

1: Kant's Ethics – Summary – Peter Sj st d-H

KANTIAN ETHICS. German philosopher Immanuel Kant () was an opponent of utilitarianism. Leading 20 th century proponent of Kantianism: Professor Elizabeth Anscombe ().

Existence-Nonexistence Necessity-Contingency While Kant does not give a formal derivation of it, he believes that this is the complete and necessary list of the a priori contributions that the understanding brings to its judgments of the world. Every judgment that the understanding can make must fall under the table of categories. And subsuming spatiotemporal sensations under the formal structure of the categories makes judgments, and ultimately knowledge, of empirical objects possible. Since objects can only be experienced spatiotemporally, the only application of concepts that yields knowledge is to the empirical, spatiotemporal world. Beyond that realm, there can be no sensations of objects for the understanding to judge, rightly or wrongly. Since intuitions of the physical world are lacking when we speculate about what lies beyond, metaphysical knowledge, or knowledge of the world outside the physical, is impossible. Claiming to have knowledge from the application of concepts beyond the bounds of sensation results in the empty and illusory transcendent metaphysics of Rationalism that Kant reacts against. That is, Kant does not believe that material objects are unknowable or impossible. While Kant is a transcendental idealist--he believes the nature of objects as they are in themselves is unknowable to us--knowledge of appearances is nevertheless possible. As noted above, in *The Refutation of Material Idealism*, Kant argues that the ordinary self-consciousness that Berkeley and Descartes would grant implies "the existence of objects in space outside me. Another way to put the point is to say that the fact that the mind of the knower makes the a priori contribution does not mean that space and time or the categories are mere figments of the imagination. Kant is an empirical realist about the world we experience; we can know objects as they appear to us. All discursive, rational beings must conceive of the physical world as spatially and temporally unified, he argues. And the table of categories is derived from the most basic, universal forms of logical inference, Kant believes. Therefore, it must be shared by all rational beings. So those beings also share judgments of an intersubjective, unified, public realm of empirical objects. Hence, objective knowledge of the scientific or natural world is possible. Indeed, Kant believes that the examples of Newton and Galileo show it is actual. In conjunction with his analysis of the possibility of knowing empirical objects, Kant gives an analysis of the knowing subject that has sometimes been called his transcendental psychology. Kant draws several conclusions about what is necessarily true of any consciousness that employs the faculties of sensibility and understanding to produce empirical judgments. As we have seen, a mind that employs concepts must have a receptive faculty that provides the content of judgments. Space and time are the necessary forms of apprehension for the receptive faculty. The mind that has experience must also have a faculty of combination or synthesis, the imagination for Kant, that apprehends the data of sense, reproduces it for the understanding, and recognizes their features according to the conceptual framework provided by the categories. The mind must also have a faculty of understanding that provides empirical concepts and the categories for judgment. The various faculties that make judgment possible must be unified into one mind. And it must be identical over time if it is going to apply its concepts to objects over time. Judgments would not be possible, Kant maintains, if the mind that senses is not the same as the mind that possesses the forms of sensibility. And that mind must be the same as the mind that employs the table of categories, that contributes empirical concepts to judgment, and that synthesizes the whole into knowledge of a unified, empirical world. So the fact that we can empirically judge proves, contra Hume, that the mind cannot be a mere bundle of disparate introspected sensations. In his works on ethics Kant will also argue that this mind is the source of spontaneous, free, and moral action. Kant believes that all the threads of his transcendental philosophy come together in this "highest point" which he calls the transcendental unity of apperception. First, in his analysis of sensibility, he argues for the necessarily spatiotemporal character of sensation. Then Kant analyzes the understanding, the faculty that applies concepts to sensory experience. He concludes that the categories provide a necessary, foundational template for our concepts to map onto our experience. In addition to providing these transcendental concepts, the understanding also is the source of

ordinary empirical concepts that make judgments about objects possible. The understanding provides concepts as the rules for identifying the properties in our representations. The cognitive power of judgment does have a transcendental structure. Kant argues that there are a number of principles that must necessarily be true of experience in order for judgment to be possible. Within the *Analytic*, Kant first addresses the challenge of subsuming particular sensations under general categories in the *Schematism* section. Transcendental schemata, Kant argues, allow us to identify the homogeneous features picked out by concepts from the heterogeneous content of our sensations. Judgment is only possible if the mind can recognize the components in the diverse and disorganized data of sense that make those sensations an instance of a concept or concepts. A schema makes it possible, for instance, to subsume the concrete and particular sensations of an Airedale, a Chihuahua, and a Labrador all under the more abstract concept "dog. That is, the role of the mind in making nature is not limited to space, time, and the categories. In the *Analytic of Principles*, Kant argues that even the necessary conformity of objects to natural law arises from the mind. In the sections titled the *Axioms*, *Anticipations*, *Analogies*, and *Postulates*, he argues that there are a priori judgments that must necessarily govern all appearances of objects.

Axioms of Intuition All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.

Anticipations of Perception Analogies of Experience In all appearances the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, i. In all variations by appearances substance is permanent, and its quantum in nature is neither increased nor decreased. All changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect. All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction.

Postulates of Empirical Thought What agrees in terms of intuition and concepts with the formal conditions of experience is possible. What coheres with the material conditions of experience with sensation is actual. That whose coherence with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary exists necessarily 6. The purpose of the *Analytic*, we are told, is "the rarely attempted dissection of the power of the understanding itself. Kant calls judgments that pretend to have knowledge beyond these boundaries and that even require us to tear down the limits that he has placed on knowledge, *transcendent judgments*. The *Transcendental Dialectic* section of the book is devoted to uncovering the illusion of knowledge created by transcendent judgments and explaining why the temptation to believe them persists. Kant argues that the proper functioning of the faculties of sensibility and the understanding combine to draw reason, or the cognitive power of inference, inexorably into mistakes. The faculty of reason naturally seeks the highest ground of unconditional unity. It seeks to unify and subsume all particular experiences under higher and higher principles of knowledge. But sensibility cannot by its nature provide the intuitions that would make knowledge of the highest principles and of things as they are in themselves possible. Nevertheless, reason, in its function as the faculty of inference, inevitably draws conclusions about what lies beyond the boundaries of sensibility. Corresponding to the three basic kinds of syllogism are three dialectic mistakes or illusions of transcendent knowledge that cannot be real. The *Dialectic* explains the illusions of reason in these sections. But since the illusions arise from the structure of our faculties, they will not cease to have their influence on our minds any more than we can prevent the moon from seeming larger when it is on the horizon than when it is overhead. In the *Paralogisms*, Kant argues that a failure to recognize the difference between appearances and things in themselves, particularly in the case of the introspected self, leads us into transcendent error. Kant argues against several conclusions encouraged by Descartes and the rational psychologists, who believed they could build human knowledge from the "I think" of the cogito argument. From the "I think" of self-awareness we can infer, they maintain, that the self or soul is 1 simple, 2 immaterial, 3 an identical substance and 4 that we perceive it directly, in contrast to external objects whose existence is merely possible. That is, the rational psychologists claimed to have knowledge of the self as transcendently real. Kant believes that it is impossible to demonstrate any of these four claims, and that the mistaken claims to knowledge stem from a failure to see the real nature of our apprehension of the "I. But to take the self as an object of knowledge here is to pretend to have knowledge of the self as it is in itself, not as it appears to us. Our representation of the "I" itself is empty. It is subject to the condition of inner sense, time, but not the condition of outer sense, space, so it cannot be a proper object of knowledge. It can be thought through concepts, but without the commensurate spatial and temporal intuitions, it cannot be known. Each of the four paralogisms explains the categorical

structure of reason that led the rational psychologists to mistake the self as it appears to us for the self as it is in itself. We have already mentioned the Antinomies, in which Kant analyzes the methodological problems of the Rationalist project. Kant sees the Antinomies as the unresolved dialogue between skepticism and dogmatism about knowledge of the world. Each antinomy has a thesis and an antithesis, both of which can be validly proven, and since each makes a claim that is beyond the grasp of spatiotemporal sensation, neither can be confirmed or denied by experience. The First Antinomy argues both that the world has a beginning in time and space, and no beginning in time and space. The Fourth Antinomy contains arguments both for and against the existence of a necessary being in the world. The seemingly irreconcilable claims of the Antinomies can only be resolved by seeing them as the product of the conflict of the faculties and by recognizing the proper sphere of our knowledge in each case. In the first Antinomy, the world as it appears to us is neither finite since we can always inquire about its beginning or end, nor is it infinite because finite beings like ourselves cannot cognize an infinite whole. As an empirical object, Kant argues, it is indefinitely constructable for our minds. As it is in itself, independent of the conditions of our thought, it should not be identified as finite or infinite since both are categorical conditions of our thought. He considers the two competing hypotheses of speculative metaphysics that there are different types of causality in the world: The conflict between these contrary claims can be resolved, Kant argues, by taking his critical turn and recognizing that it is impossible for any cause to be thought of as uncaused itself in the realm of space and time. But reason, in trying to understand the ground of all things, strives to unify its knowledge beyond the empirical realm. The empirical world, considered by itself, cannot provide us with ultimate reasons. So if we do not assume a first or free cause we cannot completely explain causal series in the world. So for the Third Antinomy, as for all of the Antinomies, the domain of the Thesis is the intellectual, rational, noumenal world. The domain of the Antithesis is the spatiotemporal world. The Ideas of Reason The faculty of reason has two employments. For the most part, we have engaged in an analysis of theoretical reason which has determined the limits and requirements of the employment of the faculty of reason to obtain knowledge. Theoretical reason, Kant says, makes it possible to cognize what is. But reason has its practical employment in determining what ought to be as well. Kant believes that, "Human reason is by its nature architectonic. That is, reason thinks of all cognitions as belonging to a unified and organized system. Reason is our faculty of making inferences and of identifying the grounds behind every truth. It allows us to move from the particular and contingent to the global and universal. I infer that "Caius is mortal" from the fact that "Caius is a man" and the universal claim, "All men are mortal."

