

Herbartianism, pedagogical system of German educator Johann Friedrich Herbart (). Herbart's educational ideas, which applied particularly to the instruction of adolescents, had a profound influence on late 19th-century teaching practices, especially in the United States, where educators established the National Herbart Society in

Ayres Pestalozzi was a reformer rather than a psychologist; but he was well aware of the fact that any valid science of education must be based on psychology. He was a careful observer of the mental processes of his pupils and adapted his methods of instruction to these processes as he understood them. His true successor is found in Herbart, the philosopher, psychologist, and pedagogical expert. Herbart, the son of a German lawyer and statesman, was well trained in the home before he entered the schools, and had during the entire period of his life the most favorable surroundings for his intellectual growth. His mother studied the Greek language in order to help her son in his studies. He had previously studied also at the University of Jena. Before his graduation he had acted as tutor for several boys, and his interest in pedagogical methods had caused him to visit Pestalozzi. He had made written reports on his own methods and observations, and had written an essay on Pestalozzi. From then he lectured on pedagogy at Gottingen. During this period he published his book on *The Chief Function of Education*. In 1829 he became professor of Philosophy at the University of Konigsburg, where he lectured for nearly a quarter of a century. He then returned to Gottingen, where he lectured until his death. At Konigsburg he established the first university school for teachers, in which many of the most successful of the Prussian principals and teachers were trained. His was the uneventful life of the scholar, the university professor, and the author. It is his chief distinction that he developed a system of psychology with some modification is still the basis of most pedagogical systems. The great authorities on education in America are nearly all Herbartians. He made little of instruction, and everything of natural development. Locke and others had made too much of systematic, formal instruction, and exalted the intellectual authority of the teacher. Herbart criticized both extremes. True education must avoid both extremes; it must respect tradition sufficiently to keep one from repeating the blunders of the past, and have individuality enough to make some real advance possible. There must be some promise for the future as well as a solid basis in the past. Such reflection would preserve individuality, because in such deliberate reflection the objects emphasized always depend on individual choice. All this would apply to music teaching. How to give the pupil the advantage of traditional interpretations and methods without making him conventional, how on the other hand how to develop his individuality without making him crude, unpolished, barbarous is our problem. Either extreme is failure. The one is of no advantage to society, contributes nothing, counts for nothing; the other is not likely to gain the ear of society whatever his original message may be. And much of his vaunted originality will prove to be of little worth. His must assist him to distinguish the ideas already in his possession. New material must be presented clearly. The good teacher must know how to distinguish things that differ. The teacher should help his pupil to group his work around some central subject. Ideas must be made to support each other in accordance with the Law of Association. This Law of Association, or Apperception, the followers of Herbart have tried to apply in various ways. Some have proposed history as the central study. All other studies would then be grouped around history and become phases of that subject. Others have urged science, others geography, others economics, others social life. Many music teachers have found the historical method most fruitful. Herbart put great emphasis upon the importance of interest as the only emotion that really assists observation and reason without in any way hindering them. By exciting the interest of the pupil, indifference and stupidity must be overcome. In a large measure the good teacher is able to control the interest of the pupil.

2: Johann Fredrich Herbart by Andrea Janzen on Prezi

Johann Friedrich Herbart (German Herbart believed ideas crossed a limen of In America the National Society for the Scientific Study of Education was founded.

Biographical sketch Herbart was born on May 4, 1776, in Oldenburg. His early education emphasized music, which would be reflected in his later writings. There he met Fichte, becoming a member of his inner circle. Already by 1795, however, Herbart took a critical stance towards the Wissenschaftslehre. While working as a private tutor to a Swiss family from 1798 to 1801, Herbart met Pestalozzi, the great Swiss educator and theorist of pedagogy. The metaphysical problems it aims to address include: He considers these problematic because they give rise to an empirically given, yet self-contradictory concept *Weiss*. Due to space constraints, we will here only briefly touch on the problems of thing and ego, the former for its role in the development of apperception, the latter because it is grounds his psychology. Both his idea of metaphysics and the method of relations will become clearer as we see them used to explain concrete psychological phenomena in Section 3. The problems of both thing and ego may be stated thus: We consider a thing to be one substance, yet possessing a number of conflicting qualities; and we regard the self as a single entity conscious of many thoughts. But is the thing the one, or its many qualities? Is the self or psyche the one, or its thoughts? Speculative use of the method of relations would have us consider the conflicting elements not as distinct entities in genuine opposition, but rather as members of a unifying relation. Similarly, Herbart regards the psyche not as a substance, but simply as the condition of mental change itself. He follows Kant in distinguishing between conscious phenomena and unknowable noumena that must be conceived as underwriting the coherence that experience finds in the fluctuating phenomenal manifold. The idea seems to be that every being must have an inherent force holding it together, or there would be no reason to suppose its continued existence: In short, the method of relations is a way of doing metaphysics with strong Platonic and Kantian overtones: Thus, the method does more than merely analyze contradiction; it also resolves them by supplying the intelligible links. In particular, such contradictions arise when essentially opposed concepts are thought together as unities. This problem of the unity of opposites also arises in the case of the psyche, which is at once a unity and multiplicity: First, he claims that these so-called faculties are really nothing more than class concepts *PsW*: Second, the theory fails to account for the causal relation among the psychic faculties, through which, acting in concert, they interact and mutually prompt or induce or force each other to act. Similarly, Herbart argues, our mental representations are subject to a system of laws that let us discern the regularities of their interactions *cf.* He identifies three possible ways of identifying these principles of consciousness: Each of these paths has its drawbacks. Even if introspection happens incidentally, Herbart points out that the observer always already introduces some prior knowledge of himself that colors the resulting observation *SW V*: Rather, the products of conscious activity are the very phenomena of which our science must seek the causes *PsW*: So Herbart turns to his method of relations. But thinking the empirically given with the aid of something hidden is only possible through metaphysics, which explains all being *Seiendes Hartenstein*. Only in this way can empirical psychic facts be brought under a universal set of laws and overcome their isolation from physical phenomena *Weiss*. But of these three paths only calculation is available to psychology. Beyond this, however, psychology must avail itself of mathematics, in that representations must be viewed as forces, whose effective power depends on their strength [or intensity], their oppositions, and their connections, all of which differ in degree. Since the soul is by nature simple, the source of any psychic differentiation must be sought outside of it, *viz.* They do this in two ways. Simply put, two representations present in consciousness may either resemble each other or not. If the former, then they will merge into one, stronger representation, and unity will be attained in this way. If they differ, then they will struggle against each other, each trying to negate the other as far as possible. Now, as they struggle to negate each other, each of the two opposing representations is, as Herbart puts it, inhibited *gehemmt* by the other *PsW*: Which is to say: Just as the ripples caused by two raindrops will interfere and conflict with each other, they nevertheless share a common substrate—the water—that makes both their being and conflict possible in the first place: This active nature helps explain why Herbart often

