INTERSTATE CRISES AND VIOLENCE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY FINDINGS JONATHAN WILKENFELD AND MICHAEL BRECHER pdf

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Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: The debate in the last quarter of the twentieth century has concentrated on the tension between the postures of anarchy and order, conflict and stability, in world politics. What is the dominant principle in international relations? Is it the anarchical nature of the international system predominant in many parts of the world, resulting, as the neorealists contend, in cycles of conflict and an ongoing search for security? Or is international institutionalism, currently prevailing in the more developed parts of the globe, the wave of the future, as the nonrealists assert? Can institutionalism common in international economics replace the security dilemma in international politics? Along with the growing order in relations between states, we are also witnessing the emergence of ethnic conflict on a global scale. A large share of contemporary violence and disintegration in the world stems from ethnic conflicts both intrastate, such as within Northern Ireland and Canada, or with an interstate link, as in the ethnic confrontations in Afghanistan, Cyprus, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and the Kurds, and former Yugoslavia. The shift of conflict from the interstate realm to the intrastate domain calls for some amendment in realist contentions, while also challenging the institutionalist precepts. Our study explores the relative merits of realism and institutionalism in explaining international phenomena and remains open to evidence supporting each. A priori we admit to a predilection for the realist school because of the subject matter; the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict are more compatible with power politics. Similarly, by adopting international crisis as our conceptual framework and as the basis for our empirical research, we are obviously choosing a conflict-oriented approach. We do hope to explain, however, the appearance of international order and some institutionalism in a conflict-ridden region. Our realist disposition will be modulated, as previously noted, by an appreciation for the worldwide phenomenon of ethnic conflict, which has dogged the Arab-Israeli conflict since its inception. This study thus supplements classical international politics theory with its attention to both institutional and ethnic elements. From the realist school we draw concepts of international interactions such as conflict, international crisis, balance of power, and deterrence. From the institutional school we derive cooperative concepts such as rules, regulations, and regimes. When we turn to the ethnic dimension we use terms such as ethnonational aspirations, civil wars, and interethnic crises. In our application of these approaches we also intend to probe their validity. By taking such a comprehensive perspective, this inquiry will not only provide a better understanding of the Middle East conflict but will also produce theoretical insights useful for the study of other conflicts. This study examines change in the Arab-Israeli conflict as reflected by the dynamics of international crises. Three questions arise in this context: Was there change in the attributes of international crises over time? If yes, in which dimensions and directions did change take place? Why did changes in conflict occur? In order to answer these questions we pursue five goals: In this chapter, we start with a review of the main paradigmatic approaches and theories debated in the discipline. We suggest a set of conditions taken from the theoretical literature that explain change from conflict and confrontation to some You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

The culmination of more than twenty years of research by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, this work analyzes crucial themes about crisis, conflict, and war and presents systematic knowledge about more than crises, thirty-one protracted conflicts, and almost state participants.

