

1: Is Islam Compatible With Democracy? | HuffPost

contrasting "Islamism" (shorthand for "Islamic fundamentalism") to what they saw as the defining characteristics of democracy, freedom, reason, and pluralism—in short, to civilization.

Societies and Associated Political Regimes" But not just any government will do. It must be one that not only commands your obedience to its laws, but one that in its very organization embodies what being free means to you. As a concept, "democracy" has not only developed many meanings since its first use by the ancient Greeks, but also meanings once well-established have changed. You may define democracy by its inherent nature and by its empirical conditions. As to its nature, Aristotle defined democracy as rule by the people Greek *demokratia*: In the ancient Greek city states and the early Roman Republic democracy meant that people participated directly in governing and making policy. This was possible because of the small populations of these cities, hardly ever more than 10,000 people, and the exclusion of women and slaves from participation. Although limited to free males, this idea of the direct participation of the people in government was the central meaning of democracy up to modern times, and now is usually known as pure or direct democracy. Many philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as Immanuel Kant and John Locke, disliked direct democracy, although otherwise they favored freedom. For one thing, it was impractical for nations of millions of people, or even for cities of hundreds of thousands. Clearly, a representative system was necessary. For another, they felt that democracy, as so understood, was mob rule, government by the ill informed who would simply use government to advantage them. They assumed that people behave to fulfill their self-interest and were generally selfish, making a direct democracy as a means to achieve justice and protect natural rights dangerous. Nonetheless, they believed strongly in the "consent of the governed," and argued for a republican form of government in which elected representatives would reflect popular will. This was a general view among the authors of the Constitution, who believed that by establishing a republic they would institutionalize the central ideas of their Declaration of Independence: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That, to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Constitutionally, therefore, the founders of the United States established a republic, not a democracy--as political philosophers then defined democracy. A republic is based on the consent and will of the people, but through a buffer of elected representatives and indirect election, as by the President and Vice President of the United States whom an electoral college elects, with the electors chosen by the voters of each state and their number depending on the number of senators and representatives each state sends to Congress. That the United States was created as a republic and that we now call it a democracy has caused considerable confusion. In the writings on my web site I refer to the United States as a democracy, and therefore have received well over a dozen e-mails informing me that it was not a democracy, but a republic. The problem is that in the Twentieth Century the understanding of democracy as the direct participation of citizens was transformed to mean any government in which the people elect their representatives. Democracy now generally means a republican or representation government. With this contemporary understanding of the term democracy, what are its characteristics. One necessary and sufficient set of characteristics involves the electoral system through which people choose their representatives and leaders, and thus give their consent to be governed and communicate their interests. The manner in which democracies conduct their elections vary from one to another, but all share these characteristics: Having a near-universal franchise is an entirely modern addition to the idea of democracy. Not long ago, governments that were called democratic excluded from the franchise all slaves and women, as did the United States through much of its history former American black, male slaves got the right to vote after the Civil War; women did not get this right until 1920, when Congress passed the Nineteenth Amendment, as well as all non-slave males who did not meet certain property or literacy requirements. We now consider it perverse to call democratic any country that so restricts the vote, as did the apartheid regime in South Africa that limited voting to minority whites. Real competition in the elections is a key requirement. Many communist nations

had all the electoral characteristics mentioned, periodically electing legislators hand picked by the Communist Party, and who simply rubber-stamped what the Party wanted. Competitive means that those running for office reflect different political beliefs and positions on the issues. If they do not, as in the communist nations, then the government is not democratic. Besides its electoral characteristics, one kind of democracy has characteristics, which while neither necessary nor sufficient for democracy to exist, are crucial to your freedom. These involve the recognition of certain human rights discussed in the previous chapter. One is the freedom to organize political groups or parties, even if they represent a small radical minority, and for the party to nominate their members to run for high office. Also there are the rights to freedom of speech, particularly the freedom of newspapers and other communication media to criticize government policies and leaders; freedom of religion; and the freedom to form unions and organize businesses. One of the most important of these rights is to a fair trial and rule by law. Above the state there must be a law that structures the government, elaborates the reciprocal rights and duties of government and the people, and which all governing officials and their policies must obey. This is a constitution, either as a single document as for the United States, or a set of documents, statutes, and traditions, as for Great Britain. If a democracy recognizes these rights, we call it a liberal democracy. If it does not, if it has only the electoral characteristics, but suppresses freedom of speech, leaders put themselves above the law, representatives make and vote on policies in secret, then we can call it a procedural, or better, an electoral democracy. For American readers particularly there is conceptual confusion over the term "liberal. It stood for an emphasis on individual liberty--on the freedom of a people versus their government. A liberal slogan of the time was "the government that governs least governs best. This emphasis on freedom from government regulation and controls we now call classical liberalism, and presently are reflected best in political philosophy of American conservatives. Libertarians also trace their philosophy back to classical liberalism, but this is true only regarding the classical liberals emphasis on economic freedom and human rights. Classical liberals, but unlike modern libertarians and liberals, believed that the government had a strong moral role. Conservatives show their affinity for this moral role by their support for laws against dope, prostitution, and gambling In modern times liberal has evolved to mean a belief that government is a tool to improve society and deal with the problems of poverty, discrimination, and monopolies, among others, and to improve public health, education, social security, the environment, and working conditions. There is no less an emphasis on human rights, a dedication which is shared by Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and modern liberals, but the liberal today no longer accepts minimum government, nor sees the government as the danger classical liberals perceived it. In "liberal" democracy, however, it is the root definition of liberal that is meant, and not its modern sense. A liberal democracy then means that a people rule themselves through periodic elections of their highest leaders in which nearly all adults can participate, for which offices they are eligible, and under the rule of law which guarantees them certain human rights. In sum, then, democracy now means a republican form of government, which may be only electorally representative in its characteristics, or also liberal. It is time for an example that well illustrates the nature and working of liberal democracy. The Clinton impeachment was a deeply divisive, partisan political battle, and most Americans developed strong opinions supporting or opposing it. After all, this was a matter of whether the nationally elected President of the United States would be fired. To begin at the beginning, Clinton was born in Hope, Arkansas, in , a few months after his father died. When he was two years old, he lived with his grandparents in Hope while his mother studied nursing in New Orleans. Two years later his mother married a car salesman, and Clinton joined the new family. His stepfather was hardly a good role model for the young boy: While Clinton was fourteen, he joined a youth program to learn about government, and as a delegate was part of a group that went to Washington, D. While there, President John F. Kennedy invited the group to meet with him in the White House. This was an unforgettable experience for teenage Clinton, who was very much impressed by Kennedy. He even shook his hand; more important for the future was the fact that the experience decided young Clinton on politics as a profession and sparked his ambition to be president. Clinton was an excellent student, and much involved in student politics. He completed high school, got a degree in international affairs from Georgetown University in Washington, D. During this whole period, from the time he attended Georgetown to getting his law degree, he tried to learn

politics firsthand. He also took part in demonstrations against the Vietnam War. One is that his humble beginnings did not prevent him from actually meeting and shaking hands with the President of the United States--not only the highest office of the country, but also the most powerful in the world. In addition, without fear of retribution or any negative consequences, he was also able to help Senator McGovern wage his election campaign to defeat that of the incumbent, President Richard M. Most revealing about liberal democracy, Clinton felt free to join public demonstrations, even in England, against a war his country was conducting. As exemplified in the first chapter by Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, and China, in many parts of the world this could get you arrested, tortured, and even executed by the regime on your return to your country, as well as it retaliating against your family and even killing them. In some other countries, this would cause your harassment by authorities, and possibly the end of any possibility of future political office. But living in a liberal democracy, Clinton had nothing to fear from a secret police. He could learn the art of politics from personal experience and prepare himself for running for political office, while also exercising his right to public protest. After receiving his law degree, Clinton worked on the staff of the U. In this year he began his formal political career by running for Congress as a Democrat, and lost. But in , he decided that he would be more successful if he worked up from a lower rung on the political ladder, and waged a successful campaign for the office of the Attorney General of Arkansas. He then used this position to run for the highest state office in , and at age thirty-two, the people of Arkansas elected him Governor. However, new Governor Clinton had yet to learn the democratic limits of this high office. Because of his reform policies, along with a tax he had imposed, Arkansans kicked him out of office in the elections. But, he had learned well how to manage democratic politics. After Clinton showed public remorse for his "mistakes" in office and after running a carefully calculated campaign , Arkansans returned him to the governorship in They also reelected him in and To Clinton this was all preparation to run for president. He had passed up the opportunity to do so in because of rumors about his womanizing, but in , he felt that he stood a good chance of being nominated by the Democratic Party. Much stronger candidates for the nomination had refused to run, believing that the huge popularity of President George Bush resulting from his victory in the Gulf War made his reelection to the presidency certain. Clinton thought, however, he could stress poor economic conditions, the "Reagan-Bush deficit," and the need for change. And to the surprise of many who did not see him as a national figure, he did win the nomination. What is also noteworthy about this election is that out of nowhere, a very rich business executive, H. Ross Perot, was able to capture public attention as an independent, even running ahead of President Bush and Governor Clinton in popularity at one point in the campaign. He finally got 19 percent of the presidential vote. Had he not made several missteps in his campaign and been politically inexperienced, he might have even won the three-way election. In liberal democratic elections, outsiders are a constant threat to established parties and candidates, as it should be when the consent of the governed rules. And you are free to exercise your judgment, no matter how biased, anywhere along the campaign trail, whether in voting for the candidates in caucuses or party conventions, or in voting for the final nominee, or in running yourself as a party nominee or an independent. Fearing a voter back lash over excessive negative campaigning, and misreading that the public already was upset by several scandals surrounding Clinton and his White House, Republicans did not capitalize on them. They also allowed the Democrats to convince the public that the Republicans had no compassion for working families, children, and the elderly. Clinton easily won reelection in with 49 percent of the vote.