seems to suggest that individual representations possess their own energy or will [11] to survive and prevail over others. But experience does not reveal the laws according to which representations come and go in the mind. How can they be rendered calculable, and thus susceptible to scientific understanding? Herbart proceeds as follows. As we have seen, insofar as representations conflict with each other in their struggle to find a place in consciousness, they inhibit hemmen [14] each other; an inhibited representation is correspondingly dimmed or obscured verdunkelt ; and to the degree that a representation is inhibited from full expression, it is transformed into a striving Streben cf. Representations oppose each other by degrees, as we see in the case of colors and tones PsW: This has important implications. In short, the degree of opposition among representations sets one of two conditions for a degree of dimming. The second condition is the intensity with which each representation initially appears in the psyche. That is, representations may originally be either weaker or stronger, even without inhibition; we originally ascribe to all of our perceptions a certain degree [of native vivacity]. Here calculation [Rechnung] finds its appropriate matter. It is to these that we now turn. Any representation, taken in isolation, is fully determined by the real object it presents to consciousness. Instead, various streams of new representations constantly come flowing into consciousness, and of these representations, many oppose each other. We might picture these atoms as elastic [18] balls streaming into the narrow beam [19] of awareness, jostling and crowding those already bobbing on the surface of consciousness. The idea is simply this: The laws governing this movement are treated by mechanics see following section , whereas statics deals with the end-state, i. This equilibrium is reached when each representation expresses itself to the greatest degree possible, given the countervailing pressure of the other. The two elastic balls reach a state, in other words, where each presses or inhibits the other, but neither can increase that pressure further. All psycho-static investigations are ultimately based on two determinations of psychic magnitude: Under normal conditions, representations are of different strengths, and so oppose each other with differential intensity, making a clear statement of their underlying laws difficult. In this case, he says, one representation could remain fully uninhibited even if the other were inhibited only to a certain degree PsW: Given representations a and b, by how much would each of the two completely opposed representations be inhibited? Let us now return to the case in which representations, a and b are fully opposed. If a is the stronger, then it will be b that is fully inhibited and dimmed. What is the minimal necessary magnitude of the inhibitory force that a exercises upon b? Exactly b, since beyond this amount there would be no cause for a to exert a dimming effect. It turns out, however, that in either of the two cases i. Because, after all, S is conceived as in effect the load distributed over the different representations that must bear it, viz. For if all those [representations] were completely suppressed, then the strongest [i. Hence, he argues, the share of the load, S, that a representation must bear is inversely proportional to its vivacity: These equations allow us to calculate the portions of S that are distributed to representations a and b individually. As in the case of two representations above, we can calculate the remaining degrees of clarity Klarheitsgrade after inhibition SW V: Hence any further determination of c would be irrelevant for calculating the S for a and b: On the one hand, we notice, he says, that the mind is at any given moment preoccupied with a tiny fraction of the total number of cognitions, thoughts, or desires that might appear in our consciousness, given an appropriate stimulus SW V: This knowledge, absent, yet not annihilated, but rather remaining in our possession: How does it happen that, although it is present, it nonetheless does not contribute to the determination of our state of mind until we recall it? What can preventâ€”sometimes for a long timeâ€”our most vivid convictions, best resolutions, and most refined feelings, from being effectual? What can imbue them with the unfortunate inertia by which they abandon us to vain regret? Rather, it is the necessary consequence of the oppositions among our representations themselves, and thus dependent on their native vivacity cf. Now, again, unity is the principle by which the unification of certain representations might be explained cf. Within one and the same continuum, individual representations are opposed to each other, while representations from generically different continua are not SW V: Therefore, as representations may belong to the same or different continua, there must be, respectively, two different genera of representational unification SW V: Two generically similar, and therefore opposed, representations will strive to fuse with one another, on account of the unity of the psyche. Now, on the one hand, no inhibition is possible across continua, i. On the other hand, ex hypothesi, there is no second

representation within each respective continuum to oppose and inhibit either of the two representations cf. Clearly these make up the vast majority of our compound representations Felsch Thus, we should note that psycho-statics describes the laws of a state reached after the laws of psycho-mechanics have operated on a given set of representations. Psycho-mechanics, by contrast, studies the laws of representational motion, i. But this sum is in fact a fixed quantum,[40] a constant, dictated by the inherent vivacity of each representation and the degree of opposition[41] among representations. In a case examined above, S is the load actually borne by a and b when they reach equilibrium cf. But psycho-mechanics is concerned not with the condition of a and b in equilibrium, but on the way to equilibrium. Consider now not the end-state of equilibrium, but rather the beginning of the process. At this first instant, the vivacity of each representation is at its uninhibited maximum,[42] and therefore the forces of opposition are also maximally active. Hence, the rate of inhibition and dimming decreases over time as well. The situation can be summarized thus: That is, the total amount of a and b that is actually inhibited never in a finite time attains the inhibition sum; which, in turn, means that a and b never reach complete equilibrium SW IV: Due to this latter circumstance, in a waking person, even in a state of equanimity, the representations are always caught up in a gentle floating.

3: Full text of "The doctrines of Herbart in the United States"

Johann Friedrich Herbart () was a German philosopher-psychologist and educator, noted for his contributions in laying the foundations of scientific study of education. Johann Friedrich Herbart was born on May 4, , in Oldenburg, the son of the state councilor for Oldenburg. He attended.

Biography Johann Friedrich Herbart Facts Johann Friedrich Herbart was a German philosopher-psychologist and educator, noted for his contributions in laying the foundations of scientific study of education. Johann Friedrich Herbart was born on May 4, , in Oldenburg, the son of the state councilor for Oldenburg. He attended the University of Jena. In Switzerland he met Johann Pestalozzi and visited his school at Burgdorf. He began to seek a sound philosophical base upon which to rest his educational theories. He met Wilhelm von Humboldt, the Prussian commissioner of education, and at his request served on the commission for higher education. He then married Mary Drake, an English girl. Herbart wrote *System of Psychology*, *Text-book of Psychology*, *Psychology as a Science*, and a two-volume work, *General Metaphysics*. His work cast him as a liberal thinker in many minds, and this did not fit well into the reactionary tone then gaining headway in Prussia. He lectured at the university and published *Outline of Pedagogical Lectures*. He died on Aug. He not only developed a philosophical-psychological rationale for teaching but a teaching method as well. He emphasized the importance of both the physical and the human environment in the development of the mind. To Herbart, ideas were central to the process. He felt they grouped themselves into what he called "apperceptive masses. This was the learning process. Herbart went further to emphasize that through the proper correlation of subjects curriculum materials the student would come to understand the total unity of what is the world. In Germany, Leipzig and Jena became centers for Herbartianism. It was through the influence of Americans who studied at Jena that the ideas of Herbart reached the United States ca. Brubacher, *A History of the Problems of Education*; 2d ed. Dunkel, *Herbart and Herbartianism: An Educational Ghost Story*. Cole, Percival Richard, *Herbart and Froebel: Folcroft Library Editions*, *Encyclopedia of World Biography*. Copyright The Gale Group, Inc.

