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Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May Similar Items Der Briefwechsel mit Bartholomäus Des Bosses / by: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von,

In my view, the vinculum substantiale and scientia visionis do not represent rival strategies, as they have been recently portrayed in the literature; rather, they work together. But scientia visionis, when applied to questions of ontology, gives us a rather vacuous kind of reality, while the vinculum substantiale represents a much more significant, albeit problematic, account of the nature of substance. The backdrop for this paper is a recent article by Donald Rutherford, in which it is argued that Leibniz gives his best account of the reality of bodies in the theory of scientia visionis. In my view, however, the vinculum substantiale and scientia visionis work together in the correspondence with Des Bosses, scientia visionis accounting for the reality of any aggregate of monads that appears as a body or phenomenal unity, the vinculum substantiale accounting for the genuine unity of an organism. The vinculum substantiale, on the other hand, is concerned with a strong notion of reality and ensures that a being is a genuine unity. I should like to argue that scientia visionis, when applied to questions of ontology or the reality of the constituents of the world, can at best give us only a vacuous kind of "reality," while the vinculum substantiale represents a much more significant, albeit problematic, account of the composition of the world. Scientia Visionis and the Vinculum Substantiale The doctrine of scientia visionis was certainly not new to Leibniz. Indeed, it was an essential part of the Scholastic theory of divine foreknowledge, being distinguished typically from scientia simplicis intelligentiae. In the notes to his letter of February , Leibniz says, If bodies are phenomena and judged in accordance with how they appear to us, they will not be real since they will appear differently to different people. And so the reality of bodies, of space, of motion, and of time seem to consist in the fact that they are phenomena of God, that is, the object of his knowledge by intuition [scientia visionis] Indeed, God sees things exactly as they are in accordance with geometrical truth, although he also knows how everything appears to everything else, and so he eminently contains in himself all other appearances. Only insofar as God perceives bodies-and by His very nature, He perceives them as they truly are-can they be said to be real or said to be in a certain way. And in a letter sent from Vienna on 24 January , Leibniz writes the following: If monads are not substantial parts of bodies, however, and composite beings are mere phenomena, it would have to be said that the substances of bodies consist in true phenomena-phenomena, namely, which God himself perceives in them through intuition [scientia visionis], as do also angels and the blessed, to whom it is given to see things truly. The only similarity between this idea of scientia visionis and the traditional Scholastic notion seems to be just this: He invokes scientia visionis in the notes to his February letter in an attempt to work out the consequences of the claim in the body of the letter that "either bodies are mere phenomena In other words, the problem that leads Leibniz to invoke a doctrine of scientia visionis is how to explain "reality" of phenomena when we have only the varying perceptions of different observers. The other "method" Leibniz has for establishing the reality of phenomena is that of the vinculum substantiale, the substantial bond of monads that, through its addition to the monads of a composite, essentially bonds them together, rendering the monads of a composite a real unity. In the February letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz says the following: If that vinculum substantiale of monads did not exist, all bodies, together with all of their qualities, would be nothing but well-founded phenomena, like a rainbow or an image in a mirror, in a word, continual dreams perfectly in agreement with one another, and in this alone would consist the reality of those phenomena. And it is here that Leibniz invokes the vinculum substantiale, not the doctrine of scientia visionis. He fails to invoke scientia visionis, I believe, because scientia visionis answers a different kind of problem about "reality"-namely, the sense in which the phenomena of bodies, perceived differently by different observers, may be said to be real. The vinculum substantiale, on the other hand, gives unity and hence reality to a corporeal substance, and it serves to ensure that the phenomena of the natural world are indeed real-where "real" means that what is a phenomenal unity is a genuine unity a unity per se as well. Unity and Reality Within the correspondence with Des Bosses, Leibniz uses the phrase "real phenomenon" equivocally, thus causing some confusion with respect to the interpretation

of scientia visionis and the vinculum substantiale. But when Leibniz is speaking of the vinculum substantiale, real phenomena will be phenomenal unities whose unity is made real by the vinculum substantiale. In other words, the vinculum will guarantee that the phenomenon of unity in a body is in fact a genuine unity; the vinculum will somehow unify those beings that would otherwise be only phenomenal unities; and in this consists the realization or reification of phenomena. In this sense, then, the contrast will be between real phenomena and mere phenomena. And scientia visionis can be said to reify the actual relations between substances precisely because it applies solely to the actual objects of the world. In this way, Leibniz can avoid the relations that exist between objects in other possible or potential worlds. Therefore, both scientia visionis and the vinculum substantiale account in some sense for the reality of corporeal phenomena. And it might seem, therefore, that they represent competing strategies. After all, God created the universe and is omniscient. And when Leibniz says that "the reality of bodies, of space, of motion and of time seems to consist in this, that they are the phenomena of God, or the object of scientia visionis," GP II one wonders how much explanatory force this view actually has. For example, let us consider an aggregate, like a herd of sheep, and a genuine unity, like a human being. God, according to Leibniz, will understand the relations that exist between the genuine individuals in an aggregate, for example, spatial proximity, and those that exist between the simple substances of the composite substance or animal, for example, spatial proximity and the relation between dominant and subordinate monads. But the important relation that exists between the simple substances of the composite, the relation that makes them a genuine unum per se, will be something determined by the natures of the simple substances themselves. If it is the case, as I have suggested here, that scientia visionis is used to answer a skeptical challenge, then it seems unlikely that this idea could truly compete with the idea of the vinculum substantiale as a means to reify the phenomena. Two issues here need to be properly delineated; namely, the explanation of the unity of composite substances and the explanation of the reality of composite substances. In my view, scientia visionis provides us only with a guarantee of the reality of composite substance, and this is done primarily on an epistemological level: On the other hand, scientia visionis does not guarantee the unity of composite substances because it is at best a reflection of the way the world is. Does scientia visionis bring about the unity of an aggregate? In other words, we may say that scientia visionis guarantees the reality of an aggregate; but it does not in fact act to unify any particular aggregate of monads. This is done by the relation of dominant monad and its subordinate monads and, perhaps, the vinculum substantiale. Thus, the unity and reality of bodies will ultimately be explicated on very different levels. Much of the difficulty involved in the correspondence with Des Bosses rests in the fact that Leibniz seems at times to lump the category of composite substances in. Of course, on one level, there is little difference between my perception of a table and my perception of an animal—both will be phenomenal unities. But, if we assume that a certain being has a mind, an internal unifying principle, then that being, that animal, will possess genuine unity as well. A more helpful picture of the Leibnizian world would therefore be the following:

2: On Kant's knowledge of Leibniz metaphysics: A reply to Garber | Stefan Storrie - www.enganchecubano.com

This volume is a critical edition of the ten-year correspondence () between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, one of Europe's most influential early modern thinkers, and Bartholomew Des Bosses, a Jesuit theologian who was keen to bring together Leibniz's philosophy and the Aristotelian philosophy and religious doctrines accepted by his order.

