INTRODUCTION TO A HERMENEUTICS OF THE OCCULT TRENT EGLIN pdf

1: Hermeneutic circle | Revolvy

First published in , this collection of essays brings together ethnomethodological studies from key academics of the discipline, including the renowned scholar Harold Garfinkel who established and developed the field.

Hermeneutic circle Save The hermeneutic circle German: Neither the whole text nor any individual part can be understood without reference to one another, and hence, it is a circle. However, this circular character of interpretation does not make it impossible to interpret a text; rather, it stresses that the meaning of a text must be found within its cultural, historical, and literary context. Understanding involved repeated circular movements between the parts and the whole. Hence the idea of an interpretive or hermeneutic circle. Thus, as we are reading this sentence, you are analysing single words as the text unfolds, but you are also weighing the meaning of each word against our changing sense of the overall meaning of the sentence you are reading, or perhaps misunderstanding, or maybe this sentence is reminding you of, or clashing with, another view about interpretation you have, in the past, advocated or disparaged. Wilhelm Dilthey used the example of understanding a sentence as an example of the circular course of hermeneutic understanding. He particularly stressed that meaning and meaningfulness were always contextual. Thus the meaning of any sentence cannot be fully interpreted unless we know the historical circumstances of its utterance. And this means that interpretation is always linked to the situation of the interpreter, because one can only construct a history from the particular set of circumstances in which one currently exists. So understanding was developed on the basis of "fore-structures" of understanding, that allow external phenomena to be interpreted in a preliminary way. This is neither a makeshift or a defect. To enter upon the path is the strength of thought, to continue on it is the feast of thought, assuming thinking is a craft. Not only is the main step from work to art a circle like the step from art to work, but every separate step that we attempt circles this circle. In order to discover the nature of the art that really prevails in the work, let us go to the actual work and ask the work what and how it is. Neither of these concepts is independent of the other, yet neither can be reduced to the other: Heidegger suggests we have to look beyond both. While Heidegger saw the hermeneutic process as cycles of self-reference that situated our understanding in a priori prejudices, Gadamer reconceptualized the hermeneutic circle as an iterative process through which a new understanding of a whole reality is developed by means of exploring the detail of existence. Gadamer viewed understanding as linguistically mediated, through conversations with others in which reality is explored and an agreement is reached that represents a new understanding. De Man points out that the "textual unity" New Criticism locates in a given work has only a "semi-circularity" and that the hermeneutic circle is completed in "the act of interpreting the text. Not only do they believe one can only know the world through the words one uses to describe it, but also that "whenever people try to establish a certain reading of a text or expression, they allege other readings as the ground for their reading". No concept can therefore have an ultimate, unequivocal meaning". Shklar points out the ambiguity in the meaning and function of the "circle" as a metaphor for understanding. Only the Bible really meets these conditions. It is the only possibly wholly self-sufficient text. Finally, she warns that, at least in social science, interpretation is not a substitute for explanation. While it does imply presuppositions, it does not take any premise for granted.

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2: Harold Garfinkel / edited by Michael Lynch & Wes Sharrock - Details - Trove

On the margin of the visible: sociology, the esoteric, and the occult. Introduction to a Hermeneutics of the occult: alchemy / Trent Eglin. Introduction to a.