4: Johann Friedrich Herbart - Encyclopedia

In America there is a Herbart Society, of which Prof. Charles De Garmo is the leading spirit, and which issues an important Year-Book. Herbartian bibliography is very extensive. Herbartian bibliography is very extensive.

Life[edit] Herbart was born on 4 May in Oldenburg. His education then continued at Jena , whereupon he studied philosophy and came to disagree with his teacher Fichte precisely because Fichte had taught him to think in a logical manner. He composed a few essays, which he had given to Fichte during his years at Jena, criticising the works of Schelling and advocating his contention for the German idealism promoted by others like Kant at the time. Leaving Jena after three years, he tutored the children of Herr von Steiger, who was the Governor of Interlaken. During these three years, his tutoring job sparked his interest in educational reform. While tutoring in Switzerland , Herbart met and came to know Pestalozzi , the Swiss educator involved with issues of reform in the schools. While there, he received a privat-docent for his endeavours in educational studies after receiving his doctoral degree. Herbart gave his last lecture in perfectly good health and then unexpectedly died two days later from apoplexy. He became acquainted with her and asked her for her hand in marriage. Philosophy[edit] Philosophy, according to Herbart, begins with reflection upon our empirical conceptions, and consists in the reformation and elaboration of these, its three primary divisions being determined by as many distinct forms of elaboration. Logic , which stands first, has to render our conceptions and the judgments and reasonings arising from them clear and distinct. But some conceptions are such that the more distinct they are made the more contradictory their elements become; so to change and supplement these as to make them at length thinkable is the problem of the second part of philosophy, or metaphysics. There is still a class of conceptions requiring more than a logical treatment, but differing from the last in not involving latent contradictions, and in being independent of the reality of their objects, the conceptions that embody our judgments of approval and disapproval; the philosophic treatment of these conceptions falls under aesthetics. The validity of even the forms of experience is called in question on account of the contradictions they are found to involve. And yet that these forms are given to us, as truly as sensations are, follows beyond doubt when we consider that we are as little able to control the one as the other. To attempt at this stage a psychological inquiry into the origin of these conceptions would be doubly a mistake; for we should have to use these unlegitimated conceptions in the course of it, and the task of clearing up their contradictions would still remain, whether we succeeded in our enquiry or not. But how are we to set about this task? We have given to us a conception A uniting among its constituent marks two that prove to be contradictory, say M and N; and we can neither deny the unity nor reject one of the contradictory members. For to do either is forbidden by experience; and yet to do nothing is forbidden by logic. We are thus driven to the assumption that the conception is contradictory because incomplete; but how are we to supplement it? What we have must point the way to what we want, or our procedure will be arbitrary. Experience asserts that M is the same i. But even now we cannot say one of these Ms is the same as N, another is not; for every M must be both thinkable and valid. We may, however, take the Ms not singly but together; and again, no other course being open to us, this is what we must do; we must assume that N results from a combination of Ms. In the Ontology this method is employed to determine what in reality corresponds to the empirical conceptions of substance and cause, or rather of inherence and change. But first we must analyse this notion of reality itself, to which our scepticism had already led us, for, though we could doubt whether the given is what it appears, we cannot doubt that it is something; the conception of the real thus consists of the two conceptions of being and quality. That which we are compelled to posit, which cannot be sublated , is that which is, and in the recognition of this lies the simple conception of being. But when is a thing thus posited? When it is posited as we usually posit the things we see and taste and handle. If we were without sensations, i. Keeping fast hold of this idea of absolute position, Herbart leads us next to the quality of the real: This must exclude everything negative; for non-A sublates instead of positing, and is not absolute, but relative to A. The real must be absolutely simple; for if it contain two determinations, A and B, then either these are reducible to one, which is the true quality, or they are not, when each is conditioned by the other and their position is no longer absolute. All quantitative conceptions are

excluded, for quantity implies parts, and these are incompatible with simplicity. But there may be a plurality of reals, albeit the mere conception of being can tell us nothing as to this. Take some thing, say A, having n attributes, a, b, c So when we ask, What is the one posited? But if so, then A, as a real, being simple, must be equal to a ; similarly it must be b ; and so on. Now this would be possible if a, b, c Such, of course, is not the case, and so we have as many contradictions as there are attributes; for we must say A is a , is not a , is b , is not b , etc. There must then, according to the method of relations, be several As. But now what relation can there be among these several As, which will restore to us the unity of our original A or substance? There is just one; we must assume that the first A of every series is identical, just as the centre is the same point in every radius. Bodies, we say, are coloured, but color is nothing without light, and nothing without eyes. They sound, but only in a vibrating medium, and for healthy ears. Colour and tone present the appearance of inherence, but on looking closer we find they are not really immanent in things but rather presuppose a communion among several. In place of the one absolute position, which in some unthinkable way the common understanding substitutes for the absolute positions of the n attributes, we have really a series of two or more positions for each attribute, every series, however, beginning with the same as it were, central real hence the unity of substance in a group of attributes, but each being continued by different reals hence the plurality and difference of attributes in unity of substance. Where there is the appearance of inherence, therefore, there is always a plurality of reals; no such correlative to substance as attribute or accident can be admitted at all. Substantiality is impossible without causality, and to this as its true correlative we now turn. The common-sense conception of change involves at bottom the same contradiction of opposing qualities in one real. The same A that was a, b, c The metaphysical supplementing is also fundamentally as before. But to think a number of reals in connection *Zusammensein* will not suffice as an explanation of phenomena; something or other must happen when they are in connection; what is it? What actually happens as distinct from all that seems to happen, when two reals A and B are together is that, assuming them to differ in quality, they tend to disturb each other to the extent of that difference, at the same time that each preserves itself intact by resisting, as it were, the others disturbance. And so by coming into connection with different reals the self-preservations of A will vary accordingly, A remaining the same through all; just as, by way of illustration, hydrogen remains the same in water and in ammonia, or as the same line may be now a normal and now a tangent. Having thus determined what really is and what actually happens, our philosopher proceeds next to explain synthetically the objective semblance *der objective Schein* that results from these. But if this construction is to be truly objective, i. This we have in the forms of Space, Time and Motion which are involved whenever we think the reals as being in, or coming into, connection and the opposite. These forms then cannot be merely the products of our psychological mechanism, though they may turn out to coincide with these. Meanwhile, let us call them intelligible, as being valid for all who comprehend the real and actual by thought, although no such forms are predicable of the real and actual themselves. But an investigation of dependent lines which are often incommensurable forces us to adopt the contradictory fiction of partially overlapping, i. By its help we are enabled to comprehend what actually happens among reals to produce the appearance of water. When three or more reals are together, each disturbance and self-preservation will in general be imperfect, i. But objective semblance corresponds with reality; the spatial or external relations of the reals in this case must, therefore, tally with their inner or actual states. Had the self-preservations been perfect, the coincidence in space would have been complete, and the group of reals would have been inextended; or had the several reals been simply contiguous, i. As it is we shall find a continuous molecule manifesting attractive and repulsive forces; attraction corresponding to the tendency of the self-preservations to become perfect, repulsion to the frustration of this. Motion, even more evidently than space, implicates the contradictory conception of continuity and cannot, therefore, be a real predicate, though valid as an intelligible form and necessary to the comprehension of the objective semblance. For we have to think of the reals as absolutely independent and yet as entering into connections. This we can only do by conceiving them as originally moving through intelligible space in rectilinear paths and with uniform velocities. For such motion no cause need be supposed; motion, in fact, is no more a state of the moving real than rest is, both alike being but relations, with which, therefore, the real has no concern. The changes in this motion, however, for which

