

1: The History of the Race Idea: From Ray to Carus by Eric Voegelin

THE HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF RACE AND WHY IT MATTERS Audrey Smedley Professor of Anthropology Emerita Virginia Commonwealth University The position taken by many.

He also acknowledged that certain geographical areas with more complex ethnic compositions, including much of the Horn of Africa and the India subcontinent, did not fit into his racial paradigm. As such, he noted that: His Melanochroi thus eventually also comprised various other dark Caucasoid populations, including the Hamites e. Berbers, Somalis, northern Sudanese, ancient Egyptians and Moors. Despite rejection by Huxley and the science community, the paper is sometimes cited in support of racialism. This view contrasts polygenism, the theory that each race is actually a separate species with separate sites of origin. In the former, he writes that the "highest places in the hierarchy of civilization will assuredly not be within the reach of our dusky cousins, though it is by no means necessary that they should be restricted to the lowest". This application by Darwin would not become explicit until with the publication of his second great book on evolution, *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex*. Darwin, who had come from a family with strong abolitionist ties, had experienced and was disturbed by cultures of slavery during his voyage on the *Beagle* years earlier. Darwin thus used *Descent of Man* to disprove the polygenist thesis and end the debate between polygeny and monogeny once and for all. Darwin also used it to disprove other hypotheses about racial difference that had persisted since the time of ancient Greece, for example, that differences in skin color and body constitution occurred because of differences of geography and climate. Darwin concluded, for example, that the biological similarities between the different races were "too great" for the polygenist thesis to be plausible. He also used the idea of races to argue for the continuity between humans and animals, noting that it would be highly implausible that man should, by mere accident acquire characteristics shared by many apes. Darwin sought to demonstrate that the physical characteristics that were being used to define race for centuries i. Because, according to Darwin, any characteristic that did not have survival value could not have been naturally selected, he devised another hypothesis for the development and persistence of these characteristics. The mechanism Darwin developed is known as sexual selection. Though the idea of sexual selection had appeared in earlier works by Darwin, it was not until the late s when it received full consideration Stepan Furthermore, it was not until that sexual selection received serious consideration as a racial theory by naturalist thinkers. Darwin defined sexual selection as the "struggle between individuals of one sex, generally the males, for the possession of the other sex". Sexual selection consisted of two types for Darwin: 1. The physical struggle for a mate, and 2. The preference for some color or another, typically by females of a given species. Darwin asserted that the differing human races insofar as race was conceived phenotypically had arbitrary standards of ideal beauty, and that these standards reflected important physical characteristics sought in mates. That all human beings, regardless of race share a single, common ancestor and 2. Phenotypic racial differences are superficially selected, and have no survival value. Al, as well as notions that there existed a natural racial hierarchy that reflected inborn differences and measures of value between the different human races. But it would be an endless task to specify the numerous points of difference. The races differ also in constitution, in acclimatization and in liability to certain diseases. Their mental characteristics are likewise very distinct; chiefly as it would appear in their emotion, but partly in their intellectual faculties. In *The Descent of Man*, Darwin noted the great difficulty naturalists had in trying to decide how many "races" there actually were: Man has been studied more carefully than any other animal, and yet there is the greatest possible diversity amongst capable judges whether he should be classed as a single species or race, or as two Virey , as three Jacquinot , as four Kant , five Blumenbach , six Buffon , seven Hunter , eight Agassiz , eleven Pickering , fifteen Bory St. Vincent , sixteen Desmoulins , twenty-two Morton , sixty Crawford , or as sixty-three, according to Burke. This diversity of judgment does not prove that the races ought not to be ranked as species, but it shews that they graduate into each other, and that it is hardly possible to discover clear distinctive characters between them. Decline of racial studies after [edit] Several social and political developments that occurred at the end of the 19th century and into the 20th century led to the transformation

in the discourse of race. Three movements that historians have considered are: Nazism made an argument for racial superiority based on a biological basis. This led to the idea that people could be divided into discrete groups and based on the divisions, there would be severe, tortuous, and often fatal consequence. The exposition of racial theory beginning in the Third Reich , up to the Final Solution , created a popular moral revolution against racism. Consequently, studies of human variation focused more on actual patterns of variation and evolutionary patterns among populations and less about classification. Some scientists point to three discoveries. Firstly, African populations exhibit greater genetic diversity and less linkage disequilibrium because of their long history. Secondly, genetic similarity is directly correlated with geographic proximity. Lastly, some loci reflect selection in response to environmental gradients. Therefore, some argue, human racial groups do not appear to be distinct ethnic groups. Boas made significant contributions within anthropology , more specifically, physical anthropology , linguistics , archaeology , and cultural anthropology. His work put an emphasis on cultural and environmental effects on people to explain their development into adulthood and evaluated them in concert with human biology and evolution. This encouraged academics to break away from static taxonomical classifications of race. It is said that before Boas, anthropology was the study of race, and after Boas, anthropology was the study of culture. Julian Huxley and A. Haddon[edit] Sir Julian Sorell Huxley “ was an English evolutionary biologist, humanist and internationalist. After returning to England from a tour of the United States in , Huxley wrote a series of articles for the Spectator which he expressed his belief in the drastic differences between "negros" and "whites". He was a proponent of racial inequality and segregation. By the mids, Huxley was considered one of the leading antiracist and committed much of his time and efforts into publicizing the fight against Nazism. In , Huxley and A. They believed that races were a classification based on hereditary traits but should not by nature be used to condemn or deem inferior to another group. Like most of their peers, they continued to maintain a distinction between the social meaning of race and the scientific study of race. From a scientific stand point, they were willing to accept that concepts of superiority and inferiority did not exist, but from a social stand point, they continued to believe that racial differences were significant. For example, they argued that genetic differences between groups were functionally important for certain jobs or tasks.