Or rather, he found new worldsâ€”two of them. The other was epistemological: The significance of these worlds was precisely that they were found, in the objective nature of their truth, rather than made. Discovery meant liberation from superstition and a positive encounter with decisive facts. The result was Jefferson, Lavoisier, Kantâ€"in a word, Enlightenment. Invention, as opposed to discovery, is now the academic leitmotif of the early-modern. Far from merely finding new aspects of the world as it wasâ€"it is now arguedâ€"the expansionist Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made its new worlds, in many aspects, as these have come to be. This is not only a trite observation about modernity and innovation. It is historicized skepticism about innovation in modernity. For the story of wondrous finding, as a model for what basically happened during the early-modern period, can be treated as both analytically suspect and ethically turpid. The resulting turn from discovery to invention, as a ruling trope for early-modern studies, owes much to phenomenological critique, even more to a Foucauldian notion of social construction; and is consistent with a broad current of postmodernist revisionism. The discovery of America, the anatomization of sexuality, and the empiricization of natural philosophy are just a few of the traditionally early-modern alleged objectivities that have been reconsidered in this way. Yet it brings with it several dangers. For one thing, the analytic turn from discovery to inventionâ€"from objective finding, to cultural makingâ€"tends to be presented as an interesting peripeteia or reversal of fortune. In other words, it is supposed to matter, more-or-less by definition, if discovery turns out to be invention: This mattering, however, runs the risk of reifying the starting-position that the analysis was supposed to reduce: If the significance of early-modern invention is primarily that it results from deconstructing discovery, then it is discovery, and not invention, that grounds a claim on our interest. So it is with any peripeteia. Reversal of fortune depends upon, and re-projects as normative, that fortune. Ending the age of discovery, perhaps, is not quite as easy as it seems. For another thing, early-modern European culture, as we know, did not even assume a stable distinction between invention and discovery, making and finding. This point is usually presented as a classicizing rhetorical one, on a semantic basis: Latin invenire means "to find," and in Renaissance rhetoric the first step is "invention," which means finding something to sayâ€"often, and indeed preferably, in a pre-existing and model text. In this respect, the old "age of discovery" model imposed an anachronistic discretion, from an Enlightenment perspective, on a highly synthetic and untidy early-modern category. Yet the new "age of invention" model runs the risk of re-imposing that discretion, just from the other way around. To place invention over discovery, as much as to place discovery over invention, is still to be dealing with opposing terms. But it is not clear that the early-modern period dealt with them in that way. At the same timeâ€"and this, perhaps, we do not quite knowâ€"the Enlightenment got its idea of early-modern discovery from at least some aspects and motifs of the preceding period. It is possible to observe a diachronic process via which various departments of Renaissance culture, following motivations of their own, pried the idea of invention apart from the idea of discovery, and subordinated the former to the latterâ€"historically, epistemologically, and hermeneutically. For us postmoderns, thinking outside that legacy is likely to be difficult. Yet thinking about it, by that very token, becomes an urgent task. It may be that discovery, precisely as a period invention, remains the category we need to focus on, if we are to understand early-modern geopolitical and epistemological developments. The invention of discovery, in sum, may be the aboriginal version of all the "inventions" that have filled postmodern scholarship on the early-modern. From Translation to Empire Consider humanism. The translatio of classical letters, beginning in the fourteenth century, but extending well into the seventeenth, entailed the recovery of classical texts. This entailed, in turn, journeys to and excavations within far-flung and neglected libraries. Yet classical materials had not languished in these monastic