

1: Ten reasons to oppose military intervention in Iraq and Syria - Counterfire

1. US-led military interventionism in modern times is literally always disastrous, literally never helpful, and literally never accomplishes what its proponents claim it will accomplish.

With many in the international community calling for intervention in various locations around the world, a better understanding of the consequences of past interventions is critical. Experts remain divided over whether foreign military intervention can be an effective mechanism for building durable institutions in fragile states, and under what conditions this strategy is most likely to succeed. In Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the US sought to build democratic institutions and practices through military occupation and reconstruction that could survive the withdrawal of US support. Each of these cases produced very different outcomes. Japan The US occupation of Japan during was highly attuned to the scope and strength of Japanese state institutions. In comparison to US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, planning for the occupation and political reconstruction of Japan began earlier and was more comprehensive. In addition, while the US occupation purged the government of many of the individuals associated with the previous ruling regime, it did not do so in a way that risked weakening the underlying administrative capacity of the Japanese state. The result was that the capacity of Japanese national political institutions was not fundamentally affected by the purge process. Finally, the US initiated an array of social and economic reforms designed to create the conditions for sustainable liberal democracy—such as breaking up large industrial conglomerates, and instituting land reform. In the process, it successfully built institutional capacity where it had not previously existed. Iraq The US approach to state-building in Iraq from to failed to preserve the existing capacity of Iraqi state institutions. The US war plan envisioned a relatively small force that would enter and exit Iraq quickly. In contrast with the Japanese occupation, decision makers under the Bush administration initially rejected the idea of creating a formal occupation authority. Even after the administration was compelled to form a more structured occupation authority, the US reform agenda continued to dismantle and undermine the capacity of Iraqi state institutions. This reform agenda focused on reducing the scope of the Iraqi state, which US officials viewed as bloated and inefficient. The result was the introduction of free market-oriented reforms, including privatizing state-owned companies, rolling back the state sector, and eliminating a vast network of state subsidies. The US decision to dissolve the Iraqi military and other security institutions further undermined the state and contributed to the outbreak of anti-government violence. Afghanistan The military stabilization operation in Afghanistan from to involved a more limited direct military commitment than Japan and Iraq. The US intervention focused on building the strength of Afghan institutions, but failed to make significant progress in accomplishing this goal. Yet the Afghan state still seems unable to deliver many basic services outside the capital region of Kabul. The US attempted to attach certain governance conditions to assistance but did not withhold aid when these were not met, which may have led state leaders to behave even more recklessly. Lessons for future intervention It is easier for international actors to preserve existing state strength than to build it when it does not exist. This was a challenge given the weak state in Afghanistan, and the war-weakened state in Iraq. Foreign assistance can succeed in delivering public goods in areas where national institutions are failing such as security. However, aid may also create a disincentive for national leaders to invest in institutions that can provide these goods while they are already being provided by international actors. This logic may explain why, despite massive US programmes intended to build the security sectors in Iraq and Afghanistan, these programmes have had limited success in creating organizations that can operate independently. It may be difficult for intervention to succeed when certain structural conditions are not in place, such as high prior levels of economic development or previous experience with democratic rule. This is true regardless of the design or administration of aid programs.

2: Interventionism | Definition of Interventionism by Merriam-Webster

This section discusses three implications of these patterns after the intervention trap in the Middle East, the effect of American interventionist proclivities on American allies, and the effects of a less-permissive global environment on the future of American military interventionism.

