

1: If your memory fails, are you still the same person? | Aeon Essays

2 Episodic Memory and Personal Identity – Hume: what we are is a bundle of memories – where memories are episodic memories of life episodes. – What memories seem critical to self identity?

Criticizing the Storehouse Model of Memory Reid traces the target of his criticisms back to the Ancients, whom he depicts as holding that the mind is a sensorium – a repository of past ideas and impressions. These physiological states are taken to have mental correlates – sensations or ideas of sense or sense impressions – which are the objects of perception, memory and imagination. These ideas or impressions are representations in the sense that they preserve, or re-present information from their physiological correlates. According to Reid, this view recognizes no distinction between imagination and memory. Each consists in having a picture-like impression that remains after the object that impressed upon the senses is gone. The only difference between the two is in the fidelity of the imagistic impression to its cause. Memory consists in the preservation of images imprinted in the mind from previous experiences, while imagination consists in constructing images that lack a duplicate in experience. Reid offers two criticisms of the ancient theory, as he understands it. According to Reid, there is no observational evidence of the existence of impressions on the brain – they are merely theoretical entities. Furthermore, even if we granted the otherwise theoretical existence of impressions, such entities would not be sufficient to explain memory. We might establish a correlation between impressions and memories, but it would remain at best just that: Though Reid identifies his target as having ancient origins, his primary concern is with what he regards as its modern equivalent. This modern theory was introduced by Locke and, according to Reid, extended to its inevitable idealist and skeptical conclusions by Berkeley and Hume. The other way of Retention is the Power to revive again in our Minds those Ideas, which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight – This is Memory, which is as it were the Store-house of our Ideas – But our Ideas being nothing but actual Perceptions in the Mind, which cease to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our Ideas in the Repository of the Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in many cases, to revive Perceptions, which it once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this Sense it is, that our Ideas are said to be in our Memories, when indeed, they are actually no where, but only there is an ability in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again; and as it were paint them anew on it self, though some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely Locke, Essay, Book II. As this passage illustrates, Locke himself acknowledges that the notion that the mind is a kind of repository or storehouse is metaphorical. Locke is committed to the thesis that ideas are momentary and non-continuous and to the thesis that identity over time requires continuous existence. These two theses jointly entail that numerically identical ideas cannot be stored over time. In order to use a previous idea as its model, the mind must remember it. But then the ability to paint ideas anew upon itself presupposes rather than explains memory. Locke offers a non-metaphorical account of memory when he claims that memory consists of two perceptions: Because Locke is committed to the thesis that numerically identical ideas cannot be stored over time, the belief must be the belief that one has previously enjoyed a perception qualitatively similar to the present perception, rather than numerically identical with it. Reid criticizes this account as circular, once more. We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: Either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. Like Locke, Hume holds that ideas have no continued existence. And so, Reid argues, Hume cannot claim that a numerically identical idea can reappear. Hume accounts for memory by appealing to an idea that is qualitatively similar to, but less forceful and vivacious than a previous idea. But the ability to judge qualitative similarity and degrees of force and vivacity between present ideas and past impressions presupposes memory. Reid interprets Hume as holding that these three faculties do not differ in kind, but rather in the degree of force and vivacity of the ideas that are their objects. Ideas with the greatest degree of force and vivacity are

perceptions, those with a lesser degree are memories, and those with the least degree of force and vivacity are imaginings. Reid criticizes this taxonomy on phenomenological grounds. Some perceptions are less forceful and lively than some memories, as when lost in reminiscence, and some memories are less forceful and lively than imaginings, as when lost in reverie. Furthermore, increasing the degree of force and vivacity does not transform a memory or an imagining into a perception. Reid grants that perceptions, memories and imaginings often differ in degree of force and vivacity, but, he argues, this difference is insufficient to account for the special quality of presentness represented in perceptions, the special quality of pastness represented in memories, and the special quality of atemporality represented in imaginings. Inquiry, While memories may be faint, or weak, these features are not necessary to these states being memories, and so cannot be used to individuate them. In addition, a present idea "whatever its degree of force and vivacity" cannot ground judgments about events in the past because present ideas represent events as present. For according to that theory, the immediate object of memory, as well as every other operation of the understanding, is an idea present to the mind. And, from the present existence of this idea of memory I am led to infer, by reasoning, that six months ago or six years ago, there did exist an object similar to this one. But what is there in the idea that can lead me to this conclusion? What mark does it bear of the date of its archetype? Essays, Present ideas contain no information, qualitatively or representationally, that could serve as the basis of judgments about past events. As a result, no reflection on present ideas and their quality or character is sufficient for a representation of events in the past, as past. A Direct Realist Theory of Memory Contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists recognize that memory is a diverse phenomenon and they draw some useful distinctions among varieties of memory. Remembering how to ride a bike is an example of procedural memory. Remembering that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo is an example of a semantic memory. The distinction most relevant to the issues Reid, Locke and Hume raise for memory and personal identity is between semantic and episodic memory. Episodic memories are further distinguished from semantic memories by the Previous Awareness Condition on episodic memory. The Previous Awareness Condition has been developed and examined by Sydney Shoemaker, among others. Put simply, one has an episodic memory of an event only if one was agent or witness to the event remembered. The Previous Awareness Condition is a necessary but insufficient condition on episodic memory. If one has an experience as of being lost in a store as a child, but one was not in fact lost in a store as a child, such an experience is not an episodic memory. On the other hand, each of us has been agent or witness to many events of which we have no episodic memory. Reid is most interested in episodic memory. Though Reid does not use the contemporary terminology, his theory draws upon both the distinction between episodic and semantic memory and the Previous Awareness Condition on episodic memory. As he puts the matter: Things remembered must be things formerly perceived or known. I remember the transit of Venus over the sun in the year I must therefore have perceived it at the time it happened, otherwise I could not now remember it. Our first acquaintance with any object of thought cannot be by remembrance. Memory can only produce a continuance or renewal of a former acquaintance with the things remembered. Essays, Acquaintance presupposes apprehension, and prior episodes of apprehension are necessary for retained acquaintance. According to Reid, episodic memory is not a current apprehension of a past event, nor is it a current apprehension of a past experience. Rather, according to Reid, memory is an act that preserves a past apprehension. Reid characterizes memory as exhibiting what we now call the Previous Awareness Condition. He holds that reports of episodic memory are true only if the person reporting satisfies the condition, and that experiences that otherwise appear to be episodic memories, but which fail the condition, are not episodic memories. Essays, He discounts them not because they fail to meet the Previous Awareness Condition, but because he holds that semantic memories are better classified as beliefs or knowledge rather than memories. For example, he would hold that a person today who reports remembering that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo expresses a belief or knowledge rather than a memory. He holds this because he requires a distinction between two sorts of beliefs that would otherwise be obscured by the fact that each sort can be expressed in the form of a semantic memory report. The distinction is between beliefs that play a role in preserving past apprehension and which are constituents of episodic memory, and those that do not play a role in preserving past apprehension and which are not, strictly speaking, memories. For example,

