

1: Causes of income inequality in the United States - Wikipedia

The era of the most rapid suburbanization—the period roughly from the late s to the late s—also saw the rapid expansion of the middle class, while that of the wealthiest actually fell. 58 By the mids, the percentage of households earning middle incomes had doubled to 60%, compared with the boom years of the s. By , over 60% of Americans owned their own homes.

Educational attainment in the United States Income differences between the varying levels of educational attainment usually measured by the highest degree of education an individual has completed have increased. Households in the upper quintiles are generally home to more, better educated and employed working income earners, than those in lower quintiles. This relationship holds true not only for the entire population but also across most subgroups. Within each specific educational level, earnings differed by sex and race. This variation may result from a variety of factors, such as occupation, working full- or part-time, age, or labor force experience. The college premium doubled from to , as the demand for college-educated workers has exceeded the supply. The supply of available graduates did not keep up with business demand due primarily to increasingly expensive college educations. This, in turn, led to low achievement in later schooling due to the inability of the low income group to verbalize concepts. Conversely, poor people tend to believe that the wealthy have been lucky or have earned their money through illegal means. She believes that both attitudes need to be discarded if the nation is to make headway in addressing the issue of inequality. She suggests that college not be a litmus test of success; that valorizing of one profession as more important than another is a problem. The wage premium for college educated has risen little and there has been little shift in shares of employment to more highly skilled occupations. Employment requiring either more skill or less has been less affected. Nor does the introduction of technologies that increase the demand for more skilled workers seem to be generally associated with a divergence in household income among the population. Inventions of the 20th century such as AC electric power , the automobile, airplane, radio, television, the washing machine, Xerox machine, each had an economic impact similar to computers, microprocessors and internet, but did not coincide with greater inequality. An example of the slowdown in education growth in America that began about the same time as the Great Divergence began is the fact that the average person born in received two more years of schooling than his parents, while the average person born in received only half a year more of schooling. Gender pay gap in the United States and Racial wage gap in the United States Income levels vary by gender and race with median income levels considerably below the national median for females compared to men with certain racial demographics. Women are more likely to consider factors other than salary when looking for employment. On average, women are less willing to travel or relocate, take more hours off and work fewer hours, and choose college majors that lead to lower paying jobs. Women are also more likely to work for governments or non-profits which pay less than the private sector. In the case of women this concept is referred to as the glass ceiling keeping women from climbing the occupational ladder. In terms of race, Asian Americans are far more likely to be in the highest earning 5 percent than the rest of Americans. Despite closing gender and racial gaps, considerable discrepancies remain among racial and gender demographics, even at the same level of educational attainment. Asian Americans have significantly higher college graduation rates than their peers and are much more likely to enter high status and high income occupations. Median income for female earners male earners increased Today the median male worker earns roughly In , Hispanics were more than twice as likely to be poor than non-Hispanic whites, research indicates. During the early s, median earnings decreased for both sexes, not increasing substantially until the late s. Since the median income for workers of both sexes increased by This left little for investment in productive capabilities or higher income for employees, shifting more income to capital rather than labor. He blamed executive compensation arrangements, which are heavily based on stock options, stock awards and bonuses for meeting earnings per share EPS targets EPS increases as the number of outstanding shares decreases. Restrictions on buybacks were greatly eased in the early s. He advocates changing these incentives to limit buybacks. This indicates the U. Economists Piketty and Saez reported in , that U. While dramatic reductions in the top

marginal income tax rate contributed somewhat to worsening inequality, other changes to the tax code e. Considering all federal taxes, including the payroll tax, the effective tax rate on the top 0. CBO reported an effective tax rate decline from In other words, the effective tax rate on the very highest income taxpayers fell by about one-quarter. So the tax code remained progressive, only less so. While pre-tax income is the primary driver of income inequality, the less progressive tax code further increased the share of after-tax income going to the highest income groups. For example, had these tax changes not occurred, the after-tax income share of the top 0. A progressive tax is a tax in which the effective tax rate increases as the taxable base amount increases. In their comprehensive study of income inequality Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between and , [] the CBO found that, The top fifth of the population saw a percentage-point increase in their share of after-tax income. Most of that growth went to the top 1 percent of the population. All other groups saw their shares decline by 2 to 3 percentage points. In , federal taxes and transfers reduced the dispersion of income by 20 percent, but that equalizing effect was larger in The share of transfer payments to the lowest-income households declined. The overall average federal tax rate fell. However, a more recent CBO analysis indicates that with changes to tax law e. The inequality trend for pre-tax income during this period was much more dramatic. A study by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez found that "large reductions in tax progressivity since the s took place primarily during two periods: Taxes on income derived from capital e. Therefore, since higher-income taxpayers have a much higher share of their income represented by capital gains, lowering taxes on capital income and gains increases after-tax income inequality. Although the tax rate for low-income earners fell as well though not as much , these tax reductions compare with virtually no change â€” But we have a state that is still large enough and distorted enough that it can provide a bounty of gifts to the wealthy. This average increase, however, obscures a great deal of variation. Also during this period, the proportion of income from capital increased for the top 0. CBO reported in November that: Federal taxes also reduce income inequality, because the taxes paid by higher-income households are larger relative to their before-tax income than are the taxes paid by lower-income households. The equalizing effects of government transfers were significantly larger than the equalizing effects of federal taxes from to Between and , the Gini index for market income increased by 23 percent, the index for market income after transfers increased by 29 percent, and the index for income measured after transfers and federal taxes increased by 33 percent. The benefits from tax expenditures, such as income exclusions for healthcare insurance premiums paid for by employers and tax deductions for mortgage interest, are distributed unevenly across the income spectrum. They are often what the Congress offers to special interests in exchange for their support. According to a report from the CBO that analyzed the data: This is a proxy for how much they reduced revenues or increased the annual budget deficit. Tax expenditures tend to benefit those at the top and bottom of the income distribution, but less so in the middle. Understanding how each tax expenditure is distributed across the income spectrum can inform policy choices.

2: Project MUSE - Restructuring the Philadelphia Region

The contours of inequality in the United States are much different than the world's.