Old Wine in New Bottles? March 18, The French government attempted to justify its military intervention in Mali on humanitarian and security grounds. Despite its public relations efforts, the French government has not been able to avoid accusations of neocolonialism. Some have argued France has failed to abjure its outmoded paternalistic-colonial tendencies, while other critics suggest more immediate economic concerns motivated the intervention. Regardless of the actual reason for the campaign, France seems unwilling or unable to extricate its contemporary foreign policies from its colonial legacy. Charles Glass argues that such a policy is only likely to contribute to a worsening of the humanitarian situation in the country without providing a resolution to the civil war. Despite expressing a desire for peace in Syria, western governments including the UK have consistently opposed the Assad government, and would therefore have little credibility as mediators in the conflict. The Russian government, on the other hand, has been more sympathetic to the Assad government. Glass argues that, if humanitarian concerns are actually prioritized, diplomatic efforts could more effectively be channeled into pursuing an agreement with Russia to prevent the importation of arms for any side of the conflict. Humanitarian aid organizations are expressing deep concerns about this strategy because their ability to be granted access to conflict situations relies heavily on their political neutrality and strict agenda of responding to humanitarian needs alone. If the US plans go ahead, the Assad government may not only restrict access, but perceive aid agencies as a front for a US military agenda. This has multiple consequences. Humanitarian aid agencies could be blocked from entry, or even become military targets themselves. Also, if aid is selectively given to some groups over others, the aid itself can become a source of conflict, thus fostering more violence. Regardless of political affiliation, children in need of food should be given assistance. This is the principle of humanitarian aid, which can be damaged beyond repair in a situation like Syria, if its apolitical reputation is tarnished by intervening powers. The Worst is Yet to Come February 20, The recent French intervention in Mali was successful in repelling the Islamist fighters who had previously established control over much of the country. While insurgents no longer control northern Mali, and are not in a position to invade the capital Bamako, there are some initial indications that tactics of asymmetric warfare including suicide bombing may precipitate a more protracted conflict. So long as the underlying causes of conflict remain, violence in Mali will likely continue, even if French intervention has stemmed the direct military threat of an insurgency. February 14, The Obama administration has recently been the subject of criticism for its controversial use of drones. Ultimately, the US drone program is predicated on a flexible interpretation of sovereignty, a concept that has had its strictures attenuated by the proponents of humanitarian intervention. The conflict in Mali is fundamentally grounded in nationalist grievances and aims which have been co-opted by relatively marginal religious extremists. Roy contends that extremist groups endeavor to entice western intervention in order to transform nationalist conflicts into confrontations with the west. In this article, independent scholar Diane Johnstone argues that the concept and language of genocide is being appropriated to justify interventionist policies by major powers. Johnstone is concerned that the obviously commendable and uncontroversial desire to prevent genocide has provided a pretext for great power interference in the affairs of smaller states. She also argues that the responsibility to protect undermines the perception that war is an atrocity in itself, and turns war into a legitimate tool for atrocity-prevention. Along with claims about the risks of political instability, humanitarian concerns have also been cited as a reason for the intervention. However, all sides of the conflict have been implicated in these violations, including the Malian authorities that the French intervention is supporting. Since this intervention is partially a consequence of the previous one, there is concern that even if the operation in Mali is initially successful, it may precipitate even further western military entrenchment in the region. Moreover, a military deployment would inevitably constrain an already difficult humanitarian access. International Peace Institute Rice: Yet, the shape of such military action

remains unclear as France and the United States are divided on the right strategy to adopt. France, South Africa, India, and other Council members favors the adoption of a single Security Council resolution authorizing a foreign intervention force by the end of France promotes a "two track" approach - promoting a democratic political transition while training Malian security forces to conduct offensive military operations. The French government immediately called for a new government and a military intervention, arguing that that "these developments underline the need for the rapid deployment of an African stabilization force. North Mali is now described as a safe haven for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and a UN-backed military intervention seems more likely. Reuters The Responsibility to Protect: November 6, The United Nations advocates the Responsibility to Protect R2P , a controversial doctrine related to military interventions. Yet many fundamental practical questions remain unanswered and "no-one seems sure of what R2P even is. Branch explains how this lack of conceptual clarity is particularly worrying for the African continent, where three-quarters of the crises in which R2P has been invoked or applied. Ultimately, R2P engenders a divide between Western "protectors" and African states, whose legitimacy and sovereignty are to be judged by the "international community". Western powers "mainly France and the US" are pushing to gain consensus over a military operation against radical Islamist rule across most of northern Mali. This explains why the US is putting pressure on Algeria, the most influential power in the region, to support an intervention. While it seems that Algeria has "tacitly" agreed to military action, the country has always expressed its suspicion regarding a foreign interference in the region, fearing that it would push fleeing Al-Qaeda members and Tuareg refugees across its southern border. Reuters Military Intervention in Mali: On Friday October 12, the UN Security Council agreed on a resolution that provides an open-ended invitation to outside powers to send military trainers to Mali. Will this really stabilize the country or rather amplify the food crisis, increase the number of internally displaced persons and restrict access to genuine humanitarian relief? They are genuinely dangerous on Iran. They must not be heeded on Syria. Since the coup of March , North Mali which controlled by Tuareg rebel and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb have increased its presence in the region. Yet, aid officials and experts of humanitarian affairs warn the UN that such intensification of the conflict would actually exacerbate the current food and nutrition crisis by displacing important part of the population. UN to Debate Military Intervention September 25, The crisis in Mali continues, and the International Crisis Group has warned that "all scenarios are still possible" in the country, "including another military coup and social unrest in the capital. However, the United Nations is reluctant to authorize military intervention in Mali, for fear of further escalating the crisis. After 18 months of violence, the conflict can now best be described as a Lebanon-type inter-ethnic civil war. Hence, a military intervention would mean taking side with an opposition that remains deeply divided. This and the Libyan chaos will restrain Western powers, and specifically the US, when contemplating military operations in the country. Time The Siren Song of American Imperialism September 20, From the invasion of the Philippines in to the recent mission in Libya, military interventions under humanitarian pretexts have always been at the cornerstone of US foreign policy. Huffington Post Divided We Stand: As a result, while local armed groups fighting for the control of resources are in charge of providing security in the country, the proliferation of weapons is threatening the whole Sahel region. Ultimately, the chaotic situation of Libya 18 months after the intervention reminds us that before calling for a similar military mandate in Syria, interventionists should carefully weights the potential longer term consequences with which Syrians would have to live once the last jet planes fly away. But would this be effective? Christopher Dickey sheds light on the uneven record of such strategy used in Iraqi Kurdistan in and Srebrenica in This concept, established at the UN in , affirms that if a state fails to protect its citizens, the international community has the responsibility to act through coercive measures, military intervention being the last resort. Guardian In Defence of "Iraq Syndrome": Liberal Values Never Drive Intervention April 3, Liberal support for military interventions by the West rests on the assumption that the West is essentially a benevolent force in the world. In this Guardian article David Wearing skewers this belief and makes a case for skepticism. The lack of self-reflection, evaluation and assessment following a campaign waged in the name of protecting civilians, suggests a deliberate obfuscation of the facts, and an obstruction of any attempts to uncover the true cost of military intervention in Libya. Chaotic Libya Reveals the Perils of Humanitarian

