

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

1: The Great Powers and the "Eastern Question"

The Great Powers And The Decline Of The European States System [Graham Ross] on www.enganchecubano.com
**FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System*

The dictator ruled by terror with a series of brutal policies, which left millions of his own citizens dead. During his reign—which lasted until his death in — Stalin transformed the Soviet Union from an agrarian society to an industrial and military superpower. Stalin implemented a series of Five-Year Plans to spur economic growth and transformation in the Soviet Union. The first Five-Year Plan focused on collectivizing agriculture and rapid industrialization. Subsequent Five-Year Plans focused on the production of armaments and military build-up. Between and , Stalin enforced the collectivization of the agricultural sector. Rural peasants were forced to join collective farms. Those that owned land or livestock were stripped of their holdings. Hundreds of thousands of higher-income farmers, called kulaks, were rounded up and executed, their property confiscated. The Communists believed that consolidating individually owned farms into a series of large state-run collective farms would increase agricultural productivity. The opposite was true. The Great Purge Amid confusion and resistance to collectivization in the countryside, agricultural productivity dropped. This led to devastating food shortages. Millions died during the Great Famine of For many years the USSR denied the Great Famine, keeping secret the results of a census that would have revealed the extent of loss. Stalin eliminated all likely opposition to his leadership by terrorizing Communist Party officials and the public through his secret police. Millions more were deported, or imprisoned in forced labor camps known as Gulags. The Americans and British feared the spread of communism into Western Europe and worldwide. In , the U. The alliance between countries of the Western bloc was a political show of force against the USSR and its allies. The Cold War power struggle—waged on political, economic and propaganda fronts between the Eastern and Western blocs—would persist in various forms until the fall of the Soviet Union in He became Communist Party secretary in and premier in At home, however, Khrushchev initiated a series of political reforms that made Soviet society less repressive. During this period, later known as de-Stalinization, Khrushchev criticized Stalin for arresting and deporting opponents, took steps to raise living conditions, freed many political prisoners, loosened artistic censorship, and closed the Gulag labor camps. Members of his own political party removed Khrushchev from office in Many early projects were tied to the Soviet military and kept secret, but by the s, space would become another dramatic arena for competition between dueling world superpowers. The success of Sputnik made Americans fear that the U. He inherited a stagnant economy and a crumbling political system. He introduced two sets of policies he hoped would reform the political system and help the USSR become a more prosperous, productive nation. These policies were called glasnost and perestroika. It addressed personal restrictions of the Soviet people. Glasnost eliminated remaining traces of Stalinist repression, such as the banning of books and the much-loathed secret police. Newspapers could criticize the government, and parties other than the Communist Party could participate in elections. Under perestroika, the Soviet Union began to move toward a hybrid communist-capitalist system, much like modern China. The policy-making committee of the Communist Party, called the Politburo, would still control the direction of the economy. Yet the government would allow market forces to dictate some production and development decisions. Collapse of the Soviet Union During the s and s, the Communist Party elite rapidly gained wealth and power while millions of average Soviet citizens faced starvation. Bread lines were common throughout the s and s. Soviet citizens often did not have access to basic needs, such as clothing or shoes. The divide between the extreme wealth of the Politburo and the poverty of Soviet citizens created a backlash from younger people who refused to adopt Communist Party ideology as their parents had. In the s, the United States under President Ronald Reagan isolated the Soviet economy from the rest of the world and helped drive oil prices to their lowest levels in decades. A loosening of controls over the Soviet people emboldened independence movements in the Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe. Political revolution in Poland in sparked

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

other, mostly peaceful revolutions across Eastern European states and led to the toppling of the Berlin Wall. By the end of , the USSR had come apart at the seams. The Soviet Union ceased to exist on December 31,

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

2: World War II: the Rise of the Superpowers | Novelguide

Get this from a library! The great powers and the decline of the European states system, [Graham Ross].

Elections were held for a provisional government, and monarchists were elected, which was unacceptable to revolutionaries of Paris. Paris responded by forming its own government, a 40 member council or "commune" with its own national guard. On May 21, Adolph Theiers, leader of the French provisional government, sent in troops to "restore order" in Paris. Members of the commune killed the Archbishop, packed the Tuileries with gunpowder, and blew it up. When it was all over, however, 20 Parisians had been killed by the troops. Thus began the 3rd Republic of France from until The 3rd Republic consisted of a ceremonial President and a two chamber Parliament with universal male suffrage. The kingdom was succeeded by the Holy Roman Empire, but the authority of the emperors was weak, and the power of the central state declined until its final abolition in In the German-speaking territories were divided into around 40 states, many of them small. Many people within the German heartlands wished to escape the influence of foreign autocrats, such as the emperors of France and Austria, and build their own state. This broad feeling was encouraged by the works of eighteenth century German writers and philosophers, such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and particularly Johann Gottfried von Herder. With his work on aesthetics, gothic art, and folk poetry, Herder encouraged an idea that the Germans had a rich common cultural heritage. Although Herder glorified the Germans, he was well travelled, feeling that every country had its unique features, and was worthy of some admiration. However, the unification of Germany was not solely due to nationalism. It is worth noting that, in an era when Europe was increasingly dominated by large empires, many German states were small to the point of insignificance. Most German rulers understood that there was strength in working together. This understanding was to lead to inter-state co-operation across the region, the most notable example being the Zollverein, the customs union that encompassed most of northern Germany by the early s. This variety of factors, both nationalistic and economic, were exploited by the conservative King of Prussia, William I, and his chief minister, Otto von Bismarck. Both understood the value of a unified German state, particularly one which excluded Austrian influence. Wars of Unification[edit] Whilst he had a clear idea that the unification of Germany should be his goal, Bismarck was a shrewd politician and exploited, rather than initiated, events. The complicated dynastic successions within the German confederation proved to be a useful tool to this end. The first such conflict was triggered by the Schleswig-Holstein problem. The Diet of the German Confederation demanded that this be prevented and encouraged Prussia and Austria, the only German states to have significant military strength, to invade Denmark. The war between Denmark and the Germany states was short and decisive and the Danes were defeated in In the resultant peace treaty, the Danish king renounced his rights to the disputed territories of Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia and Austria respectively. The occupation of Schleswig and Holstein was to prove the catalyst for the next German war, the Seven Weeks War of Whilst control of these provinces was regulated by the Gastein Convention of , Bismarck was able to provoke the Austrians into declaring war. This was as decisive as the previous conflict. The meticulously planned Prussian advances outmaneuvered the Austrians, who were forced on the defensive, and quickly defeated. In , Prussia established the North German Confederation, made up of 21 small northern states with a constitution and Kaiser Wilhelm as king. The small states were still in a vacuum, however, and needed some form of encouragement to join with Prussia. In , Prince Leopold Hohenzollern was asked to take the crown in Spain, and France demanded that the Prussians agree that no Hohenzollern ever take the Spanish throne in the so-called "Ems Dispatch. After he released it to the press in Europe, France declared war on Prussia, and the remaining German states joined Prussia for protection. He was captured on September 2, at the Battle of Sedan. Italy[edit] Throughout the Middle Ages and early modern period Italy consisted of a patchwork of small states. Its urbanization and position in the Mediterranean meant that Italy was a politically important region and, for much of this period it was dominated by foreign powers, most notably the Bourbon dynasty which, during the eighteenth century,

