

1: Labour and Liberalism in 19th-Century Europe: Essays in Comparative History PDF Kindle - DraganRay

Labour and liberalism in nineteenth-century Europe should appeal to academics and undergraduates specialising in European social and political history, particularly German and British history. It will also interest general readers concerned with the historical background of Western European culture.

Bring fact-checked results to the top of your browser search. Revolution and the growth of industrial society, 1789–1848 Developments in 19th-century Europe are bounded by two great events. The French Revolution broke out in 1789, and its effects reverberated throughout much of Europe for many decades. World War I began in 1914. Its inception resulted from many trends in European society, culture, and diplomacy during the late 19th century. In between these boundaries—the one opening a new set of trends, the other bringing long-standing tensions to a head—much of modern Europe was defined. Europe during this year span was both united and deeply divided. A number of basic cultural trends, including new literary styles and the spread of science, ran through the entire continent. European states were increasingly locked in diplomatic interaction, culminating in continentwide alliance systems after 1815. At the same time, this was a century of growing nationalism, in which individual states jealously protected their identities and indeed established more rigorous border controls than ever before. Finally, the European continent was to an extent divided between two zones of differential development. Changes such as the Industrial Revolution and political liberalization spread first and fastest in western Europe—Britain, France, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and, to an extent, Germany and Italy. Eastern and southern Europe, more rural at the outset of the period, changed more slowly and in somewhat different ways. Europe witnessed important common patterns and increasing interconnections, but these developments must be assessed in terms of nation-state divisions and, even more, of larger regional differences. Some trends, including the ongoing impact of the French Revolution, ran through virtually the entire 19th century. Other characteristics, however, had a shorter life span. Some historians prefer to divide 19th-century history into relatively small chunks. Thus, 1789–1848 is defined by the French Revolution and Napoleon; 1848–1871 forms a period of reaction and adjustment; 1871–1914 is dominated by a new round of revolution and the unifications of the German and Italian nations; and 1914–1918, an age of imperialism, is shaped by new kinds of political debate and the pressures that culminated in war. Overriding these important markers, however, a simpler division can also be useful. Between 1789 and 1848 Europe dealt with the forces of political revolution and the first impact of the Industrial Revolution. Between 1848 and 1914 a fuller industrial society emerged, including new forms of states and of diplomatic and military alignments. The mid-19th century, in either formulation, looms as a particularly important point of transition within the extended 19th century.

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"This book represents a significant reinterpretation of nineteenth-century liberalism and labour history. Going beyond the usual confines of national frameworks, the author compares national experiences, discarding the preconceptions that have frequently distorted historical writing.

Classical liberals believe that individuals are "egoistic, coldly calculating, essentially inert and atomistic" [9] and that society is no more than the sum of its individual members. These beliefs were complemented by a belief that laborers could be best motivated by financial incentive. This belief led to the passage of the Poor Law Amendment Act, which limited the provision of social assistance, based on the idea that markets are the mechanism that most efficiently leads to wealth. They opposed any income or wealth redistribution, which they believed would be dissipated by the lowest orders. They were critical of what would come to be the idea of the welfare state as interfering in a free market. In a free market, both labor and capital would receive the greatest possible reward while production would be organized efficiently to meet consumer demand. A government to protect individual rights and to provide services that cannot be provided in a free market. A common national defense to provide protection against foreign invaders. Building and maintaining public institutions. Public works that included a stable currency, standard weights and measures and building and upkeep of roads, canals, harbors, railways, communications and postal services. For society to guarantee positive rights, it requires taxation over and above the minimum needed to enforce negative rights. In its most extreme form, neo-classical liberalism advocated Social Darwinism. Hayek saw the British philosophers Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Josiah Tucker and William Paley as representative of a tradition that articulated beliefs in empiricism, the common law and in traditions and institutions which had spontaneously evolved but were imperfectly understood. This tradition believed in rationalism and sometimes showed hostility to tradition and religion. Hayek conceded that the national labels did not exactly correspond to those belonging to each tradition: Guido De Ruggiero also identified differences between "Montesquieu and Rousseau, the English and the democratic types of liberalism" [25] and argued that there was a "profound contrast between the two Liberal systems". This liberalism had "insensibly adapted ancient institutions to modern needs" and "instinctively recoiled from all abstract proclamations of principles and rights". Lieber asserted that "independence in the highest degree, compatible with safety and broad national guarantees of liberty, is the great aim of Anglican liberty, and self-reliance is the chief source from which it draws its strength". Whiggery had become a dominant ideology following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and was associated with the defence of the British Parliament, upholding the rule of law and defending landed property. The origins of rights were seen as being in an ancient constitution, which had existed from time immemorial. These rights, which some Whigs considered to include freedom of the press and freedom of speech, were justified by custom rather than by natural rights. They believed that the power of the executive had to be constrained. While they supported limited suffrage, they saw voting as a privilege rather than as a right. However, there was no consistency in Whig ideology and diverse writers including John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith and Edmund Burke were all influential among Whigs, although none of them was universally accepted. Richard Price and Joseph Priestley adapted the language of Locke to the ideology of radicalism. Classical liberals were committed to individualism, liberty and equal rights. They believed that required a free economy with minimal government interference. Writers such as John Bright and Richard Cobden opposed both aristocratic privilege and property, which they saw as an impediment to the development of a class of yeoman farmers. Some elements of Whiggery opposed this new thinking and were uncomfortable with the commercial nature of classical liberalism. These elements became associated with conservatism. The Anti-Corn Law League brought together a coalition of liberal and radical groups in support of free trade under the leadership of Richard Cobden and John Bright, who opposed militarism and public expenditure. Their policies of low public expenditure and low taxation were adopted by William Ewart Gladstone when he became Chancellor of the Exchequer and later Prime Minister. Classical liberalism was often associated with religious dissent and nonconformism. From around 1830 to 1840, laissez-faire advocates of the

Manchester School and writers in *The Economist* were confident that their early victories would lead to a period of expanding economic and personal liberty and world peace, but would face reversals as government intervention and activity continued to expand from the s. Jeremy Bentham and James Mill , although advocates of laissez-faire, non-intervention in foreign affairs and individual liberty, believed that social institutions could be rationally redesigned through the principles of utilitarianism. The Conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli rejected classical liberalism altogether and advocated Tory democracy. By the s, Herbert Spencer and other classical liberals concluded that historical development was turning against them. Herbert Spencer in Britain and William Graham Sumner were the leading neo-classical liberal theorists of the 19th century. The economic ideas of the Jacksonian era were almost universally the ideas of classical liberalism. To the vast majority of American classical liberals, however, laissez-faire did not mean no government intervention at all. On the contrary, they were more than willing to see government provide tariffs, railroad subsidies, and internal improvements, all of which benefited producers. What they condemned was intervention in behalf of consumers. In the words of William Jennings Bryan , " You shall not crucify the American farmer on a cross of gold ". Classical liberalism remained the orthodox belief among American businessmen until the Great Depression. In the words of Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Alan Wolfe summarizes the viewpoint that there is a continuous liberal understanding that includes both Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes: When instead we discuss human purpose and the meaning of life, Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes are on the same side. Both of them possessed an expansive sense of what we are put on this earth to accomplish. For Keynes, monopolies were. It makes perfect sense for an eighteenth-century thinker to conclude that humanity would flourish under the market. For a twentieth century thinker committed to the same ideal, government was an essential tool to the same end. The view that modern liberalism is a continuation of classical liberalism is not universally shared. Lerner , John Micklethwait , Adrian Wooldridge and several other political scholars have argued that classical liberalism still exists today, but in the form of American conservatism.