Intervention February 19, In this article Peter Beaumont argues that the aftermath of the Libyan intervention discredits the practice of humanitarian intervention as it currently stands. Guardian The Contest Over Peace and Security in Africa February 6, Africa expert Alex de Waal argues that foreign powers, in particular the US, UK, and France, dominate African conflicts, and that they have eclipsed traditional conflict resolution methods, discredited domestic in the eyes of citizens across Africa. Negotiated settlements between international power brokers take precedence over local political actors, who are increasingly excluded from peace processes and as such, damage African democracies and make lasting peace a less likely outcome.

3: What does TRAP stand for in Military category?

Interventionism is a policy of non-defensive (proactive) activity undertaken by a nation-state, or other geo-political jurisdiction of a lesser or greater nature, to manipulate an economy and/or society.

These propagandists keep giving us all these different, unrelated reasons why the US and its allies should definitely totally intervene in Syria and overthrow its government. Here are a few of the things which prevent interventionism in Syria from being a sane and appropriate thing for the US and its allies to do: US-led military interventionism in modern times is literally always disastrous, literally never helpful, and literally never accomplishes what its proponents claim it will accomplish. How to be right about everything: Oppose all censorship of political speech 3. Advocate rational skepticism of any narrative that advances the agendas of western intelligence agencies â€” Caitlin Johnstone caitoz September 13, Argue against US warmongering for any length of time and you will invariably run into someone who brings up World War II. Since World War II ended in , the US has become an unrivaled superpower with such strong alliances that it is effectively a globe-spanning empire whose agendas are seldom in the broader interests of the rest of humanity. Happens every single time, without a single solitary exception. Here is a useful article featuring excerpts from the memo showing some jarring parallels between what was being planned and what happened a quarter century later. These are not conspiracy theories, these are conspiracy facts. Every violent death in Syria is the fault of the US and its allies. The narrative that there is a bad guy who that same alliance needs to protect civilians from is the exact opposite of the truth. The Syrian government is trying to restore stability to a region the US-centralized empire is solely responsible for destabilizing. A sovereign nation has every right to undo the damage that was done to it by western imperialism, and western imperialists have no right to stop it. US State Department admits Idlib is controlled by al-Qaeda in Syria al-Nusra and other extremist groups that use "chemical weapons" <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/08/11/chemical-weapons-in-syria/>: That is why everyone agreed to ban it. The Syrian government and its allies are having military victory after military victory over the occupying militias which had taken over large territories, and they have been doing so using far more effective conventional munitions. Why, after all that success, would Assad suddenly switch to using an ineffective, banned military tactic that is guaranteed to provoke western retaliation and potentially bring about his own downfall? The only possible explanation would be that Assad receives some kind of personal gratification from committing war crimes, perhaps sexual in nature, and that this bizarre, unheard of kink is so alluring to him that it would overwhelm his desire to remain in power and stay alive. Furthermore, he would have to have only discovered this strange, unique sexual fetish a few years ago, coincidentally around the same time the US and its allies decided it was time to remove him from power. We know that they are lying to us, just like they lied to us about Vietnam, Iraq, and Libya. There is no legitimate reason for any military force to be in Syria without the invitation of the Syrian government. Get out, you murderous bastards.

4: United States non-interventionism - Wikipedia

The Empire Trap looks at how modern U.S. involvement in the empire business began, how American foreign policy became increasingly tied to the sway of private financial interests, and how postwar administrations finally extricated the United States from economic interventionism, even though the government had the will and power to continue.