2: Criticism of Islamism - Wikipedia

Islamist movements and thinkers -- The founding of the Muslim brotherhood -- Goals and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood -- The need for islamic leadership -- The primacy of the shari'a -- From Arabism to Islamism -- Islamism, democracy, and the limits of freedom -- "Impious democratic dogma" -- Representative government in Islam -- An Islamist view of the media -- Women and family life.

The two concepts are inherently incompatible with each other at their core. He stated that open expressions of atheism would be not only tolerated but also protected in the Islamic state that he envisaged. At the same time, he argued on another occasion that apostasy should be considered a political crime akin to treason. DOES the emergence of Islamism, or political Islam, as a potentially transformative force in the Arab world augur well for democratic prospects in the region? The question assumes special significance now, as political developments over the past one year have confirmed that the fall of dictatorships in Arab countries is most likely to be followed by the rise of Islamists to power. Are the core beliefs and ideological fundamentals that the Islamists stand for compatible with even the elementary concepts of democracy? Prevailing Confusions The general tendency is to conflate on the one hand Islam as a faith and Islamism as a political ideology and on the other Islamism and other streams of Islamic or Muslim perspectives that view the establishment of a sharia-based Islamic state as a favourable goal. It is noteworthy that no mainstream Islamic sect doubts the favourability of setting up an Islamic state, should the circumstances prove conducive. There is a bewildering gulf between the clearly articulated ideological positions in the core texts of all branches of Islamism and the ambiguous public posturing and tactical positions of the more dominant Islamist groups. The most important factor that complicates the study of Islamism and democracy is the fact that Islamist groups or intellectuals have so far not put forth a blueprint of their political programme or a model of the political system they envisage. Islam and Islamism It is crucially important to state that we are not discussing the compatibility between Islam and democracy. Islam as a faith and democracy as a political concept and a cultural framework are eminently compatible with each other. Many of the core values and concepts that either permeate Islamic scriptures or manifest themselves in the life of the Prophet and his companions can be fairly interpreted as being quite in line with the fundamental concepts of democracy. Shura internal consultation , justice, strictures against imposing faith, ijma consensus and ijihad independent interpretive judgment , and assertions of equality are some of those values and concepts generally marshalled to clinch the argument about Islam being democratic. In any case, Islam in its long history as a lived global faith has proved itself to be flexible or elastic enough to accommodate changing social, political and cultural patterns. It has actually coexisted with or has been subsumed within different types of political orders ranging from dictatorships and totalitarian regimes to full-fledged democracies. The question of compatibility with democracy is therefore relevant only in relation to Islamism because it is an ideology that interprets Islam as an essentially political project. An attempt at defining Islamism is fraught with problems, but a lack of clarity on this count can lead one in contradictory directions. Islamism, defined broadly, is an ideological construct based on a political reading of Islam in both its history and its textuality. It was an impassioned response to the two thriving ideologies of the early 20th century, capitalism and communism. This response rose in the context of colonialism and against the backdrop of a widespread sense of defeatism and self-pity that gripped Muslim societies. Needless to say, the Islamist zest for the capture of power reflected an unquestioning internalisation of the idea that the state represented the entire emancipatory, therapeutic and transformative potential of a society. Once you establish the kind of state that conforms to your lofty ideals, every other virtue automatically follows, as had supposedly happened in the early days of Islamic glory. In short, the most crucial invention of Islamist thinking is the notion that Islam has unfortunately, and wrongly, been internalised by its followers as a mere instrument of persuasion, to the utter exclusion of its potential as a powerful instrument of coercion. The proper and just utilisation of this coercive potential, many Islamist writings argue, will liberate Muslims from all kinds of bondage. Success in this pursuit will guarantee justice on earth and salvation in the hereafter. Therefore, Muslim groups will not be content with the establishment of an Islamic state in one area alone. Depending on

their resources, they should try to expand in all directions. On the one hand they will spread their ideology and on the other they will invite people of all nations to accept their creed, for salvation lies only in it. Islamist concept of state There are two clear concepts of an Islamist state within the Islamist discourse. One is the idea of an Islamic state articulated in a populist conciliatory idiom. Representatives of this idea do not accuse the entire civil society of kufr unbelief or jahiliyya a state of pagan ignorance and moral decadence ; nor do they dub the lands of Islam Darul Harb land of war. All the mainstream Islamist groups, it must be stated clearly, argue for a civilian ruler who derives his authority from the community. Guilain Dinoeux has noted that the strategy of the radicals follows a Leninist approach. Even within the so-called moderate camp, we often see extremely radical vestiges of the foundational doctrines of political Islam coexisting rather uncomfortably with highly refined and conciliatory ideas that are compatible with the requirements of democratic pluralism. For example, Rachid Ghannouchi, the Tunisian Islamist thinker behind the success of Al Nahda, stated categorically that open expressions of atheism would be not only tolerated but also protected in the Islamic state that he envisaged. At the celebration to mark the 33rd anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. There are two clear concepts of an Islamist state within the Islamist discourse. The so-called radicals aim at the seizure of power through revolutionary means and violence, while the moderates try to change the system from below and rely heavily on social and charitable activities in addition to political mobilisation. Another moderate, Fahmy Huweidi, the famed journalist from Egypt and fellow-traveller of Islamism, is ambivalent on the punishment meted out for apostasy in Islam. Writing in the context of the assassination of seven intellectuals in Algeria by Islamists on charges of apostasy, he tries to express his criticism against the brutality in a rather patronising tone. Rather, his criticism is that only the judiciary has the right to pass a judgment on whether or not a person has committed apostasy and the punishment for it. The learned scholar, while emphasising the legal option of death against apostasy, tries to appear benevolent in the end and says there are precedents for apostasy being either punished rather lightly or not being punished at all in the hope of eventual repentance on the part of the alleged apostate. The issue of apostasy is of utmost relevance to our present discussion because all art and literature, let alone academic and intellectual pursuits, can be brought under the scanner and judged blasphemous if the law of apostasy is given teeth. Apostasy as the Sword of Damocles The case of Dr Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid is a frightful example of what could happen to intellectual life if the state of Islamist dreams comes into being. Abu Zeid was not only declared an apostate by an Egyptian court, but his divorce from his wife was also decreed on the basis of the argument that a Muslim woman should not be married to an apostate or blasphemer. His crime was that some of the opinions he had expressed on the Quran and its interpretations ran counter to popular positions. More shockingly, the verdict was manipulated through convoluted legal procedures and on the basis of a hasba third party petition because Egypt did not have a law on apostasy. He had to flee the country with his wife and seek shelter in the Netherlands because Islamic Jihad declared its intention to murder him on the basis of the judgment. Two points need to be noted here. He did not indulge in a polemical offensive against the religion or declare himself blasphemous. Second, he declared himself to be a Muslim who had the right to express his views on the religion even if they differed from popular views on the subject. This is what he said in his defence: My worst fear is that people in Europe may consider and treat me as a critic of Islam. I treat the Quran as a nass text given by God to the Prophet Muhammad. That text is put into a human language, which is the Arabic language. This is not a crisis of thought, but a crisis of conscience. They rejected his defence, declared him an apostate and ordered him to divorce his wife. It is important to note here that one of the issues that clinched the verdict of apostasy on Abu Zeid was his criticism against the secondary status accorded to religious minorities in the Islamist discourse. This article was published before the court verdict came out and dealt with the controversy on the denial of promotion to Abu Zeid at Cairo University. In the Indian context, this statement bears frightening resemblance to many of the declarations from Sangh Parivar ideologues on many occasions, most recently during the debate on A. Huweidi says in the article: They are playing with fire at the same time, especially if they, on the basis of this mistaken understanding, open the doors to mess around with the faith and sanctities of people. He was declared an apostate by an Egyptian court, and his divorce from his wife was also decreed on the basis of the argument that a Muslim woman should not be married to an apostate.

