

## 1: Religion in Literature and Film in South Asia - PDF Free Download

*Creating a public: emergence of a middle class in colonial Lucknow --An uneasy sangam: gender and the contradictions of middle-class --Modernity --Publicizing religiosity: modernity, religion, and the middle class --Impermanent identities: limits of middle-class nationalisms --Reflections on fractured modernity. Responsibility: Sanjay Joshi.*

Friday, November 11, - 7: Please come up to the Santa Rosa Foyer, on the second level above the lobby, to register for the conference and pick up your nametag and conference program. Eloise Whisenhunt, Young Harris College. As a sequence, the poems criticize American tyranny. Ery Shin, Stanford University. Lone Wolf or Underground Hero?. Irandokht Dina Moinszadeh, Independent Scholar. This paper will focus on the writer Charles Bukowski and the way he is described in scholarly works. He is indeed portrayed in contradictory ways by academics -- he is either an isolated writer, or an involved poet-editor who collaborated with other local poets. Those contradictions reveal the historiographical erasure of the poetry scene he was a part of. They also reveal some specificities of the Los Angeles poetry scene in the middle of the 20th century. Adah Isaacs Menken in Free Verse. Amanda Licato, Stanford University. Gertrude Stein and Her Saints: Rediscovering the Birdman of Alcatraz: Prison Ornithology as Personal Autobiography. The Autobiography of the Huntress. Recent hunting memoirs present autobiographical accounts of women finding growth, empowerment, and connection through the act of the hunt. Even though the claim is manifestly untrue, it seems clear that by the time of Jesus it had become an established belief. Some later Christian commentators, like Augustine, Aelred of Rievaulx, and Reginald Pecock, insist that love of self is a prerequisite for fulfilling the commandment. Ruth and Proactive Women of the Bible. This paper explores the use of inner-biblical allusion in the Book of Ruth and how it invokes earlier female biblical figures. From ancilla to empress. To I Friday, November 11, - 8: Emily George, The University of Washington. Shane Wood, University of California, Irvine. This paper will look at the imagery used to discuss women on the cusp of death. When living, Cleopatra, Ophelia, and Hermoine are seen as soft, even sensual women. However, at or near the time of death, they are all described in some way as stone, and as such can then be examined and removed from the plot while lessening the horror of a woman dead. Sonia Desai, University of California, Irvine. My paper looks to the female characters who encounter this male arena and the way they are depicted. These women are seen as monstrous, aberrations of femininity because of their incursions into the battlefield. Their success in battle is a negation of their femininity, as they cannot be both a warrior and appropriately female. Chris Wallis, University of California, Davis. Nozomi Irei, Southern Utah University. Comparative Literature is "hammer" to and "rhizome" in the Humanities. Matt Ehlenbach, Georgetown University. Economic and technological changes following the Second World War radically altered social mores in Europe and North America. Analyzing the Emotions across Three Ancient Cultures. Kirby, University of Miami. A comparative analysis of texts from three ancient cultures, all of which provide catalogues of the emotions: This paper argues that the letter "a" genre that is not privileged in the college composition classroom "is an ideal form to develop student writing at the university level, especially for freshmen from underrepresented backgrounds who are the first in their families to attend college. Getting the Writer to Speak Up. San Jacinto Community College. This interactive presentation has three presenters discuss their findings and approaches to a question-based pedagogy in first-year writing courses. We will share why we chose a question-based approach, we will share our methodology and results, and we will share how we taught our students to ask for feedback. Write What They Know: Lindsey Chiles, Winthrop University. Compositional instruction has often utilized writing about the self as a stepping-stone to other rhetorical approaches such as persuasion or argumentation. However, by utilizing more effective and deliberate assignment design that incorporates the complex actions required by effective personal writing, instructors can re-conceptualize the way in which writing about the self is applied in the composition classroom, which could ultimately assist developing writers in reconciling this mode of writing with academic discourse. Kimberly Drake, Scripps College. The

Absent Presence of Disability: Kassia Waggoner, Friends University. In this essay, I argue that Singer displays what I call feminist listening through his interactions with Mick. Nicole Kenley, Simpson University. Accordingly, the poems are remarkable for epigrammatic qualities, such as sharpness of wit and surprising turns, in their progression toward a conclusion, with proverb or adage offered to the reader. Jill Goad, Shorter University. Poet Natasha Trethewey draws inspiration from photographs of often overlooked or unacknowledged figures in history such as prostitutes, sharecroppers, and domestic workers, using ekphrastic descriptions of snapshots to comment on broader issues in public life and complicate dominant perceptions of Southern history. Joyce Moser, Stanford University. Chandler and Wilder had little in common but their outsider status: Chandler learned California English almost as a second language, Wilder literally so. The Long Green Line: Andrew Howe, La Sierra University. In several of his films, director John Ford establishes the U. Army as a site of integration and assimilation for Irish-Americans during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Work Print as a Text. This paper will look at the Work Print version of the film and place it in the same conversation as the other versions of the film in terms of scholarship. Rebooting films and franchises has become a common practice in the film industry. I discuss the evidence in process that I have used to create the character of Kajle, an Elizabethan courtier who travels as a spy with Francis Drake. Canons, Bodies, and Reimagining: Containing and Freeing Queer Identity. This paper will discuss archives through literary canons. I argue that literary canons, although pertinent to academia, consequently exclude bodies and texts. Within this context, queer bodies and their lives become erased in favor of heteronormative figures. Families of Invisible Gay Elves: Zachary Snider, Bentley University. In this paper I explore the genre constrictions and crossovers of autobiography, memoir, and scholarly research publications. By using literary theories from memoirists and critics, I chronicle my own book project about the social and familial injustices committed against same-sex adoptive parents. Gender Fluency within Orlando, A Biography. This paper connects language translation to gender transition within Orlando, A Biography to demonstrate the parallel between linguistic and lived gender identity. Paul Buchholz, University of California, Berkeley. William Christopher Burwick, Hamilton College. Their presence, the aesthetics of their arrangement and their materiality represent intellectual spirit, economic power, and the power of an empire to shape knowledge itself. Lora Geriguis, La Sierra University. An examination of the efforts Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, made to gift her publications to the fellows serves to illuminate the politics driving their network of libraries. Early Modern Reading for Profit and Pleasure. This paper examines bibliographic culture in Los Angeles in the early twentieth century. How is regionality constructed and reconstructed through such bibliographies and texts? Deanne Sparks, University of North Dakota. Archiving Years of Surveillance: Reading Stolen Generation Narratives from Australia. This paper intends to locate the role of the various records maintained by the Australian colonial government on the lives its indigenous population. These records which scrutinized and panopticed the lives of indigenous people also played a significant role in creating a false identity for a group of people also known as stolen generation, who not only were unaware of their ancestry but had no immediate connection to locate one. The role of colonial archiving in forging a false identity for them is located through the Indigenous life narratives. Books in the Air: Jacob Price, Rutgers University. This statement presents an alternative idea of how books and knowledge are shared within a community. This study explains this open source network in Amazonian cosmology as explained by the shaman. The network of books in the air addresses questions about authorship and knowledge accessibility while offering other ways of understanding how knowledge is stored and retrieved.