2: Ideas of Race in Early America - Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History

The history of the race idea, according to Voegelin, begins with the postChristian orientation toward a natural system of living forms. In the late seventeenth century, philosophy set about a new task--to oppose the devaluation of man's physical nature.

The History of an Idea in the West Ivan Hannaford guides readers through a dangerous engagement with an idea that so permeates Western thinking that we expect to find it, active or dormant, as an organizing principle in all societies. But, Hannaford shows, race is not a universal idea— not even in the West. It is an idea with a definite pedigree, and Hannaford traces that confused pedigree from Hesiod to the Holocaust and beyond. Hannaford begins by examining the ideas of race supposedly held in the ancient world, contrasting them with the complex social, philosophical, political, and scientific ideas actually held at the time. Through the medieval, Renaissance, and early modern periods he critically examines precursors in history, science, and philosophy. But he also finds the first traces of the modern ideas of race in the proto-sciences of late medieval cabalism and hermeticism. Following that trail forward, he describes the establishment of the modern scientific and philosophical notions of race in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and shows how those notions became popular and pervasive, even among those who claim to be nonracist. At the same time, Hannaford sets out an alternative to a race-based notion of humanity. In his examination of ancient Greece, he finds in what was then a dazzling new idea, politics, a theory of how to bring a purposeful oneness to a society composed of diverse families, tribes, and interests. This idea of politics has a history, too, and its presence has waxed and waned through the ages. At a time when new controversies have again raised the question of whether race and social destiny are ineluctably joined as partners, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* reveals that one of the partners is a phantom— medieval astrology and physiognomy disguised by pseudoscientific thought. And *Race* raises a difficult practical question: What price do we place on our political traditions, institutions, and civic arrangements? This ambitious volume reexamines old questions in new ways that will stimulate a wide readership. Ivan Hannaford was assistant director for academic affairs at Kingston University in England until his retirement in 1991. Bernard Crick is professor emeritus of politics, University of London. The work is enormously learned, quoting liberally from authors spanning 2,500 years and packed with insightful and nuanced readings. It is simultaneously a detective story, tracking down the provenance of a powerful idea, a work of meticulous textual exegesis with a decidedly breathtaking sweep, a subtle exercise in political theory, and a study in the epistemology of social science. Hannaford shows how modern notions have been projected backward onto the quite different conceptions of earlier ages. He is able to pick up the first threads of racial thinking and follow them to the present. A major work of scholarship, this book is careful, bold, and wise.

3: Race The History of an Idea in America - PCVolcan

the history of the race idea An Introduction by Eric Voegelin In terms of thought images, our point of departure in this study is the necessity to create a conceptual apparatus for integrating the living substances, which became visible for the first time after the dissolution of the creationist view of the world, into a philosophical system.

Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice. It provided the foundation for the colonization of Native land, the enslavement of American Indians and Africans, and a common identity among socially unequal and ethnically diverse Europeans. Longstanding ideas and prejudices merged with aims to control land and labor, a dynamic reinforced by ongoing observation and theorization of non-European peoples. Rather, it was a heterogeneous compound of physical, intellectual, and moral characteristics passed on from one generation to another. Drawing upon the frameworks of scripture, natural and moral philosophy, and natural history, scholars endlessly debated whether different races shared a common ancestry, whether traits were fixed or susceptible to environmentally produced change, and whether languages or the body provided the best means to trace descent. Racial theorization boomed in the U. The Renaissance increased circulation of classical theories. Those of Galen stressed the influence of geography upon peoples. Climate and individual bodily humors possessed corresponding properties black bile was cold, yellow bile hot, blood dry, and phlegm wet. Because humors counterbalanced the surrounding environment, preponderant humors animated individuals and nations with characters either melancholic, choleric, sanguine, or phlegmatic. By the late 16th century, when Queen Elizabeth intensified colonization of Ireland, English Protestants insisted that Irish Catholicism was little better than paganism. Initially, the Spanish employed the theory of natural slavery, a concept devised by Aristotle and reworked for Christians by Thomas Aquinas. Dominion was just because these people were uncivil, supposedly lacking civility and mastery of nature. The empires of Mesoamerica and the Andes, however, undermined this view. The Mexica Aztecs and Incas possessed hierarchical societies, courteous speech, impressive cities, flourishing commerce, and stone pyramids. While such attainments seemed to fulfill classical understandings of civility, theorists such as Francisco de Vitoria insisted that they did not live according to the law of nature. Charges of human sacrifice and cannibalism, which Catholic and Protestant invaders leveled against numerous inhabitants of the Americas, were especially damning. Indians were fully human, but only conversion would allow them to fulfill their human potential. Numerous writers elaborated the view of Indians as fundamentally deficient, but capable of being raised to Christianity and civility. Other Europeans also embraced this view. The Roman empire and the gospel had brought civilization to Britain, which, in turn, would bring it to North America. Some accounts asserted that the surrounding climate or celestial bodies, with the former influenced by the latter, explained human diversity. In the southern hemisphere especially, where sailors found constellations different from those known in northern skies, astronomy offered a window into human diversity. Climate was thought to affect complexion—Indians were variously labeled tawny, swarthy, purple, olive, and chestnut, among others—but so too might customs. The use of bear grease and paint darkened the skin of infants allegedly born white over time, binding infants in cradle boards flattened their skulls, and raising children to ignore pain ostensibly produced adult women who could give birth painlessly and men able to withhold cries even as they endured torture. Alternately, some reports offered shared ancestry as an explanation for the similarity of widely separated peoples. Native-settler conflict, such as the Anglo-Powhatan wars and the Pequot War in the 1600s, often catalyzed such views. Colonists were ignorant of microbes, but they also noted that Native people suffered disproportionately from smallpox, influenza, and other diseases even as their own population grew rapidly in the New World. Some also suspected that constitutional differences between Europeans and Indians explained perpetual charges of Indian drunkenness. Theories of Native inferiority in mind and body provided Europeans, simultaneously, a compelling claim to the land and reassurance that colonists would not degenerate in an alien environment. Comparisons of contemporary Indians to ancient peoples in the work of Acosta, Lafitau, and others converged with political theorization on the historical development of property and the interrelationship of environment, laws, and customs in the work of scholars