Jane believes that she dined with a friend last night. The difference between these two sorts of belief is obscured by the fact that each may be expressed by using the factive complement: Folescu examines whether memorial conception differs from or is the same as the kind of conception ingredient in perception, consciousness, and other intentional mental states. In particular, it is a belief that it happened to me, where the pronoun is indexed to the person who is represented in the memory as agent or witness to the event. Essays, , The belief is about or of the event because the other constituent of memory—the conception—supplies the event, which is the object of the belief. Memory preserves past apprehensions by relating us to the events originally presented in perception—memory preserves past apprehension through conception and belief. In particular, the objects of memory are not the past apprehensions themselves but that which is presented in the past apprehensions, namely, the original event. Inquiry, According to Reid, we remember events that were apprehended in the past by perception. But Reid insists that perception is confined to the present. Because perception is confined to the present, we cannot perceive events, which have a duration. How, then, can we remember what we cannot have perceived? Reid holds that memory is not a current apprehension of an event already presented in a past apprehension. In other words, we do not remember events by re-apprehending them. Rather, the past apprehension is itself preserved by the act of remembering the event apprehended. Memory is an act of preservation through conception and belief. Such preservation does not itself constitute an additional apprehension over and above the apprehension preserved. Indeed, according to Reid, it is impossible to currently apprehend any events in the past; apprehension is confined to perceiving present objects or being conscious of present mental operations. Essays, 23, Reid does not deny that memory is itself a current mental state, nor does he deny that memory presupposes a past apprehension. He denies only that memory is a current apprehension, and that the object of a memory is a past apprehension. Essays, Memory preserves past apprehension by conceiving of an event previously apprehended and believing, of this event, that it happened to me. Reid holds that memory, like perception, is immediate. Neither the conception nor the belief that are the ingredients of memory are formed on the basis of reasoning or testimony. In order to infer to a past event, one must have some prior, non-inferential relation to the event if it is to be a memory rather than a belief or knowledge. But then this prior, non-inferential relation would be an episodic memory. In addition, if episodic memory involved an inference to the effect that the event happened to me, the inference would be otiose because, as Reid claims, such a belief is already an immediate, non-inferential component of episodic memory. In principle, one could infer from the conception and belief that are ingredients in memory to a further belief that the event happened. But if such a belief plays a role in preserving past apprehension then it is superfluous—such a belief, subject to the Previous Awareness Condition, is already embedded in episodic memory. If the belief does not play a role in preserving past apprehension then it is a semantic memory, which, according to Reid, is among the species of belief or knowledge rather than memory. The distinction between beliefs that are ingredients in episodic memories and beliefs that are based on, but not ingredients in, episodic memories allows Reid to account for cases in which a memorial experience continues to represent an event as having happened, even when the person who seems to remember the event has what she regards as an overriding reason to believe that the event did not occur. The belief that is an ingredient in the experience represents the event as having happened to the person who seems to remember it.

2: Personal Identity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Identity information is encoded in memory in quite complex ways. To more effectively use those codes, to improve your memory for names, faces, and important personal details, it helps to understand how identity information is recorded in memory.

Recognizing a person is a complex matter. There are several different types of memory code for identity information. Improving your memory for people requires you to improve the connections between these memory codes. And the reason for this is not that their memory is poor, but because it is so embarrassing when their memory lets them down. Nothing makes a person “a client, a customer, a student” feel more valued than being remembered. Think about the ease with which you distinguish between hundreds, even thousands, of human faces, and then think about how hard it is to distinguish between the faces of birds, or dogs, or monkeys. This is not because human faces are any more distinctive than the faces of other animals. Think about how much harder it is for you to distinguish between the faces of people of an unfamiliar racial type. Contrary to what many European-descended people believe, Asian faces are no less distinctive than European faces, but the differences between any human face are sufficiently subtle that they take a great deal of experience to learn. The importance of learning these subtle differences is shown in the way new babies focus on faces, and prefer them to other objects. Our memory for other people is of course more than a memory for faces, although that part probably has the most impressive capacity. We can recognize people by hearing their voice, at a distance by seeing their shape or the way that they move, or even by their clothing. Many years ago, when I was in my second year at university, I left the student cafeteria and nearly bumped into a young woman in a white lab coat. I murmured some sort of apology and started to move on, and she said my name. I stared at her blankly. I still remember staring at her unfamiliar face, and then the features seemed to shift under my eyes. It was very weird. Suddenly I knew her. I was mortified, and stunned. How could I not immediately recognize her? Identity information is complex. Identity information is encoded in memory in quite complex ways. To more effectively use those codes, to improve your memory for names, faces, and important personal details, it helps to understand how identity information is recorded in memory. While this sounds terribly obvious, there is actually a clinical condition the Capgras delusion whereby a person, while recognizing the people around them, believes they have been replaced by doubles imposters, robots, aliens. This is simply because the normal accompanying feeling of familiarity is missing. This is because names are held in a separate place to biographical details, and can only be accessed through those details. Identity codes and how they are structured in memory. Why is there this hierarchy? Why can we only access names through biographical information? Because identity information is ordered. Your memory for a person is not like this: In other words, there are several different kinds of identity information, and they are clustered according to type, and can in fact only be accessed in a particular order. Of the various identity codes bits of encoded identity information, there are three kinds that are important for recognizing a person: Visually-derived semantic codes are useful for remembering new faces because the link with the physical features of the face is strong and meaningful. However you cannot identify a person without reference to the biographical codes. The interesting aspect of these different codes is that you can only access them in a particular order: Whether the name is recalled therefore depends on the strength of the connection between the biographical details and the name. A fascinating account of what it is like to be face-blind, from a person with the condition, can be found at:

3: The Lockean Memory Theory of Personal Identity: Definition, Objection, Response - Inquiries Journal

Reid criticizes Locke's theory of personal identity for inferring a metaphysical hypothesis now called the Memory Theory from the conceptual connection between memory and personal identity. On this theory, personal identity consists in memory; sameness of memory is metaphysically necessary and sufficient for sameness of persons.

Howland remains the same person and yet is clearly no longer the person she once was. And where is the real Alice Howland to be found? Memory becomes like a flickering signal from a faraway shortwave radio station: They can no longer read obvious social cues. They become easily distressed as a thickening fog descends upon them, causing them to lose track of everything. As the disease progresses, only fleeting glimpses of the once capable person can be seen; for the rest of the time, everyone is stuck with an uninvited guest. Eventually, the sufferer fails to recognise even loved ones. Dementia raises deeply troubling issues about our obligations to care for people whose identity might have changed in the most disturbing ways. In turn, those changes challenge us to confront our philosophical and ethical assumptions about what makes up that identity in the first place. Everyone touched by the disease goes through a crash-course in the philosophy of mind. Philosophy is not of much practical use with most illnesses but in the case of dementia it provides insights about selfhood and identity that can help us make sense of the condition and our own reactions to it. Broadly speaking, there are two accounts of how personal identity is formed and sustained. Each has different implications for how we understand dementia and so seek to care for people with it. Locke, for his part, identified the self with the ordered flow of sense experiences that the mind recorded. That tradition, more recently updated by the British philosopher Derek Parfit in books such as *Reasons and Persons*, argues that identity and memory come from the same place: Selfhood hinges on our ability to order memory, and connect a set of experiences to form a coherent autobiography of who we were and how we became the person we are now. The theory has implications for dementia, because dementia destroys the temporal binding that sustains our identity. According to Baldwin van Gorp of Leuven University in Belgium, who studies how the media reports dementia, this individualistic, inward looking, memory-based account of identity is the default way that dementia is framed in most public debates. That framing carries clear implications for how we might hold dementia at bay: It explains why dementia self-help books lean so heavily on the provision of external supports: Post-It notes and other visual reminders that jog the memory. Google "that instant memory-jogger" might already be helping to forestall the dependency created by dementia. Before long, no doubt, little robots will accompany us to make sure we remember to take our pills and flush the toilet. Since, movement disorders such as tremors have been treated in the US with electronic implants that provide deep brain stimulation DBS. Theodore Berger, a biomedical engineer at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, and Robert Hampson, an associate professor of pharmacology and physiology at Wake Forest School of Medicine in North Carolina, are drawing on that success to design implants that help people maintain their memories. In, they announced with colleagues that in experiments on rats and monkeys they had found a way to artificially stimulate the hippocampus so it might recall memories that would otherwise be lost. The usual dystopic spectres then hove into view, with memory becoming the site of a sharp new social divide: The memory test is practically a SAT test for the overs, who will be separated into two lines: People lucky enough to have a fully functioning memory find themselves thrust into the roles of carers and keepers, controllers and jailers: The memory-based account of identity is powerful, deeply rooted and dangerously partial. It will direct us to potential memory cures "a mixture of implants and drugs" that will almost certainly disappoint as much as they excite. Memory is not created in a little box in the brain, but by diffuse and dispersed circuits of neurons firing in concert. Someone with dementia would need more than an implant: And still the nagging question would remain: A more promising way forward might be drawn from ideas about personhood that sit within the continental philosophical tradition that includes Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. At the risk of simplification, philosophers in this tradition contend that who we are depends not simply on our self-reflective ability to marshal our memories but, crucially, on our relationships with other people and how we are embedded in the world around us. You are a husband or wife, mother or