**2: Project MUSE - Balikbayan Configurations and a U.S.-Philippine Politics of Modernization**

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Exile, Mysticism, and Secularism in K. Her research interests are Hindi drama, Bollywood film, bhakti Hinduism, and Hindu reform movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Festschrift Helmut Nespital Reinbek: Rethinking Reader Response New York: Oxford University Press, Narratives of Home, Dislocation, and Resettlement Pearson, , co-ed. Journal of Comparative Poetics, Gramma, and book collections. Anne Castaing obtained her Ph. She is also a translator of Hindi Literature: In she received a Fulbright scholarship University of Washington, Seattle. Her research interests include contemporary Hindi fiction: A Random Approach and the Perpetuation of Stereotypes. A Drama of Attachment and Nonattachment. Her publications include The Agent in the Margin: Postcolonial Fusions Rodopi, Heidi Pauwels obtained her Ph. Her main research interests are Krishna and Rama bhakti, esp. Sita and Radha as role models in Sanskrit and medieval texts and contemporary film and television, and Nagridas alias Savant Singh of Kishangarh. She is the author of In Praise of Holy Men: Egbert Forsten, and Kr.. Recasting Classics London; New York: Lucy Rosenstein obtained her Ph. Egbert Forsten, , New Poetry in Hindi: An Anthology Permanent Black , Anthem , and numerous translations of and articles on contemporary Hindi poetry. She is particularly interested in the theory and practice of translation and in gender issues, and the work of contemporary Hindi women poets has remained the focus of her research for the past seven years. She is completing her Ph. The Spanish translation of the novel won the Mar de Letras prize in Spain. Her second book, a work of nonfiction titled Single in the City: Her research interests include gender, postcoloniality, popular culture, and cinema. Perundevi Srinivasan is a Ph. Her research focuses on the conceptions of the body and modernity within a framework of the goddess cult in Tamil Nadu, India. Perundevi is a Tamil writer and poet. Her publications include two poetry collections and short stories. Laetitia Zecchini obtained her Ph. PUR, forthcoming and has published several articles on Indian poetry and on postcolonial theory. Her research interests include the politics of poetics, the representation of the subaltern in literature, specifically poetry, strangeness in Indian writing, and the literature of the Dalits. Nasalization is indicated by the sign m. The titles of films and the names of deities, of characters in fiction and scripture, of languages, and of cities and countries have not been marked with diacritics. This page intentionally left blank On Myth and Mythologizing: An Introduction Diana Dimitrova T his book deals with the representation of myth and religion in South Asian literature and film. The volume brings together several essays that explore the interface between religion, philosophy, mythology, gender, and fundamentalism. It is organized in two parts. Part I has a focus on religion, myth, and gender, and Part II on religion, myth, and politics. The common thread that links the two parts is the appropriation and reinterpretation of myth. All essays explore various aspects of the ongoing process of remythologizing of the present, as revealed in literature and film in South Asia. The essays in this collection respond to one and the same question: What is the meaning of ancient and venerated myths today? What are the ideological implications of the interpretation of myths and how do they reflect and influence the power structures of contemporary societies in South Asia? The study of myth has been of central importance to philosophers in antiquity and to scholars of religion and literature from the sixteenth century onward. Scholars of different persuasions and methods have approached myth and studied it from different perspectives. I therefore examine the major theories of myth in the fields of religious studies and literary studies. Next I deal with the importance of myth in South Asia and the ongoing remythologizing of South Asian culture. I look into some major works on myth by scholars of South Asian religions and philosophy, some recent studies of myth in South Asian literatures by scholars who deal with literatures in South Asian languages, and the surprising absence of any studies of myth in theoretical postcolonial criticism, which dominates the academic discourse on South Asia in the West today. The present volume studies the links between myth and ideology with regard to the representation of gender and politics in the works of

several major poets, dramatists, novelists, and filmmakers. The Study of Myth has been the subject of study of religious and philosophical thought since antiquity. Classical philosophy was engaged in a rational evaluation of mythology and the connections between knowledge and myth. The Sophists, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the neo-Platonists took serious interest in the study of myth. During the Renaissance interest in the mythology of antiquity reemerged, and myths were seen positively as manifestations of poetic and moral allegories or religious, philosophical, and scientific truths. By contrast, in the period of the Enlightenment, myth was interpreted negatively and was seen as the expression of ignorance and delusion. At this time several books were published that influenced present-day theories and approaches to the study of myth in the eighteenth century. Myth is seen as an aesthetic phenomenon and the symbolic prototype of artistic creation. The Romantic views on myth mark the declining of the traditional interpretations of myth as allegory and the rise of the symbolic approach. These two schools had contrasting views on the study of myth. The mythological school, whose main representative was the Indologist Max Mueller,<sup>4</sup> was based on comparative and historical linguistics and attempted to reconstruct ancient Indo-European mythology by means of comparison of the etymologies of words in Indo-European languages. By contrast, the anthropological school, whose main representatives were Edward B. Tylor and Andrew Lang,<sup>5</sup> was based on comparative ethnography. It studied not Indo-European linguistic data but archaic and civilized societies. In the twentieth century the study of myth continued and new theories of myth arose. These are the rationalistic, ritualistic, functional, the French Sociological School, symbolic, psychoanalytic, phenomenological, and structural theories. Similar to scientific theories myths can explain the origin of human life or the origin and function of the universe. Myths are considered to offer false explanations. This theory does not explain why whole societies persist in believing what is false. Ritualistic theories of myth assert the primacy of ritual over myth. Rituals are considered the principal source from which emerged myth, religion, and art. He emphasizes the primacy of magic and the role magic plays in asserting social order and hierarchy in marriage and property relations. He believes that myth is the script for ritual and not an attempt to understand the world. The myth and ritual school was prominent in the 19th and 20th centuries and influenced the study of Western literature, art, and culture. Functionalist theories postulate that the meaning of myth is to be found in the functions of myth. Myths function to satisfy the needs of societies and individuals such as the need for meaning, identity, and belonging. The most prominent representative of the functionalist theory is Bronislaw Malinowski. He denies the claims of rationalistic theory that myth serves primarily as an explanation satisfying scientific interest. He believes that myth should be understood in terms of its social function within a particular culture. Myths are told to satisfy the need for social submission or practical requirements. Thus, for Malinowski, myth has a purely practical function. Myth codifies thought, sanctions rituals, reinforces social practices, and justifies the social order, that is, myth is a powerful mechanism for maintaining social and economic harmony. He finds that society reproduces itself through religion. Durkheim studies totemism in Australian aboriginal societies and finds that the mythology of totemism legitimates the social and political organization of the tribe. Totemism sacralizes not specific objects or natural phenomena but the group itself and provides a model of the world. His findings are of major importance for the development of the theory of myth. He criticizes both Tylor and Frazer for seeing the way primitives respond to experience of the world as primitive error. He contends that while European thinking is rational, logical, and scientific, primitive thinking is affective, poetic, and mystical. Rather they contain symbolic representations. The basic assumption of symbolic theories is that myths have hidden meanings that must be decoded. Ernst Cassirer is the most prominent thinker of this school. The psychoanalytic theory of myth is closely linked to the symbolic theory as the symbolic representations that myths are considered to contain may refer to repressed material from the individual unconscious, universal archetypes of patterns from the collective unconscious, or social organization and structure. Freudian psychology sees myth as the obvious expression of a psychic complex. The symbolism of the mythological imagination is interpreted as allegory of the erotic complex that the ego represses. The archetype resembles what is called in myth a motif and collective representations. Jung points out that the participation in the

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ritualization of a myth can shape and create whole communities.

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*The social base and ideological orientation of middle class activists, therefore ensured that identities they forged through their interventions in the public sphere remained shifting, protean and impermanent constructs. ^.*

To view a copy of this license, visit <http://www.upf.edu>: You are free to electronically copy, distribute, and transmit this work if you attribute authorship. However, all printing rights are reserved by the University Press of Florida <http://www.upf.edu>: Please contact UPF for information about how to obtain copies of the work for print distribution. You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work. For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission from the University Press of Florida. Nothing in this license impairs or restricts the authors moral rights. The Florida James Joyce series Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN acid-free paper 1. Nationalism and literature IrelandHistory20th century. Politics and literatureIreland History20th century. National characteristics, Irish, in literature. Epic literature History and criticism. Fables History and criticism. A Negotiation with History and Nationhood 1 1. The Argument of the Fable: An Overview 24 2. Closure and Millicent Bloom 67 5. Epic Mimesis and the Syntax of Ulysses 80 6. Ungar stresses the importance of epic parallels in the novel in translating them into a familial fable of Irish sovereignty in keeping with the epic s traditional interpretation as an allegory of nationhood. Manifest in his book is the exceptional idea of Ulysses as a real Irish nationalistic epic in its most ancient and politically figurative form, ultimately drawing on Arthur Griffith s version of Sinn Fein for a promise of Ireland s future emergence as a sovereign country. By making its own fable the essential frame of the articulation of this horizon, for the conjunction between the quest for an appropriate epic voice and national self-awareness, Ulysses connects its Dublin scenes and conversations to the grand lexicon of legitimacy in the West. The result is a celebration of the epic as a formative power in everyday life. Joyceans have been struggling for a long time to provide a sufficient answer to the problem of Joyce s intent beyond the mere comic value of parody in connecting his novel to Homer s great ur-epic. Applied to the idea of Joyce s celebration of the epic fable as a formative power in everyday life and creation, Joyce s scene of Ireland, at a crossroads of its own nationalistic destiny, expropriates the significance of Sinn Fein for its own political fable of national destiny, weaving the whole into the domestic drama of the Blooms extended household. While the history of the Sinn Fein party and the politics of the treaty are generally well known to Joyceans, the details of the relationships of the crowns of St. Throughout, Ungar s close reading of segments of Ulysses produces new interpretations founded in nearly every case not on speculation but on solid historical grounds and common sense. I d like to thank my readers at the University Press of Florida: Zack Bowen for his patience and suggestions; Dominic Manganiello for his encouragement; Enda Duffy for his careful survey of the whole argument and detailed commentary. I remain grateful to Joseph Ronsley, then of McGill University, for patience in his encounters with several ur -versions of the argument. At Concordia University, where I completed several degrees and have now taught for many more years than I was a student, I have learned a great deal from G. David Sheps interest in modern literature, Eyvind Ronquist s work on Dante, Laszlo Gefin s analysis of Pound, and Fred Krantz s studies in menschheit I d like to thank Ramesh Rambaran at the Webster Library for his help and consideration and my students both in the English Department and at the Liberal Arts College for helping to keep alive the ideas that went into this work. I can t begin to detail my debt to my family. This book owes a great deal to my late father, who never heard of Joyce. A refugee from Stalinist Hungary, fatally ill soon after his arrival in Canada, he was determined to understand the politics and historical events that had destroyed his first family and had forced him to emigrate with the very young children of his second family. I owe my interest in history and language to the daily duty of having to translate for him at an age when I could hardly manage English or the news. My father had a terrific appreciation of how practical things worked. In Joyce, I was attracted to the intellectual horizon of an migr a poet with