The Military Intervention against the Islamic State 3. Introduction Has the world of international intervention come to a turning point? Casualties and considerable material costs in combination with sobering results are said to have led to a growing uneasiness in Western societies when it comes to sending troops abroad. Against this background the hypothesis is put forward that future interventions will be harder to legitimize and are likely to differ in their character. Academia is debating this development vividly. Towards a Post-Interventionist Era? Some point at the NATO-led military campaign in Libya, which differed from earlier missions in several aspects, and argue it might herald a new type of intervention Leuprecht But there might be more change in the world of international intervention. Scholars like David Chandler argue that the Libyan case illustrates a shift towards a post-interventionist discourse. This discourse, Chandler claims, evolves around the paradigm of resilience and moves away from liberal internationalist claims of Western securing or sovereign agency towards a concern with empowering those held to be vulnerable Chandler The conflict between sovereignty and intervention becomes discursively dissolved this way. The mission, which is still running, includes airstrikes, arming and support of local ground forces and humanitarian efforts. This intervention offers the opportunity to examine whether the post-interventionist paradigm holds ground. The case has been selected for two reasons. It is the first major Western military intervention since Libya with all NATO members being involved – albeit to varying degrees. Moreover, there has been a vivid public debate, especially in the United States, regarding the issue of whether and how to intervene. These aspects make the case well suited for a further examination in order to find out if it displays post-interventionist features. The focus of the case study lies on the United States. With its unique military capabilities and leading role in NATO the country has a long history of military interventions. In the post-interventionism debate the US is a case frequently referred to. For this purpose, it gives an overview over current trends in Western security politics and societal developments that might affect the future of military campaigns. This section also draws on research about the Western discourse which is associated to intervention. The aim is to present a set of features and trends characterizing military interventions in a proclaimed post-interventionist age. In this context the paper also shortly addresses the question if the Libyan case can serve as an example for post-interventionist practice. In a second step the focus turns to the US-led military campaign against the Islamic State and the discourse associated to it. After providing some basic background information about the case, the section sets out to examine to which degree post-interventionist characteristics can be identified. In the conclusion the findings are summarized and the question whether Western society is moving towards a post-interventionist era is addressed. In doing so the author strives to contribute to the ongoing debate about the future of military intervention. This makes a further examination necessary in order to outline which developments could have led to a turning point in the practice of military intervention. First of all, however, it is important to mention that post-interventionism does not mean non-interventionism but a different type of intervention. Following the news, one can easily conclude that interventions are and probably will stay a frequent phenomenon in our globalized world. Therefore, this analysis starts from the observation, that Western military interventions in the last two decades have been increasingly confronted with financial, societal and political resistance and limitations. As a consequence of these wartime spending choices, the United States will face constraints in funding investments in personnel and diplomacy, research and development and new military initiatives, Bilmes forecasted. In times of financial crisis and austerity many European countries are in a similar situation. In the past two decades several scholars have argued that Western societies have entered a post-heroic age. He cited mainly sociological reasons for the decreasing enthusiasm for sacrifice in war. According to Luttwak, the average number of children per family has shrunken considerably in Western societies during the course of the twentieth century with the result that

parents are increasingly wary of losing their children in war. Whatever reasons are given for the emergence of this post-heroic mentality, its proponents predict that it will create issues for Western war-making capabilities. This societal development not only makes military recruiting on an individual level harder, but also leads to a decreasing willingness to accept civil or military casualties. Research suggests that this casualty sensitivity differs according to the type of conflict and depends on the national interest understood to be at stake. If democratic publics perceive wars as unnecessary or in vain, casualties create more disapproval Gelpi et al. The war in Afghanistan is perhaps the best example for disappointed expectations and disillusionment when it comes to ambitious peace- and state-building missions. While some Western politicians are still trying hard to frame the mission a success, many experts and the media are painting a much darker picture e. The slowed troop withdrawal since due to the poor security situation in the country raises the question in the public what was bought with blood and treasure. In consequence of this, the political costs and risks for decision makers to opt for an intervention far away from home have considerably increased. Defense Secretary Robert Gates bluntly put it this way in his farewell address: How will Western intervention policies look like in the future? Nevertheless, military strategists and scholars claim that we are already witnessing consequences of the presented findings. They are debating them vividly and take them as a basis to formulate hypotheses about the near future of Western military interventions. The most prominent ones are presented below. Interest Western military interventions will be more selective and more obviously oriented towards the respective national interest than those in the past. This assumption has to be treated with caution though. Size and Scope Interventions will be less ambitious than in the past. Complex and costly state-, nation- and peacebuilding missions will become rare. In times of fiscal austerity, we are likely to witness shorter interventions with limited objectives and expectations. One is the deployment of mercenaries, the personnel of private military companies PMCs , rather than regular soldiers. Another option, whose use and effects are increasingly discussed in the public as well as in academia, is the military reliance on unmanned systems, mainly drones. Most notably, however, they allow the protection of troops from above or even to substitute them and thereby to prevent losses. Additionally, the precision-guided munitions, the real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance “ supposedly “ allows for striking with enough precision to minimize or even avoid civilian casualties and unnecessary damage. Legitimation Western interventions will be harder to sell to the war-weary Western public. The political pressure to use the existing resources for domestic problems will increase at the same time. A poll of the Pew Research Centerfound the lowest public support for an active US foreign policy since , as well as a growing desire to focus away from the world stage Pew Reserach Center David Chandler argues, as presented in detail in the section 2. Other tools and strategies to minimize wartime casualties, described by Mandel, are nonlethal weapons, precision-guided munitions, and information warfare Mandel

5: Humanitarian Intervention?