Lashkar-e-Taiba LeT , the terrorist group quickly attributed with responsibility for the attack, had close ties to the Pakistan military and intelligence services, raising suspicions that the attack was state-sponsored. Ultimately the Indian government opted not to conduct a military response â€" a decision attributed to Indian dysfunctional decision-making, weak-willed leadership, limited military capabilities, a robust Pakistani deterrence posture, and U. Regional Powers and International Conflict Princeton: Princeton University Press, What is striking is that two years earlier, LeT was attributed responsibility for conducting a similar mass casualty attack, but without triggering expectations of a crisis. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: This prompts an interesting puzzle â€" why did one event trigger a crisis while the other did not? Eerily similar serial bomb blasts had been set off in Mumbai in that killed more than and injured over Within days of the bombing, the group responsible was publicly linked to Pakistan, yet no crises ensued. This is not the first time this empirical puzzle has emerged. In , a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament that only resulted in the loss of a few lives triggered the first part of the Twin Peaks crisis. The crisis involved massive military mobilization on both sides and intensified shows of force including artillery exchanges across the Line of Control LoC but stopped short of war. Before this event, however, there was a strikingly similar terrorist attack just a year earlier on another iconic symbol â€" the historic Red Fort â€" in the heart of New Delhi. The Parliament attack erupted into a major crisis while the Red Fort attack did not trigger such escalatory pressures and went comparatively unnoticed. In January , a Pakistan-based terrorist group attacked an Indian airbase in Pathankot, Punjab, killing seven Indian soldiers. Instead of a crisis or India-Pakistan standoff, both countries sought to collaborate on a joint investigation of the attack. By contrast, in September , another cross-border attack on an army installation in Uri, Kashmir, was believed to have violated a red line. In addition to terrorist attacks, military exercises and cross-border incursions appear to also have varying effects on crisis onset. While there has been much consternation over recent Indian military exercises in and , they have not resulted in crises. An unexpected second major Indian strike corps exercise in one year offered an uncharacteristically low level of information besides pre-notification but did not trigger a crisis in the same manner as in decades prior. The latter event triggered an actual limited war between two nuclear powers for only the second time in history. Cambridge University Press, Both incidents began with a quiet Pakistani troop movement to capture Indian-controlled territory in the Kargil heights. Both ultimately resulted in an Indian military response and recapture of territory, although only the Kargil incident escalated to the level of crisis. South Asian history is littered with similarly patterned provocations that were prime candidates for an international crisis, with only a few actualizing into crisis onset. In summary, during the past few decades several potential crisis events have punctuated the India-Pakistan rivalry, but only some of these have escalated to the level of a crisis. Why then do some events trigger a crisis episode while others do not? This narrow empirical question introduces some broader theoretical questions: What is an international or interstate crisis? What triggers crisis onset? How can scholars, analysts, and policymakers better anticipate these episodes? The essay seeks to address these questions. India and Pakistan have fought four wars and are the only two states with nuclear weapons that regularly exchange fire. In particular, crisis management has been a key priority for the United States since the nuclear tests added a nuclear tinge to all India-Pakistan crises. In the future, however, China may play a larger role in preventing escalation. This essay proceeds as follows. First, it offers a definition of an interstate crisis and its essential properties. Second, it details how we approach crisis onset and the importance of studying it specifically in the context of India and Pakistan. Fourth, it briefly describes our research design including data sources and how we identify crises. Fifth, it draws on the literature on international crises and India-Pakistan