we should require a cause, would be the objective semblance of the self-pervations that actually occur when reals meet. Further, by means of such motion these actual occurrences, which are in themselves timeless, fall for an observer in a definite time " a time which becomes continuous through the partial coincidence of events. But in all this it has been assumed that we are spectators of the objective semblance; it remains to make good this assumption, or, in other words, to show the possibility of knowledge; this is the problem of what Herbart terms Eidology, and forms the transition from metaphysic to psychology. Here, again, a contradictory conception blocks the way, that, viz. The contradiction becomes more evident when the ego is dened to be a subject and so a real that is its own object. As real and not merely formal, this conception of the ego is amenable to the method of relations. The solution this method furnishes is summarily that there are several objects which mutually modify each other, and so constitute that ego we take for the presented real. And these sensations are the sole material of our knowledge; but they are not given to us as a chaos but in definite groups and series, whence we come to know the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to posit absolutely. In Platonic tradition, Herbart espoused that only by becoming productive citizens could people fulfill their true purpose: The five key ideas which composed his concept of individual maturation were Inner Freedom, Perfection, Benevolence, Justice and Equity or Recompense. In order to develop an educational paradigm that would provide an intellectual base that would lead to a consciousness of social responsibility, Herbart advocated that teachers utilise a methodology with five formal steps: Whereas the moralistic tales in many of the primers and readers of the period were predictable and allegorical, Herbart felt that children would appreciate the psychological and literary nuances of the masterpieces of the canon. Aesthetics and ethics[edit] Aesthetics elaborates the ideas involved in the expression called forth by those relations of object which acquire for them attribution of beauty or the reverse. The beautiful is to be carefully distinguished from the allied conceptions of the useful or the pleasant, which vary with time, place and person; whereas beauty is predicated absolutely and involuntarily by all who have attained the right standpoint. These relations Herbart finds to be reducible to five, which do admit of further simplification; and corresponding to them are as many moral ideas *Musterbegriffe* , as follows: Virtue is the perfect conformity of the will with the moral ideas; of this the single virtues are but special expressions. The conception of duty arises from the existence of hindrances to the attainment of virtue. A general scheme of principles of conduct is possible, but the sublimation of special cases under these must remain matter of fact. The application of ethics to things as they are with a view to the realisation of the moral ideas is moral technology *Tugendlehre* , which the chief divisions are Paedagogy and Politics. Theology[edit] In theology Herbart held the argument from design to be as valid of divine activity as for human, and to justify the belief in a supersensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is neither tenable nor on practical grounds desirable. He was the first individual to point out how important a role psychology plays on education. In developing his ideas about psychology, Herbart came to disagree with Kant about how true knowledge is obtained. Kant believed that we become knowledgeable through studying the innate categories of thought, while Herbart believed that one learns only from studying external and real objects in the world as well as the ideas that come about from observing them. The soul, considered to be a real, was thought to be completely passive initially as well as very resistant to changes outside factors exert and force upon it. Even though reals are disrupted by other forces appearing to cause a change in the reals themselves, they are thought to be unchangeable. Reals tend to collide and struggle with one another so much so that each real fights for its own self-preservation *Selbsterhaltung*. These ideas were regarded as dynamic forces that Herbart attempted to explain by means of mathematical formulas. The mechanics of ideas involved their ability to move in different ways, whether they be moving up into the conscious or delving down into the unconscious. Different ideas come into contact with each other and result in more complex ideas through the processes of blending, fusing, fading and combining in a multitude of approaches.

5: Johann Friedrich Herbart The Father of Educational Psychology - Music Of Yesterday

Johann Friedrich Herbart () was a German philosopher-psychologist and educator, noted for his contributions in laying the foundations of scientific study of education. Johann Friedrich Herbart was born on May 4, , in Oldenburg, the son of the state councilor for Oldenburg.

Oldenburg, Germany, 4 May ; d. Herbart was first greatly interested in science and music, but at Jena he studied philosophy and law. Later he became a close friend of Pestalozzi. He also served on various commissions responsible for the improvement of the Prussian educational system. The behavior of these entities is determined by their tendency toward self-assertion. The task of philosophy is to create a rigorous analytic-synthetic conceptual system from perceived reality. The soul is a central totality of manifold simple reals. If in this process an idea is so thoroughly repressed that it vanishes from consciousness, it struggles to emerge from below the threshold of consciousness until it reappears as a freely moving idea memory. Herbart held that mental processes can be described with the exactness of mathematical laws. This latter quality is especially characteristic of the moral will. Therefore, the goal of upbringing and education is the development of the personality of the whole human being. This development aims at the union of five ideas: The development of insight and will requires a rhythmic alternation from a probing, analytic instruction to a reflective, synthetic one. From these four fundamental concepts Herbart deduced the four formal stages of instruction. The course that the instruction takes can be demonstrative, analytic, or synthetic, according to need. A goal of discipline is to mold the interests stimulated by instruction into a totality of moving ideas Gedankenkreis. In particular, instruction seeks by this means to instill within the pupil fundamental moral tenets and to form them into a conscience. With increasing age, education is first restraining, then determining, then regulating, and finally supportive, as it ends and self-education begins. With these basic concepts and requirements Herbart established pedagogy as an independent science. He was likewise a founder of educational therapy and a precursor of child psychiatry. Leipzig, 1806; 2nd ed. Langensalza, 1810; new ed. Leipzig, 1817, 3rd ed. Paderborn, 1827; 2nd ed. Weinheim, 1837; 7th ed. Weinheim, 1877; 3rd ed. Heidelberg, 1887; B. F. Herbart Brescia, 1897; and La pedagogia in J. Herbart Brescia, 1907; J. Holstein, Bildungsweg und Bildungsgeschehen Ratingen, 1917; H. Hornstein, Bildsamkeit und Freiheit. Rimsky-Korsakov, Herbart's Ontologie St. Petersburg, 1917; J. Schmitz, Herbart-Bibliographie 1806-1877 Weinheim, 1917; B. Weiss, Herbart und seine Schule Munich, 1917; and H.