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

provided kings for both France and Spain. The dominance of foreign powers was brought to an end by the Napoleonic wars. Moreover, Napoleon had attempted to conglomerate much of Italy into a single state, a process that encouraged a sense of the Italians belonging to a nation. It is notable, for instance, that Napoleon provided Italy with its national flag, the green, white, and red tricolore. Although the Treaty of Vienna restored many of the small Italian states, nationalist feeling remained, and was preserved by nationalistic and revolutionary groups, such as the Carbonari in southern Italy. These groups were inspired by revolutionary activity in other European states. As a result, the early nineteenth century saw numerous small insurrections against the autocrats ruling the Italian states, most notably with the French-inspired revolts of , which afflicted the Papal States. Such revolts were frequently small in scale, however, and were easily dealt with by the rulers of Italy. The Italian Unification movement was led primarily by two central figures: Count Camillo Benso di Cavour, who supplied much of the ideology for the movement, and Giuseppe Garibaldi, who led the fighting of the movement. He built up the strength of Piedmont-Sardinia, establishing a strong army, a healthy economy, and political freedoms, such as freedom of the press. Austria invaded Italy, but the Italians, aided by French troops, defeated the Austrians at the battles of Magenta and Solferino. Garibaldi led the Red Shirts, or guerrilla fighters in Italy. He was a supporter of a republic but conceded to a monarchy. He took his forces into southern Italy and successfully conquered Naples and the two Sicilies. Cavour sent troops south to stop Garibaldi from invading Rome, which was occupied by French troops, but both sides met in Naples and surprisingly became allies. The state was considered weaker in military terms than other nations and had lost to Britain and France in the Crimean War of 1853-56. It had an autocratic tsar with no social contract, and serfdom still existed in Russia. There was a small middle class with much less industrialization. Nicholas I came to power after the death of his brother, Alexander I. His reign began marred by the Decembrist revolt of 1825 among the soldiers, some of whom supported his other brother. Thus, Nicholas ruled through police action and use of the army. Alexander II came to power, using the defeat in the Crimean War as the major impetus to reform. He believed that Russia needed to follow the European model in order to become more powerful. As a result, in 1861, he gave the serfs freedom. However, the serfs were still bound in many ways to their former feudal dues. The former serfs were given only half of the land, and the nobles were allowed to keep the other half. In addition, former serfs had to pay a communal redemption fee to their former lords. In addition, Alexander II ended the secret police started by Nicholas I, and he created public trials that had professional judges with state salaries as well as juries. Zemstvos were created, which were local provincial councils, elected by the people, that dealt with local governmental issues such as roads and schools. Finally, Alexander reduced the draft from 25 years to 6 years. Peasant revolutionaries resented the redemption fees, and two new groups arose in Russia. The first, the nihilists, believed in nothing but science and rejected traditional society and culture. The second, the anarchists, led by Mikhail Bakunin, set out to destroy any government, even a reformist tsar like Alexander II. In a number of key battles, the war resulted in a surprise victory for Japan in a peace agreement brokered by U. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1895. The war resulted in the establishment of Japan as a major world power. Japan modeled European industrialization and militarism, and increased its focus on China, gaining dominion over Korea and establishing a claim to Manchuria. This expansion helped to cause World War I. The war marked the first major victory of a non-western power over a western power. As a result of the failure of the war in Russia, there was considerable discontent at home, and this discontent led to the Revolution of 1905. Finally, as a result of the defeat, Russia turned its interests back to the West and the Balkans. The Revolution of 1905 [edit] Under Czar Nicholas II, who ruled from 1894 to 1917, the people believed that "papa czar" could hear their grievances and he would fix them. However, the people soon learned that the czar could not be trusted. On what has become known as "Bloody Sunday," June 22, 1905, a peaceful march of thousands of St. Petersburg workers to the Winter Palace by Father Gapon took place. The marchers desired an eight hour work day, the establishment of a minimum wage, and a constitutional assembly. However, the Czar was not in the city, and Russian troops panicked and killed several hundred of the marchers. As a result of Bloody Sunday, riots erupted throughout the country during 1905. Soviets formed the councils of workers in St. Petersburg. Demands

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

for representation increased, and the moral bond between the people and the czar was broken. As a result, the October Manifesto was granted to stop the disturbances. The October Manifesto provided a constitution, a parliament called the Duma, and some civil liberties. The Duma actually possessed little power, however, and was primarily intended to divide and subdue the revolutionaries. Peasants were now allowed to buy more land to increase their holdings, and were even given loans. In some sense this was a sincere attempt at reform, and it created a new class of prosperous, entrepreneurial peasants called Kulaks. However, for the most part this was again an attempt to subdue revolutionaries, as the ulterior motive of the plan was to create a new class of peasant farmers who would be conservative and loyal to the czar. Imperialism[edit] In , political stability of European nations resulted in renewed interest in imperialist endeavors. Britain became heavily involved in colonialism. The newly-unified Germany saw expansion as a sign of greatness. France also became involved in imperialist affairs due to foreign competition. This, of course, was utilized by some of the European governments as moral justification for their imperialistic foreign policies. In addition, as a result of European industrialization, nations had an increased need for various resources, such as cotton, rubber, and fuel. As nationalism grew at home, citizens began to desire more troops for their army, and thus colonies were needed to provide more troops, as well as naval bases and refueling points for ships.

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

3: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers - Wikipedia

THE GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM by Graham Ross. Longman, Softcover. Good. Good Condition. Binding tight, pages clean.

To be a superpower, a nation needs to have a strong economy, an overpowering military, immense international political power and, related to this, a strong national ideology. It was this war, and its results, that caused each of these superpowers to experience such a preponderance of power. Before the war, both nations were fit to be described as great powers, but it would be erroneous to say that they were superpowers at that point. To understand how the second World War impacted these nations so greatly, we must examine the causes of the war. The United States gained its strength in world affairs from its status as an economic power. From these situations, similar foreign policies resulted from widely divergent origins. Whether this is the case or not, Roosevelt was forced to work with an inherently isolationist Congress, only expanding its horizons after the bombing of Pearl Harbour. He signed the Neutrality Act of 1937, making it illegal for the United States to ship arms to the belligerents of any conflict. The act also stated that belligerents could buy only non-armaments from the US, and even these were only to be bought with cash. The Soviet Union was committed to collective action for peace, as long as that commitment did not mean that the Soviet Union would take a brunt of a Nazi attack as a result. These treaties, however, were designed more to create security for the West, as opposed to keeping all three signatories from harm. At the same time, Stalin was attempting to polarise both the Anglo-French, and the Axis powers against each other. The important result of this was the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, which partitioned Poland, and allowed Hitler to start the war. Another side-effect of his policy of playing both sides was that it caused incredible distrust towards the Soviets from the Western powers after 1939. This was due in part to the fact that Stalin made several demands for both influence in the Dardanelles, and for Bulgaria to be recognised as a Soviet dependant. The seeds of superpowerdom lie here however, in the late thirties. Overy has written that "stability in Europe might have been achieved through the existence of powers so strong that they could impose their will on the whole of the international system, as has been the case since 1914. Britain and France were in imperial decline, and more concerned about colonial economics than the stability of Europe. Both imperial powers assumed that empire-building would necessarily be an inevitable feature of the world system. German aggression could have been stifled early had the imperial powers had acted in concert. The memories of World War One however, were too powerful, and the general public would not condone a military solution at that point. The aggression of Germany, and to a lesser extent that of Italy, can be explained by this decline of imperial power. They were simply attempting to fill the power vacuum in Europe that Britain and France unwittingly left. The two nations were determined to maintain their status as great powers however, without relying on the US or the USSR for support of any kind. They went to war only because further appeasement would have only served to remove from them their little remaining world standing and prestige. The creation of a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany can be viewed as an example of imperial decline as well. Stalin explained the fact that he reached a rapprochement with Germany, and not one with Great Britain by stating that "the USSR and Germany had wanted to change the old equilibrium England and France wanted to preserve it. Germany also wanted to make a change in the equilibrium, and this common desire to get rid of the old equilibrium had created the basis for the rapprochement with Germany. One of two ways war could have been avoided was for the United States or Russia to have taken powerful and vigorous action against Germany in 1938. Divine, holds that "superpowerdom gives a nation the framework by which a nation is able to extend globally the reach of its power and influence. The question must then be raised, were the United States and Russia superpowers even then, could coercive, unilateral actions taken by them have had such significant ramifications for the international order? It must be concluded that, while they were not yet superpowers, they certainly were great powers, with the incredible amount of influence that accompanies such status. Neither the United States nor