The Romans, for instance, threw out their own kings at the very outset of their republic and set up a system of governance that was quite advanced for its time. Like in Athens, the people of Rome would gather together in assemblies to pass legislation and elect various magistrates who would oversee the implementation of the laws, elect higher-ranking state officers, and give rulings in legal cases. Power, moreover, was split between different classes and offices, theoretically ensuring that no one sector of society could dominate the rest. Rome was, therefore, a democratic republic both in spirit and in law. This relatively small population allowed citizens to if not personally know one another, then to at least know of each other, their reputations and other features and commonalities that collectively made them a people to one another. As Romans, they were tied to together through family, clan and class into a tightly-knit civic body that could, in a pinch, offer up tremendous sacrifices for their beloved Rome. Indeed, the stoicism and unstinting patriotism of those at the bottom who were asked to sacrifice for their country was, in turn, reflected in the deep sense of noblesse oblige that was present throughout much of the traditional Roman upper class. The people would suffer and serve the needs of the Roman state, but so, too, did their social betters and, most importantly, were seen to do so. There was, in essence, a shared sense of destiny that tied the citizen soldiers of Rome to the glory-seeking aristocrats who sought to lead them. While not exactly the same, they were nonetheless of a kind and all in it together. Take away those cultural linkages that made Romans see each other as members of a common enterprise, however, and decay quickly set in. This was because the only way to hold down large territories for lengthy periods of time was not through brute force, but through a system of indirect rule that incorporated the elites of conquered, subject peoples into the very imperial system that had conquered them. Deserts, as Tacitus once said, the Romans could make, but the taxes and manpower that created them were not something Rome could produce at will. The resulting solution of indirect rule was common in all ancient empires, of course, but in Republican Rome, local elites were often granted the same citizenship rights as the residents of Rome itself, effectively transforming Roman identity away from a tightly-bound ethnic identity that tied rich to poor together and toward a much looser civic identity premised on mutual inclusion and equal rights in the same political system. This transformation of Roman citizenship away from a form of ethnic identity and into a form of civic identity proved immensely useful, and it is largely responsible for the relative lack of ethnic rebellions experienced by the empire. Indeed, it was only those subject peoples who were denied this identity by dint of their economic status, such as slaves, or those who chose to cling to their primordial identity, such as the Jews, who engaged in large-scale, identity-based rebellions against Roman rule. In contrast, all other rebellions were primarily civil wars that pitted different groups of Roman citizens against one another for political control of the Roman state. So, the advantage of this type of open citizenship was clear – it could produce buy-in to the growing empire by those it conquered and, as a result, greatly increase the amount of territory and manpower Rome could efficiently command. Such was its power that even when the great Carthaginian general Hannibal invaded the Italian peninsula and occupied much of Southern Italy for years, most of Italy – conquered by Rome though it had been – remained stoutly loyal to Rome. The problem with expansion So, where was the problem in expansion? First, while more territories, manpower and wealth could be leveraged for Rome in its wars, the expansion of citizenship to non-ethnic Romans became much more problematic as Rome expanded beyond Italy. Nearby Latins and other Italians, for instance, were not so different from the Romans that including them as citizens was deeply divisive. This, however, was not so for the Greeks, Africans, Gauls, Germans and Egyptians who were conquered and, in many cases, also given citizenship. This meant that, for the first time, Roman culture and Roman politics were not necessarily one and the same. Second, expansion also led to the great enrichment of the Roman upper class, for it was they who naturally captured the vast majority of its spoils. Huge amounts of precious jewels, gold, silver, slaves and other riches were brought back to Rome and put in the coffers of its wealthy citizens. True, your average Roman soldier got away with some loot, too, but given the cost of leaving behind the family farm or artisan

enterprise to go campaigning for years on end, it is little wonder that war swiftly became a losing proposition at least for the poor. Rome, at least temporarily, did not suffer unduly from the death of its former middle class, as it swiftly converted from a system of citizen soldiering to a professional, standing army. No longer was service necessarily the guaranteed future of either the Roman poor or rich. Instead, a class of professional officers, long-term service troops and public bureaucrats and contractors tasked with maintaining the empire and paid out of the coffers of the republic and, importantly, out of the loot given out by successful generals, emerged as the true source of Roman military power. Given time, they could defeat almost any enemy the ancient world could throw against them. What had once been a tightly-bound society of ethnic kin allied with one another against the rest of the world turned into a loosely bound society of competing cultural identities tied together via imperial domination and money. Being Roman eventually meant being whatever wealth said it was, and shorn of the old ties that kept the rich and poor together out of a mutual sense of common destiny, they soon turned on one another. Elections, as a consequence, became things to be bought and sold, while the mob became something to be stirred up with appeals to cash, imperial loot and resentment, not appeals to civic pride or public virtue. By the time Julius Caesar defied the Senate and led his army across the Rubicon and so on to Rome, the Roman Republic had long since rotted away from within. Why is this relevant today? So, what are the parallels with our own history? For one, the enervating power of money in our politics has reached, if not yet surpassed, similar levels of corruption as that seen in Rome. In our system, the candidate with more money commonly wins over 90 percent of the time, while it can be empirically documented that even as the voices of the wealthy go unchallenged in the halls of power, the interests of the poor are heard not at all. This comes, moreover, at a time when skyrocketing inequality has reached levels last seen in the Gilded Age of the 19th century. Second, our own citizen military in which nearly everyone once served is a long-gone vestige of the past. It has since been replaced by a professional force whose leadership has become something of a service caste within our wider democratic society. Mass conscription may have had many faults, but it was the draft especially its threatened expansion to the middle class that forced us out of Vietnam. Finally, American identity itself is something that is beginning to crack and mean many different things to many different people. Once universally acknowledged as being synonymous with being a white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant, it has since come to include a wide variety of ethnic identities and faith traditions far outside the orbit of traditional WASP culture. Being American, like being Roman, is no longer principally about being a member of a discernible people as opposed to paying homage, or more often lip service, to a civic idea America today, Rome yesterday that is larger than any given form of parochial cultural attachment. Is America, like Rome, doomed? Is our own mob, crushed by economic inequality and distracted by reality television, ready to surrender democracy into the hands of an imperial state?

3: Higher education and growing inequality - Academic Matters

Wage inequality is closely associated with skills, human capital, technology and metro size, in line with the literature, but these factors are only weakly associated with income inequality. Furthermore, wage inequality explains only 15% of income inequality across metros.