such as Samuel Pufendorf and Montesquieu, as well as the psychology of John Locke, which held that the mind possessed no innate ideas and that words were merely conventional labels for things and concepts, to provide the foundation for theories of the progress of civilization. One view, best represented by Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, held that human advancement came from linguistic and mental refinement. Over time, the invention of new and more precise signs allowed for more analytical thinking and, thus, advancement in the arts and sciences, though precision came at the price of imagery in speech and writing. Another view, best represented by Adam Smith, stressed the appetites and passions over reason. Distinct modes of subsistence hunting, shepherding, agriculture, and commerce led to distinct forms of social organization. Progress came from increasing production and mastery over nature, which, in turn, increased specialization within societies and the transfer of knowledge among societies. Innumerable and occasionally contradictory ethnographic accounts from throughout the Americas, in turn, provided evidence for these theories. While enslavement of Indians, considered vassals of the Spanish crown, was illegal by the mid 17th century, Africans were legally enslaved in the colonies, just as they had been in Spain and Portugal in the centuries preceding colonization of the Americas. Iberians and other Europeans found justification in religion. Missionaries frequently compared African slaves willing to accept Christianity favorably to Natives who spurned the gospel. Because heathenism was crucial to the initial enslavement of Africans, however, planters often resisted evangelization. Unlike in the Iberian kingdoms, slavery no longer existed as an institution in early modern England. The first slaves held in the English colonies were stolen as slaves or bought as slaves. Initially, English colonial slavery followed Spanish and Portuguese models, which included hard, forced labor, but also significant degrees of manumission, incorporation into church and society, and intermixture. The blurring of the line between Christian and heathen, and growing numbers of freed people and children with mixed ancestry, however, prodded Englishmen to codify the lines of slavery and freedom. This process began in the Caribbean, with Barbadians making the bondage of Africans perpetual by 1660, but the way in which slavery became racialized may be clearest in the Chesapeake. Between 1660 and 1700, Virginia passed a series of laws that originally distinguished between Christian and heathen, freeman and servant, but which came to distinguish between whites and negroes and mulattoes. The French created an analogous Code noir in the Caribbean in 1685 and Louisiana in 1724. Prevailing medical views held Negroes to be more resistant to tropical diseases than Europeans, who were perhaps unsuited to the torrid zone. The success of smallpox inoculation—the subject of public controversy early in the 18th century—which underlined the shared bodily constitutions of Africans and Europeans, did nothing to alter notions of African fitness for labor in torrid climes. In advertisements for runaway slaves, colonists found continuous commentary on the traits of slaves, which described individuals with distinct bodies, skills, and styles, yet which painted a near-uniform picture of slaves as unfaithful and rebellious. Other newspaper advertisements provide implicit evidence of the casual breaking apart of black families even without economic motivation. While descriptions of African women often echoed those of American Indian women regarding ostensible promiscuity and painless childbirth, African women were more frequently cast in monstrous terms. European discovery of the Americas, however, undermined this theory. Those who inhabited its equatorial regions did not resemble those living in the corresponding regions of Africa, American Indian complexions did not vary by latitude, and Africans transported to other regions in the transatlantic slave trade did not change in appearance. Crowds came out to view the corpses of two men convicted of conspiring to burn New York City in 1743 when word spread that the black man was turning white and the white man black. Among colonists curious about a spectacle and increasingly interested in questions of color and character, albino children born of black parents caused a sensation, as did those whose blackness seemed to disappear. While George-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon argued that the case of the Cartagena slave Marie Sabine indicated the degenerative effects of an unhealthy American climate, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, suggested that if such a man and woman had children, they might produce a new race. Early dissections had found a lower layer of white skin and an outer layer of black skin, which were interpreted as confirmation of the ancient association of blackness with tropical heat. In 1750, however, Marcello Malpighi identified a distinct anatomical feature found only among those with dark skin. Blistering black skin with chemicals and examining specimens beneath a microscope, Malpighi identified an intermediate third layer of skin containing