6: Johann Friedrich Herbart (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Herbartianism (Her-bart-ti-an-ism) is an educational philosophy, movement, and method loosely based on the educational and pedagogical thought of German educator Johann Friedrich Herbart, and influential on American school pedagogy of the late 19th century as the field worked towards a science of education.

Johann Friedrich Herbart German: Herbart is now remembered amongst the post-Kantian philosophers mostly as making the greatest contrast to Hegel – in particular in relation to aesthetics. Herbart was born on 4 May in Oldenburg. His education then continued at Jena, whereupon he studied philosophy and came to disagree with his teacher Fichte precisely because Fichte had taught him to think in a logical manner. He composed a few essays, which he had given to Fichte during his years at Jena, criticising the works of Schelling and advocating his contention for the German idealism promoted by others like Kant at the time. Leaving Jena after three years, he tutored the children of Herr von Steiger, who was the Governor of Interlaken. During these three years, his tutoring job sparked his interest in educational reform. While tutoring in Switzerland, Herbart met and came to know Pestalozzi, the Swiss educator involved with issues of reform in the schools. While there, he received a privat-docent for his endeavours in educational studies after receiving his doctoral degree. Herbart gave his last lecture in perfectly good health and then unexpectedly died two days later from apoplexy. He became acquainted with her and asked her for her hand in marriage. Philosophy Philosophy, according to Herbart, begins with reflection upon our empirical conceptions, and consists in the reformation and elaboration of these, its three primary divisions being determined by as many distinct forms of elaboration. Logic, which stands first, has to render our conceptions and the judgments and reasonings arising from them clear and distinct. But some conceptions are such that the more distinct they are made the more contradictory their elements become; so to change and supplement these as to make them at length thinkable is the problem of the second part of philosophy, or metaphysics. There is still a class of conceptions requiring more than a logical treatment, but differing from the last in not involving latent contradictions, and in being independent of the reality of their objects, the conceptions that embody our judgments of approval and disapproval; the philosophic treatment of these conceptions falls under aesthetics. The validity of even the forms of experience is called in question on account of the contradictions they are found to involve. And yet that these forms are given to us, as truly as sensations are, follows beyond doubt when we consider that we are as little able to control the one as the other. To attempt at this stage a psychological inquiry into the origin of these conceptions would be doubly a mistake; for we should have to use these unlegitimated conceptions in the course of it, and the task of clearing up their contradictions would still remain, whether we succeeded in our enquiry or not. But how are we to set about this task? We have given to us a conception A uniting among its constituent marks two that prove to be contradictory, say M and N; and we can neither deny the unity nor reject one of the contradictory members. For to do either is forbidden by experience; and yet to do nothing is forbidden by logic. We are thus driven to the assumption that the conception is contradictory because incomplete; but how are we to supplement it? What we have must point the way to what we want, or our procedure will be arbitrary. Experience asserts that M is the same as N. But even now we cannot say one of these Ms is the same as N, another is not; for every M must be both thinkable and valid. We may, however, take the Ms not singly but together; and again, no other course being open to us, this is what we must do; we must assume that N results from a combination of Ms. In the Ontology this method is employed to determine what in reality corresponds to the empirical conceptions of substance and cause, or rather of inherence and change. But first we must analyse this notion of reality itself, to which our scepticism had already led us, for, though we could doubt whether the given is what it appears, we cannot doubt that it is something; the conception of the real thus consists of the two conceptions of being and quality. That which we are compelled to posit, which cannot be sublated, is that which is, and in the recognition of this lies the simple conception of being. But when is a thing thus posited? When it is posited as we usually posit the things we see and taste and handle. If we were without sensations, i. Keeping fast hold of this idea of absolute position, Herbart leads us next to the quality of the real: This must exclude everything negative; for non-A sublates

instead of positing, and is not absolute, but relative to A. The real must be absolutely simple; for if it contain two determinations, A and B, then either these are reducible to one, which is the true quality, or they are not, when each is conditioned by the other and their position is no longer absolute. All quantitative conceptions are excluded, for quantity implies parts, and these are incompatible with simplicity. But there may be a plurality of reals, albeit the mere conception of being can tell us nothing as to this. Take some thing, say A, having n attributes, a, b, c So when we ask, What is the one posited? But if so, then A, as a real, being simple, must be equal to a; similarly it must be b; and so on. Now this would be possible if a, b, c Such, of course, is not the case, and so we have as many contradictions as there are attributes; for we must say A is a, is not a, is b, is not b, etc. There must then, according to the method of relations, be several As. But now what relation can there be among these several As, which will restore to us the unity of our original A or substance? There is just one; we must assume that the first A of every series is identical, just as the centre is the same point in every radius. Bodies, we say, are coloured, but color is nothing without light, and nothing without eyes. They sound, but only in a vibrating medium, and for healthy ears. Colour and tone present the appearance of inherence, but on looking closer we find they are not really immanent in things but rather presuppose a communion among several. In place of the one absolute position, which in some unthinkable way the common understanding substitutes for the absolute positions of the n attributes, we have really a series of two or more positions for each attribute, every series, however, beginning with the same as it were, central real hence the unity of substance in a group of attributes , but each being continued by different reals hence the plurality and difference of attributes in unity of substance. Where there is the appearance of inherence, therefore, there is always a plurality of reals; no such correlative to substance as attribute or accident can be admitted at all. Substantiality is impossible without causality, and to this as its true correlative we now turn. The common-sense conception of change involves at bottom the same contradiction of opposing qualities in one real. The same A that was a, b, c The metaphysical supplementing is also fundamentally as before. But to think a number of reals in connection *Zusammensein* will not suffice as an explanation of phenomena; something or other must happen when they are in connection; what is it? What actually happens as distinct from all that seems to happen, when two reals A and B are together is that, assuming them to differ in quality, they tend to disturb each other to the extent of that difference, at the same time that each preserves itself intact by resisting, as it were, the others disturbance. And so by coining into connection with different reals the self-preservations of A will vary accordingly, A remaining the same through all; just as, by way of illustration, hydrogen remains the same in water and in ammonia, or as the same line may be now a normal and now a tangent. Having thus determined what really is and what actually happens, our philosopher proceeds next to explain synthetically the objective semblance *der objective Schein* that results from these. But if this construction is to be truly objective, i. This we have in the forms of Space, Time and Motion which are involved whenever we think the reals as being in, or coming into, connection and the opposite. These forms then cannot be merely the products of our psychological mechanism, though they may turn out to coincide with these. Meanwhile, let us call them intelligible, as being valid for all who comprehend the real and actual by thought, although no such forms are predicable of the real and actual themselves. But an investigation of dependent lines which are often incommensurable forces us to adopt the contradictory fiction of partially overlapping, i. By its help we are enabled to comprehend what actually happens among reals to produce the appearance of water. When three or more reals are together, each disturbance and self-preservation will in general be imperfect, i. But objective semblance corresponds with reality; the spatial or external relations of the reals in this case must, therefore, tally with their inner or actual states. Had the self-preservations been perfect, the coincidence in space would have been complete, and the group of reals would have been inextended; or had the several reals been simply contiguous, i. As it is we shall find a continuous molecule manifesting attractive and repulsive forces; attraction corresponding to the tendency of the self-preservations to become perfect, repulsion to the frustration of this. Motion, even more evidently than space, implicates the contradictory conception of continuity and cannot, therefore, be a real predicate, though valid as an intelligible form and necessary to the comprehension of the objective semblance. For we have to think of the reals as absolutely independent and yet as entering into connections. This we can only do by conceiving them as