Yet the class divide is not monolithic in its nature, causes, or geography. Housing represents a central, if not dominant, factor in the rise of inequality. Although the cost of food, fuel, electricity, and tax burdens vary, the largest variation tends to be in terms of housing prices. Even adjusted for income, the price differentials for houses in places like the San Francisco Bay Area or Los Angeles are commonly two to three times as much as in most of the country, including the prosperous cities of Texas, the mid-south and the Intermountain West. These housing differences also apply to rents, which follow the trajectory of home prices. This has a particularly powerful impact on the poor, the working class, younger people, and middle class families, all of whom find their upward trajectory blocked by steadily rising housing costs. In response to higher prices, many Americans, now including educated Millennials, are heading to parts of the country where housing is more affordable. Jobs too have been moving to such places, particularly in Texas, the southeast and the Intermountain West. As middle income people head for more affordable places, the high-priced coastal areas are becoming ever more sharply bifurcated, between a well-educated, older, and affluent population and a growing rank of people with little chance to ever buy a house or move solidly into the middle class. Ironically, these divergences are taking place precisely in those places where political rhetoric over inequality is often most heated and strident. Progressive attempts, such as raising minimum wages, attempt to address the problem, but often other policies, notably strict land-use regulation, exacerbate inequality. The other major divide is not so much between regions but within them. Even in expensive regions, middle class families tend to cluster in suburban and exurban areas, which are once again growing faster than areas closer to the core. By shutting down the production of family-friendly housing, these areas are driving prices up and, to some extent, driving middle and working class people out of whole regions. Without allowing for greater options for the middle class and ways to accumulate assets, the country could be headed not toward some imagined social democratic paradise but to something that more accurately prefigures a new feudalism. The Affordability Crunch Source: Thomas Piketty, the French economist, recently described the extent to which inequality in 20 nations has ramped up in recent decades, erasing the hard-earned progress of previous years in the earlier part of the 20th century. Today, house prices in places like San Francisco and Los Angeles are up to three or more times as high, when adjusted for income, than most other metropolitan areas. For most new buyers, such metropolitan areas are becoming exclusionary regions for all but the most well-heeled new buyers. US Census Bureau, Harvard University and Demographia data Regulations frequently diminish the supply of housing, particularly single-family homes. Houston and Dallas-Fort Worth, areas with less draconian regulations, issued three times as many permits per capita last year. New Houses Building Permits Source: US Census Bureau data California is an extreme case, but one that has national significance. By setting up greenhouse gas emissions goals as prepatory local policies, the state has now abrogated itself to control land use and zoning across the state. For one thing, the restrictions on housing development—including urban growth boundaries, fees, and extensive controls on density and transportation improvements—have led to soaring house prices, even in places with modest economic growth, and high energy prices. The result has been to make California—a state with enormous natural and human resources—the state with the worst housing cost adjusted poverty rate in the country¹⁶ and home to roughly one-third of all welfare recipients. Overall during the last decade, the urban core population aged 5 to 14 dropped by ., almost three times the net gain of ., residents aged 20 to . In Manhattan, singles make up half of all households. Four decades later, they comprised just . Historian Becky Nicolaides suggests that whatever their other differences, intellectuals generally agreed about suburbia: Roughly four in five American home buyers, according to a study conducted by the National Association of Realtors and Smart Growth America, prefer a single-family home. Housing Preferences, Realtors Survey Source: US Census Bureau data Nor does this desire seem to be fading. To be sure, suburban

growth slowed in the immediate aftermath of the recession, after having been driven artificially high by the loose mortgage lending standards during the housing bubble. The real estate-tracking website Trulia reported that between 2000 and 2007, ZIP codes that were less dense than average grew at double the rate of those that were more dense than average in the 50 largest metropolitan areas. The Brookings Institution, U. Census Bureau

Fundamentally, America remains a suburban nation, and seems likely to remain that way. Core Municipality Share of Growth Source: If it were a country, New York City overall would have the 15th highest inequality level out of countries, according to James Parrott of the Fiscal Policy Institute, landing between Chile and Honduras. New York City, the densest and most influential urban environment in North America, exhibits the most profound level of inequality and the most bifurcated class structure in the United States. Urban analyst Pete Saunders has suggested Chicago is really now two different cities: During the first 10 years of the new millennium, the number of neighborhoods with entrenched urban poverty actually grew, increasing from 1, to 3, and in population from two to four million. Within the 51 metropolitan areas with more than 1 million in population, notes demographer Wendell Cox, suburban areas were less unequal measured by the Gini coefficient than the core cities in 46 cases. Census, Current Population Survey data Figure Particularly revealing has been the performance of Texas cities compared to those on the coast between 2000 and 2007. A modest loss was posted in Austin, which ranked 13th, while Dallas- Fort Worth placed in the top half, at 25th. Texas ranked 10th among the states, with a gain in its combined middle-income and upper- income segments, while California ranked 26th and saw a decrease in its combined middle-income and upper-income population. Whereas roughly a quarter of urban core residents own their own homes, over three- fifths of residents in older suburbs and more than seven in 10 of those in newer suburbs and exurbs own theirs. The increase in homeownership, notes historian Stephanie Coontz, between 2000 and 2007 was greater than that achieved in the preceding century and a half. Homeownership Rate, Source: Census Bureau

Ownership provided a cornerstone in this process. As sociologist Robert Lynd noted: Homes represent only 9. Makeup of Assets by Household Wealth, Source: Research for the Woodrow Wilson Center has indicated that homeownership was generally considered more important after the housing bubble than it was beforeâ€”even after the damaging housing crisis, Americans still continued to sanctify homeownership. Merrill Lynch â€” Age Wave, Millennials are proving more like their parents in their purchases than commonly assumed. The National Association of Realtors surveyed the housing types that had been purchased by homebuyers in 2000 and 2007. House Purchases Under Age 35 Source: National Association of Realtors, In recent years, Millennials, seeking reasonable rents and the possibility of purchasing a home, have also begun to move to more affordable areas. A recent account by the magazine Techcrunch traced the percentage of income paid by generation in California. Changing Migration of Millennials Source: In relatively slow-growing California, they represent four out of five new buyers. In New York, the immigrant portion of housing growth is two-thirds. Home Ownership Rate, Source: Census American Community Survey, Overall, the geography for upward mobility is changing. Gerard Mildner, the Academic Director of the Center for Real Estate at Portland State University, notes that a high rise over five stories costs nearly three times as much per square foot as a garden apartment. FBI Statistics , Major metropolitan areas average. Census American Community Survey Some researchers insist that, despite higher costs, dense urban places deliver outsized benefits to their denizens, including the poor and minorities. For example, in 2007, nine of the 10 most affluent cities, according to Brookings Institution data, were in the United States, and all were low-density by international standards. Second-ranked Hartford, fourth-ranked Bridgeport and sixth-ranked Boston all had urban densities approximately one-quarter or less that of European urban areas. At the same time, many of the functions of urban-centered sectors, such as finance and business services, have tended to shift their management and support services to other, less expensive regions. Big money and financial power may remain concentrated in Gotham, but jobs, particularly for the middle income worker, increasingly are not. Sometimes less than a hundred employees are involved, as opposed to the thousands that might have been located in a downtown headquarters decades ago. Finance Industry Growth, Source: Wendell Cox, based on U. Neighboring San Mateo County still holds more than five times as many jobs in software publishing as San Francisco. Suburbs Dominate Job Growth Source: City Sector Model Calculated from Census Bureau data Most STEM employmentâ€”jobs in science, technology,

