

1: Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality - PhilPapers

Mathematics, Matter and Method (Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1) 2nd Edition. by Hilary Putnam (Editor) [Visit Amazon's Hilary Putnam Page.](#) Find all the books, read.

He argued that if someone living on earth were to see a liquid and call it "water", while some alien twin of hers identical down to the last detail living on another planet were to see what appeared to be an identical liquid and called it "water", then if it turned out that the substance the alien saw was really XYZ and not H₂O, she and her human double would mean something different by "water", even though water would have the same function for both of them. This led Putnam to adopt a version of semantic externalism with regard to meaning and mental content. So, for example, the reference of the term "lion" is fixed by the community of zoologists, the reference of the term "elm tree" is fixed by the community of botanists, and the reference of the term "table salt" is fixed as "NaCl" by chemists. These referents are considered rigid designators in the Kripkean sense and are disseminated outward to the linguistic community. Such a vector consists of four components: Such a "meaning-vector" provides a description of the reference and use of an expression within a particular linguistic community. It provides the conditions for its correct usage and makes it possible to judge whether a single speaker attributes the appropriate meaning to that expression, or whether its use has changed enough to cause a difference in its meaning. According to Putnam, it is legitimate to speak of a change in the meaning of an expression only if the reference of the term, and not its stereotype, has changed. However, since there is no possible algorithm that can determine which aspect—the stereotype or the reference—has changed in a particular case, it is necessary to consider the usage of other expressions of the language. Ergo, c One must have ontological commitments to mathematical entities. Both Putnam and Quine invoke naturalism to justify the exclusion of all non-scientific entities, and hence to defend the "only" part of "all and only". The assertion that "all" entities postulated in scientific theories, including numbers, should be accepted as real is justified by confirmation holism. Since theories are not confirmed in a piecemeal fashion, but as a whole, there is no justification for excluding any of the entities referred to in well-confirmed theories. This puts the nominalist who wishes to exclude the existence of sets and non-Euclidean geometry, but to include the existence of quarks and other undetectable entities of physics, for example, in a difficult position. These proofs inspired further research in the area, and formed a quasi-empirical consensus for the theorem. Even though such knowledge is more conjectural than a strictly proven theorem, it was still used in developing other mathematical ideas. Yuri Matiyasevich had formulated a theorem involving the use of Fibonacci numbers in , which was designed to answer the question of whether there is a general algorithm that can decide whether a given system of Diophantine equations polynomials with integer coefficients has a solution among the integers. In , they further refined the algorithm with the help of George Logemann and Donald W. It became known as the DPLL algorithm. This algorithm is efficient and still forms the basis of most complete SAT solvers. In the field of epistemology, Putnam is known for a thought experiment known as the "brain in a vat", which is interpreted by philosophers such as Tim Black as an attempt to refute skepticism. Words always refer to the kinds of things they were coined to refer to, thus the kinds of things their user, or her ancestors, experienced. Rather, she saw something that looked like a brain, but was actually an image fed to her through the wiring. Similarly, her idea of a "vat" would not refer to a "real" vat. On the other hand, if she is not a "brain in a vat", then saying that she is is still incoherent, but now because she actually means the opposite. This is a form of epistemological externalism: He is limited to his conceptual schemes. Metaphysical realism is therefore false, according to Putnam. He adopted a rather different view, which he called "internal realism". According to the metaphysical realist, our concepts and categories refer because they match up in some mysterious manner with the pre-structured categories, kinds and individuals that are inherent in the external world. But how is it possible that the world "carves up" into certain structures and categories, the mind carves up the world into its own categories and structures, and the two "carvings" perfectly coincide? The answer must be that the world does not come pre-structured but that structure must be imposed on it by the human mind and its conceptual schemes. In that work, Goodman went as far as to suggest that there is "no

one world, but many worlds, each created by the human mind. No one of these descriptions can be scientifically proven to be the "one, true" description of the world. This does not imply relativism, for Putnam, because not all descriptions are equally correct and the ones that are correct are not determined subjectively. That is, ethical and aesthetic judgements often have a factual basis, while scientific judgements have an ethical element. He rejected internal realism because it assumed a "cognitive interface" model of the relation between the mind and the world. Under the increasing influence of James and the pragmatists, he adopted a direct realist view of this relation. Under the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein, he adopted a pluralist view of philosophy itself and came to view most philosophical problems as nothing more than conceptual or linguistic confusions created by philosophers by using ordinary language out of its original context. However, many significant criticisms of his views have come from other philosophers and scientists. For example, multiple realizability has been criticized on the grounds that, if it were true, research and experimentation in the neurosciences would be impossible. It is the similarity or homology of brain structures that allows us to generalize across species.