originally moving through intelligible space in rectilinear paths and with uniform velocities. For such motion no cause need be supposed; motion, in fact, is no more a state of the moving real than rest is, both alike being but relations, with which, therefore, the real has no concern. The changes in this motion, however, for which we should require a cause, would be the objective semblance of the self-pervations that actually occur when reals meet. Further, by means of such motion these actual occurrences, which are in themselves timeless, fall for an observer in a definite time " a time which becomes continuous through the partial coincidence of events. But in all this it has been assumed that we are spectators of the objective semblance; it remains to make good this assumption, or, in other words, to show the possibility of knowledge; this is the problem of what Herbart terms Eidology, and forms the transition from metaphysic to psychology. Here, again, a contradictory conception blocks the way, that, viz. The contradiction becomes more evident when the ego is dened to be a subject and so a real that is its own object. As real and not merely formal, this conception of the ego is amenable to the method of relations. The solution this method furnishes is summarily that there are several objects which mutually modify each other, and so constitute that ego we take for the presented real. And these sensations are the sole material of our knowledge; but they are not given to us as a chaos but in definite groups and series, whence we come to know the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to posit absolutely. In Platonic tradition, Herbart espoused that only by becoming productive citizens could people fulfill their true purpose: The five key ideas which composed his concept of individual maturation were Inner Freedom, Perfection, Benevolence, Justice and Equity or Recompense. In order to develop an educational paradigm that would provide an intellectual base that would lead to a consciousness of social responsibility, Herbart advocated that teachers utilise a methodology with five formal steps: Whereas the moralistic tales in many of the primers and readers of the period were predictable and allegorical, Herbart felt that children would appreciate the psychological and literary nuances of the masterpieces of the canon. Aesthetics and ethics Aesthetics elaborates the ideas involved in the expression called forth by those relations of object which acquire for them attribution of beauty or the reverse. The beautiful is to be carefully distinguished from the allied conceptions of the useful or the pleasant, which vary with time, place and person; whereas beauty is predicated absolutely and involuntarily by all who have attained the right standpoint. These relations Herbart finds to be reducible to five, which do admit of further simplification; and corresponding to them are as many moral ideas *Musterbegriffe* , as follows: Virtue is the perfect conformity of the will with the moral ideas; of this the single virtues are but special expressions. The conception of duty arises from the existence of hindrances to the attainment of virtue. A general scheme of principles of conduct is possible, but the sublimation of special cases under these must remain matter of fact. The application of ethics to things as they are with a view to the realisation of the moral ideas is moral technology *Tugendlehre* , which the chief divisions are Paedagogy and Politics. Theology In theology Herbart held the argument from design to be as valid of divine activity as for human, and to justify the belief in a supersensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is neither tenable nor on practical grounds desirable. He was the first individual to point out how important a role psychology plays on education. In developing his ideas about psychology, Herbart came to disagree with Kant about how true knowledge is obtained. Kant believed that we become knowledgeable through studying the innate categories of thought, while Herbart believed that one learns only from studying external and real objects in the world as well as the ideas that come about from observing them. The soul, considered to be a real, was thought to be completely passive initially as well as very resistant to changes outside factors exert and force upon it. Even though reals are disrupted by other forces appearing to cause a change in the reals themselves, they are thought to be unchangeable. Reals tend to collide and struggle with one another so much so that each real fights for its own self-preservation *Selbsterhaltung*. These ideas were regarded as dynamic forces that Herbart attempted to explain by means of mathematical formulas.

7: Herbart, Johann (1776-1841) | www.enganchecubano.com

The investigation of, or even attention to, the fine points of Herbartian theory, was notably lacking in American Herbartianism, although the central ideas remained intact. First and foremost was the development of moral character as the central aim of education.

After studying under Fichte at Jena he gave his first philosophical lectures at Gottingen in 1802, whence he removed in 1807 to occupy the chair formerly held by Kant at Konigsberg. Here he also established and conducted a seminary of pedagogy till 1810, when he returned once more to Gottingen, and remained there as professor of philosophy till his death on the 14th of August 1841. Philosophy, according to Herbart, begins with reflection upon our empirical conceptions, and consists in the reformation and elaboration of these - its three primary divisions being determined by as many distinct forms of elaboration. Logic, which stands first, has to render our conceptions and the judgments and reasonings arising from them clear and distinct. But some conceptions are such that the more distinct they are made the more contradictory their elements become; so to change and supplement these as to make them at length thinkable is the problem of the second part of philosophy, or metaphysics. There is still a class of conceptions requiring more than a logical treatment, but differing from the last in not involving latent contradictions, and in being independent of the reality of their objects, the conceptions, viz. By this scepticism the real validity of even the forms of experience is called in question on account of the contradictions they are found to involve. And yet that these forms are "given" to us, as truly as sensations are, follows beyond doubt when we consider that we are as little able to control the one as the other. To attempt at this stage a psychological inquiry into the origin of these conceptions would be doubly a mistake; for we should have to use these unlegitimated conceptions in the course of it, and the task of clearing up their contradictions would still remain, whether we succeeded in our enquiry or not. But how are we to set about this task? We have given to us a conception A uniting among its constituent marks two that prove to be contradictory, say M and N; and we can neither deny the unity nor reject one of the contradictory members. For to do either is forbidden by experience; and yet to do nothing is forbidden by logic. We are thus driven to the assumption that the conception is contradictory because incomplete; but how are we to supplement it? What we have must point the way to what we want, or our procedure will be arbitrary. Experience asserts that M is the same as N. But even now we cannot say one of these Ms is the same as N, another is not; for every M must be both thinkable and valid. We may, however, take the Ms not singly but together; and again, no other course being open to us, this is what we must do; we must assume that N results from a combination of Ms. In the Ontology this method is employed to determine what in reality corresponds to the empirical conceptions of substance and cause, or rather of inherence and change. But first we must analyse this notion of reality itself, to which our scepticism had already led us, for, though we could doubt whether "the given" is what it appears, we cannot doubt that it is something; the conception of the real thus consists of the two conceptions of being and quality. That which we are compelled to "posit," which cannot be sublated, is that which is, and in the recognition of this lies the simple conception of being. But when is a thing thus posited? When it is posited as we are wont to posit the things we see and taste and handle. If we were without sensations, i. Keeping fast hold of this idea of absolute position, Herbart leads us next to the quality of the real. I This must exclude everything negative; for non-A sublates instead of positing, and is not absolute, but relative to A. Let us take some thing, say A, having n attributes, a, b, c So when we ask, What is the one posited? Now this would be possible if a, b, c There must then, according to the method of relations, be several As. But now what relation can there be among these several As, which will restore to us the unity of our original A or substance? There is but one; we must assume that the first A of every series is identical, just as the centre is the same point in every radius. By way of concrete illustration Herbart instances "the common observation that the properties of things exist only under external conditions. Bodies, we say, are coloured, but colour is nothing without light, and nothing without eyes. They sound, but only in a vibrating medium, and for healthy ears. Colour and tone present the appearance of inherence, but on looking closer we find they are not really immanent in things but rather presuppose a communion among several. In place of the one absolute position, which in some