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

the Soviet Union possessed the international framework necessary to be a super power at this time. It is likely that frameworks similar to Nato or the Warsaw Pact could have been developed, but such infrastructures would have necessarily been on a much smaller scale, and without influence as the proposed Anglo-American English speaking world pact was. At this time, neither the United States nor Russia had developed the overwhelming advantages that they possessed at the end of the war. There are several factors that allowed them to become superpowers: The United States, it seems, did not become a superpower by accident. Indeed, Roosevelt had a definite European policy that was designed from the start to secure a leading role for the United States. In order to make it nearly impossible for France to reclaim her former world position, Roosevelt objected to De Gaul taking power immediately after the war. Roosevelt defended the Allies "right [to] hold the political situation in trust for the French people. It could be argued, however that they were taking the reigns of power, not from the resistance, but from the hands of the Vichy French. It might be asked why Roosevelt did not plot the fall of the British Empire as well. It made sense that because the United States and Britain are cultural cousins, the most commodious solution would be to continue the tradition of friendliness, set out in the Atlantic Charter earlier. As far as economic or military competition, Roosevelt knew that if he could open the British Empire to free trade it would not be able to effectively compete with the United States. This is because an imperial paradigm allows one to sell goods in a projectionist manner, finding markets within the Empire. This allows a nation to have restrictive tariffs on imports, which precludes foreign competition. A nation, that is primarily concerned with finding markets on the other hand, is in a much better position for global economic expansion, as it is in its interest to pursue free trade. The more generous, and likely the correct interpretation is that Roosevelt originally planned to have a system of three superpowers, including only the US, the UK, and the USSR. This was modified from the original position which was formed before the USSR joined the allies, that held for Great Britain to take a primary role in Europe, and the United States to act as a custodial in Asia. Later, after it was seen that either the Germans or the Russians would dominate Eastern Europe, the plan was forced to change. Roosevelt hoped for the creation of an Anglo-American-Russo world police force. However, Roosevelt, underestimated the power of the Russian ideology. He believed that the Russians would back away from communism for the sake of greater stability and union with the West. Roosevelt saw the Soviet Union as a country like any other, except for her preoccupation with security the safety corridor in Eastern Europe that Stalin insisted on , but he thought that that this could be explained by the cultural and historical background of Russia. It was not thought unreasonable to request a barrier of satellite states to provide a sense of security, given that Russia and the USSR had been invaded at least four times since It was felt that granting the Soviet Union some territory in Eastern and Central Europe would satisfy their political desires for territory. It was only after experiencing post World War II Soviet expansion, that the Soviet quest for territory was seen to be inherently unlimited. He felt that there should be definite spheres of influence, as long as it was clear that the Soviet Union was not to interfere with the governments of the affected nations. The reason that Roosevelt did not object to a large portion of Eastern Europe coming under the totalitarian control of the Soviet Union was that he believed the weakness in the Soviet economy caused by the war would require Stalin to seek Western aid, and open the Russians to Western influence. Many historians feel that Roosevelt was simply naive to believe that the Soviet Union would act in such a way. Arthur Schlesinger saw the geopolitical and ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. He stressed however, the ideological differences as being most important. They were divided by the most significant and fundamental disagreements over human rights, individual liberties, cultural freedom, the role of civil society, the direction of history, and the destiny of man. He thought that the Russian Revolution created two antipodal camps: Anglo-America and Soviet Russia. Stalin felt that the best way to ensure the continuation of communist world revolution was to continually annex the countries bordering the Soviet Union, instead of attempting to foster revolution in the more advanced industrial societies. The creation of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe did not come as a total surprise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff however, predicted that after the German defeat, the Russians would be able to impose whatever territorial settlement

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

they wanted in Central Europe and the Balkans. In it was hoped that if the Soviet Union was attacked, that they could hold off the Germans long enough for the West to help fight them off with reinforcements. In the Soviet Army was marching triumphantly through Berlin. Was this planned by Stalin in the same way that Roosevelt seems to have planned to achieve world supremacy? The answer to this question must be a somewhat ambivalent "no. Stalin was an opportunist, and a skilful one. He demanded that Britain and America recognise territory gained by the Soviet Union in pacts and treaties that it had signed with Germany, for instance. Roosevelt and his advisors thought that giving the Soviet Union control of Central and Eastern Europe, would result in the creation of states controlled somewhat similar to the way in which the United States controlled Cuba after the Platt Amendment. The State Department assumed that the USSR would simply control the foreign policy of the satellite nations, leaving the individual countries open to Western trade. This idea was alien to Soviet leaders. To be controlled by the Soviet Union at all was to become a socialist state; freedom to decide the domestic structure, or how to interact with the world markets was denied to such states. Stalin assumed that his form of control over these states would mean the complete Sovietization of their societies, and Roosevelt was blind to the internal logic of the Soviet system which in effect required this. Roosevelt believed that the dissolution of Comintern in , along with the defeat of Trotsky, meant that Stalin was looking to move the Soviet Union westward in its political alignment. While Stalin might have been primarily concerned with "socialism in one country," communist revolution was a "paramount, if deferred policy goal. The post war plan that he had created was dependant upon the creation of an open market economy, and the prevailing nature of the dollar. He was convinced that the Soviet Union would move westward and abandon its totalitarian political system along with its policy of closed and internal markets. His fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet state can be forgiven, once it has been allowed that an apparently peaceful nature was apparent at the time, and that it had existed for a relatively short time. While the United States wanted to "eschew isolationism, and set an example of international co-operation in a world ripe for United States leadership," the Soviet Union was organising its ideals around the vision of a continuing struggle between two fundamentally antagonistic ideologies. The United States believed that the world at large, especially the Third World, would be attracted to the political views of the West if it could be shown that democracy and free trade provided the citizens of a nation with a higher standard of living. Byrnes, "To the extent that we are able to manage our domestic affairs successfully, we shall win converts to our creed in every land. The American ideology of democracy is not complete without the accompanying necessity of open markets. America has tried to achieve an open world economy for over a century. From the attempts to keep the open door policy in China to Article VII of the Lend-Lease act, free trade has been seen as central to American security. The United States, in , forced Great Britain to begin to move away from its imperial economic system. Churchill fought this measure bitterly, realising that it would mean the effective end of the British Empire, as well as meaning that Great Britain would no longer be able to compete economically with the United States. American leadership of the international economy--thanks to the institutions created at Bretton Woods in , its strong backing for European integration with the Marshall Plan in and support for the Schuman Plan thereafter The seeds of the massive expansion of the military-industrial complex of the early fifties are also to be found in the post war recovery. Feeling threatened by the massive amount of aid the United States was giving Western Europe, the Soviet Union responded with its form of economic aid to its satellite counties. This rivalry led to the Western fear of Soviet domination, and was one of the precursors to the arms-race of the Cold War. The foundation for the eventual rise of the Superpowers is clearly found in the years leading up to and during World War II. The possibility of the existence of superpowers arose from the imperial decline of Great Britain and France, and the power vacuum that this decline created in Europe.