The safety of the society, in terms of its existence, limits, territory and humanity, is an objective condition for the right to free expression, in the sense that whoever expresses a thought that occurs in his head which subverts the society, the society has to, by all means, incriminate him, outlaw him, prevent him and to restrict him. All Constitutions and laws in the world comprise rules that incriminate, outlaw and prevent transgression committed on the pretext of freedom of expression against those elements essential for the shaping of a society. Any adverse Ijtihad aimed at assaulting the religious texts and pulling down their fabric and texture will not include most definitely in freedom of expression. It will be banned and the society has to prevent and outlaw it, particularly if the Constitution stipulates Islam to be the state religion and Shariah to be the principal source of legislation. This precisely is the core issue that comes to the fore when we look at the extent to which Islamists can incorporate democratic values when they come to power. The presumption of a mandatory inviolable safe zone in the sphere of thought we are talking here not about defamation or libel but about thought is a deeply anti-democratic idea. That the whole argument was made at a time when an academic was condemned to a life of exile and declared an apostate merely for the crime of expressing his opinion is ample proof that the Islamists hardly care about free speech and democratic freedoms. Democracy and Islamism Islamist views on democracy can be classified essentially into two. Islamists of the main current are now of the near consensual opinion that the best method to bring about an Islamic state is to establish a democratic system with Islamic legislative, legal and moral content. But they make it amply clear that it does not spring from any conviction about the virtues of democracy as a whole, but because it is the best bet in the given circumstances to somehow get to power. They are clear that they adopt democracy only to the extent of procedures and institutions and not beyond its formal structures. The former can be adopted from any source regardless of its faith and communal affiliation. He accepts democracy as the best bet among the given alternatives in the absence of the Islamic system. According to him, a society ruled by a defective law is better than a society whose law is the will and whims of the tyrant. A reading of his various writings together provide a clearer idea of his approach to democracy. There is a need to distinguish the legal legitimacy of democracy from the religious legitimacy that only an Islamic system can claim. He sees the transition from dictatorship to democracy as a natural and necessary stage leading up to the eventual establishment of the Islamic order. Mohamed Imarah, the prominent Egyptian Islamist, gives a hand of support to pro-democratic voices within Islamism by saying that the Islamic concept of shura does not differ from democracy in its experiences, institutions and mechanisms. It is the hermeneutical hair-splitting on this aspect that determines the dividing line between the so-called radicals and the moderates within the Islamist bloc. The radicals are honest and straightforward on this point: When they claim the political order they envisage is democratic, they overlook two cardinal facts: Unlike other confessional systems, the Islamic state as envisaged by the Islamists derives its legitimacy primarily from its adherence to the sharia, a legal framework of divine origin. The problem with such a system is that soteriological and eschatological postulates and concerns, which are absolutist in their essence and abstract and unempirical by their very nature, underpin the entire business of governance and political activity. Therefore it is incapable of running the affairs of a polity that consist of not only a plurality of faiths and belief systems but also a large number of people who prefer to either remain outside the fold of faith or live according to their own subjective understanding of their faith, away from institutional mechanisms of religion. A confessional political party that makes soteriological and eschatological convictions the basis of its political programme is sure to turn the logic of democracy upside down because it is premised on the notion of permanent majorities. The moment a permanent majority around confessional calculations gets solidified in a democracy, it ceases to be a democracy and turns into tyranny. The following statement by a prominent Islamist scholar is sufficient to demonstrate the ethical dilemmas and undemocratic potential implicit in the Islamist idea of the state in regard to religious minorities and dissenting groups. Muhammad Asad, the Polish convert to Islam and one of the most celebrated figures of Islam in the 20th century, is candid in admitting that an Islamic state is impossible without allowing for certain amount of differentiation between the majority and the minority. The resemblance between this rhetoric and Sangh Parivar discourse on Muslims is striking! Nevertheless, in the context of modern political thought, which is strongly influenced by Western concepts and prejudices, even a theoretical discrimination on the ground of

religion might be unpalatable to many Muslims, not to mention the non-Muslims living in their midst. One must, therefore, frankly admit from the outset that without a certain amount of differentiation between Muslim and non-Muslim there can be no question of our ever having an Islamic state or states in the sense envisaged in Quran and Sunnah. One cannot escape the fact that no non-Muslim citizen "however great his personal integrity and his loyalty to the state" could, on psychological grounds, ever be supposed to work wholeheartedly for the ideological objectives of Islam; nor, in fairness, could such a demand be made of him "[T]hose who are to wield supreme authority in the Islamic state and are to be responsible for the shaping of its policies should always be Muslims; and this not merely de facto, by virtue of their majority in the country, but also de jure, by virtue of a constitutional enactment. From what preceded, it will not be unfair to conclude that Islamism in all its diversity is fundamentally incompatible with democracy" in the sense of a liberal, competitive political system that does not discriminate against certain groups and constituencies.

Conclusion Although claims of moderation and adherence to democratic values by Islamists must be taken at face value, the fact remains that Islamism and democracy are inherently incompatible with each other at their core. While Islam as a faith and lived reality and democracy as a culture and political system are compatible, Islamism as a political ideology is premised upon the total negation of all the fundamentals of pluralist democracy, most importantly the idea of equal citizenship.

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The most important factor that complicates the study of Islamism and democracy is the fact that Islamist groups or intellectuals have so far not put forth a blueprint of their political programme or a model of the political system they envisage.

Others include novelist Egyptian Salahaddin Muhsin who in the absence of an Islamic state to carry out this sentence, those who assumed that responsibility were not blameworthy. The group slaughtered entire villages, murdered foreigners, and executed Algerians for "violating Islamic law," for "infractions ranging from infidelity to wearing Western clothing. Khawarij Some Islamists principally Daesh have been condemned by other Muslims as Kharijites for their willingness to Takfir declare other Muslims to be unbelievers and kill self-professed Muslims. While Islamists often argue that they are returning to Islam unpolluted by Western Enlightenment ideas of freedom of thought and expression, early Islam also condemned extreme strictness in the form of the 7th century to the Kharijites. The Kharijites were particularly noted for their readiness to takfir self-professed Muslims. Other observers have remarked on the narrowness of Islamism, and its lack of interest in studying and making sense of the world in general. Husain complained "We sermonized about the need for Muslims to return to Islam, but many of the shabab [activists] did not know how to pray. There is neither history, since nothing new has happened except a return to the jahiliyya of pre-Islamic times, nor anthropology, since man is simply the exercise of virtue there is no depth psychology in Islam: Anything, in fact, that differentiates is seen as a menace to the unity of the community. In both cases the heroic Islamic self-sacrifice that brought Islamist insurgents to power was followed by notably un-heroic and un-virtuous governance of the victorious warriors "demanding their due" in spoils and corruption, [42] or abandon politics to "climbers, careerists, and unscrupulous businessmen. In Iran the failure is seen not just in lack of support for Islamist government, but in the decline of the Islamic revival. In the country with perhaps the strictest policy of separation of the sexes Saudi Arabia one disillusioned Islamist Ed Husain, who worked as an English teacher was startled at the attitude of Saudi Arabian men towards women. Husain complained that despite the strict Saudi policy separation of the sexes that he wished to emulate as an Islamist, he heard harrowing stories of kidnapping of women and encountered downloading of hard core pornography by his students that he never encountered in Britain or the more "secular" Syrian Republic where he also taught. In all the years I had known my wife, never had I seen her appear so dull. Yet on two occasions she was accosted by passing Saudi youths from their cars. In supermarkets I only had to be away from Faye for five minutes and Saudi men would hiss or whisper obscenities as they walked past. Wahhabism and its rigidity could easily have repelled me from Islam. It won the presidential election but within a year was overthrown and crushed by the military after massive protests by millions. Sayyid Qutb preached that Islam has been extinct for "centuries" and that it is "necessary that the Muslim community be restored to its original form," [52] and follow the example of the original companions of Muhammad Sahabah, who not only cut themselves off from any non-Islamic culture or learning "Greek, Roman, Persian, Christian or Jewish logic, art, poetry, etc. Abul Ala Maududi indicates it was the era of the Prophet and the year reign of the four "rightly guided caliphs" Rashidun. Meddeb points out the celebration of rightly guided originated a century later with Ibn Hanbal. Historical context[edit] Critics contend that this unification is not unique to Islam but to the premodern era, or at least the era around the time of Muhammad. According to Reza Aslan: This was also an era in which religion and the state were one unified entity. Your religion was your ethnicity, your culture, and your social identity. The post-Julian Roman Empire was Christian, with one "officially sanctioned and legally enforced version" of Nicene Christianity. The Sassanid Empire in Persia was Zoroastrian, again with one officially sanctioned and legally enforced version of Zoroastrianism. On the Indian subcontinent, Vaisnava kingdoms devotees of Vishnu and his incarnations fought with Savia kingdoms devotees of Shiva for territorial control. In China, Buddhist rulers fought Taoist rulers for political ascendancy. Christianity was based within the "massive and enduring" Roman Empire. The Hebrews had "ethnic bonds before becoming Jews. He lived in western Arabia, a stateless region where tribal affiliations dominated all of public life. A