3: History of Europe - Revolution and the growth of industrial society, â€” | www.enganchecubano.com

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Hints and suggestions of the liberal idea can be found in other great cultures. But it was the distinctive society produced in Europe â€” and in the outposts of Europe, and above all America â€” that served as the seedbed of liberalism. In turn, that society was decisively shaped by the liberal movement. Decentralization and the division of power have been the hallmarks of the history of Europe. After the fall of Rome, no empire was ever able to dominate the continent. Instead, Europe became a complex mosaic of competing nations, principalities, and city-states. The various rulers found themselves in competition with each other. If one of them indulged in predatory taxation or arbitrary confiscations of property, he might well lose his most productive citizens, who could "exit," together with their capital. The kings also found powerful rivals in ambitious barons and in religious authorities that were backed by an international Church. Parliaments emerged that limited the taxing power of kings, and free cities arose with special charters that put the merchant elite in charge. By the Middle Ages, many parts of Europe, especially in the west, had developed a culture friendly to property rights and trade. On the philosophical level, the doctrine of natural law â€” deriving from the Stoic philosophers of Greece and Rome â€” taught that the natural order was independent of human design and that rulers were subordinate to the eternal laws of justice. Natural-law doctrine was upheld by the Church and promulgated in the great universities, from Oxford and Salamanca to Prague and Krakow. As the modern age began, rulers started to shake free of age-old customary constraints on their power. Royal absolutism became the main tendency of the time. The kings of Europe raised a novel claim: Accordingly, they sought to direct religion, culture, politics, and, especially, the economic life of the people. To support their burgeoning bureaucracies and constant wars, the rulers required ever-increasing quantities of taxes, which they tried to squeeze out of their subjects in ways that were contrary to precedent and custom. The first people to revolt against this system were the Dutch. After a struggle that lasted for decades, they won their independence from Spain and proceeded to set up a unique polity. The United Provinces, as the radically decentralized state was called, had no king and little power at the federal level. Making money was the passion of these busy manufacturers and traders; they had no time for hunting heretics or suppressing new ideas. Thus de facto religious toleration and a wide-ranging freedom of the press came to prevail. Devoted to industry and trade, the Dutch established a legal system based solidly on the rule of law and the sanctity of property and contract. Taxes were low, and everyone worked. The Dutch "economic miracle" was the wonder of the age. Thoughtful observers throughout Europe noted the Dutch success with great interest. A society in many ways similar to Holland had developed across the North Sea. In the 17th century, England, too, was threatened by royal absolutism, in the form of the House of Stuart. The response was revolution, civil war, the beheading of one king and the booting out of another. In the course of this tumultuous century, the first movements and thinkers appeared that can be unequivocally identified as liberal. With the king gone, a group of middle-class radicals emerged called the Levellers. They protested that not even Parliament had the authority to usurp the natural, God-given rights of the people. Religion, they declared, was a matter of individual conscience; it should have no connection with the state. State-granted monopolies were likewise an infringement of natural liberty. A generation later, John Locke, drawing on the tradition of natural law that had been kept alive and elaborated by the Scholastic theologians, set forth a powerful liberal model of man, society, and state. Every man, he held, is innately endowed with certain natural rights. These consist in his fundamental right to what is his property â€” that is, his life, liberty, and "estates" or material goods. Government is formed simply to preserve the right to property. When, instead of protecting the natural rights of the people, a government makes war upon them, the people may alter or abolish it. The Lockean philosophy continued to exert influence in England for generations to come. In time, its greatest impact would be in the English-speaking colonies in North America. The society that emerged in England after the victory over absolutism began to score

astounding successes in economic and cultural life. Thinkers from the continent, especially in France, grew interested. Some, like Voltaire and Montesquieu, came to see for themselves. Just as Holland had acted as a model before, now the example of England began to influence foreign philosophers and statesmen. The decentralization that has always marked Europe allowed the English "experiment" to take place and its success to act as a spur to other nations. In the 18th century, thinkers were discovering a momentous fact about social life: In Scotland, a succession of brilliant writers that included David Hume and Adam Smith outlined the theory of the spontaneous evolution of social institutions. They demonstrated how immensely complex and vitally useful institutions — language, morality, the common law, and above all the market — originate and develop not as the product of the designing minds of social engineers, but as the result of the interactions of all the members of society pursuing their individual goals. In France, economists were coming to similar conclusions. The greatest of them, A. Turgot, set forth the rationale for the free market: The policy to pursue, therefore, is to follow the course of nature, without pretending to direct it. For, in order to direct trade and commerce it would be necessary to be able to have knowledge of all of the variations of needs, interests, and human industry in such detail as is physically impossible to obtain even by the most able, active, and circumstantial government. And even if a government did possess such a multitude of detailed knowledge, the result would be to let things go precisely as they do of themselves, by the sole action of the interests of men prompted by free competition. The French economists coined a term for the policy of freedom in economic life — they called it *laissez-faire*. Meanwhile, starting in the early 17th century, colonists coming mainly from England had established a new society on the eastern shores of North America. Under the influence of the ideas that the colonists brought with them and the institutions they developed, a unique way of life came into being. There was no aristocracy and very little government of any kind. Instead of aspiring to political power, the colonists worked to carve out a decent existence for themselves and their families. Fiercely independent, they were equally committed to the peaceful and profitable exchange of goods. A complex network of trade sprang up, and by the mid-century the colonists were already more affluent than any other commoners in the world. Self-help was the guiding star in the realm of spiritual values as well. Churches, colleges, lending libraries, newspapers, lecture institutes, and cultural societies flourished through the voluntary cooperation of the citizens. When events led to a war for independence, the prevailing view of society was that it basically ran itself. As Tom Paine declared, Formal government makes but a small part of civilized life. It is to the great and fundamental principles of society and civilization — to the unceasing circulation of interest, which passing through its million channels, invigorates the whole mass of civilized man — it is to these, infinitely more than to anything which even the best instituted government can perform that the safety and prosperity of the individual and the whole depend. In fine, society performs for itself almost everything which is ascribed to government. Government is no further necessary than to supply the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently competent. In time, the new society formed on the philosophy of natural rights would serve as an even more luminous exemplar of liberalism to the world than had Holland and England before it. As the 19th century began, classical liberalism — or just liberalism, as the philosophy of freedom was then known — was the specter haunting Europe and the world. In every advanced country the liberal movement was active. Drawn mainly from the middle classes, it included people from widely contrasting religious and philosophical backgrounds. Christians, Jews, deists, agnostics, utilitarians, believers in natural rights, freethinkers, and traditionalists all found it possible to work towards one fundamental goal: Emphases varied with the circumstances of different countries. Sometimes, as in central and eastern Europe, the liberals demanded the rollback of the absolutist state and even the residues of feudalism. Accordingly, the struggle centered on full private-property rights in land, religious liberty, and the abolition of serfdom. In western Europe, the liberals often had to fight for free trade, full freedom of the press, and the rule of law as sovereign over state functionaries. In America, the liberal country par excellence, the chief aim was to fend off incursions of government power pushed by Alexander Hamilton and his centralizing successors, and, eventually, somehow, to deal with the great stain on American freedom — Negro slavery. From the standpoint of liberalism, the United States was remarkably lucky from the start. Thomas Jefferson, one of the leading liberal thinkers of his time, composed its founding document, the Declaration of

Independence. The Declaration radiated the vision of society as consisting of individuals enjoying their natural rights and pursuing their self-determined goals. In the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Founders created a system where power would be divided, limited, and hemmed in by multiple constraints, while individuals could go about the quest for fulfillment through work, family, friends, self-cultivation, and the dense network of voluntary associations. In this new land, government "as European travelers noted with awe" could hardly be said to exist at all. This was the America that became a model to the world. One perpetuator of the Jeffersonian tradition in the early 19th century was William Leggett, a New York journalist and antislavery, Jacksonian Democrat. Leggett declared, All governments are instituted for the protection of person and property; and the people only delegate to their rulers such powers as are indispensable to these objects. The people want no government to regulate their private concerns, or to prescribe the course and mete out the profits of their industry. Protect their persons and property, and all the rest they can do for themselves. This laissez-faire philosophy became the bedrock creed of countless Americans of all classes. In the generations to come, it found an echo in the work of liberal writers like E. Godkin, Albert Jay Nock, H. Mencken, Frank Chodorov, and Leonard Read. To the rest of the world, this was the distinctively, characteristically American outlook. Meanwhile, the economic advance that had been slowly gaining momentum in the Western world burst out in a great leap forward. First in Britain, then in America and western Europe, the Industrial Revolution transformed the life of man as nothing had since the Neolithic age. Now it became possible for the vast majority of mankind to escape the immemorial misery they had grown to accept as their unalterable lot. Now tens of millions who would have perished in the inefficient economy of the old order were able to survive.