This is the credibility trap that interventionists want the government to fall into every time there is an opportunity for the U.S. to interfere in another country's affairs.

Hillary Clinton is today one of the leading exponents of the idea, but so are many of the advisors around President Obama. Naked imperial ambitions tend to be recognizable for what they are. What humanitarian could object to such lofty goals? Professor Rajan Menon brings a considerable variety of skills to bear in this brief and lucid book. Despite his first class academic credentials in the field, he also writes in clear and persuasive language for the concerned general reader. Second, Menon is no theoretician: He is deeply concerned for the wellbeing of peoples and societies abroad—who are often among the primary victims of such liberal interventionism. He argues not as an isolationist but rather as an observer who has watched so many seemingly well-minded interventions turn into horror stories for the citizens involved. Where is the humanitarian vision behind such a comment? Afghanistan is still mired in conflict. The US has regularly invoked these principles in justifying its ongoing—indeed nonstop—wars over the past several decades. Yet when many genuine humanitarian crises do burst forth, as in Rwanda or in the ongoing agonies of the Congo five million dead and counting Washington has opted not to intervene because it did not perceive its immediate national interests to be threatened. In short, the selective and opportunistic character of liberal interventionism ends up giving a bad name to liberalism. Any reader of the book is eventually forced to confront a deeper question: Menon here poses the question whether, for whatever motivation, great powers can ever sufficiently master the complexity of foreign societies to truly engineer a better life in the countries we target for remodeling. And whether we can afford an enterprise that might take decades at the least. In the end we become aware of the unhealthy nature of combining broad ideals married to global power. In the case of the British Empire, and now the American, this combination readily leads to the manipulation and then corruption of those ideals—discrediting US prestige and credibility and damaging the lives of those living in troubled areas. None of this is to say that there is never room for international intervention in arenas of horrific depredations against civilian populations. But it is only when such intervention is truly international essentially UN-sanctioned and not a mere maneuver to insert NATO into another global hotspot that it can take on a measure of credibility and international respect. Otherwise it ends up perceived as a US proxy move against Russia, China, Iran, or some other adversary. Here is a cogent critique of the recent decades of US foreign policy misadventures in which our military has become the primary instrument of US policy—and justified in the name of humanitarian goals. We rarely get to hear these arguments so clearly presented.

6: A brief history of CIA interventionism in the Philippines, to : Philippines

The Roots of French Interventionism The first driving force behind French interventionism is France's image of itself as a great nation, "home of human rights," bearer and defender of universal values.

However, during the American Revolution, the Second Continental Congress debated about forming an alliance with France. It rejected non-interventionism when it was apparent that the American Revolutionary War could be won in no other manner than a military alliance with France, which Benjamin Franklin successfully negotiated in 1778. The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Jefferson said that one of the "essential principles of our government" is that of "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced that we resent injuries, or make preparations for our defense. The first significant foreign intervention by the US was the Spanish-American War, which ultimately resulted in the Philippine-American War from 1898 to 1902. The President of the United States Woodrow Wilson, after winning reelection with the slogan "He kept us out of war," was able to navigate neutrality in World War I for about three years. Early on, their historic shunning of foreign entanglements, and the presence in the US of immigrants with divided loyalties in the conflict helped maintain neutrality. Various causes compelled American entry into World War I, and Congress would vote to declare war on Germany; [7] this would involve the nation on the side of the Triple Entente, but only as an "associated power" fighting the same enemy, not one officially allied with them. While this American proclamation was less triumphalist than the aims of some of its allies, it did propose in the final point, that a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. After the war, Wilson traveled to Europe and stayed for months to labor on the post-war treaty; no president had previously enjoined such sojourn outside of the country. Isolationism Between the World Wars[edit] Further information: A group of Senators known as the Irreconcilables, identifying with both William Borah and Henry Cabot Lodge, had great objections regarding the clauses of the treaty which compelled America to come to the defense of other nations. Lodge, echoing Wilson, issued 14 Reservations regarding the treaty; among them, the second argued that America would sign only with the understanding that: Nothing compels the United States to ensure border contiguity or political independence of any nation, to interfere in foreign domestic disputes regardless of their status in the League, or to command troops or ships without Congressional declaration of war. The economic depression that ensued after the Crash of 1929, also continued to abet non-intervention. The attention of the country focused mostly on addressing the problems of the national economy. The rise of aggressive expansionism policies by Fascist Italy and the Empire of Japan led to conflicts such as the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. These events led to ineffectual condemnations by the League of Nations. Official American response was muted. America also did not take sides in the brutal Spanish Civil War. Between 1935 and 1939, much to the dismay of President Roosevelt, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts. For example, in the final Neutrality Act, Americans could not sail on ships flying the flag of a belligerent nation or trade arms with warring nations. Such activities had played a role in American entrance into World War I. In an address to the American People two days later, President Roosevelt assured the nation that he would do all he could to keep them out of war. He also cautioned the American people to not let their wish to avoid war at all costs supersede the security of the nation. The basic principle of the interventionist argument was fear of German invasion. By the summer of 1940, France suffered a stunning defeat by Germans, and Britain was the only democratic enemy of Germany. Writer Archibald MacLeish asked, "How could we sit back as spectators of a war against ourselves? Although a minority, they