tribe protected its members by threatening to take revenge for them, and it provided social bonds, economic opportunities, as well as political enfranchisement. An individual lacking tribal ties had no standing: If Muhammad was to attract tribesmen to join his movement, he had to provide them with an affiliation no less powerful than the tribe they had left behind". However, journalist and author Abdelwahab Meddeb questions this idea on the grounds that the definition of the Arabic word hukm is broader than simply "to govern", and that the ayah Maududi quoted is not about governing or government. Hukm is usually defined as to "exercise power as governing, to pronounce a sentence, to judge between two parties, to be knowledgeable in medicine, in philosophy, to be wise, prudent, of a considered judgment". Those who you adore outside of Him are nothing but names that you and your fathers have given them. God has granted them no authority. He has commanded that you adore none but Him. Such is the right religion, but most people do not know. According to Meddeb, Quranic "commentators never forget to remind us that this verse is devoted to the powerlessness of the companion deities parades that idolaters raise up next to God" [64] Islamist interpretation of Sharia [edit] Criticisms of Sharia law or orthodox historical sharia law [65] are varied and not always in agreement. Ignorance [edit] Despite the great importance Islamists gave to strict adherence to Sharia, many were not trained jurists. Islamic scholar and moderate Abou el Fadl complains that "neither Qutb nor Mawdudi were trained jurists, and their knowledge of the Islamic jurisprudential tradition was minimal. Eikmeier points out the "questionable religious credentials" of many Islamist theorists, or "Qutbists," which can be a "means to discredit them and their message": Although a devout Muslim, Hassan al Banna was a teacher and community activist. Sayyid Qutb was a literary critic. Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj was an electrician. Ayman al-Zawahiri is a physician. Osama bin Laden trained to be a businessman. According to Qutb, "The Muslim community with these characteristics vanished at the moment the laws of God [i. Sharia] became suspended on earth. The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power. No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator. If God would have willed, He would have made you a single people. Legal scholar Sadakat Kadri complains that "the supposed purists cannot even agree on which sins to repress. Saudi Arabia forces women to be veiled and forbids them to drive, while Iran allows females to show their faces behind wheels but threatens them with jail if they expose too much hair. Qutb believed that Sharia would be no problem to implement because there is "no vagueness or looseness" in its provisions. There is no need for you, after establishing a government, to sit down and draw up laws, or, like rulers who worship foreigners and are infatuated with the west, run after others to borrow their laws. Everything is ready and waiting. Olivier Roy refers to the call to enforce Sharia, as a periodic cycle of Islamic history "as old as Islam itself. It is a tendency that is forever setting the reformer, the censor, and tribunal against the corruption of the times and of sovereigns, against foreign influence, political opportunism, moral laxity, and the forgetting of sacred texts. Every government devoted to full implementation finds this an impossible assignment. Scarcely enough to form a constitution. Ignoring Maslaha [edit] A solution to this problem embraced by modernists and usually ignored by Islamists, is the inclusion of the principle that Islamic law must serve the general common good or maslaha. For those schools that place priority on the role of maslaha in Islamic thinking, Islam by definition serves the common good; therefore, if a given policy or position demonstrably does not serve the public interest it simply is "not Islam". This formulation is used by the huge Muhammadiyah movement in Indonesia, among others. Islam approves of all policy which creates good and eradicates evil even when it is not based on any revelation. That is how the Companions of the Prophet understood Islam. Abu Bakr, for example, appointed Umar to succeed him without precedent. Umar suspended the Quranically mandated punishment of hand amputation during a famine, he suspended it also when he discovered that two thieves, the employees of Hatib, were under-paid. The sayings were not written down for some generations but transmitted orally. Nonetheless these were often not essential elements "in the dissemination of a hadith

4: Islamism and democracy

They say that freedom of expression does not imply an endorsement of insulting people's religious feelings, and besides, they add, the media censor themselves every day. So, please do not teach us.

Democracy, Secularity and Religious Freedom: The terrorist attacks of the recent past that have struck France have re-opened debate over identity and the place of religion, notably Islam, in French society. This debate has led to questions about the potential for unity and cohesion of Republican values in the modern world. For its part the goal of equality refers to the issue of non-discrimination and solidarity, and also to the end of privileges and corporatism. At the same time there is the question of the place occupied by young people in our societies, including those born to immigrant families, who find it difficult to enter the job market, to win their material independence, and also to satisfy their need for an ideal, in the absence of any mobilising project. Finally, the strong public mobilisation after the Charlie Hebdo Attack shows that freedom can be a powerful driving force in terms of social bonding, if we recognise that this is not self-evident. Increasingly however, many citizens are experiencing the effective limits of this freedom; this is the case notably in the suburbs, where individual freedom is threatened by various kinds of insecurity and also fundamentalism, which is negating this liberty. Discussion goes far beyond France and has taken on a European dimension. After the terrorist attacks in several EU Member States, these events, both in France and elsewhere in Europe, have shown they can unite as they can divide. Solidarity and unity must win the day, but the fear is that these new catastrophes are heightening not only division within French society, but also in and even between other European countries; when this type of event occurs in "healthy" societies, recovery is difficult; but in societies that have been weakened by successive crises, it is even more complicated. In this context, beyond the fight to counter terrorism, via military action abroad and by police enforcement and justice at home, the present events raise at least one fundamental issue for the cohesion of society, whose unity is necessary more than ever before given the crises that are affecting it: But the debate over Islam raises multiple questions: Hence, we have to distinguish between the various registers which include: It is in this context that the relationship between the Republic, Islam and secularity has to be thought about anew. The issue at stake lies in the transformation of our national and European democracies and in the reshaping of problematic relations and divisions that form the core of liberal regimes, between public and private, universal and particular, unity and diversity, freedom and security, religious belief and the rule of Law. Over the last ten years political and intellectual debate in France on this has focused on quite clear divisions between the various elements [5]. On the one hand, there are those who believe that the Christian legacy is part of French and European identity, and who think that Islam is not compatible with the French nation - a position to be found rather on the right of the political scale; on the other - and rather more to the left - there are the defenders of the Republic and secularity, which are split between the "pessimists" for whom Islam and secularity are incompatible and the "optimists" who hope for the development of a secular Islam. Moreover, there is a Republican break-away intellectual trend emerging on the left, which deems that the source of the problem lies in the links between Islamic fundamentalism and antisemitism. It is in this context that we regularly find the political project both on the right and left that aims to revive the lacking sense of a protective, reassuring identity the failed debate over national identity and the assertion of the necessary strengthening of the sense of belonging to the Republic" [6] and of recovering the sense of belonging to the national community. However, the temptation to revive the old features of the nation, of the Republic and secularity [7] - in its "defensive" form - does not seem to be on a level with the issues in question: However, although we cannot recreate the sense of republican belonging by brandishing the words "Republic" or "secularity", national and local public action has to be guided by the need to drive home once more the practical pertinence of certain values. This is particularly the case with freedom. When children or teenagers say "I am not Charlie" or worse "I am Coulibaly", they have to made to understand what it would mean for them, in terms of freedom, if society were to be guided by fundamentalism, and for them to ask whether they would like to live in a society like that: This is also the question to be asked with other forms of radical behaviour. This is where policies of

education and training find their full meaning - at all levels - from the primary school to University, not forgetting the "colleges" [9]. When shall we see the "new Hussards of the Republic"? Secularity, religious freedom and democracy: Secularity, another "French" exception? As Dominique Schnapper wrote "We have known it for years. The hate of France and the hate of Jews has grown in certain so-called "sensitive" areas And yet the fear of stigmatising Republican Muslims - we should not forget that the massive phenomenon is that of the progressive integration of the majority of the population who are descendants of North African immigrants - and also for not having known how to counter this ill, an embarrassed, well-meaning silence has covered these facts in a veil of ignorance. Out of weakness, cowardice, out of a legitimate desire not to stigmatise all Muslims, the intellectuals keep their mouths shut, denouncing Islamophobia rather than anti-Semitism, including making accusations against "republicanism" whose rigidity and refusal to acknowledge "differences" is said to have been to blame for these recent events. It is not about covering up the fact that "although Islamism is not Islam, as we have so often and rightly repeated, it remains that it is in the name of Islam that the terrorists act with particular barbarity, and that they pretend to find justifications for their action in the holy texts" [10]. And yet, debate about the place of Islam in France seems to show that secularity must undoubtedly rise above its defensive, uniformist tradition, to acknowledge cultural and religious identity, whilst countering Islamism as a political ideology that seeks to reorganise all aspects of society against Western values: The biggest problem however is to prevent the dialectic of extremes, between opposite religious passions or between religious or secular passions, leading to an escalation in Islamophobia on the one hand, to anti-Western and anti-Jewish feelings on the other. It is important to distinguish young people in quest of identity or revenge for their poor situation or against society in general, from fanatic and murderous leaders, who kill those who do not share their view of Islam [11]. Opposition to the exercise of these freedoms can only be made on the grounds of public order. From this point of view secularity must allow individuals not to "look like each other" but to "rally together in a common, mutually respectful framework" [12] ; "French-style" secularity finds itself trapped in ambiguity. France is the only State in the Union to have included secularity in its Constitution. With this it is an original model in Europe in that other Member States have not established the separation of the Church and the State quite as strictly. However, although France is the only "secular" country in the strict sense of term, it is part of a European area of Human Rights. European law acknowledges religious freedom art. This requirement can now be accepted by all of the Member States which share a community of values: Freedom of worship and European identity The freedom of worship is one of the least questionable of the fundamental rights in the intellectual sphere of European liberal democracies [16]. Of course, the nature of relations between the Church and the State varies from one Member State to another: However, European societies distinguish themselves via their high degree of secularity except possibly for Ireland and Poland and stand apart from other Western countries such as the USA, a secular country confirmation of the separation of the Church and the State , but which allows a major place for religion in the public sphere. It is, incidentally, this difference in terms of secularity that undoubtedly allows us to see the difference in the way the media dealt with the Paris attacks in January and the caricatures on the European continent and across the Anglo-Saxon world or more precisely a share of the Anglo-Saxon world [17]. In European societies every individual is free to believe or not to believe in God; if he believes, he is free to accept the opinions and doctrines he deems to be the most appropriate; he is also free to change religion. Non-negotiable limits European history has a wealth of lessons regarding the recognition of religious pluralism and its limits. An entire tradition, directly linked to the context of the Wars of Religion - has tried to establish religions of equal dignity, asserting that the freedom of conscience of each of us must be inaccessible by the State and also the Church [18]. From this standpoint faith is a question of critical assessment and judgement; in other words, the truth cannot be separate from the quest for the truth, and in liberal democracies, religions can be subject to the critical assessment of reason. These democratic, liberal requirements make total sense in the present context and the words of Ghaleb Bencheik reflect this: Ending "religious reason" and "magical thinking", escaping the argument of authority, shifting concerns from belief towards problems of the objectivity of knowledge are of an imperious necessity and a vital requirement. We no longer need to infantilise minds and make people feel guilty. There is a huge amount of work to be done and this is a matter

