

1: Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy - CORE

where \bar{t}_i is the exogenously given tax rate on initial wealth. 17 This is what gives rise to a conflict of interests between Groups 1 and 2 over the amount of g and s to be produced by the government.

As ordinary citizens are encouraged to take part in the political life of the country, they have the power to directly influence the outcome of government policies through the democratic procedures of voting, campaigning and the use of press. Essentially this means that a democratic government may not be providing the most good for the largest number of people. However, some have argued that this should not even be the goal of democracies because the minority could be seriously mistreated under that purported goal. Madison, "Federalist 63," in *The Federalist Papers*, p. He does not defend this phenomenon but rather seeks to describe it. Manin draws from James Harrington, Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau to suggest that the dominant form of government, representative as opposed to direct, is effectively aristocratic. As far as Montesquieu is concerned, elections favor the "best" citizens who Manin notes tend to be wealthy and upper-class. As far as Rousseau is concerned, elections favor the incumbent government officials or the citizens with the strongest personalities, which results in hereditary aristocracy. Manin further evinces the aristocratic nature of representative governments by contrasting them with the ancient style of selection by lot. However, Manin also provides criticism of direct democracy, or selection by lot. Montesquieu finds that citizens who had reason to believe they would be accused as "unworthy of selection" commonly withheld their names from the lottery, thereby making selection by lot vulnerable to self-selection bias and, thus, aristocratic in nature. The revolutionaries prioritized gaining the equal right to consent to their choice of government even a potentially aristocratic democracy, at the expense of seeking the equal right to be face of that democracy. And it is elections, not lots, that provide citizens with more opportunities to consent. In elections, citizens consent both to the procedure of elections and to the product of the elections even if they produce the election of elites. In lotteries, citizens consent only to the procedure of lots, but not to the product of the lots even if they produce election of the average person. That is, if the revolutionaries prioritized consent to be governed over equal opportunity to serve as the government, then their choice of elections over lotteries makes sense. Michels[edit] A major scholarly attack on the basis of democracy was made by German-Italian political scientist Robert Michels who developed the mainstream political science theory of the iron law of oligarchy in "Who says organization, says oligarchy" and went on to state "Historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy. Maurras criticized democracy as being a "government by numbers" in which quantity matters more over quality and prefers the worst over the best. Maurras denounced the principles of liberalism as described in *The Social Contract* by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and in *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* as based upon the false assumption of liberty and the false assumption of equality. Lagardelle[edit] French revolutionary syndicalist Hubert Lagardelle claimed that French revolutionary syndicalism came to being as the result of "the reaction of the proletariat against democracy," which he claimed was "the popular form of bourgeois dominance. Shach[edit] Israeli politician Rabbi Elazar Menachem Shach promoted Judaic law to be the natural governance for Jews and condemned democracy, he claimed that "Democracy as a machinery of lies, false notions, pursuit of narrow interests and deceit - as opposed to the Torah regime, which is based on seeking the ultimate truth. The one does what the other asks him to do in pursuit of his own interest, so as to be given what he himself asks for, and the whole purpose of the transaction is that each would get what they want. As governments are frequently elected on and off there tend to be frequent changes in the policies of democratic countries both domestically and internationally. Even if a political party maintains power, vociferous, headline grabbing protests and harsh criticism from the mass media are often enough to force sudden, unexpected political change. Frequent policy changes with regard to business and immigration are likely to deter investment and so hinder economic growth. For this reason, many people have put forward the idea that democracy is undesirable for a developing country in which economic growth and the reduction of poverty are top priority. Coalitions are frequently formed after the elections in many countries for example India and the basis of alliance is predominantly to