pigment, the rete muscosum. Other anatomists focused their attention on even more interior portions of black bodies. While anatomists formulated these theories as alternatives to humoral or environmentalist explanations, many simply drew upon a range of views syncretically to understand African difference. Colonials also played prominent roles in these debates, not only as scholars but also as examples of the abilities of people of African descent. The poetry, letters, and antislavery tracts of Phyllis Wheatley, Ignatius Sancho, and Olaudah Equiano carried this significance. Francis Williams, the youngest son of free black Jamaicans, was made the subject of a social experiment to determine whether a black man might be cultivated as a gentleman. The title of a book by the antislavery race theorist Charles White expressed similar views far more succinctly: *An Account of the Regular Gradation in Man Blood and Lineage* Ideas of cultural and physical difference frequently intertwined with ideas of descent and heredity in the 17th and 18th centuries. These two theories were not incompatible since the Lost Tribes might have followed just such a path over many generations. By the 17th century, other writers theorized that diverse old world nations had populated the supposedly new world, a theory especially congenial as the tremendous ethnic diversity of the Americas became increasingly apparent. Such ideas had been crucial in the Iberian Reconquista, when subjects with Muslim or Jewish forbears were considered to possess irrevocably tainted ancestries, and Spaniards embraced their ancestry in opposition to charges of degeneration in the American environment. Although the Spanish Crown initially considered Indian converts to possess potential purity of blood, a legal system of classification according to Spanish, Indian, or African descent, or degree of mixed descent, arose as intermarriage increased. Spanish policies encouraged the production of genealogies among those of European and Indian descent as a means to prove the possession of legal privileges. The Spanish imposed a similar system on New Orleans after , though substantial numbers of blancos continued to form families with free women of color. In the second half of the 18th century, a new genre of painting emerged that divided the population into categories usually sixteen by depicting a mother of one race or racial intermixture, a father of another race or racial intermixture, and the child they would produce. At a time when colonial mestizaje came under increasing fire from Spain and from creoles as a mark of social degeneration and political disorder, these casta paintings provided positive and negative representations of intermixture. Racial categories, however, despite attempts to fix them in nomenclature, remained porous. By the late 17th century, imperial officials were divided over the propriety of intermarriage, and by the 18th century the failures of francisation gave rise to speculations about the inherent difference of Indians. Yet the lives of individuals such as Jean Saguingouara, son of a French officer and a Catholic Illinois woman, demonstrate a continued porousness of boundaries. His contract as a fur trader included a provision for the laundering of his shirts, which suggests his acceptance of European rather than Native notions of cleanliness fresh linen as opposed to washing , and the degree to which racial conceptions rested in part upon uses of material culture. Interestingly, even as laws throughout the French Atlantic prohibited interracial marriage, examples from Haiti demonstrate a stunning attempt not to catalog intermixture, but to manufacture it. Although English colonial laws did not prohibit Anglo-Indian intermarriage, unlike the earlier prohibition of intermarriage in Ireland, legitimate marriages were rare, mainly confined to those few instances in which Native women had converted to Christianity such as the celebrated marriage between John Rolfe and Rebecca, the baptismal name of Pocahontas or Metoaka. Sexual relationships continued, of course, but these were illicit. This was especially true for Native“black unions, the progeny of which were often categorized as black or as people of color. English colonies and later U. Racial categories in the English colonies and early United States were bounded more sharply, with fewer intermediate gradations, than in the French and Spanish colonies. Carolus Linneaus provided more influential classifications that grouped human beings with other primates and divided them from one another in successive editions of *Systema naturae*, beginning in Linnaeus established six distinct varieties of homo sapiens, grouped according to characteristics, complexion, and continent, adding unspeaking wild men and monstrous peoples including pygmies in Africa, supposed giants in Patagonia, and Indians who flattened the heads of infants to sanguine and inventive white Europeans; lazy, careless, and cunning black Africans; melancholy, haughty, and tradition-bound yellow Asians; and red warlike Indians who lived by habit. Other scholars practiced natural history while insisting on the gulf that separated humanity from beasts. Buffon

counted six races discarding monsters and wild men , while acknowledging individual diversity within races and stressing that environmental influences associated with human migration would produce degeneration over time and place. Other scholars worked to refine racial classifications. Most of these were not essentialist. Buffon, for instance, believed that all American Indians were underdeveloped in body and mind, as were other species of American flora and fauna, because the American land was unhealthy. Some writers fused theories of stages and theories of genealogy. De Pauw and William Robertson, for instance, applied savagery to the presumed shared ancestry of all the indigenous peoples of the Americas. By the middle of the 18th century, towering intellectual figures such as Hume and Voltaire spoke unambiguously of races being different species of humanity that possessed inferior characters and capacities. Among the most inflammatory, because the orthodox considered it so insidious, was that of Henry Home, Lord Kames. Sketches of the History of Man suggested that the story of the Tower of Babel, in which God confused human tongues and dispersed nations, should be interpreted as casting humanity into a savagery from which different peoples emerged at differing rates, just as they would have if different nations had descended from different original pairs.

4: Race The History of an Idea in America | MoviezArena

The history of race in the Atlantic world is a complicated topic made even more so by the difficulty in defining the basic terms of the debate. The idea of race at once encompasses scholarly consideration of race relations, racial ideology, racial discrimination, racial oppression, and other forms of domination.