rivalry to distill some plausible hypotheses to explain crisis onset, as well as ways to operationalize and measure them. Finally, the essay presents some analysis of our initial findings and concludes with suggested future avenues for additional research. What is a Crisis? Every interstate war and conflict starts as a crisis. To better anticipate crises and understand their causes, this essay first seeks clarity on the meaning of crisis and its properties. For this, we turn to the extensive literature on the subject, mostly written during the Cold War, to unpack essential properties and dynamics. Princeton University Press, , International crises are distinct from normal decisions affecting interstate relations because of the following perceptions: The Nature of International Crisis Baltimore: Studies in International Actions and Interactions, ed. Edward Azar and D. Ben Dak New York: Gordon and Breach, , Third Parties in International Crises Princeton: A fourth feature is incomplete information and uncertainty. The essence of the crisis is its unpredictability. It is the essence of a crisis that the participants are not fully in control of events; they take steps and make decisions that raise or lower the danger, but in a realm of risk and uncertainty. Schelling, Arms and Influence New Haven: Yale University Press, , Studies employing simulations or experiments in laboratory-like environments to evaluate which components of a crisis have the most discernible effect on decision processes found that the amount of time available to make a decision was the most impactful variable. Insights from Behavioral Research, ed. Free Press, , Standard information, coordination, and miscalculation problems inherent to state decision-making can be exacerbated under time pressure, intensifying uncertainty and the risk of war. Based on this analysis, we define an interstate crisis as a decision point between peace and war in which a state perceives an intensification of a cross-border threat to national interests, heightened uncertainty, and time constraints and at least considers retaliation by force. In the context of South Asia, misperceptions about military exercises or mobilization, fears of pre-emption, gray zone incursions, and cross-border attacks have precipitated crises. In recent years, the most commonly feared and analyzed South Asia crisis scenario arises from an attack by a violent nonstate group. Oxford University Press, Though India averages three terrorist incidents per day, 24 According to the Global Terrorism Database, India had 1, terrorist incidents in Beyond the inherent destruction and loss of life in an attack, major incidents are perceived as breakdowns in immediate and general deterrence that could invite further harm. Brookings Institution Press, , 62, These events galvanize Indian decision-makers to consider retaliatory responses but are shadowed by uncertainty and the risk of escalation to war between two nuclear powers. Pressure for making rapid decisions emerges from a desire to satiate the domestic audience, avoid crisis interveners, and to effectively communicate to external audiences its retaliation responses to the initial provocation. This particular type of crisis scenario is the subject of this study, though there are other potential crisis scenarios worth examining. Why Study Crisis Onset? Studying crises also helps practitioners draw lessons on how to manage, intervene, and potentially preempt future crises. Scholarship on international crises disaggregates four distinct phases: While much contemporary work has covered the last three, onset studies appear less frequently, potentially because of their difficulty. The question for governments is knowing when they are in a crisis. Crisis onset was thoroughly studied in the Cold War s and s by scholars trying to identify system effects because any international crisis could have become a flashpoint for great power intervention, competition, and conflict. Even if the United States and the Soviet Union were not the primary actors in a crisis, they still risked being drawn into a shooting war and all the risks of escalation to total nuclear war. Crises nested prior to and within the Korean War offer good examples of where secondary parties to the conflict chose to operate in secrecy for escalation control. The superpowers sought to anticipate and prevent the outbreak of major international crises to stave off a more serious confrontation. In the post–Cold War era, interest in crisis onset decreased, at least for those entities concerned with major power war. The number of conflicts increased, but the risk of such events drawing in nuclear powers in a unipolar world seemed remote. Comparatively less attention is paid to the causes of crisis onset in international security politics than, for instance, the causes of international financial crises. The interests in systemic analysis of international crisis onset shifted to early warning and predictions of civil war onset, 30 James D. Fearon and David D. Today, the study of interstate crisis explores dynamics

like escalation, crisis bargaining, management, coercion outcomes, and consequences but tends to treat the crisis itself as exogenous. Crises seem to emerge from the vicissitudes of international politics, and the work that does seek to explain onset tends to look for immediate triggers specific to individual cases rather than more systematic approaches. Thus, this essay seeks to account for crisis onset by examining the conditions under which seemingly inert military-political events transform into crises. India-Pakistan Crises In addition to analytical and conceptual value, there is a more practical application for unpacking crisis onset. The risks of escalation in nuclearized South Asia are severe. The United States has been involved in de-escalating and defusing nearly every major India-Pakistan crisis over the past 30 years. In fact, some scholars have argued that triggering U. While attempts at crisis prediction may be a fraught exercise, scholars and policymakers would profit from a closer understanding of why crises erupt in South Asia. Now that the prospect for nuclear-tinged crises are re emerging in other dyads like the United States and Russia and the United States and China, the findings from South Asia might yield useful mechanisms and process insights applicable to other regions anticipating crises. The Subjectivity of Crisis: In fact, perception and misperception conditions all these components of a crisis and therefore constitutes an essential, if obvious, intervening variable between a provocation and crisis. The sense of tension within a crisis is subjectively felt within states even if it derives from some objective conditions or events. There is an inherent subjectivity in that the precipitant functions as a convenient legitimizer and only a proximate cause.

3: A Study of Crisis

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan & Michael Brecher, ` Interstate Crises and Violence: Twentieth Century Findings ', in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press (-).