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Sanderson, the Archbishop of Canterbury For a start, Sanderson was never Archbishop of Canterbury; but this is evidently a slip, because in a note to this claim the relevant archbishop is correctly identified as Sancroft. In fact, however, the claim is false. Nine English bishops refused the oath. One Irish bishop, all the Scottish bishops, and nearly all the Scottish episcopal priests also refused. As Carroll recognizes, about four hundred of the English parochial clergy also refused. Altogether the nonjurors were much more prominent and influential than one might think from reading this book. I suppose it can be defended on a liberal interpretation of "about. There are a few typographical errors, but there are some other minor things in the text that must be intentional. One that I cannot understand at all is the use of "[sic]"--and not even consistently--in quotations from seventeenth-century texts. Anyone who has ever read any text from the period knows that the spelling is rarely even internally consistent, let alone what modern conventions would demand. Seldom does this cause the modern reader any serious problem. This kind of thing is doubtless harmless, but one cannot help wondering what its point could be. This is a complex book, which in effect falls into two parts. He gives particular attention to chapters. The central concept of the first five chapters is that of expression. The author stresses the distinction, drawn in "Quid sit Idea," between two types of expressions: Examples of the latter sort are "the expressions that come about by means of words or symbols" Gerhardt, IS, 7: Mugnai begins by remarking, quite correctly, that Leibniz thought that ordinary language has a natural basis pp. Mugnai seems to take this as meaning that natural languages involve the first kind of expression that which has a "basis in nature" and artificial language the second. Leibniz need not deny that natural You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

3: G. W. Leibniz resources

Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May This volume is a critical edition of the ten-year correspondence () between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, one of Europe's most influential early modern thinkers, and Bartholomew Des Bosses, a Jesuit theologian who was keen to bring together Leibniz's philosophy and the Aristotelian philosophy and.

Text with Running Commentary 39 Appendix 1. Leibniz to Nicole Remond: Appendix on Monads Glossary of Terms Questions for Further Study Further Reading Index Acknowledgements I would like to extend my warmest thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Edinburgh University Press for feedback on the entire manuscript. Parts of the commentary were incorporated into a talk given to members of the Oxford Philosophical Society in November I would like to thank everyone present for their comments, and especially Julia Weckend for her insightful discussion on a number of topics, and for feedback on parts of the commentary. A draft of the whole commentary was used as the basis of discussion for a reading group on monadologies at the University of Edinburgh in January and February The feedback I received was very helpful, and I would like to thank the members of that group for their careful reading of the commentary: My thanks are also due to Daniel J. Cook for helpful feedback on a draft of the introductory essay, and to R. Rockingham-Gill for comments and guidance on the Structure of the Monadology. Thanks also to Sean Greenberg and R. Sleight Jr, who allowed me to consult a draft of parts of their new translation of the Theodicy forthcoming with the Oxford University Press. The exercise of comparing their translation with mine was very beneficial, and allowed me to improve my translation of some of the sections of the Theodicy included in this volume. I acknowledge with gratitude the permission granted by the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek, Hanover, to use a scan of the first page of the manuscript of the Monadology on the cover of this volume. Thanks also to Tim Clark, who copy edited the typescript. In the commentary, when referring to translated material contained within this volume, the following abbreviations are used: Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 8 series, each divided into multiple volumes Berlin: Yale University Press, Gerhardt, 7 vols Hildesheim: Paul Lodge New Haven: Woolhouse and Richard Francks Oxford: Oxford University Press, Mary Morris and G. Jonathan Bennett and Peter Remnant Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber Indianapolis: Leroy Loemker, 2nd edn Dordrecht: Gaston Grua, 2 volumes with successive pagination Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, It is difficult not to be struck by both its scope and its size, and in particular the apparent disparity between the two. In the entire history of philosophy there is little else like it. Great philosophers, as a rule, have sought to present their thought to the public through the medium of books, often ones of great length: While Leibniz did write book-length works of philosophy, he was not a natural book writer, and preferred to capture and disseminate his thought via shorter writings. These became so familiar to him that even in later life he was said to be able to recite the poems of Virgil from memory. He entered the University of Leipzig at the age of fifteen, and obtained the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy in 1696, at the age of seventeen, and a Masters degree a year later. In 1697, in an attempt to divert war between France and the Netherlands, Leibniz wrote a lengthy memoir recommending that the King of France, Louis XIV, commit himself instead to an invasion of Egypt, presenting the plan as a seventeenth-century crusade against the Turks. Due to the opportunities afforded by what was at the time the intellectual capital of Europe, Leibniz chose to remain in Paris for almost four years. In Hanover, Leibniz was initially appointed a Court Councillor, though his duties were various. Leibniz, *Logico-Philosophical Puzzles in the Law*, trans. Leibniz initially hoped that the history could be completed relatively quickly, within a couple of years, but it soon got away from him: Yet he did still find time for such projects. He lobbied tirelessly for the establishment of scientific academies, and in 1700 was rewarded for his efforts with the foundation of the Berlin Academy of Sciences of which Leibniz was subsequently made president for life. He created calculating machines, drew up plans for the development of a universal encyclopaedia that would contain everything that was so far known, wrote Latin poetry, funded alchemical research, and undertook studies on the origin of languages. That Leibniz managed to find the time for such an astonishing number and range of intellectual projects may in part be due to his not having the demands of family life he never married, but was said to be "by some of his earliest