were well organized, and had a powerful presence in Congress. Of the 20 counties in which his share declined by 35 points or more, 19 were largely German-speaking. Of the 35 counties in which his share declined by 25 to 34 points, German was the largest or second-largest original nationality in This policy shift, driven by the President, came in two phases. The first came in with the passage of the Fourth Neutrality Act, which permitted the United States to trade arms with belligerent nations, as long as these nations came to America to retrieve the arms, and pay for them in cash. Historian George Fujii, citing the Taft papers, argues: Taft fought a mostly losing battle to reduce government expenditures and to curtail or prevent foreign aid measures such as the British loan of and the Marshall Plan. He feared that these measures would "destroy the freedom of the individual, freedom of States and local communities, freedom of the farmer to run his own farm and the workman to do his own job" p. According to his biographer James T. The only question is the degree to which we shall take action throughout the entire world. But the United States had limited funds and problems at home and must therefore curb its commitments Differences over collective security in the G. His whole effort proved unsuccessful, largely because by spring the internationalist camp had a formidable candidate of its own in Dwight D. These approaches are similar in that they all invoked the mantle of " realism " and pursued foreign policy goals designed to promote national interests. Conservatives, however, were the only group that was "realist" in the academic sense in that they defined the national interest narrowly, strove for balances of power internationally, viewed international relations as amoral, and especially valued sovereignty. By contrast, neoconservatives based their foreign policy on nationalism , and isolationists sought to minimize any involvement in foreign affairs and raise new barriers to immigration. Supporters of non-interventionism[edit].

7: 56 U.S Military Interventions in Latin America : ChapoTrapHouse

22 meanings of TRAP acronym and TRAP abbreviation. Get the Military definition of TRAP by All Acronyms dictionary. Top Definition: Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel In Military dictionary category.

No one in America, Britain, France or Israel is yet to suggest what is the goal of such an attack. What are the military initiatives? But the most crucial question is what could be the positive outcome of such a military assault? It seems as if in a relatively short time, the American administration has managed to fall into every possible trap. It is now affiliated as well as conflicting with Al-Qaeda assuming there is such a thing, Wahhabi war-mongers, Salafi terrorists, the Muslim Brotherhood and their enemies – the Arab seculars and nationalist revolutionary forces. America has tried to appease them all, but it obviously failed in every possible front. Dropping bombs on Syria is not going to provide the goods either. Can an American leader think for himself? Can an American leader think for America? Can an American leader think at all, or is he or her just reacting to Lobby pressure? I guess that no super power can maintain its hegemony under such circumstances. Accordingly, America, in its attempt to appease many conflicting lobbies, conveys a growing hesitance that has led into political impotence and a diplomatic standstill. I guess that the meaning of it all is pretty devastating: Western democracies are becoming lethal instruments easily manipulated by foreign interests and ethnic lobbies. We are basically taken into wars by our elected politicians, because some other people expect us to do so. Yet when our leaders launch criminal wars they actually incriminate not just themselves, but each and every one of us. The meaning of it is simple: Obama and Cameron should present the exact reasoning that led them to decide upon a military action. They should present a smoking gun that links Assad to the chemical attack on his people. It is not enough for us to learn that the White House has managed to convince itself that Assad is a war criminal. I guess the fact that Bush and Blair have never been brought to The Hague has something to do with our leaders dismissal of international law. Yesterday evening, when it looked as if an American attack on Syria was imminent and just a matter of hours away, Britain managed to save the situation – it gave president Obama a rope, it allowed him a bit more time to reconsider his action. Someone in Britain must have realised that launching a war while the UN team is still investigating, would be hard if not impossible to justify afterwards. Clearly, the timing of the British decision to postpone the attack was crucial, yet, in order to save our civilization, we must form the necessary political instruments that would prevent our politicians from dragging us into foreign conflicts and world wars against our will and without our consent.

8: 4 Reasons Why US Military Interventionism In Syria Is Crazy And Stupid | The Iranian

2 The latest military intervention has returned to Iraq the powers who led the invasion in and the occupation that followed. This will do nothing to solve the problems of the region. This will do nothing to solve the problems of the region.