Actually, they very strongly favor the Proposition , even though Weede concludes that: This is the most important finding of this analysis To compensate for difficulties in his democracy scale, he dichotomized the scale into democracies and nondemocracies, and war frequencies into the occurrence of at least one war or no war for the regime. The result for the different data sets on war and the three different periods is that all the cross-tabulations are in the proper direction, although only one specific cross-tabulation is significant by itself Weede, Although frequencies are dichotomized into the presence or absence of war, they still do not avoid the problem of regimes with a few killed in war being equated with those in which millions are lost. Nonetheless, he has also been cited as finding that democracies are neither more nor less warlike than other types of regimes. Small and Singer used an appropriate measure of severity battle dead and their results are relevant to the Proposition. But the Chan and Weede studies are inappropriate, since they measure violence by the number of years at war, by the frequency of wars, or by the existence of war, none of which measures the severity of violence central to the Proposition. There are five other studies following on these that do analyses bearing on the Proposition , but they all use the Small and Singer war or the Gochman and Maoz militarized dispute data and cross-tabulate or correlate violence or war frequencies with some measure of democracy. If their use of frequencies was relevant to the Proposition, one study would be positive Morgan and Schwebach, , 30 two would tend to be ambiguous Domke, ; Maoz and Abdolali, , and two studies would be negative Cole, ; Morgan and Campbell, , neither one strongly so. In Crises in the Twentieth Century, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Michael Brecher and Sheila Moser cross-tabulate actors involved in crises according to whether they were democracies, authoritarian or military dictatorships. Conversely, democratic regimes which were most likely to perceive non-violent acts as triggers to their crises tended to choose pacific [crisis management techniques], with negotiation the most frequent among them: That is, democracy is less warlike severity than other regimes. This is contrary to the prevailing wisdom among students of war, but upon careful inspection the results underlying their consensus have not only been shown to equate for a nation wars involving a few dozen killed with wars killing millions, but also, were frequencies relevant, to support the Proposition, not negate it. Regardless, one does not need to rely on the nuances of these studies or their methodology. As empirically shown in my "Libertarianism and International Violence" study, by other work in the field in which relevant and appropriate variables have been used, and by the analyses I did here, when properly measured, democracies are less violent than non-democracies. Typographical errors have been corrected, clarifications added, and style updated. This significance was for two different ways of calculating the highest violence in the sample, significant at chi-squares, p , one-tailed. Also the correlation between regime type and severity was significant at p 3. Although I am often cited as the exception to the alleged findings that democracies are no less warlike than other regimes, in my Vol. A Test Against Published Research Results" article, I list over a dozen studies the empirical results of which also support the Proposition. Fore a chapter length discussion and presentation of the evidence on each of these propositions, see Power Kills. Note that as far as these propositions and their evidence are concerned, the term "freedom" can be replaced by "democracy". The average battle dead for the given type of regime is the sum of all those killed in battle of all the regimes of that type such as US citizens killed in battle for the United States, plus Canadians for Canada, plus Australians for Australia, and so on for democracies divided by the number of regimes of that type. Since only state regimes are involved, all battle dead are for interstate wars. For both Bonferroni adjusted and Tukey pairwise comparisons, p 8. The significance for the analysis of variance is p All the data on violence and type of regime used here are given in Statistics of Democide. How many regimes have existed depends on how different regimes have been defined. For the Gurr Polity II data there are regimes, Polity II gives three