biographers at least seem to have fathered a son in his youth. Following a short illness, he died in Hanover on 14 November at the age of seventy. Consequently, his philosophising along with his other intellectual endeavours had to be carried out in his spare time, around his official duties. But pressures of time aside, by his own confession, he simply did not have the inclination to write a lengthy treatise that brought all the parts of his philosophical system together: Without the time or inclination to lay out his philosophy in books, Leibniz instead took full advantage of alternative means of circulating and publicising his ideas, in particular the letter and the journal article. In addition to letters, Leibniz also sought to promulgate his ideas through short articles in learned journals. This gave Leibniz the opportunity to disseminate his ideas in a way that had not been available to earlier philosophers. So keen was Leibniz on the very idea of the learned journal that he proposed the establishment of one in Germany. Although his own plans did not come to fruition, a German journal entitled *Acta eruditorum* *Chronicles of the Learned* was nevertheless established in by two of his university friends. Leibniz also put his weight behind another journal, the *Miscellanea Berolinensia* *Miscellaneous matters from Berlin*, which was the journal of the Berlin Academy of Sciences: Over the course of his career Leibniz published well over a hundred articles, on a kaleidoscope of subjects: Leibniz fully embraced the format of the journal article: Despite the challenges presented by the restricted length, it was the format with which Leibniz was most comfortable. The beginnings of the first thread are to be found in 5 G. Leibniz there explains his approach to philosophy, and offers a very brief and possibly apocryphal account of his philosophical development: I have tried to uncover and unite the truth buried and scattered in the opinions of different philosophical sects, and I believe I have added something of my own to take a few steps forward. The circumstances of my studies, from my earliest youth, have given me some facility in this. I learned Aristotle as a lad, and even the Scholastics did not put me off; I am not at all regretful of this even now. But at that time Plato too, and Plotinus, gave me some satisfaction, not to mention other ancient thinkers whom I consulted later. After leaving the trivial schools, I fell upon the moderns, and I remember at the age of fifteen taking a walk by myself in a grove on the outskirts of Leipzig, called the Rosental, in order to deliberate about whether I should retain substantial forms. Mechanism finally prevailed and led me to apply myself to mathematics. It is true that I did not enter into its depths until after I had conversed with Mr Huygens in Paris. But when I looked for the ultimate reasons for mechanism, and for the laws of motion themselves, I was very surprised to see that it was impossible to find them in mathematics, and that I should have to return to metaphysics. This is what led me back to entelechies, and from the material to the formal, and ultimately brought me to understand, after a number of corrections and improvements to my notions, that monads, or simple substances, are the only true substances, and that material things are only phenomena, albeit well-founded and well-connected. Mr Remond, councillor of His Royal Highness the Duke of Orleans, thinks very highly of my Theodicy, and is asking me for clarifications. It would be easier for me to give them if difficulties, objections, comments or questions were raised about it, for without that passages are sometimes clarified in which others find no difficulties. The poem evidently made an impact on Leibniz, who was inspired to compose one of his own, appending it to his letter to Remond of 14 March. The Leibnizian part of the poem ends with the claim that God, the ruler of the best world, has arranged things in such a way that actions bring about their own punishments and rewards. Mimesis, pp. According to Fraguier, in order to treat such matters successfully, it would be necessary for the poet to have a mastery of the sublime material that was so thorough that he would be able to present it in verse as clearly as he could sensible things. For that, he would have to have each proposition expressed with the utmost precision, without metaphor, and like the axioms of geometers; he would have to have the most immediate and most indirect consequences of these propositions, and he would have to use them to explain the passions and the natural effects. But I am some way from being in that position, and my mind furnishes me almost only with objections that I cannot resolve, because I do not yet know the points well enough. He [Fraguier] finally got me to agree that he had spoken fairly when he compared the knowledge we have of your system of monads to the knowledge that we would have of the sun just from single rays escaping from the clouds covering it. He began the letter with this apology: I hoped to enclose with this letter some clarification on monads that you apparently requested, but it has grown under my hand, and many distractions have prevented me from finishing it already. And you know, Sir, that these

sorts of considerations require contemplation. If through some clarifications I could contribute to encouraging him to implement the plan he apparently has, to give substance and colour to thoughts about the most sublime philosophy, I would have rendered a great service to mankind. Fraguier had in fact made a different but presumably related request of Leibniz the previous year, again through a third party. Leibniz certainly seems to have conceived these as two distinct requests: Whatever Leibniz had in mind, from the extant manuscripts it is clear that he devoted a great deal of time and energy to the text, but ultimately, for reasons at which we can only speculate, he decided not to send it to Remond. Whatever the reason for this might have been and again, we can do little more than speculate Leibniz appears not to have been so dissatisfied with the text as to keep it from everyone, as he allowed certain of his correspondents in Vienna to have access to early drafts of the text. Body, Substance, Monad Oxford: Oxford University Press, , p. Presses Universitaires de France, , pp. The source used for this translation was a different early draft of the text, which is now lost. Evidently it consisted of ninety-two sections rather than the ninety found in all surviving manuscript copies of the text, but is otherwise very similar to one of the surviving early draft manuscripts. The copy of the Monadology used for this translation consisted of ninety-three sections, but is otherwise similar to one of the surviving early draft manuscripts. Leibniz, Opera omnia, ed. Dutens, 6 vols Geneva, , vol. Leibniz, Opera philosophica omnia, ed. Erdman Berlin, , pp. Leibniz, Oeuvres de Leibniz. Jacques, new edn Paris: Charpentier, , pp. Leibniz, Oeuvres philosophiques de Leibniz. Ladrangé, , pp.

4: 20th WCP: Unity and Reality in Leibniz's Correspondence with Des Bosses

A critical edition of the ten-year correspondence () between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, one of Europe's most influential early modern thinkers, and Bartholomew Des Bosses, a Jesuit.