father, son, friend, colleague, lover, writer, cook, teacher, or plumber. And your identity is secured through mutual recognition or, as the Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre puts it in *After Virtue* The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor argues that shared language and culture play a critical role in creating this sense of rapport, by constituting a common vantage point from which we view the world together. If someone cannot remember not just where the milk bottle goes, but what a milk bottle is for, then the shared pre-suppositions on which communication, meaning and identity depend become badly strained. The common vantage point that we depend upon, splinters and fractures. Besides, as the British anthropologist Daniel Miller has shown in his study of our relationship to the material world, *The Comfort of Things*, people cherish objects precisely because they embody relationships and emotions. When someone forgets what an object is for, they lose its social and emotional context as well. Forgetting on that scale is most intensely painful when someone no longer recognises their life partner, a fate described by the UK writer Andrea Gillies in *Keeper: A Book About Memory, Identity, Isolation, Wordsworth and Cake*, which she wrote while looking after her mother-in-law Nancy who has advanced dementia. Each morning, Nancy would wake up thinking that Morris, her husband of plus years, sleeping next to her, was a stranger. It implies that the main challenge is to work imaginatively and empathetically to find common ground, creating conversational topics and cues that help make connections with people, despite their failing memory. As the British psychologist Oliver James explains in *Contented Dementia*, this requires more skill and persistence than most conversations demand, precisely because its pre-suppositions cannot be taken for granted. My year-old mother-in-law, for example, cannot always remember that she has a preserving pan, but that does not stop her enjoying making and, even more, talking about making marmalade. How people feel and what moves them becomes vastly more important than what they can remember. People who cannot follow a story or read a book can be deeply moved by music or dance, by physical feeling and the lingering memories it evokes. As minds fade, bodies become ever more important as a source of identity. Applied to dementia, his thinking highlights the significance of physical routines, which, like recalling the steps in a dance, become more important as the ability to follow written instructions dwindles. Even the simple act of walking can restore a dementia sufferer to feeling fit, healthy and capable. Rather than pin our hopes on memory implants, it might make more sense to create environments that are well-lit, simply signed and relatively stable. If the environment is cognitively overloaded, with bewildering signs, forms and instructions, not to mention smart devices, then it will make someone with dementia feel less capable and more distressed. That is why, in her book *Dementia: People with dementia need environments that are constant and reliable, and so require little new learning*. Living with such people entails embracing the pleasures of patient repetition rather than constant novelty. Not that memory disappears entirely, at least for a long while. But as it becomes less sure, it becomes just one among several sources of identity. It now draws heavily on her experiences as a young girl evacuated from East London during the Blitz. The story of that foundational moment is endlessly repeated because it still says something vital about her, as if she is saying defiantly: At the core of identity politics is the claim that people deserve equal recognition, despite being different in ways that turn out to be far less significant than first thought. That same insight now needs to be applied to people with dementia: Philosophy gives us a choice about how to understand this challenge as people in their hundreds of thousands are diagnosed with this condition. Once the mind is invaded, all hope of maintaining a memory-based identity goes, and with that goes everything we value about the idea of independence and self-fulfilment. Living with dementia then becomes a long process of mourning someone who is no longer there. But if we understand our identity as something held by relationships, expressed through feelings, reflected by our environment and enacted bodily, dementia instead becomes a daily puzzle to find common ground with people different from us, and to find new, often non-verbal forms of communication and communion that make people feel good about themselves without necessarily knowing why. Most of all, it helps if we see that people with dementia are still involved in the struggle all of us are involved in, to make and remake ourselves, to find and assert who we are, even as we change and cast aside parts of who we once were – jobs, relationships, hairstyles. I have people I love dearly. I have things I want to do with my life. I rail against myself for not being able to remember things – but I still have moments in the day of pure happiness and joy. And please do not think that I am suffering. I am not suffering. Struggling

to be part of things, to stay connected to whom I once was. Instead of squeezing people with dementia into complicated systems designed for people who can remember who the President is, we should find kinder, less judgmental ways to be with them. We, the lucky people who are yet to fail the memory test, will benefit too, by learning to make ourselves available to the physical, expressive and relational aspects of our own identities. Put simply, we should avoid the temptation of becoming memory snobs, as any of us could find ourselves downwardly mobile so far as memory goes. Charles Leadbeater advises organisations, cities and governments on innovation and creativity. He is chairman of Apps for Good and an associate at the Centre for London. His latest book is *The Frugal Innovator*. He lives in Highbury, North London.

4: Reid on Memory and Personal Identity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Memory is the faculty which models the identity of human beings at both a personal and a collective level. In fact, it is through memory that our sense of identity forms and defines itself in the personal psyche.

This article has been cited by other articles in PMC. Abstract John Locke speaks of personal identity and survival of consciousness after death. A criterion of personal identity through time is given. Such a criterion specifies, insofar as that is possible, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the survival of persons. John Locke holds that personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity. He considered personal identity or the self to be founded on consciousness viz. Personal Identity, Consciousness, Self, Memory, Survival after death Introduction The issue of personal identity and its deterrents has always been of concern for many philosophers. Questions are raised as to what does being the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist of. Personal identity theory is the philosophical confrontation with the ultimate questions of our own existence, such as who are we, and is there a life after death? This sort of analysis of personal identity provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time. In the modern philosophy of mind, this concept of personal identity is sometimes referred to as the diachronic problem of personal identity. The synchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterise a given person at one time. There are several general theories of this identity problem. In this paper, the views of John Locke and a criticism of his theory of personal identity are presented. Against Cartesian Theory John Locke 29 August October was one of the philosophers who were against the Cartesian theory that soul accounts for personal identity. Locke holds that personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity. For the brain, as the body and as any substance, may change, while consciousness remains the same. Therefore, personal identity is not in the brain, but in consciousness. The problem of personal identity is at the centre of discussions about life after death and immortality. In order to exist after death, there has to be a person after death who is the same person as the person who died. Consciousness Can Be Transferred from One Soul to Another Locke holds that consciousness can be transferred from one soul to another and that personal identity goes with consciousness. Consciousness can be transferred from one substance to another, and thus, while the soul is changed, consciousness remains the same, thereby preserving the personal identity through the change. On the other hand, consciousness can be lost as in utter forgetfulness while the soul or thinking substance remains the same. Under these conditions, there is the same soul but a different person. These affirmations amount to the claim that the same soul or thinking substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity over time. One answer is that the distinction solves the problem of the resurrection of the dead. What is this problem? The problem begins with Biblical texts asserting that we will have the same body at the resurrection as we did in this life. The Prince and the Cobbler Locke explicitly tells us that the case of the prince and the cobbler Feser, , p shows us the resolution of the problem of resurrection. The result of this exchange is that the prince still considers himself the prince, even though he finds himself in an altogether new body. Locke focusses on the prince with all his princely thoughts because in his view, it is consciousness which is crucial to the reward and punishment which is to be meted out at the Last Judgment Uzgalis, This means, then, that an account of the identity of persons across time will have forensic - normative - implications. And so it does. But this interesting border case leads to this problematic thought that since personal identity is based on consciousness, and that only oneself can be aware of his consciousness, exterior human judges may never know if they really are judging - and punishing - the same person, or simply the same body. In other words, Locke argues that you may be judged only for the acts of your body, as this is what is apparent to all but God; however, you are in truth only responsible for the acts for which you are conscious. This forms the basis of the insanity defence: Critics There are several philosophers who criticised the Lockean memory theory and stated that it was circular and illogical. So while memory can reveal my identity with some past experiencer, it does not make that experiencer me. What I am remembering, then, insists Butler, are the experiences of a substance, namely, the same substance that constitutes me now. He criticised his theories for several reasons. Firstly, Reid believed that personal identity was something that