regimes for the Soviet Union, ; 1 count only one here as well. The Bonferroni adjustment and Tukey pairwise comparisons were significant at p Data were from Global Data Manager Wealth is a distinct dimension from one with which political characteristics are correlated. That is, political characteristics, and thus type of regime, have little correlation with wealth. As with wealth, the political characteristics of nations also have little correlation with their physical power, that is, their capability. This statement is based on a simultaneous factor analysis called super-P factor analysis of behavior and attributes for , , and ; and a canonical analysis of dyadic behavior regressed on the distances between nations, such as along wealth and capability dimensions, among others. Data are from Global Data Manager Not only is energy consumption among the best indicators of capability, but it also avoids the currency convertibility problem of its close rival, GNP. See also Small and Singer In previously using the Small-Singer data I avoided the problem of the vastly different number killed in a war for each country by using battle dead as my measure of war. But my results are still affected by the 1, battle-dead cutoff for a war. Thus, a state that had a few killed in a war in which it had many troops was included in my analysis while a state that lost near 1, in a military action in which 1, were not killed overall was not included. The t-test should be 2. They do have another table giving the number of democracies and nondemocracies participating in wars Table 3. The number of democracies is always a small percentage of the total number of nations involved, but nothing can be made of this without knowing the total number of democratic regimes in the international system. The significance tests were by chi-square. Admittedly, my phrasing of this led Chan to conclude I was using frequencies. However, my previous discussion of the methodology and Proposition should have warned him away from this interpretation. I should also say that when I wrote the article I did not realize that virtually without exception subsequent research by others would use frequencies. In any case, Chan At the very least, this approach assumes that the analyst has a homogeneous set of war involvements. I suspect that depending on the particular measure of war or conflict used, one can arrive at very different conclusions about the relative pacifism of democracies". Chan is now persuaded that democracies may be more peaceful but still in terms of frequencies. In his latest piece These are given in the January-February issues of Freedom at Issue for each year. I will ignore the results for extrasystemic wars, since only independent states are counted. All significance levels were one-tailcd. If we assume that there is no relationship between democracy and having fought wars, then the probability of getting 10 cross-tabulations out of 10 in the hypothesized direction by chance is 0. But these 10 cross-tabulations were not all independent. The different data sets overlap, as do the subperiods with the full periods, and this is enough to vitiate the probability. Nonetheless, it is possible that these 10 cross-tabulations can be either positive or negative and therefore that they were all in the proper direction should be considered substantively important, if one accepts the underlying measurements. Note also that it is incorrect to test separately the significance of coefficients arrayed in a table as Weede does here. For such coefficients, 5 should be significant at p 0. Weede ignored the Proposition that democracies do not make war on each other, and, as he later wrote, did not accept it at this time. In his latest article Now, the weight of the evidence makes me accept this proposition. Two readers, one strongly, argued that Bremer should also be included as positive, since he found that democratic vs. But these results are dyadic, not monadic, and thus irrelevant to whether democracies are more or less warlike. However, these results do bear positively on the different Proposition that the more democratic two regimes, the less likely there will be violence between them. Russett does not present results relevant to the monadic Proposition, but in a personal communication he reported reanalyzing his data on democracy, wars and disputes. He found that the data, , clearly supported the Proposition. Domestic and International Imperatives. Chan, Steve "Mirror, Mirror on the War Are Democratic States More Pacific? Chan, Steve "Democracy and War: Cole, Timothy Michael "Politics and Meaning: Rosenau eds Government without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, pp. Evidence from Experimental Research", International Interactions 18 3: Clifton and Valerie L. A Prescription for Peace? Ray, James Lee "Wars between Democracies: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition. University of South Carolina Press. Quantitative International Politics, pp.

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Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars. I would like to thank Karl DeRouen, Edward Newman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Hugh Miall for incredibly helpful and constructive comments that significantly improved previous drafts of this chapter. The quantitative method has two principal purposes: Both descriptive and inferential statistics have led to significant advances in our understanding of civil conflict. Descriptive analysis of conflict databases have provided significant insights into the characteristics of individual conflicts, and helped to reveal larger trends in the nature of contemporary violence. For instance, quantitative analysis has provided us with a greater appreciation of the frequency and deadliness of civil conflict, highlighted the geographic distribution of civil strife, and illustrated the relatively consistent decline in all forms of violence over the past two millennia e. Inferential statistics also play a central role in the civil war research program. Scholars using econometric tools have uncovered much of what we now know about the onset, duration and outcome of civil war. For example, quantitative methods have been responsible for the widespread consensus that now exists on the conflict inducing effects of features including: Quantitative literature is also been at the heart of the key controversies within civil war studies. Providing a review of the bourgeoning body of influential statistical studies on civil war is beyond the scope of this chapter, as in many cases this scholarship is discussed in the collection of thematic chapters later in the volume. Similarly, a detailed instruction of how to 2 undertake quantitative analysis is not within the remit of this compendium. Instead this chapter will provide an overview of the quantitative study of civil war, focusing on the development of quantitative conflict studies, the basics of the quantitative method, the prominent sources of civil conflict data, and the strengths and weaknesses of using quantitative methods to analyse civil war. The Emergence of the Quantitative Method Quantitative conflict research first emerged in the lates in conjunction with the behaviourist revolution that swept the social sciences. In this period conflict studies begun to mature into a fully-fledged academic discipline, bringing together scholars from a diverse range of subjects including: This new generation of conflict scholars took conscious steps to model themselves on the natural sciences, embracing the positivist principles1 of observation, empirical data and measurement. Researchers sought to acquire knowledge though the identification of patterns from within large collections of data, and began to use mathematical approaches to model social and international processes. To advance this new scientific analysis of conflict new research tools, concepts and journals were created. Kenneth Boulding played a pivotal role in the behaviourist revolution, helping to promote a research program centred on the collection and systematic analysis of data. In Boulding, along with mathematician-biologist Anatol Rapoport, social psychologist Herbert Kelman, and sociologist Robert Cooley Angell, set up the Journal of Conflict Resolution, which published and promoted conflict literature with a scientific methodology Boulding, Building on this success Boulding and Rapoport later launched the Peace Science Society, an interdisciplinary effort to develop an individual set of concepts, techniques and data to better understand and mitigate conflict Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, Originally led by David Singer and Melvin Small , , the first iteration of COW project provided data on all conflicts from to Yet the behaviourist principles advocated by Boulding, Singer and Richardson were not welcomed by all conflict scholars. Critics argued that behaviourists reduced the complexity of the social world to those aspects that could be measured, thus ignoring the wider body of factors driving human behaviour, such as ideas, beliefs, meanings and reasons Kurki and Wight, This struggle largely divided conflict theorists; on the one hand explanatory conflict scholars sought generalised inferences by codifying and measuring key concepts, while interpretive theorists rejected the generalising approach and instead focused upon the interpretation of the unobservable and immeasurable forms of action using