infinitely complicated talents who was committed to elaborate conversations with acquaintances, poets, historians, and politi- PAGE 10 x Acknowledgmentscians, living and dead, and who thrived on the practical difficulties of providing a coherent historical account. Bela Ungar would have wanted to know how Joyce s story worked. I d like to thank Viola Schwartz-Ungar, Suzanne Ungar, Giselle Foti, and especially Kathryn Gill for just being around and for forbearance, humor, and support throughout the long composition of this book. Some of the material here has appeared in print previously as *Among the Hapsburgs: Essays on Anglo-Irish Literature and Language* ed. Morse Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire, England: Simple parentheses without any letters refer to chapter and line in *Ulysses* for example 1. I used the Gabler edition. *FW Finnegans Wake* London: Notes for James Joyce s *Ulysses* Rev. University of California Press, A Negotiation with History and Nationhood *Ulysses* distinctive contribution to historiography is as comprehensive as its systematic elaboration of the expressive possibilities of different styles. With apparently atavistic nonchalance, *Ulysses* recovers the claims of the epic to represent historical events and the communal we, a premise of coherent narrative representation both for historians concerned with collective agency in the past and for nationalists concerned with future communal self-definition. *Ulysses* construes the epic, which since the Enlightenment had been deemed inherently not suited, in Hayden Whites phrase, to the representation of historical events, as a distinct discursive opportunity for historiography, distinct from, but in close dialogue with, the present-mindedness that treats history as representative of current concerns and comes to the fore with twentieth-century historiography. Indeed, it is when we note the absence of a privileged role for a deliberative middle style as the medium appropriate for historiographic representation that we form a first notion of the extent of the discursive domain that *Ulysses* has reserved for innovation. *Ulysses* implicitly argues that epic precedent constitutes the cohesion required in the representation of historical agency. The epic fable negotiates a continuous self-reflective dynamic relation between the action of the characters and the historical constraints on the formation and expression of a national communal identity. In effect, *Ulysses* shaping of the epic as historiography belongs with the late-nineteenth-century shift in historical study from concentration PAGE 14 2 Joyce s *Ulysses* as National Epicon political history toward various forms of interdisciplinarity. Innovative German historiansLamprecht, Schmoller, Hintzeopted for historical narrative sustained by borrowings from social sciences. Robinson, Vernon Parrington, Perry Miller, Frederick Jackson Turnerprepared studies around the influence of the economy, ideas, religion, and the frontier. The *Annales* historians in France shifted the focus to geography, economics, and anthropology, replacing the linear view of time with a nonprogressive, relative, and multilayered understanding. The move is radically new and surprisingly conservative. *Ulysses* has withdrawn from the de-rhetoricisation of historical thinking, from the project of methodological restraint deemed by White the acme of modern historical writing. Incidents that would traditionally have been conceived to be the stuff of religious belief and ritual miracles, magical events, godly events compete with material apt for farce, satire, and calumny. At issue is the modality of the communal we, the requirement, equally, for the transmission of a distinctive narrative and for national vision. In approximating this communal focus, *Ulysses* resumes the perennial conversation with the epic tradition. This recourse to the epic as a touchstone for historical argument is rich with precedent. At the turn of the twentieth century, discussions of the link between history and literature were commonplace. Dilthey, Croce, Collingwood, all called explicitly on imaginative vision to serve as a tool of investigation; Pound and Eliot had investigations of history frame the workings of imagination. The Epic Fable 3history. The *Aeneid* has Jupiter praise empire, Anchises foresee the rule of the Caesars, and Aeneas s shield prefigure imperial triumphs. *Ulysses* elaborates the fable of Stephen Dedalus s encounter with Leopold Bloom and their efforts at continuity as the embodiment or, in G. Hopkins s phrase, the bodying forth of a historical self-understanding possible for Ireland in the wake of these concerns. *Dubliners* had presented history as the absent cause of national paralysis. *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* had dramatized the hope that a Great Man would create an alternative to the deformed legacy of the Irish past. *Ulysses* treats the making of history, the prospect of a distinctively contemporary Irish historical horizon, as a fait accompli. In representing this

self-understanding, it adds incrementally to the vision. The self-awareness enables a conversation about the parameters of historical experience that is much more substantial and farranging than the poetics of the earlier works had permitted. The readiest analogue for the resumption of this conversation with the epic tradition is Virgil's return to Troy in his apologia for Rome. The fable of Ulysses exploits the coincidence between its own publication and the proclamation of the first sovereign Irish state in seven hundred years as the occasion for a comparable disquisition. The coincidence serves as a warrant for making the historical prospect and destiny of Ireland a principal theme, an epic warrant prefigured by The Aeneid's vision of a future Rome and by The Lusitads's celebration of Portugal and its empire. This is tantamount to a celebration of the epic as a formative power in everyday life. This holistic, material celebration of epic comprehensiveness cannot be confused either with the idealizing abstraction of the classical past evident in Tennyson's *Idylls of the King* or with the modernist dilution of a specific, and inherently epic, function as in Hugh Kenner's characterization of The Odyssey as Western man's pioneer novel. It concentrates the action responsible for the PAGE 16 4 Joyce's Ulysses as National Epicshaping of the polity in a synthetic overview of the comprehensiveness of communal destiny and creativity on the model of The Aeneid and The Lusitads. Through the sustained reflection on the epic task, the fable links the self-awareness of the Irish polity and the imperatives of positivist historiographic documentation to the rhetorical force of the powerful topos of natality, the corner stone, in Hannah Arendt's phrase, of the human condition. The fit between the ironic liminality of community in these earlier writings and the generous exfoliation of communal bonds in Ulysses suggests a triadic sequence and Ulysses as mastering contradictions in a quasi-Hegelian synthesis of earlier naively passive, quasi-objective, and vaingloriously self-determined subjective moments. In such a progression Dubliners Portrait and Ulysses function as symbolic shorthand for, respectively, a history-burdened actuality, a messianic subjectivity, and national self-definition. This is a stronger statement of the case than I would argue. James Longenbach described the distinctive twentieth-century stance in historiography as the rejection of the presuppositions about the nature of historical knowledge that make the construction of any sort of teleological or even linear event possible. Its resuscitation of the epic, in historiography an obsolete mode of discourse, brackets teleology in a new way. Instead of a submerged Hegelian logos, the recourse to the epic tradition opens the prospect of an open-ended meditation on historical continuity, present-minded but resistant to foreshortening the prospect to accord with current definitions. While acutely attentive to implications of tradition, Ulysses's resumption of the conversation ensures that the significance of a historic moment will be recognized as finally *sui generis*. It made it easier to turn to the epic for such a synthetic representation of historical change that events in Ireland were arguing for a dramatic climax which, at least in the short run, suggested that Irish history would have to foreground the traditional value of communal self-determination. Ireland was about to achieve a measure of political sovereignty for the first time in seven hundred years. In formal scope, if not in metaphysical sweep, such a redefinition of the political context allowed for a potential resolution of the PAGE 17 Introduction: The Epic Fable's deadlock and isolation featured in the earlier works. In refusing the self-limitation of Dubliners and the mistaken solace of an aesthetically selfsubsisting and historically ideal artist figure of Portrait able, in Ezra Pound's mistaken appreciation, to describe things as they are, not only for Dublin, but for every city, the resort to the epic genre holds out the promise of a broad synoptic understanding. Tom Nairn has recently speculated that the recurrent problem in modern thought might well be the intractability of this inevitable aspect of social experience to adequate symbolization. The true subject of modern philosophy is nationalism, not industrialization, he writes, the nation, not the steam engine and the computer. An adequate account of nationality, while paradigmatic for rational collective agency, figures among the recurrent issues of political life. The need for a programmatic approach to the political status of Ireland as part Britain was a hotly debated topic in contemporary Irish politics. The index of the mounting radicalism of debate is the rising significance of Sinn Fein.