engineering, or mathâ€”remains firmly in overwhelmingly suburbanized areas with lower-density development and little in the way of transit usage. Many of these same unassuming regions are creating new STEM jobs faster than the high-tech stalwart locations. One retro-urbanist author, David Owen, in his book *Green Metropolis* suggests that the planet needs to live in densities associated with his former Manhattan home, although he himself moved to bucolic Connecticut. Indeed much of the research advocating density as a solution to climate change is deeply flawed, since it usually excludes GHG emissions from common areas, including elevators, and from lighting fixtures, space heaters, and air conditioners, usually because data is not available. Improved mileage on cars, including electric and natural gas or hydrogen-propelled vehicles, would thus be far more impactful, not to mention less disruptive. The shift to home-based work, which is now growing far faster than transit use, directly addresses some environmental problems often associated with suburbs, notably issues around auto commuting. The environmental savings related to reducing office energy consumption, roadway repairs, urban heating, office construction, business travel, and paper usage as electronic documents replace paper could also be prodigious. Mark Schill, Praxis Strategy Group, [http:](http://) Without access to affordable, usually suburban homes, working and middle class families face a somewhat dismal future. Draconian attempts to limit or even eliminate suburban growth would guarantee that people without wealth will be hard-pressed to achieve upward mobility. One approach would be to draw on the successful policies enacted after World War II. The solution combined governmental activismâ€”through such things as the GI Bill and mortgage interest deductionsâ€”with less regulatory control over development. These new suburbs, as well as in-fill projects, could open up the housing market to more minorities and Millennials, while serving to lessen the burden on rents. These new suburbsâ€”as well as older onesâ€”could be adapted to encourage such environmentally beneficial aspects as home-based work, solar power, bicycling, and open spaces without undermining the fundamental attractions of lower-density living. Attempts to subsidize new units in such diverse places as San Francisco, New York, and San Jose have not altered significantly market dynamics and might also have driven up prices for unsubsidized units. Following our current path, we can expect our societyâ€”particularly in deep blue statesâ€”to move ever more towards a kind of feudalism where only a few own property while everyone else devolves into rent serfs. The middle class will have little chance to acquire any assets for their retirement, and increasingly few will choose to have children. Imagine, then, a high-tech Middle Ages with vast chasms between the upper classes and the poor, with growing dependenceâ€”even among what once would have been middle class householdsâ€”on hand-outs to pay rent. Imagine too, over time, Japanese-style depopulation and an ever more rapidly aging society. Yet, none of this is necessary. This is not a small country with limited land and meager prospects. It would provide the basis for a greater spread of assets and perhaps a less dividedâ€”and less angryâ€”country.

4: This is the state of inequality in Europe | World Economic Forum

CONTENTS List of Figures and Tables vii Acknowledgments xi Introduction: Expanding the Focus 1 1 Expansion, Decline, and Geographies of Inequality 15 2 Employment Opportunity 36 3 Housing Opportunity

In recent decades all countries have seen a rapid growth in the number of students going into higher education, including students from lower income backgrounds. But has this created more equal societies? Take the case of the United States, still in many ways the model and trend leader for the Western world in economy, society, and higher education. The USA has developed extreme levels of economic and social inequality, social mobility is declining, and higher education has been unable to compensate—in fact, higher education itself is becoming more stratified. The upper middle class dominates access to the top private universities, participation rates have stopped growing, and graduation rates among low-income families are very disappointing. Inequality is also increasing in Canada—although social mobility, the opportunity to raise up from a low-income background or remote location—is still higher in Canada than in other English-speaking countries. This article draws together what we know about economic and social inequality with what we know about social ordering through higher education. Most people earn most of their income from their job. Only the top 0.1% of wealth is much more concentrated than labour incomes. The top 10 per cent of those who earn their income from labour typically get 20 to 35 per cent of all labour incomes, depending on the country. The top 10 per cent of individuals who earn income from capital normally secure between 50 and 90 per cent of all capital incomes, with the precise proportion again depending on country. The concentration of wealth and income in the hands of the top 10 per cent, top one per cent, and top 0.1% are seeing extreme income concentration effects. The higher we move up the income scale, the more private fortunes are expanding—the proportional increase to the income of the top 0.1%. The ultra-rich seem to be in another world from the rest of us. They pay tax at low rates, hide wealth offshore, and their incomes are climbing rapidly, while other incomes stagnate or decline. They are untroubled by the limited funding of public services in low-tax polities because they purchase their own high quality private services. Education and working hard were not enough to move into the upper echelons—the would-be upwardly mobile in salaried positions could not secure the level of comfort afforded by inherited wealth. However, this changed dramatically in the period between, as a result of two world wars and the Great Depression, which reduced or eliminated many large fortunes. World War II reset the counters close to zero, triggering a remaking and rejuvenation of wealth—in effect there were many vacancies in the middle and upper levels of society for the upwardly mobile to fill. Ultimately, this proved to be a transitional phase. Nevertheless, the period of social and economic openness was an extended one. This is because wealth creation had been partly democratized, notably and influentially in the USA. Social openness was also facilitated by a long period of high economic growth after 1945, which helped to expand the size of the middle class and hence further increased the number of opportunities for upward mobility. The passage of the GI Bill in the USA in 1945 set off an explosion of growth in higher education. It provided veterans with generous financial aid for tuition and living expenses, changing the face of the country by creating access to higher education for millions of Americans. There were parallel postwar higher education enrolment policies in many countries, including my own country of Australia. Many students obtained university degrees who would never previously have had the opportunity. The period between the 1940s and the 1970s was the heyday of meritocracy in the English-speaking world, Western Europe, and Japan. Salary differentials in the workplace were modest. A new property-holding middle class emerged, spreading wealth as well as incomes. For a brief time in the 1950s inherited wealth was a minority of all private capital, outweighed by the capital people had created during their lifetimes, saved and invested in their own homes. The great role carved out for schooling and higher education was that of a democratic mechanism for selecting aspirants for a socially just elite based in hard work and educated merit—an alternative to capital markets and inheritance. In Europe in 1970, the top one per cent received 10 per cent of all incomes. However, in the USA in 1970, the top one per cent received a much higher share at 20 per cent, and Piketty predicts it will be 25 per cent by 2020 if present trends continue. The income received by the bottom 50 per cent has been as follows: Piketty predicts it will be just 15 per cent in the USA