collections just because people had not managed to find them. They had languished, rather, because people had, for the most part, not bothered to look. The potential discovery of classical originals had simply not occurred, at least not in a systematic or paradigmatic way, to a medieval culture that was frequently satisfied with the colorful misprisions of its own redactions. Petrarch, one of the pioneers of the philological safari, nonetheless placed its signature activity very low on the intellectual totem pole. Rather, it is the learned expert, recognizing the coin or text in its ancient and ongoing meaning, who is laudable. Protestantism, in the sixteenth century, brought the secular trope into the sacred realm. Here, philology ad fontes came to mean 1 recovery of the Bible from beneath the accretions of ecclesiastical authority and patristic representation; and 2 recovery of Biblical intensions, in their original languages, from beneath the interpretations of canonical Latin i. The latter move was then supposed to support the former, as the intensions of scripture could be universally vernacularized through new and, in principle, hermeneutically transparent translations. This is notjust a base or wicked refusal of a common-sense procedureâ€”the procedure of discovery. Rather, the Tridentine position is a principled rejection of discovery, based on an alternative philology. Protestantism, a controversial to say the least innovation of the period, was controversial in part because of its countervailing commitment to the discovery-trope. At the same time, as with humanism, we find a tension or confusion on this point within Protestantism itself. Philologically, the Reformers Tyndale, Luther, Calvin are zealous discoverers: By that very token, however, that is where they wish to stop. Absent any good reason to depart from the literal or self-evident sense of scriptureâ€”if it is neither incoherent on its face, nor impeding the glory of Godâ€”Protestant authorities are loath to do so. Luther, for example, in his exegesis of Genesis 3: Therefore, Luther concludes, as a matter of zoological fact, that snakes eat dirt. Protestantism does not provide a model of hermeneutics based on the signature trope of humanist philology. Literalism admitting the established exceptions , the hermeneutic accompaniment of Protestant philology, finds its scientific analog only in observation-reports: The characteristic and transformative claim of the new science, however, is precisely that what was seen is no more than an index to what is true. Metals, for example, may seem like sui generis substances; but laboratory practice shows that they can best be explained as secondary functions of largely unobservable, and genuinely substantial, corpuscles. Similarly, a drop of water, though evidently lifeless, can be made to reveal a teeming micro-world. Even more startlinglyâ€”and far more radically than the hypothetical epicycles of Ptolemaic astronomyâ€”geocentric impressions can be reduced to heliocentric facts. The last two examples, admittedly, involve technological innovations the microscope and telescope that consist in nothing other than an augmentation of observation. That is to say, however, that the new-scientific trope of discovery, unlike its humanist and Protestant antecedents, does not stop at the clear determination of its data-set. Rather, the same process that brought the investigator to the dataâ€”the process of discoveryâ€”must be repeated upon and within the data, in order to find out its true meaning. The topic of nature, to adopt the ubiquitous period metaphor, must first of all be discovered; but then it must submit to further discovery of its intelligible structureâ€”its sense, in semantic terms. The meaning of evidence, as a standing rule or expectation of scientific practice, must be recovered from within, and even against, its initial presentation. The way things seem, even on close observation, is no better than an occluded guide to the way they truly are. Of course, the way things truly are, insofar as it can be grasped or known, must then be protected from further interpretative penetration, lest scientific factuality produce infinite regress. That is to say, however, that scientific hermeneutics leads to a conception of factuality that must exempt itself from its own generative procedures. It is striking that two giants of the new science, Galileo and Newton, when they involve themselves in what we would now consider a