2: Immanuel Kant: Ethics - Philosophy - Oxford Bibliographies

Immanuel Kant () is, by common consent, one of the most profound and original philosophers who ever lived. He is equally well known for his metaphysics-the subject of his Critique of Pure Reason -and for his moral philosophy which is set out in his Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason.

They are a priori, as morality must come prior to experience. We cannot derive morality from experience a posteriori because how then would we be able to recognize a moral act as being moral if there were not something already within us a priori: They are synthetic because the predicate is not contained within the subject as in analytic propositions. But neither is this proposition true through experience a posteriori, so it is also a priori. Consequently a Categorical Imperative is synthetic a priori: They must be intentions. If everyone did that, it would mean that putting a price on food would become pointless. Therefore, food would be free. Therefore universalising the subjective maxim would lead to a contradiction. To universalise stealing is to make stealing a redundant term. This contradiction indicates that an act or maxim is immoral. Contradiction of the Will When you would not want the maxim to become universal. When the action would contradict the natural purposes final causes found in nature. This applies especially to the Formula of the Law of Nature. Breaking an imperfect duty will not lead to contradiction if universalised. Who told you that there are laws to which we ought to subject our actions? Who told you that something ought to happen that never happens? He thus assumes what he seeks to prove: In general, in the centuries of Christianity, philosophical ethics has unconsciously taken its form from the theological. Since this ethics is now essentially dictatorial, the philosophical too, has appeared in the form of prescription and the doctrine of duty in all innocence and without suspecting that for this, first a further authority is necessary [God]. Instead, it supposes that this is its own and natural form. Kant therefore fails his project. Therefore instead of postulating it as necessary for morality, Kant should rather reject normative morality, as its condition freedom is impossible. Schopenhauer wrote an essay on the freedom of the will. This awareness of the lack of free will keeps me from taking myself and my fellow men too seriously as acting and deciding individuals, and from losing my temper. It is advisor, not executor.

3: Immanuel Kant - Wikipedia

Rational, consistent, impartial: Kant's view emphasizes the importance of rationality, consistency, impartiality, and respect for persons in the way we live our lives.

This 18th century philosopher from Königsberg, East Prussia, grew up belonging to a strong Protestant family. His father died just as he entered university, which meant that he tutored students for seven years in order to fund his Phd. His income after that time was solely derived from his lectures, and students paid to attend them because he was so good. Kant is one of the most significant contributors to ethical theory and part of the Enlightenment movement. This cultural group of academics sought to reform society and advance knowledge based on rational thinking. Laplace is known as one of the greatest scientists to ever live as he invented the mathematical and astronomical formulae for movements in the solar system. All actions were moral, not divinely intended said Hume, as we act as to how we feel. So according to emotivism, feelings were the main impetus to do actions, so good people did what gave them a good feeling. Kant was having none of it. Kant went back to the original question of all ethicists: Is a person good and is an action good? Kant then decided to base his ethical theory by examining the second part of the question. Action, Good Will and Moral Duty The study of whether or not an action is ethical is known as normative ethics. There are two ways of examining this. Hume said that a good feeling should precipitate good actions. Kant thought that a good action was the result of someone feeling they ought to act a certain way. What Kant went deeper into, was what prompted us to act as if we ought to. When we act as if we ought to; for example, demonstrating polite manners at the dinner table; we might not be happy doing so. So why do it? Action - for Kant, the goodness of an action was not determined by the consequences or result of the action. Kant is not a consequentialist theorist Utilitarianism is consequentialist for example. Kant decided the intention behind an action is the measure of whether an action is good or bad. Good will - Kant determined that in order to intend a good action a rational agent person must possess the good will to do the action. This is a measure of whether you are dealing with a morally "good" individual. Moral duty - Kant went on to say that possessing good will is one thing, but the reason we go on to do a "good" action is the result of a sense of obligation. Source Aristotle and Theories of Happiness Rejected In the above diagram, Kant has a problem with the idea that if we just look at the consequences of actions, we will not know if a person acts out of duty or self serving egoism. For this reason, the outcome is sometimes the wrong thing occurs for society, or in this example, people are dishonest. We all ask ourselves, are people dishonest? Kant says it comes from the neglect of moral duty to society as a whole. For those who do obey the moral duty, they may or may not benefit, as they are not focused on the consequences of their actions, but what they "ought" to do that is right by other members of society. To act this way, it must be an intrinsic motivation towards the moral duty. Kant prefers to say virtues are within us already and need to be maintained - you can not pick a virtue up as you go along. Kant also rejects theories like emotivism that say actions are good when they make people happy, as he clearly shows through the pink bubble above, that society does not benefit from self interested members, so their actions are not moral or "good". The only moral value for Kant is the "good" action of someone who intends the best for others. Immanuel Kant Quotes "You have to deserve happiness. Kant would say that such people who compromise their moral duty and behave egoistically will eventually be found out. That most will not view them as good people if the result for society is not good. That we all need to imagine we are accountable to a "Rational, Disinterested Spectator" in order to know, categorically, right from wrong. For Kant there is no middle ground. This theory is black and white. Knowing good from bad is intrinsic - or hard wired into all of us. Deontological theories like Natural Law bind the ethical follower to the notion of God as spectator and arbitrator of actions. Universal Maxims and Kant Not just any definition of duty would do for Kant. He said that ideas for duty must cover all persons at all times. So we have an absolutist theory at work, where universal maxims are applied. Universal moral laws that are logical are the foundation of all life. There are no contradictions. Right and wrong is black and white. Kant says that you can analyse a scenario and decide your behaviour. Instead Kant says you ought to act according to moral duty and that we can all be universal

lawmakers because it is within us intrinsically to do so. The Pull of Duty Imagine the scenario of seeing a hungry homeless person by the side of the road and feeling the compulsion to buy that person a sandwich and give it to them. Kant would say it was a "good" action to do so if we felt obligated to do so, as opposed to inclined to do so. Universal Maxims According To Kant 1. Act according to the maxim that it would become a universal law. Act so that you always treat others as an end, never as a means to an end. I treat the person as an end. Formula of Universal Law: Formula of Humanity as an End: All human beings are free rational agents bound by a will that is logical. Bad human beings have bad wills. Perfect justice and perfect peace will ensue. Kant did not tell people what to do, but how to determine the right course of action. He said we all had this unique ability to determine a "good" behaviour using our a priori reasoning. Make a decision to act, and not examining consequences later to determine if we made a good decision. You could say Kant believed in having a clear conscience. God will lead all to perfect happiness if we base universal maxims on what God would desire. Basically, the "rational, disinterested spectator" could now be God, if God is not an interventionist God and gave everyone complete free will. Is Genetic Engineering Ethical? Ethical issues with genetic engineering face our modern society. How Kantian Are You? Think of a modern issue that society is wrestling with. What answer would you choose below to agree with? The issue if adopted by society does not make a universal maxim. The issue if adopted by society does make a good universal maxim.

4: Immanuel Kant (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Immanuel Kant () argued that the supreme principle of morality is a standard of rationality that he dubbed the "Categorical Imperative" (CI).