could not be determined by operations, and that personal identity should be determined by something indivisible. Another objection is based precisely on the link between identity and ethics: But such an implication must be absurd. Also, Butler concurs, expanding the point to include considerations of self-concern. What Butler and Reid retain in common with Locke, though, is the belief that identity grounds certain of our patterns of concern, both prudential and moral. What they disagree over is just what identity consists of. And although Locke disagrees that the implications of his view are crazy, he does agree with the basic methodology. And this is a methodological assumption that has been retained by most theorists on identity and ethics since. Nevertheless, even if this objection to Locke is thwarted, the others remain in force. For one thing, memory does seem to presuppose personal identity, and so cannot constitute a criterion of it. Finally, there is the obvious worry that identity seems to persist through the loss of memory:

5: John Locke on Personal Identity

*For centuries philosophers have struggled to define personal identity. In his work *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, John Locke proposes that one's personal identity extends only so far as their own consciousness. The connection between consciousness and memory in Locke's theory has.*

Perhaps the problem that most people think of first when they think about the nature of the mind is whether the mind can survive the death of the body. The possibility that it can is, of course, central to many religious doctrines, and the notion of personal identity. One makes a judgment of personal identity whenever one says that a person existing at one time is the same as a person existing at another time: Matters of great importance often turn on the truth of such judgments. Whether someone should be punished for a crime, for example, depends on whether he is the person who committed it, and whether someone is the owner of something now may depend on whether he is the person who purchased it at some past time. The topic of personal identity has to do with what the truth of judgments of personal identity consists of and how it can be known. Equivalently, it has to do with the nature of the persistence of persons through time and their awareness of such persistence. Bodily and immaterial-substance theories What one normally relies on in making judgments of personal identity in everyday life are facts about human bodies' sameness of appearance, sameness of fingerprints, sameness of DNA, and so on. This fact suggests that the sameness of persons consists of the sameness of human bodies. This suggestion of course raises the question of what the sameness of human bodies consists of. It cannot consist simply of similarity of bodily characteristics: A better answer would be that it consists of spatiotemporal continuity and continuity of bodily characteristics. These philosophers would say that the persistence of a person consists of the persistence of such an immaterial substance. As to what that consists in, the most common answer is that the identity of such substances is simple and unanalyzable. The psychological view Both of these accounts of personal identity—the bodily theory and the immaterial-substance theory—were rejected by the 17th-century English philosopher John Locke in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, which contained the first extended treatment of the topic in Western philosophy. Updated versions of this example involve brain transplants rather than soul transfers. He also held that consciousness can be transferred from one immaterial substance to another, so that the immaterial substance that was initially the mind of one person might become the mind of a different person. Locke said that the identity of persons consists of sameness of consciousness. This is usually interpreted to mean that identity consists of facts about memory: A small boy is flogged for stealing an apple; later, as a young officer, he remembers the flogging; later still, as an old general, he remembers acting bravely as a young officer but does not remember being flogged as a boy. The 18th-century English bishop and philosopher Joseph Butler raised a different objection: In a subsequent elaboration of this response, memory continuity was replaced by psychological continuity, which includes memory continuity as a special case. Psychological continuity consists of the holding of a number of psychological relations between person-stages. It may be theoretically possible for a person to quasi-remember past experiences or actions. But remembering will be a special case—and perhaps the only actual case—of quasi-remembering. Of course, a psychological-continuity theory based on quasi-memory will be satisfactory only if it contains provisions that determine whether a case of quasi-remembering is a case of genuine remembering. Joseph Butler, detail from an engraving by T. Dean, after a portrait by John Vanderbank. BBC Hulton Picture Library Fission and special concern Most contemporary versions of the psychological view of personal identity assume that persons are physical in nature. The idea is that the recipient of a brain transplant could be expected to have memories corresponding to the past life of the donor, as well as a psychological history generally continuous with that of the donor before the transplant. The recipient would think that he is the donor—and, according to the psychological view, others should think the same. A variant of the brain-transplant example, due to the British philosopher David Wiggins, in which the two hemispheres of a brain are transplanted into two different bodies, has been extensively discussed since the 1960s. Here the supposition is that after the transplant there are two persons who are psychologically continuous with the