non-scientific area of interpretative activityâ€”Biblical scholarshipâ€”insist 1 on highly allegorical or at least non-literal readings of crucial passages or issues scriptural geocentrism, for Galileo; Trinitarianism, for Newton , even as they insist 2 on the absolute and literal factuality of the very non-evident, even paranoid, readings they thereby achieve. Both its productivity, and its instability, are derived from a theoretical and methodological alignment, if not isomorphism, between valid data-interpretation and the penetration of evidentiary appearances. We can call this general conception an hermeneutics of discovery1 It cannot be assumed for pre-scientific natural philosophy. After all, Renaissance scholasticism tended to place the recondite core of a natural phenomenonâ€"its substantial form, or essential beingâ€"beyond empirical discovery. It did so, however, precisely by conceiving of essences as engines of their own spontaneous manifestation. The Ficinian cosmologist Patrizi, as Kepler complained, rejected both chief world systems the Copernican and the Ptolemaic , not because he had a better one, but because he rejected the necessity of any. For Patrizi, the erratic and supposedly puzzling planets "move amongst the fixed stars â€¦ exactly as they appear to. And what, in the end, is the argument for such penetration? It is power and convenience. Practical and political motivations, as Bacon himself explicitly recognized, underwrote the allegedly transcendent standards of emergent science. This point has been reinforced, in recent years, from the somewhat surprising quarter of scholarship on the Iberian empires. Anglocentric narratives of the scientific revolution have tended to marginalize Spanish and Portuguese contributions, limiting them to a retrograde and intellectually tawdry militarism. It is now apparent, however, that the project of imperial conquest prompted Iberian adventurers to anticipate British technological innovations, in some cases, by centuries. Rather, it emanated from, and was validated by, the conquests, as the method by which power had been obtained, and therefore was called knowledge. Obviously, the above sketch, necessarily both selective and generalizing, cannot establish that the early-modern period invented the hermeneutics of discovery. It can, however, open up that possibility as a question or hypothesis. Under the latter, early-modern science emerges as a crucial topic. Yet precisely because of the intellectual hegemony of modern natural science, critical examination of its hermeneutic origins entails wider intellectual and cultural intersections. Inventions and Discoveries This collection begins, accordingly, with a series of topics that juxtapose the new-scientific trope of discovery with some of its extra-scientific matrices. Brown argues that a journey-trope does more to construct the natural-philosophical objectivity of the new astronomy than does the more familiar trope of the scientific hunt. For hunting or searching is teleological, to the extent that one has to know what one is looking for. But journeying can be accidental: Yet this construction depends on an almost ludic randomness that is in tension with the strict objectivity that it is supposed to support. Brown has illuminated a paradox in the relationship between the new-scientific astronomy and its data: Steven Matthews, in the following topic, asks how and why new-scientific discovery itself came to be discovered, at least insofar as Sir Francis Bacon was concerned. This gave Bacon the original of his method of negative instances, canonized today as "eliminative induction. Baconian science emerges by appropriating and displacing Pseudo-Dionysian contemplation of the celestial hierarchies. The effect is not to deconstruct Baconian discovery, subversively or reductively, but to show what it is in its own terms: Booth approaches the work of the Elizabethan astronomer, mathematician, and comparative linguist Thomas Harriot through "blend-theory," a recent innovation of cognitive science. The implication of his analysis is that a binary of discovery and invention may be far too coarse a "blend" for the kinds of intellectual and period complexities that Harriot embodies. It is, rather, to recognize that neither discovery nor invention can fully map the productive terrain on which data turn to knowledge. The doctrine of occult qualities, in neo-Aristotelian scientia, is a familiar topic to students of this area.