enable a viable majority, not an ideological concurrence. This opportunist alliance not only has the handicap of having to cater to too many ideologically opposing factions, but it is usually short lived since any perceived or actual imbalance in the treatment of coalition partners, or changes to leadership in the coalition partners themselves, can very easily result in the coalition partner withdrawing its support from the government. Democratic institutions work on consensus to decide an issue, which usually takes longer than a unilateral decision. Golwalkar in his book *Bunch of Thoughts* describes democracy as, "is to a very large extent only a myth in practice The high-sounding concept of "individual freedom" only meant the freedom of those talented few to exploit the rest. Another form is commonly called Pork barrel , where local areas or political sectors are given special benefits but whose costs are spread among all taxpayers. Mere elections are just one aspect of the democratic process. Other tenets of democracy, like relative equality and freedom, are frequently absent in ostensibly democratic countries. Potential incompatibility with former politics[edit] The new establishment of democratic institutions, in countries where the associated practices have as yet been uncommon or deemed culturally unacceptable, can result in institutions that are not sustainable in the long term. One circumstance supporting this outcome may be when it is part of the common perception among the populace that the institutions were established as a direct result of foreign pressure. Sustained regular inspection from democratic countries, however effortful and well-meaning, are normally not sufficient in preventing the erosion of democratic practices. In the cases of several African countries, corruption still is rife in spite of democratically elected governments, as one of the most severe examples, Zimbabwe, is often perceived to have backfired into outright militarism. Efficiency of the system[edit] Economist Donald Wittman has written numerous works attempting to counter criticisms of democracy common among his colleagues. He argues democracy is efficient based on the premise of rational voters, competitive elections, and relatively low political transactions costs. Economist Bryan Caplan argues that, while Wittman makes strong arguments for the latter two points, the first is vitiated by the insurmountable evidence for voter irrationality. For many voters, the difficulty of learning about a particular issue is too high compared to the likely costs of ignorance, but this ignorance does not lessen their enthusiasm for voting. By the median voter theorem , only a few people actually hold the balance of power in the country, and many may be unhappy with their decisions. In this way, they argue, democracies are inefficient. Fierlbeck points out that such a result is not necessarily due to a failing in the democratic process, but rather, "because democracy is responsive to the desires of a large middle class increasingly willing to disregard the muted voices of economically marginalized groups within its own borders. Susceptibility to propaganda[edit] See also: Low information voter , Low-information rationality , Deliberative democracy , and Meritocracy Voters may not be educated enough to exercise their democratic rights prudently. While arguments against democracy are often taken by advocates of democracy as an attempt to maintain or revive traditional hierarchy and autocratic rule, many extensions have been made to develop the argument further. However, education alone cannot sustain a democracy, though Caplan did note in that as people become educated, they think more like economists. Opinion polls before the election are under special criticism. Suppression of dissent Various reasons can be found for eliminating or suppressing political opponents. Methods such as false flags , counterterrorism-laws , [27] planting or creating compromising material and perpetuation of public fear may be used to suppress dissent. Dahl defines democracies as systems of government that respond nearly fully to each and every one of their citizens. He then poses that no such, fully responsive system exists today. Thus, Dahl rejects a democracy dichotomy in favor of a democratization spectrum. To Dahl, the question is not whether a country is a democracy or not. The question is to what extent a country is experiencing democratization at a national level. And polyarchy, or "rule of the many people," is the only existing form of democratizeable government; that is, it is within polyarchies that democratization can flourish. Countries do not immediately transform from hegemonies and competitive oligarchies into democracies. Instead, a country that adopts democracy as its form of government can only claim to have switched to polyarchy, which is conducive to, but does not guarantee, democratization. Dahl is not deeply concerned about the limits of his polyarchy spectrum because he believes that most countries today still have a long way before they reach full polyarchy status. Assuming that the Republic was intended to be a serious critique of the political thought in Athens, Plato argues that only Kallipolis , an