Friedrich noted in his family journal: On Sunday 21 June [NS: He was given free access to it from the age of seven. He also composed hexameters of Latin verse , in a single morning, for a special event at school at the age of He defended his Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui Metaphysical Disputation on the Principle of Individuation , [28] which addressed the principle of individuation , on 9 June He published and defended a dissertation Specimen Quaestionum Philosophicarum ex Jure collectarum An Essay of Collected Philosophical Problems of Right , [28] arguing for both a theoretical and a pedagogical relationship between philosophy and law, in December He next declined the offer of an academic appointment at Altdorf, saying that "my thoughts were turned in an entirely different direction". Many posthumously published editions of his writings presented his name on the title page as " Freiherr G. Leibniz then dedicated an essay on law to the Elector in the hope of obtaining employment. The stratagem worked; the Elector asked Leibniz to assist with the redrafting of the legal code for the Electorate. Although von Boyneburg died late in , Leibniz remained under the employment of his widow until she dismissed him in He published an essay, under the pseudonym of a fictitious Polish nobleman, arguing unsuccessfully for the German candidate for the Polish crown. Leibniz proposed to protect German-speaking Europe by distracting Louis as follows. France would be invited to take Egypt as a stepping stone towards an eventual conquest of the Dutch East Indies. In return, France would agree to leave Germany and the Netherlands undisturbed. In , the French government invited Leibniz to Paris for discussion, [40] but the plan was soon overtaken by the outbreak of the Franco-Dutch War and became irrelevant. Soon after arriving, he met Dutch physicist and mathematician Christiaan Huygens and realised that his own knowledge of mathematics and physics was patchy. With Huygens as his mentor, he began a program of self-study that soon pushed him to making major contributions to both subjects, including discovering his version of the differential and integral calculus. He met Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld , the leading French philosophers of the day, and studied the writings of Descartes and Pascal , unpublished as well as published. He met with the Royal Society where he demonstrated a calculating machine that he had designed and had been building since The machine was able to execute all four basic operations adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing , and the society quickly made him an external member. Leibniz promptly returned to Paris and not, as had been planned, to Mainz. In this regard, a invitation from the John Frederick of Brunswick to visit Hanover proved to have been fateful. Leibniz had declined the invitation, but had begun corresponding with the duke in In , the duke offered Leibniz the post of counsellor. Leibniz very reluctantly accepted the position two years later, only after it became clear that no employment in Paris, whose intellectual stimulation he relished, or with the Habsburg imperial court, was forthcoming. He left Paris in October House of Hanover, â€"[edit] This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. On the journey from London to Hanover, Leibniz stopped in The Hague where he met van Leeuwenhoek , the discoverer of microorganisms. He also spent several days in intense discussion with Spinoza , who had just completed his masterwork, the Ethics. Leibniz served three consecutive rulers of the House of Brunswick as historian, political adviser, and most consequentially, as librarian of the ducal library. He thenceforth employed his pen on all the various political, historical, and theological matters involving the House of Brunswick; the resulting documents form a valuable part of the historical record for the period. Leibniz began promoting a project to use windmills to improve the mining operations in the Harz Mountains. This project did little to improve mining operations and was shut down by Duke Ernst August in To each of these women he was correspondent, adviser, and friend. In turn, they all approved of Leibniz more than did their spouses and the future king George I of Great Britain. Leibniz played a role in the initiatives and negotiations leading up to that Act, but not always an effective one. For example, something he published anonymously in England, thinking to promote the Brunswick cause, was formally censured by the British

Parliament. The Brunswicks tolerated the enormous effort Leibniz devoted to intellectual pursuits unrelated to his duties as a courtier, pursuits such as perfecting calculus, writing about other mathematics, logic, physics, and philosophy, and keeping up a vast correspondence. He began working on calculus in 1684; the earliest evidence of its use in his surviving notebooks is 1686. By then he had a coherent system in hand, but did not publish it until 1702. That journal played a key role in advancing his mathematical and scientific reputation, which in turn enhanced his eminence in diplomacy, history, theology, and philosophy. The Elector Ernest Augustus commissioned Leibniz to write a history of the House of Brunswick, going back to the time of Charlemagne or earlier, hoping that the resulting book would advance his dynastic ambitions. From 1690 to 1695, Leibniz traveled extensively in Germany, Austria, and Italy, seeking and finding archival materials bearing on this project. Leibniz never finished the project, in part because of his huge output on many other fronts, but also because he insisted on writing a meticulously researched and erudite book based on archival sources, when his patrons would have been quite happy with a short popular book, one perhaps little more than a genealogy with commentary, to be completed in three years or less. They never knew that he had in fact carried out a fair part of his assigned task: In 1717, while traveling in northern Europe, the Russian Tsar Peter the Great stopped in Hanover and met Leibniz, who then took some interest in Russian matters for the rest of his life. In 1713, Leibniz began a two-year residence in Vienna, where he was appointed Imperial Court Councillor to the Habsburgs. Even though Leibniz had done much to bring about this happy event, it was not to be his hour of glory. Despite the intercession of the Princess of Wales, Caroline of Ansbach, George I forbade Leibniz to join him in London until he completed at least one volume of the history of the Brunswick family his father had commissioned nearly 30 years earlier. Moreover, for George I to include Leibniz in his London court would have been deemed insulting to Newton, who was seen as having won the calculus priority dispute and whose standing in British official circles could not have been higher. Finally, his dear friend and defender, the Dowager Electress Sophia, died in 1702. Death[edit] Leibniz died in Hanover in 1703. Even though Leibniz was a life member of the Royal Society and the Berlin Academy of Sciences, neither organization saw fit to honor his death. His grave went unmarked for more than 50 years. Leibniz was eulogized by Fontenelle, before the French Academy of Sciences in Paris, which had admitted him as a foreign member in 1702. The eulogy was composed at the behest of the Duchess of Orleans, a niece of the Electress Sophia. Personal life[edit] Leibniz never married. In his diplomatic endeavors, he at times verged on the unscrupulous, as was all too often the case with professional diplomats of his day. On several occasions, Leibniz backdated and altered personal manuscripts, actions which put him in a bad light during the calculus controversy. On the other hand, he was charming, well-mannered, and not without humor and imagination. He never admitted the Protestant view of Pope as an Antichrist. Leibniz dated his beginning as a philosopher to his Discourse on Metaphysics, which he composed in 1686 as a commentary on a running dispute between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld. This led to an extensive and valuable correspondence with Arnauld; [56] it and the Discourse were not published until the 19th century. The Monadologie, composed in 1714 and published posthumously, consists of 90 aphorisms. Unlike Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz had a thorough university education in philosophy. He was influenced by his Leipzig professor Jakob Thomasius, who also supervised his BA thesis in philosophy. Leibniz was deeply interested in the new methods and conclusions of Descartes, Huygens, Newton, and Boyle, but viewed their work through a lens heavily tinted by scholastic notions. Leibniz variously invoked one or another of seven fundamental philosophical Principles: If a proposition is true, then its negation is false and vice versa. Two distinct things cannot have all their properties in common. If every predicate possessed by x is also possessed by y and vice versa, then entities x and y are identical; to suppose two things indiscernible is to suppose the same thing under two names. It has attracted the most controversy and criticism, especially from corpuscular philosophy and quantum mechanics. *Natura non facit saltus* [62] literally, "Nature does not make jumps". He proposes his theory that the universe is made of an infinite number of simple substances known as monads. These simple substances or monads are the "ultimate units of existence in nature". Monads have no parts but still exist by the qualities that they have. These qualities are continuously changing over time, and each monad is unique. They are also not affected by time and are subject to only creation and annihilation. Using the principle of reasoning, Leibniz concluded that the first reason of all things is God. The contingent