4: Liberalism, Economic | www.enganchecubano.com

REVIEW ESSAY *Liberalism, Labour and State-Formation in Nineteenth-Century Europe* SIEP STUURMAN
LUEBBERT, GREGOR MY. *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy.*

A variety of social classes existed in Europe between and , and the relations among these disparate classes raise some of the most interesting problems of nineteenth-century European history. Class transformations were characteristic features of nineteenth-century Europe, and relationships among classes changed significantly over time. But class transformations and class relationships followed no inexorable logic. They were profoundly shaped by historical conjunctures and by cultural and political forces as well as by economic forces. At the very top, aristocrats managed to retain considerable power, but they had to renegotiate their relationships with both rulers and bourgeoisie. In general, the character of aristocratic economic power changed over time. In Great Britain the least change occurred because, although membership in the House of Lords still conferred considerable power, in most areas the aristocracy had lost almost all legal prerogatives before. But they retained their economic power: Even late-nineteenth-century Liberal leaders such as Henry Campbell-Bannerman ended their careers with a knighthood. In most of Europe, however, a hereditary aristocracy secured by legal privilege essentially evolved toward landlordism. Despite the loss of feudal obligations, noble families such as the Stolberg-Wernigerodes and the Von Ratibors in the German empire and the Schwarzenbergs and Liechtensteins in Austria-Hungary owned huge expanses of national territory. In Russia aristocratic power was greatest and least constrained. Everywhere great landowning aristocrats were also cultural pacesetters. Custom and often law required that aristocrats lead an "honorable lifestyle" that included fighting, dueling, sports, gambling, religion, and government. The aristocratic gentleman might have intellectual interests, but he must be a dilettante, interested in art, poetry, and literature in an amateur capacity only. The aristocratic lady also had her prerogatives. While it was important that a woman bear legitimate male children to carry on the family line, once she had carried out this obligation there was leeway. Aristocratic women often possessed some control over the dowry or were able to draw on family financial resources and so enjoyed a measure of independence. The elegant salons of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century gave aristocratic women a setting in which they could exert independent power. While the double standard was the rule of European society, like so many rules, it was not always enforced as rigorously among the aristocracy. Many an aristocratic couple, considered successfully married, had separate bedrooms, with separate access, in different wings of their townhouse. As consolidated states expanded their power, aristocrats found it necessary to adapt. Before many aristocrats saw themselves as part of a French-speaking international ruling class whose self-identity was defined by honor, race, and lifestyle but certainly not by national loyalty. They felt free to offer their services wherever they might receive the most recognition. No contemporary thought that his actions were in any way dishonorable. As the century went on, aristocrats increasingly reconciled themselves to a new statist Europe that required national loyalty; in return, they continued to lead the armies and staff the diplomatic services of all the powers. British radical John Bright even referred to the diplomatic services as "a gigantic system of outdoor relief for the aristocracy. Throughout the eighteenth century the bourgeoisie had accumulated its grievances against the aristocracy even while it was thrilled to associate with aristocrats in Masonic fraternities, scientific societies, and the theater. But the grievances generated in such potentially awkward situations were sometime deeply felt. The most powerful element of the bourgeoisie was the haute bourgeoisie, a small minority of bourgeois men and women who owned factories, banks, and large trading establishments. In the first half of the nineteenth century a new bourgeois aristocracy had emerged whose names would resound through the century: In the years between the onset of the French Revolution and the revolutions of 1848 capitalist elites and the solid middle classes often looked upon aristocrats as rivals and opponents. In England middle-class radicals scorned the leisured life of the aristocracy, mocked their lack of a work ethic, and deplored the decadence of both their art and their personal lives. Throughout Europe the French Revolution had inspired fear among the aristocracy, while the liquidation of aristocratic land and the provisioning of revolutionary and then of Napoleonic armies made

many mercantile fortunes. After in France the restored Bourbons sought to reestablish aristocratic power and could not forgive bourgeois leaders, some of whom had voted for the death of King Louis XVI and many of whom had rallied behind Napoleon I in his ill-fated attempt at a comeback during the " Hundred Days. The revolutions of changed all that. In Paris, and to a lesser extent in Berlin and Vienna, revolutionary-minded bourgeois discovered that popular insurrections could threaten bourgeois order. Young middle-class sons who had played a leading role in early-nineteenth-century secret societies increasingly confined their interest to Masonry. By the end of the century, the bourgeoisie and aristocracy had largely reconciled their differences. Faced with their fear of popular revolution from below, the aristocracy, the haute bourgeoisie, and the solid middle classes discovered interests in common. In the second half of the century, the effects of this reconciliation were particularly striking in the Austro-Hungarian after , German, and Russian empires where monarchs possessed considerable autonomous power and where aristocrats dominated the upper administration, the army, and important portions of the countryside. Here Marxist exhortations to bourgeois elites to make a bourgeois revolution were greeted with profound skepticism and deep suspicion. In turn, the weak opposition of liberal bourgeois politicians to monarchical and aristocratic power contributed to the evolution of independent working-class parties. The power of bourgeois elites increased greatly after but as it did, they frequently adopted aristocratic lifestyles, and eagerly accepted titles, becoming aristocrats themselves. In great cities such as London, Paris, and Berlin, centers of aristocratic society, such amalgamations proceeded more swiftly than in great commercial and manufacturing towns such as Birmingham and Hamburg where the middle-class population was large and the aristocratic population almost non-existent. Successful businessmen nearly always purchased landed property and added a country home to their urban townhouse. They or their sons and daughters interested themselves in literature and the arts as they sought to enter an aristocratic-dominated high society and to intermarry with the aristocracy. A key element to bourgeois entry into the aristocratic world was the dowry. Many an indebted aristocrat was able to continue his lifestyle only by marrying bourgeois wealth. Below the haute bourgeoisie was the solid middle class of society doctors, famous lawyers, top civil servants, small manufacturers, and wholesale merchants. Economically secure, they could not live off accumulated wealth. Already by the beginning of the nineteenth century, ideals of domesticity flourished among the solid middle classes. Here wives were expected to stay at home, to provide a peaceful refuge for a husband involved in the competitive business world and to rear and educate children. Educating children was an important function because the solid middle-class male child would need an education to succeed and the female would need an education to fulfill her maternal role. In an age of partnerships in which family fortunes depended on the integrity of partners, family ties enabled businessmen to bind partners more closely to themselves and also provided intimate surveillance of their character. The lower middle classes possessed small amounts of capital and were required to work for a living; indeed many were often on the brink of proletarianization. Many a petit bourgeois dreamed of a financial coup or a string of successes that might lift him and his family into the solid middle classes while envying the skilled worker who earned as much as he did without having to worry about fussy customers or the responsibilities of management. Most shopkeepers either owned or rented their own shops and lived in a few rooms adjoining the shop. The private world of the middle-class family only partially extended to this world and then only to the wealthiest members. Perhaps the family was saving to send a talented son to an elite secondary school , but more likely, children were expected to learn the business on the job. Their parents did not possess sufficient money to retire and hand the shop over to them, and so they would have to establish themselves largely by their own skill and talent, although perhaps with a loan from their parents. By the very nature of their business, the establishments of the lower middle classes were scattered all over town. In the more prosperous areas, shopkeepers and doctors tended to be wealthier and better off than in the poorer areas where they were continually opening and shutting down. Shopkeepers were recruited partly from the sons and daughters of shopkeepers. In Paris, most shopkeepers were recruited from provincial shopkeepers. But more typically they were from the working classes. In working-class areas, middle-class shopkeepers and the working classes lived side by side. The precarious financial position of many shopkeepers in working-class areas also gave them a stake in the vicissitudes of popular life. During much of the nineteenth century, the

lower middle classes, particularly those located in working-class districts, rallied to popular causes. A great part of the power of the revolutions of stemmed from the successful union of the lower middle classes and the working classes. The lower middle classes had played a leading role in the revolutionary struggles up to and continued to serve as revolutionary fuel into the s. Yet in the second half of the long nineteenth century the alliance between the lower middle classes and the working classes became more problematic where it did not collapse altogether. Grocery chains and catalog shopping were deadly threats to the lower middle classes, yet their working-class neighbors became prime customers of these retail innovations. Consumer cooperatives, a popular tool of the socialist movement, particularly alienated the lower middle classes as did the spread of trade unionism, which threatened to raise the wages of the helpers who gave the lower middle-class family a little extra time to take care of family needs. Despite the rhetoric of laissez-faire, governmental services increased greatly during the period. Between and , railways expanded along with the railway workforce, and postal services increased rapidly as did the number of postal workers. Everywhere the number of teachers grew apace and secretaries, administrators, and accountants all were in high demand. The number of those employed in banking, health, entertainment, and insurance also grew. Were these service workers and urban professionals a new middle class or a white-collar working class? Unlike the working classes, both artisans and factory workers, these workers did not work with their hands and were far more likely to be women. While many artisans earned more than clericals, the white-collar workers were required to dress for work and they possessed more formal education than the most skilled workers. At a time when industrial labor was becoming more masculine, white-collar work was feminizing. Emerging from technical training schools, women were hired as secretaries and typists and female lay teachers often replaced nuns in teaching young women in a still largely sex-segregated educational system in which they routinely received lower wages than their male counterparts. White-collar identities varied according to political or social circumstances. In some countries such as France, teachers, civil service workers, and other groups formed unions and mobilized their constituents into popular movements. In Germany though, they were more likely to remain separate from the working classes and to identify themselves with a broadly construed middle group, the *Mittelstand*. Over the course of the century the number of factory workers increased considerably, the number of artisans and domestic servants declined, while sweatshop labor first expanded and then declined. In manufacturing, preindustrial forms of labor slowly gave way to factory and millwork. Preindustrial work had its own distinctive characteristics. It was dispersed over town and country and was organized along family lines. Preindustrial workers controlled the pace and rhythm of their own work and often possessed a monopoly of knowledge about their job. They often had their own internal job hierarchy and their own distinctive occupational identity. Oftentimes, preindustrial workers lived close together to fellows who performed the same job. Skilled artisans, such as puddlers makers of wrought iron or glassblowers, tended to live in their own communities within the city or village; they often had a shared leisure life based on common work and residence patterns. Glassworkers retained their own sense of identity when thrown together with other groups of workers. These workers were capable of considerable solidarity, but waves of innovation, such as the mechanization that swept the glass industry in the s, were capable of reducing them to relative penury. In early-nineteenth-century cities, the largest groups of workers were usually domestic servants who catered to the needs of upper- and middle-class families. Whether they resided with a wealthy family or performed cleaning services for a middle-class family, servants were under the close scrutiny of their employers, and this limited their ability to act independently, either personally or collectively. Personal contact might result in lifelong friendships between older servants and the wealthy children they had raised.