2: Philosophical Papers: Volume 2, Mind, Language and Reality - Hilary Putnam - Google Books

According to John Passmore, Hilary Putnam's work is a "history of recent philosophy in outline" (Recent Philosophers). He adds that writing "about "Putnam's philosophy" is like trying to capture the wind with a fishing-net."

Life[edit] Putnam was born in Chicago , Illinois , in His father, Samuel Putnam , was a scholar of Romance languages, columnist, and translator who wrote for the Daily Worker , a publication of the American Communist Party , from to when he became disillusioned with communism. His wife, the philosopher Ruth Anna Putnam , took a teaching position in philosophy at Wellesley College. They had "no idea how to do it [themselves]", in the words of Ruth Anna. They therefore began to study Jewish ritual and Hebrew, and became more Jewishly interested, identified, and active. In , Hilary Putnam celebrated a belated Bar Mitzvah service. His wife had a Bat Mitzvah service four years later. In keeping with the family tradition, he was politically active. Putnam was disturbed when he learned from reading the reports of David Halberstam that the U. The following year, he was selected as Walter Beverly Pearson Professor of Mathematical Logic, in recognition of his contributions to the philosophy of logic and mathematics. He continued to be forthright and progressive in his political views, as expressed in the articles "How Not to Solve Ethical Problems" and "Education for Democracy" He retired from teaching in June , but, as of , he continued to give a seminar almost yearly at Tel Aviv University. His corpus includes five volumes of collected works, seven books, and more than articles. M stands for mental and P stands for physical. It can be seen that more than one P can instantiate one M, but not vice versa. Causal relations between states are represented by the arrows M1 goes to M2, etc. His most noted original contributions to that field came in several key papers published in the late s that set out the hypothesis of multiple realizability. Putnam cited examples from the animal kingdom to illustrate his thesis. He asked whether it was likely that the brain structures of diverse types of animals realize pain, or other mental states, the same way. If they do not share the same brain structures, they cannot share the same mental states and properties. The answer to this puzzle had to be that mental states were realized by different physical states in different species. Putnam then took his argument a step further, asking about such things as the nervous systems of alien beings, artificially intelligent robots and other silicon-based life forms. These hypothetical entities, he contended, should not be considered incapable of experiencing pain just because they lack the same neurochemistry as humans. Putnam concluded that type-identity theorists had been making an "ambitious" and "highly implausible" conjecture which could be disproven with one example of multiple realizability. He defined the concept in these terms: Therefore, a computer made out of silicon chips and a computer made out of cogs and wheels can be functionally isomorphic but constitutionally diverse. Functional isomorphism implies multiple realizability. In fact, there are many functional kinds, such as mousetraps, software and bookshelves, which are multiply realized at the physical level. This formulation, which is now called "machine-state functionalism", was inspired by analogies noted by Putnam and others between the mind and Turing machines. The point, for functionalism is the nature of the states of the Turing machine. Each state can be defined in terms of its relations to the other states and to the inputs and outputs, and the details of how it accomplishes what it accomplishes and of its material constitution are completely irrelevant. According to machine-state functionalism, the nature of a mental state is just like the nature of a Turing machine state. Just as "state one" simply is the state in which, given a particular input, such-and-such happens, so being in pain is the state which disposes one to cry "ouch", become distracted, wonder what the cause is, and so forth. His change of mind was primarily due to the difficulties that computational theories have in explaining certain intuitions with respect to the externalism of mental content. Asserting that functionalism is really a watered-down identity theory in which mental kinds are identified with functional kinds, Putnam argued that mental kinds may be multiply realizable over functional kinds. The argument for functionalism is that the same mental state could be implemented by the different states of a universal Turing machine. The view holds that "what matters for consciousness and for mental properties generally is the right sort of functional capacities and not the particular matter that subserves those capacities". Twin Earth shows this, according to Putnam, since on Twin Earth everything is identical to Earth, except that its lakes, rivers and