As part of the Enlightenment tradition, Kant based his ethical theory on the belief that reason should be used to determine how people ought to act. No other virtue has this status because every other virtue can be used to achieve immoral ends the virtue of loyalty is not good if one is loyal to an evil person, for example. The good will is unique in that it is always good and maintains its moral value even when it fails to achieve its moral intentions. A will which acts from duty is distinguishable as a will which overcomes hindrances in order to keep the moral law. A dutiful will is thus a special case of a good will which becomes visible in adverse conditions. Kant argues that only acts performed with regard to duty have moral worth. This is not to say that acts performed merely in accordance with duty are worthless these still deserve approval and encouragement , but that special esteem is given to acts which are performed out of duty. Thus, when an agent performs an action from duty it is because the rational incentives matter to them more than their opposing inclinations. Kant wished to move beyond the conception morality as externally imposed duties and present an ethics of autonomy, when rational agents freely recognise the claims reason makes upon them. The former are classified as perfect duties, the latter as imperfect. A perfect duty always holds trueâ€”there is a perfect duty to tell the truth, so we must never lie. An imperfect duty allows flexibilityâ€”beneficence is an imperfect duty because we are not obliged to be completely beneficent at all times, but may choose the times and places in which we are. A hypothetical imperative is one we must obey if we want to satisfy our desires: A categorical imperative binds us regardless of our desires: These imperatives are morally binding because they are based on reason, rather than contingent facts about an agent. We owe a duty to rationality by virtue of being rational agents; therefore, rational moral principles apply to all rational agents at all times. For Kant, an act is only permissible if one is willing for the maxim that allows the action to be a universal law by which everyone acts. A contradiction in conception happens when, if a maxim were to be universalized, it ceases to make sense because the " The maxim is not moral because it is logically impossible to universalizeâ€”we could not conceive of a world where this maxim was universalized. This does not mean a logical contradiction, but that universalizing the maxim leads to a state of affairs that no rational being would desire. He thus believed that a perfectly rational being must also be perfectly moral because a perfectly rational being subjectively finds it necessary to do what is rationally necessary. Because humans are not perfectly rational they partly act by instinct , Kant believed that humans must conform their subjective will with objective rational laws, which he called conformity obligation. Just as physical laws exist prior to physical beings, rational laws morality exist prior to rational beings. Therefore, according to Kant, rational morality is universal and cannot change depending on circumstance. Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means. A rational being cannot rationally consent to be used merely as a means to an end, so they must always be treated as an end. Because all rational agents rationally will themselves to be an end and never merely a means, it is morally obligatory that they are treated as such. Kant believed that any moral law motivated by the desire to fulfill some other interest would deny the Categorical Imperative, leading him to argue that the moral law must only arise from a rational will. A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered possible by the freedom of will. Accordingly, people have an obligation to act upon principles that a community of rational agents would accept as laws. Pietism emphasised honesty and moral living over doctrinal belief , more concerned with feeling than rationality. Kant believed that rationality is required, but that it should be concerned with morality and good will. Kant favoured rationalism over empiricism, which meant he viewed morality as a form of knowledge, rather than something based on human desire. Natural law the belief that the moral law is determined by nature and intuitionism the belief that humans have intuitive awareness of objective moral truths were, according to Pojman, also influential for Kant. Rejecting any form of coercion or manipulation, Habermas believes that agreement between the parties

is crucial for a moral decision to be reached. Kant distinguished between the phenomena world, which can be sensed and experienced by humans, and the noumena, or spiritual world, which is inaccessible to humans. This dichotomy was necessary for Kant because it could explain the autonomy of a human agent: For Habermas, morality arises from discourse, which is made necessary by their rationality and needs, rather than their freedom. To achieve this fairness, he proposed a hypothetical moment prior to the existence of a society, at which the society is ordered: This should take place from behind a veil of ignorance, where no one knows what their own position in society will be, preventing people from being biased by their own interests and ensuring a fair result. He proposed that, while Kant presented human freedom as critical to the moral law, Sade further argued that human freedom is only fully realised through the maxim of *jouissance*. Conceiving of reason as a tool to make decisions with means that the only thing able to restrain the principles we adopt is that they could be adopted by all. If we cannot will that everyone adopts a certain principle, then we cannot give them reasons to adopt it. To use reason, and to reason with other people, we must reject those principles that cannot be universally adopted. She argues that the rejection of certain principles, such as deception and coercion, provides a starting point for basic conceptions of justice, which she argues are more determinate for human beings than the more abstract principles of equality or liberty. Nevertheless, she concedes that these principles may seem to be excessively demanding: He gives the example of Smith, who visits his friend in hospital out of duty, rather than because of the friendship; he argues that this visit seems morally lacking because it is motivated by the wrong thing. After presenting a number of reasons that we might find acting out of duty objectionable, she argues that these problems only arise when people misconstrue what their duty is. Acting out of duty is not intrinsically wrong, but immoral consequences can occur when people misunderstand what they are duty-bound to do. Duty need not be seen as cold and impersonal: For Baron, being governed by duty does not mean that duty is always the primary motivation to act; rather, it entails that considerations of duty are always action-guiding. A responsible moral agent should take an interest in moral questions, such as questions of character. These should guide moral agents to act from duty. F Hegel[edit] Portrait of G. Hegel German philosopher G. Hegel presented two main criticisms of Kantian ethics. To illustrate this point, Hegel and his followers have presented a number of cases in which the Formula of Universal Law either provides no meaningful answer or gives an obviously wrong answer. He also used the example of helping the poor: For Hegel, it is unnatural for humans to suppress their desire and subordinate it to reason. He argued that all modern ethical systems share two problematic characteristics: Nietzsche cast suspicion on the use of moral intuition, which Kant used as the foundation of his morality, arguing that it has no normative force in ethics. Under the Kantian model, reason is a fundamentally different motive to desire because it has the capacity to stand back from a situation and make an independent decision. Nietzsche conceives of the self as a social structure of all our different drives and motivations; thus, when it seems that our intellect has made a decision against our drives, it is actually just an alternative drive taking dominance over another. There is thus no self-capable of standing back and making a decision; the decision the self-makes is simply determined by the strongest drive. Elizabeth Anscombe criticised modern ethical theories, including Kantian ethics, for their obsession with law and obligation. As well as arguing that theories which rely on a universal moral law are too rigid, Anscombe suggested that, because a moral law implies a moral lawgiver, they are irrelevant in modern secular society. Initially, this requires following rules—but the intention is that the agent develop virtuously, and regard acting morally as a joy. This is in contrast with freedom of indifference, which Pinckaers attributes to William Ockham and likens to Kant. On this view, freedom is set against nature: They argue that if something is universally a priori. On the other hand, if humans truly do legislate morality, then they are not bound by it objectively, because they are always free to change it. Furthermore, the sense in which our wills are subject to the law is precisely that if our wills are rational, we must will in a lawlike fashion; that is, we must will according to moral judgments we apply to all rational beings, including ourselves. That is, an autonomous will, according to Kant, is not merely one which follows its own will, but whose will is lawful—that is, conforming to the principle of universalizability, which Kant also identifies with reason. Medical ethics[edit] Kant believed that the shared ability of humans to reason should be the basis of morality, and that it is the ability to reason that makes humans morally significant. He, therefore, believed that all

humans should have the right to common dignity and respect. For example, a researcher who wished to perform tests on patients without their knowledge must be happy for all researchers to do so. Medical research should be motivated out of respect for the patient, so they must be informed of all facts, even if this would be likely to dissuade the patient. He argues that there may be some difference between what a purely rational agent would choose and what a patient actually chooses, the difference being the result of non-rational idiosyncrasies. Although a Kantian physician ought not to lie to or coerce a patient, Hinkley suggests that some form of paternalism - such as through withholding information which may prompt a non-rational response - could be acceptable. She proposed that a woman should be treated as a dignified autonomous person, with control over their body, as Kant suggested. Cohen believes that even when humans are not rational because of age such as babies or fetuses or mental disability, agents are still morally obligated to treat them as an ends in themselves, equivalent to a rational adult such as a mother seeking an abortion. He argued that humans have a duty to avoid maxims that harm or degrade themselves, including suicide, sexual degradation, and drunkenness. He admitted sex only within marriage, which he regarded as "a merely animal union". Commercial sex has been criticised for turning both parties into objects and thus using them as a means to an end ; mutual consent is problematic because in consenting, people choose to objectify themselves. Alan Soble has noted that more liberal Kantian ethicists believe that, depending on other contextual factors, the consent of women can vindicate their participation in pornography and prostitution. Animals, according to Kant, are not rational, thus one cannot behave immorally towards them. Kant argued that, because we cannot fully know what the consequences of any action will be, the result might be unexpectedly harmful. Therefore, we ought to act to avoid the known wrongâ€”lyingâ€”rather than to avoid a potential wrong. If there are harmful consequences, we are blameless because we acted according to our duty. However, this new maxim may still treat the murderer as a means to an end, which we have a duty to avoid doing. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 6 April 2011 via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Immanuel Kant () is one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy. His contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement that followed him.