5: Labour and Liberalism in 19th-Century Europe : John Breuille :

A collection of essays which compare and contrast the ways in which the ideas of liberalism arose out of the labour movement in Britain and Germany in the 19th century.

Europe, to Economic liberalism is an anachronistic but useful term to describe theories propounded in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The term was coined by nineteenth-century thinkers to describe their own theories; rather than "economics," seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers considered their inquiries "political economy," and those who defended the rights and freedoms of individuals over and against the state would not bear the appellation of liberals until the s. Nevertheless, "economic liberalism" usefully describes theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that defended the individual liberty to buy, sell, work, employ, and trade without restriction or governmental interference. This theory maintained that people should be left alone because their self-interested activities in the market were self-regulating, guided by natural economic laws that were far more conducive to social well-being than the directives of state authorities. Such state policies are designated by historians as mercantilism. Economic liberalism manifested itself in systematic criticism of such state interference for violating natural economic laws to the detriment of society. Economic liberalism arose after a wide variety of authors who had spent decades speculating about economic processes articulated natural economic laws that produced an automatic self-regulation of economic activity most conducive to social well-being. The enormous fiscal demands of state-building in the modern era led various European crowns in relentless efforts for new revenues. Taxation was increased and expanded, and the sale of exclusive monopolies for the production of goods and trade, domestic and foreign, also brought new revenues. By the seventeenth century in Europe , almost any foreign goods people used were likely imported by a trade monopoly; any domestic goods, by someone operating under a monopoly patent. European crowns also engaged in currency debasement, that is, adulterating the silver coinage with a base metal and pocketing the difference between the original silver content of the coinage and its nominal value. This had significant consequences in terms of domestic price increases and distortions of rents and real wages. It also disrupted foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and international flows of gold and silver specie. To ameliorate such consequences, governments undertook the regulation of wages, the prices of primary consumer goods, and interest rates. Since currency debasement created incentives for holders of specie to send it out of the country to markets where purchasing power was determined by specie value, rather than nominal values , governments were also greatly concerned about the loss of specie within their borders. The power of any state depended on its possession of specie, which allowed it to purchase mercenary troops and supplies abroad for the military struggles of European power politics. Although colonial mines served as the key source of specie for Spain , most other European powers could only obtain specie through international trade. It became an article of faith that state power was maximized by policies that produced a favorable balance of trade, that is, an influx of foreign specie in payment for domestic exports that was greater than the specie outflows to pay for foreign imports. To restrict outflows of specie, heavy import taxes restrained purchases of foreign goods and also produced revenue. To facilitate exports, and therefore specie inflows, government policy promoted the production of high-value domestic manufactures, protected by high tariffs or even prohibitions on imports of foreign manufactures. The above mercantilist state-building objectives introduced new perspectives on economic activity. Because national power was promoted by influx of specie, international trade was seen in a new, positive light. Medieval views of merchants as exploitative were supplanted by a view of traders as national assets. From this perspective, domestic trade only transferred wealth from one group to another, but foreign trade brought in new treasure from abroad. Nevertheless, many believed that the selfish interests of merchants might run contrary to the interests of the state, and for that reason, trade needed strict regulation and the guiding hand of authorities. Such commentators, now designated mercantilists, were not mere spokesmen for the system of the same name. They frequently wrote to get the government to pursue some policy that would benefit them for example, reduction of interest rates or prohibition of imports by competitors , but there was a wide variety of views and motives in their work, and many criticisms of government policy. Over time,

the proliferation of such works resulted in a general understanding of "the economy" as a linkage of prices, money flows, interest rates, and international trade, which could be subjected to and explained by analytical theories. The analytical tools and theories developed by these writers were not terribly sophisticated, nor universally accepted or applied in anything like a systematic manner. Yet from such efforts to comprehend the intricate network of exchanges, prices, and behavior of human beings as producers and consumers, a new science emerged called political economy. Most authors now described as mercantilists showed a clear understanding, for example, of sophisticated ideas such as international trade representing a sort of barter mediated by money, and that there can be no export customers if nations do not also purchase imports from those to whom they hope to sell. Even though most recognized the need for regulated trade, virtually none proposed economic self-sufficiency. Similarly, most understood that the merchants could not simply set prices for exports; rather, prices were determined by the actions of all involved "in the common market of the world. Since England imported more than it exported, specie was lost to the nation. The true solution to the problem, Misselden urged, was to restore a favorable balance of trade. A favorable balance of trade provided specie for national strength, but it was also desired because plenty of money at home would stimulate domestic trade and employment. Further, since interest rates were determined by the supply of money, plenty of money would reduce interest rates and stimulate investment. Such aspirations fed the ambitions of those who sought to place human action within the descriptive bounds of similar natural laws. Many writers believed that the cause of such regularities was economic actors responding to opportunities for personal gain. Thus, the seventeenth century saw a new regard for self-interest. On the one hand, self-interest came to be seen as a more rational, less dangerous motivation for human behavior than the passions. On the other hand, because self-interest involved rational calculation, some believed that acts of self-interest demonstrated the same kinds of regularity in human nature as was found in other scientific laws in the natural realm. In his *Discourse of Trade* English physician Nicholas Barbon asserted that, as with all things necessary to life, everything that produced delight and pleasure, along with peace and economic development, was the product of trade, the consequence of people acting in the market for their own benefit. Perhaps no name is more closely associated with the concept of natural law than that of John Locke , the English philosopher widely accorded status as a founder of political liberalism. In the case of interest rate reductions, Locke insisted that there was a "natural rate" that was the product of "the present state of trade, money, and debts," in other words, by the supply and demand for funds that could be loaned. Locke denied that interest rates could be regulated by law. The law would be flouted, as "it will be impossible by any contrivance of the law, to hinder men. Thus, rather than making loans more available, artificial reductions of the rate of interest decreased the supply of credit. The idea of legislating interest rates, Locke says, is as absurd as legislating rents: Since contracts and rents had been entered into based upon coins having a given silver content, to change the silver content of the coins would amount to fraud. The proponents of the scheme may call debased coins shillings, but "one may as rationally hope to lengthen a foot by dividing it into fifteen parts instead of twelve and calling them inches. His *Discourses upon Trade* , edited and published posthumously by his brother Roger, was suffused with the "principles of the new philosophy," the "mechanical" science that alone provides "clear and evident truths. Indeed, North observed, the reason interest rates were lower in the Netherlands "which had no interest regulations" was that the trading wealth of the Dutch meant that more money was available for loans. North argued that artificial reductions of the rate of interest would reduce the sums available for loans since "it probably will keep some money from coming abroad into trade; whereas on the contrary, high interest certainly brings it out. As North explained, the "ebbing and flowing of money, supplies and accommodates itself, without any aids from politicians. Petty also served as secretary to Thomas Hobbes , another great social anatomist. Instead of the dissection of nerves and tissues, the scientific investigator of human society had to master quantitative data on population, tax revenues, trade and production, and all manner of social statistics. Petty called his program "political arithmetic," and, while his general view of economic policy followed predictable mercantilist lines in viewing national wealth as contingent on its share of the fixed world trade, he also argued that government policy had limited capacity to directly control economic events because of the immutable operation of natural economic laws. Thus he attacked legislative reduction of the rate of interest as