## 4: Nationalism, Internationalism and New Politics - Geopolitical Futures

*Above all, we need to help change the narrative in Europe as well as in the Middle East from one of opposing religious and cultural identities to one of healthy national development.*

No part of this material may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical including photocopying without written permission from the DepEd Central Office. Sources Article 1 Eriksen, Thomas Hyland. Small Places, Large Issues: Democratic Ideals and Realities. The Beginnings of Filipino Society and Culture. The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western Democracy. A Very Short Introduction. Lynch and Alfonso de Guzman II eds. Institute of Philippine Culture. An Anarchy of Families. Policymaking in a Restored Democracy. Article 17 Gans, Herbert. In Down to Earth Sociology, J. The McDonaldization of Society. Contentious Politics, 2nd Edition. It will bring the reader from the damp rainforests of the Amazon to the cold semi-desert of the Arctic; from the skyscrapers of Manhattan to mud huts in the Sahel; from villages in the New Guinea highlands to African cities. D C O It is a long journey in a different sense too. Social and cultural anthropology has the whole of human society as its field of interest, and tries to understand the connections between the various aspects of our existence. When, for example, we study the traditional economic system of the Tiv of central Nigeria, an essential part of the exploration consists in understanding how their economy is connected with other aspects of their society. If this dimension is absent, Tiv economy becomes incomprehensible to anthropologists. If we do not know that the Tiv traditionally could not buy and sell land, and that they have customarily not used money as a means of payment, it will plainly be impossible to understand how they themselves interpret their situation and how they responded to the economic changes imposed on their society during colonialism. EP E Anthropology tries to account for the social and cultural variation in the world, but a crucial part of the anthropological project also consists in conceptualising and understanding similarities between social systems and human relationships. Put in another way: D Another prominent anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, has expressed a similar view in an essay which essentially deals with the differences between humans and animals: If we want to discover what man amounts to, we can only find it in what men are: It is in understanding that variousness—its range, its nature, its basis, and its implications—that we shall come to construct a concept of human nature that, more than a statistical shadow and less than a primitivist dream, has both substance and truth. As will become clearer as we proceed on this journey through the subject-matter and theories of social and cultural anthropology, there is a multitude of ways in which to approach these problems. Whether one is interested in understanding why and in which sense the Azande of Central Africa believe in witches, why there is greater social inequality in 1 All rights reserved. Brazil than in Sweden, how the inhabitants of Mauritius avoid violent ethnic conflict, or what has happened to the traditional way of life of the Inuit Eskimos in recent years, in most cases one or several anthropologists would have carried out research and written on the issue. Whether one is interested in the study of religion, child-raising, political power, economic life or the relationship between men and women, one may go to the professional anthropological literature for inspiration and knowledge. The discipline is also concerned with accounting for the interrelationships between different aspects of human existence, and usually anthropologists investigate these interrelationships taking as their point of departure a detailed study of local life in a particular society or a delineated social environment. One may therefore say that anthropology asks large questions, while at the same time it draws its most important insights from small places. C O An Outline of the Subject PY It has been common to regard its traditional focus on small-scale non-industrial societies as a distinguishing feature of anthropology, compared with other subjects dealing with culture and society. However, because of changes in the world and in the discipline itself, this is no longer an accurate description. Practically any social system can be studied anthropologically and contemporary anthropological research displays an enormous range, empirically as well as thematically. D What, then, is anthropology? Let us begin with the etymology of the

concept. Social anthropology would then mean knowledge about humans in societies. Such a definition would, of course, cover the other social sciences as well as anthropology, but it may still be useful as a beginning. In the early s, Clyde Kluckhohn and Alfred Kroeber presented different definitions of culture. It would not be possible to consider the majority of these definitions here; besides, many of them were “fortunately” quite similar. Let us therefore, as a preliminary conceptualisation of culture, define it as those abilities, notions and forms of behaviour persons have acquired as members of society. A definition of this kind, which is indebted to both the Victorian anthropologist Edward Tylor and to Geertz although the latter stresses meaning rather than behaviour, is the most common one among anthropologists. Culture nevertheless carries with it a basic ambiguity. On the one hand, every human is equally cultural; in this sense, the term refers to a basic similarity within humanity. On the other hand, people have acquired different abilities, notions, etc. Culture refers, in other words, both to basic similarities and to systematic differences between humans. If this sounds slightly complex, some more complexity is necessary already at this point. Truth to tell, during the last decades of the twentieth century, the concept of culture was deeply contested in anthropology on both sides of the Atlantic. The influential Geertzian concept of culture, which had been elaborated through a series of erudite and elegant essays written in the s and s Geertz, depicted a culture both as an integrated whole, as a puzzle where all the pieces were at hand, and as a system of meanings that was largely shared by a population. Culture thus appeared as integrated, shared in the group and sharply bounded. But what of variations within the group, and what about similarities or mutual contacts with neighbouring groups and what to make of, say, the technologically and economically driven processes of globalisation, which ensure that nearly every nook and cranny in the world is, to varying degrees, exposed to news about football world cups, to wargames and the concept of human rights? Many began to criticise the overly neat and tidy picture suggested in the dominant concept of culture, from a variety of viewpoints. Alternative ways of conceptualising culture were proposed. As I shall indicate later, the concept of society has been subjected to similar critiques, but problematic as they may be, both concepts still seem to form part of the conceptual backbone of anthropology. In his magisterial, deeply ambivalent review of the culture concept, Adam Kuper, p. 10 The relationship between culture and society can be described in the following way. Culture refers to the acquired, cognitive and symbolic aspects of existence, whereas society refers to the social organisation of human life, patterns of interaction and power relationships. The implications of this analytical distinction, which may seem bewildering, will eventually be evident. A short definition of anthropology may read thus: The discipline thus compares aspects of different societies, and continuously searches for interesting dimensions for comparison. If, say, one chooses to write a monograph about a people in the New Guinea highlands, one will always choose to describe it with at least some concepts such as kinship, gender and power that render it comparable with aspects of other societies. Further, the discipline emphasises the importance of ethnographic fieldwork, which is a thorough close-up study of a particular social and cultural environment, where the researcher is normally required to spend a year or more. Clearly, anthropology has many features in common with other social sciences and humanities. Indeed, a difficult question consists in deciding whether it is a science or one of the humanities. Do we search for general laws, as the natural scientists do, or do we instead try to understand and interpret different societies? Evans-Pritchard in Britain and Alfred Kroeber in the USA, leading anthropologists in their day, both argued around that anthropology had more in common with history than with the natural sciences. Although their view, considered something of a heresy at the time, has become commonplace since, there are still some anthropologists who feel that the subject should aim at scientific rigour similar to that of the natural sciences. Some of the implications of this divergence in views will be discussed in later chapters. A few important defining features of anthropology are nevertheless common to all practitioners of the subject: Unlike sociology proper, anthropology does not concentrate its attention on the industrialised world; unlike philosophy, it stresses the importance of empirical research; unlike history, it studies society as it is being enacted; and unlike linguistics, it stresses the social and cultural context of speech when looking at language. Definitely, there are great overlaps with other sciences and