The argument of the Transcendental Deduction is one of the most important moments in the Critique, but it is also one of the most difficult, complex, and controversial arguments in the book. Hence, it will not be possible to reconstruct the argument in any detail here. Kant takes it to be uncontroversial that we can be aware of our representations as our representations. Further, we are also able to recognize that it is the same I that does the thinking in both cases. In general, all of our experience is unified because it can be ascribed to the one and same I, and so this unity of experience depends on the unity of the self-conscious I. Kant next asks what conditions must obtain in order for this unity of self-consciousness to be possible. His answer is that we must be able to differentiate between the I that does the thinking and the object that we think about. That is, we must be able to distinguish between subjective and objective elements in our experience. If we could not make such a distinction, then all experience would just be so many disconnected mental happenings: So next Kant needs to explain how we are able to differentiate between the subjective and objective elements of experience. His answer is that a representation is objective when the subject is necessitated in representing the object in a certain way, that is, when it is not up to the free associative powers of my imagination to determine how I represent it. For instance, whether I think a painting is attractive or whether it calls to mind an instance from childhood depends on the associative activity of my own imagination; but the size of the canvas and the chemical composition of the pigments is not up to me: Kant begins with a premise accepted by everyone, but then asks what conditions must have been met in order for this premise to be true. Kant assumed that we have a unified experience of the many objects populating the world. This unified experience depends on the unity of apperception. The unity of apperception enables the subject to distinguish between subjective and objective elements in experience. This ability, in turn, depends on representing objects in accordance with rules, and the rules in question are the categories. Hence, the only way we can explain the fact that we have experience at all is by appeal to the fact that the categories apply to the objects of experience. It is worth emphasizing how truly radical the conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction is. Kant takes himself to have shown that all of nature is subject to the rules laid down by the categories. But these categories are a priori: Thus the conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction parallels the conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic: Theory of Experience The Transcendental Deduction showed that it is necessary for us to make use of the categories in experience, but also that we are justified in making use of them. In the following series of chapters together labeled the Analytic of Principles Kant attempts to leverage the results of the Deduction and prove that there are transcendently necessary laws that every possible object of experience must obey. The first two principles correspond to the categories of quantity and quality. First, Kant argues that every object of experience must have a determinate spatial shape and size and a determinate temporal duration except mental objects, which have no spatial determinations. The next three principles are discussed in an important, lengthy chapter called the Analogies of Experience. They derive from the relational categories: According to the First Analogy, experience will always involve objects that must be represented as substances. One event is said to be the cause of another when the second event follows the first in accordance with a rule. And according to the Third Analogy which presupposes the first two, all substances stand in relations of reciprocal interaction with each other. That is, any two pieces of material substance will effect some degree of causal influence on each other, even if they are far apart. The First Analogy is a form of the principle of the conservation of matter: Hume had argued that we can never have knowledge of necessary connections between events; rather, we can only perceive certain types of events to be constantly conjoined with other types of events. In arguing that events follow each other in accordance with rules, Kant has shown how we can have knowledge of necessary connections between events above and beyond their mere constant conjunction. The Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General contains the final set of principles of pure understanding and they derive from the modal

categories possibility, actuality, necessity. The Postulates define the different ways to represent the modal status of objects, that is, what it is for an object of experience to be possible, actual, or necessary. The most important passage from the Postulates chapter is the Refutation of Idealism, which is a refutation of external world skepticism that Kant added to the edition of the Critique. In the Refutation, Kant argues that his system entails not just that an external that is, spatial world is possible which Berkeley denied, but that we can know it is real which Descartes and others questioned. Where the skeptics assume that we have knowledge of the states of our own minds, but say that we cannot be certain that an external world corresponds to these states, Kant turns the tables and argues that we would not have knowledge of the states of our own minds specifically, the temporal order in which our ideas occur if we were not simultaneously aware of permanent substances in space, outside of the mind. Accordingly, Kant holds that there can be knowledge of an object only if it is possible for that object to be given in an experience. This aspect of the epistemological condition of the human subject entails that there are important areas of inquiry about which we would like to have knowledge, but cannot. The three most important ideas with which Kant is concerned in the Transcendental Dialectic are the soul, the world considered as a totality, and God. The peculiar thing about these ideas of reason is that reason is led by its very structure to posit objects corresponding to these ideas. Kant argues that such reasoning is the result of transcendental illusion. A cognition involves both intuition and concept, while a mere thought involves only concept. For instance, consider the question whether we can cognize the I as a substance that is, as a soul. On the one hand, something is cognized as a substance when it is represented only as the subject of predication and is never itself the predicate of some other subject. On the other hand, something can only be cognized as a substance when it is given as a persistent object in an intuition see 2f above, and there can be no intuition of the I itself. Hence although we cannot help but think of the I as a substantial soul, we can never have cognition of the I as a substance, and hence knowledge of the existence and nature of the soul is impossible. Antinomies arise when reason seems to be able to prove two opposed and mutually contradictory propositions with apparent certainty. Kant discusses four antinomies in the first Critique he uncovers other antinomies in later writings as well. The First Antinomy shows that reason seems to be able to prove that the universe is both finite and infinite in space and time. The Second Antinomy shows that reason seems to be able to prove that matter both is and is not infinitely divisible into ever smaller parts. The Third Antinomy shows that reason seems to be able to prove that free will cannot be a causally efficacious part of the world because all of nature is deterministic and yet that it must be such a cause. And the Fourth Antinomy shows that reason seems to be able to prove that there is and there is not a necessary being which some would identify with God. In all four cases, Kant attempts to resolve these conflicts of reason with itself by appeal to transcendental idealism. The claim that space and time are not features of things in themselves is used to resolve the First and Second Antinomies. Since the empirical world in space and time is identified with appearances, and since the world as a totality can never itself be given as a single appearance, there is no determinate fact of the matter regarding the size of the universe: It is neither determinately finite nor determinately infinite; rather, it is indefinitely large. The distinction between appearances and things in themselves is used to resolve the Third and Fourth Antinomies. Although every empirical event experienced within the realm of appearance has a deterministic natural cause, it is at least logically possible that freedom can be a causally efficacious power at the level of things in themselves. And although every empirical object experienced within the realm of appearance is a contingently existing entity, it is logically possible that there is a necessary being outside the realm of appearance which grounds the existence of the contingent beings within the realm of appearance. It must be kept in mind that Kant has not claimed to demonstrate the existence of a transcendent free will or a transcendent necessary being: Kant denies the possibility of knowledge of things in themselves. Instead, Kant only takes himself to have shown that the existence of such entities is logically possible. In his moral theory, however, Kant will offer an argument for the actuality of freedom see 5c below. Reason is led to posit the idea of such a being when it reflects on its conceptions of finite beings with limited reality and infers that the reality of finite beings must derive from and depend on the reality of the most infinitely perfect being. Of course, the fact that reason necessarily thinks of a most real, necessary being does not entail that such a being exists. Kant argues that there are only three possible arguments for the

existence of such a being, and that none is successful. According to the ontological argument for the existence of God versions of which were proposed by St. Anselm and Descartes , among others , God is the only being whose essence entails its existence. Kant argues that both of these implicitly depend on the argumentation of the ontological argument pertaining to necessary existence, and since it fails, they fail as well. Although Kant argues in the Transcendental Dialectic that we cannot have cognition of the soul, of freedom of the will, nor of God, in his ethical writings he will complicate this story and argue that we are justified in believing in these things see 5c below. Recall that an analytic judgment is one where the truth of the judgment depends only on the relation between the concepts used in the judgment. Kant, by contrast argued that mathematical knowledge is synthetic. Recall, however, that a judgment can be both synthetic yet a priori. Like the judgments of the necessary structures of experience, mathematics is also synthetic a priori according to Kant. Surely, this proposition is a priori: I can know its truth without doing empirical experiments to see what happens when I put seven things next to five other things. If mathematical knowledge is synthetic, then it depends on objects being given in sensibility. And if it is a priori, then these objects must be non-empirical objects. What sort of objects does Kant have in mind here? Recall that an intuition is a singular, immediate representation of an individual object see 2c above. Empirical intuitions represent sensible objects through sensation, but pure intuitions are a priori representations of space and time as such. These pure constructions in intuition can be used to arrive at synthetic, a priori mathematical knowledge. And this will be true irrespective of what particular triangle I constructed isosceles, scalene, and so forth. Kant holds that all mathematical knowledge is derived in this fashion: I take a concept, construct it in pure intuition, and then determine what features of the constructed intuition are necessarily true of it.