world must have some necessary reason for its existence. Leibniz uses a geometry book as an example to explain his reasoning. If this book was copied from an infinite chain of copies, there must be a some reason for the content of the book. The ontological essence of a monad is its irreducible simplicity. Unlike atoms, monads possess no material or spatial character. They also differ from atoms by their complete mutual independence, so that interactions among monads are only apparent. Instead, by virtue of the principle of pre-established harmony , each monad follows a preprogrammed set of "instructions" peculiar to itself, so that a monad "knows" what to do at each moment. By virtue of these intrinsic instructions, each monad is like a little mirror of the universe. Monads need not be "small"; e. Monads are purported to have gotten rid of the problematic: Theodicy and optimism[edit] Further information: Best of all possible worlds and Philosophical optimism The Theodicy [70] tries to justify the apparent imperfections of the world by claiming that it is optimal among all possible worlds. It must be the best possible and most balanced world, because it was created by an all powerful and all knowing God, who would not choose to create an imperfect world if a better world could be known to him or possible to exist. In effect, apparent flaws that can be identified in this world must exist in every possible world, because otherwise God would have chosen to create the world that excluded those flaws. Leibniz asserted that the truths of theology religion and philosophy cannot contradict each other, since reason and faith are both "gifts of God" so that their conflict would imply God contending against himself. Because reason and faith must be entirely reconciled, any tenet of faith which could not be defended by reason must be rejected. Leibniz then approached one of the central criticisms of Christian theism:

5: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - Wikipedia

Leibniz Cursus Vitae Date Location Text Comment January Vienna 3 letter to Bourguet (G) 10 letter to Coste (G) letter to Remond (G).

From Maria Rosa Antognazza, *Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography*, , pp xvii-xxvii. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is born in Leipzig Saxony. Leibniz begins his studies at the University of Leipzig. Enrolment for the summer semester at the University of Jena Saxony. Return to Leipzig for the beginning of the winter semester. *Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria*. End of September Enrolment in the law faculty of the University of Altdorf, situated within the territories of the imperial free city of Nuremberg. Discussion of the thesis for the licence and the doctorate in law *Disputatio de Casibus perplexis in Jure*. Leibniz leaves Nuremberg, intending to undertake a European grand tour via the Rhine and Holland. Leibniz in Frankfurt; visit to the nearby Catholic archiepiscopal seat in Mainz. End of "early First encounters with Baron Johann Christian von Boineburg. Letter to his former teacher, Jakob Thomasius. New edition with introduction by Leibniz of Mario Nizolio, *Antibarbarus seu de veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos*. *Theoria motus abstracti* and *Hypothesis physica nova*. Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf. *Directiones ad rem Medicam pertinentes*. Departure for Paris, where Leibniz arrives at the end of March. First meeting with Christiaan Huygens. Intensive mathematical work, especially on the summation of series. Autumn of "early End January"end February First visit to London. First personal encounter with Heinrich Oldenburg, secretary to the Royal Society. Beginning of March Leibniz back in Paris. Leibniz elected Fellow of the Royal Society. Leibniz dismissed by the widow of the late Baron Boineburg. Leibniz accepts the offer of Duke Johann Friedrich of Hanover to enter his service. Invention of the infinitesimal calculus, prepared by a series of mathematical studies and results achieved after his return from London. *De Summa Rerum* including the dialogue *Pacidius Philaleti*. Second visit to London. Arrival in Hanover to assume the duties of court counsellor and librarian to Duke Johann Friedrich. Letter to Duke Johann Friedrich: Leibniz suggests the investigation of a possible link between the Guelf house and the ancient Italian noble family of Este. Leibniz relaunches his encyclopaedic plan of the *Demonstrationes Catholicae* letter of the autumn of to Duke Johann Friedrich ; introduces the idea of a *scientia generalis* and a demonstrative or inventive encyclopaedia; writes a ground-breaking study on the notion of force in which he quantifies force as the product of mass m and the square of speed v^2 *De corporum concursu*, January ; starts developing a *characteristica geometrica* or analysis situs and a dyadic or binary arithmetic; writes a cluster of key logical papers providing the basis of a logical calculus April ; lays the foundations for an advanced philosophy of probability *De incerti aestimatione*, September ; proposes the creation of new ways of organising scientific research and learned societies to collaborate on the encyclopaedic task. Beginning of his involvement in the Harz mines. Death of Duke Johann Friedrich. Series of practical proposals to Ernst August, including the introduction of an official medical system and state provision of education. Heavy involvement in the Harz mines: Leibniz makes thirty-one separate trips to the Harz and spends at least weeks there out of a total of Invention of determinants and discovery of their properties. Collapse of the Harz project. Leibniz charged with writing the Guelf history. Leibniz writes four fundamental texts in physics, metaphysics, theology, and logic: End of October Departure for southern Germany. Two-week stay in Rheinfels, visiting one of his most trusted friends and correspondents, Landgraf Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels. Leibniz hosted for several days by Christian Knorr von Rosenroth in Sulzbach. End of March After a number of stops and detours including a meeting in Graupen, Bohemia, with his long-standing friend, Johann Daniel Crafft, and two weeks in Regensburg , Leibniz arrives at his original main destination: End of April Leibniz decides to visit the Este archives in Modena Italy. On 29 April he leaves Munich for Vienna. Leibniz arrives in Vienna where he stays until February ; audience with Emperor Leopold I October and several meetings on ecclesiastical reunification with Bishop Rojas. Leibniz receives permission from the duke of Modena to visit the Este archives. Leibniz in Venice until the end of the month. Leibniz arrives in Rome. Beginning of May Leibniz back in Rome, where he stays until 20 November ; participation in meetings of the *Accademia Fisico-Matematica*. Second half of July *Phoronomus seu de*