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

4: International relations of the Great Powers (â€“) - Wikipedia

The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System Paperback - Be the first to review this item.

Summary[edit] Kennedy argues that the strength of a Great Power can be properly measured only relative to other powers, and he provides a straightforward and persuasively argued thesis: Great Power ascendancy over the long term or in specific conflicts correlates strongly to available resources and economic durability; military overstretch and a concomitant relative decline are the consistent threats facing powers whose ambitions and security requirements are greater than their resource base can provide for. He concludes that declining countries can experience greater difficulties in balancing their preferences for guns, butter and investments. The relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant, principally because of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and of the technological and organizational breakthroughs which bring a greater advantage to one society than to another. It briefly discusses the Ming page 4 and Muslim worlds page 9 of the time and the rise of the western powers relative to them page The book then proceeds chronologically, looking at each of the power shifts over time and the effect on other Great Powers and the " Middle Powers ". Kennedy uses a number of measures to indicate real, relative and potential strength of nations throughout the book. He changes the metric of power based on the point in time. Chapter 2, "The Habsburg Bid for Mastery , â€œ"" emphasizes the role of the "manpower revolution" in changing the way Europeans fought wars see military revolution. There are no stunning contrasts in evidence here; success and failure are to be measured by very narrow differences. All states, even the United Provinces, were placed under severe strain by the constant drain of resources for military and naval campaigns The victory of the anti-Habsburg forces was, then, a marginal and relative one. They had managed, but only just, to maintain the balance between their material base and their military power better than their Habsburg opponents. Kennedy presents a table page 81, Table 2 of "British Wartime Expenditures and Revenue"; between and is especially illustrative, showing that Britain was able to maintain loans at around one-third of British wartime expenditures throughout that period Total Wartime Expenditures, â€œ" This chapter ends on the Napoleonic Wars and the fusion of British financial strength with a newfound industrial strength. The United Kingdom grows from 10 in , to 16 in , 25 in , 64 in , 87 in , to in page Relative shares of world manufacturing output also first appearing on page are used to estimate the peaks and troughs of power for major states. China, for example, begins with Kennedy also emphasizes productivity increase, based on systematic interventions, which led to economic growth and prosperity for great powers in the 20th century. He compares the great powers at the close of the 20th century and predicts the decline of the Soviet Union, the rise of China and Japan, the struggles and potential for the European Economic Community EEC , and the relative decline of the United States. He predicts that continued deficit spending , especially on military build-up, will be the single most important reason for decline of any great power. During this time the U. From the s onward, the U. In the space of a few years, the U. He comments that the map of U. Part Two, Strategy and Economics Today and Tomorrow Stability and Change in a Bipolar World, To the Twenty-first Century Maps, tables and charts[edit] The book has twelve maps, forty-nine tables and three charts to assist the reader in understanding the text. It reached number six on the list of best-selling hardcover books for

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

5: The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System www.enganchecubano.com: Books

, *The great powers and the decline of the European states system*, / Graham Ross Longman London ; New York
Wikipedia Citation Please see Wikipedia's template documentation for further citation fields that may be required.

Ready to fight back? Sign up for Take Action Now and get three actions in your inbox every week. You can read our Privacy Policy here. Thank you for signing up. For more from The Nation, check out our latest issue. Support Progressive Journalism The Nation is reader supported: Travel With The Nation Be the first to hear about Nation Travels destinations, and explore the world with kindred spirits. Sign up for our Wine Club today. Did you know you can support The Nation by drinking wine? This piece originally appeared at TomDispatch. A soft landing for America 40 years from now? The demise of the United States as the global superpower could come far more quickly than anyone imagines. If Washington is dreaming of or as the end of the American Century, a more realistic assessment of domestic and global trends suggests that in , just 15 years from now, it could all be over except for the shouting. Ad Policy Despite the aura of omnipotence most empires project, a look at their history should remind us that they are fragile organisms. So delicate is their ecology of power that, when things start to go truly bad, empires regularly unravel with unholy speed: However, instead of the bloodshed that marked the end of so many past empires, with cities burning and civilians slaughtered, this twenty-first century imperial collapse could come relatively quietly through the invisible tendrils of economic collapse or cyberwarfare. But have no doubt: As a half-dozen European nations have discovered, imperial decline tends to have a remarkably demoralizing impact on a society, regularly bringing at least a generation of economic privation. As the economy cools, political temperatures rise, often sparking serious domestic unrest. Available economic, educational, and military data indicate that, when it comes to US global power, negative trends will aggregate rapidly by and are likely to reach a critical mass no later than The American Century, proclaimed so triumphantly at the start of World War II, will be tattered and fading by , its eighth decade, and could be history by By , according to current plans, the Pentagon will throw a military Hail Mary pass for a dying empire. Ordinary Americans, watching their jobs head overseas, have a more realistic view than their cosseted leaders. The future scenarios include: While these are hardly the only possibilities when it comes to American decline or even collapse, they offer a window into an onrushing future. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself. Similarly, American leadership in technological innovation is on the wane. A harbinger of further decline: Add to this clear evidence that the US education system, that source of future scientists and innovators, has been falling behind its competitors. After leading the world for decades in to year-olds with university degrees, the country sank to 12th place in The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in Nearly half of all graduate students in the sciences in the US are now foreigners, most of whom will be heading home, not staying here as once would have happened. By , in other words, the United States is likely to face a critical shortage of talented scientists. Rogoff, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. Suddenly, the cost of imports soars. Unable to pay for swelling deficits by selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad, Washington is finally forced to slash its bloated military budget. Under pressure at home and abroad, Washington slowly pulls US forces back from hundreds of overseas bases to a continental perimeter. By now, however, it is far too late. Meanwhile, amid soaring prices, ever-rising unemployment, and a continuing decline in real wages, domestic divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates, often over remarkably irrelevant issues. Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair, a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence. Compounding the problem, the Chinese and Indians have suddenly become far heavier energy consumers. Other developed nations are meeting this threat aggressively by plunging into experimental programs to develop alternative energy sources. The United States