disciplines, and there is a lot to be learnt from them, yet anthropology has its distinctive character as an intellectual discipline, based on ethnographic fieldwork, which tries simultaneously to account for actual cultural variation in the world and to develop a theoretical perspective on culture and society. To what extent do all humans, cultures or societies have something in common, and to what extent is each of them unique? Since we employ comparative concepts—that is, supposedly culturally neutral terms like kinship system, gender role, system of inheritance, etc. However, many anthropologists challenge this view and claim the uniqueness of each culture or society. EP E age-grading, athletic sports, bodily adornment, calendar, cleanliness training, community organization, cooking, cooperative labor, cosmology, courtship, dancing, decorative art, divination, division of labor, dream interpretation, education, eschatology, ethics, ethnobotany, etiquette, faith healing, family, feasting, fire making, folklore, food taboos, funeral rites, games, gestures, gift giving, government, greetings Several arguments could be invoked against this kind of list: An institution such as arranged marriage means something fundamentally different in the Punjabi countryside than in the French upper class. Is it still the same institution? Brown is right in accusing anthropologists of having been inclined to emphasise the exotic and unique at the expense of neglecting cross-cultural similarities, but this does not mean that his approach is the only possible way of bridging the gap between societies. Several other alternatives will be discussed, including structural-functionalism all societies operate according to the same general principles , structuralism the human mind has a common architecture expressed through myth, kinship and other cultural phenomena , transactionalism the logic of human action is the same everywhere 4 All rights reserved. The tension between the universal and the particular has been immensely productive in anthropology, and it remains an important one. It is commonly discussed, inside and outside anthropology, through the concept of ethnocentrism. In saying this, we warn against the application of a shared, universal scale to be used in the evaluation of every society. Such a scale, which is often used, could be defined as longevity, gross national product GNP , democratic rights, literacy rates, etc. Until quite recently, it was common in European society to rank non-Europeans according to the ratio of their population which was admitted into the Christian Church. Such a ranking of peoples is utterly irrelevant to anthropology. In order to pass judgement on the quality of life in a foreign society, we must first try to understand that society from the inside; otherwise our judgement has a very limited intellectual interest. Within this frame of thought, other peoples would necessarily appear as inferior imitations of oneself. If the Nuer of the Sudan are unable to get a mortgage to buy a house, they thus appear to have a less perfect society than ourselves. If the Kwakiutl Indians of the west coast of North America lack electricity, they seem to have a less fulfilling life than we do. Such points of view express an ethnocentric attitude which fails to allow other peoples to be different from ourselves on their own terms, and can be a serious obstacle to understanding. Rather than comparing strangers with our own society and placing ourselves on top of an imaginary pyramid, anthropology calls for an understanding of different societies as they appear from the inside. Anthropology cannot provide an answer to a question of which societies are better than others, simply because the discipline does not ask it. If asked what is the good life, the anthropologist will have to answer that every society has its own definition s of it. Moreover, an ethnocentric bias, which may be less easy to detect than moralistic judgements, may shape the very concepts we use in describing and classifying the world. We return to this fundamental problem later.

## 5: Full text of "Fractured Modernity"

*Wealthy landowners are benefitting yet peasants living in deep poverty, no land or education, peasants, factory workers, and middle class liberals resented Diaz dictatorship Struggle for power - radical leaders.*

Less well known is the fact that Ango spent his student years studying classical Buddhist texts in Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan, and that at one time he aspired to the priesthood. We have only returned to being human. Reproduced with permission Introduction The trauma of defeat in the Pacific War in late brought about dramatic changes at virtually all levels of Japanese culture and society. As John Dower relates in his work Embracing Defeat, the brief span between and witnessed a remarkable surge in iconoclasm, especially "though by no means exclusively" among the disillusioned intelligentsia and avant-garde literary circles. It is, in short, a way of thinking and relating to the world that follows the so-called "linguistic turn" in modern Western thought, according to which the ultimate goal of philosophical investigation "is no longer contact with something existing independently from us, but rather Bildung, the unending formation of oneself. According to Santiago Zabala, a postmetaphysical perspective "has a linguistic outcome in the idea that the linguistic a priori is the form in which our experience is structured. Paul Ricoeur suggests that we require distanciation or disruption in order to come to know or realize something properly. As Dale Wright argues: Rorty speaks extensively of "ironism" in Rorty I contend that it is precisely this attunement to irony in the Rortyan sense that allows Ango to avoid the residual essentialism and associated quasi-imperialism of some of his contemporary thinkers, most notably those representing the Kyoto School of philosophy: Moreover, the redescriptive aspect of ironism opens up a path to take us from irony towards the more general and recognizably Buddhist notion of contingency, rooted in traditional doctrines of impermanence, emptiness, conditioned arising, and interdependence. Following Nishikawa Nagao, Ango might be seen as a prophet of a "postmodern" theory of culture, characterized by the following four insights: Sakaguchi Ango Born Sakaguchi Heigo into a large upper middle class family in Niigata prefecture in , Ango "as he is usually known" came of age during a particularly turbulent time in modern Japanese history. Most significant was the general wave of modernization and relative openness to foreign ideas that immediately followed the Restoration, the so-called Rokumeikan period of the s and early s. The Taisho period, beginning in July , brought about further changes, and a brief return to a more liberal and cosmopolitan outlook, encapsulated by what is now often wistfully referred to as "Taisho democracy. Though Ango was only twenty years old when the Taisho period came to an end in December , he was clearly influenced by these modernist trends, which would largely fade from the scene under censorship from the early s until their return in the very different conditions of a postwar Japan suffering from exhaustion and defeat. Ango had dreamt of being a writer from an early age, and moved to Tokyo in after facing disciplinary problems at school. After working for a year as a substitute teacher, in Ango entered Toyo University in order to study Buddhism and Indian philosophy. He was a vocal and active student, in addition to being extremely diligent, and took to the study of Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan texts with passion. Like many other youths of his day, he also became entranced with Western literature and thought, devouring the works of Voltaire and Moliere, among others. Kasutori Bunka and the Burai-ha It was during the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War that Ango came into his own "or perhaps found his element" as both a writer and critic. According to Stephen Mansfield, the literature and life of the Burai-ha "centered around erotic entertainment, pulp fiction, sleazy bars and clubs" Mansfield , p. As the opening lines to "Darakuron" read: To this end, he punningly and provocatively replaced the abstract, controlled and imperialist mythos of the "national body" or kokutai with the individual, free and carnal body: It is because of all these things that we realize, for the first time, that we are alive. We now believe in nothing but our own bodies" Tamura , p. It is worth noting the obvious parallels between the Burai-ha and kasutori culture and the decadent movement in literature, art and culture that flourished in fin de Steele western Europe, particularly France and the United Kingdom, associated with figures such as Joris-Karl

Huysmans , Felicien Rops , Arthur Symons and Oscar Wilde Here too, "decadence" was indicative of a comprehensive attitude or lifestyle, not simply a literary genre, artistic style or philosophical approach, and an attitude that rejected commonplace assumptions about modernity and progress, and questioned the ideals of bourgeois capitalist society. Still, there are significant cultural differences between the European and Japanese movements, not least of which is the quasi-religious occasionally satanic but often, oddly, Roman Catholic aspect of the former. At the same time, as a few scholars have recently argued, this particular aesthetic is a palpably modern creation, and one that was effectively manipulated for ideological purposes by the wartime regime to stand for the willingness of ordinary Japanese men and women to "fall" in the service of the kokutai. Indeed, this is the first step to both societal and individual recovery: The problem is not that the mirror we have is "clouded," but that it, like any "contrivance," distorts our perception of reality, and leads us to believe that there is something solid we can rely upon. The mirror, such as it is, can only be smashed, or allowed to fall from our hands. For Ango, there was unmistakable attractiveness in the massive destruction of the 17 See Charles Muller, ed. In ancient times, people thought it terrible to be under the cherry blossoms; nobody thought it beautiful at all" Sakaguchi i, p. The story, a kind of horror-fantasy tale, overturns the lingering sakura aesthetic to present cherry blossoms in a fearful light, symbolizing madness and isolation. See Yinshun , p. Nor should we merely adopt alternative visions of harmony and totality, as with the postwar Marxists and Communists. This is well expressed in the climactic lines towards the end of "Darakuron," where Ango invokes both the "banality" and inescapability of decadence as the true beginnings of "human history," repeating the trope of illusion and disillusion. Could we not say that the kamikaze hero was a mere illusion, and that human history begins from the point where he takes to black-marketeering? That the widow as devoted apostle is mere illusion, and that human history begins when the image of a new face enters her breast? As might be expected, there was considerable critical reaction to both kasutori bunka and the Burai-ha. See Slaymaker , p. While a valid critique, this applies more directly to Tamura than Ango. His theory of decadence was intended to push the boundaries of subjectivity, and of values, further than this. We fall not because we have lost the war. We fall because we are human beings; we fall simply because we are alive. And yet, we cannot keep falling forever. This is because it is not possible for human beings to possess hearts of steel, hearts immune to suffering. People are pitiful and fragile, and therefore foolish; for these reasons they are too weak to fall too far. And yet, for the purpose of killing their own virgin, following their own bushidd, and carrying their own emperor, it is necessary for people to fall down the correct path. And, as with individuals, it may be necessary for Japan as a whole to fall once again. By falling to the extremes of decadence, we can discover ourselves, and find salvation. It is the height of absurdity to imagine that such a superficial thing as politics can save us. Soon the ascent will begin. By accepting the vulgar and low, the individual will be relieved of the worries of the bourgeoisie. It is rather a fall from an illusion or series of illusions that were posing as "truth. After insisting that the writings of Ango 27 Miyoshi , p. This is not to say that Ango rejected the principle of subjectivity; rather, he "poses a dynamic, open-ended quality in his view of individuals as capable of containing within them a spectrum of tendencies, including both the desire for and fear of freedom. But, and this is where things take a turn towards "Zen paradox," this recognition is not one that leads to cynicism and despair, but rather contains within it seeds of liberation and rebirth. As noted above, Ango studied Indian philosophy at Toyo University, on a course that included the study of the original Buddhist languages: Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan. In an autobiographical essay on his late youth entitled "Kaze to hikari to nijii no watashi to" M. In addition to commenting on his own struggles with language training, Ango notes the difficulties, and perhaps the absurdity, of carnal human beings striving for Buddhist liberation or satori. He relates the cautionary tale of a figure called Sharakusai 29 Ibid. See Williams , pp. While there is some fairness to this critique, it is, to say the least, a gross generalization to suggest that a such reasoning can be attributed to Buddhism alone"as opposed to a certain vision of "aesthetics" inspired by German Idealism, and particularly Hegelian influence"and b all Buddhist thought is prey to such circularity. Following directly upon the tale of Sharakusai, Ango notes that the quest for satori is a "life and death" matter not to be