aristocracy led by the unwilling philosopher-kings the wisest men , is a just form of government. Plato attacked Athenian democracies for mistaking anarchy for freedom. The lack of coherent unity in Athenian democracy made Plato conclude that such democracies were a mere collection of individuals occupying a common space rather than a form of political organization. According to Plato, other forms of government place too much focus on lesser virtues and degenerate into other forms from best to worst, starting with timocracy , which overvalues honour, then oligarchy , which overvalues wealth, which is followed by democracy. In democracy, the oligarchs, or merchant, are unable to wield their power effectively and the people take over, electing someone who plays on their wishes for example, by throwing lavish festivals. However, the government grants the people too much freedom, and the state degenerates into the fourth form, tyranny , or mob rule. Tyranny of the majority The constitutions of many countries have parts of them that restrict the nature of the types of laws that legislatures can pass. A fundamental idea behind some of these restrictions, is that the majority of a population and its elected legislature can often be the source of minority persecutions, such as with racial discrimination. For example, during the mids and mids in the democratic country of Sweden, the government forcibly sterilized thousands of innocent women. Some countries throughout the world have judiciaries where judges can serve for long periods of time, and often serve under appointed posts. This is often balanced, however, by the fact that some trials are decided by juries. While many, like Wittman, have argued that democracies work much the same way as the free market and that there is competition among parties to prevent oppression by the majority, others have argued that there is actually very little competition among political parties in democracies due to the high cost associated with campaigning. Wenders, a professor of Economics at the University of Idaho , writes: In words attributed to Scottish historian Alexander Tytler: It can only exist until a majority of voters discover that they can vote themselves largess out of the public treasury. A majority bullying a minority is just as bad as a dictator, communist or otherwise, doing so. Democracy is two coyotes and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. For example, Fierlbeck Of course this is only a critique of a subset of types of democracy that primarily use majority rule. The Founding Fathers of the United States intended to address this criticism by combining democracy with republicanism. A constitution [39] would limit the powers of what a simple majority can accomplish. He put forth a cyclical theory of government where monarchies tend to decay into aristocracies, which then decay into democracies, which subsequently decay into anarchy, then tyranny, then return to monarchy. He hypothesized that a hybrid system of government incorporating facets of all three major types monarchy, aristocracy and democracy could break this cycle. Many modern democracies that have separation of powers are claimed to represent these kinds of hybrid governments. For example, the modern United States executive branch has slowly accumulated more power from the legislative branch, and the Senate no longer functions as a quasi-aristocratic body as was originally intended, since senators are now democratically elected. Political Coase theorem[edit] Some have tried to argue that the Coase theorem applies to political markets as well. Daron Acemoglu , however, provides evidence to the contrary, claiming that the Coase Theorem is only valid while there are "rules of the game," so to speak, that are being enforced by the government. But when there is nobody there to enforce the rules for the government itself, there is no way to guarantee that low transaction costs will lead to an efficient outcome in democracies.

2: Criticism of democracy - Wikipedia

Abstract: This paper analyses the efficiency consequences of lobbying in a production economy with imperfect commitment. We first show that the Pareto efficiency result found for truthful equilibria of common agency games in static exchange economies no longer holds under these more general conditions.

Guest Writer A Modern Progressive Populist Platform The way populism wins is to be angry at what the elites have done to this country and smart about how to fix it at the same time. It is the only thing that will save the Democrats politically and rebuild our country again. Using faulty historical analogies, polls with carefully designed questions in order to elicit certain answers, and the specter of far-right anti-intellectualism as reasons not to be populist, they fear what might happen if Democrats actually start listening to real voters and make the changes people were promised in The good news is that if the Democrats running for office in this tough, tough year will respond to the anti-establishment anger that is out there and ride it, they can do better than anyone is currently predicting. The latest article I have seen comes from a self-described liberal named Kevin Mattson writing in The American Prospect. He makes arguments unsupported by any polling numbers or actual knowledge of political dynamics, such as: There is no way to steer that boat back to left-wing shores. The Powerful convention speech, he shot ahead in the polls in that race only losing his lead after he performed badly in the debates. What I want to focus on today is a progressive populist platform that wins politically in our currently political environment. But a platform and message that does actually take on big corporate elites and an entrenched establishment does not have to wallow in simplicity, pandering and proud stupidity the way Palin-style right-wing populism does. Anger alone does not win elections for progressives, but righteous anger combined with accurate analysis and policies that take on the corruption of wealthy elites certainly can. The way populism wins is to be angry at what the elites have done to this country and smart about how to fix it all at the same time. Here is a winning progressive populist platform for the 21st century. Making government work for the people, not the powerful. Our mission should not be to defend government, because government has screwed up a lot of the time, especially when corporate special interests control it as they have on most issues since the s. Our mission instead is to wrest government from the clutches of the corporate interests who are feeding at the trough and turn government into something that can effectively serve and help middle- and lower-income Americans. Government contracting is as corrupt and inefficient as anything in American life. Way too many contracts are no-bid contracts; way too many go to a few big companies like Halliburton who have cheated American taxpayers over and over and never seem to get penalized. Cost overruns are rarely punished, and businesses built into most contracts are a scandal. There is enough land and waste in there to give us hundreds of billions of dollars worth of savings without even questioning the War in Afghanistan or the troops still in Iraq. And think how much we could save over the next decade if there was a serious endgame strategy. Corporations have captured far too many agencies in the federal government. A public option in health care and bargaining with drug companies over their prices were two huge ways to drive down health care costs, which we sadly chose to reject in the recent health care plan. Both would have saved tens of billions of taxpayer dollars. Big agribusiness companies have come to dominate our farm subsidy programs and have gotten far more federal dollars than struggling family farmers. The number of tax loopholes and special provisions for big business in the federal tax code is also in the hundreds of billions of dollars a year, all stuck into tax bills thanks to corporate lobbyists. Progressive populists are not pro-government; we are in favor of a government independent enough of big special interests to work well, and strong enough to oversee big business effectively. Collective action is as important as an effective government. I have always found it funny that even as conservatives hate government, they also hate private actions that hold big business accountable and provide another kind of check on its power. Labor unions, community organizing, class action lawsuits, blogging and netroots organizing, consumer boycotts are all mocked and attacked by the free market worshippers, even though they are private citizens banding together to get things done. Working together and organizing collectively are key components in providing a way to keep big business from being too powerful. We need stronger labor unions, and policies to make collective bargaining easier, like the