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

has taken a different path, doing far too little to develop alternative sources while, in the last three decades, doubling its dependence on foreign oil imports. Scenario The United States remains so dependent upon foreign oil that a few adverse developments in the global energy market in spark an oil shock. By comparison, it makes the oil shock when prices quadrupled in just months look like the proverbial molehill. That only hikes the cost of US oil imports further. At the same moment, while signing a new series of long-term delivery contracts with China, the Saudis stabilize their own foreign exchange reserves by switching to the Yuan. All the elements that long assured the United States limitless supplies of low-cost oil from that region—logistics, exchange rates, and naval power—evaporate. The oil shock that follows hits the country like a hurricane, sending prices to startling heights, making travel a staggeringly expensive proposition, putting real wages which had long been declining into freefall, and rendering non-competitive whatever American exports remained. With thermostats dropping, gas prices climbing through the roof, and dollars flowing overseas in return for costly oil, the American economy is paralyzed. With long-fraying alliances at an end and fiscal pressures mounting, US military forces finally begin a staged withdrawal from their overseas bases. Within a few years, the US is functionally bankrupt and the clock is ticking toward midnight on the American Century. Present Situation Counterintuitively, as their power wanes, empires often plunge into ill-advised military misadventures. These operations, irrational even from an imperial point of view, often yield hemorrhaging expenditures or humiliating defeats that only accelerate the loss of power. Embattled empires through the ages suffer an arrogance that drives them to plunge ever deeper into military misadventures until defeat becomes debacle. In 1914, a dying imperial Spain dispatched 20,000 soldiers to be massacred by Berber guerrillas in Morocco. In 1914, a fading British Empire destroyed its prestige by attacking Suez. And in 1950 and 1951, the US occupied Afghanistan and invaded Iraq. With the hubris that marks empires over the millennia, Washington has increased its troops in Afghanistan to 100,000, expanded the war into Pakistan, and extended its commitment to Korea and beyond, courting disasters large and small in this guerilla-infested, nuclear-armed graveyard of empires. With the US military stretched thin from Somalia to the Philippines and tensions rising in Israel, Iran, and Korea, possible combinations for a disastrous military crisis abroad are multifold. Soon, mullahs are preaching jihad from mosques throughout the region, and Afghan Army units, long trained by American forces to turn the tide of the war, begin to desert en masse. Taliban fighters then launch a series of remarkably sophisticated strikes aimed at US garrisons across the country, sending American casualties soaring. In scenes reminiscent of Saigon in 1975, US helicopters rescue American soldiers and civilians from rooftops in Kabul and Kandahar. With gas prices soaring and refineries running dry, Washington makes its move, sending in Special Operations forces to seize oil ports in the Persian Gulf. This, in turn, sparks a rash of suicide attacks and the sabotage of pipelines and oil wells. With its growing resources, Beijing is claiming a vast maritime arc from Korea to Indonesia long dominated by the US Navy. To check China and extend its military position globally, Washington is intent on building a new digital network of air and space robotics, advanced cyberwarfare capabilities, and electronic surveillance. Military planners expect this integrated system to envelop the Earth in a cyber-grid capable of blinding entire armies on the battlefield or taking out a single terrorist in field or favela. By 2015, if all goes according to plan, the Pentagon will launch a three-tiered shield of space drones—reaching from stratosphere to exosphere, armed with agile missiles, linked by a resilient modular satellite system, and operated through total telescopic surveillance. Last April, the Pentagon made history. It extended drone operations into the exosphere by quietly launching the X-47B unmanned space shuttle into a low orbit 250 miles above the planet. The X-47B is the first in a new generation of unmanned vehicles that will mark the full weaponization of space, creating an arena for future warfare unlike anything that has gone before. Scenario The technology of space and cyberwarfare is so new and untested that even the most outlandish scenarios may soon be superseded by a reality still hard to conceive. While cyber-shoppers pound the portals of Best Buy for deep discounts on the latest home electronics from China, US Air Force technicians at the Space Surveillance Telescope SST on Maui choke on their coffee as their panoramic screens suddenly blip to black. The first overt strike is one nobody predicted. It suddenly fires all the rocket pods beneath its enormous

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

foot wingspan, sending dozens of lethal missiles plunging harmlessly into the Yellow Sea, effectively disarming this formidable weapon. Determined to fight fire with fire, the White House authorizes a retaliatory strike. In near panic, the Air Force launches its Falcon Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle into an arc miles above the Pacific Ocean and then, just 20 minutes later, sends the computer codes to fire missiles at seven Chinese satellites in nearby orbits. The launch codes are suddenly inoperative. Carrier fleets begin steaming in circles in the mid-Pacific. Fighter squadrons are grounded. Reaper drones fly aimlessly toward the horizon, crashing when their fuel is exhausted. Within hours, the military power that had dominated the globe for nearly a century has been defeated in World War III without a single human casualty. A New World Order? Even if future events prove duller than these four scenarios suggest, every significant trend points toward a far more striking decline in American global power by than anything Washington now seems to be envisioning. As allies worldwide begin to realign their policies to take cognizance of rising Asian powers, the cost of maintaining or more overseas military bases will simply become unsustainable, finally forcing a staged withdrawal on a still-unwilling Washington. With both the US and China in a race to weaponize space and cyberspace, tensions between the two powers are bound to rise, making military conflict by at least feasible, if hardly guaranteed. Complicating matters even more, the economic, military, and technological trends outlined above will not operate in tidy isolation. As happened to European empires after World War II, such negative forces will undoubtedly prove synergistic. They will combine in thoroughly unexpected ways, create crises for which Americans are remarkably unprepared, and threaten to spin the economy into a sudden downward spiral, consigning this country to a generation or more of economic misery. As US power recedes, the past offers a spectrum of possibilities for a future world order. At one end of this spectrum, the rise of a new global superpower, however unlikely, cannot be ruled out. Yet both China and Russia evince self-referential cultures, recondite non-roman scripts, regional defense strategies, and underdeveloped legal systems, denying them key instruments for global dominion. At the moment then, no single superpower seems to be on the horizon likely to succeed the US. In a dark, dystopian version of our global future, a coalition of transnational corporations, multilateral forces like NATO, and an international financial elite could conceivably forge a single, possibly unstable, supra-national nexus that would make it no longer meaningful to speak of national empires at all. While denationalized corporations and multinational elites would assumedly rule such a world from secure urban enclaves, the multitudes would be relegated to urban and rural wastelands. In *Planet of Slums*, Mike Davis offers at least a partial vision of such a world from the bottom up. In this neo-Westphalian world order, with its endless vistas of micro-violence and unchecked exploitation, each hegemon would dominate its immediate region—Brasilia in South America, Washington in North America, Pretoria in southern Africa, and so on.