taken lightly. He goes out of his way to note that this is not a reflection on the teachings themselves, though it may be a reflection on the impossibility of ordinary men to attain satori as imagined in the Indian Buddhist tradition, i. The problem with Buddhist teachers is that they have no talent for expressing "the brightness, hopes and exhilaration of satori. Whether it will be any more possible for human beings to attain is another matter. In fact, contingency in Buddhism incorporates several related teachings: Rather, "dependent origination" was understood as a truth that we could "overcome" through Buddhist practice leading to nirvāṇic "extinction" McMahan , ch. My reading here is more in line with Mahayana interpretations of impermanence, including those of the Sino- Japanese Tiantai Jp. Tendai , Huayan Jp. Kegon and Chan Jp. Zen schools, which were less inclined to think of impermanence as something that could be "overcome. Our transformation or "salvation" occurs in the acceptance of this condition, rather than in an attempt to transform or step out of it. Human beings become decadent; loyal retainers and saintly women become decadent. It is impossible to stop the process, and impossible to save humanity by stop- ping it. Human beings live and human beings fall. There is no ready shortcut to human salvation outside this. Though there are differences across various sects as to the precise techniques employed towards this goal, there is broad agreement that, to a large degree, the "suffering" that human beings experience is a product of a disjunction between our ideas, hopes and desires and "the way things are," which is, once again, impermanent and transitory though, it is important to add, no less "real" or "meaningful" for being so. This is not to say that all "suffering" is a product of the mind— to suggest so would be to lapse into idealism— but rather that mental and emotional factors play an immense and often unrecognized role in causing suffering. In response to this process of naturalization, Ueno insists that it is history that is responsible for making objects what they are. Recognition of the force of historical significations to shape social reality introduces within this latter an element of contingency, and it is on the basis of such contingency that political change e. Though Dower suggests that Ango, "[i]n his distinctive way It is quite possible that customs followed in foreign countries but hitherto not in Japan, are, in fact, more appropriate for Japanese people, and that customs followed in Japan but not in foreign countries are in fact better suited to foreigners. Though Ango aims his barbs at German architect and Japanophile Bruno Taut , the rhetoric of Japanese cultural uniqueness can 41 Dower , p. Further, this leads to an "even more ominous" example of the aesthetic justification of material privation, simplicity and insufficiency, i. Even after the war, Ango is one of the few to speak out against this notion of enduring poverty and simplicity as a form of bitoku beauty and virtue. Most iconic here is the koan story, recorded in the eleventh century Dentoroku WSM. Tanka Tennen, , in order to keep himself warm on a chilly evening. And it could only do so by first "polishing" the clouded "mirror of Yamato," ridding it of all foreign and modern pollutions in order to see more clearly its true essence. As Nishikawa Nagao argues, even after the war, "culture" came to replace the "nation" as a focus of reflection on the Japanese "essence. His proposition also looked towards the fundamental principle of the global age: As he writes in "Zoku darakuron," in a phrase that rings as much of Darwin as of Marx: I argue that the quest for some sort of "resolution" leads us back into the logic of transcendence. Finally, it is not at all evident that Ango felt that there was anything wrong with "desire," which is itself perfectly natural and healthy.

## 6: Schedule - Complete with Abstracts | Pacific Ancient and Modern Language Association

*All nationalisms are gendered, all are invented, and all are dangerous- women and men serves to symbolically define the limits of national middle class from a.*

This is factually correct. But if so, the fact needs explanation. Why hope then and rage now? The list of those who supported both the Remain vote and Hillary Clinton both in the primaries against Sanders and in the presidential elections reads like a roll-call of corporate and banking elites: After all, democracy is intended to give ordinary people a chance to counter elites through representative politics. But this still does not capture what we instinctively recoil from in populism. Suppose she or he were to consider the humane policies that some nations in Europe embraced after World War Two; policies which created or expanded social safety nets whether health, education, or housing for working people. This hypothetical worker might well ask how and where these safety nets were implemented and administered. And the answer would be clear: This worker might then ask whether a supra-national body has ever administered such safety nets and, if so, what the operating mechanism would even look like. As Joseph Stiglitz says in his book on the European Union, there are two ways for nations to respond to the present crisis that populism is reacting to throughout Europe: But in light of the excellent questions posed by our hypothetical worker in Nottingham, it is hard to see how the second option, strengthening ties, would be appealing. What these questions reveal is that it has never been explained why a single market that previously functioned perfectly well moved on to promote further integration through a common currency without a clear understanding of the wider institutions of governance that would be needed for such integration. Of course, such a person may go beyond these shrewd questions to reach more troubling conclusions, associating supra-national affiliation with immigrant hordes who not only deprive him or her of economic opportunities, but dilute centuries-old national cultures that are a source of pride. But there is no logical connection between that initial scepticism and these trumped-up anxieties. It is perfectly possible to pose those questions without answering them in this way. Unfortunately, though, the confused thinking that links them together happens all the time. This is the negative side of populism. This leads us to a question of our own: Where does the compulsion to make this non-compulsory connection originate? Here we must resist the temptation to blame the individuals themselves. When people make this connection, it is not due to any feebleness of mind, but rather to a wide variety of distortions presented in the media, which come from the political class – not just its extreme elements but also the establishment itself. There is an important lesson to be learned here. Even if we identify what we recoil from in contemporary populism as the unnecessary linking of sound questions with unsound anxieties, this connection cannot simply be attributed to an intrinsic incapacity in the judgement of ordinary people, but must instead be attributed to a failure of public education for which universities, the media, and the political class are all to blame. It is not possible to believe in democracy and dismiss the electorate as vile or stupid, for the electorate is shaped by the knowledge it possesses. It is misguided to expect academia and the media to be sources of much-needed public education on the fundamental matters shaping the common good in our societies. Firstly, a chronic economic crisis and secondly, the failure of the left to find an adequate response to that crisis. Populism is a reaction to the neoliberal drift of the last few decades. The failure of the left to mobilise an adequate response to these crises created an ideological vacuum. Such a vacuum no doubt derives from a failure of imagination on the part of the left. To be fair, however, leftist movements today are increasingly constrained by the turn that political economies have taken over the last few decades. First of all, old-style movements based on trade union activism are hardly possible because ever since financial capital supplanted industrial capital as the driving force of the global economy, traditional trade unions have only possessed a residual form of agency. Where such unions are still in place, they have been beaten down by neoliberal economic policies which generate chronic unemployment by increasingly making work impermanent and informal all over the world, depriving labour of its old bargaining power by way of the obvious opportunity for corporations to tap the