qualitative, discursive and historical analysis Kurki and Wight, This division was largely observable in relation to geographic boundaries and institutional membership, with North American scholars commonly adopting the behaviourist approach and membership in the Peace Science Society, whilst scholars outside the United States more often rejected the behaviourist principles and leant towards the International Peace Research Association Isard, Today there remains a large divide between quantitative and non-quantitative scholars, with researchers often defined as much by their methodological approach as the substantive area of research that they pursue. This division extends to all aspects of the discipline, from the form of graduate training programs offered within different institutions, to the journals in which research using different methodologies are published. This is unfortunate, for as the final section of this chapter discusses, both quantitative and qualitative approaches are often required to generate a full understanding of civil strife. The Basics of the Quantitative Method Quantitative research is essentially any form of analysis that utilizes numerical data. Most of the concepts relevant to civil war studies do not naturally assume a numerical value e. Therefore the first stage of quantitative research is always to develop a method through which social concepts can be transformed into numerical values. This can involve the researcher devising the methods in which the phenomena of interest can be observed and systematically represented by numbers coding procedure , or alternatively drawing upon conventional methods of measurement used in other literature. Creating your own dataset has obvious advantages, such as allowing the researcher to tailor the variables and methods of operationalization to the requirements of a research question. Broadly speaking these techniques fall into two categories: Descriptive Statistics Descriptive statistics seek to illustrate the distribution of the data by providing simple descriptions of interesting characteristics. This commonly includes frequency tables, measures of central tendency, and indicators of the level of dispersion. To describe data in the most parsimonious fashion, researchers often rely upon a form of statistical modelling. A statistical model is a mathematical representation of reality, which can be used to describe data. For instance, the mean average is a statistical model that measures the central tendency of a collection of data. By calculating the sum of each of the numbers in a dataset, and dividing this number by the total number of observations, you can represent the entire dataset using only one number. Statistical modelling of this nature is relatively straightforward and can often be undertaken with only minimal training. Using basic statistical packages such as Excel or SPSS, a researcher can highlight the total number of civil conflicts in a time period, the average duration of these conflicts, and the level of variance across regions. Armed Conflict by Type, 6 Descriptive analysis can often illuminate findings that were previously overlooked by researchers. In particular the graphical representation of descriptive statistics can more clearly illuminate important trends, in particular when dealing with large bodies of data. Figure one illustrates this process, representing the evolving frequency of different forms of conflict since the Second World War. The chart simply presents the total number of inter, intra and extra systematic conflicts in the post-war period. In their raw form these data are unwieldy and challenging to appreciate, but when displayed in this manner they clearly highlight the evolving frequencies of different forms of violent conflict. Descriptive statistics can also help to illustrate relationships between two bivariate or more multivariate variables. This can give an indication of a causal relationship, suggesting cases in which a change in one independent variable produces a change in a different dependent variable. This form of analysis cannot conclusively demonstrate a causal process, but can often highlight a relationship that is worthy of additional quantitative or qualitative assessment. For example, using descriptive statistics Lacina 7 demonstrated that secessionist civil conflicts are almost as deadly in absolute deaths and deaths per year as non-secessionist conflicts, contradicting the previous belief that secessionist wars are limited on account of their geographically isolated nature. However, she also finds that wars of secession do induce far less deaths per capita, which she argues is the result of there tendency to occur with large populous states. This finding has motivated a number of subsequent studies into the influence of conflict type, population size, and conflict location e. Buhaug, , ; Raleigh and Hegre, Inferential Statistics Inferential statistics go further than descriptive analysis, allowing a researcher to make claims beyond those cases that are under investigation. Inferential