by It is striking that by in the USA, the highly inegalitarian income distribution of Europe had been restored, though now more through disparities in labour income than through capital income as in the past. The USA is already the most unequal society in modern history in terms of income distribution, but it is going to get worse. In the next generation, the balance between wage inequality and wealth inequality will start to shift back towards wealth. Income inequality becomes translated into inequality of property, and ownership of property and other forms of wealth is reproduced across generations. Those with the largest fortunes gain the highest rate of return from capital, leading to further concentration of wealth. To illustrate this point about large fortunes Piketty cites university endowments, as the data are transparent: Harvard earns over 10 per cent a year on accumulated capital while the average is more like six per cent for other universities. If salary inequality continues to increase in the future, the two sources of this inequality, from labour and from capital, will compound. Their share dropped to less than two per cent and did not get back to the position until , after two decades of tax cuts and super-manager salary hikes. It then rose to an historic high of six per cent in , dipped during the recession, but was restored to six per cent a year later and is ripping upwards again. In the Nordic countries income differentials are modest. France, Germany, and Japan are intermediate cases. Inequality in Brazil is actually decreasing. These differences show that historical, institutional, and political factors play a role and that the tendency to accumulation of inherited capital is by no means inevitable. In Degrees of Inequality, Suzanne Mettler notes that in , 40 per cent of US students whose families were in the top income quartile had achieved a degree by age . By that percentage had risen to 77 per cent. For families in the bottom income quartile in , only six per cent achieved a degree. By after 43 years of supposed equality of opportunity that proportion was just nine per cent. The institutional hierarchy is getting steeper. Research by Scott Davies and David Zarifa in the USA and Canada shows that institutions that begin from a position of advantage build on that to improve their relative position over time. This is what market competition does when it is not corrected by policy. The relationship between resource concentration and student selectivity becomes stronger over the years. This raises the question of whether degree value is increasingly unequal in labour markets. It is difficult to disentangle the effects of institution the so-called brand effect from the social and academic advantages enjoyed by the clientele of elite universities at point of entry, the effects of social background in mediating labour market outcomes, and the effects of learning. The evidence is mixed. But a large number of studies in the USA and also in the UK and China suggest that institutional brand affects degree value. Access to elite institutions is stratified sharply by social group. Joseph Soares has shown that in the Tier 1 private universities in the USA, 64 per cent of students come from families earning in the top 10 per cent. According to the Dean of Admissions at Yale, only five per cent of American families can pay the full sticker price. Recent research by Caroline Hoxby and Christopher Avery shows that the vast majority of low-income high achievers do not apply to any selective college. Associated with growing stratification at the top is the weak and weakening status of mass higher education. It is being weakened because of the partial withdrawal of per-student funding from public education, and the rising use of poor quality private for-profit higher education heavily subsidized by federal loans financing in the USA and online courses, as substitutes for state-guaranteed provision. Higher education is not responsible for extreme income inequalities in the USA, which derive from labour markets and tax policy. But these inequalities no doubt undermine the meritocratic rationale for higher education, and this contributes to undermining support for mass higher education and the weakening of its public funding. First, across the English-speaking world, the former Soviet bloc, and much of Eastern Asia and Latin America, per-capita public funding of higher education is declining as participation grows. Increasing tuition costs affect social access, especially to the elite private universities. But the problem is that the tax revenues are not there to pay for it. There is a vicious circleâ€”the taxpayer will not support equality of opportunity as a public good so public financing is reduced, which in turn reduces equality of opportunity and evaporates the argument for it. Second, research especially in the USA suggests a declining commitment to student learning among both students and institutions. It is difficult to pin this phenomenon down conclusively, but there is some evidence that suggests a retreat from solid learning content and an increased focus on the selection function of education, navigating the educational hierarchy, student consumer satisfaction, and credentialingâ€”aspects that are highlighted in a positional market. These practices

break the link between hard work, content, and educational outcomes. This denies aspiring students from poor backgrounds a learning technology that they can invest in, while placing greater emphasis on the institutional smarts—the social and cultural capital—that they do not possess. This is as fatal for equality of opportunity as financial barriers. The formation of world-class universities is not a problem for equal opportunity provided the rest of the sector is elevated as well. However, in much of the world, the world-class university movement has become combined with a crisis in the quality of mass higher education. Here the retreat of the state shows itself. In many systems the majority of enrolments are located in private institutions of dubious value. Fourth, the transfer function, or the potential to move between mass institutions and elite ones, is mostly weak or non-existent in most places. So we have on one hand growing economic and social inequality, and on the other a hierarchical higher education system with socially differentiated access to higher education overall, and further differentiated access to its upper reaches. Clearly all these structures and processes are interactive and in some sense mutually constitutive. It is clear that higher education plays only a minor role in sustaining the position of the mega-rich. Higher education is not the driver of inequality at that level though no doubt the stratification of higher education sector plays into widening gap between upper class and middle class. Where higher education can have its greatest effect is in increasing opportunities for upward mobility. Upper middle class family domination of prestigious universities limits that prospect. This is a key area in which to concentrate reform efforts. Education is a matter of social relations. We are all affected by the number and value of high quality educational places and by what governs access to those places. We need to assert the role of higher education as a public good and as a response to social and economic inequality, rather than as a mechanism for enhancing inequality, or a dead end with limited capacity to lift the individual and collective position. We need to build more egalitarian higher education systems with a more broadly distributed capacity to create value. This will strengthen the relation between higher education and social outcomes and opportunities.

5: Project MUSE - Economic Growth and Income Inequality in Hong Kong: Trends and Explanations

Equitable Growth supports research and policy analysis on how trends in economic inequality and mobility and changes in the economy have affected the concentration of wealth, income, and earnings, and how these distributional shifts have affected the promise of economic security and opportunity.

Constrained by logistic multilevel model to be 1. Std Errors In Brackets Table 7 shows only those variables which remained significant at each stage of the modelling process. The values in the table are Beta coefficients and may be read in the same manner as those for logistic regression. The quadratic term in age is also useful as health determinants tend to have stronger effects at older ages. Extrabinomial variation was tested for and found not to be present Woodhouse The base model reveals that between-area differences are present level 2 variance is 0. Differences between the aggregate health of districts, thus decrease once we take account of the characteristics of the individuals who make up the district populations. Attempts to explain the remaining between-area differences, by taking account of the deindustrialisation have produced a reduction in level 2 variance by Of greatest interest are those places which, from the analysis of residuals in the model, appear significantly more or less healthy, once individual and area characteristics are accounted for. As the modelling progressed the number of areas with a significant residual reduced. In the base model, where only differences in age had been accounted for, 73 significantly healthy and 88 significantly unhealthy districts remained. With the addition of deindustrialisation 51 significantly healthy and 69 significantly unhealthy areas remain unexplained. The left-hand map shows districts whose population remains significantly more sick or more healthy, after we account for differences between the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of their populations. The right-hand map shows districts whose population remains significantly more sick or more healthy, after we account for differences between the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of their populations and the deindustrialisation which took place there. The Impact Of Deindustrialisation On Health To make these results easier to interpret, figure 15 shows those places in which there is apparently better health than we would expect, given the amount of deindustrialisation experienced after accounting for the socio-economic and demographic composition of the population and those places in which health is worse. It is a map of the effect of deindustrialisation on the health of the resident population. That the populations of some areas appear to experience better health once deindustrialisation is accounted for is slightly counter-intuitive. In the next section of the paper, the results presented here are drawn together and discussed. Feeling part of the community was itself related to age figure 4 , but did not differ between men and women, or between social classes. We were unsure if men would feel more part of their community because of the nature of their work or if women would feel more part of their community through the nature of their friendships. For social class however, the results seem to have exploded the myth and our own expectations that there is a greater degree of community coherence amongst working class groups or perhaps that the middle and professional classes lead more detached and private lives. It must be remembered that despite the position of the community question in the interview schedule, the definitions which were used in responses may have varied between a spatial, social or business based community. It may be that most people feel part of a community, but that the nature of community differs from group to group. The relationship between the community variable and the health outcome variable is however, very clear. People who do not feel part of their community are more likely to report high numbers of physical symptoms. With cross-sectional data, the direction of the relationship table 3 was difficult to determine. Do people with more illness not feel part of their community because their symptoms prevent them from taking an active role in it? Or are people who do not take an active part in their community somehow denied the health benefits of that interaction? It was not possible to provide an answer from these data and there is therefore a need for caution in our treatment of the result. Community interaction had a different relationship to health at different ages figure 5 and in different classes figure 6 , so that it acted to sharpen both the age and class gradients in health see Stansfeld et al. The fact that feeling part of the community remained independently related to health when deindustrialisation was included in the model marks a key aspect of this research. This represents an improvement over approaches