unemployed population if the employed population bargains too hard. From the perspective of the global left, if that kind of platform is implemented, triggering the threat of capital flight, the only solution would be for comparable working-class movements to be waiting wherever such capital might flee. Sadly, that form of international solidarity is not a realistic possibility at the moment. Indeed, the mind boggles at the prospect of truly global labour movements emerging to oppose global finance capital. This idea should be explored in serious detail. These are all under-explored innovations worth thinking about. But it would take significant imagination from the left to actually produce tangible results. Populism in international perspective Although I have thus far focused on common underlying causes of worldwide working class dissatisfaction and the populist upsurge, this is not to imply that the character of populism in different parts of the world is exactly the same. In fact, it is substantially different. For example, in the United States and the United Kingdom, populism has been opposed to globalisation, whereas in India and Turkey it has cheerfully promoted it. India and Turkey have fused the pro-globalisation populism of growing middle classes with a revivalist stress on majoritarian religious identities. India and Turkey are both compulsively authoritarian in ways that border on fascism. They demand distinctive explanatory accounts, and I will restrict myself to India. Indian Hindu nationalism today, which bears alarming similarities to the nationalism of Italy and Germany, represents a radical departure from the nationalism that characterised the long struggle against British colonial rule. This needs to be explained in more detail. An indirect means of examining this realisation is to explore why Mahatma Gandhi, for almost the entire duration of the nationalist movement resulting in Indian independence, never claimed to be a secularist in the way Jawaharlal Nehru did. Gandhi believed that secularism had arisen from the distinctive nature of European history, and because this history had no Indian equivalent, Indian secularism should not be seen as compulsory. In his view, the rise of the new sciences and their increasing centrality in European culture, beginning in England and then moving across Europe, had made justifications of state power focused on the divine right of the state, personified by its monarch, untenable. At the same time, a new form of political organisation was emerging in the wake of the Westphalian peace. These developments converged to produce a radically new political outlook. State power now sought legitimacy in a far more mundane source. It rested on a presiding feeling in the people over whom it exercised power. This was not a feeling for the state itself, but a new entity created by the Westphalian peace: Being defined to some extent in terms of territorial boundaries, the nation overlapped with the state. Later, this feeling came to be referred to as nationalism, and the justification it provided for state power became both fundamental for and unique to modern Europe until it began to spread to other lands via colonial conquest. Gandhi emphasised that understanding the emergence of secularism as a doctrine required closer scrutiny of the strategy by which this political psychology was generated across Europe. There was a method that had its apotheosis in Germany during the Third Reich, although its essential work had been accomplished long before. Of course, by the time this method achieved its hideous culmination in Germany, religion played a reduced role in its application. The rhetoric of race loomed larger. However, in earlier European nation-building and state-legitimation exercises, religion had often been a central factor. When statistical forms of discourse were then applied to studies of social governance, the notions of majority and minority were developed and implemented, an approach described as majoritarianism. Religious majoritarianism would often generate a religious minoritarian backlash. Instead, religion itself came to be seen as a negative influence, contaminating the polity. Until religious influence was contained within the domains of civil society and personal life, far away from state power and the polity more generally, strife would continue. In this way, the doctrine of secularism emerged predominantly as a corrective measure, a counterweight to a process that had begun when nationalism was founded on religious majoritarianism. Therefore, there was no need to impose the kind of self-conscious secularism that is only necessary when pluralism gets destroyed by religious majoritarian nation-building exercises, as had been the case for European nationalisms. Gandhi, Gandhi sought to preempt the emergence of European-style nationalism in India by equating nationalism with a different idea, anti-imperialism. Early twentieth-century India was, therefore, a place in which secularism had no relevance.

India, since the s, has been emphatically different in this respect, especially over the last few years. Besides the identification, despising, and subjugating of an enemy within – Jews then, Muslims now – several other similarities are worth noting. No other right-wing nationalism in the world has anything quite like this influence. Constant talk of caste purity echoes the racist attitudes towards blood and lineage of European fascism. We can make a safe generalisation from the history of nations over the last century: The ruling class is able to hold sway by convincing other classes that its interests represent theirs. Authoritarian states lack this form of consent. Either the current Indian government lacks the popular consent characterising Gramscian hegemony, or, despite having the consent of a broad swathe of the population, still tends towards authoritarianism. I believe that latter to be true and that this authoritarianism is pathological in a way that we may appropriately equate with fascism. Let me ask why fascism is so puzzling. The problem is that we cannot explain its emergence as a by-product of tendencies within capitalism. The crises generated by capitalism may represent preliminary conditions for fascist developments, but they are not sufficient to explain them. The reason fascism is more mysterious to us than imperialism is that capitalism is not enough to explain it; we need to explore other factors.

US populism and the limits of modernity

Returning to the United States, it is hardly news to say that Trump is a xenophobe, a racist, and a misogynist. Both his personal statements and his policy proposals reflect these traits. Of course many were dismayed by his election, leading to protests of heartening scope. But the deeper issue is not how terrible Trump is as a person or leader, but why he was elected. We might also remember that an even more classic expression of alienation played out when the African-American population voted in far larger numbers for Hillary Clinton than Bernie Sanders. Sanders would have done more for both working and unemployed black voters than Clinton, and this was a case of identity politics dominating over material interests. It was Bill Clinton, in fact, who signed an infamous bill depriving many African-American and white citizens of welfare provisions. The Clintons are not racist in the social sense, but their approach to government would have resulted in more structural racism than a Sanders victory. Sanders paid the price for honourably refusing to engage in identity politics because it was largely the African-American vote that nominated his opponent, particularly in states that were bound to vote Republican in November. To believe otherwise would be complacent. One reason Trump achieved upset electoral expectations was his repeated equating of the Clintons with the political and financial elites so many Americans had come to despise. Unlike India, the United States has a two-party system that has traditionally seen consensus on fundamental questions of statecraft, in spite of the continual news cycle of party-political conflict. Although they compete, they tend to find more agreement than is seen in democracies with some form of proportional representation. This makes it hard for anybody else to break in. Sanders made it as far as anybody working within the two parties could have done. Predictably, Democratic party leaders undermined his campaign.

## 7: Can the Left Reclaim Nationalism? | The Nation

*Impermanent Identities: Middle Class and Hindu Communalism in Colonial Lucknow, Paper presented at the Annual South Asia Conference at the University of.*

Please leave this field empty. By George Friedman The world is experiencing a shift from the old liberal-conservative model to an internationalist-nationalist model. Nationalist challenges against the internationalist model have moved from the margins of the political system to the center, winning victories in the United States and the United Kingdom, and rising in strength in other countries. The rise of nationalism is the decisive character of the day. Internationalism is on the defensive. Whatever the ultimate outcome, this struggle will politically define at least the next decade. The world that emerged from World War II was built on certain assumptions. First, that the origins of the war rested in the rise of nationalism in Germany and the inability of other countries to form an effective and proactive alliance to contain German and destroy the Nazi regime. Second, the economic crisis that preceded World War II was rooted in the collapse of international trade due to protectionism. Protesters who oppose arrivals of buses carrying largely women and children undocumented migrants for processing at the Murrieta Border Patrol Station yell at counter-demonstrators on July 4, in Murrieta, California. To maintain this alliance structure, vibrant economies were necessary, both to allow allies to devote resources to their militaries and to demonstrate to the world the superiority of Western capitalism. Economic development depended on economic cooperation and increasingly free trade. World War II was seen as revealing the dangers of nationalism and the necessity of international cooperation. What emerged was an internationalist system that wanted to see increasing political, military and economic integration in the West. Internationalism became a moral imperative, not simply a national strategy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the internationalist assumptions appeared to be validated. The West had defeated the Soviets because of superior military and economic systems produced by international integration. From until , the internationalist ideology became a global orthodoxy. The greater the interdependence among nations, the greater the common interest and the lesser chance for conflict. The greater the integration, the greater the prosperity, and the greater the prosperity the more inclined nations would be to behave as liberal democracies and respect human rights. What began as a lesson learned from World War II and a prudent response to containing the Soviet Union became a moral orthodoxy and a moral imperative. In many ways it buried political distinctions. All major parties were internationalists. Some marginal reactionary elements may have bucked the orthodoxy, but on the whole, conservative advocates of the free market and liberal advocates of social justice embraced internationalism. The former saw it as a path to prosperity through trade. The latter saw it as increasing standards of living and creating international standards for internal political behavior. The distinction between left and right eroded , with social issues taking precedence over economic and strategic issues between the factions. Abortion and multi-culturalism, for instance, divided political parties. Different countries had different emphases, but the doctrine of internationalism dominated the world except on the margins. Even those that were not going to be liberal democracies, like China, valued the trading system and depended on it. And Westerners believed that if the Chinese had iPods, they would inevitably become like the West. The love of internationalism permeated all levels of society, but it particularly moved business. In , the underside of interdependence showed its hand. Capitalism is prone to financial crises, and one occurred in In a nationalist environment with barriers between countries “ from tariffs to currencies “ a financial crisis in one country has the strong potential of being moderated in other countries. The crisis of tore through the world. The highly integrated banking system, designed to facilitate the free flow of capital and therefore international efficiency, facilitated the free flow of a contagion. The system had lost its ability to protect against contagion. What had been the vehicle of the internationalist spring turned into a multinational disaster. The effects of are still far from contained. The crisis clearly revealed the core weakness of the interdependent system. But the very success of interdependence had been gnawing away at the system for decades. It is true