Natural Science In addition to his work in pure theoretical philosophy, Kant displayed an active interest in the natural sciences throughout his career. Most of his important scientific contributions were in the physical sciences including not just physics proper, but also earth sciences and cosmology. In *Critique of the Power of Judgment* he also presented a lengthy discussion of the philosophical basis of the study of biological entities. Hence, Kant was pessimistic about the possibility of empirical psychology ever amounting to a true science. A few years later, Kant wrote the *Physical Monadology* , which dealt with other foundational questions in physics see 2a above. This theory can be understood as an outgrowth and consequence of the transcendental theory of experience articulated in *Critique of Pure Reason* see 2f above. Where the *Critique* had shown the necessary conceptual forms to which all possible objects of experience must conform, the *Metaphysical Foundations* specifies in greater detail what exactly the physical constitution of these objects must be like. The continuity with the theory of experience from the *Critique* is implicit in the very structure of the *Metaphysical Foundations*. The basic idea is that each volume of material substance possesses a brute tendency to expand and push away other volumes of substance this is repulsive force and each volume of substance possesses a brute tendency to contract and to attract other volumes of substance this is attractive force. The repulsive force explains the solidity and impenetrability of bodies while the attractive force explains gravitation and presumably also phenomena such as magnetic attraction.

6: Immanuel Kant's Ethics of Pure Duty - Essay

The ethical theory of Immanuel Kant (b. d.) exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent history of philosophy and continues to be a dominant approach to ethics, rivaling consequentialism and virtue ethics.

Immanuel Kant has presented one viewpoint in *The Grounding For The Metaphysics of Morals* that is founded on his belief that the worth of man is inherent in his ability to reason. John Stuart Mill holds another opinion as presented in the book, *Utilitarianism* that is seemingly in contention with the thoughts of Kant. What is most distinctive about the ethics of morality is the idea of responsibilities to particular individuals. According to Kant and Mill, moral obligations are not fundamentally particularistic in this way because they are rooted in universal moral principles. Mill and Kant are both philosophers whom have made great impact on their particular fields of philosophy and a critique of their theories in relation to each other may help develop a better understanding to them and their theories individually. Mill holds an empiricist theory while Kant holds a rationalist theory. Kant grounds morality in forms that he believes, are necessary to free and rational practical judgment, namely his deontological ethics. Thus, deontologicalism and consequentialism are the main criticisms for both these theories. Both deontologicalism and consequentialism are valid points of argument to the ethics of an action but they are also argumentative towards each other. Mill, in his later work, *On Liberty*, adds deontologicalism to correct his consequentialist view. John Stuart Mill, who made utilitarianism the subject of one of his philosophical treatise *Utilitarianism* , is the most proficient defender of this doctrine after Jeremy Bentham. His contribution to the theory consists in his recognition of distinctions of quality, in addition to those of intensity, among pleasures. Thus, whereas Bentham maintained that the "quality of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry," Mill contended that "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied," that is, human discontent is better than animal fulfillment. Or more clearer stated as "better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied", as the fool would only be of a different opinion because he did not know both sides of the question. Although his position was based on the maximization of happiness, he distinguished between pleasures that are higher and lower in quality. Utilitarianism may be viewed as an instance of a more general theory of right consequentialism, which holds that right and wrong can only be assessed by the goodness of consequences. This general kind of theory can perhaps be most easily understood by considering the form of consequentialism. Consequentialism is that an act is right if, of those available to the agent at the time, it would produce the greatest overall net value in the end. Utilitarian views are based around the concept of attaining happiness and Mill maintains hedonism; happiness or pleasure is the only intrinsic good for persons. Mill believes, that a hedonist should, maintain that pleasures involving cultivated intellectual, emotional, and imaginative faculties are intrinsically better. Hedonism shows that the intellectual pleasures are better pleasures because they are in better quality than those of purely extrinsic value. Kant sees this distinction and goes on to explain that a numerical value cannot be placed on something that has intrinsic value. His ethical theory has been more influential than his work in epistemology and metaphysics. Kantian theory on morality is stated in terms of his ethics of pure duty. What is the duty that motivates our actions and gives them moral value? Kant distinguishes two kinds of law produced by reason. Kant believes that rational agents are moral agents, that every moral agent has the same ability as any other and therefore must be given consideration and respect. Hence, moral agents cannot be instrumentalized to reach an end but are ends in themselves. Given some end we wish to achieve, reason provides a hypothetical imperative, or rule of action for achieving that end. A hypothetical imperative says that if you wish to buy a new house, then you must determine what sort of houses are available for purchase. Deriving a means to achieve some desired end is the most common use of reason. However, Kant shows that the acceptable formation of the moral law cannot be merely hypothetical because our actions cannot be moral on the ground of some conditional purpose or goal. Kant believes that reason dictates a categorical imperative for moral action. To be moral one cannot have the condition of "if I want to achieve some end, then do X", but simply "do X". The moral or categorical imperative is unconditional whereas the hypothetical imperative is not. Categorical imperatives say what, under certain circumstances, one ought to do. Unlike a hypothetical

imperative, one can conclude that, if the circumstances obtain, one really ought to act. A hypothetical imperative is not simply

7: Kant's Moral Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Kantian ethics refers to a deontological ethical theory ascribed to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. The theory, developed as a result of Enlightenment rationalism, is based on the view that the only intrinsically good thing is a good will ; an action can only be good if its maxim - the principle behind it - is duty to the moral law.

Critique of Practical Reason , he proposed a "Table of the Categories of Freedom in Relation to the Concepts of Good and Evil," using the familiar logical distinctions as the basis for a catalog of synthetic a priori judgments that have bearing on the evaluation of human action, and declared that only two things inspire genuine awe: Kant used ordinary moral notions as the foundation for a derivation of this moral law in his *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals From Good Will to Universal Law We begin with the concept of that which can be conceived to be good without qualification, a good will. Other good features of human nature and the benefits of a good life, Kant pointed out, have value only under appropriate conditions, since they may be used either for good or for evil. But a good will is intrinsically good; its value is wholly self-contained and utterly independent of its external relations. Since our practical reason is better suited to the development and guidance of a good will than to the achievement of happiness , it follows that the value of a good will does not depend even on the results it manages to produce as the consequences of human action. So he concludes that "Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law. So the only relevant feature of the moral law is its generality, the fact that it has the formal property of universalizability , by virtue of which it can be applied at all times to every moral agent. From this chain of reasoning about our ordinary moral concepts, Kant derived as a preliminary statement of moral obligation the notion that right actions are those that practical reason would will as universal law. Imperatives for Action More accurate comprehension of morality, of course, requires the introduction of a more precise philosophical vocabulary. Although everything naturally acts in accordance with law, Kant supposed, only rational beings do so consciously, in obedience to the objective principles determined by practical reason. So we experience the claim of reason as an obligation , a command that we act in a particular way, or an imperative. Such imperatives may occur in either of two distinct forms, hypothetical or categorical. A hypothetical imperative conditionally demands performance of an action for the sake of some other end or purpose; it has the form "Do A in order to achieve X. For a perfectly rational being, all of this would be analytic, but given the general limitations of human knowledge, the joint conditions may rarely be satisfied. A categorical imperative, on the other hand, unconditionally demands performance of an action for its own sake; it has the form "Do A. The supreme principle of morality must be a synthetic a priori proposition. Leaving its justification for the third section of the Grounding and the Second Critique , Kant proceeded to a discussion of the content and application of the categorical imperative. The Categorical Imperative Constrained only by the principle of universalizability, the practical reason of any rational being understands the categorical imperative to be: This expression of the moral law, Kant maintained, provides a concrete, practical method for evaluating particular human actions of several distinct varieties. Consider, for example, the case 2 in the text of someone who contemplates relieving a financial crisis by borrowing money from someone else, promising to repay it in the future while in fact having no intention of doing so. Notice that this is not the case of finding yourself incapable of keeping a promise originally made in good faith, which would require a different analysis. The maxim of this action would be that it is permissible to borrow money under false pretenses if you really need it. But as Kant pointed out, making this maxim into a universal law would be clearly self-defeating. The entire practice of lending money on promise presupposes at least the honest intention to repay; if this condition were universally ignored, the universally false promises would never be effective as methods of borrowing. Since the universalized maxim is contradictory in and of itself, no one could will it to be law, and Kant concluded that we have a perfect duty to which there can never be any exceptions whatsoever not to act in this manner. On the other hand, consider the less obvious case 4 in the text of someone who lives comfortably but contemplates refusing any assistance to people who are struggling under great hardships. The maxim here would be that it is permissible never to help those who are less well-off than ourselves. Although Kant