person who existed before. Because these two persons are not identical to each other, it is impossible for both to be identical to the original person. Yet neither of them seems to have any characteristic that would make the original person identical to him and not to the other. They also seem to provide examples of quasi-memory that is not memory: Theorists differ, however, in how convincing they find this proposal. Fission cases also raise questions about the special concern that people have for their own future well-being. It seems plausible that a person anticipating fission would have a special concern for the welfare of both of the fission products, even though—strictly speaking—he would be identical to neither of them. The idea of special concern has figured prominently in the work of the contemporary English philosopher Derek Parfit. Amnesia Another objection to the psychological view has to do with the possibility of amnesia: Alternatively, the psychological theorist would be committed to saying that, despite appearances, amnesia is not really possible. Defenders of the psychological view reply that the sort of amnesia that actually occurs is compatible with the psychological view, because people can recover from ordinary amnesia—which means that their memories continue to exist in a latent state—and in any case there is more to psychological continuity than continuity of memory. There is no reason to think that a person could survive this. The psychological view versus animalism Coincident entities A powerful set of criticisms, raised in the late 20th century, has to do with the intuitively plausible assumption that persons are human animals. Although as mentioned earlier most versions of the psychological view assume that persons are physical entities, they are committed to holding that a person is not identical to his body, because the relations that constitute personal identity are different from those that constitute bodily identity. For some philosophers, this is reason enough to reject the psychological view. Others have argued that, even if coincident entities are possible, the psychological view implies the counterintuitive claim that persons are not animals. Given that a person and his coincident human animal are physically exactly alike, it would seem on a physicalist view about mentality that the human animal should have the same mental states as the person and so should itself be a mental subject and a person, contrary to what the psychological view maintains. It might seem that the only way to avoid this conclusion is to assume that animals cannot think, which is also strongly counterintuitive. Animalism is additionally supported by the fact that in actual cases not involving brain transplants and the like sameness of person and sameness of human animal always go together. Defenders of the psychological view, including Shoemaker, deny that they are committed to too many minds. Although persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, the result is not the instantiation of mentality in two different things, person and animal, but its instantiation in just one thing, the person. Only in the career of a creature having the persistence conditions of mental subjects. Defenders also maintain that there is a good sense in which persons are animals, though not biologically individuated animals, and that animals in that sense can think. What they hold against animalism is the same as what Locke held against a similar view, the bodily theory:

6: Memory and Identity - Wikipedia

Below you will find the important quotes in The Color of Water related to the theme of Memory and Identity. Chapter 1 Quotes I was born an Orthodox Jew on April 1, , April Fool's Day, in Poland.

The next thing that happens is a volunteer is going to take your wicker basket and bring it up to where I am, and going to empty all of your memories into my brain. And the question is now, where do you think you exist? We see it in philosophy too whereby we think that really memories or authentic memories are the essence of who we are. Today we explore memory and identity, and what remains of the person left behind after parts of their mind are damaged. When are they no longer themselves? UK neurologist Dr Jules Montague was inspired to think further about this question; if we lose our memories, do we lose ourselves? So it came from a story of a friend really. Her name is Anna and she is from Dublin where I am also from. Her mother had developed some symptoms essentially, some double vision, some problems with her balance, and it turned out eventually to be a brain tumour we realised. And my friend Anna had this question for me one day that had nothing to do with the things like the double vision and the balance but actually her mum had become essentially a nicer person. And Anna asked me, you know, is this really my mother? Is this her true self, does she mean it when she says that she loves us? So I actually said, you know, this is really your mum, she means what she says. And afterwards I wondered had I been dishonest in fact, had her mum only manifested this change in affection because of the brain tumour at the front of her brain? And so really I wrote this book to try and come up with some honest answers for Anna. It draws on her experiences working as a neurologist both in Dublin and London. And these are questions of identity, sameness, the real person. And we only tend to I think ask them when something goes wrong with us, so if we have some sort of brain the problem usually is the time that we start to wonder about things like memory and personality, for example. But that is easy to say, and on a bad day it might be difficult to understand. We do become the stories that we tell really, and dementia does interrupt that, particularly for others, for loved ones. And we certainly do think about narrative as making us a coherent self. You asked people with dementia whether they think they are the same person. So how did people generally respond to that? On certain days they might not feel that, and of course as the condition advances they certainly might not feel quite the same or their families might not. But by and large people feel that they still hold onto something of themselves. And we really rarely in medicine, not just in neurology, ask people what they can do. So how might trying to change this perception help people with dementia and their families? So what date is it now, what year is it now, why are you talking about the past, why do you think today is last year? Certain brain malfunctions can cause people to tell so-called honest lies. Jules Montague recalls one of her patients, called Charlie. Charlie used to come into the hospital all the time, he was a regular, and he would tell these wonderfully fantastic stories about judging an egg and spoon race or going on the trampoline that morning. And this classically happens because there is a disruption in the circuitry of memory. The hippocampus, which is a memory centre, further forward in the brain, the connections between those two places seem to be disturbed in some way. And my point in the book really is that it tells us a lot about memory and our own memory and how we love to think that we are absolutely accurate when we remember things but perhaps we are not that far, you and I, from Charlie. There is everyday forgetting. To what extent should we worry about this everyday forgetting? Those sorts of things are not essentially memory as we try to think of it but something called attention. The other thing, for example, is where you parked your car. So I tell people to preserve their memory for better things. And you describe memory as like a house under construction rather than a video loop. What you mean by that? Thinking about memory has completely changed in the last few years because of some wonderful research. And now we have this understanding, as you say, that it is constantly under reconstruction. And as a result, each time you remember something, it represents all the things that have happened since. And you give examples of where people have made up stories, confabulated, in the public eye. And there was one study that was done in reaction to the 11th of September terrorist attack. Just briefly describe what happened there. And there was a study that looked at downtown participants, so people who were really close to what happened, and some who