which implicitly assume that individuals are part of a local social and economic milieu because their residential postcode locates them within an areal unit with a particular set of aggregate socio-economic characteristics. It is not sufficient to know what kinds of people an individual lives nearby, how those people interact with each other is also important. This point highlights the fact that quantitative spatial analysts must not only keep pace with the technological developments around them, but also with theoretical developments which might enhance the variables and the concepts which are fed into the new technologies. There has been much discussion in the media of the effects of deindustrialisation on communities and their health, aspirations and beliefs. Films such as "The Full Monty" and "Brassed Off" dealt directly with the social and health effects of the decline of heavy industry and mining, on the community and the individuals within it. The statistics which describe deindustrialisation are staggering. During the period - , in the coalfields alone, nearly , jobs were lost. Beatty and Fothergill, Champion and Townsend report a net loss of 2. Families traditionally supported by the industries simultaneously lost the incomes of father and the employment prospects for son. Since, for economic and production reasons, the manufacturing and mining industries were spatially concentrated and surrounded by communities almost entirely dependent on them for work and economic life-blood, the effects of their loss were socially and spatially concentrated too. Analysis of the HALS sample figures 9 and 10 suggest that it has captured those experiencing different degrees of deindustrialisation without great bias. People in skilled manual labour, at the early stages of their working lives appear to have experienced greatest industrial decline. This would have resulted in more respondents saying that they felt part of the community in those wards which underwent greatest industrial decline. Or, perhaps the experience of industrial decline, job loss and possible industrial conflict would reduce the community coherence in areas which had experienced the harshest changes. Neither of these scenarios appeared to be correct, with no significant differences in attitude to the community between groups which experienced different degrees of deindustrialisation. It may be that the longer-term effects of industrial decline had yet to take an effect on the communities sampled for HALS. With regard to health, deindustrialisation compounded an already considerable burden on the populations of heavy industrial workers. In addition to the physical effects of working in heavy industry, the populations had then to deal with unemployment and social and economic decline. It is this decline which has been pinpointed as a possible source of influence over health outcomes for the entire population of a deindustrialised area. It must also be remembered that the people experiencing industrial decline were often not very healthy before the process began. The single-level analysis has shown that when people reach ages at which they naturally start to experience more ill-health, the industrial decline in their area appears to be exacerbating their own health decline. If this were an effect of having worked in or close to heavy industry, we would expect the influences of deindustrialised and extremely deindustrialised areas to be similar. The fact that the greatest increases in ill-health accompany the greatest industrial decline suggests that this is a function of changes in the social milieu and the resources available to maintain health in those areas. There is also an interesting effect on the youngest age group in that those exposed to extreme deindustrialisation appear to have relatively higher chances of reporting high numbers of symptoms. It may also be that some form of migratory selection is illustrated by these results with those young and healthy enough to do so, moving away from areas experiencing extreme deindustrialisation. The single-level analyses we have presented suggest that even after we account for the effects of different personal circumstances, those living in an area which has experienced industrial decline are more likely to report higher numbers of symptoms table 6. Being in a lower social class III manual or below, being a woman and having been out of work for two years or more are also significantly associated with a greater chance of ill-health. The differences between limiting long-term illness, used in the multilevel analysis and the measure of acute physical symptoms used in the analysis of HALS, are clearly shown by table 7. These results convey the considerable differences between the two health outcome measures. There will also be some difference in the results obtained when local authority districts, rather than wards, form the spatial units for analysis. Given our implicit hypothesis that individuals draw influences over their health from their community, ward is probably a more appropriate scale to explore the effects of industrial decline. Methodological constraint has prevented us from applying multilevel techniques at this scale. We must therefore recognise that we may be