conceded that no direct contradiction would result from the universalization of such a rule of conduct, he argued that no one could consistently will that it become the universal law, since even the most fortunate among us rightly allow for the possibility that we may at some future time find ourselves in need of the benevolence of others. Here we have only an imperfect duty not act so selfishly, since particular instances may require exceptions to the rule when it conflicts either with another imperfect duty e. Kant also supposed that moral obligations arise even when other people are not involved. The essence of immorality, then, is to make an exception of myself by acting on maxims that I cannot willfully universalize. It is always wrong to act in one way while wishing that everyone else would act otherwise. The perfect world for a thief would be one in which everyone else always respected private property. Thus, the purely formal expression of the categorical imperative is shown to yield significant practical application to moral decisions. Alternative Formulae for the Categorical Imperative Although he held that there is only one categorical imperative of morality, Kant found it helpful to express it in several ways. Some of the alternative statements can be regarded as minor variations on his major themes, but two differ from the "formula of universal law" sufficiently to warrant a brief independent discussion. Kant offered the "formula of the end in itself" as: In application to particular cases, of course, it yields the same results: Thus, the Kantian imperative agrees with the Christian expression of "The Golden Rule" by demanding that we derive from our own self-interest a generalized concern for all human beings. Drawing everything together, Kant arrived at the "formula of autonomy," under which the decision to act according to a maxim is actually regarded as having made it a universal law. Here the concern with human dignity is combined with the principle of universalizability to produce a conception of the moral law as self-legislated by each for all. As Kant puts it, A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member when he legislates in it universal laws while also being himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign, when as legislator he is himself subject to the will of no other. A rational being must always regard himself as legislator in a kingdom of ends rendered possible by freedom of the will, whether as member or as sovereign. Just as the understanding in each of us determines the regulative principles of natural science that all must share, so the practical reason in each of us determines the universal maxims of morality that all must obey. Autonomy of the Will In fact, this final formula for the categorical imperative brings us back to the original concept of the will itself as that which is good without qualification. At this point in the argument, Kant can provide a more technical statement of its intrinsic moral value by distinguishing between autonomy and heteronomy of the will. A heteronomous will is one in obedience to rules of action that have been legislated externally to it. Such a will is always submitting itself to some other end, and the principles of its action will invariably be hypothetical imperatives urging that it act in such a way as to receive pleasure, appease the moral sense, or seek personal perfection. In any case, the moral obligations it proposes cannot be regarded as completely binding upon any agent, since their maxim of action comes from outside it. An autonomous will, on the other hand, is entirely self-legislating: The moral obligations by which it is perfectly bound are those which it has imposed upon itself while simultaneously regarding them as binding upon everyone else by virtue of their common possession of the same rational faculties. All genuinely moral action, Kant supposed, flows from the freely chosen dictates of an autonomous will. Human Freedom As we might expect, Kant offered as proof of human freedom a transcendental argument from the fact of moral agency to the truth of its presupposed condition of free will. This may seem to be perfectly analogous to the use of similar arguments for synthetic a priori judgments in the First Critique, but the procedure is more viciously circular here. Having demonstrated the supreme principle of morality by reference to autonomy, Kant can hardly now claim to ground free will upon the supposed fact of morality. That would be to exceed the bounds of reason by employing an epistemological argument for metaphysical purposes. Each case of moral action may be said to embody its own unique instance of the antinomy between freedom and causal determination. For in order to do the right thing, it must at least be possible for my action to have some real effect in the world, yet I must perform it in complete independence from any external influence. Morality requires both freedom and causality in me, and of course Kant supposes that they are. I can think of myself from two standpoints: I operate within the phenomenal realm by participating fully in the causal regularities to which it is subject; but as a timeless thing in itself in the noumenal realm I must be wholly free. The trick is to think of

myself in both ways at once, as sensibly determined but intelligibly free. Kant rightly confesses at the end of the *Grounding* that serious contemplation of morality leads us to the very limits of human reason. Since action in accordance with the moral law requires an autonomous will, we must suppose ourselves to be free; since the correspondence of happiness with virtue cannot be left to mere coincidence, we must suppose that there is a god who guarantees it; and since the moral perfection demanded by the categorical imperative cannot be attained in this life, we must suppose ourselves to live forever. Thus god, freedom, and immortality, which we have seen to be metaphysical illusions that lie beyond the reach of pure reason, turn out to be the three great postulates of practical reason. Things could hardly have been otherwise: In *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* *Metaphysics of Morals* he worked out the practical application of the categorical imperative in some detail, deriving a fairly comprehensive catalog of specific rules for the governance of social and personal morality. What each of us must actually will as universal, Kant supposed, is a very rigid system of narrowly prescribed conduct. In *Zum ewigen Frieden* *On Perpetual Peace*, Kant proposed a high-minded scheme for securing widespread political stability and security. If statesmen would listen to philosophers, he argued, we could easily achieve an international federation of independent republics, each of which reduces its standing army, declines to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, and agrees to be governed by the notion of universal hospitality.

8: BBC - Ethics - Introduction to ethics: Duty-based ethics

Rossian duty-based ethics *Rossian duty-based ethics. Kantian ethics seems pretty uncompromising and not really suited to the untidiness of many moral choices that people have to make.*

Kant pursues this project through the first two chapters of the Groundwork. The point of this first project is to come up with a precise statement of the principle or principles on which all of our ordinary moral judgments are based. The judgments in question are supposed to be those that any normal, sane, adult human being would accept on due rational reflection. Nowadays, however, many would regard Kant as being overly optimistic about the depth and extent of moral agreement. But perhaps he is best thought of as drawing on a moral viewpoint that is very widely shared and which contains some general judgments that are very deeply held. In any case, he does not appear to take himself to be primarily addressing a genuine moral skeptic such as those who often populate the works of moral philosophers, that is, someone who doubts that she has any reason to act morally and whose moral behavior hinges on a rational proof that philosophers might try to give. He rests this second project on the position that we "or at least creatures with rational wills" possess autonomy. The argument of this second project does often appear to try to reach out to a metaphysical fact about our wills. This has led some readers to the conclusion that he is, after all, trying to justify moral requirements by appealing to a fact "our autonomy" that even a moral skeptic would have to recognize. Yet in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant also tried to show that every event has a cause. Kant recognized that there seems to be a deep tension between these two claims: Kant thought that the only way to resolve this apparent conflict is to distinguish between phenomena, which is what we know through experience, and noumena, which we can consistently think but not know through experience. Our knowledge and understanding of the empirical world, Kant argued, can only arise within the limits of our perceptual and cognitive powers. On one interpretation Hudson, one and the same act can be described in wholly physical terms as an appearance and also in irreducibly mental terms as a thing in itself. On this compatibilist picture, all acts are causally determined, but a free act is one that can be described as determined by irreducibly mental causes, and in particular by the causality of reason. A second interpretation holds that the intelligible and sensible worlds are used as metaphors for two ways of conceiving of one and the same world Korsgaard; Allison; Hill a, b. When we are engaging in scientific or empirical investigations, we often take up a perspective in which we think of things as subject to natural causation, but when we deliberate, act, reason and judge, we often take up a different perspective, in which we think of ourselves and others as agents who are not determined by natural causes. We also need some account, based on this principle, of the nature and extent of the specific moral duties that apply to us. To this end, Kant employs his findings from the Groundwork in The Metaphysics of Morals, and offers a categorization of our basic moral duties to ourselves and others. In addition, Kant thought that moral philosophy should characterize and explain the demands that morality makes on human psychology and forms of human social interaction. These topics, among others, are addressed in central chapters of the second Critique, the Religion and again in the Metaphysics of Morals, and are perhaps given a sustained treatment in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Further, a satisfying answer to the question of what one ought to do would have to take into account any political and religious requirements there are. Each of these requirements turn out to be, indirectly at least, also moral obligations for Kant, and are discussed in the Metaphysics of Morals and in Religion. Finally, moral philosophy should say something about the ultimate end of human endeavor, the Highest Good, and its relationship to the moral life. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argued that this Highest Good for humanity is complete moral virtue together with complete happiness, the former being the condition of our deserving the latter. Unfortunately, Kant noted, virtue does not insure wellbeing and may even conflict with it. Further, he thought that there is no real possibility of moral perfection in this life and indeed few of us fully deserve the happiness we are lucky enough to enjoy. Throughout his moral works, Kant returns time and again to the question of the method moral philosophy should employ when pursuing these aims. A basic theme of these discussions is that the fundamental philosophical issues of morality must be addressed a priori, that is, without drawing on