were farther away. And those who were involved and closer to the action of what happened that day actually had lots of memories to impart and they were very vivid, but not necessarily more accurate. Hello, my name is Benjamin Kyle. Benjamin Kyle is the alias chosen by an American man who was found in , he had no idea who he was. His true identity was only discovered three years ago. So he had something called dissociative fugue. And Benjamin was one of these people that essentially went missing, even though he was right there in front of you and in front of the cameras. And he just had to own this new character that he created. And it was through the wonder of genetic testing and DNA that the story took a turn in the last couple of years and Benjamin Kyle finally became someone else. What was that a result of, that loss of identity? Her book is called *Lost and Found*. We tend to assume that our personality remains fairly fixed across our lifetime, but perhaps we are made up of a series of different selves, depending on what happens to us. Jules Montague is interested in how personality shapes us and who we become when somehow our personality changes. It can be due to brain disorder, injury or certain drugs. She recalls another of her patients, Martin. Martin was a patient of mine in Ireland again, I saw him with a condition that affected the front of his brain. So previously he had been very polite, well liked in his community in the west of Ireland, a small village, very compassionate. He was very organised, he had braces and cufflinks and he was on various committees. But over the course of a couple of years he was a completely changed man. And really he was a transformed man. And that led me to think about why is it that personality change threatens our identity so much. And it turns out there was some research done at Yale University recently, that what seems to matter to you and I when we think about someone and have they changed are moral traits. So in that case would you assess that Martin actually was no longer his former self? Yes, there were two questions that came to mind, and Tara who was his niece asked me that very question, you know, Martin had always cared about his sister, her mum, and he no longer cared as far as they were aware. But there was another question that was really difficult, and Tara said to me; is this the real Martin, is this really the way he always was and it was just a veneer that he had that he was this nice compassionate man? So it feels unfair to me that we would say this is finally the real Martin who has now been exposed by this brain condition. And I would like to say that we should preserve Martin as we remember him best rather than judging him at his worst I guess. Tell me about how that happens. And we see creativity in certain conditions. He needs hour care for everything else, but he starts to draw at the same time every single day, and this beautiful creative talent surges forth. And what we think is happening, without undermining the underlying condition of course, what we think is happening is that even though the front of the brain, the language part included has started to shut down, the artistic part of the brain is now free to roam. And there are also instances where creativity seems to emerge or be enhanced when particular drugs are involved. What was observed about creativity in that study? But she became increasingly psychotic. But part of the picture was, so to speak, that she became again an artist really and she set up this studio in her home. And again, there was this wonderful artistic talent that surged forth. But it was at great personal cost and cost to her family because she became very psychotic and actually ended up in a psychiatric hospital. The doctors had to think what to do. But in the process she lost that creativity, that artistic talent. And she said of course that she was happy to pay that price, it was too high a price to become such an excellent artist. But it shows us, again, that dopamine we think probably changes your personality, it makes you become a novelty seeker and therefore potentially a better artist. It only seems to have that effect if you actually have a deficit in dopamine in the first place. Can you introduce us to Kevin who told you that his spirit had left his body? And needless to say he was terrified. Eventually he was reunited with the physical body in the bed and he became Kevin as one again. They can happen to anyone but they also happen in things like migraine, for example, epilepsy, drugs like ketamine, anaesthetic, that sort of thing. So they are not that atypical or pathological a phenomena necessarily. We see them in some psychiatric conditions as well. Can you expand on that? So very surprisingly we can now recreate the out-of-body experience. So these experiments were done quite early in University College London and Queens Square again in London, a neurology hospital. And out-of-body experiences were created or recreated in the lab.

7: PassMark RAMMon - Identify RAM type, speed & memory timings

for identity claim that ordinary memory is a sub-category of quasi-memory. From my quasi-memory of doing X, I cannot infer that I did X, but I can infer that somebody did X.

Defining Lockean Memory Theory In the history of discourse on the subject of the self and personal identity, conflicting viewpoints have arisen. So long as one is the same self, the same rational being, one has the same personal identity. Given this assertion, any change in the self reflects a change in personal identity, and any change in personal identity therefore implies that the self has changed. The consciousness Locke refers to can be equated with memory. It is by this reasoning that Locke arrives at the most controversial portion of his theory which suggests that the converse of the previous argument is true: Memory is therefore, according to Locke, a necessary condition of personal identity. Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, also, which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he was conscious of his taking the standard but had absolutely lost consciousness of the flogging. Reid has demonstrated that transitivity allows for the officer and the boy who was flogged to share a personal identity despite that the officer has lost all memory of his having been flogged. Response of a Memory Theorist: However, memory theorist H. In his essay Personal Identity, Grice proposes the introduction of a new term, a total temporary state t . In a series of total temporary states belonging to one person, every t . Grice What Grice proposes is that each total temporary state of a single self or person contains some element, a remembered experience or impression, shared by the t . Most people would be unwilling to believe that, as Locke suggests, they do not share a personal identity with themselves as toddlers simply because they cannot remember the experience of toddlerhood. Memory is necessary only insofar as the memory of a particular experience is contained within at least one total temporary state in the stream of t . This stipulation successfully satisfies critics who question whether or not forgetting an experience inherently means one did not have that experience. Grice is explicitly stating that if A is equal to B , and B is equal to C , A is equal to C , or, in terms similar to his, if t . This argument is as sound as an argument can be, and is an adequate response to Reid. He stipulates that the transitivity of total temporary states will not hold true if the t . Grice is right to conclude that the illusion of having experienced is not equivalent with actually having experienced. His amendment assesses personal identity in a Humean fashion, concluding that it is more like a bundle of interconnecting experiences and impressions than it is an independent substance. University of California Press, Cite References Print Grice, H. More By This Author:

8: Personal Identity and Memory - Oxford Scholarship

The memory-based account of identity is powerful, deeply rooted and dangerously partial. It will direct us to potential memory cures - a mixture of implants and drugs - that will almost certainly disappoint as much as they excite.