This raises the problem of organism. What unites the race theory rooted in this era with liberalism and Marxism is the will to deprive the state of history, to hand it over to the masses, to destroy the historical substance and the primal image of man in its community-forming function. Current race theory is characterized by uncertainty about what is essential and a decline in the technical ability to grasp it cognitively. We turn to the history of a great idea to trace the law of its creation in happier moments of the world-spirit and to return from this immersion in its mature forms with a new firm vision and with hands now more skilled to reproduce what we have seen. The race idea came into being at a turning point in time; its emergence is an epiphenomenon of an extensive historical process characterized by a change in the primal image [Urbild] of man. There is no one primal way of seeing and no one primal image of man maintained throughout history as the eternal norm of a perfect existence; the views and the images change with the times and nations. Though a law governs each new image, the change occurs freely; that is, we cannot fathom the ultimate reasons for the appearance of a particular image. However, we can understand the necessary conditions accompanying the first view and appearance of a new image and then trace the law of the course of its existence from its beginning to its decline and disappearance. A norm does not completely become an image unless it is realized in a historical person; and the image remains unseen in spite of its embodiment in a person if the time is not ripe for seeing it. Embodiment and fullness of time are the broadest categories of intellectual history under which we must look at the change in the image of man. A Christian Future The primal images in whose transformation the race idea arises are the Christian one as it became flesh in the person of Jesus and a post-Christian, pagan one. Several persons have carried the development of the post-Christian primal image without any one so far having embodied as decisively as Christ embodied the Christian one. The change is not marked by a sharp break, a clear end and a new beginning; rather, it is a blending of one image into another, a fading out of one and simultaneous intensifying of the other. The Christian image raises man out of nature; though it presents him as a creature among other creatures, as a finite being among others, it nevertheless juxtaposes him to the rest of nature; he stands between God and the subhuman world. This intermediate status is not determined by a unique formative law that would constitute man as a self-contained existence but by his participation in both the higher and the lower world. Man must live according to the example of Christ and follow Him: Ita est summa sapientia, per contemptum mundi tendere ad regna coelestia. Thus the supreme wisdom is to seek the kingdom of heaven by despising the things of this world. The world is vain, and the body a prison. The eye is not satisfied by what it sees nor the ear filled by what it hears; those who follow their senses lose grace. Every day is to be lived as if it were the last, and the soul should always be anxious for the world beyond the senses. During his earthly existence, man connects with God in the act of communion; life and death no longer needs this expedient for union with God. Thus we have briefly outlined the image of man as Thomas a Kempis saw it in the Imitation of Christ This can no longer be seen in the same intensity in the transitional period to a new primal image and on the intellectual level on which the race idea arises. What has remained as the essential trait is the devaluation of the subhuman world and of human existence itself as far as its creaturely transitoriness is concerned. At the same time, a correspondingly high value is placed on a soul substance that, freed from all worldly ties, leads an afterlife without death. A Secular Future However, a philosophical anthropology whose first goal is no longer the rational glorification of fundamental Christian experiences but insight into the nature of man is more skeptically open to experiences transcending the horizon of Christian experience, and its own speculative movement leads it to doubt the validity of its constructions and to be willing to make attempts in other directions. As is characteristic for such transition times, we find in Kant experiences blending into each other that should be basic experiences, but for Kant they are no longer or not yet that. However, the Christian idea of

the coming of the Kingdom of God is so secularized that the kingdom of perfected man is envisioned as attainable on earth in an unending historical process; on the infinitely distant temporal horizon the kingdom evolved on earth and the one effected by God come together. We find the strictest separation of the eternal rational substance, which he sees as the true human nature, from the sensory dimension, which he considers a subordinate, evil realm, and, contrary to this devaluation of what is natural, we get the first full view of the phenomenon of organic life as an autonomous realm between mechanistic nature and the realm of reason. In referring to Kant we are already looking at an advanced stage of the evolution of the race idea. Those blows were aimed at eliminating first the devaluation of subhuman nature and next that of human existence itself insofar as it belongs to that realm by virtue of being a sensory-bodily existence. Fascination with the enigmas of living nature may just as well be due to a new, extra-Christian experience of nature as to the desire to see divine providence at work even in the lowliest creatures. The attitude of the zoologist who sees the hand of God in the anatomy of a louse cannot be easily distinguished from that seeking to study the law of the living between without reference to divine manifestation. Here we are confronting questions of classification in intellectual history, and in our opinion there can be no unequivocal answer to them. Does the turn to a realistic look at nature represent a last lingering of Christian mysticism or a first step toward the new image of the world and of man? The new understanding of living nature began with an enormous increase in knowledge of the subject matter in the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century; zoology and botany expanded their knowledge of living forms both in the number of genera and species and in the precision of knowledge about the structure of the various forms. Since the end of the seventeenth century there have been attempts to compile the knowledge of the large classes, such as birds or fishes, and to establish a system on which to base classification. The idea of a natural system emerged then as the first step to the subsequent effort at a historical classification of nature. We start with our investigations into intellectual history at the beginnings and show how the idea of a system is active in the works of the great English naturalists of the late seventeenth century, especially in those of John Ray, and how gradually the idea of a natural order of the living world came to prevail over the artificial order based on external characteristics, according to genus proximum and differentia specifica. Together with the knowledge of subhuman nature that of the physical forms of man also grew. Since the Renaissance, travel accounts, which had become more and more numerous up to the first half of the eighteenth century, had given a general idea of the variety in the bodily form of man, the broad outlines of which agree with our present-day knowledge. Around the middle of the eighteenth century this collection of material had grown to the point of being ready for systematic classification, and thus arises the question of the significance of the body and its diverse forms for an understanding of man. Is man, as being in nature, to be classified with the animals? How can such a classification be reconciled with the Christian idea of man as an essentially supernatural, imperishable substance? Is his essence to be defined as that of an animal species or as a unique substance radically different from animals? If the human substance differs radically from animal substance, what are we to make of the differences in customs, convictions, and institutions that go hand in hand with the physical differences, and so on? The new factual knowledge and the questions it raised gradually led to a readiness to see the living world and man in a new way. We can distinguish two phases in this maturation process: In the first phase the Christian image of nature was dissolved. Plants and animals had been seen as creatures of God, as material beings shaped and ensouled by the hand of a master craftsman. The living substance presented itself as the medium in which a plan had been realized; organized matter was understood as a construct, a machine, an instrument embodying the ingenious idea of its builder and moving according to this idea. In the eighteenth century this image of the machine was gradually changed into that of a substance carrying the law of its construction within it, a substance that is not created or animated from the outside but that is itself a primary force, a substance that is not given its life from the outside but lives out the wellsprings of its own aliveness. It was not easy to focus on this phenomenon for the first time and to school others to see it. A thousand-year-old habit of seeing had to be destroyed, and a new one had to be acquired in its stead that was willing to accept living existence as primary and not to separate it into form and material. Buffon, Wolff, and Blumenbach had to persuade themselves and their contemporaries with the help of analogies to inorganic nature to accept what they saw as real. Nonliving matter as the building