unthinkable way the common understanding substitutes for the absolute positions of the n attributes, we have really a series of two or more positions for each attribute, every series, however, beginning with the same as it were, central real hence the unity of substance in a group of attributes, but each being continued by different reals hence the plurality and difference of attributes in unity of substance. Where there is the appearance of inherence, therefore, there is always a plurality of reals; no such correlative to substance as attribute or accident can be admitted at all. Substantiality is impossible without causality, and to this as its true correlative we now turn. The common-sense conception of change involves at bottom the same contradiction of opposing qualities in one real. The same A that was a, b, c The metaphysical supplementing is also fundamentally as before. But to think a number of reals "in connexion" *Zusammensein* will not suffice as an explanation of phenomena; something or other must happen when they are in connexion; what is it? And so by coming into connexion with different reals the "self-perservations" of A will vary accordingly, A remaining the same through all; just as, by way of illustration, hydrogen remains the same in water and in ammonia, or as the same line may be now a normal and now a tangent. Having thus determined what really is and what actually happens, our philosopher proceeds next to explain synthetically the objective semblance *der objective Schein* that results from these. But if this construction is to be truly objective, *i.* This we have in the forms of Space, Time and Motion which are involved whenever we think the reals as being in, or coming into, connexion and the opposite. These forms then cannot be merely the products of our psychological mechanism, though they may turn out to coincide with these. Meanwhile let us call them "intelligible," as being valid for all who comprehend the real and actual by thought, although no such forms are predicable of the real and actual themselves. The elementary spatial relation Herbart conceives to be "the contiguity *Aneinander* of two points," so that every "pure and independent line" is discrete. But an investigation of dependent lines which are often incommensurable forces us to adopt the contradictory fiction of partially overlapping, *i.* By its help we are enabled to comprehend what actually happens among reals to produce the appearance of matter. When three or more reals are together, each disturbance and self-preservation will in general be imperfect, *i.* But "objective semblance" corresponds with reality; the spatial or external relations of the reals in this case must, therefore, tally with their inner or actual states. Had the self-perservations been perfect, the coincidence in space would have been complete, and the group of reals would have been inextended; or had the several reals been simply contiguous, *i.* As it is we shall find a continuous molecule manifesting attractive and repulsive forces; attraction corresponding to the tendency of the self-perservations to become perfect, repulsion to the frustration of this. Motion, even more evidently than space, implicates the contradictory conception of continuity, and cannot, therefore, be a real predicate, though valid as an intelligible form and necessary to the comprehension of the objective semblance. For we have to think of the reals as absolutely independent and yet as entering into connexions. This we can only do by conceiving them as originally moving through intelligible space in rectilinear paths and with uniform velocities. For such motion no cause need be supposed; motion, in fact, is no more a state of the moving real than rest is, both alike being but relations, with which, therefore, the real has no concern. The changes in this motion, however, for which we should require a cause, would be the objective semblance of the self-perservations that actually occur when reals meet. Further, by means of such motion these actual occurrences, which are in themselves timeless, fall for an observer in a definite time - a time which becomes continuous through the partial coincidence of events. But in all this it has been assumed that we are spectators of the objective semblance; it remains to make good this assumption, or, in other words, to show the possibility of knowledge; this is the problem of what Herbart terms *Eidology*, and forms the transition from metaphysics to psychology. Here, again, a contradictory conception blocks the way, that, *viz.* The contradiction becomes more evident when the ego is defined to be a subject and so a real that is its own object. As real and not merely formal, this conception of the ego is amenable to the method of relations. The solution this method furnishes is summarily that there are several objects which mutually modify each other, and so constitute that ego we take for the presented real. And these sensations are the sole material of our knowledge; but they are not given to us as a chaos but in definite groups and series, whence we come to know the relations of those reals, which, though themselves unknown, our sensations compel us to posit absolutely. In his *Psychology* Herbart rejects altogether the doctrine of mental faculties as one refuted by his metaphysics,

and tries to show that all psychical phenomena whatever result from the action and interaction of elementary ideas or presentations *Vorstellungen*. The soul being one and simple, its separate acts of self-preservation or primary presentations must be simple too, and its several presentations must become united together. And this they can do at once and completely when, as is the case, for example, with the several attributes of an object, they are not of opposite quality. But otherwise there ensues a conflict in which the opposed presentations comport themselves like forces and mutually suppress or obscure each other. The act of presentation *Vorstellen* then becomes partly transformed into an effort, and its product, the idea, becomes in the same proportion less and less intense till a position of equilibrium is reached; and then at length the remainders coalesce. We have thus a statics and a mechanics of mind which investigate respectively the conditions of equilibrium and of movement among presentations. In the statics two magnitudes have to be determined: 1 the amount of the suppression or inhibition *Hemmungssumme*, and 2 the ratio in which this is shared among the opposing presentations. For a given degree of opposition this burden will be shared between the conflicting presentations in the inverse ratio of their strength. The first and simplest law in psychological mechanics relates to the "sinking" of inhibited presentations. As the presentations yield to the pressure, the pressure itself diminishes, so that the velocity of sinking decreases, *i. e.* More important is the law according to which a presentation freed from inhibition and rising anew into consciousness tends to raise the other presentations with which it is combined. Emotions and volitions, he holds, are not directly self-pervations of the soul, as our presentations are, but variable states of such presentations resulting from their interaction when above the threshold of consciousness. Thus when some presentations tend to force a presentation into consciousness, and others at the same time tend to drive it out, that presentation is the seat of painful feeling; when, on the other hand, its entrance is favoured by all, pleasure results. Desires are presentations struggling into consciousness against hindrances, and when accompanied by the supposition of success become volitions. Self-consciousness is the result of an interaction essentially the same in kind as that which takes place when a comparatively simple presentation finds the field of consciousness occupied by a longformed and well-consolidated "mass" of presentations - *as, e. g.* What we call Self is, above all, such a central mass, and Herbart seeks to show with great ingenuity and detail how this position is occupied at first chiefly by the body, then by the seat of ideas and desires, and finally by that first-personal Self which recollects the past and resolves concerning the future. But at any stage the actual constituents of this "complexion" are variable; the concrete presentation of Self is never twice the same. And, therefore, finding on reflection any particular concrete factor contingent, we abstract the position from that which occupies it, and so reach the speculative notion of the pure Ego. Aesthetics elaborates the "ideas" involved in the expression of taste called forth by those relations of object which acquire for them the attribution of beauty or the reverse. The beautiful *KaX6v* is to be carefully distinguished from the allied conceptions of the useful and the pleasant, which vary with time, place and person; whereas beauty is predicated absolutely and involuntarily by all who have attained the right standpoint. Ethics, which is but one branch of aesthetics, although the chief, deals with such relations among volitions *Willensverheiltisse* as thus unconditionally please or displease. These relations Herbart finds to be reducible to five, which do not admit of further simplification; and corresponding to them are as many moral ideas *Musterbegriffe*, *viz.:* The ideas of a final society, a system of rewards and punishments, a system of administration, a system of culture and a "unanimated society," corresponding to the ideas of law, equity, benevolence, perfection and internal freedom respectively, result when we take account of a number of individuals. Virtue is the perfect conformity of the will with the moral ideas; of this the single virtues are but special expressions. The conception of duty arises from the existence of hindrances to the attainment of virtue. A general scheme of principles of conduct is possible, but the subsumption of special cases under these must remain matter of tact. The application of ethics to things as they are with a view to the realization of the moral ideas is moral technology *Tugendlehre*, of which the chief divisions are Paedagogy and Politics. In Theology Herbart held the argument from design to be as valid for divine activity as for human, and to justify the belief in a supersensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is neither attainable nor on practical grounds desirable. Among the post-Kantian philosophers Herbart doubtless ranks next to Hegel in importance, and this without taking into account his very great contributions to the science of education. His criticisms are