one example of "the variety and fruitlessness of making Civil Positive Laws against the Laws of Nature. One disciple, the politician and civil servant Charles Davenant" , illustrates how economic law came to undermine the old sureties of beneficent government direction of the economy. In the s, the English East India Company began to import large quantities of cheap printed Indian cotton goods. This produced a storm of protest from writers who attacked the company for undermining the domestic production of English woollens and silks. Although he conceded that Indian imports injured English woolen manufactures, Davenant merely took this as evidence that they were akin to hothouse flowers, unable to survive without artificial aids. To force trade in this manner brought no "natural profit" and was ultimately injurious to the public. Woolen manufactures were injured only because the public benefited more from cheap Indian cottons than from woolen garments dependent upon protection for a market. Cheap Indian cloth, Martyn wrote, was just one of many benefits, including from spices, silks, and wine, which foreign trade produced. While the public benefited from Indian imports, it would benefit still more, Martyn argued, if the trade were open to all, as competition between merchants would force prices and transportation costs to the minimum. Martyn also reasoned that if Indian goods could be purchased more cheaply than those produced at home, English cloth manufactures simply wasted labor. Political Maxims of the State of Holland Aanwysing der heilsame politike Gronden en Maximen van de Republike van Holland en West-Vriesland, attacked monarchical principles and linked the cause of crowns with standing armies, clerical mystification, and the destruction of urban commercial society. Commerce, he wrote, by "common interest wonderfully linked together" all the people of the Netherlands "from the least to the greatest" in "excellent and laudable harmony. The whaling monopoly, for example, proved unprofitable; but under competition, "everyone equips their vessel at the cheapest rate, follow[s] their fishing diligently, and manage all carefully" and whaling became profitable with fifteen times more ships involved in the industry. Monopoly did nothing more than cause the Dutch to be "bereft of the freedom of buying their necessaries at the cheapest rate they can. In his chief work, A Detailed Account of France Le detail de la France, , Boisguillbert dismissed the mercantilist equation of money with wealth, contending that wealth lay in goods, rather than coin. Social harmony and well-being were the products of individuals acting in their self-interested pursuit of happiness. The transactions of self-interested actors in a market created order and peace, for "the pure desire of profit will be the soul of every market for buyer and seller alike; and it is with the aid of that equilibrium or balance that each partner to the transaction is equally required to listen to reason, and submit to it. Any other authority spoils everything by trying to interfere, no matter how well intentioned it may be. If the government would merely lift its controls on prices and grain imports, he argued, food would soon be abundant. Liberal critics saw the persistence of a feudal land tenure system in France as responsible for backwardness in agriculture, especially in comparison with her neighbors, England and the Netherlands. Chief among these critics was the circle gathered around the physician Francois Quesnay" The Physiocrats popularized the slogan, "laissez-faire, laissez passer," as the essence of economic wisdom. At the heart of physiocratic doctrine was the conviction that agriculture alone was the source of all wealth, since only it provided surplus, or net product. Therefore, all restrictions on agriculture, such as price controls and barriers to internal and foreign trade, undermined national wealth. In the eyes of the Physiocrats, the countless restrictions on free commerce imposed by the government were as socially beneficial as blood clots in human circulation. Turgot, in a eulogy to Gournay, praised him for grasping the fundamental principle of economic policy, which was that every individual knew his or her own interest best, and that with individuals left free to pursue their interests, "it would be impossible for the aggregate individual interests not to concur with the general interest. Rather than the plethora of regulations covering every aspect of economic life, or monopoly privileges, Gournay favored the "natural liberty" to buy and sell as the guarantor of production, and of consumers obtaining goods at the best price. Short of providing justice, and bestowing honors on inventors and artists, government best served the economy by removing obstacles it had erected. His chief objective was to remove all barriers to agricultural and international trade. The farmer was "the only one who suffers from monopoly as buyer and at the same time as seller. There is only he who cannot buy freely from foreigners the things which he has need; there is only he who cannot sell to foreigners the commodity he produces. The key was productivity, the secret of which Smith identified as the "division of

labor. Smith was scornful of all the policies that were designed over centuries to secure a favorable balance of trade. Trade itself reflects the fact that different regions, different countries, have certain "natural advantages" in producing goods; and so if "a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them. Rather, the extensive transactions that characterized markets were based on mutual gains from trade. Contrivances to replace "the natural price, or the price of free competition" ranging from outright monopoly privileges, to bounties, to restrictive tariffs, to restrictions on free movement of labor—there were myriad ways governments could protect some person or group against competition, and thus allow private interest to take precedence over the public good. The elimination of all schemes to insulate people against competition was vital. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with any other man, or order of men. In the nineteenth century economic liberalism acquired not only its name, but the status of scientific orthodoxy, with the establishment of professorships in the new academic discipline of political economy in universities throughout Europe. The nineteenth century also saw the implementation of such iconic economic liberal policies as free trade in Britain.

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Bring fact-checked results to the top of your browser search. Liberalism in the 19th century As an ideology and in practice liberalism became the preeminent reform movement in Europe during the 19th century. The national character of a liberal movement could even be affected by religion. Liberalism in Roman Catholic countries such as France, Italy, and Spain, for example, tended to acquire anticlerical overtones, and liberals in those countries tended to favour legislation restricting the civil authority and political power of the Catholic clergy. In Great Britain the Whigs had evolved by the mid-century into the Liberal Party, whose reformist programs became the model for liberal political parties throughout Europe. The liberal project of broadening the franchise in Britain bore fruit in the Reform Bills of 1832, 1867, and 1884. The sweeping reforms achieved by Liberal Party governments led by William Gladstone for 14 years between 1868 and 1884 marked the apex of British liberalism. Culver Pictures Liberalism in continental Europe often lacked the fortuitous combination of broad popular support and a powerful liberal party that it had in Britain. After the Bourbon Restoration in 1814, however, French liberals were faced with the decades-long task of securing constitutional liberties and enlarging popular participation in government under a reestablished monarchy, goals not substantially achieved until the formation of the Third Republic in 1870. Throughout Europe and in the Western Hemisphere, liberalism inspired nationalistic aspirations to the creation of unified, independent, constitutional states with their own parliaments and the rule of law. But the failure of the Revolutions of 1848 highlighted the comparative weakness of liberalism on the Continent. The liberal-inspired unification of Italy was delayed until the 1860s by the armies of Austria and of Napoleon III of France and by the opposition of the Vatican. The United States presented a quite different situation, because there was neither a monarchy, an aristocracy, nor an established church against which liberalism could react. In Europe, by contrast, liberalism was a transforming force throughout the 19th century. Industrialization and modernization, for which classical liberalism provided ideological justification, wrought great changes. The feudal system fell, a functionless aristocracy lost its privileges, and monarchs were challenged and curbed. Capitalism replaced the static economies of the Middle Ages, and the middle class was left free to employ its energies by expanding the means of production and vastly increasing the wealth of society. As liberals set about limiting the power of the monarchy, they converted the ideal of constitutional government, accountable to the people through the election of representatives, into a reality. Modern liberalism Problems of market economies By the end of the 19th century, some unforeseen but serious consequences of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America had produced a deepening disenchantment with the principal economic basis of classical liberalism—the ideal of a market economy. The main problem was that the profit system had concentrated vast wealth in the hands of a relatively small number of industrialists and financiers, with several adverse consequences. First, great masses of people failed to benefit from the wealth flowing from factories and lived in poverty in vast slums. Second, because the greatly expanded system of production created many goods and services that people often could not afford to buy, markets became glutted and the system periodically came to a near halt in periods of stagnation that came to be called depressions. Finally, those who owned or managed the means of production had acquired enormous economic power that they used to influence and control government, to manipulate an inchoate electorate, to limit competition, and to obstruct substantive social reform. In short, some of the same forces that had once released the productive energies of Western society now restrained them; some of the very energies that had demolished the power of despots now nourished a new despotism. The modern liberal program Such, at any rate, was the verdict reached by an increasing number of liberals in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As noted above, modern liberals held that the point of government is to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of individual freedom. In this they followed the lead of thinkers and reformers such as the British political philosopher T. According to Green, the excessive powers of government may have constituted the greatest obstacles to freedom in an earlier day, but by the middle of the 19th century these