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An Introduction On Conversation - Don H. Zimmerman The Conversation Analytic Perspective Introduction to Hermeneutics of the Occult - Trent Eglin Alchemy.

The Sufficiency of Scripture: Unfortunately, some of my documentation has been lost and some quotes are not attributed to the original authors. Some may criticize for moving forward with publishing it for that reason, but I believe that what I wrote years ago is still fresh for today and needs to be reviewed by others. For those whom I quote and have lost the proper notations, please forgive me. I have played the great game of basketball from the time I was in the fifth grade all the way through my college years. One thing that all teams, leagues, conferences and divisions had in common was a single book; the official rulebook of basketball. During any game the rules written in that book governed the competition and were binding for everyone involved whether it is the coaches, players, scorekeepers, or referees. No one involved would dare question that book for it is the final authority for all things basketball. It is also sufficient to answer any question, settle any dispute, and completely govern the game. In each game there were at least two men, sometimes three, who were to oversee each contest to make sure the rules of the rulebook, were understood and obeyed. These were the referees. Anytime there was any question concerning error or infraction concerning the rulebook these men would have the final say in deciding the answer, because these men had the rulebook memorized theoretically and ideally. In my recollection of the years I spent playing basketball there is not one time that I can point to when my opinion was allowed to make the final decision when there was a violation of the rulebook. That is because the rulebook had already decided the outcome, and the referees would simple make a declaration of the rules already established. Even some 20 years after I played my last college game it is still that rulebook that governs the game of basketball. Not much has changed. Such a battle has raged since that first question in the Garden with various waves of victory and loss of ground for those who would hold to the authority of Scripture. Along with that battle over authority must necessarily be included the question of sufficiency, for sufficiency is inextricably linked to authority. If the word of God is THE authority, then it must also be sufficient. This has been the orthodox understanding of Scripture in both the Old and New Testaments as well as in both the religion of the Jews and of the Christian Church. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss various aspects of the sufficiency of Scripture, and will do so with the presupposition that Scripture is the inspired, infallible, authoritative word spoken by God to man. However, it is my desire to discuss the issue as thoroughly as time and space allow. To use another phrase, the round peg is just what the doctor ordered; it is exactly what is needed to meet the need at hand. Draper has offered a simple, yet adequate definition and description of the sufficiency as it relates to Scripture. Just as the doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture logically leads to belief in its authority, even so the doctrine of the authority of the Bible necessitates the confidence that the Scriptures are sufficient. Christians did not arrive at the doctrine of the sufficiency of the Bible simply by way of logical reasoning; we believe that the Bible is the road map for living because it is what the Bible claims about itself. Scripture gives us every truth we need for life and godliness. Nothing else is needed to guide us in our everyday living. These definitions along with their corresponding descriptions will serve as our standard for the understanding and study of this most important subject. Part 2 â€” Recently I began a series of articles dealing with the sufficiency of Scripture. I began by giving a definition and description of sufficiency. By way of introduction I will briefly review. It refers to something being what is necessary or desirable for a specified need. Simply put, if something is sufficient it is just what the doctor ordered. Most of us would agree that the greater portion of the Church has abandoned this long-held belief in the sufficiency of Scripture. What some of us may not know is the history of how we have arrived at this place in the life of the Church. I would add to the previous statement that I am by no means alone in my understanding of the history that follows. Not withstanding the original attack upon the authority and sufficiency of Scripture in the Garden, the shift from the authority and sufficiency within the Christian Church can be seen with the first formal theory of interpretation, that of Origen A. His hermeneutic system was fashioned after that of Philo, a Jewish Platonist who adopted the allegorical method in approaching the Hebrew Scriptures. Likewise, Origin applied the allegorical method in his exegesis of Scripture. In so doing the authority of the word of God was made to be subservient to the interpreter, thereby making it insufficient in itself to direct men into proper living. His system is known as dualism, and the modification that he introduced was seen in his practice of limiting allegorical interpretations to prophetic passages, while taking other passages in their normal, literal sense. This dualistic method of allegorical interpretation once again pushed the subtle shift from the sufficiency of Scripture as it tore at the foundation of the authority of Scripture. This view of the millennium was absorbed whole by the Roman Catholic Church and their theology. This had a devastating impact upon the Roman Catholic hermeneutic method, and, therefore, to the authority and, in turn, the sufficiency of Scripture. It would not be, however, be an exaggeration to assert that the preponderance of exegetical work was allegorical. Yet, as damaging as this aspect of their system was, it was merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg. When the normal sense of Scripture is not the true or deepest meaning of Scripture, then interpretation must be left up to those who have been granted the divine right of interpretation, i. In turn, that transition of the divine right of interpretation from the individual Christian to the Church placed the individual Christian under the authority of the Church, and since the method of interpretation placed the interpreting body in control of what Scripture means the Church became the authority, Scripture