of urgency; pluralism, secularity, the disentangling of politics from religion, the basic equality between being, the freedom of expression and religion, the guarantee of being able to change religion, deconsecrating violence, the rule of law are some of the vital answers and primordial antidotes that are required. Which type of behaviour is defensible and which is inadmissible in terms of belief? Political liberalism provides a clear answer to this question. The State was established to guarantee the protection of life, freedom and individual property and therefore it has a secular role to protect the temporal interests of the members of society; for its part the Churches are voluntary assemblies of men and women who gather to worship their god and by doing this, they take care of the fate of their own soul by seeking paths of salvation - in this sense the Churches exercise a spiritual role through persuasion and not coercion or force [20]. These are the circumstances in which one can exercise the freedom of worship and faith. In this context the State must allow the Churches to introduce and practice the kind of worship they want, on condition that they force no one to share it and that they do not threaten the interests - life, safety or property etc. This is the political, non-religious principle that results from the separation of the political from the religious, as two autonomous spheres, as well as the containment of religion to the private sphere and to individual opinion. In this sense secularity - in its "inclusive" and "non-defensive" acceptance, must be designed as a protection of religions against religious fanaticism: And just like militant, ideological reality, they can generate, in certain circumstances, intolerant attitudes and even fanaticism and violence. Hence the need for a type of secularity that protects us from clerical, absolutist threats that religions can pose when they want to force their normativity on their members. In the face of the morbid attraction that people have for the Islamic State-style jihad, given the terrorist risk, vigilance and mobilisation on the part of the State and society itself are necessary and legitimate. And yet this is not a reason to persist stubbornly with a defensive idea of secularity that aims to protect society from religion as if it were a fortress under siege by politico-religious fanaticism. On the contrary it is an additional reason to implement a pro-active, inclusive idea of secularity designed for religious people who are not fanatics in the main, in other words a secularity that is sufficiently self-confident to positively take on board the contributions made by the religious elements of society. This inclusive secularity seems to us to be the best rampart to counter religious fanaticism. In this sense the re-assertion of these principles that came from the Enlightenment is not an admission of weakness nor a relinquishment in the face of those who would like, in the name of religion, to impose by force the reorganisation of all aspects of European society through a total and complete rupture from the values that most citizens of European liberal democracies adhere to: These values are non-negotiable and in no way can a narrative dictate - in the name of religion - behaviour that aims to challenge them or to reduce individual freedoms that are protected by the Constitution including within the family, and in the first instance, security. Avoiding this type of trap supposes making a correct distinction between two types of challenges and implications. On the one hand, it means identifying and countering politico-religious fundamentalists who try to turn young people, in their quest for identity and the absolute, into fanatics, as well as to trigger civil war in Europe and with whom it is impossible to negotiate. Beyond the fear, the emotion and the mourning in the wake of the violence of the terrorist massacres, this supposes an understanding of the jihadist phenomenon, and its development over the past few years [22] and defining police resources including cyber-police to counter ideological propaganda on the Internet and the social networks, justice, but also defence, so that we are able to rise to challenges like this in a context in which traditional distinctions between interior and exterior, and also between the State and non-State have become entwined. On the other hand, it means organising discussion between the various elements of our societies - since of course each of the latter is different and laden with power relations - aiming for compromise and not polarisation, which would only lead to fragmentation. The difficulty lies in the fact that the challenges we face are also multi-faceted: This discussion has to take place within a framework of clearly set rules - within a framework of common principles that form the base of our constitution and the European treaties. On the basis of these common principles, formed by the core of the political liberalism of the Enlightenment, European societies must succeed in forming an agreement on the respect of these common values. These should allow each of us to defend the values we deem fundamental, possibly against the choice of the legislator, without this opposition leading to insurmountable conflict, which would divide society, and without the debate of

ideas transforming into the opposition of the national and European political systems themselves. It is precisely this type of rule which forms the base of constitutional democracy, which anticipates and provides the necessary tools to take decisions in a context of divergent preferences, without fragmenting society and undermining the foundations of the democratic system. Agreement on a common principle such as this, or on the rules of the game, must be deemed legitimate by the citizens of a political community. Tocqueville wrote "Without common ideas, there is no common action and without common action, men still exist, but there is no social body. Some explain this by the fact that the liberals do not really believe their own ideas and that they are not prepared to sacrifice themselves for them. The French and the Europeans will only be able to overcome their malaise in the face of a collective identity deficit if they are sure of their joint principles and that they are prepared to defend them: History has shown that the passion for freedom often enabled men and women to rise beyond their own limits. Filii, *Le nouveau Moyen-Orient*. Hassner, *La revanche des passions*. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of this right.

5: Democracy, Secularity and Religious Freedom: which balance is there in France and Europe?

freedom (hurriyya) and of its content and limits. It is worth noting that, unlike the secular versus Islamic state debate, freedom was a concept conspicuously present in the protests, for.

The relationship between Islam and democracy has always been a cause of debates between Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers. There is a delicate point when comparing Islam and democracy: Islam is a divine religion while democracy is a manmade way of governance. Major commonalities between an Islamic and a democratic system include: The author maintains that the above principles have been observed in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic system is, therefore, a democratic system. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran guarantees political and social rights and freedoms of citizens and enforces the principle of supervision over power as a means to prevent dictatorship. Even the Supreme Leader should be just and pious and the Assembly of Experts supervises his performance. Other powerful institutions such as the Majlis, president, and judiciary are directly or indirectly supervised by the people. Democracy is a complex concept which has been introduced by a number of thinkers and many political scholars have expanded it during past centuries. Democracy may mean many things and, therefore, may appear in different forms. The rule of people is also a vast concept and its realization needs many tools, the most important of which is elections and polls. Those philosophical and ideological themes emanate from such concepts as governance, leadership, and legitimacy while political themes are closely related to strategic aspects of the government. The main issue here is the relationship between democracy and the Islamic system which is a controversial issue preoccupying many Muslim scholars, both those who are fundamentalists and those who are inclined toward secularism. Comparison should be made between two things that are of the same type. Such subsystems are fully developed and some of them may have been already in force in various places. If we considered philosophical and theoretical concepts of democracy, not as a political practice in a special social environment, but as a tool for the establishment of government, there would be many commonalities between a democratic system and the political system of Islam. Of course, all aspects of that Islamic government would not be necessarily democratic because Islam has its own executive tools some of which conform to a democratic system and some others do not conform. However, commonalities between the two systems can be summarized as follows.

Rule of law Democratic and Islamic systems stress on the rule of law. Of course, we must not ignore differences in the origin of laws under Islamic and democratic systems. Democracy has considered principles to assure conformance of the government to the rule of law, the most important of which include existence of the constitution which guarantees mutual laws and obligations of the government and the people, separation of powers, judicial supervision, and support for personal laws and freedoms, especially political laws and freedoms. The Islamic system has tried to enforce those principles, which are based on fundamental principles of Islam. That is, the nation first formulated a constitution through electing experts. Then it voted for that constitution. The constitution has stipulated separation of powers and is a criterion for grading laws and supporting personal and social rights and freedoms. Also, needed legal institutions for protecting religious principles and the constitution have been taken into consideration.

Republicanism Islamic and democratic systems are common in that people can play their role in establishing the government and determining its content.

Separation of powers This principle is one of the most basic principles of democracy which was introduced by the famous French thinker, Montesquieu. After him, separation of powers has remained as a requisite for democratic rule and has been accepted by democratic governments. This principle has also been accepted by the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Article 57 of the Iranian constitution notes: These forces are independent of each other. The presence of a supervising power over the main branches of the Islamic system is very important and has even been recognized by advocates of democracy.

Public rights and freedoms Some viewpoints show that there are differences among political thinkers about roots of freedom and rights and laws pertaining to them. However, after a certain stage, they reach an agreement. Islam has been a forerunner in establishing such rights and freedoms and contemporary experience of the Islamic Revolution aimed to implement changes that have been considered by Islam in this regard. Articles 19 to 21 of