powers had been greatly reduced or mitigated. The time had come, therefore, to recognize hindrances of another kind—such as poverty, disease, discrimination, and ignorance—which individuals could overcome only with the positive assistance of government. The new liberal program was thus to enlist the powers of government in the cause of individual freedom. Although most liberals eventually adopted this new course, there were some dissenters, notably the influential social Darwinists Herbert Spencer in England and William Graham Sumner in the United States. As the term Darwinists indicates, these writers thought of politics, economics, and society in general in evolutionary terms. Like Paine, they regarded government as at best a necessary evil—not, however, because it coerces but because it too often interferes with the struggle for survival that nature imposes on human beings as much as on other species see natural selection. Helping the poor and the weak, they argued, impedes individual freedom and retards social progress by holding back the strong and the fit. They saw no reason for a fixed line eternally dividing the private and public sectors of the economy; the division, they contended, must be made by reference to what works. The spectre of regimentation in centrally planned economies and the dangers of bureaucracy even in mixed economies deterred them from jettisoning the market and substituting a putatively omniscient state. On the other hand—and this is a basic difference between classical and modern liberalism—most liberals came to recognize that the operation of the market needed to be supplemented and corrected. The new liberals asserted, first, that the rewards dispensed by the market were too crude a measure of the contribution most people made to society and, second, that the market ignored the needs of those who lacked opportunity or who were economically exploited. They contended that the enormous social costs incurred in production were not reflected in market prices and that resources were often used wastefully. Not least, liberals perceived that the market biased the allocation of human and physical resources toward the satisfaction of consumer appetites. Finally, although liberals believed that prices, wages, and profits should continue to be subject to negotiation among the interested parties and responsive to conventional market pressures, they insisted that price-wage-profit decisions affecting the economy as a whole must be reconciled with public policy. Greater equality of wealth and income To achieve what they took to be a more just distribution of wealth and income, liberals relied on two major strategies. First, they promoted the organization of workers into trade unions in order to improve their power to bargain with employers. Such a redistribution of power had political as well as economic consequences, making possible a multiparty system in which at least one party was responsive to the interests of wage earners. Second, with the political support of the economically deprived, liberals introduced a variety of government-funded social services. Meeting these objectives required a redistribution of wealth that was to be achieved by a graduated income tax and inheritance tax, which affected the wealthy more than they did the poor. Social welfare measures such as these were first enacted by the decidedly nonliberal government of Otto von Bismarck in Germany in the late 19th century, but liberal governments soon adopted them in other countries of northern and western Europe. In the United States such measures were not adopted at the federal level until passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. Europe was reshaped by the Treaty of Versailles on the principle of national self-determination, which in practice meant the breakup of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires into nationally homogeneous states. The League of Nations was created in the hope that negotiation would replace war as a means of settling international disputes. But the trauma of the war had created widespread disillusionment about the entire liberal view of progress toward a more humane world. In Italy, meanwhile, dissatisfaction with the peace settlement led directly to the takeover by the Fascist Party in 1922. Liberalism was also threatened by Soviet communism, which seemed to many to have inherited the hopes for progress earlier associated with liberalism itself. While liberalism came under political attack in the interwar period, the Great Depression threatened the very survival of the market economy. The boom-and-bust character of the business cycle had long been a major defect of market economies, but the Great Depression, with its seemingly endless downturn in business activity and its soaring levels of unemployment, confounded classical economists and produced real pessimism about the viability of capitalism. The wrenching hardships inflicted by the Great Depression eventually convinced Western governments that complex modern societies needed some measure of rational economic planning. The New Deal—1933, the domestic program undertaken by Pres. Roosevelt to lift the United States out of the Great

Depression, typified modern liberalism in its vast expansion of the scope of governmental activities and its increased regulation of business. Among the measures that New Deal legislation provided were emergency assistance and temporary jobs to the unemployed, restrictions on banking and financial industries, more power for trade unions to organize and bargain with employers, and establishment of the Social Security program of retirement benefits and unemployment and disability insurance. In his influential work *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, the liberal British economist John Maynard Keynes introduced an economic theory that argued that government management of the economy could smooth out the highs and lows of the business cycle to produce more or less consistent growth with minimal unemployment. Library of Congress, Washington, D. As western Europe, North America, and Japan entered a period of steady economic growth and unprecedented prosperity after the war, attention shifted to the institutional factors that prevented such economies from fully realizing their productive potential, especially during periods of mass unemployment and depression. Great Britain, the United States, and other Western industrialized nations committed their national governments to promoting full employment, the maximum use of their industrial capacity, and the maximum purchasing power of their citizenry. Here, clearly, was a program less disruptive of class harmony and the basic consensus essential to a democracy than the old Robin Hood method of taking from the rich and giving to the poor. A further and final expansion of social welfare programs occurred in the liberal democracies during the postwar decades. Johnson as part of his Great Society program of national reforms. These measures created the modern welfare state, which provided not only the usual forms of social insurance but also pensions, unemployment benefits, subsidized medical care, family allowances, and government-funded higher education. The new nations almost invariably adopted constitutions and established parliamentary governments, believing that these institutions would lead to the same freedom and prosperity that had been achieved in Europe. The results, however, were mixed, with genuine parliamentary democracy taking root in some countries but succumbing in many others to military or socialist dictatorships.

Contemporary liberalism The revival of classical liberalism The three decades of unprecedented general prosperity that the Western world experienced after World War II marked the high tide of modern liberalism. But the slowing of economic growth that gripped most Western countries beginning in the mids presented a serious challenge to modern liberalism. By the end of that decade economic stagnation, combined with the cost of maintaining the social benefits of the welfare state, pushed governments increasingly toward politically untenable levels of taxation and mounting debt. Equally troubling was the fact that the Keynesian economics practiced by many governments seemed to lose its effectiveness. Governments continued to spend money on programs aimed at stimulating economic growth, but the result too often was increased inflation and ever-smaller declines in unemployment rates. As modern liberals struggled to meet the challenge of stagnating living standards in mature industrial economies, others saw an opportunity for a revival of classical liberalism. The intellectual foundations of this revival were primarily the work of the Austrian-born British economist Friedrich von Hayek and the American economist Milton Friedman. He also famously argued, in *The Road to Serfdom*, that interventionist measures aimed at the redistribution of wealth lead inevitably to totalitarianism. Friedman, as one of the founders of the modern monetarist school of economics, held that the business cycle is determined mainly by the supply of money and by interest rates, rather than by government fiscal policy — contrary to the long-prevailing view of Keynes and his followers. These arguments were enthusiastically embraced by the major conservative political parties in Britain and the United States, which had never abandoned the classical liberal conviction that the market, for all its faults, guides economic policy better than governments do. Revitalized conservatives achieved power with the lengthy administrations of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher —'90 in Britain and Pres. Ronald Reagan —'89 in the United States. Bill Clinton in the s.

Civil rights and social issues Contemporary liberalism remains deeply concerned with reducing economic inequalities and helping the poor, but it also has tried to extend individual rights in new directions. With the exception of the utilitarians, liberals have always invoked the concept of rights to argue against tyranny and oppression; but in the later 20th century claims to rights became the most common way of articulating struggles for social justice. In the s there arose similar movements struggling for equal rights for women, gays and lesbians, the physically or mentally disabled, and other minorities or disadvantaged social groups. For

example, the relaxation in most developed countries of long-standing restrictions on contraception , divorce , abortion , and homosexuality was inspired in part by the traditional liberal insistence on individual choice. In similar fashion, the liberal emphasis on the right to freedom of speech led to the loosening of inherited restrictions on sexual content and expression in works of art and culture see censorship.

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Liberalism in the 19th century. As an ideology and in practice liberalism became the preeminent reform movement in Europe during the 19th century. Its fortunes, however, varied with the historical conditions in each country—the strength of the crown, the decline of the aristocracy, the pace of industrialization, and the circumstances of national unification.

Civil liberties in the United Kingdom The Bill of Rights was a landmark piece of liberal legislation Isolated strands of liberal thought that had existed in Western philosophy since the Ancient Greeks began to coalesce at the time of the English Civil War. In particular, the Levellers , a radical political movement of the period, published their manifesto Agreement of the People which advocated popular sovereignty , an extended voting suffrage , religious tolerance and equality before the law. The impact of these ideas steadily increased during the 17th century in England, culminating in the Glorious Revolution of , which enshrined parliamentary sovereignty and the right of revolution , and led to the establishment of what many consider the first modern, liberal state. The Bill of Rights formally established the supremacy of the law and of parliament over the monarch and laid down basic rights for all Englishmen. The right to petition the monarch was granted to everyone and " cruel and unusual punishments " were made illegal under all circumstances. In , the Commons refused to renew the Licensing of the Press Act , [26] leading to a continuous period of unprecedented freedom of the press. The Licensing of the Press Act , which sanctioned government censorship of the printing press , expired in at the end of the existing session of parliament. In , the Commons refused to renew the legislation, [27] leading to a continuous period of unprecedented freedom of the press apart from seditious libel. Age of Enlightenment[edit] Main article: Age of Enlightenment The development of liberalism continued throughout the 18th century with the burgeoning Enlightenment ideals of the era. This was a period of profound intellectual vitality that questioned old traditions and influenced several European monarchies throughout the 18th century. In contrast to England, the French experience in the 18th century was characterised by the perpetuation of feudal payments and rights and absolutism. Ideas that challenged the status quo were often harshly repressed. Most of the philosophes of the French Enlightenment were progressive in the liberal sense and advocated the reform of the French system of government along more constitutional and liberal lines. The American Enlightenment is a period of intellectual ferment in the thirteen American colonies in the period " , which led to the American Revolution and the creation of the American Republic. Influenced by the 18th-century European Enlightenment and its own native American Philosophy , the American Enlightenment applied scientific reasoning to politics, science and religion, promoted religious tolerance, and restored literature, the arts, and music as important disciplines and professions worthy of study in colleges. Joseph II of Austria was an archetypal enlightened despot and although he maintained a belief in absolutist monarchy , he also championed a series of liberal reforms A prominent example of a monarch who took the Enlightenment project seriously was Joseph II of Austria , who ruled from to and implemented a wide array of radical reforms, such as the complete abolition of serfdom , the imposition of equal taxation policies between the aristocracy and the peasantry , the institution of religious toleration , including equal civil rights for Jews and the suppression of Catholic religious authority throughout his empire, creating a more secular nation. In the early 18th century, the Commonwealth men and the Country Party in England, promoted republicanism and condemned the perceived widespread corruption and lack of morality during the Walpole era , theorizing that only civic virtue could protect a country from despotism and ruin. They were an important influence on the development of Republicanism in the United States. Liberty consisted in frequent elections. This was to begin a long tradition of British radicalism. Montesquieu was a prominent figure of the French Enlightenment who argued for the separation of the powers of government in his The Spirit of the Laws In contrast to England, the French experience in the 18th century was characterized by the perpetuation of feudalism and absolutism. Montesquieu wrote a series of highly influential works in the early 18th century, including Persian letters and The Spirit of the Laws The latter exerted tremendous influence, both inside and outside France. Montesquieu pleaded in favor of a constitutional system of government , the preservation of