From debates over joining the League of Nations to intervention in Europe, Americans have found odd comfort in siding with one of these two camps. The isolationists wanted to avoid being mired in foreign intrigues, wars, and crises. The internationalists argued that without involvement, the world would evolve in ways that lacked US influence and thus threatened its national security. On December 7, 1917, the internationalists won the debate. The problem was that the friction was not between true isolationists and internationalists. The fact was, there were no genuine isolationists. The debate was actually between two internationalist strategies. The clash between these two camps has been ongoing since the founding of the United States. It is an issue that is simmering towards a boil again today. During the 19th century, this debate centered on the best way to handle Europe. One side argued that the US had to play a role in shaping Europe. The counterargument—dubbed isolationism—was that trying to shape Europe was a trap. The Europeans had been engaged in an endless struggle. It should be noted that the so-called isolationists did not, in general, object to US involvement in China. The US sent gunboats to patrol its rivers, gave military aid to China, and permitted American airmen to volunteer to assist the Chinese. The story was different for Europe. There was no desire for US engagement. This reflected the reality that the US Army was extremely small, but was the largest force it could field. If deployed, it would be readily overwhelmed by German forces. So, the internationalists wanted to involve the US in Europe and, to a lesser extent, in China. The isolationists pressed to avoid involvement in Europe and for limited action against Japan. This was not, however, a struggle between isolationists and internationalists. This was a contest between competing internationalist strategies that both supported some degree of foreign engagement. Yet, the American Revolution was won only because the colonies used extensive diplomacy and alliance building. The French, at first, provided some covert supplies to the US during the revolution. France would later make a large-scale commitment to the US because it wanted the British defeated in North America. Jefferson himself had been deeply involved in the first US foreign policy crisis after the French Revolution in 1793. France had formed a republic and, therefore, had a moral bond with the American republic. Britain also controlled the North Atlantic and could blockade American ships, strangling the American economy. The US had to choose between alignment with Britain and its old ally, France. The US chose Britain. When faced with a choice between reality and morality, the US chose to protect its own interests. George Washington summed up the ideal American strategy in his Farewell Address: The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Washington feared European controversies. The priority for the US was commercial relations, avoiding politics as much as possible. The US, he argued, had formed some alliances that must be honored, but there should be no more. When his address is read carefully, it is clear that Washington was not promoting isolation. That was impossible given US commercial interests. Rather, he was calling for a minimal level of political engagement. That level will vary over time and is not a fixed point. But Washington believed that the US should pay the lowest price possible to protect its commercial relations. They expected war and assumed it would resemble the extended bloodbath of World War I. The internationalists supported some means of containing Germany. The British could not stabilize France, and it was doubtful that any military force the US would deploy could do so. The isolationist strategy was to allow France and Britain to block Germany. If that failed, then accept a German-dominated Europe. The internationalist position was that if Germany conquered

the Continent, Britain would have to capitulate to Germany. The internationalist position was to aid Britain after the fall of France. The isolationists objected, saying the war was over. The critical point is not that there were two competing moral principles regarding US behavior, but two competing strategic concepts. One was proved wrong under the circumstances, but neither was absurd. Had France not collapsed in six weeks, the isolationist strategy might have proved sound. Nevertheless, the US adopted the position that maximum involvement was optimal. The internationalist position turned from a strategy into an existential stance. The US must be involved in the world. Fortunately, it was the right strategy for confronting the Soviet Union. Here, the strategy was containment, which required an extensive network of alliances, a constant deployment of troops, and massive economic involvement. Except for a direct assault on Soviet forces—a military impossibility—it was the only viable strategy, and it worked. From this emerged a lesson. Isolationism had failed, and internationalism was the only doctrine possible. In the post-Cold War world, it was accepted that the US had to be deeply involved in global affairs. There was no strategy beyond the principle of involvement. Given that the US was the only global power, it was assumed that it had an inherent interest in managing global affairs. Inevitably, the idea that everything was an American responsibility was countered with the idea that nothing was in the American interest. It necessarily proceeds to a strategic argument. One side is committed to maintaining the institutions created to fight the Cold War. The supporting argument is that these were successful in the Cold War, and they remain a useful platform for broad US engagement in the Eastern Hemisphere. The counterargument is that the Cold War was a contest with a peer power, the Soviet Union. Today, no peer power threatens American interests. Therefore, the Cold War structures are irrelevant and too expensive. More important, they are no longer designed to deal with anything that is essential to the US. That effort is no longer needed. What is needed is to clearly identify American interests and relationships, and forces tailored to those needs. Everything cannot be an American duty, since American resources are limited. Involvement in affairs not central to American interests strain the treasury, and cause wars that can neither be won nor abandoned. I am not arguing which is the more persuasive view. There is, perhaps, even a third option. But to label as isolationist a view that argues for a shift in prior US policy is in error. Washington did not have an expansive view of US involvement. He had a realistic view, seeing that the US had minimal resources at the time. His doctrine was to limit American involvement to what was necessary. There are those who now argue that maintaining Cold War relationships when there is no Cold War is irrational. Others argue that these institutions are flexible enough to deal with multiple events, all of them requiring American involvement for the American interest. This is a necessary strategic discussion that must be had now. I will discuss my own view on this in the coming weeks. However, the strategic discussion is impossible until the concepts of internationalism and isolationism are clarified. Otherwise, the two concepts, particularly isolationism, will be used to end the discussion. Only then can we define what the American strategy should be—and, more important, how to define American interests—under current circumstances.