worth more than his constructions; indeed for exactness and penetration of thought he is quite on a level with Hume and Kant. His merits in this respect, however, can only be appraised by the study of his works at first hand.

8: Johann Friedrich Herbart | German educator | www.enganchecubano.com

Part II contains the "Extension and Application of Herbart's Educational Ideas in Germany." Part III is devoted to "Herbartian Ideas in America." A valuable appendix, containing a bibliography of Herbartian literature is given at the end of the volume.

May 4, Death Date: August 11, Place of Birth: Johann Friedrich Herbart was born on May 4, , in Oldenburg, the son of the state councilor for Oldenburg. He attended the University of Jena In Switzerland he met Johann Pestalozzi and visited his school at Burgdorf. He began to seek a sound philosophical base upon which to rest his educational theories. He met Wilhelm von Humboldt, the Prussian commissioner of education, and at his request served on the commission for higher education. He then married Mary Drake, an English girl. Herbart wrote *System of Psychology* , *Text-book of Psychology* , *Psychology as a Science* , and a two-volume work, *General Metaphysics* His work cast him as a liberal thinker in many minds, and this did not fit well into the reactionary tone then gaining headway in Prussia. He lectured at the university and published *Outline of Pedagogical Lectures* He died on Aug. He not only developed a philosophical-psychological rationale for teaching but a teaching method as well. He emphasized the importance of both the physical and the human environment in the development of the mind. To Herbart, ideas were central to the process. He felt they grouped themselves into what he called "apperceptive masses. This was the learning process. Herbart went further to emphasize that through the proper correlation of subjects curriculum materials the student would come to understand the total unity of what is the world. In Germany, Leipzig and Jena became centers for Herbartianism. It was through the influence of Americans who studied at Jena that the ideas of Herbart reached the United States ca. Brubacher, *A History of the Problems of Education* ; 2d ed. Dunkel, *Herbart and Herbartianism: An Educational Ghost Story* Cole, Percival Richard, *Herbart and Froebel: Folcroft Library Editions*, Need a custom written paper? Let our professional writers save your time. Need an original paper?

Herbart and the Herbartians, [Charles De Garmo] Herbartian ideas in America. The Herbart Club --Three plans for the correlation of studies --A new era in.

He was born at Oldenburg, May 4, 1776, at the instance of W. His writings were collected and published by Hartenstein in 12 volumes Leipzig, 1808, and reprinted in Hamburg 13 vols. Another edition is appearing at Langensalza. His pedagogical works have been published in two volumes at different times, 1808, and 1810. Some of his letters were published in 1810 and in 1811. His chief works are: *Smith, ; Psychologie als Wissenschaft ; Allgemeine Metaphysik*. In addition to the one mentioned above, the following translations should be mentioned: His philosophy is a thorough-going atomism. Such reactions are our ideas, which are called for by the effort of our unknowable souls to maintain themselves. These ideas in turn tend to preserve themselves, and conscious life is the behavior of these ideas toward each other in the way of conflict or of mutual support -- conflict when they are totally or partially opposed; support when they are alike. In the mechanical relation of ideas, those already in consciousness have an important part to play with regard to new ideas just appearing. The ideas already present are called the apperceiving ideas, and the new ideas are said to be apperceived. The problem of education is to present such new ideas as can be most easily apperceived, i. e. That is, nothing can be ultimately real of which two contradictory predicates can be asserted. To predicate unity and multiplicity of an object is to predicate contradictions. Hence ultimate reality must be absolutely unitary and without multiplicity, hence also without change. Among prominent Herbartians of recent times and of the present day may be mentioned M. In America there is a Herbart Society, of which Prof. Charles De Garmo is the leading spirit, and which issues an important Year-Book. Herbartian bibliography is very extensive. For the life of Herbart, consult: For an account or for criticism of his views, consult:

Apache tomcat 7 umentation espaÃ±ol Speech synthesis and recognition systems The glass alembic. Proceedings of an All-Union School on the Theory of Functions (Miass, July 1989) Ibc code 2012 Creative Cooking With Spices Greasing the Wheels The heiress effect courtney milan Vedic maths tutorial Node.js design patterns 2nd edition The illustrated ninja handbook Drama script in kannada Have Fun with the Presidents The Complete Book Of Sailing More Love Talks for Couples (Lovetalks Flip Books) Logic, argumentation and interpretation Superbiometalemon (F&SF, 1982) Weve come a long way, baby! The tropical Asian house Nineveh and Its Remains, Vol. 2 Love goes round the circle Glutathione and sulfur amino acids in human health and disease Readings on drug education. An overview of human rights and the administration of justice under the sharia in Nigeria with particular Powers of the presidency 4th edition cq press Frankfurts attack on the principle of alternative possibilities David Widerker Japanese immigrants today. Frommers Frances Best-Loved Driving Tours (Best Loved Driving Tours) Markets and the Media Modern real estate practice Expediting the appeal The Puerto Rican short story of the forties generation. The junior church in action The Book of the Flame (Samurai Girl) A world of watchers Roles and Relationships Defined Thinking in enterprise java Man and the imagination Facsimile of letter from General Lafayette to David Ruggles. Know your alpha beta