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

6: The Decline and Fall of the American Empire | The Nation

4 Ross, Graham, , *The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System* , pp. *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration Vol.3, No.6, pp, December*

Next lecture Two things happened during the nineteenth century to disturb the internal affairs of the Balkans. The first was the introduction of novel social and economic forces see Lecture 9. The second was the increasing intervention of outside political forces. In the s this process was only beginning. Concerns about raw materials and world markets were only spreading slowly from England to the rest of Europe. International diplomacy still operated on the basis of simpler calculations. Wars were still fought about drawing borders and putting kings on thrones, without sophisticated consideration of economic elements or the impact of social change. Diplomacy was conducted from the top down, by social elites with little interest in social change or popular unrest. If we look at the history of international relations in the Balkans in the nineteenth century, it is hard to set aside our foreknowledge that the train of events will lead to World War I. Ultimately, diplomacy of the old style failed in when new forces such as nationalism and militarism escaped its control. In Balkan diplomatic history it is easy to find situations in which old-style diplomacy encountered new forces and did a poor job dealing with them. Especially after , rivalries grew: Bulgaria, until the crisis of On the other hand, there were many crises and wars before that merely led to limited conflicts. It is inaccurate and misleading to analyse them only as rehearsals for World War I. The central issue in Balkan diplomacy at this time was the Eastern Question. The Great Powers approached each crisis with the hope of emerging with the maximum advantage. Sometimes this led one or another to support revolutionary change. More often, state interests led them to support the status quo. The diplomacy of the Eastern Question went forward in disregard, and often ignorance, of the wishes of the Balkan peoples. Because of its traditions and structures, old-style diplomacy was poorly equipped to deal with popular movements like nationalism. The diplomacy of the Eastern Question began in the Early Modern Period, before modern nationalism or representative governments. Diplomats from the Great Powers did not take into account the wishes of their own citizens, so why listen to Balkan peasants? The failed Ottoman siege of Vienna in was the last important Turkish threat to a European Power. Thereafter, the Ottomans were on the defensive. However, is a little remote for our purposes. The modern group of Great Powers had not yet formed at that time Poland and Venice were still major forces. Diplomatic practices had not yet assumed their modern form, involving permanent embassies and specialized ministries. Nor were economic interests involved in the same way that they came to be after the Industrial Revolution. It is really in that the elements of the modern Eastern Question come into play. In that year, after Russia defeated Turkey again the two powers signed the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. That treaty altered the Balkan scene in three important ways: Russia gained access to the Black Sea coast, so that for the first time Russia physically impinged on the Turkish heartland, including the Balkans. Russian merchant ships got the right to enter the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Russian merchants got the right to trade in the Ottoman Empire, and Russia got the right to appoint consular agents inside Turkey. Russia became protector of the Orthodox Christians of Turkey, with special rights in Wallachia and Moldavia. These clauses set in train a competition among the Great Powers for influence in Turkey because no power was willing to permit Russia or any other to dominate the vast Ottoman holdings. These states followed rather consistent Balkan policies. Some of the Powers expressed an interest in the Balkan population, but in a crisis each followed its own national security and defense needs. When Great Powers made compromises, they did so out of a belief in the tactical value of stability because the outcomes and risks of war were too hard to predict. States also compromised to retain their position as members of the "Concert of Europe," the legal concept under which these large states gave themselves the right to settle matters of war and peace. Russia tended to be the most visible disturbing agent and was usually the agent of each new Turkish defeat. Russia began the Early Modern period as the most backward of the Great Powers but also was the state with the greatest potential to

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

tap new resources and grow. In Eastern Europe and the Balkans, a succession of states have opposed Russian interests or at least perceived Russian interests: More important, the same treaty gave Russia important rights to intercede on behalf of the Orthodox millet and to conduct commerce within the Ottoman Empire. One aim of Russian policy was control of local client states. Russian policy toward the Orthodox Christians of the Balkans involved mixed elements of compassion and self-interest. Russians deplored the abuse of Balkan fellow Christians and Slavs the Pan-Slav movement of the s brought forward similar Russian interests, in a slightly different form. Petersburg abandoned its Balkan proteges when higher policy required. After autonomous or independent Christian states appeared, Russian policy was complicated by the need to find reliable client states in the region. When a state like Serbia fell under Austrian influence, the Russians would switch their support to a regional rival, such as Bulgaria. Russia had fewer ties to non-Slavic states like Romania: A second aim of Russian Balkan policy was retention and expansion of rights of navigation from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. Russia wanted full rights not only for its merchant trade but also for warships to pass through the Straits, while resisting the rights of other states to send ships especially warships into the Black Sea. In general, Russia has had to accept compromises that allow free traffic for all merchant ships and no traffic for warships except the largely harmless Turkish navies. A third aim of Russian policy, arising from the first two, has been outright physical possession of Istanbul and the Dardanelles. Annexation of that region would guarantee passage of the Straits, and make Balkan client states unnecessary. However, that step implied complete partition of the Turkish Balkans and was never acceptable to the other Powers. This idea came up in talks with Napoleon in , and was later revived during World War I. Limited partitions were a staple of Balkan discussions, especially with Austria, but never came to any concrete result. No other Power would concede such a great prize to the Russians. With the years of the Cold War behind us, and the spectacle of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seems doubtful that Russia could have absorbed half the Balkans successfully. At the time, however, the difficulty of ruling in the absence of local consent was never strongly considered. Rather than go into the details of Russian policy in Serbia, Greece and the other Balkan states, here we can only point to themes. The greatest check to Russian expansion took place after the Crimean War. By the Treaty of Paris of , Russia lost much that she had gained. All warships were barred from the Black Sea, and it was opened to merchant ships of all states: Above all, losing the war cast Russia in the role of an outcast state. British interests led to intermittent support for Ottoman rule. British Balkan interests derived from interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Britain needed to secure the shipping lanes to India. Those trade routes passed through areas like Suez that were nominally Turkish. The Turks themselves were too weak to act as a threat, so British policy opposed France, then Russia and eventually Germany, when those states seemed most likely to get too much influence over a weak Turkey. Britain also had humanitarian interests in the Balkans: In , William Gladstone a past and future Prime Minister wrote a pamphlet called "The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East" condemning the massacres that the Turks carried out while suppressing the latest Balkan revolt. After that year, no British cabinet could provide unlimited support for the sultan. In , Britain had gone to war rather than see Russian influence grow in the Balkans, but when the Russians invaded and defeated Turkey in , Britain stood by. British leaders instead adopted a new policy to protect the sea lanes to India. Britain also had important trading interests within the Ottoman Empire itself and later in the successor states. Short term profits, political or economic, had to be balanced against long term interests. Investors in railroads and state bonds preferred to take as much profit as they could, as soon as they could; this tendency often pulled resources out of Turkey that might have contributed to stability and long term profit. In general, British capitalists tried to take as much profit out of Turkey as possible, without fatally weakening the country and killing the golden goose. France France, like Britain, had both political and economic Balkan interests. During the Napoleonic wars, France was a major threat to Ottoman rule. Napoleon himself invaded Egypt in After defeat in , France lost military and political clout: French economic interests tended to outweigh political interests during the s. France had commercial rights in Turkey dating back to the Capitulation Treaties of the s. In the s, France joined Britain and Russia to intervene on behalf of the Greek insurgents, partly to protect

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

commercial interests, partly out of Philhellenic sympathy for the Greeks, partly to prevent a Russo-British condominium in the area, and partly to regain a role on the world stage after the defeat of 1871. By treaty, France was also the protector of Catholics in Turkey: French intervention in the quarrels between Orthodox and Catholic monks in Jerusalem was one excuse for the Crimean War. Under Napoleon III, France also followed a policy of support for nationalists and this meant support for rebels against the Ottomans. There was a special feeling of affinity in the case of Romania. Many Romanian leaders had a French education and cultural ties. The Romance roots of their language made Romania seem like an outpost of Latin culture in a sea of Slavs. French investors also played a role in Balkan policy. During the crisis and war of 1914-1918, the Turkish state went bankrupt. French bondholders were the biggest potential losers in case of a default so the French state pursued conservative fiscal policies in Turkey. When the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was created to monitor Turkish state finances, French directors played a major role: Like British investors, French investors forced their government to balance competing interests.