Employee Free Choice Act; we need to make it easier for lawyers, stockholders, and consumers to file class action lawsuits against corporate fraud and malfeasance; we should be investing more in community organizing and legal services for the poor like we did in the 60s and 70s. Progressive foundations and donors need to invest in a vibrant blogosphere and a strong consumer movement to keep pushing back against oligarchical corporations with way too much power. Investing in people and a bottom up economic structure is the best way to grow the economy. Progressive populists know that we have to invest in regular people to help lift them up. We need world class schools. We need a health system where everyone is covered and preventative medicine helps keep us healthier. We need more money for Head Start, school lunches, and early childhood health and nutrition to help lift the poorest children so that they have a good chance to make it. We need big investments in our massively underfunded physical infrastructure, roads, bridges, schools, highways. We need to make sure every American has access to the highest quality high-speed internet service. We also need for the federal government to actually have a jobs strategy, an industrial policy that helps nurture the industries of the future, like solar and wind power. Our trade deficit is a bigger long-term economic problem than the federal deficit, but because it benefits certain big special interests, we continue to avoid doing anything about it. We have to start investing in our people and our economy. We are pro-business, but against oligarchy. Progressive populists believe in supporting and investing in entrepreneurship, small business, and the manufacturing jobs of tomorrow. The only kind of businesses we are against are overgrown oligarchies who are big enough to stifle competition, distort the marketplace for their own greed, and get special breaks from the government. We expect businesses to live by the social contract and give back to the country that made it possible for them to do well by treating their workers and communities decently, not polluting the environment and paying a fair share of taxes. Progressive populism is better for business and the economy than the concentrations of wealth and power that have wreaked havoc in the financial, energy, telecom, and health care sectors. We need to throw the moneychangers out of the temple. One of the reasons that I am so enthusiastically working with the MoveOn. For the sake of our economy and our democracy, we need to break the inseparable link between big, corporate interests and our government. We need tough lobbying reform, public financing for campaigns, and we need to overturn the Citizens United decision. Although as far as I know this is not true of Mattson, the anti-populist crowd in the Democratic Party tend to be financially and socially aligned with the corporate special interests -- but they have one other thing in common with them: The anger that is out there at both parties and elites of all stripes is real and palpable, and it is not going away anytime soon. The underlying fundamentals of this economy for middle income people have been badly damaged by the financial collapse, and the throw-the-bums-out mood that caused the and wave elections is still in force. A smart, tough-minded populism that is willing to take on the D. Do you have information you want to share with HuffPost?

3: World Bank Research Digest, Vol. 2(3)

Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy – Filipe R. Campantea, Francisco H.G. Ferreira, a Department of Economics, Harvard University, United States b Research Department, The World Bank, United States.

4: Plutocracy - Wikipedia

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This paper analyses the efficiency consequences of lobbying in a production economy with imperfect commitment. We first show that the Pareto efficiency result found for truthful equilibria of common agency.

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