, at the Presidents mansion Student Nurse Success Pack Online and on the streets Philip the Second and Macedonian Imperialism Laserjet 4250 service manual The Weight of Glory: A Vision and Practice for Christian Faith : The Future of Liberal Theology Record-setting animals Conclusion: Believing Gods promises Building in the 21st century robert cooke Gods Animals Color and Activity (Double Fun Pad) Preparation and analysis of financial statements Psychology And Social Issues Determination of occupational stress and coping strategies of mediators utilizing the Delphi technique