the Iranian constitution stress on the equality and justice; Articles pertain to political rights and freedoms, Articles 34 to 36 pertain to the right to petition, Article 29 is related to social security and Articles 46 and 47 reflect on the right to private ownership. The constitution has stipulated about political rights and freedoms as well as political and social participation that the limits of political and social freedoms are set by the law. Setting limits for political and social freedoms is a requisite for an Islamic system. Also, people should have the right to vote on various affairs of their country, and this has been realized in the Islamic Republic of Iran through election of the president, members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly Majlis, members of other assemblies and so on through public votes. Nobody can deprive humans from that God-given right or exploit it for the interests of a certain person or group and the nation shall implement its God-given right. The Iranian constitution has recognized activities by political and guild-related parties, associations, and societies; Islamic societies and religious minorities, provided that they do not harm the basic principles of independence and freedom or national unity, or Islamic tenets, and the pillars of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, nobody can be forbidden from becoming a member to such parties or forced to be a member of a specific party. Print media are free to express their positions and viewpoints as long as they do not harm Islam and the rights of other people. Freedom of protests and demonstrations: Staging rallies and demonstrations without carrying firearms would be of no objection. These are major forms of freedoms and rights that have been also recognized by democratic systems. A glance at the outcomes of civil society, apart from its philosophical themes, or the structure of Western society, which has created it, would prove that those outcomes conform to the Iranian constitution; such themes as superiority of the law and equality of people before it, existence of civil society organizations which have been established by the people in contrast to the political society, political development, freedom, social order, and so forth. Participation of the Iranian nation in the Islamic system or the role played by people in political and social life of the system is a notable point. No other concept in conventional methods of public participation can be compared to it. Here, we will bring comparative and practical examples of public participation in the Islamic Republic of Iran during the past 20 years. Less than two months after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iranians took part in a plebiscite through which Afterwards, the nation elected its representatives for the Assembly of Experts which were in charge of formulating the constitution. People have thus far elected five presidents through seven presidential polls the last of which was the ninth presidential election which amazed the world and more than 80 percent of eligible voters took part in the vote. This figure for election turnout is unparalleled, even in democratic countries. People have, thus far, taken part in five elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly Majlis. Iranians have voted three times for the election of members of the Assembly of Experts. The assembly is tasked with overseeing performance of the supreme leader, as well as appointing or dismissing him. After agreement of all people to leadership of Imam Khomeini, his successor was chosen through indirect votes. That means, people voted for members of the Assembly of Experts who in turn chose Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei as leader in During preceding months, people have chosen their representatives for local municipal councils, as one of the most important manifestations of their political participation and the election, which was a final stage in the realization of self-determination right of the nation, was in line with overall structure of the Islamic system. Widespread participation of the Iranian people in political affairs proves that the system attaches great significance to this issue and considers it a powerful backing for the government and the leader. Then the supreme leader is the pivot of the Islamic system while councils make its basis. A council is the executive arm of the system and links all other components of the Islamic system including the Majlis, the judiciary, and the executive. In fact, people assert their presence in all state bodies through central councils and implement their right to self-determination. The highest ranking examples of councils in the Islamic Republic of Iran are as follows: While political participation in democratic systems is limited to parties, the Islamic system has paved the way for all social and individual activities. At present, democratic systems are incapable of getting rid of the new form of dictatorship, which is nagging it. On the one hand, political parties use various propaganda gimmicks against their rivals and, on the other hand, their interest groups lobby with the governments and the public opinion in their favor. After gaining power, the political parties implement orders which are given to them and serve the interests of those who have supported them. They include major

economic organizations and cartels as well as multinational companies or secret political and ideological forces. However, in the political system of Islam, separation of powers has been implemented in full. The powers have been obliged to comply with Muslim jurist, on the one side, while on the other side, they are supervised by the nation. Thus, there is no room for dictatorship either by a jurist or by the president, Majlis, or judiciary. This is due to thoughtful laws that have been compiled in this regard. The constitution has set clear rules in this regard to prevent any form of dictatorship some of which are as follows: The leader should be just and pious and if he lacks those conditions, the Assembly of Experts should move to remove him. Justice is the opposite of injustice and dictatorship. The constitution has also considered a consultative arm for the leader in the form of the Expediency Council which delineates general policies of the Islamic system. These are practical examples of rules that will rule out any possibility of dictatorship by the leader. The president and the executive are supervised by the Majlis whose deputies are elected by the people. In addition, the president can be removed or disqualified through the Majlis and agreement of the leader. In addition, the leader can remove the president from his post if the Supreme Court votes for it. Ministers are also under constant oversight of the Majlis. Therefore, neither the president nor his ministers would be able to act in a dictatorial manner. The Guardian Council oversees ratifications by the Islamic Consultative Assembly and Majlis cannot approve anything without confirmation of the Guardian Council. This is a guarantee against dictatorship by the legislature. The Muslim nation is tasked with supervision over the government and other powers. The above facts prove that the Islamic system is way ahead of democratic governments in supporting the rights and freedoms of people and realizing them and this is a blessing from the Islamic system and the man who rose to provide the nation with worldly means of ensuring their welfare in the Hereafter. Perhaps emphasis put on the fact that conventional democracies are not a role model for the Islamic system is one of the most important proven methods which should be observed by any researcher of political matters. The Islamic system is totally independent in its ideological fundamentals as well as jurisprudential basics and political philosophy and the realities of the Islamic system and its divine goals attest to this. Neither opposition to democracy will damage this system in theoretical fields, nor would conforming to democracy do anything to make it stronger. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article , p. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 57, p. Fifth chapter of the Iranian constitution, p. The constitution has not relieved the president from responsibility, but has emphasized that he would be held responsible while in most imitative democratic system the head of the government king or president are not held responsible and stand above laws. In view of the Iranian constitution, Article , p. Ibid, Article 6, p. Ibid, Article 56, p.

6: Probing Question: Are there limits to freedom of speech? | Penn State University

Turkish Islamism "which had ceased to be Islamist in any real sense" showed the way to a brave new future where Islamists would agree to work within the framework of secular democracy.

Arts and Entertainment Probing Question: Are there limits to freedom of speech? Constitution declares freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion to be fundamental rights of American citizens. Flickr user euthman Probing Question: The attack prompted swift worldwide condemnation, but it has also renewed intense debate about freedom of expression. Are there limits to the right to free speech in the United States? If so, where do we draw those lines? Beyond that, we are free to speak. Charlie Hebdo is considered by many to be an inflammatory and offensive publication, particularly for its graphic cartoons lampooning religious figures such as the Prophet Muhammad. Yet the very notion of blasphemy -- defined as insulting God or any religious or holy person or thing -- varies greatly around the world. In some countries, blasphemy is not only illegal but is punishable by death. In the United States, several states have had laws against blasphemy even though such laws violate the U. Pennsylvania enacted a blasphemy law in , which was struck down by the U. District Court in . The last conviction for blasphemy in the U. Just a couple of years ago, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the Westboro Baptist Church to protest at military funerals with signs carrying extremely offensive messages. Without question, most Americans found those demonstrations to be repugnant. Nonetheless, we protect the right to protest. Satire, such as what we often see in political cartoons, is an important part of the rights of a free press. Of course, in some parts of the world, that type of expression is taken much more seriously and the cartoonists are punished. The court noted the history of political cartoons and affirmed the importance of the protection even though the cartoons can be quite stinging. The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-sided. Not all countries share our sense of protecting speech, and efforts to create a more global initiative would be difficult in this area. That support alone sends a message that many citizens of the world unite in the need for protection for free speech. The majority takes care of itself. He can be reached at rdr2 psu.

7: Islamic democracy - Wikipedia

There is not even a city with defined powers, limits, and functions, but only an assemblage of neighborhoods, mostly defined by family, tribal, ethnic, or religious criteria, and governed by.

Rahila Gupta 27 July A recent conference on freedom of expression threw up issues around relationships between ex-Muslims and reformist Muslims and the ideological confusion of their allies. Public art protest organised by Victoria Gugenheim in solidarity with persecuted freethinkers, at the conference in London. He referenced the case of Jahed Chaudhury, the first Muslim gay man in Britain to marry, who was spat at and threatened with acid attacks by Muslims. Bangash said it was disingenuous to call this Islamism when it was simply people following Islam. Could these two groups of people work together in a secular alliance or do atheists and ex-Muslims feel silenced because their critique of religion is seen as offensive by some believers? In her closing statement on this panel, Karima Bennoune, UN special rapporteur on cultural rights, emphasised that while the struggles of atheists are important, they are separate from those of secularists. Namazie said her "whole life has been bulldozed by Islam". She expressed frustration at lacking space to say that Islam offends her, for fear of offending some of her religious sisters in a secular alliance. Gita Sahgal, director of the Centre for Secular Space, argued from the floor that atheism got a raw deal in secular circles. Ex-Muslims in Muslim majority countries have had to undertake dangerous journeys to becoming visible in order to find and give support to other ex-Muslims. Ex-Muslims in the west have had access to many more potential allies. But, as many speakers reiterated, finding the right allies can be a minefield. Although talking of the American context, much of what he said applies to the UK too. Black and minority ethnic BME feminists in the west, and particularly in Britain, have never received support from those who should have been their natural allies in their struggle against religious fundamentalism, particularly Islamic fundamentalism. In a statement, Pride organisers said their community advisory board was considering whether CEMB could join the next march in He described an infamous incident when he invited Namazie to speak and her talk was repeatedly disrupted by students from the Islamic Society. They literally pulled the plug on her Powerpoint presentation when she showed cartoons of Jesus and Mo. Namazie has been disinvited from talks at a number of universities on the basis that she is an Islamaphobe a favourite tactic in shutting down criticism. At the conference, Jodie Ginsberg, CEO of Index on Censorship, said it was a tragedy that the right to free speech was increasingly associated with the right though it is too important a right for progressive people to relinquish. This position leads logically to support for ex-Muslims but this support is the kiss of death because it further alienates potential left supporters. Challenging religion should have no greater consequences than the crossfire of intellectual debate. This article is part two of a series on the Conference on Free Expression and Conscience, which took place in London in July Next, we look at the threats and risks facing defenders of free expression, in Bangladesh and beyond. About the author Rahila Gupta is a freelance journalist and writer. Her work has appeared in The Guardian and New Humanist among other papers and magazines. Her books include, Enslaved: Follow her on twitter RahilaG Related Articles.

8: Books in Review: Islam and Democracy

People often associate freedom with electoral democracy. According to Prof. Pavel Yakovlev, the freedom to vote is an inherently limited tool for fostering a free society. Although majority vote can serve as a useful tool for expressing the will of the people, it can be taken too far. Imagine a.