block of the world was the type of an independent and autonomous substance in analogy to which other independent substances could be conceived. The second phase is one we have called the internalization of the person. When the image of life as internalized emerged, the Christian image of man as an immortal being chained to the sensory realm changed into the image of a unified figure living out its meaning in this earthly existence. Once again, as in the formation of the image of life, substantiating moments and the willingness to accept them as such had to combine. Just as the phenomenon of life became irresistible through increased knowledge of living beings in all their diversity, so the image of uniform man became obvious through its ideal realization in the great figures of the time. Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Grand Duke Karl August, and Goethe are the towering figures that served to train the vision of their contemporaries for what is unique and uniform in a human being. We find the traces of their influence everywhere. Kant had Frederick the Great in mind, but could not yet completely understand him. Though Kant no longer saw Frederick the Great as one figurant among many others in the development of human reason toward its perfection in the far-off future but rather as an excellent person outshining all other people, he could not yet see him as a unique phenomenon, a figure sufficient unto itself. After all, the new image could not be made visible within the imagination of a development toward the Kingdom of God and of the immortal rational substance imprisoned in the body. Goethe and Schiller found the word that captures the powerful human existence in its earthly character [Erdenhaftigkeit]: Reason is the secularized bearer of the moral characteristics, of the virtues; it is the source of moral law and, its hue being more active, the source of the moral deed. Peter the Great, Byron, Mozart are listed as persons of great positive prolificacy and active energy, but the image of Napoleon always recurs, of Napoleon who followed deed with deed, whose life was filled to the brim with deeds, and who marched from one victory to the next like a demigod. Once again Napoleon is the prototype: In the idea of a recurring puberty, spiritual and bodily elements interpenetrate, forming the idea of a spirit that undergoes bodily phases and of a body that rejuvenates itself in the phases of the spirit. Because of the inconsiderable traditional formal content of the civic-political sphere, the spirit was more free and willing to turn to new primal images; to examine the internalization of the person we have analyzed the German development of the image and the problem because there we find the phases of the change to the new image of man most clearly expressed. Just as for Goethe Napoleon was the most intense and prolific person, so Goethe represented the prototype of the perfect, this-worldly person for his contemporaries. In his perfect, self-sufficient worldliness Goethe confirmed for Schiller that a meaningful human existence was possible, even if at first only for small circles. Kant, on the other hand, was no longer entirely comfortable with the results of his escapist speculation on reason but could not tear himself away from the image of a soul that is perfected only in the next world. Carus, who had the greatest ability for seeing things from the perspective of the new primal image, was the first to develop, compelled by the Goethean image, a more detailed race theory. Our study will conclude with the presentation of this theory. Thought Images and Types By distinguishing between primal images and thought images, we break with the notion that philosophizing takes place only on the level of rational, conceptualizing science. While the philosopher forms concepts and judgments, these do not contain truth in the simple sense of an *adaequatio rei ac intellectus*: The change from the Christian to the post-Christian image of man is reflected in the sphere of thought images as a revision and reordering of fundamental philosophical concepts, which in turn speed up the transformation of the perception of the primal images. The Concept of Organism In terms of thought images, our point of departure in this study is the necessity to create a conceptual apparatus for integrating the living substances, which became visible for the first time after the dissolution of the creationist view of the world, into a philosophical system. In the Cartesian worldview, on which Buffon still based his thinking, the two fundamental classes of being are the disembodied soul and the soulless mechanism; now a new concept had to be found to appropriately define the living being having newly become visible, a concept that would not simply describe the phenomenon with the help of the Christian dualism of matter and soul. We consider it one of the most important results of our study to have ascertained the precise point at which the word organism took on the meaning we accept today as definitive and self-evident. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the meaning of the word organism was still identical with that of mechanism, namely, a piece of matter constructed from the outside according to a plan. Thanks to the work of Leibniz, Buffon,

Wolff, Blumenbach, and Kant, the term gradually took on the meaning of a living substance that develops, regenerates, and reproduces according to an inner law. The more clearly and distinctly the living form appears as a primary phenomenon, the more precise and definite does the meaning of organism come to designate it. The concept of organism, which was intended to offer a clear view of the phenomenon of the living substance with its immanent law of development, also marks the end of a heated discussion of the species issue. The living being does not exist independently for itself but as a link in a chain, namely, the species, extending from the past into the future through repeated procreation. In the Christian view, the problem of the law governing the species was solved in the same manner as that of the law governing the construction of an individual: However, this solution is no longer satisfactory when faith in the divine creation of the world is shaken. For those who no longer believe that the chain of species has a definite beginning at which its unique characteristics were imprinted on it the species dissolves into separate individuals. In this intermediate stage we find attempts at solving the problem with the idea that the species-related law governing the structure of the individual was predetermined from infinity. According to this idea, the structural law of the individual does not inhere in this individual but is determined by its predecessor in the previous generation, whose structure in turn was determined by his predecessor, and so an ad infinitum. The idea of the infinite replaces the divine act of creation, and for this reason Buffon embedded a profound analysis of the infinity issue in his biological-theoretical discussion, an analysis designed to prove that infinite regression cannot explain why here and now and at any arbitrary point in the sequence of generations of members of a species appear in an unvarying, constant form. Clearly, the structural law of the substance must always be present; it cannot be explained by regress to an authority situated outside the living form itself. We consider it the second most important result of our study of this topic to have shown the function of the infinity problem in the eighteenth century as a typical transitional problem between the finitism of the creationist worldview and that of the post-Christian worldview. The species problem brings with the problem of evolution. Assuming an immanent law of the species is not an answer to the question of the beginning of the chain of generations. Knowledge of the diversity of forms draws attention to the relatedness of forms and of the possibility of arranging the species in turn in a sequence of historical origin. The third most important result of our study is the explanation of the change in thought images to the idea of the development of species and their real descent from one another; this idea is supported by the first clear view of the primary phenomenon of the formal relatedness of all life and its historical development.