observations of human beings and their behavior. The *Metaphysics of Morals*, for instance, is meant to be based on a priori rational principles, but many of the specific duties that Kant describes, along with some of the arguments he gives in support of them, rely on general facts about human beings and our circumstances that are known from experience. In one sense, it might seem obvious why Kant insists on an a priori method. Such a project would address such questions as, What is a duty? What kinds of duties are there? What is the good? What kinds of goods are there? These appear to be metaphysical questions. Any principle used to provide such categorizations appears to be a principle of metaphysics, in a sense, but Kant did not see them as external moral truths that exist independently of rational agents. Moral requirements, instead, are rational principles that tell us what we have overriding reason to do. Metaphysical principles of this sort are always sought out and established by a priori methods. However, the considerations he offers for an a priori method do not all obviously draw on this sort of rationale. The following are three considerations favoring a priori methods that he emphasizes repeatedly. The first is that, as Kant and others have conceived of it, ethics initially requires an analysis of our moral concepts. Given that the analysis of concepts is an a priori matter, to the degree that ethics consists of such an analysis, ethics is a priori as well. Of course, even were we to agree with Kant that ethics should begin with analysis, and that analysis is or should be an entirely a priori undertaking, this would not explain why all of the fundamental questions of moral philosophy must be pursued a priori. Indeed, one of the most important projects of moral philosophy, for Kant, is to show that we, as rational agents, are bound by moral requirements and that fully rational agents would necessarily comply with them. Kant admits that his analytical arguments for the CI are inadequate on their own because the most they can show is that the CI is the supreme principle of morality if there is such a principle. Kant must therefore address the possibility that morality itself is an illusion by showing that the CI really is an unconditional requirement of reason that applies to us. This is the second reason Kant held that fundamental issues in ethics must be addressed with an a priori method: The ultimate subject matter of ethics is the nature and content of the principles that necessarily determine a rational will. Fundamental issues in moral philosophy must also be settled a priori because of the nature of moral requirements themselves, or so Kant thought. This is a third reason he gives for an a priori method, and it appears to have been of great importance to Kant: Moral requirements present themselves as being unconditionally necessary. But an a posteriori method seems ill-suited to discovering and establishing what we must do whether we feel like doing it or not; surely such a method could only tell us what we actually do. Kant argued that empirical observations could only deliver conclusions about, for instance, the relative advantages of moral behavior in various circumstances or how pleasing it might be in our own eyes or the eyes of others. Such findings clearly would not support the unconditional necessity of moral requirements. To appeal to a posteriori considerations would thus result in a tainted conception of moral requirements. It would view them as demands for which compliance is not unconditionally necessary, but rather necessary only if additional considerations show it to be advantageous, optimistic or in some other way felicitous. Thus, Kant argued that if moral philosophy is to guard against undermining the unconditional necessity of obligation in its analysis and defense of moral thought, it must be carried out entirely a priori. Nevertheless, this idea of a good will is an important commonsense touchstone to which Kant returns throughout his works. The idea of a good will is supposed to be the idea of one who is committed only to make decisions that she holds to be morally worthy and who takes moral considerations in themselves to be conclusive reasons for guiding her behavior. This sort of disposition or character is something we all highly value, Kant thought. He believes we value it without limitation or qualification. By this, we believe, he means primarily two things. First, unlike anything else, there is no conceivable circumstance in which we regard our own moral goodness as worth forfeiting simply in order to obtain some desirable object. By contrast, the value of all other desirable qualities, such as courage or cleverness, can be diminished, forgone, or sacrificed under certain circumstances: Courage may be laid aside if it requires injustice, and it is better not to be witty if it requires cruelty. There is no implicit restriction or qualification to the effect that a commitment to give moral considerations decisive weight is worth honoring, but only under such and such circumstances. Second, possessing and maintaining a steadfast commitment to moral principles is the very condition under which anything else is worth having or pursuing. The value of a

good will thus cannot be that it secures certain valuable ends, whether of our own or of others, since their value is entirely conditional on our possessing and maintaining a good will. Indeed, since a good will is good under any condition, its goodness must not depend on any particular conditions obtaining. Human beings inevitably feel this Law as a constraint on their natural desires, which is why such Laws, as applied to human beings, are imperatives and duties. A human will in which the Moral Law is decisive is motivated by the thought of duty. A holy or divine will, if it exists, though good, would not be good because it is motivated by thoughts of duty because such a will does not have natural inclinations and so necessarily fulfills moral requirements without feeling constrained to do so. Kant confirms this by comparing motivation by duty with other sorts of motives, in particular, with motives of self-interest, self-preservation, sympathy and happiness. He argues that a dutiful action from any of these motives, however praiseworthy it may be, does not express a good will. Only then would the action have moral worth. Many object that we do not think better of actions done for the sake of duty than actions performed out of emotional concern or sympathy for others, especially those things we do for friends and family. What is crucial in actions that express a good will is that in conforming to duty a perfectly virtuous person always would, and so ideally we should, recognize and be moved by the thought that our conformity is morally obligatory. The motivational structure of the agent should be arranged so that she always treats considerations of duty as sufficient reasons for conforming to those requirements. In other words, we should have a firm commitment not to perform an action if it is morally forbidden and to perform an action if it is morally required. Having a good will, in this sense, is compatible with having feelings and emotions of various kinds, and even with aiming to cultivate some of them in order to counteract desires and inclinations that tempt us to immorality. Suppose for the sake of argument we agree with Kant. We now need to know what distinguishes the principle that lays down our duties from these other motivating principles, and so makes motivation by it the source of unqualified value.

Duty and Respect for Moral Law According to Kant, what is singular about motivation by duty is that it consists of bare respect for the moral law. What naturally comes to mind is this: Duties are rules or laws of some sort combined with some sort of felt constraint or incentive on our choices, whether from external coercion by others or from our own powers of reason. For instance, the bylaws of a club lay down duties for its officers and enforce them with sanctions. City and state laws establish the duties of citizens and enforce them with coercive legal power. Thinking we are duty bound is simply respecting, as such, certain laws pertaining to us. Respect for such laws could hardly be thought valuable. For another, our motive in conforming our actions to civic and other laws is rarely unconditional respect. We also have an eye toward doing our part in maintaining civil or social order, toward punishments or loss of standing and reputation in violating such laws, and other outcomes of lawful behavior. Indeed, we respect these laws to the degree, but only to the degree, that they do not violate values, laws or principles we hold more dear. Yet Kant thinks that, in acting from duty, we are not at all motivated by a prospective outcome or some other extrinsic feature of our conduct except insofar as these are requirements of duty itself. We are motivated by the mere conformity of our will to law as such. Human persons inevitably have respect for the moral law even though we are not always moved by it and even though we do not always comply with the moral standards that we nonetheless recognize as authoritative. The force of moral requirements as reasons is that we cannot ignore them no matter how circumstances might conspire against any other consideration. Basic moral requirements retain their reason-giving force under any circumstance, they have universal validity. So, whatever else may be said of basic moral requirements, their content is universal.

9: Ethical Theories of Aristotle and Immanuel Kant | Essay Writing Blog

Immanuel Kant and the Categorical Imperative explained. The concepts of good will, moral duty, summum bonum and the five rules of Kant's universal maxims alongside a brief discussion on how Kant's theory could be applied to the modern ethical issue of genetic engineering.

His father was a master harness maker, and his mother was the daughter of a harness maker, though she was better educated than most women of her social class. Pietism was an evangelical Lutheran movement that emphasized conversion, reliance on divine grace, the experience of religious emotions, and personal devotion involving regular Bible study, prayer, and introspection. Leibniz " was then very influential in German universities. But Kant was also exposed to a range of German and British critics of Wolff, and there were strong doses of Aristotelianism and Pietism represented in the philosophy faculty as well. For the next four decades Kant taught philosophy there, until his retirement from teaching in at the age of seventy-two. Kant had a burst of publishing activity in the years after he returned from working as a private tutor. In and he published three scientific works " one of which, *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* , was a major book in which, among other things, he developed what later became known as the nebular hypothesis about the formation of the solar system. Unfortunately, the printer went bankrupt and the book had little immediate impact. To secure qualifications for teaching at the university, Kant also wrote two Latin dissertations: The following year he published another Latin work, *The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry, of Which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology* , in hopes of succeeding Knutzen as associate professor of logic and metaphysics, though Kant failed to secure this position. Both works depart from Leibniz-Wolffian views, though not radically. Kant held this position from to , during which period he would lecture an average of twenty hours per week on logic, metaphysics, and ethics, as well as mathematics, physics, and physical geography. In his lectures Kant used textbooks by Wolffian authors such as Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten " and Georg Friedrich Meier " , but he followed them loosely and used them to structure his own reflections, which drew on a wide range of ideas of contemporary interest. These ideas often stemmed from British sentimentalist philosophers such as David Hume " and Francis Hutcheson " , some of whose texts were translated into German in the mids; and from the Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau " , who published a flurry of works in the early s. From early in his career Kant was a popular and successful lecturer. After several years of relative quiet, Kant unleashed another burst of publications in " , including five philosophical works. *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* rehearses criticisms of Aristotelian logic that were developed by other German philosophers. The book attracted several positive and some negative reviews. *The Prize Essay* draws on British sources to criticize German rationalism in two respects: In *Negative Magnitudes* Kant also argues that the morality of an action is a function of the internal forces that motivate one to act, rather than of the external physical actions or their consequences. Finally, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* deals mainly with alleged differences in the tastes of men and women and of people from different cultures. After it was published, Kant filled his own interleaved copy of this book with often unrelated handwritten remarks, many of which reflect the deep influence of Rousseau on his thinking about moral philosophy in the mids. These works helped to secure Kant a broader reputation in Germany, but for the most part they were not strikingly original. While some of his early works tend to emphasize rationalist ideas, others have a more empiricist emphasis. During this time Kant was striving to work out an independent position, but before the s his views remained fluid. In Kant published his first work concerned with the possibility of metaphysics, which later became a central topic of his mature philosophy. In , at the age of forty-six, Kant was appointed to the chair in logic and metaphysics at the Albertina, after teaching for fifteen years as an unsalaried lecturer and working since as a sublibrarian to supplement his income. Kant was turned down for the same position in In order to inaugurate his new position, Kant also wrote one more Latin dissertation: Inspired by Crusius and the Swiss natural philosopher Johann Heinrich Lambert " , Kant distinguishes between two fundamental powers of cognition, sensibility and understanding intelligence , where the Leibniz-Wolffians regarded understanding