potentia et legibus naturae. *Dynamica de Potentia et Legibus Naturae Corporeae*. Leibniz leaves Florence for Bologna. Leibniz leaves Bologna, finally headed for the official destination of his Italian trip: Consultation of the Este archives. Leibniz leaves Modena on 2 February. Visit to the tombs of the ancient Este family in the monastery of Vangadizza at Badia Polesine, near Rovigo. Leibniz discovers the exact connection between the Este and Guelf houses. Meetings with Michel Angelo Fardella. Leibniz leaves Venice on 24 March. End of April – mid-May Leibniz back in Hanover. Correspondence with Paul Pellisson-Fontanier on religious toleration. Several outlines of the Guelf history, notably a *Brevis synopsis historiae Guelficae*. Leibniz plans to complete the history by Letter of Nicolas Fatio de Duillier to Huygens, claiming that Leibniz has derived his calculus from Newton without acknowledging his debt. Renewed involvement in the Harz mines. Publication of the *Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus*. Antonio Alberti alias Amable de Turreil informs Leibniz that he could be offered the custodianship of the Vatican Library if he converts to Catholicism. Elevation to the position of privy counsellor of justice *Geheimer Justizrat*. *De rerum originatione radicali*. Leibniz comments on the dispute between John Locke and Edward Stillingfleet. Death of Ernst August. Leibniz spends extended periods of time in Berlin some twenty-four months in total, establishing an exceptionally close bond with Sophie Charlotte, electress of Brandenburg and sister of Georg Ludwig. Correspondence with Burchard de Volder. A mathematical treatise by Nicolas Fatio de Duillier raises the suspicion that Leibniz plagiarized his calculus from Newton. End of October – mid-December Leibniz in Vienna following a summons from Emperor Leopold for further talks on the reunification of the Catholic and Protestant churches. The Act of Settlement is presented to the dowager Electress Sophie, sanctioning the Protestant succession to the English crown through the Hanoverian line. *Lettre touchant ce qui est independant des Sens et de la Matiere*, addressed to Sophie Charlotte. Beginning of June Summer of – summer of Leibniz in Dresden to promote the idea of founding a Society of Sciences in Saxony. Correspondence with Christian Wolff. Correspondence with Bartholomew Des Bosses, including from discussion of the *vinculum substantiale*. Publication of the first volume of *Scriptores rerum Brunsvicensium*; two further volumes follow in and

6: Project MUSE - Astrazione e realtà : Saggio su Leibniz (review)

60 Leibniz to Des Bosses 10 January (pp.) Two major causes have delayed my journey.

Critical Notice of Daniel Garber, Leibniz: This agreement with Kant has not been lost on the scholars involved in the debate. This notion is incompatible with a pure monadology because it involves the idea that monads are not sufficient to account for the nature of corporeal substance. However, what Garber believes is that it: Both of these arguments are highly problematic. With regards to the first point, Garber states that: Nor could it have been any other way. So for me, as a scholar of early-modern thought, the question is really the way in which Kant distorted the history of early-modern thought. In saying this, I do not mean to blame Kant for having committed any intellectual misdeed. My interest as an historian of early-modern philosophy is just to set the record straight. On the face of it, the claim that the fact that Kant was not a historian of philosophy supports the contention that Kant read Leibniz as he was taught him is puzzling. Kant began publishing serious philosophical work That is like someone publishing philosophy in referring to philosophical work from the s. It is true that Leibniz was mentioned in some works on the history of philosophy at the time that Kant was aware of, such as the highly influential Brucker, J. *Historia Critica Philosophiae*, 5 vol. This is surely true, but mere subtlety, Leibniz says bodies are substantial phenomena, they appear to be substances, but only the parts are. He presumably had another sense here than which Wolff and the author impute to him, otherwise he could well have kept this to himself, that can easily be comprehended by anyone. Nevertheless, it appears that Baumgarten is here presented as attacking Leibniz on the ground that the latter calls bodies substances. The problem, as Baumgarten sees it, is that a body is a composite of substances and therefore is not properly substantial because composition is an accident. At the end of this passage it also becomes clear that Kant attributes this criticism also to Wolff. If Leibniz says that bodies are substances, what he means is that they are substantial phenomena, that is, that bodies are grounded in simple substances, as phenomena of monads with the power of representation. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Baumgarten is not mentioned here. Following from the above citation his paper continues: Therefore, Kant would have been oblivious of the realist element in Leibniz middle period and the pluralist conception of metaphysics in the latter part of the Des Bosses correspondence. Beside the works that were indisputably well-known in the first half of the s, the *Theodicy* , the *Monadology* written and published and the articles he published in widely circulated journals, such as *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas* , *A Specimen of Dynamics* , *New System* , and *On Nature Itself* , it will be helpful to divide the material into the following four categories: Then, turning to what Garber takes to be most central, 3 the Arnauld correspondence and 4 the Des Bosses correspondence. *Otium Hanoveranum, sive Miscellanea*, Leipzig. Garber only mentions the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. The correspondence with Bierling is from and so during what Garber understands as the idealist phase. However, the Bernoulli correspondence is highly significant. The first nine exchanges between Leibniz and de Volder, which took place between 5 July and 6 December , are letters between Leibniz and Bernoulli and in this way the early part of the de Volder correspondence is in fact included in the correspondence with Bernoulli. *Epistolae Ad Diversos*, Leipzig. *Oeuvres philosophiques*, Amsterdam and Leipzig. *Oeuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld*, 43 vol. In fact, even though it included one letter less than the now standard edition of the correspondence that we have in Gerhardt it should probably be considered a superior edition. As Look and Rutherford explains: The result is an edition of uneven quality. In particular, the letters to Arnauld from and , the correspondence with Bernoulli, part of the de Volder 23 Dutens, L. *Gothofredi Guillelmi Leibnitii Opera Omnia*, 6 vol. *Die Philosophischen Schriften*, 7 vols. While Garber is correct in stating that the *Discourse on Metaphysics* and *Primary Truths* were not available to Kant, all his other claims about unavailable texts are either subject to qualification, or are false. Conclusion The aim of this paper has been limited to a historical point about the availability of texts. Of course, it does not follow that Kant in fact was acquainted with any of the works listed under 2 - 4. Lesser known texts and correspondences were also available. Schulenburg dated March 29, *Mathematischer Beweis der Erschaffung und Ordnung der Welt*, Leipzig, strongly suggesting that Kant must have consulted one of these two works.

7: The Leibniz-Des Bosses correspondence | Arlington Public Library

Leibniz's correspondence with the Jesuit theologian and philosopher Bartholomew Des Bosses is one of the richest sources of Leibniz's mature philosophical thought. Occupying the last ten years of.