5: Race: The History of an Idea in America | The Black Past: Remembered and Reclaimed

vol 3 the history of the race idea from Ray to Carus "[The Nazi annexation of Austria] is the reason why this book, which I consider one of my better efforts, has remained practically unknown, though it would be of considerable help in the contemporary, rather dilettantic, debates between evolutionists and anti-evolutionists.

This is not new to anthropologists. Since the 1940s when Ashley Montagu argued against the use of the term "race" in science, a growing number of scholars in many disciplines have declared that the real meaning of race in American society has to do with social realities, quite distinct from physical variations in the human species. I argue that race was institutionalized beginning in the 18th century as a worldview, a set of culturally created attitudes and beliefs about human group differences. Slavery and the Coming of Africans Race and its ideology about human differences arose out of the context of African slavery. But many peoples throughout history have been enslaved without the imposition of racial ideology. When we look at 17th century colonial America before the enactment of laws legitimizing slavery only for Africans and their descendants after , several facts become clear. The first people that the English tried to enslave and place on plantations were the Irish with whom they had had hostile relations since the 13th century. In the latter part of the 17th century the demand for labor grew enormously. It had become clear that neither Irishmen nor Indians made good slaves. More than that, the real threats to social order were the poor freed whites who demanded lands and privileges that the upper class colonial governments refused. Some colonial leaders argued that turning to African labor provided a buffer against the masses of poor whites. Until the 18th century the image of Africans was generally positive. They were farmers and cattle-breeders; they had industries, arts and crafts, governments and commerce. In addition, Africans had immunities to Old World diseases. They were better laborers and they had nowhere to escape to once transplanted to the New World. The colonists themselves came to believe that they could not survive without Africans. When some Englishmen entered slave trading directly, it became clear that many of the English public had misgivings about slave-trading and re-creating slavery on English soil. It was an era when the ideals of equality, justice, democracy, and human rights were becoming dominant features of Western political philosophy. Those involved in the trade rationalized their actions by arguing that the Africans were heathens after all, and it was a Christian duty to save their souls. By the early part of the 18th century, the institution was fully established for Africans and their descendants. Large numbers of slaves flooded the southern colonies and even some northern ones. Sometimes they outnumbered whites, and the laws governing slavery became increasingly harsher. A New Social Identity Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the image of Africans began to change dramatically. The major catalyst for this transformation was the rise of a powerful antislavery movement that expanded and strengthened during the Revolutionary Era both in Europe and in the United States. As a consequence proslavery forces found it necessary to develop new arguments for defending the institution. Focusing on physical differences, they turned to the notion of the natural inferiority of Africans and thus their God-given suitability for slavery. Such arguments became more frequent and strident from the end of the eighteenth century on, and the characterizations of Africans became more negative. From here we see the structuring of the ideological components of "race. By focusing on the physical and status differences between the conquered and enslaved peoples, and Europeans, the emerging ideology linked the socio-political status and physical traits together and created a new form of social identity. Proslavery leaders among the colonists formulated a new ideology that merged all Europeans together, rich and poor, and fashioned a social system of ranked physically distinct groups. The model for "race" and "races" was the Great Chain of Being or Scale of Nature *Scala Naturae* , a semi-scientific theory of a natural hierarchy of all living things, derived from classical Greek writings. The physical features of different groups became markers or symbols of their status on this scale, and thus justified their positions within the social system. Race ideology proclaimed that the social, spiritual, moral, and intellectual inequality of different groups was, like their physical traits, natural, innate, inherited, and unalterable. Thus was created the only slave system in the world that became exclusively "racial. By keeping blacks, Indians and whites socially and spatially separated and enforcing endogamous mating, they were making sure that visible physical differences would be