intellect as the only fundamental power. Moreover, as the title of the Inaugural Dissertation indicates, Kant argues that sensibility and understanding are directed at two different worlds: The Inaugural Dissertation thus develops a form of Platonism; and it rejects the view of British sentimentalists that moral judgments are based on feelings of pleasure or pain, since Kant now holds that moral judgments are based on pure understanding alone. After Kant never surrendered the views that sensibility and understanding are distinct powers of cognition, that space and time are subjective forms of human sensibility, and that moral judgments are based on pure understanding or reason alone. But his embrace of Platonism in the Inaugural Dissertation was short-lived. He soon denied that our understanding is capable of insight into an intelligible world, which cleared the path toward his mature position in the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which the understanding like sensibility supplies forms that structure our experience of the sensible world, to which human knowledge is limited, while the intelligible or noumenal world is strictly unknowable to us. Kant spent a decade working on the Critique of Pure Reason and published nothing else of significance between and Kant also published a number of important essays in this period, including Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Aim and Conjectural Beginning of Human History, his main contributions to the philosophy of history; An Answer to the Question: Jacobi's "accused the recently deceased G. Lessing" of Spinozism. With these works Kant secured international fame and came to dominate German philosophy in the late 18th century. But in he announced that the Critique of the Power of Judgment brought his critical enterprise to an end 5: In his chair at Jena passed to J. Kant retired from teaching in 1797. For nearly two decades he had lived a highly disciplined life focused primarily on completing his philosophical system, which began to take definite shape in his mind only in middle age. After retiring he came to believe that there was a gap in this system separating the metaphysical foundations of natural science from physics itself, and he set out to close this gap in a series of notes that postulate the existence of an ether or caloric matter. Kant died February 12, 1797, just short of his eightieth birthday. See also Bxiv; and 4: Thus metaphysics for Kant concerns a priori knowledge, or knowledge whose justification does not depend on experience; and he associates a priori knowledge with reason. The project of the Critique is to examine whether, how, and to what extent human reason is capable of a priori knowledge. The Enlightenment was a reaction to the rise and successes of modern science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The spectacular achievement of Newton in particular engendered widespread confidence and optimism about the power of human reason to control nature and to improve human life. One effect of this new confidence in reason was that traditional authorities were increasingly questioned. For why should we need political or religious authorities to tell us how to live or what to believe, if each of us has the capacity to figure these things out for ourselves? Kant expresses this Enlightenment commitment to the sovereignty of reason in the Critique: Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion through its holiness and legislation through its majesty commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination Axi. Enlightenment is about thinking for oneself rather than letting others think for you, according to What is Enlightenment? In this essay, Kant also expresses the Enlightenment faith in the inevitability of progress. A few independent thinkers will gradually inspire a broader cultural movement, which ultimately will lead to greater freedom of action and governmental reform. The problem is that to some it seemed unclear whether progress would in fact ensue if reason enjoyed full sovereignty over traditional authorities; or whether unaided reasoning would instead lead straight to materialism, fatalism, atheism, skepticism Bxxxiv, or even libertinism and authoritarianism 8: The Enlightenment commitment to the sovereignty of reason was tied to the expectation that it would not lead to any of these consequences but instead would support certain key beliefs that tradition had always sanctioned. Crucially, these included belief in God, the soul, freedom, and the compatibility of science with morality and religion. Although a few intellectuals rejected some or all of these beliefs, the general spirit of the Enlightenment was not so radical. The Enlightenment was about replacing traditional authorities with the authority of individual human reason, but it was not about overturning traditional moral and religious beliefs. Yet the original inspiration for the Enlightenment was the new physics, which was mechanistic. If nature is entirely governed by mechanistic,

causal laws, then it may seem that there is no room for freedom, a soul, or anything but matter in motion. This threatened the traditional view that morality requires freedom. We must be free in order to choose what is right over what is wrong, because otherwise we cannot be held responsible. It also threatened the traditional religious belief in a soul that can survive death or be resurrected in an afterlife. So modern science, the pride of the Enlightenment, the source of its optimism about the powers of human reason, threatened to undermine traditional moral and religious beliefs that free rational thought was expected to support. This was the main intellectual crisis of the Enlightenment. In other words, free rational inquiry adequately supports all of these essential human interests and shows them to be mutually consistent. So reason deserves the sovereignty attributed to it by the Enlightenment. In a way the Inaugural Dissertation also tries to reconcile Newtonian science with traditional morality and religion, but its strategy is different from that of the Critique. According to the Inaugural Dissertation, Newtonian science is true of the sensible world, to which sensibility gives us access; and the understanding grasps principles of divine and moral perfection in a distinct intelligible world, which are paradigms for measuring everything in the sensible world. So on this view our knowledge of the intelligible world is a priori because it does not depend on sensibility, and this a priori knowledge furnishes principles for judging the sensible world because in some way the sensible world itself conforms to or imitates the intelligible world. Soon after writing the Inaugural Dissertation, however, Kant expressed doubts about this view. As he explained in a February 21, letter to his friend and former student, Marcus Herz: In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of the soul brought about by the object. However, I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible. And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects — objects that are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby? The position of the Inaugural Dissertation is that the intelligible world is independent of the human understanding and of the sensible world, both of which in different ways conform to the intelligible world. But, leaving aside questions about what it means for the sensible world to conform to an intelligible world, how is it possible for the human understanding to conform to or grasp an intelligible world? If the intelligible world is independent of our understanding, then it seems that we could grasp it only if we are passively affected by it in some way. But for Kant sensibility is our passive or receptive capacity to be affected by objects that are independent of us 2: So the only way we could grasp an intelligible world that is independent of us is through sensibility, which means that our knowledge of it could not be a priori. The pure understanding alone could at best enable us to form representations of an intelligible world. Such a priori intellectual representations could well be figments of the brain that do not correspond to anything independent of the human mind. In any case, it is completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondence between purely intellectual representations and an independent intelligible world. But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge. This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties. We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience. Kant characterizes this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial

motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest.

Listening chart 23 : Debussy, Clouds Walt Disney World (Birnbaums Travel Guides) Phemie Millar, by the author of The Kinnears. Clinical epidemiology the essentials 5th Contents: 1 manual 1 cassette 1 pack scoring sheets contained in folder. Exploring families through mothering across time and cultures Rethinking writing Philosophical logic Book three : The grand alliance (Sunday, December 7, 1941, and onward) Bring on the heat katie rose KanyenKeha Tawatati Accounting information systems romney 13th edition Time-travel Christmas Regional planning and development book Santa Clarita Valley A Pictorial History Vol 2 1926-1976 More of everything else The politics of marriage in contemporary China The Moving Finger (Miss Marple Mysteries (Paperback)) Bradleys complete gas grill cookbook Quiz 7. Helping the immigrants Searching for the mind 4 Fascism and Anti-Fascism, 1934-6 Before and after Darwin Infiniti g35 user manual Une Vie, A Piece of String and Other Stories, V1 Richard C. Lee United States Courthouse Miscellaneous towns, plantations, &c. Devout remembering. Attributive and model theses Steam Transport on the Roads Savings Bond Advisor Build the Ultimate Gaming PC Paul, virtues, and vices Troels Engberg-Pedersen. Fearfully and wonderfully made : brain chemistry and depression New eyes for old stories Homefaring (1983); Part 3 : Moderate old school Presbyterian. Psychology class 11 chapter 5 notes Practice examination one Good-Bye, Mr. Chips/Pbn 20085/2-Cassettes