civil liberties and the law and the idea that political institutions ought to reflect the social and geographical aspects of each community. In particular, he argued that political liberty required the separation of the powers of government. In a lengthy discussion of the English political system, which he greatly admired, he tried to show how this might be achieved and liberty secured, even in a monarchy. He also notes that liberty cannot be secure where there is no separation of powers, even in a republic. He also emphasized the importance of a robust due process in law, including the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence and proportionality in the severity of punishment. Another important figure of the French Enlightenment was Voltaire. Initially believing in the constructive role an enlightened monarch could play in improving the welfare of the people, he eventually came to a new conclusion: His most polemical and ferocious attacks on intolerance and religious persecutions indeed began to appear a few years later. Era of revolution[edit] Main article: The intellectual underpinnings for independence were provided by the English pamphleteer Thomas Paine. His Common Sense pro-independence pamphlet was anonymously published on January 10, and became an immediate success. The Articles of Confederation, written in, now appeared inadequate to provide security, or even a functional government. The Confederation Congress called a Constitutional Convention in, which resulted in the writing of a new Constitution of the United States establishing a federal government. In the context of the times, the Constitution was a republican and liberal document. The American theorists and politicians strongly believe in the sovereignty of the people rather than in the sovereignty of the King. As one historian writes: By abandoning English constitutionalism and creating a new republic based on the rights of the individual, the North Americans introduced a new force in the world. Ideas spread most rapidly when they have found adequate concrete expression. Up to this point, the conviction had prevailed in Europe that monarchy best served the interests of the nation. Now the idea spread that the nation should govern itself. But only after a state had actually been formed on the basis of the theory of representation did the full significance of this idea become clear. All later revolutionary movements have this same goal This was the complete reversal of a principle. Until then, a king who ruled by the grace of God had been the center around which everything turned. Now the idea emerged that power should come from below These two principles are like two opposite poles, and it is the conflict between them that determines the course of the modern world. In Europe the conflict between them had not yet taken on concrete form; with the French Revolution it did. Influence of the French Revolution The march of the women on Versailles in October, one of the most famous examples of popular political participation during the French Revolution, forced the royal court back to Paris—it would remain there until the proclamation of the First Republic in Historians widely regard the French Revolution as one of the most important events in history. Revolution became a tradition, and republicanism an enduring option". The two key events that marked the triumph of liberalism were the Abolition of feudalism in France on the night of 4 August, which marked the collapse of feudal and old traditional rights and privileges and restrictions, and the passage of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in August. Jefferson, the American ambassador to France, was consulted in its drafting and there are striking similarities with the American Declaration of Independence. However, conflict between rival political factions, the Girondins and the Jacobins, culminated in the Reign of Terror, that was marked by mass executions of "enemies of the revolution", with the death toll reaching into the tens of thousands. The rise of Napoleon as dictator in, heralded a reverse of many of the republican and democratic gains. However Napoleon did not restore the ancien regime. He kept much of the liberalism and imposed a liberal code of law, the Code Napoleon. Outside France the Revolution had a major impact and its ideas became widespread. Furthermore, the French armies in the 1790s and 1800s directly overthrew feudal remains in much of western Europe. They liberalised property laws, ended seigneurial dues, abolished the guild of merchants and craftsmen to facilitate entrepreneurship, legalised divorce, and closed the Jewish ghettos. The Inquisition ended as did the Holy Roman Empire. The power of church courts and religious authority was sharply reduced, and equality under the law was proclaimed for all men. For nearly two decades the Italians had the excellent codes of law, a fair system of taxation, a better economic situation, and more religious and intellectual toleration than they had known for centuries Everywhere old physical, economic, and intellectual barriers had been thrown down and the Italians had begun to be aware of a common nationality. It proclaimed the equality of citizens before the law, equality

of languages, freedom of thought and faith; it created a Swiss citizenship, basis of our modern nationality, and the separation of powers, of which the old regime had no conception; it suppressed internal tariffs and other economic restraints; it unified weights and measures, reformed civil and penal law, authorised mixed marriages between Catholics and Protestants, suppressed torture and improved justice; it developed education and public works. For France, however, the defeat of Napoleon brought about the restoration of the monarchy and an ultra-conservative order was reimposed on the country. Classical liberalism The development into maturity of classical liberalism took place before and after the French Revolution in Britain, and was based on the following core concepts: Classical liberals were committed to individualism, liberty and equal rights. Writers such as John Bright and Richard Cobden opposed both aristocratic privilege and property, which they saw as an impediment to the development of a class of yeoman farmers.

8: Authentic German Liberalism of the 19th Century | Mises Institute

*Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Comparative History [John Breuilly] on www.enganchecubano.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. A collection of essays which compare and contrast the ways in which the ideas of liberalism arose out of the labour movement in Britain and Germany in the 19th century.*

In the classical statement, these are the rights to life, liberty, and property. In this respect, the French have remained true to the original and historical conception of liberalism. It is not by accident that the French term *laissez-faire* is used throughout the world as a synonym for the freely-functioning economy. Understanding liberalism as grounded in the self-regulating capacity of society is even, I believe, methodologically necessary, in order to enable us, as Anthony de Jasay writes, to distinguish liberalism from the other ideologies. In recent years there have been some very interesting developments in regard to the treatment of liberalism. First of all, a massive shift has taken place in scholarly attention away from socialism, and especially from Marxism, towards liberalism. This has to do with some well-known events in world politics, namely, the collapse of "real-existing" socialist regimes. With that has come the general recognition that private property and free enterprise are indispensable for the furtherance of the wealth of nations. Second, there is a growing awareness of the intimate connection between liberal ideology and what has been called "the European miracle" — that is, the breakthrough to sustained economic growth that has characterized Europe and its offshoots around the world, including America. Finally, there is an enhanced consciousness that liberal ideas have never been limited to English-speaking nations. That used to be the prevailing view in Britain and the United States. To take one example: There is also, for instance, a burgeoning interest among Anglophone scholars in the great tradition of the Late Scholastic thinkers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, who laid the foundation for modern economics. The fact is becoming increasingly evident that the great edifice of the liberal doctrine has been the achievement not only of the British and the Americans, but of many other peoples as well — not least of all, the Austrians. There has been a growth of interest also in German liberalism. This tradition was unduly neglected for decades, especially after what was seen as its ignominious defeat in the later Imperial period. Oswald Spengler spoke for the nationalistic-authoritarian school of his time when he wrote: Paul Kennedy, of Yale University, writes of "the sheer venom and blind hatred behind so many of the assaults in Germany on Manchesterism. As Julius Faucher, a leader of the free trade party, noted in , it was invented by Ferdinand Lassalle, the founder of German socialism. It then went the rounds of the conservative press, finally, as Faucher wrote, coming to "form the alpha and the omega of political wisdom," even for the Prussian government. It is clear that there can be no question that German liberalism was never the equal of, for instance, French liberal thought. Yet upon examination, the political and even intellectual contributions of German authentic liberalism are evident. Whatever heuristic value this concept may have had, there is little doubt that it has been very much over-applied. Germany after all is not Russia. The German experience included: The twelve-year experience of National Socialism, with all its atrocities, was terrible. But it should not lead us to forget that for a thousand years before Hitler, Germany was an integral part of western civilization. Dietheim Klippel is a leading scholar of German liberalism in the later eighteenth century. In particular, Klippel has effectively criticized the view of Leonard Krieger, author of an influential work on German ideas of freedom. But the fact is, that, besides the publicists and scholars influenced by the French Physiocrats, there existed in Germany in the eighteenth century "a wide stream of democratic and liberal ideas in all possible shadings. Methodologically under the influence of Kant and contentatively inspired by John Locke, this school provided a theory of the priority of civil society as against the State; of private property, private enterprise, and competition as the essence of the self-regulating society; and of the need to protect social life against state usurpation. Klippel emphasizes that the economic-liberal position of these scholars was "aimed directly against the legal position of segments of the bourgeoisie," against the guilds, but equally "against monopolies and privileges of manufactures and mills. By the nineteenth century, however, this natural-law school was totally eclipsed by Hegelian and other doctrines. One key figure in late eighteenth century German liberalism exerted a powerful, if unappreciated, influence on the history of European