statistics attempt to make predications, or inferences, about the wider population, using observations and analyses from a sample a subset of the population selected for analysis. Put differently, by studying a subset of the population researchers attempt to produce findings that can be generalised to the larger population of which the sample is a part. This is achieved by applying a more sophisticated form of statistical model to the conflict data. Inferential models are based upon a series of probabilistic assumptions, based upon the distribution of the data, how the parameters of that distribution change over time, and the dependence of one observation on another. Once a model has been selected an estimator is chosen. An estimator is a function of the sample data that provides estimation for the unknown parameter. In most cases models can be estimated using a number of different estimators. Whilst a number of the assumptions that justify the selection of an estimator can be assessed using statistical tests, more often theoretical and substantive knowledge are the best guides of model choice. Regression analysis estimates the typical change in the dependent variable that occurs when an independent variable is varied, whilst at the same time holding constant other variables that could plausibly account for the change in the dependent variable. The broad family of regression based models offers researchers a wide range of tools for the analysis of all aspects of civil violence. The appropriateness of the different forms of regression models is dependent upon the theoretical assumptions and data. When research is attempting to explain a dichotomous outcome, logit and probit models[4] are the most common method of choice e. When an outcome takes more than two categories in which there is a clear ordering, but in which the space between values is not the same across all levels of the variable, then multi-nominal logit models are generally preferred e. Alternatively when the outcome under evaluation is some form of time interval, then a duration or hazard model is often most appropriate e. Finally, in those cases in which the sample selection is related to or correlated with the dependent variable, a Heckman or Sartori selection model is required e. This data specification generally has repeated observations e. A standard pooled cross sectional dataset would be formed of cross sectional data on n states and t time periods, producing n x t number of observations. For example a dataset covering of states for 68 years would produce a time series cross sectional dataset of observations. Time series cross sectional analysis has a number of advantages. Firstly, this approach helps to reduce the small n problem, which occurs when analysts are faced with a limited number of units e. This can lead to a problem of too many variables with too few cases, which occurs when a large number of potentially explanatory variables require assessment on a small sample Landman, By assessing wider pool of cross- sectional observations across both time and space the researcher increases the variability of the data Hicks Finally, time series cross sectional analysis allows researchers to assess the variation across two-dimensions simultaneously. Rather than assessing the cross section of cases at one point in time e. Sierra Leone from , the analyst can assess all countries through time e. Using these approach inferences can therefore be drawn on a wider range of cases. These significant advantages have lead pooled analysis to assume a central role in the quantitative analysis of civil war. However, time series cross sectional analysis also presents a number of problems for a more detailed account, see Hicks ; Beck and Katz This primarily relates to the violations of standard error assumptions. Similarly, there is more likely to be correlation between certain sub-sets of units. For example, regional trends could potentially lead Kenya and Uganda, and France and Germany to share common features whilst remaining independent of each other. Increasingly sophisticated methods have been devised to overcome these challenges, but they remain serious obstacles that quantitative researchers using pooled methods must continue to address. The first systematically collected data set was not released until , when Pitirim Sorokin published his three-volume series that quantitatively assessed the temporal and qualitative changes in civilizations, in which the history of warfare was one element. Other early pioneers included Quincy Wright and Lewis Fry Richardson , who both led the way in the collection of systematic conflict data. Yet conflict datasets in the form we now know them did not truly emerge until the s with the launch of the correlates of war project CoW. The CoW dataset has been hugely influential in all forms of conflict studies, and remains one of the most frequently utilized data resources Eck, In addition to the original data project, the CoW dataverse includes a diverse range of variables that make the CoW data an