The Ideal Form of Metaphysics Leibniz conceived of metaphysics as an a priori demonstrative science. Leibniz thought that truth consisted in conceptual containment: This implies that all metaphysical truths are conceptual truths. Leibniz thought that a concept could be defined by analyzing it into simpler component concepts. The universal characteristic would allow one to express in a purely formal manner the composition of any concept on the basis of a set of primitive concepts. He made impressive progress on the project during his career, though he fell well short of attaining his lofty ideal. Leibniz then argues in the voice of The Philosopher: If all happiness is harmonious as demonstrated, and all harmony is known by God by the definition of God, and all experience of harmony is a delight by the definition of delight, it follows that all happiness is pleasing to God. Therefore by the definition of love assumed previously God loves everyone, and, accordingly by the definition of the just God is just A VI. These texts include definitions of key metaphysical concepts and many informal demonstrations of metaphysical propositions. In Leibniz quickly composed a work that was closer to the ideal of a demonstrative science of metaphysics than anything he had written to date *De Affectibus* AVI. It contained a long list of definitions of key terms along with some demonstrations of metaphysical principles and theses. By Leibniz had developed a logical calculus for expressing identity and inclusion relations among concepts. Around this time, however, Leibniz began to doubt whether it was possible to discover absolutely primitive concepts. He also did not succeed in developing his purely formal system of representation, the universal characteristic. Without primitive concepts or the universal characteristic it was not possible for Leibniz to attain his ideal of a fully demonstrative metaphysics. It is plausible to think that Leibniz could nevertheless have completed a work that was an approximation of the ideal, written in Latin and using non-primitive concepts. Leibniz insisted throughout his later years that he could complete a work along these lines. And in Leibniz writes to Biber: But Leibniz never did unfold his entire system, even in this less ambitious form. In one of his earliest philosophical works, a very opinionated preface to an edition of a book by Marius Nizolius, Leibniz distinguishes between esoteric and exoteric modes of philosophizing. In this text he claims that the notion of demonstration provides the line of demarcation between the esoteric and exoteric modes. In this and other texts Leibniz equates the esoteric mode of philosophizing with the geometrical model of demonstration, as briefly described above. We have already seen that Leibniz never completed a work in metaphysics that was in strict accordance with the geometrical model of demonstration. It is important to recognize, however, that there are degrees of exoteric discourse. Esoteric Form and Esoteric Content Leibniz advocated the geometrical model of demonstration as the ideal form for metaphysics throughout his career. He claimed later in his career that he had all the materials at hand to compose a work that was a close approximation of the ideal. Yet such a work he did not compose. Why did Leibniz not make more progress on this task, which would seem to be of such great importance? Leibniz often mentioned his lack of free time as the reason for not completing an esoteric treatise. But this seems to provide an incomplete explanation of the situation. Though his extra-philosophical duties were numerous and burdensome, he made the time to write quite a lot on metaphysical subjects. If he thought that the geometrical model of demonstration was indeed the ideal form for metaphysics, one cannot help but wonder why he did not find the time to begin composing such a work. It is likely that there were several additional factors that led Leibniz to compose exoteric rather than esoteric works. The remarks occur in the context of a discussion of the precision or lack thereof in natural language: If anyone wants to write like a mathematician in metaphysics or moral philosophy there is nothing to prevent him from rigorously doing so; some have announced that they would do this, and have promised us mathematical demonstrations outside mathematics, but it is extremely seldom that anyone has succeeded. I believe that people are repelled by the amount of trouble they would have to take for a tiny number of readers: Yet I think that if anyone did go about it in the right way, he would have no reason to regret his labour. I have been tempted to try it myself RB: In this intriguing text Leibniz through

the voice of Theophilus notes that few people have tried to write in the esoteric mode, and even fewer if any have succeeded in the endeavor. He also suggests several reasons that authors avoid esoteric expositions. Esoteric texts are both difficult to compose and unlikely to attract readers, presumably because of their intimidating formal apparatus. And what is the point of writing a text that no one is going to read? This point is also emphasized by Leibniz in a letter to Burnett: He does, however, provide some important additional remarks on esoteric philosophy earlier in the text. In the Preface he points out some key differences between his philosophy and the philosophy of Locke: His is closer to Aristotle and mine to Plato, although each of us parts company at many points from the teachings of both of these ancient writers. He is more popular [populaire] whereas I am sometimes forced to be a little more esoteric [acroamatique] and abstractâ€”which is no advantage for me, particularly when writing in a living language Preface to the New Essays, RB: The ordinary person, for example, is unlikely to believe that bodies are aggregates of an infinity of immaterial mind-like entities a thesis that Leibniz affirms on a number of occasions. This puts Leibniz at a significant disadvantage when it comes to presenting his philosophy to the general public. In some of his letters to trusted correspondents Leibniz makes this point in even stronger terms. Consider, for example, what Leibniz writes to Pierre Bayle in For I write not so much to make an impression as to investigate the truth, which it is often useless, and even harmful, to publishâ€”on account of the uninitiated [des profanes], who are incapable of appreciating it, and quite capable of taking it the wrong way G 3: These are striking words. His point, as additional texts will make clear, is that he thinks it is often useless and harmful to straightforwardly present the content of his metaphysics to the public and even to trusted correspondents. He thought that the ideal form for metaphysics was the esoteric mode of presentation. However, he knew that few people were inclined to read texts presented in the esoteric mode due to their daunting formal structure. Even worse, Leibniz thought that the content of his philosophy was such that most people were likely to misunderstand it in fundamental ways. How then would it be possible for him to communicate his views to the public? An answer to this question is suggested in some unpublished remarks appended to metaphysical notes that Leibniz wrote in I have divided it into several parts for ease of reference: For thus this metaphysics will be able to be received. Leibniz suggests a strategy of selective omission, not to permanently hide the controversial features of his philosophy, but as part of a longer-term strategy of preparing his readers to understand his most esoteric doctrines. In [d] he suggests a complementary strategy of supplementation. In subsequent works he can explicitly draw the conclusions that may have only been implicit in the initial text. Consider, for example, what he writes to Fontenelle in The true metaphysics, or philosophy, if you will, does not appear to me any less important than geometry, especially if there is also a way of introducing into it demonstrations, which until now have been entirely excluded from it, along with the calculus that will be necessary in order to give them all the entry they need. However, it is necessary to prepare readers with exoteric writings. The journals have served me well until now FC 1: Consider what Leibniz writes to correspondent Nicolas Remond in In the Leipzig journal [Acta Eruditorum] I adapt myself to the language of the schools, in the others I adapt myself more to the style of Cartesians, and in this latest piece I try to express myself in a way that could be understood by those who are not yet very accustomed to the style of one or the other G 3: He thinks that using language that is familiar with his readers is a good way to make his views seem not too far removed from received opinions. This is not merely a feature of his published writings. Leibniz tailors his writings in a similar way in his private correspondences. For example, in his correspondence with Jesuit theologian Bartholomew Des Bosses he frequently employs scholastic terminology, and in his correspondence with largely Cartesian physicist Burcher de Volder he sometimes presents his views with a Cartesian slant. To use a more concrete example, early in the correspondence with de Volder, Leibniz appeals to the doctrine of continued divine creation, which he Leibniz regards as a central Cartesian tenet. Although he initially presents the doctrine in a way that makes it seem like this is a point of common doctrine between him and the Cartesians, it emerges later in the correspondence that Leibniz only affirms the doctrine in a qualified sense for a detailed discussion of this issue see Whipple The general strategy here is to use language that is familiar to the reader or correspondent and to emphasize initial points of agreement. Fine-grained differences and esoteric implications are typically avoided at the initial stages of engagement. The received opinions of a