lost both its authority and sufficiency, and direction for all areas of life fell under the authority of the church; the Roman Catholic Church held the sufficiency. The Bible was taken out of the hands of the average man on the street and given only to the church to dictate to the individual what was held within its pages. Although affirming the Bible as inspired revelation from God, as has already been established, the Church became the only competent interpreter of Scripture. Two major errors occurred. Therefore, the church and not Scripture, is sufficient for salvation. Secondly, they established that the guidance of the Roman Catholic Church is absolutely necessary for correct understanding of the Bible. Popes and bishops are the only competent interpreters of the Scriptures; therefore, the individual cannot grow, serve or obey without the guidance of the Catholic Church. Scripture alone is not sufficient for salvation or daily living. With the Bible taken from those who were not in authority in the church the natural progression was to drift into deep superstition and mysticism. The results were horrific in the life of the Church in general, and devastating to individuals overall. None had assurance of salvation. Many lived in fear of evil spirits, or even in fear of their own religious leaders. The Roman Church became oppressive and overbearing, and millions suffered greatly. Praise God that the history of the Church and biblical interpretation did not end there. Part 3 â€” I recently began a series of articles dealing with the sufficiency of Scripture. By way of introduction and reminder, the following is our definition: Our last discussion ended with the historical development of the Roman Catholic standard form of hermeneutic, an allegorical method of interpreting Scripture. At least one of the results prior to the Reformation was rampant superstition, which is a glaring display of the abandonment of the sufficiency of Scripture. Reformation Hermeneutics â€” By the time the Reformation came about the damage was so ingrained that even the Reformers never quite returned completely to sound biblical interpretation. Granted the hermeneutical principles established by the two most influential Reformers, Luther and Calvin , were sound and good; in practice they did not always follow their own rules. Luther rejected the allegorical method completely. But after lecturing on the Epistles of the Romans I came to have knowledge of Christ. For therein I saw that Christ is no allegory and I learned to know what Christ is. Briefly, his principles were as follows: Luther believed that the illuminating work of the Holy Spirit was of absolute necessity. Scripture is the final and supreme authority above all church authority. Literal normal interpretation is key. Luther believed that the function of all of interpretation is to find Christ. Luther believed that there must be a careful distinction held between Law and Gospel. John Calvin also established sound hermeneutical practices. Therefore, despite the great success and blessing from God that the Reformation was, its success was incomplete leaving the door open for building good doctrine on top of bad. Regardless of the progress towards sound hermeneutic principles of the Reformers the issue remained; through all the years prior to and following the Reformation the sufficiency of Scripture was and is challenged. This challenge has often been by interpreters seeking to help make Scripture plain, or by the Roman Catholic Church seeking to centralize the power of Christendom. It may be safe to say that the situation has worsened with the addition of numerous sects and cults, and the failure of conservative churches to teach the sufficiency of Scripture. The result can be seen in the current drift back to superstition, which includes the current tide of continually seeking new direct revelation from God for everyday guidance instead of simply living in obedience to His revealed word. Part 4 â€” To all who have read these recent posts I will remind that the documentation of quotes has been lost. Therefore, many of the quotes are not properly attributed to those who made them. I recently began a series of articles dealing with the sufficiency of Scripture. In the last post we examined the move toward a proper hermeneutic that was directly attributable to the great Reformers including Luther and Calvin. We also briefly discussed the fact that even they did not consistently utilize the proper procedures in their interpretation and exegesis. That is not to say that such things were not being pondered before these two events, but in the wake of them their was a noticeable expansion of such explorations. The consequences were not always positive. From Revelation to Reason â€” Shortly after the Reformation, there was a move toward what is termed Rationalism. In other words the authority and sufficiency of the human mind, reason, and the religion of humanism replaced the authority and sufficiency of Scripture. From Rationalism to Idealism â€” As influential as these two men were Francis Schaeffer believed that there were four other men who were more crucial in directing the mindset of philosophical thinking, which in turn filtered over into the overall view of the sufficiency of Scripture. For the purpose of this study the focus will be upon Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard, with the edition of Friedrich Schleiermacher, the father of liberalism. In their minds, and in truth, the humanistic ideal had failed. The upper story, which was above and beyond mere human reason, and the lower story, the realm of human thought, understanding, and the physical world. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel This was his dialectical system. For Hegel man was the consciousness of the universe, and all is ever evolving in this dialectical system.

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4: Harold Garfinkel : Michael Lynch :

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BENNFITA JULES-ROSETTE Asociate Professor of Sociology at the University of California. San Dirgo. received her B.A. () in Social Relations at Radcliffe College and her M.A. and Ph.D. () at Harvard Univenity in Social Relations. Since she has conducted a series of field studies in.

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Douglas Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations Eglin, Trent Introduction to a Hermeneutics of the Occult: Alchemy. In On the Margin of the Visible: Sociology, the Esoteric, and the Occult. Edward A. Tiryakian, ed. Pp.

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