indispensable resource for a wide range of empirical studies e. The rapid growth in quantitative conflict studies in the post-Cold War era led to a significant increase in the availability high quality datasets. Firstly it has a far lower threshold for inclusion, also coding conflicts that produce a significantly lower death count. The ICB data contains a rich level of information on crisis situations taking place both between and within states, including precise information on the initiation e. As well as the large data projects housed within major conflict research centres, a number of individuals have also created their own datasets. Some of the most prominent sources focus specifically on civil conflict, most notably those produced by James Fearon Fearon and Laitin, and Nicholas Sambanis These resources are based upon individual coding procedures, and therefore complement the larger data projects, offering 12 researchers the opportunity to test the robustness of their findings on a range of different data collections.

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5: Project MUSE - Arab-Israeli Conflict Transformed, The

Brecher, Michael, Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality. Oxford: Pergamon.: Brecher, Michael & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Crisis, Conflict and Instability.

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: In its examination of conflict, crisis and war, this study posed three core questions: Was there change in the attributes of international crises over time? If yes, in which dimensions and directions did change take place? Why did changes in conflict occur? In addressing these queries we purposely drew on multiple scholarly approaches thereby making three theoretical contributions to the international relations field. First, in explaining change we articulated our theory in a terminology taken from both major contending schools in contemporary international relations theory: Second, our empirical research combined quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. Third, we integrated the ethnonational dimension into our analysis. This book, as noted at the onset, is divided thematically into seven chapters. Chapter 1 presented the theoretical framework for all further analysis. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 analyzed the interstate dimension, while chapters 5 and 6 focussed primarily on the ethnic dimension of the conflict. Chapter 7 now integrates the interstate and ethnic aspects and suggests directions for new research. The findings from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 point to a clear conclusion regarding all three core questions guiding this research: Our conclusions below will unfold according the structure of the book and its research questions. At the end of the chapter we shall add some policy comments regarding our ability to analyze the direction of the conflict. We conducted our research of this book in the midst of a post-Oslo trend suggesting the winding down of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We tried to test this apparently positive inclination with empirical evidence. Indeed,despite the outbreak of strife and violence in the Israeli-Palestinian arena in September , our theoretical framework and empirical evidence supported the perhaps surprising argument that at the close of the twentieth century, the fierceness of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been subsiding. Taking a broad and comprehensive view of almost a hundred years of conflict and over fifty years of international crises, we discovered that for the last two decades and a half a gradual decline has occurred in the frequency and magnitude of international crises in the Arab-Israeli arena. Against this trend, we also noticed the vigorousness of ethnic -state and interethnic types of crises. While we observed some modification in the Jewish-Palestinian sphere of the conflict, it was less pronounced than in the interstate domain. The evaluation of these changes gains significance given the enduring condition of the conflict. The question we leave open is whether the ethnic elements will pull the entire conflict back to its former rigid and hostile nature. An international crisis among states was designated in this study as a critical stage in the transition from stability to the use of force in world politics. We assumed that the reduction of such occurrences , or modifications in the mode of behavior within them, would reflect both change in the pattern of relations among the involved actors as well as the introduction of rules and regulations. An international crisis can deteriorate into war but it can also shift toward stability. Hence,we chose state behavior in international crises as an indicator of a potential transition from an anarchical order to one that is more stable. The duration of a crisis was regarded as a period characterized by the dynamics of transition from normal relations range to violent interactions and back. On the basis of the above, we assumed that an international crisisâ€"a microcosm of international politics and condensed changeâ€" would be an effective vehicle through which to evaluate the potential transformation from total conflict to a more regulated rivalry and perhaps even further, to some level of cooperation in a protracted conflict. To capture the dual nature of conflict, with its static and dynamic components , we chose to focus on the core attributes of You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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