preserved as the premier insignia of unequal social statuses. From its inception separateness and inequality was what "race" was all about. The attributes of inferior race status came to be applied to free blacks as well as slaves. In this way, "race" was configured as an autonomous new mechanism of social differentiation that transcended the slave condition and persisted as a form of social identity long after slavery ended. Humans as Property American slavery was unique in another way; that is, how North American slave-owners resolved the age-old dilemma of all slave systems. Slaves are both persons and things human beings and property. How do you treat a human being as both person and property? And what should take precedence, the human rights of the slave or the property rights of the master? American laws made clear that property was more sacred than people, and the property rights of masters overshadowed the human rights of slaves. Said Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in the famous Dred Scott case of , "Negroes were seen only as property; they were never thought of or spoken of except as property" and " thus were not intended by the framers of the Constitution to be accorded citizenship rights. Literature of the early nineteenth century began to portray "the negro" as a savage in even stronger terms than those that had been used for the Irish two centuries earlier. This was a major transformation in thought about who Africans were. Historian George Fredrickson states explicitly that "before open assertions of permanent black inferiority were exceedingly rare" *The Black Image in the White Mind*, By mid-century, the ideology of "negro inferiority" dominated both popular and scholarly thought. Science and the Justification for "Races" What is so striking about the American experience in creating such an extreme conception of human differences was the role played by scientists and scholars in legitimizing the folk ideas. Scholarly writers began attempting to prove scientifically that "the Negro" was a different and lower kind of human being. The first published materials arguing from a scientific perspective that "negroes" were a separate species from white men appeared in the last decade of the eighteenth century. They argued that Negroes were either a product of degeneration from that first creation, or descendants of a separate creation altogether. Samuel Morton in the s initiated the field of craniometry, the first school of American anthropology, proponents of race ideology received the most powerful scientific support yet. Measuring the insides of crania collected from many populations, he offered "evidence" that the Negro had a smaller brain than whites, with Indians in-between. Morton is also famous for his involvement in a major scientific controversy over creation. The very existence of a scientific debate over whether blacks and whites were products of a single creation, or of multiple creations, especially in a society dominated by Biblical explanations, seems anomalous. It indicates that the differences between "races" had been so magnified and exaggerated that popular consciousness had already widely accepted the idea of blacks being a different and inferior species of humans. Scientists collaborated in confirming popular beliefs, and publications appeared on a regular basis providing the "proof" that comforted the white public. That some social leaders were conscious of their role in giving credibility to the invented myths is manifest in statements such as that found in the *Charleston Medical Journal* after Dr. It states, "We can only say that we of the South should consider him as our benefactor, for aiding most materially in giving to the negro his true position as an inferior race" emphasis added. George Gliddon, co-editor of a famous scientific book *Types of Mankind*, which argued that Negroes were closer to apes than to humans and ranked all other groups between whites and Negroes, sent a copy of the book to a famous southern politician, saying that he was sure the south would appreciate the powerful support that this book gave for its "peculiar institution" slavery. Like another famous tome *The Bell Curve*, this was an page book whose first edition sold out immediately; it went through nine other editions before the end of the century. What it said about the inferiority of blacks became widely known, even by those who could not read it. During discussions in the U. Senate on the future of "the negro" after slavery, James Henry Hammond proclaimed in "somebody has to be the mudsills of society, to do the menial duties, to perform the drudgery of life. This was to be their place, one consciously created for them by a society whose cultural values now made it impossible to assimilate them. In the many decades since the Civil War, white society made giant strides to "keep the negro in his place. These are some of the circumstances surrounding the origin of the racial worldview in North America. Race ideology was a mechanism justifying what had already been established as unequal social groups; it was from its inception, and is today, about who should have access to privilege, power, status, and wealth, and who should not. As a useful political ideology for conquerors, it

HISTORY OF THE RACE IDEA pdf

spread into colonial situations around the world. It was promulgated in the latter half of the 19th century by some Europeans against other Europeans and reached its most extreme development in the twentieth century Nazi holocaust. All anthropologists should understand that "race" has no intrinsic relationship to human biological diversity, that such diversity is a natural product of primarily evolutionary forces while "race" is a social invention. *The Black Image in the White Mind. Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview. The Idea of Race in Science.* Audrey Smedley is a professor of anthropology at Virginia Commonwealth University.

6: The History Of The Race Idea-From Ray To Carus : Eric Voegelin :

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE RACE CONCEPT Michael Yudell, PhD, MPH At the dawn of the 21st century, the idea of raceâ€”the belief that the peoples of the world can be organized into biologically distinctive groups, each with their own physical, social, and.

7: Historical race concepts - Wikipedia

In The History of the Race Idea: From Ray to Carus, Eric Voegelin places the rise of the race idea in the context of the development of modern philosophy. The history of the race idea, according to Voegelin, begins with the postChristian orientation toward a natural system of living forms.

8: Race The History of an Idea in America | www.enganchecubano.com

race - The history of the idea of race - Race as a categorizing term referring to human beings was first used in the English language in the late 16th century. Until the 18th century it had a generalized meaning similar to other classifying terms such as type, sort, or kind.

9: RACE - The Power of an Illusion . Background Readings | PBS

When Tom Gosset's Race: The History of an Idea in America appeared more than a generation ago, it explored the impact of race theory on literature in a way that anticipated the entire current scholarly discourse on the subject.

Chevrolet malibu repair manual Forms Manual to Accompany Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law (American Casebook Series) JOYJUL, JOYFUL, WE ADORE THEE Matter in our surroundings class 9 notes Skyrim legendary strategy guide A History of Science, Technology and Philosophy Ogilo and the Hippo Gender dominance short stories Atomic structure and chemical bond Sales engineer resume sample The selected poetry of rainer maria rilke stephen mitchell Nitrogen and pesticide concentrations in an agricultural basin in north-central Connecticut Culture and conduct The Underestimation of / 21st Century Patent System Improvement Act; Patent and Trademark Office Surcharge Extension Act of 1997; There is no finish line U.S. participation in African Development Fund. Statutory basis for administrative and specialized service staffing in local school districts. Australian decimal stamps, 1966-1978 The epic of Kelefaa Saane TV Globo, the MPA, and contemporary Brazilian cinema Randal Johnson MCITP Self-Paced Training Kit (Exam 70-442): Designing and Optimizing Data Access by Using Microsoft SQL Realities of modern science Labour pains and labour power The god in you robert collier Fianna Fail (70 Years Later) XXX. NANNYS DREAM Frozen Torch (Wellsweep Chinese Poets) Names and their histories Problems of contraception. Edit change font color New Hampshire in Perspective 2007 (New Hampshire in Perspective) Peter Nortons guide to Visual Basic 4 for Windows 95 If Cubicles Could Talk Get Unstuck! The Simple Guide to Restart Your Life State securities regulation of product distribution Enterprise liability in the twenty-first century Randall R. Bovbjerg and Robert Berenson The occult witchcraft and magic an illustrated history Keys to childrens sleep problems World survey of economic freedom 1995-1996