Cartesian and the opinions of someone who was committed to a version of Aristotelian Scholasticism would be different in fundamental respects. When it comes to exoteric philosophy, one size does not fit all. Different strategies are required for people with different backgrounds and views. Eclecticism and Exoteric Philosophy

Leibniz is sometimes described as being an eclectic philosopher. There are different ways of understanding eclecticism, but the basic idea is that an eclectic philosopher is one who incorporates ideas from a wide range of sources. In certain places Leibniz characterizes himself as proceeding along these lines. He famously writes to Remond, for example, that: It is undeniable that Leibniz read from an extraordinary range of sources and that his thought was influenced by a number of these texts. Nuanced differences and radical implications may be left implicit or omitted entirely in his more exoteric works. One might put the point as follows. Leibniz is not merely finding ideas in other philosophers and incorporating them whole cloth into his philosophical system. In some cases, at least, Leibniz develops distinctive philosophical views and then seeks out similar ideas in his predecessors as a strategy for presenting his views to the public see Schepers and Mercer, This essay was published in in the *Journal des savants*. He prefaces the essay in the following way: Finally, since some important persons have desired to see my opinions further clarified, I have risked publishing these meditations, even though they are not at all popular [populaires], nor can they be appreciated by all sorts of minds. I have decided upon this mainly to profit from the judgments of persons enlightened in these matters, since it would be too troublesome to seek out and call individually upon all those who would be disposed to give me instructionâ€”which I shall always be glad to receive, provided that it contains the love of truth, rather than a passion for preconceived opinions G 4: First, the essay is clearly not written in accordance with the formal apparatus of definitions and demonstrations that is required in a strictly esoteric presentation. Second, and perhaps more significantly, Leibniz purposefully omits some of the most controversial features of his philosophical system in this essay. Leibniz wrote the *Discours* in It is best known for presenting the complete concept theory of substance.

8: Leibniz: Philosophical Essays - Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - Google Books

From the Letters to Des Bosses () Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason () The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology ()

A note on the text and translation. The role of correspondences. Leibniz and the Jesuits: China and the universal church. The union of soul and body. Composition and the unity of corporeal substance. The problem of transubstantiation. Leibniz on transubstantiation and the vinculum substantiale. The Leibnizdes- Bosses correspondence. Des Bosses to Leibniz, 25 January Leibniz to Des Bosses, 2 February Des Dosses to Leibniz, 12 February Leibniz to Des Bosses, 14 February Des Dosses to Leibniz, 2 March Leibniz to Des Bosses, 11 March Des Bosses to Leibniz, 21 May Leibniz to Des Bosses, 11 July Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 1 September Des Bosses to Leibniz, 17 September Leibniz to Des Bosses, 20 September Des Bosses to Leibniz, 29 September Leibniz to Des Bosses, 4 October Des Bosses to Leibniz, 14 October Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 October Leibniz to Des Bosses, 5 February Des Bosses to Leibniz, 25 June Leibniz to Des Bosses, 21 July Leibniz to Des Bosses, 3 September Leibniz to Des Bosses, 12 September Des Bosses to Leibniz, 5 October Leibniz to Des Bosses, mid-October Des Bosses to Leibniz, 14 February Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 March Des Bosses to Leibniz 22 April Leibniz to Des Bosses, 30 April Des Bosses to Leibniz, 30 July Leibniz to Des Bosses, 31 July Des Bosses to Leibniz, 6 September Leibniz to Des Bosses, 8 September Des Dosses to Leibniz, 18 January Des Dosses to Leibniz, 25 March Leibniz to Des Bosses, 2 May Des Bosses to Leibniz, 14 June Leibniz to Des Bosses, 2 July Des Bosses to Leibniz, 18 July Leibniz to Des Bosses, 4 August Des Dosses to Leibniz, 11 October Leibniz to Des Bosses, 7 November Des Bosses to Leibniz, 6 January Leibniz to Des Bosses, 8 February Des Bosses to Leibniz, 25 April Leibniz to Des Bosses, 8 July Des Bosses to Leibniz, 18 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 7 September Des Bosses to Leibniz, 28 January Leibniz to Des Bosses, 15 February Des Dosses to Leibniz, 20 May Leibniz to Des Bosses, 26 May Des Bosses to Leibniz, 12 June Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 June Des Bosses to Leibniz, 28 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 10 October Des Bosses to Leibniz, 12 December Leibniz to Des Bosses, 24 January Des Bosses to Leibniz, 8 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 23 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 10 January Des Bosses to Leibniz, 22 March Leibniz to Des Bosses, 21 April Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 September Leibniz to Des Bosses, 15 March Des Bosses to Leibniz, 6 April Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 April Leibniz to Des Bosses, 30 June Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 July Leibniz to Des Bosses, 19 August Leibniz to Des Bosses, 13 January Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May Few of the letters have been translated into English before.

9: Leibniz's Monadology: A New Translation and Guide | Lloyd Strickland - www.enganchecubano.com

The correspondence with Des Bosses has thus been taken to provide support for the interpretive thesis that Leibniz's mature ontology of finite substance countenances the existence of simple substances exclusively (but see Garber for an opposing view).

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