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

7: Joseph Nye: Global power shifts | TED Talk Subtitles and Transcript | TED

Buy The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System (The Modern European State System) Reprint by Graham Ross (ISBN:) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.

All European states were summoned to the congress, which was meant to "bring back the old times" to Europe, the times previous to the French revolution of and the Napoleonic Wars that followed. There has been much debate among historians on whether the Vienna Settlement which resulted actually managed to address and solve the problems that Europe faced in a post-Napoleonic era. They were; restoring the balance of power, the containment of France, the restoration of legitimate rulers and rewarding and punishing those involved in the Napoleonic Wars, depending on which side they had fought on. Before trying to analyze whether or not the Vienna Settlement solved "the problems of Europe", it would be good to point out that that was not its genuine intention. This was largely because the victorious side of the Napoleonic Wars pursued their national interests to a considerable extent. All the Great Powers did agree, that an effective balance of power needed to be constructed, but how to go about doing it, that was where their opinions and ideas differed. It was problematic, however, as France needed to be contained, and with the Holy Roman Empire dissolved and replaced by small, weaker German states, Prussia seemed the natural candidate to be strengthened. It was the French representative, Talleyrand, who negotiated a secret deal with the British and the Austrians, that they would mutually counter the possible threat posed by Prussia and Russia. Eventually, both Russia and Prussia were willing to give up some of their demands for land, and the situation was solved. Balance was, more or less, restored to Europe, as even France came off fairly lightly and was not humiliated with enormous economic and military sanctions like Germany was after the First World War. Containment of France was one of the issues on the agenda, as no European leader wanted to see French armies marching victoriously through Europe once more. The intention was to create a defensive belt around France to discourage future French aggression. The war reparations paid by France were rather miniscule, compared to those imposed by another, infamous, peace treaty a hundred years later. This was where the statesmen of the Allies, Castlereagh in particular, showed their ability. France would not become a vengeful, ever-threatening nation that had to be watched continuously, but in time she would become an ally and trusted partner in European affairs. In this manner France was, in effect contained, and there has been no major French expansion in Europe after the Vienna Settlement. The rift that emerged during the conference among the four major allies against Napoleon gave Talleyrand the chance to assert French influence in the congress, and he was able to exploit the rift to become an equal member of the congress system soon after. The restoration of legitimate rulers is one of the more unclear principles. It became quite evident, that this principle was applied only when it suited the interests of the Great Powers. The Bourbons of France were replaced, as was advocated by Talleyrand, and this suited the other Great Powers. The restoration of the Bourbon dynasty of Spain, an ally to the Great Powers against Napoleon, only seemed natural. Likewise, the Hapsburg princes and princesses were restored in Central Italy to keep the region under Austrian influence, as discussed earlier. However, the Legitimate monarch in Saxony was forced to give up two-fifths of his territory to please Prussian demands, which clearly goes against the principle of legitimacy advocated by the Great Powers at the Congress of Vienna. This would suggest, that this principle was not taken very seriously by the major powers, nor was it deemed very important, especially when it concerned minor states. For example, Austria gained influence and territory in Italy, after the previously Austrian-owned Belgium was incorporated into Holland. Prussia also gained impressive amounts of territory in order to strengthen central Europe against French aggression. Of course, some of this had nothing to do with France, and examples of genuine "rewards" would be the territories gained by Russia in the east. The Great Powers agreed that Russia would keep Finland, although it had been conquered in league with Napoleon, and Russia would also be able to keep large parts of Poland. Norway Danish was given to Sweden to compensate for the loss of Finland, and to punish Denmark for remaining

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

allied to Napoleon for too long. Now, it would seem that, for the most part, the four principles were followed, and they achieved the objectives they sought to achieve. Also, none of the Great Powers engaged in major hostilities in the next 40 years, and stability was more or less preserved in Europe. In that sense, the Congress of Vienna managed to address and solve the problems the Great Powers had set for themselves. However, the question arises, were they the only problems 19th century Europe faced? The complete lack of regard for the new forces of change in 19th century Europe meant that the 19th century would see its share of civil unrest and revolutions. Borders were still being drawn heavy-handedly, ignoring completely the wishes of the local populations and their ethnicity. The Congress System, as short-lived as it was, failed largely because of this. Of the European leaders, especially Metternich showed complete disregard towards the forces of change, and did his best to suppress them. In conclusion, the Congress and Settlement of Vienna managed to control and discourage war between the Great Powers in Europe for much of the 19th Century. They also managed to restore the balance of power to effectively build a peaceful Europe which was as it had been before Napoleon, as was their intention. Their refusal to acknowledge that times were changing and that there were new forces to be reckoned with and respected, they failed to build a very stable and pleasant Europe. The Great Powers might not have been aware of the potency of such forces as Nationalism or Liberalism, or they, as Metternich, thought that any attempt compromise with them would only strengthen those forces and lead to nothing but ruin. When comparing the Settlement of Vienna and its aftermath to the Treaty of Versailles and its aftermath, it becomes clear which one solved the problems that mattered.

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

8: Congress of Vienna - All Empires

Under the Concert of Europe (or "Congress system"), the major European powers—Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and (after) France—pledged to meet regularly to resolve differences. This plan was the first of its kind in European history and seemed to promise a way to collectively manage European affairs and promote peace.

All states are considered to be sovereign, and some states are more powerful than others. The system has a number of informal rules about how things should be done, but these rules are not binding. International relations have existed as long as states themselves. But the modern international system under which we live today is only a few centuries old. Significant events have marked the milestones in the development of the international system. It declared that the sovereign leader of each nation-state could do as she or he wished within its borders and established the state as the main actor in global politics. From that point forward, the international system has consisted primarily of relations among nation-states. **Shifting Balances of Power** — In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the nation-state emerged as the dominant political unit of the international system. A series of powerful states dominated Europe, with the great powers rising and falling. Weaker states often banded together to prevent the dominant power from becoming too strong, a practice known as preserving the balance of power. Frequent wars and economic competition marked this era. Some nations—*notably France and England*—were powerful through most of the modern age, but some—*such as Spain and the Ottoman Empire*—shrank in power over time. **Emergence of Nationalism** — The nineteenth century brought two major changes to the international system: Nationalism emerged as a strong force, allowing nation-states to grow even more powerful. Italy and Germany became unified countries, which altered the balance of military and economic power in Europe. The problems raised by the unification of Germany contributed to World War I — In the aftermath of the war, the international system changed dramatically again. The major powers of Europe had suffered greatly, whereas the United States began to come out of its isolation and transform into a global power. At the same time, the end of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires created a series of new nations, and the rise of communism in Russia presented problems for other nations. After the war, only two great world powers remained: Although some other important states existed, almost all states were understood within the context of their relations with the two superpowers. This global system was called bipolar because the system centered on two great powers.

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

9: European History/European Imperialism and Nationalism - Wikibooks, open books for an open world

He compares the great powers at the close of the 20th century and predicts the decline of the Soviet Union, the rise of China and Japan, the struggles and potential for the European Economic Community (EEC), and the relative decline of the United States.