liberalism in general. This was Jakob Mauvillon, of French Huguenot descent. Mauvillon was, in fact, more "doctrinaire" – a more consistent proponent of laissez-faire – than any of the French writers of the time. He advocated the privatization of the whole educational system from primary schools through to the universities, of the postal system, and of the upkeep of the clergy. He even entertained the idea that, under ideal conditions, the whole apparatus of state provision of security might also be privatized. Mauvillon was a tireless publicist for his cause, and it is likely that his ideas eventually penetrated to the world of the higher officials in Berlin, who in the 1830s were increasingly attentive to the slogan: To Possess, to Enjoy, to Earn. That young friend was Benjamin Constant. Kurt Kloocke, in his excellent intellectual biography of Constant, goes so far as to assert that: He took over from the German thinker "the demand for an uncompromising acknowledgment of religion as the basic constituent of a sphere free of the state. I have emphasized this episode of the impact of Jakob Mauvillon on the formation of the thinking of Benjamin Constant for a number of reasons. First, because it is virtually unknown, and besides is of intrinsic interest. In addition, it illustrates the international character of the liberal doctrine, the cross-fertilization of ideas within the common cultural space of western civilization. Finally, because of the great importance of Benjamin Constant. Hayek claimed that the characteristic great liberals of the nineteenth century were Tocqueville and Lord Acton. In my opinion, if one had to choose a single fountainhead of liberalism in the century, it would be Benjamin Constant. The German Enlightenment produced one of the great classics of liberal thought, translated into English under the title of *The Limits of State Action*, by Wilhelm von Humboldt. Both Hayek and Mises considered this work to be the finest expression of classical liberalism in the German language. The professors played a role in generating the *Beamtenliberalismus* Bureaucratic Liberalism that produced liberal reforms, especially in Prussia, including the reforms of the Hardenberg-Stein era. Given this flowering of liberal ideas in eighteenth century Germany, what happened to change things? Why did such a reversal of opinion occur in German political culture? There is no doubt that a major – perhaps the major – reason for the change lies in the political and military history of the period: The Jacobins who rose to power during the Revolution undertook to force their ideas onto Europe at the point of French bayonets. The rights of man, popular sovereignty, the French Enlightenment with its hatred of the age-old traditions and religious beliefs of the European peoples would be imposed by military might. To this end, the victorious, irresistible French armies invaded, conquered, and occupied much of Europe. In the nature of things, these invading armies, bringing with them an alien ideology, produced hostility and resistance against that ideology, a militant nationalist reaction. That is what happened in Russia and in Spain. Most of all, that is what happened in Germany. Individualism, natural rights, the universalist ideals of the Enlightenment – these became identified with the hated invaders, who subjugated and humiliated the German people. This identification was a burden that liberalism in Germany had to carry from that time on. The lesson that one could reasonably draw from that experience is this: By the 1830s and 40s, the population explosion that affected Germany and other countries was becoming acute. Everywhere there were signs of growing pauperism, which the inherited, still largely mercantilist system could not cope with. Free trade, in the sense of abolition of barriers to international trade, had already progressed considerably in the German states, above all, in Prussia. The Zollverein, or Customs Union, led by Prussia, was creating a larger and larger free trade zone within the German Confederation. Moreover, at the time Prussia was more advanced on the road to international free trade than any other European nation, even including England. The aim of the free trade party was to extend the principles of economic liberalism to all areas of economic life. From the 1830s to the mid-1840s – first in the German states and then in a unified Germany – this movement had a powerful and lasting effect on German institutions. More than anyone else, John Prince Smith was the creator of this free trade movement and its leading figure from the 1830s until near his death in 1843. Henderson termed him the great rival of Friedrich List. Prince-Smith, as he was usually referred to in Germany, is an obvious example of the foreign influences on German liberalism, since he was born in London in 1800 of English parents. Later he moved to Berlin and became a journalist. One of the few influences on his thinking which he acknowledged was that of Jeremy Bentham, which was clear both from his pronounced legal positivism and his insistence on treating all economic questions from a strictly utilitarian viewpoint. However, in a crucial respect Prince-Smith is much closer to the French liberals of the

time: This rule was necessary, Prince-Smith believed, in order to counter the dynamic of state-expansion, by which the state attempts "to grab as many functions as possible for itself, to tie as many economic interests as possible to its own. It was about this time that Prince-Smith gathered around him a group of bright and idealistic young men with journalistic ambitions, for whom he acted as a mentor in economics. He inspired them with the gospel of free trade, but that was only the starting-point. As one of the most prominent of them, Julius Faucher, put it, free trade was merely the "driving in of the first wedge into the welfare apparatus and happiness-making machine that the epigones of the eighteenth century on the continent had made of the state. But, Faucher added significantly in the s, "if need be, also for the expansion of the borders. His efforts continued to be focused instead on economic improvement. Nor did he and Faucher attract attention from the men at the Frankfurt Assembly, who were concentrating on precisely the issues Prince-Smith considered secondary: Prince-Smith had early on demonstrated his disagreements with the pessimistic prognoses of Malthus and Ricardo on the trend of living standards for the working classes and society as a whole. Government interventions and high taxes tended to reduce such accumulation of capital, and so create poverty. A major hindrance was the military budget. Prince-Smith had long held to an anti-militarist position, which was characteristic of Bastiat and the English Manchester school as well. An interesting sideline is that the methodology of Prince-Smith and his followers was the one traditional in British classical political economy, namely, that of deductive science. They were attacked on this account by the members of the German Historical School. Thus, the famous Methodenstreit, or dispute over the method of economics, that Gustav Schmoller, the leader of the Historical School, waged with Carl Menger, the founder of Austrian economics, was already prefigured in the dispute over method between the historical economists and the German free traders. He also worried that "if the free traders do not provide the popular mind with sufficient nourishment, it will turn to the fare offered by the socialists. This was in the s. It is interesting to note that it was at the same time, in Paris, that Gustave de Molinari was proposing, in a more systematic manner, his doctrine of the private production of security. In , the Congress of German Economists was founded, assembling the chief believers in the cause, many of whom had been led to it by Prince-Smith during his previous twenty years of labor. From until his death, Prince-Smith was head of the Economic Society, in Berlin; his home was a meeting place for Prussian politicians, among them the leaders of the German Progressive Party and later the National Liberal Party. The organ of the free trade party, the journal was published for the next thirty years, under the editorship of Faucher, Karl Braun, and others. The Quarterly Journal, the Berlin Economic Society, the Congress, and the informal influencing of politicians and officials were all elements of the same movement, facets of the same activism, and all inspired, to one degree or another, by the work of John Prince-Smith. He died in , in the knowledge that he had contributed everything he could to the reality of a Germany united, powerful, and committed to free trade.

9: Conservatism vs. Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century : Western Civilization II Guides

Do you search for PDF Labour and Liberalism in 19th-Century Europe: Essays in Comparative History ePub? Now here! Now here! You can find such kind of that e-book in our website.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Basingstoke and New York: The Militant Suffrage Movement: Citizenship and Resistance in Britain, by Laura E. Oxford and New York: In these two books, Alan S. Kahan and Laura E. Nym Mayhall provide stimulating accounts of the history of franchise reform. Kahan compares the language of exclusion used by nineteenth-century liberals in Britain, France, and Germany to justify only gradual, limited extensions of the right to vote. His analysis of liberalism emphasises its inner contradictions: Kahan brackets out discussion of liberalism as the advocacy of civil rights and the autonomy of the individual, to focus on its political language and culture. His account analyses the liberal "discourse of capacity" in relation to franchise reform and how this differed over time and in particular political contexts. He also breaks his discussion up chronologically, arguing for three distinct periods in the history of liberalism and the extension of the suffrage: Liberal discourse, according to Kahan, determined the capacity for the vote in two ways: Whereas the individualist perspective looked for the quality of "independence" , deriving variously from property and education, the second approach looked for increased capacity among social groups to exercise the franchise, again often identified in terms of property or education. Kahan argues that the individualist position came closest to the "democratic" discourse of rights and advocacy of universal suffrage, ultimately leading to the merging of liberal notions of political freedom with the social democratic vision. Each form of argument came to the fore at different periods in Britain, France, and Germany; English liberalism survived longest as a distinct political force because of its capacity to renew the language of capacity by making it increasingly inclusive. The term [End Page] can, therefore, be slippery territory for suffrage historians. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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