9: Trump's Continuation of US Interventionism - Consortiumnews

The neocons are furious with Republican frontrunner Donald Trump. He refuses to call for military interventionism like all the other Republican candidates (with the exception of Rand Paul, who is now out of the race) and says Iraq and Libya are a mess because of American foreign policy.

President Trump outside the Department of Defense on July 20, In , Hoh resigned his position with the State Department in Afghanistan in protest of the escalation of the Afghan War by the Obama administration. He previously had been in Iraq with a State Department team and with the U. He is a senior fellow with the Center of International Policy. Your thoughts after over 16 years of a US-waged war there? It has been eight years now since I resigned. If you had told me back then that this level of tragedy would still be continuing eight years on, there is no way I would have believed you. It was just revealed by the Pentagon that in the last six months, American and Afghan commandos have conducted more than 2, raids in Afghanistan. This has happened over 2, times in Afghanistan in the last six months! In addition to that, we have seen an escalation in air strikes, both from drones and from manned aircraft, in Afghanistan and throughout the Muslim world. These poor suffering people are no closer to seeing an end to this horrific violence. Money continues to pour in to support the war, people continue to get rich off the war, the opium trade continues to expand. Dropping the mother of all bombs was really the first indication of what war policy was going to look like under Trump. Under Obama and under Bush, there was a political victory sought. As immoral and misguided as the military aims were, there was a political end stated. They encouraged elections, they assisted in development, they were involved in a process of reconciliation. Under the Trump administration, there is no political end state. People who were concerned about there being so many generals in the White House were concerned for a reason. You have military operations now conducted simply for military purposes. This new bomb is a great example of that. They lied that it was used to go after a tunnel complex. It was above ground and turns the entire area into one huge flash. It is useless against tunnels. The dropping of this bomb was meant to punish the people there because, a week prior, an American service member had been killed in that area. This policy of terror and punishment is in common with other wars which America is leading in the region. Our policy has become to terrorize people into subjugation. And this ties into what Trump said on the campaign trail. The photograph released by the White House of President Trump meeting with his advisers at his estate in Mar-a-Lago on April 6, , regarding his decision to launch missile strikes against Syria. President Trump gave his big speech yesterday [Monday, Dec. What is your take on what was said? Its purpose was to reaffirm to his domestic political base that he is the man to lead a policy of American exceptionalism. This is the belief that American moral superiority is needed to keep the world in order. I always tell people, if you want the details, go to the budget. Just as in previous administrations, there is a preoccupation with China. That is meant for an adversary like China. The Air Force refuses to even reveal the price tag of its new nuclear bomber. Our nuclear weapons program will get a trillion dollar shot in the arm to modernize over the next thirty years. Is it more dangerous now because Trump is a little more volatile and dangerous and might want to create a distraction from his troubles at home? The previous administration did nothing to hold the torturers accountable. This makes it easier for a Donald Trump to proclaim that torture is back. In the case of the Pacific Pivot, we are ringing China with military bases, strike aircraft and naval ships that would demolish anything that China has, despite the fact that they have expanded their military forces over the last couple decades. A modern conventional war with China would last a week at the outside. Obama did a lot to heighten those tensions. For centuries, the Chinese have had to deal with colonization and the imperialist ambitions of various powers. A hundred years ago, the American Navy was present on Chinese rivers! What we are seeing now is really an extension of gunboat diplomacy. So when, today, the Chinese hear of American plans to build new aircraft carriers and bombers and nuclear cruise missiles, and know that this is geared toward them, it is not difficult to predict how they are going to react. I think Trump truly believes that, through our weapon superiority and our violence, we can be a great nation again. What if his son does get indicted which is probably what he deserves? Will he do something to distract from that? Clinton did something similar to

distract attention from the Monica Lewinsky affair. It is not uncommon for politicians to get the media and the public to focus elsewhere. But the fact that Trump has these generals on his cabinet who are driven by their military mindset and tend not to have the political concerns that civilians have, makes this administration more dangerous than the previous two. First of all, if the Russian intelligence services were not trying to hack into the DNC and RNC computers in order to understand our election system, as well as everything else about us, then the head of Russian intelligence should be fired. This is what intelligence services do. However, evidence of this has not been presented to the American public, other than assertions from the intelligence community, whose chief function is to lie. This is what was doctored under the Bush administration to allow for the war in Iraq. But we also saw it with the national intelligence estimate, which said that the Iranians had not been doing anything with their nuclear weapons program since So, within the intelligence community, they do have a process that would substantiate these claims of Russian interference in our elections but that process has not been utilized. Voices from a Hidden Classroom. You can access the audio archives at www.

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