that barring serious malfunction, intensified international integration can increase economic growth on the whole. These problems were not clearly visible until after and the decline in economic benefits of internationalism on the whole, the problem of classes and nations came to light. The decline of some classes, such as those that worked for businesses that moved their production elsewhere to take advantage of lower wages, was clearly visible as the tide receded. Some nations, such as those in southern Europe, discovered that economic integration was not so much an opportunity as it was a prison. It was discovered that with interdependence and integration, individual nations had lost control over their destinies. An impersonal system that seemed to be uncontrolled determined the fate of nations and their populations. It also was discovered that the idea that nations were obsolete might be true for elites, who followed capital where it went, but being Greek was very different from being German, and being Chinese was very different from being American. The nation mattered because where you lived determined how you would experience life. And that experience gave you far more in common with your countrymen than with foreigners. Greek bankers and German bankers may live similar lives. The year did not simply reveal the underlying weaknesses of the internationalist position, it also generated a nationalist counter-response. Those below the median income and those who lived in shattered countries were not going anywhere. They were trapped in a reality about which their government could do nothing. The international system was hurtling forward to a frightening and unknown destination. The comfortable ones assumed they would do fine. And they knew that whatever solutions would come would not be a massive global redemption where everyone wins. It would be a hard-fought battle among their own. This was the crucial shift. It was a shift from thinking in terms of humanity as a whole to a focus on those with whom they lived and the things and people they loved. This meshed with the cultural. Over the years, the argument had been made that national cultures and practices were irrelevant. It was the ideology of internationalism that mattered, an ideology that deplored all distinctions. Distinctions of ethnicity, religion and nation were the hangovers of the catastrophic world that had led to the rise of Hitler. What followed was an attempt by the internationalist state to suppress what it saw as parochialism, and what those who had benefited least from internationalism saw as the fabric of life. The critical point came with immigration, a global phenomenon. Immigration hit both an economic and cultural chord. From the internationalist perspective, we are all part of one humanity. From the standpoint of the rest, the flow of immigration threatened to shatter the cultural foundations of their lives, as well as put further pressure on their ability to earn a living. The flow of migrants required flexibility in culture and a willingness to help out. But for the Greeks, or the lower-middle class in the U. Well-to-do bankers would not live in communities torn by ethnic strife, but those who had already been stunned and buffeted by cultural change would. These were the people least able to endure it. The result is that throughout Euro-American civilization, the political divide has ceased to be between the left and the right. The new dividing line is internationalist and nationalist. The debate is between those who regard what is now the old system of alliances, mutual responsibility, free trade and transcultural life as essential, and those who regard a globalist perspective as incapable of addressing the vast variability of nations, cultures and classes. The question now is whether the dominant political and moral culture of represents the future or whether it is the past, and a failed past at that. It has been 70 years since , and 70 years is a very long time. The world has changed dramatically since the fundamental principles of the post-war world were laid down. As with all ideologies that have been in power so long that people assume they are the only reasonable approach, an inflexibility has set in. And when the punch lands and internationalism staggers, its first impulse is to declare its contempt for the bad manners of the nationalist. The battle is in the first stages, but it is a battle that was inevitable. The world is vast and humanity is an abstraction. My place in the world, my town, my culture and my nation are conceptually more manageable. The core principle of liberalism is the right to national self-determination. The instruments of internationalism — alliances, trade agreements and international law — run counter to the principles of national self-determination. They ignore the nation and the right of citizens to govern their nation. As in all things, the issue is not simple. Internationalism has been dramatically successful in enriching the world since World War II. Its problem is that nationalists charge that only part of

## IMPERMANENT IDENTITIES: LIMITS OF MIDDLE-CLASS NATIONALISMS

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the population has enjoyed this wealth, and there are things more fundamental than wealth such as cultural identity and differences. Internationalism is tone-deaf or hostile to cultural identity, which is its weakness. Nationalism has not yet defined the limits of national enclosure. This has a long way to go. But looking back, it is no surprise that the Republican and Democratic parties are in utter disarray in the U. The points of reference they have represented and the dogmas that have driven them have not disappeared, but are forming around the new points of reference: Neither party knows what to do with those poles. Nationalism may not simply triumph, but internationalism cannot simply stay the way it is.

## 8: Project MUSE - Mestizaje Upside Down: Subaltern Knowledges and the Known

*But for the Greeks, or the lower-middle class in the U.S., it represented a burden placed peculiarly on them. Well-to-do bankers would not live in communities torn by ethnic strife, but those who had already been stunned and buffeted by cultural change would.*

Scott Sherman More specifically, we need to abandon the efforts to create new cold-war alliances against Russia and China and instead see them as working partners essential to our national interest. We need Russia to help us in the fight against Salafist-inspired terrorism and to help steer Europe toward efforts to rebuild Ukraine and the war-torn Middle East. In Asia, we need to pivot away from the geopolitically motivated Trans-Pacific Partnership that will expose US workers to more low-wage competition. In the Middle East, we need to broaden the anti-terrorist coalition to include Russia and Iran as well as our European and Middle East allies. Above all, we need to help change the narrative in Europe as well as in the Middle East from one of opposing religious and cultural identities to one of healthy national development. At home and abroad, we need to redirect nationalist passions, not deny them. Can there be a middle ground between elitist cosmopolitanism and closed-off ethnic nationalism that halts the race to the regulatory bottom without crippling individual economies? Before we attempt to give nationalism a human face, we ought to consider whose voices, bodies, and opinions this nationalism excludes, and at what cost. Without responsible nations, there cannot be a responsible nationalism. In , in the midst of a refugee crisis, looming climate change, and the rise of non-state actors, responsible nations must also consider the welfare of immigrants, residents, and non-citizens. All countries are, by virtue of their nationhood and their sovereignty, inherently discriminatory institutions; it is a central project of any nation to decide whom it wants to admit, and to keep others out by whatever means it deems fit. But nations also exist in the world. They are interdependent, and increasingly so. There are roughly 11 million US residents who lack legal documentation but contribute labor, taxes, and innumerable social and cultural benefits of an inestimable, qualitative nature to a country that many of them consider more their own than any other. Too many take on the responsibilities of citizenship without enjoying the rights, while the converse is true for the ultra-rich: The benefits of citizenship come without basic responsibilities. Responsible nationalism should recognize, and correct, this imbalance. Too often, countries push out those who most want to belong and play a role. Nationalism cannot engage in this kind of cannibalization if it is to remain coherent, or, indeed, if it is to survive in an increasingly interconnected world. If nations exist in the world, and not in a vacuum, there can be no responsible nationalism without inclusiveness. Nothing prevents countries from adhering to a philosophy along the lines of this: Of course, individual countries will place limits on how many people they can accept for a variety of reasons. But any nationalism, even at its most responsible, is flawed if it ignores that there are millions of non-citizens who would jump at a chance to serve its interests, but are given no chance to do so. Since when is that an argument that even needs to be made? A clue lies in his diagnosis. The postwar order that brought widespread prosperity to Western working and middle classes was based around restricted financial flows, dependent central banks, a shared policy goal of full employment, and strong domestic institutions that made sure that productivity gains were shared by capital and labor so that wages and profits rose together. The neo-liberal order sees citizens as useful only insofar as their taxes serve as insurance against bank failures. That order was systematically dismantled in the s. The returns to capital exploded, as wages for the bottom 60 percent stagnated. This is the order that citizens are revolting against: Yet we also need to recognize that there is no going back to a time when 30 percent of the population worked in unionized manufacturing. We need to accept the world as it is, not wish it anew. That means focusing on the generators of inequality and its attendant politics. Summers homes in on corporate tax evasion, which is a good place to start. But there are many more spaces where policy can make a difference. Global finance may be good for global banks, but local businesses are starved for credit. Follow him on Twitter: He is the author of *Austerity*: To submit a correction for our consideration,

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### 9: Joyce's Ulysses as National Epic: Epic Mimesis and the Political History of the Nation State

*Identity is a powerful organizing presence in social life today—a social fact, or so it would, at least, seem. Whether measured by the amount of energy individuals expend claiming, cultivating, expressing, or bemoaning the lack of it or by the amount of attention devoted to it by institutions that profess to address or are said to reflect popular interests and issues, it is clear that being.*

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