Samir Yousif 7 September The fall of autocratic regimes in the Arab world have led to the inevitable rise to power of Islamist groups who have had no real competition. These groups however are ill-equipped to tackle the economic, social and political problems that these countries face today. It all started in Tunisia, and is ending in Tunisia: The young revolted while the old reaped the benefits. But what has actually gone wrong? The uncontrolled, unorganized young masses went in peaceful demonstrations challenging the well-established dictator. Their demands were simple: Their demands never had a religious dimension. No one ever demanded a return to Sharia. On the contrary, the demands were secular and liberal in their nature. They demanded a real democracy, an end to corruption and a fair economic establishment. Then Islamists suddenly popped up, taking over and harvesting the fruits of the Revolution. These unexpected developments sent shock waves all over the region. Who are the Islamists and what was their origin? A prelude to democracy Michael Mandelbaum once explained the difference between Eastern Europe and the Arab countries: Many Eastern European countries had a recent liberal past to fall back on-after artificially imposed Soviet Communism was removed. And Eastern Europe also had a compelling model and magnet for free market democracy right next door: Most of the Arab Muslim world has neither, so when the iron lid of autocracy comes off they fall back, not on liberalism, but Islamism, sectarianism, tribalism, or military rule. In western Europe liberalism prevailed centuries after the defeat of the church and the spread of the revolutionary ideas of Martin Luther , John Calvin and others. That has not happened yet in the Muslim world. On the contrary, the liberal demonstrations of the young generations in search for dignity, justice and freedom took place at a time when Muslim religion in its fundamental version was not only the strongest prevailing ideology in society, but practically the only one. The political values of Islam under the principle of shura are contradictory with the values of liberal democracy and both ideologies cannot co-exist. What is required in Muslim countries is not the political reform process many have espoused, but rather a radical reform within religion itself. Modern Islamism After the First World War the political picture prevailing throughout the Middle East and the Muslim World was characterized by secular and nationalist political movements. The reaction to the defeat and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War was not only visible in Turkey with Ataturk overtaking power and turning Turkey into a modern secular state, but also throughout the Ottoman colonies, especially the Arab Middle East where the trend to move away from the Islamic Caliphate was overriding. During the period of independence from classical colonialism, religion was nearly absent and played no part in such movements. This was valid not only for Muslim Middle East countries, but also for countries in both continents in Asia as well as Africa. Third world independent movements were guided by national political parties and strongly backed by the Eastern Block. Communism and different Marxist groups played central roles in the independence movements after the Second World War. Take a well-known example from the Middle East: Egypt under Jamal Abdul Nasser. In a young army officer called Jamal Abdul Nasser managed to take power in Cairo after a successful military coup. His message was addressed to all Arabs throughout the Middle East. He used the struggle against imperialism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as his central theme of focus and a main tool for spreading his propaganda. Military takeovers took places in different Arab countries following the guidelines of Nasser. The same picture continued after the 6-Day War of The different Palestinian groups were either nationalist, like Fatah, or Marxist-oriented organizations. This picture of national plus leftist groups dominated the Third-World Liberation spectrum. Rebel organizations in different countries also adopted one form of Marxism as their official ideology. A religious man had no place within such circumstances for he was considered to be backward, uneducated and was despised by the elite, and by the politically-motivated masses. I believe that both the US and western Europe encouraged religious centers and movements in both Asia and Africa as part of the imperatives of the Cold War. Religion was one

of the main tools against the spread of Communism. This declaration marked the birth of modern Islamism. Across the borders and into Afghanistan, the Soviet occupation was fighting fierce guerilla warfare with the Mujahedeen [5]. The international balance of power faced serious disequilibrium in that area. Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and his Islamic Revolution received high levels of international publicity. Later political developments increased the attention to the Islamic Revolution such as the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran [6]. The success of Shiite Muslims in Iran pushed to the limits Sunni Muslim traditional organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood MBH and led to the formation of new movements, especially the Sunni fundamentalist groups. Fierce competition between the Shiite and Sunni groups continued throughout this process. Regional conflicts further increased the formation and development of such groups as was seen during the Lebanese civil war, in Chechnya and the civil war in the Baltic caused by the dismantling of Socialist Yugoslavia. Sunni Islamic groups and organizations were formed in all Arab countries and were banned in one way or another. The suppression of these well-organized groups during the late part of the twentieth century in countries suffering from high levels of corruption and political mismanagement provided some popularity for these groups. Islam is the Solution was the slogan of these groups that spread strongly throughout the poor classes of society. The general political atmosphere during the last decades of the twentieth century excluded the participation of Islamism, and prevented them from taking power, as happened in Algeria. This exclusion further strengthened such groups and increased their popularity. Islamism had to move underground and to wait until the arrival of the Arab Spring. Role of the Conservative Arabs During the demonstrations and in a hidden and unpublicized way, Qatar [7] managed to be part of the Arab Spring [8]. The significant financial support that came from Qatar to the well-organized Islamists guaranteed it a permanent seat in the newly evolving power centre. While the youth were engaged in bringing down the regime, the Islamists were planning to take full advantage of the outcomes of regime change. To achieve that, they used the financial support that was coming from Qatar, exactly as Qatar had planned. From the other side, it is noted that the newly evolving system in Tunis was unaware of such developments. The Islamist Leader Rachid Ghannouchi dismissed any plans to participate in the coming elections as he landed in Tunis Airport coming from London. By saying that, he succeeded in distracting attention away from the Islamists and their plans in the upcoming elections. The legal system of the countries facing regime-change lacks important aspects of proper electoral systems. Proper legislation should be in-place before elections take place. Such legislation should include a Political Parties Law that governs the process of elections and specifies the sources of financial support. These developments produced adverse effects and consequences that have changed the course of direction of the Arab Spring. By doing that, Qatar managed to introduce its conservative Islamic political agenda that provides support to specific political groups in Tunis and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. The fundamentalists have increased their strength, making use of this huge financial support. This development will have serious consequences on the evolution of the Tunisian political system. The success of the Islamists has alienated other segments in society that once played the leading role in the Arab Spring. These segments are representatives of the middle classes, and their role in society is vital for the success of the political process. The struggle between these two groups is very fierce. In Tunis, the strategy of the Islamists is to write the Constitution according to their agenda Sharia in order to ensure their continuation in monopolizing future elections. The middle classes and the young generations have shown great concern regarding the agenda of political Islam. Any introduction of Sharia shall represent a serious step backwards for society and further deterioration in living standards. Similar developments are taking place in Egypt. The Constitution Committee is dominated by Islamists. For Tunisia what can political Islam achieve? Such figures should not be surprising in such a developing country that is located on the shores of the Mediterranean that suffers greatly from the absence of a fresh water source river and depends mainly on rain and high-cost underground water. These figures indicate the importance of tourism to the daily lives of the Tunisian population. Any interference by political Islam in the service sector will be catastrophic, and will aggravate the unemployment problem [10]. Now the aim of the Islamist Government of Tunisia is to pretend that everything in the country is back to normal and that tourism and foreign investment can return as it was before the Revolution. The agenda of political Islam provides no substantial alternative vision or guidance in

overcoming the daily challenges of unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment. Corruption is spreading as the fear from the state has vanished, and the ordinary man in the street has started to learn how to play the political game. The election success of the Islamists in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere is not an indication of their popularity, but rather a result of a combination of factors. All these factors combined explain why the Islamists won the majority of the seats [13]. Democracy presumes the existence of political and social awareness and not widespread illiteracy and ignorance. What kind of free elections can be held under such circumstances? The core problem leading to what is known as the Arab Spring in Tunis was the situation produced by the Structural Adjustment process that started in under the pressure of the World Bank. In many cases the application of specific criteria taken from highly industrialized countries and applied to developing countries like Tunisia and Egypt leads to a breaking down of the social fabric and disequilibrium in the political system. In developing countries and due to existing social institutions like nepotism and prevailing cultures which are absent in Industrialized countries , the privatization process leads to few hands owning the majority of the sectors sold off in this way. Usually the new owners are members of the ruling family and other relatives of the government. In Tunis the family of Ben Ali, and the close relatives of his wife, became the new owners of the most important newly-privatized companies. This development represented a serious setback to government efforts in combating poverty and reducing unemployment as the move away from the public sector aggravated the unemployment problem significantly. Corruption and unemployment [14] were the main factors behind the popular uprising that produced the Arab Spring in both Tunisia and Egypt and also the main factors behind the political upheavals in Libya and Yemen. Today the Islamists after forming the Government in Tunisia and Egypt are facing the real test. They face real and serious economic issues as well as the social and political consequences of enacting religious-oriented laws in a country that enjoyed secular relationships for over a century. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, find themselves in a trap. The Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, foreign investment, unemployment, freedom of speech and religion and so many other real economic, political, and social issues are awaiting clear answers.

9: Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam | UVA Library | Virgo

The question raised by the ouster of Egypt's President Morsi is whether Islam is compatible with democracy or any form of government that empowers the people and limits the power of leaders to.