The Problems of Personal Identity There is no single problem of personal identity, but rather a wide range of questions that are at best loosely connected. Here are the most familiar: The precise meaning of these phrases is hard to pin down. It may be, for instance, that being a philosopher and loving music belong to my identity, whereas being a man and living in Yorkshire do not. Someone else could have the same four properties but feel differently towards them, so that being a man and living in Yorkshire belong to his identity but not being a philosopher or loving music. It contrasts with ethnic or national identity, which consists roughly of the ethnic group or nation one takes oneself to belong to and the importance one attaches to this. Ludwig is a typical discussion of this topic. What is it to be a person? What is necessary, and what suffices, for something to count as a person, as opposed to a nonperson? The most common answer is that to be a person at a time is to have certain special mental properties then e. Others propose a less direct connection between personhood and mental properties Chisholm What does it take for a person to persist from one time to anotherâ€”to continue existing rather than cease to exist? What determines which past or future being is you? What is it about the way she relates then to you as you are now that makes her you? For that matter, what makes it the case that anyone at all who existed back then is you? This is sometimes called the question of personal identity over time. An answer to it is an account of our persistence conditions. Imagine that after your death there really will be someone, in this world or the next, who resembles you in certain ways. How would that being have to relate to you as you are now in order to be you, rather than someone else? What would the Higher Powers have to do to keep you in existence after your death? Or is there anything they could do? The answer to these questions depends on the answer to the persistence question. How do we find out who is who? What evidence bears on the question of whether the person here now is the one who was here yesterday? One source of evidence is first-person memory: Another source is physical continuity: Which of these sources is more fundamental? Does first-person memory count as evidence all by itself, for instance, or only insofar as we can check it against publicly available physical facts? What should we do when they support opposing verdicts? Ought we to conclude, on the basis of memory evidence, that the resulting person is not Charlie but Guy Fawkes brought back to life, or ought we instead to infer from the absence of physical continuity that he is simply Charlie with memory loss? What principle would answer this question? The evidence question dominated the literature on personal identity from the s to the s good examples include Shoemaker , and Penelhum , It is important to distinguish it from the persistence question. What it takes for you to persist through time is one thing; how we might find out whether you have is another. If the criminal had fingerprints just like yours, the courts may conclude that he is you. But even if that is conclusive evidence, having your fingerprints is not what it is for a past or future being to be you: If the persistence question asks which of the characters introduced at the beginning of a story have survived to become those at the end of it, we may also ask how many are on the stage at any one time. What determines how many of us there are now? If there are some seven billion people on the earth at present, what factsâ€”biological, psychological, or what have youâ€”make that the right number? The question is not what causes there to be a certain number of people at a given time, but what there being that number consists in. It is like asking what sort of configuration of pieces amounts to winning a game of chess, rather than what sorts of moves typically lead to winning. But this is disputed. Some say that cutting the main connections between the cerebral hemispheres results in radical disunity of consciousness, and that because of this, two people share a single organism see e. Nagel ; Puccetti argues that there are two people within the skin of each normal human being. Others say that a human being with split personality could literally be the home of two or more thinking beings Wilkes Still others argue that two people can share an organism in cases of conjoined twinning Campbell and McMahan ; see also Olson These terms need careful handling, however. They are apt to give the mistaken impression that identity comes in two kinds, synchronic and diachronic. The truth is simply that there are two kinds of situations where we

can ask how many people or other things there are: What sort of things, metaphysically speaking, are you and I and other human people? What are our fundamental properties, in addition to those that make us people? What, for instance, are we made of? Are we composed entirely of matter, as stones are, or are we partly or wholly immaterial? Where do our spatial boundaries lie, if we are spatially extended at all? Do we extend all the way out to our skin and no further, for instance? If so, what fixes those boundaries? Are we substances—metaphysically independent beings—or is each of us a state or an aspect of something else, or perhaps some sort of process or event? Here are some of the main proposed answers Olson, Snowdon, van Inwagen, Olson, a. We are temporal parts of animals: We are spatial parts of animals: We are partless immaterial substances—souls—or compound things made up of an immaterial soul and a material body Swinburne We are collections of mental states or events: There is nothing that we are: There is no consensus or even a dominant view on this question. What matters in identity? What is the practical importance of facts about our persistence? Why does it matter? What reason have you to care whether you yourself continue to exist, rather than someone else just like you existing in your place? Imagine that surgeons are going to put your brain into my head and that neither of us has any choice about this. Suppose the resulting person will be in terrible pain after the operation unless one of us pays a large sum in advance. If we were both entirely selfish, which of us would have a reason to pay? Will the resulting person—who will presumably think he is you—be responsible for your actions or for mine? Or both, or neither? The answer may seem to turn entirely on whether the resulting person would be you or I. Only I can be responsible for my actions. The fact that some person is me, by itself, gives me a reason to care about him. Identity itself matters practically. Perhaps what gives me a reason to care about what happens to the man people will call by my name tomorrow is not that he is me, but that he is then psychologically continuous with me as I am now see Section 4, or because he relates to me in some other way that does not imply that we are the same person. If someone other than me were psychologically continuous tomorrow with me as I am now, he would have what matters to me, and I ought to transfer my selfish concern to him. Likewise, someone else could be responsible for my actions, and not for his own. Identity itself has no practical importance. That completes our survey. Though some of these questions may bear on others, they are to a large extent independent. It is important not to confuse them.

Understanding the Persistence Question We turn now to the persistence question. Few concepts have been the source of more misunderstanding than identity over time. The Persistence Question is often confused with other questions, or stated in a tendentious way. The question is roughly what is necessary and sufficient for a past or future being to be someone existing now. Suppose we point to you now, and then describe someone or something existing at another time. Then we can ask whether we are referring twice to one thing, or once to each of two things. The persistence question asks what determines the answer to specific queries like this one. There are precisely analogous questions about the persistence of other objects, such as dogs. Some take the persistence question to ask what it means to say that a past or future being is you. The answer would be knowable a priori if at all. It would also imply that necessarily all people have the same persistence conditions—that the answer to the question is the same no matter what sort of people we considered. Though some endorse these claims Noonan What it takes for us to persist might depend on whether we are biological organisms, which is something we cannot know a priori. And if there could be immaterial people, such as gods or angels, what it takes for them to persist might differ from what it takes for a human person to persist.

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Memory and Identity is the last book written by Pope John Paul II. It was published in It was published in The work consists of 26 chapters, each opening with a short narrative paragraph, sometimes including one or more questions.

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