One is power transition, which is change of power amongst states. The other is power diffusion, the way power is moving from all states West or East to non-state actors. Those two things are the huge shifts of power in our century. And I want to tell you about them each separately and then how they interact and why, in the end, there may be some good news. When we talk about power transition, we often talk about the rise of Asia. It really should be called the recovery or return of Asia. Now fast forward to The Industrial Revolution, which meant that all of a sudden, Europe and America became the dominant center of the world. To understand power diffusion put this in your mind: But to make it more real, if the price of an automobile had fallen as rapidly as the price of computing power, you could buy a car today for five dollars. Now when the price of any technology declines that dramatically, the barriers to entry go down. Anybody can play in the game. So in , if you wanted to communicate from Oxford to Johannesburg to New Delhi to Brasilia and anywhere simultaneously, you could do it. The technology was there. But to be able to do it, you had to be very rich "a government, a multinational corporation, maybe the Catholic Church" but you had to be pretty wealthy. Now, anybody has that capacity, which previously was restricted by price just to a few actors. So capabilities that were once restricted are now available to everyone. And what that means is not that the age of the State is over. The State still matters. But the stage is crowded. There are many, many actors. Oxfam, a great non-governmental actor. Al Qaeda, another non-governmental actor. But think of what it does to how we think in traditional terms and concepts. We think in terms of war and interstate war. And you can think back to when the government of Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. You might think of that as the privatization of war. So let me step back and ask: Power is simple the ability to affect others to get the outcomes you want, and you can do it in three ways. You can do it with threats of coercion, "sticks," you can do it with payments, "carrots," or you can do it by getting others to want what you want. And that ability to get others to want what you want, to get the outcomes you want without coercion or payment, is what I call soft power. Indeed, if you can learn to use more soft power, you can save a lot on carrots and sticks. Traditionally, the way people thought about power was primarily in terms of military power. For example, the great Oxford historian who taught here at this university, A. Taylor, defined a great power as a country able to prevail in war. And we have to think much more in terms of narratives and whose narrative is going to be effective. And the current narrative is all about the rise of China and the decline of the United States. Indeed, with the financial crisis, many people said this was the beginning of the end of American power. The tectonic plates of world politics were shifting. And president Medvedev of Russia, for example, pronounced in this was the beginning of the end of United States power. But in fact, this metaphor of decline is often very misleading. In the s, as America went through a transition in the Reagan period, between the rust belt economy of the midwest to the Silicon Valley economy of California, that was the end of America. The moral of this story is all these narratives about rise and fall and decline tell us a lot more about psychology than they do about reality. Goldman Sachs has projected that China, the Chinese economy, will surpass that of the U. Now someday, with a billion point three people getting richer, they are going to be bigger than the United States. But be very careful about these projections such as the Goldman Sachs projection as though that gives you an accurate picture of power transition in this century. History is not linear. There are often bumps along the road, accidents along the way. The second thing is that the Chinese economy passes the U. China still has large areas of underdevelopment and per capita income is a better measure of the sophistication of the economy. You know, it looks at economic power measured by GDP. Indeed, one of the advantages that the Americans will have in terms of power in Asia is all those countries want an American insurance policy against the rise of

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

China. So these simple projections of the Goldman Sachs type are not telling us what we need to know about power transition. But you might ask, well so what in any case? Why does it matter? Is this just a game that diplomats and academics play? The answer is it matters quite a lot. Because, if you believe in decline and you get the answers wrong on this, the facts, not the myths, you may have policies which are very dangerous. Let me give you an example from history. The Peloponnesian War was the great conflict in which the Greek city state system tore itself apart two and a half millennia ago. Thucydides, the great historian of the the Peloponnesian War, said it was the rise in the power of Athens and the fear it created in Sparta. Notice both halves of that explanation. Many people argue that the 21st century is going to repeat the 20th century, in which World War One, the great conflagration in which the European state system tore itself apart and destroyed its centrality in the world, that that was caused by the rise in the power of Germany and the fear it created in Britain. For one thing, Germany had surpassed Britain in industrial strength by And as I said earlier, China has not passed the United States. But also, if you have this belief and it creates a sense of fear, it leads to overreaction. And the greatest danger we have of managing this power transition of the shift toward the East is fear. To paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt from a different context, the greatest thing we have to fear is fear itself. Let me say a word now about the distribution of power and how it relates to power diffusion and then pull these two types together. Middle board of this three-dimensional chess game: There are balancers – the U. It makes no sense to call this unipolar or multi-polar. Power is chaotically distributed. And the only way you can solve these problems – and this is where many greatest challenges are coming in this century – is through cooperation, through working together, which means that soft power becomes more important, that ability to organize networks to deal with these kinds of problems and to be able to get cooperation. Power can also be positive sum, where your gain can be my gain. Military power is important. Keeping balances is important. All this still persists. Hard power is there, and it will remain. So the key question that we need to think about as we look at this is how do we work together to produce global public goods, things from which all of us can benefit? In that sense, if we define our interests, for example, for the United States the way Britain defined its interests in the 19th century, keeping an open trading system, keeping a monetary stability, keeping freedom of the seas – those were good for Britain, they were good for others as well. And in the 21st century, you have to do an analog to that. How do we produce global public goods, which are good for us, but good for everyone at the same time? There are ways to define our interests in which, while protecting ourselves with hard power, we can organize with others in networks to produce, not only public goods, but ways that will enhance our soft power. So if one looks at the statements that have been made about this, I am impressed that when Hillary Clinton described the foreign policy of the Obama administration, she said that the foreign policy of the Obama administration was going to be smart power, as she put it, "using all the tools in our foreign policy tool box. We can do that. Thank you very much.

GREAT POWERS AND THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM, 1914-1945 pdf

A history of esthetics Ethics and consequences Bank of baroda credit card application form The story of Leida and her beauty farm Ms word merge uments and create How to plan and finance a growing business Nonpolluting coatings and coating processes Mous Essentials Word 97 Proficient (MOUS Essentials) Theater of Fernando Arrabal Lord of the rings two towers ebook 18. Finding Album Reviews Subaru impreza 2015 manual Welfare strategies Het kasteel van Otranto Horace Walpole The Wise handbook of masonry and waterproofing. 9 plays by black women Business to business marketing definition Eblaitica Essays on the Ebla Archives and Elaite Language Computer analysis of sequential medical trials Glorious Gardens of Ireland E-commerce and Y2K: Whats ahead for small business? Colorado Quiz Bag Oscar Israelowitzs Flatbush guide. Rodales Successful Organic Gardening 18 a McCaffrey 7/83 The effects of ICT standards on educational motivation and learning : the Australian experience Juhani E. The Tale of Jeremy Vole (Riverbank Stories, Book 1) The Studios Artizan: Christopher Marlowe, Canterbury and Cambridge Peter Roberts Essentials of health economics VENUS OF SHADOWS (Venus of Dreams) V. 1. The microbiology of wine and vinifications The conquest and triumph of divine wisdom and love in predestination Last Flight of 007 (Take Ten Books) Schaums outline of theory and problems of probability and statistics A journal from Japan Liberalism in the bedroom Developing windows azure and web services The garden in the wilderness Short Stories of Padraic Pearse California on My Mind (On My Mind Series)