masking much area effects by working with larger, less appropriate, spatial units. It is these differences between districts which medical geographers and sociologists wish to explain by identifying area characteristics with an impact on the health of residential populations. Table 7 shows that the inclusion of deindustrialisation explains some of the differences in health outcomes between populations living in different local authority districts. Figure 15 is the easiest reference point for understanding this argument. The areas highlighted in either red or blue are those in which deindustrialisation makes a significant contribution to explaining the health of the residential population, once we have accounted for their socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Given their individual characteristics, people in the blue districts are more likely to report an illness than they might have otherwise been without exposure to industrial decline. The blue areas, where deindustrialisation has increased the risk of ill-health, did not necessarily experience the highest levels of industrial decline as we have defined it. It is however, important to remember the limitations of the technique and data in question. Deindustrialisation was not confined to the decade for which we have data, nor to those industries via which we have defined it. The finding that the places where health was apparently most affected by the decline are not those in which it was most severe is interesting and we suspect that there are two factors which explain it. Extreme deindustrialisation in South Wales for example, does not appear to have explained the concentrations of ill-health found there see figure 15. It seems likely that the population were already suffering the effects of heavy industrial and mining jobs and that deindustrialisation has had little additional effect. Secondly, the districts with most extreme industrial decline may have taken remedial action to offset its worst effects. Townsend and Peck emphasise the importance of understanding the interaction between local context and national or international events and policies when reviewing the effect of industrial decline on a particular area. The areas in red in figure 15 are those with populations that are less healthy than we would expect having taken account of deindustrialisation. There are two factors which explain this result. Firstly, they are all places which experienced either small industrial growth between and or far less decline than the national average compare the red districts on figure 15 with figure 14. These places have achieved statistical significance because, relative to the rest of the sample, their populations have experienced industrial growth without a corresponding improvement in health outcomes. Secondly, not all forms of industrial decline are included in our index. Plymouth see label on figure 15 for example, experienced considerable industrial decline in the period through the closure of naval and merchant ship yards and other military cut-backs. This leads to its identification as an area which, given the amount of decline it registers on our index, is much less healthy than we would expect. This example does not however detract from the fact that, given our definition of industrial decline, we have shown that the deindustrialisation experienced in an area has had an independent, significant and detrimental affect on health. Conclusions This paper has shown that attitude to and perhaps therefore, interaction with the community has an effect on health which is independent of other individual characteristics and the degree of deindustrialisation in an area. This suggests that research which tries to classify areas, and their resident populations, in order to explore the impact of the social and economic milieu needs to take account of how people interact with their communities. The geography of area effects in ill-health is not defined purely by its spatial characteristics, but also its social characteristics. It has also shown the value of multilevel modelling in identifying the extent of that effect, although it should be recognised that the single-level analysis was able to correctly identify the same effect of industrial decline on health. The paper has made a useful contribution to the field by illustrating that there is a difference in the way that people interact with their communities and that this is associated with a difference in health outcomes. In effect the inclusion of a variable which describes attitudes to the community is an attempt to model the difference between the area in which an individual resides and the place in which they live Graham , Macintyre et al. Place, rather than space is the location in which an individual is exposed to different influences on their health and health-related behaviour and there is an urgent need for a better range of data sources which describe places rather than spaces. Supply of these kinds of data will require a new approach to the choice of spatial scale for analysis and the recognition that different groups in society interact socially and spatially with each other in different ways. The paper has illustrated how new techniques and new concepts can be combined to provide an enhanced analysis of a complex relationship. It would appear that health is a function both of

individual characteristics and area of residence. Newcastle University Bartley, M. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, Vol. An Introduction to Market Analysis. Edward Arnold Congdon, P.

6: How Inequality, Diversity And Empire Brought Down The Roman Republic

inequality to lower future growth paths, and considers it an impediment to poverty-reducing growth, as the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth is found to decline when inequality.

PinIt Instapaper Pocket Email Print Our nation, at its best, pursues the ideal that what we look like and where we come from should not determine the benefits, burdens, or responsibilities that we bear in our society. Because we believe that all people are created equal in terms of rights, dignity, and the potential to achieve great things, we see inequality based on race, gender, and other social characteristics as not only unfortunate but unjust. The value of equality, democratic voice, physical and economic security, social mobility, a shared sense of responsibility for one another, and a chance to start over after misfortune or missteps -- what many Americans call redemption -- are the moral pillars of the American ideal of opportunity. Many Americans of goodwill who want to reduce poverty believe that race is no longer relevant to understanding the problem, or to fashioning solutions for it. This view often reflects compassion as well as pragmatism. But we cannot solve the problem of poverty -- or, indeed, be the country that we aspire to be -- unless we honestly unravel the complex and continuing connection between poverty and race. Experience shows, moreover, that reductions in poverty do not reliably reduce racial inequality, nor do they inevitably reach low-income people of color. Rising economic tides do not reliably lift all boats. In , after a decade of remarkable economic prosperity, the poverty rate among African Americans and Latinos taken together was still 2. This disparity was stunning, yet it was the smallest difference in poverty rates between whites and others in more than three decades. And from to , as the economy slowed, poverty rates for most communities of color increased more dramatically than they did for whites, widening the racial poverty gap. From to , while the overall number of poor Americans declined by almost 1 million, to 37 million, poverty rates for most communities of color actually increased. Reductions in poverty do not inevitably close racial poverty gaps, nor do they reach all ethnic communities equally. Poor people of color are also increasingly more likely than whites to find themselves living in high-poverty neighborhoods with limited resources and limited options. Low-income Latino families were three times as likely as low-income white families to live in these neighborhoods in , but 5. Low-income blacks were 3. These numbers are troubling not because living among poor people is somehow harmful in itself, but because concentrated high-poverty communities are far more likely to be cut off from quality schools, housing, health care, affordable consumer credit, and other pathways out of poverty. And African Americans and Latinos are increasingly more likely than whites to live in those communities. Today, low-income blacks are more than three times as likely as poor whites to be in "deep poverty" -- meaning below half the poverty line -- while poor Latinos are more than twice as likely. The Persistence of Discrimination Modern and historical forces combine to keep many communities of color disconnected from networks of economic opportunity and upward mobility. Among those forces is persistent racial discrimination that, while subtler than in past decades, continues to deny opportunity to millions of Americans. Decent employment and housing are milestones on the road out of poverty. Yet these are areas in which racial discrimination stubbornly persists. While the open hostility and "Whites Only" signs of the Jim Crow era have largely disappeared, research shows that identically qualified candidates for jobs and housing enjoy significantly different opportunities depending on their race. In recent studies in Milwaukee and New York City, meanwhile, live "tester pairs" with comparable qualifications but of differing races tested not only the effect of race on job prospects but also the impact of an apparent criminal record. In Milwaukee, whites reporting a criminal record were more likely to receive a callback from employers than were blacks without a criminal record. In New York, Latinos and African Americans without criminal records received fewer callbacks than did similarly situated whites, and at rates comparable to whites with a criminal record. Similar patterns hamper the access of people of color to quality housing near good schools and jobs. Research by the U. Department of Housing and Urban Development HUD shows that people of color receive less information from real-estate agents, are shown fewer units, and are frequently steered away from predominantly white neighborhoods. In addition to identifying barriers facing African Americans and Latinos, this research found