Political aspects of Islam, Islamism, and Shura Deliberations of the Caliphates, most notably the Rashidun Caliphate, were not democratic in the modern sense rather, decision-making power lay with a council of notable and trusted companions of Muhammad and representatives of different tribes most of them selected or elected within their tribes. It can be viewed similar to how the prime minister is chosen in many nations. After the Rashidun Caliphs, later Caliphates during the Islamic Golden Age had a much lesser degree of democratic participation, but since "no one was superior to anyone else except on the basis of piety and virtue" in Islam, and following the example of Muhammad, later Islamic rulers often held public consultations with the people in their affairs. Since the law came from the legal scholars, this prevented the Caliph from dictating legal results. Laws were decided based on the ijma consensus of the Ummah community, which was most often represented by the legal scholars. Ali Khan argues that Islam is fully compatible with democracy. In his book, *A Theory of Universal Democracy*, Khan provides a critique of liberal democracy and secularism. He presents the concept of "fusion state" in which religion and state are fused. Contradictions represent the limited knowledge that human beings have. According to the Quran and the Sunnah, Muslims are fully capable of preserving spirituality and self-rule. Muslim democrats, including Ahmad Moussalli professor of political science at the American University of Beirut, argue that concepts in the Quran point towards some form of democracy, or at least away from despotism. For example, shura Al Imran "Quran 3: Government by the people is not therefore necessarily incompatible with the rule of Islam, whilst it has also been argued that rule by a religious authority is not the same as rule by a representative of God. This viewpoint, however, is disputed by more traditional Muslims. Moussalli argues that despotic Islamic governments have abused the Quranic concepts for their own ends: Much debate occurs on the subject of which Islamic traditions are fixed principles, and which are subject to democratic change, or other forms of modification in view of changing circumstances. Some Muslims allude to an "Islamic" style of democracy which would recognize such distinctions. Shia viewpoint[edit] According to the Shia understanding, Muhammad named as his successor as leader, with Muhammad being the final prophet, his son-in-law and cousin Ali. Therefore, the first three of the four elected "Rightly Guided" Caliphs recognized by Sunnis Ali being the fourth, are considered usurpers, notwithstanding their having been "elected" through some sort of conciliar deliberation which the Shia do not accept as a representative of the Muslim society of that time. The largest Shia grouping "the Twelvers branch" recognizes a series of Twelve Imams, the last of which Muhammad al-Mahdi, the Hidden Imam is still alive and the Shia are waiting for his reappearance. Since the revolution in Iran, the largest Shia country, Twelver Shia political thought has been dominated by that of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder and leader of the revolution. Khomeini argued that in the absence of the Hidden Imam and other divinely-appointed figures in whom ultimate political authority rests, Muslims have not only the right, but also the obligation to establish an "Islamic state". Khomeini distinguishes between Conventional Fiqh and Dynamic Fiqh, which he believes to also be necessary. Khomeini divided the Islamic commandments or Ahkam into three branches: This list includes all commandments which relate to public affairs, such as constitutions, social security, insurance, bank, labour law, taxation, elections, congress, etc. Some of these codes may not strictly or implicitly pointed out in the Quran and generally in the Sunnah, but should not violate any of the two, unless there is a collision of rules in which the more important one is given preference an apparent, but not inherent, violation of a rule. Were the powers of government to lie only within the framework of secondary divine decrees, the designation of the divine government and absolute deputed guardianship wilayat-i mutlaqa-yi mufawwada to the Prophet of Islam peace be upon him and his progeny would have been in practice entirely without meaning and content. I must point out, the government which is a branch of the absolute governance of the Prophet of God is among the primary ordinances of Islam, and has precedence over all secondary ordinances such as prayer salat, fasting sawm, and pilgrimage hajj. Other

deviations from strict sharia law have been noted in the largest Shia-majority state: Insurance is maintained even though chance, the very basis for insurance should theoretically be excluded from all contracts. The contracts signed with foreigners all accept the matter of interest. Al-Farabi argued that the ideal state was the city-state of Medina when it was governed by Muhammad, as its head of state, as he was in direct communion with God whose law was revealed to him. In the absence of the prophet, Al-Farabi considered democracy as the closest to the ideal state, regarding the republican order of the Rashidun Caliphate as an example within early Muslim history. However, he also maintained that it was from democracy that imperfect states emerged, noting how the republican order of the early Islamic Caliphate of the Rashidun caliphs was later replaced by a form of government resembling a monarchy under the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. He "welcomed the formation of popularly elected legislative assemblies" in the Muslim world as a "return to the original purity of Islam. Democracy in the Middle East There are several ideas on the relationship between Islam in the Middle East and democracy. Waltz writes that transformations to democracy seemed on the whole to pass by the Islamic Middle East at a time when such transformations were a central theme in other parts of the world, although she does note that, of late, the increasing number of elections being held in the region indicates some form of adoption of democratic traditions. They argue that the compatibility is simply not there between secular democracy and Arab-Islamic culture in the Middle East which has a strong history of undemocratic beliefs and authoritarian power structures. The confusion is, however, understandable since the idea of democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam. However, within Islam there are ideas held by some that believe Islam and democracy in some form are indeed compatible due to the existence of the concept of shura meaning consultation in the Quran. Views such as this have been expressed by various thinkers and political activists in the Middle East. The imperial legacy includes the borders of the modern states themselves and the existence of significant minorities within the states. Acknowledgment of these differences is frequently suppressed usually in the cause of "national unity" and sometimes to obscure the fact that minority elite is controlling the country. Brian Whitaker argues that this leads to the formation of political parties on ethnic, religious or regional divisions, rather than over policy differences. Brian Whitaker argues that as there is no need for taxation there is less pressure for representation. Furthermore, Western governments require a stable source of oil and are therefore more prone to maintain the status quo, rather than push for reforms which may lead to periods of instability. This can be linked into political economy explanations for the occurrence of authoritarian regimes and lack of democracy in the Middle East, particularly the prevalence of rentier states in the Middle East. As civil society is seen to be an integral part of democracy it raises doubts over the feasibility of democracy developing in the Middle East in such situations. The West, especially the US, is also seen as a supporter of Israel, and so it and its institutions, including democracy, are seen by many Muslims as suspect. Khaled Abou El Fadl, a lecturer in Islamic law at the University of California comments "modernity, despite its much scientific advancement, reached Muslims packaged in the ugliness of disempowerment and alienation. Unfortunately, these groups tend to be very intolerant of alternative views, including the ideas of democracy. Many Muslims who argue that Islam and democracy are compatible live in the West, and are therefore seen as "contaminated" by non-Islamic ideas. List of Islamic democratic political parties The Green Algeria Alliance is an Islamist coalition of political parties, created for the legislative election, in Algeria. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party is the second largest party in the Parliament of Bangladesh and the main opposition party. The BNP promotes a center-right policy combining elements of conservatism, Islamism, nationalism and anti-communism. The party believes that Islam is an integral part of the socio-cultural life of Bangladesh, and favors Islamic principles and cultural views. It has also been called the "dominant group" or "dominant force" in the Arab Spring uprising in Syria. Since then it has become the biggest and most well-organized party in Tunisia, so far outdistancing its more secular competitors. Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone but He has delegated it to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust. The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the elected representatives of the people. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed. Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Quran and Sunnah. Provision

shall be made for the religious minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures. This resolution was included in the constitution as preamble and in [70] it was inserted in the constitution itself as Article 2 and Schedule item 53 [71] but with the word "freely" in Provision shall be made for the religious minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures, removed. The resolution was inserted again in the constitution in , [73] with the word "freely" reinstated. Theory[edit] The idea and concept of Islamic democracy has been accepted by many Iranian clerics, scholars and intellectuals. There are also other Iranian scholars who oppose or at least criticise the concept of Islamic democracy. Among the most popular of them are Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi [79] who have written: Practice[edit] Some Iranians, including Mohammad Khatami , categorize the Islamic republic of Iran as a kind of religious democracy. Others maintain that not only is the Islamic Republic of Iran undemocratic see Politics of Iran but that Khomeini himself opposed the principle of democracy in his book Hokumat-e Islami: Wilayat al-Faqih , where he denied the need for any legislative body saying, "no one has the right to legislate. It is a subject of lively debate among pro-Islamic Iranian intelligentsia. Iranians have ratified the constitution in which the principle rules are explicitly mentioned as the rules of Islam to which other rules should conform. Mohaghegh, Behnam Indices of democracy in Muslim countries[edit] There are several non-governmental organizations that publish and maintain indices of freedom in the world, according to their own various definitions of the term, and rank countries as being free , partly free, or unfree using various measures of freedom, including political rights , economic rights , freedom of the press and civil liberties. The following lists Muslim-majority countries and shows the scores given by two frequently used indices: These indices are frequently used in Western media, but have attracted some criticism and may not reflect recent changes.

Gerontological interest and opinions of three groups of health care providers in Lane County, Oregon The art of influencing anyone Railway organization and management The Philosophy of Space and Time A sacred technology? : theorizing visual knowledge in the twenty-first century. Creek or Muskogee Nation. Practical database programming with visual c net To take the Advice of prudent and understanding Men, Discrimination learning process in autism : spectrum disorders : a comparator theory by Phil Reed Public Health Advocacy DAY-CARE BEAR (Just Right Books) Tao of jeet kune do new expanded edition Guidelines for Baseline Ecological Assessment The assistive technology assessment checklist Jehovahs witnesses books Carlos the Jackal (Ilich Ramirez Sanchez) Atheist Preacher: How to be Spiritual without a God concept Wills of the rich famous Learning, remembering, believing Crimes against the state The Chicago Jobbank How to save the world one recipe at a time Different approaches in the classroom: Developing new Yiddish pedagogical resources Lily Okalani Kahn The German standard contracts act Its Israels birthday ParFOR a structured environment for parallel FORTRAN. Lady Bridget in the Never-never land T.R.O.G.S. Book Two Allegorical drama of Calderon Suspense thriller novels in telugu Confession is good for you Schooners, skiffs steamships Field research into socio-cultural issues The Kundalini yoga experience Theory of fully ionized plasmas. V. 1. Abd al-Qadir-Cummings-John Aircraft of the USAF Vagts Basic Corporation Law Materials, Cases and Text, 3d The Sea Lions or the Lost Sealers The Zander Family