oceans are filled with XYZ whereas those of earth are filled with H₂O. Consequently, when an earthling, Fredrick, uses the Earth-English word "water", it has a different meaning from the Twin Earth-English word "water" when used by his physically identical twin, Frodrick, on Twin Earth. Since Fredrick and Frodrick are physically indistinguishable when they utter their respective words, and since their words have different meanings, meaning cannot be determined solely by what is in their heads. This led Putnam to adopt a version of semantic externalism with regard to meaning and mental content. Since the time of Descartes, philosophers had been concerned with proving knowledge from the basis of subjective experience. Thanks to Saul Kripke, Putnam, Tyler Burge and others, Davidson said, philosophy could now take the objective realm for granted and start questioning the alleged "truths" of subjective experience. So, for example, the reference of the term "lion" is fixed by the community of zoologists, the reference of the term "elm tree" is fixed by the community of botanists, and the reference of the term "table salt" is fixed as "NaCl" by chemists. These referents are considered rigid designators in the Kripkean sense and are disseminated outward to the linguistic community. Such a vector consists of four components: Such a "meaning-vector" provides a description of the reference and use of an expression within a particular linguistic community. It provides the conditions for its correct usage and makes it possible to judge whether a single speaker attributes the appropriate meaning to that expression or whether its use has changed enough to cause a difference in its meaning. According to Putnam, it is legitimate to speak of a change in the meaning of an expression only if the reference of the term, and not its stereotype, has changed. However, since there is no possible algorithm that can determine which aspect—the stereotype or the reference—has changed in a particular case, it is necessary to consider the usage of other expressions of the language. One must have ontological commitments to all entities that are indispensable to the best scientific theories, and to those entities only commonly referred to as "all and only". Mathematical entities are indispensable to the best scientific theories. Therefore, One must have ontological commitments to mathematical entities. Both Putnam and Quine invoke naturalism to justify the exclusion of all non-scientific entities, and hence to defend the "only" part of "all and only". The assertion that "all" entities postulated in scientific theories, including numbers, should be accepted as real is justified by confirmation holism. Since theories are not confirmed in a piecemeal fashion, but as a whole, there is no justification for excluding any of the entities referred to in well-confirmed theories. This puts the nominalist who wishes to exclude the existence of sets and non-Euclidean geometry, but to include the existence of quarks and other undetectable entities of physics, for example, in a difficult position.

3: Computational theory of mind - Wikipedia

The first volume of Putnam's Philosophical Papers is often overlooked or even neglected. This is a shame, as in this papers Putnam is a hardcore realist who has lots of things to say.

Rather, a computational system is a symbol manipulator that follows step by step functions to compute input and form output. Alan Turing describes this type of computer in his concept of a Turing Machine. Early proponents[edit] One of the earliest proponents of the computational theory of mind was Thomas Hobbes , who said, "by reasoning, I understand computation. And to compute is to collect the sum of many things added together at the same time, or to know the remainder when one thing has been taken from another. To reason therefore is the same as to add or to subtract. Causal picture of thoughts[edit] At the heart of the Computational Theory of Mind is the idea that thoughts are a form of computation, and a computation is by definition a systematic set of laws for the relations among representations. This means that a mental state represents something if and only if there is some causal correlation between the mental state and that particular thing. This is sometimes known as Natural Meaning. Conversely, there is another side to the causality of thoughts and that is the non-natural representation of thoughts. If these basic mental states can have a particular meaning just as words in a language do, then this means that more complex mental states thoughts can be created, even if they have never been encountered before. Just as new sentences that are read can be understood even if they have never been encountered before, as long as the basic components are understood, and it is syntactically correct. Criticism[edit] A range of arguments have been proposed against physicalist conceptions used in Computational Theories of Mind. An early, though indirect, criticism of the Computational Theory of Mind comes from philosopher John Searle. In his thought experiment known as the Chinese room , Searle attempts to refute the claims that artificially intelligent systems can be said to have intentionality and understanding and that these systems, because they can be said to be minds themselves, are sufficient for the study of the human mind. With the paper, the man is to use a series of provided rule books to return paper containing different symbols. Unknown to the man in the room, these symbols are of a Chinese language, and this process generates a conversation that a Chinese speaker outside of the room can actually understand. Searle contends that the man in the room does not understand the Chinese conversation. This is essentially what the computational theory of mind presents usâ€”a model in which the mind simply decodes symbols and outputs more symbols. Searle argues that this is not real understanding or intentionality. Though originally written as a repudiation of the idea that computers work like minds, it is not a stretch to also argue from this position that minds do not work like computers. Searle has further raised questions about what exactly constitutes a computation: But if the wall is implementing WordStar, if it is a big enough wall it is implementing any program, including any program implemented in the brain. They claim that computational theories of mind fail because computation is insufficient to account for some capacity of the mind. There are also objections which are directly tailored for computational theories of mind. This would mean that a normal Turing complete computer would not be able to ascertain certain mathematical truths that human minds can. Consciousness is the computation, there is no extra step or " Cartesian Theater " in which you become conscious of the computation. Jerry Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought LOT in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is codified in the brain, not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought. David Marr proposed that cognitive processes have three levels of description: Steven Pinker described a "language instinct," an evolved, built-in capacity to learn language if not writing. Hilary Putnam proposed functionalism to describe consciousness, asserting that it is the computation that equates to consciousness, regardless of whether the computation is operating in a brain, in a computer, or in a "brain in a vat.

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