significant levels of discrimination against Asian Americans, and that Native American renters may face the highest discrimination rates up to 29 percent of all. This kind of discrimination is largely invisible to its victims, who do not know that they have received inaccurate information or been steered away from desirable neighborhoods and jobs. But its influence on the perpetuation of poverty is nonetheless powerful. The Present Legacy of Past Discrimination These modern discriminatory practices often combine with historical patterns. In New Orleans, for example, as in many other cities, low-income African Americans were intentionally concentrated in segregated, low-lying neighborhoods and public-housing developments at least into the s. In , when Hurricane Katrina struck and the levees broke, black neighborhoods were most at risk of devastation. And when HUD announced that it would close habitable public-housing developments in New Orleans rather than clean and reopen them, it was African Americans who were primarily prevented from returning home and rebuilding. This and other failures to rebuild and invest have exacerbated poverty -- already at high levels -- among these New Orleanians. In the case of Native Americans, a quarter of whom are poor, our government continues to play a more flagrant role in thwarting pathways out of poverty. Unlike other racial and ethnic groups, most Native Americans are members of sovereign tribal nations with a recognized status under our Constitution. After more than a decade of litigation, and multiple findings of governmental wrongdoing, the United States is trying to settle these cases for a tiny fraction of what it owes. The trust-fund cases, of course, are just the latest in a string of broken promises by our government. But focusing as they do on dollars and cents, they offer an important window into the economic status that Native American communities and tribes might enjoy today if the U. Meanwhile, the growing diversity spurred by new immigrant communities adds to the complexity of contemporary poverty. Asian American communities, for example, are culturally, linguistically, and geographically diverse, and they span a particularly broad socioeconomic spectrum. While the Asian American poverty rate mirrored that of the country as a whole, Southeast Asian communities reflected far higher levels. Hmong men experienced the highest poverty level Researchers such as Martin Gilens and Herman Gray have repeatedly found that the mainstream media depict poor people as people of color -- primarily African Americans -- at rates far higher than their actual representation in the population. And that depiction, the research finds, interacts with societal biases to erode support for antipoverty programs that could reach all poor people. Gilens found, for instance, that while blacks represented only 29 percent of poor Americans at the time he did his research, 65 percent of poor Americans shown on television news were black. In a more detailed analysis of TV newsmagazines in particular, Gilens found a generally unflattering framing of the poor, but the presentation of poor African Americans was more negative still. The most "sympathetic" subgroups of the poor -- such as the working poor and the elderly -- were underrepresented on these shows, while unemployed working-age adults were overrepresented. And those disparities were greater for African Americans than for others, creating an even more unflattering and inaccurate picture of the black poor. Gray similarly found that poor African Americans were depicted as especially dysfunctional and undeserving of assistance, with an emphasis on violence, poor choices, and dependency. As Gray notes, "The black underclass appears as a menace and a source of social disorganization in news accounts of black urban crime, gang violence, drug use, teenage pregnancy, riots, homelessness, and general aimlessness. These racial effects are especially pronounced when the poor person in the story is a black single mother. In one study, more than twice the number of respondents supported individual solutions like the one that says poor people "should get a job" over societal solutions such as increased education or social services when the single mother was black. This research should not be surprising. Ronald Reagan, among others, effectively used the "racialized" mental image of the African American "welfare queen" to undermine support for antipoverty efforts. And the media face of welfare recipients has long been a black one, despite the fact that African Americans have represented a minority of the welfare population. But this research also makes clear that unpacking and disputing racial stereotypes is important to rebuilding a shared sense of responsibility for reducing poverty in all of our communities. Removing Racial Barriers We cannot hope to address poverty in a meaningful or lasting way without addressing race-based barriers to opportunity. The most effective solutions will take on these challenges together. That means, for example, job-training programs that prepare low-income workers for a globalized economy, combined with antidiscrimination enforcement that ensures

equal access to those programs and the jobs to which they lead. Similarly, strengthening the right to organize is important in helping low-wage workers to move out of poverty, but it must be combined with civil-rights efforts that root out the racial exclusion that has sometimes infected union locals. And it means combining comprehensive immigration reform that offers newcomers a pathway to citizenship with living wages and labor protections that root out exploitation and discourage racial hierarchy. Another crucial step is reducing financial barriers to college by increasing the share of need-based grants over student loans and better coordinating private-sector scholarship aid -- for example, funds for federal Pell Grants should be at least double current levels. But colleges should also retain the flexibility to consider racial and socioeconomic background as two factors among many, in order to promote a diverse student body as well as diverse workers and leaders once these students graduate. Guaranteed health care for all is critical, and it must be combined with protections against poor quality and unequal access that, research shows, affect people of color irrespective of their insurance status. Finally, we must begin planning for opportunity in the way we design metropolitan regions, transportation systems, housing, hospitals, and schools. That means, for example, creating incentives for mixed-income neighborhoods that are well-publicized and truly open to people of all races and backgrounds. A particularly promising approach involves requiring an "opportunity impact statement" when public funds are to be used for development projects. The statement would explain, for example, whether a new highway will connect low-income communities to good jobs and schools, or serve only affluent communities. It would detail where and how job opportunities would flow from the project, and whether different communities would share the burden of environmental and other effects rather than having the project reinforce traditional patterns of inequality. When we think about race and poverty in terms of the shared values and linked fate of our people, our approach to politics as well as policy begins to change. Instead of balancing a list of constituencies and identity groups, our task becomes one of moving forward together as a diverse but cohesive society, addressing through unity the forces that have historically divided us. PinIt Instapaper Pocket Email Print About the Author Alan Jenkins is the executive director of The Opportunity Agenda , a communications, research, and advocacy organization with the mission of building the national will to expand opportunity in America.

7: Geography of Health Inequalities

1 Expansion, Decline, and Geographies of Inequality (pp.) The narrative of the Philadelphia region's transition into the twenty-first century is a tale of mixed themes.

8: How Social/Income Inequality and the Fall of Rome is Relevant Today | Real Archaeology

Geographies of opportunity and disadvantage are both a cause and a product of the economic inequality and social groups within countries. I conclude by considering the political.

9: Inequality, Race, and Remedy

The tech giants, for their part, need to add the nation's crisis of geographical inequality to the list of the real-world side effects they are beginning to grapple with. Some signs are encouraging.

*Detective Phillip Osbourne In The papyri of Abraham Soviet interpretations of the woman question Mary Buckley Health in Australia The Electronics Industry in Britain Lets get acquainted! American business tokens Raft foundation design and analysis with a practical approach An examination of the principles, and an enquiry into the conduct of the two b****rs [i.e. brothers] The Numerical Modelling of Nonlinear Stellar Pulsations: Problems and Prospects Black Respectability and the Response to Prejudice, 157 Greeks and romans bearing gifts The Value of Culture Andersenss guide to practical methods of propagating weeds other plants The solitary self Russian PDQ-Quick Comprehensive Course Flames of war rules v3 Portable medieval reader Sitting with suffering: growing through grief Medicine, Mind and Meaning Red Foley : no trouble I see Lecuonas Best Made Easier for You Animals in Danger (QEB Start Reading) Lpn to rn transitions 4th edition The interest the map serves can be yours Talent management in school filetype Foreclosure myths Religion, politics, and the moral life Jillian michaels ripped in 30 diet plan A directory of British peerages Uncle Rubes net. Appendix i: Magical correspondences Up scholarship form 2015 16 How not to parachute more cats: saving the earth for fun and profit Amory B. Lovins The life of victory ; His cross and mine ; Lambs among wolves Behind Japans Surrender The relative rigidity of monopoly pricing Alive in Christ (Ephesians) Use of Fort McHenry Military Reservation. Ultrametabolism the simple plan for automatic weight loss*