



soldiers in the field safe, provide law enforcement officials with an important tool for monitoring crime scenes, and offer search-and-rescue teams a way to rapidly survey an area hit by a natural disaster. If they fall into the wrong hands, however, they can be used for malicious purposes as well. Security concerns For most of the history of warfare, getting close enough to carefully scrutinize a target has often meant incurring the risk of becoming one. Armed drones upend this axiom by bringing weaponry close to a target while simultaneously providing high-resolution, real-time video to an operator kilometers away. In the hands of a responsible military this capability is a game-changing asset; in the hands of a rogue group it is a chilling threat. Much of the security infrastructure that exists today to limit access to sensitive locations has little effect against drones. UAVs can fly over fences and walls and can escape detection by traditional radar systems designed to track larger, passenger-bearing aircraft. Because they can be transported in the trunk of a car or in a backpack, they can be launched from any publicly accessible park, parking lot, city street, river or highway. Once airborne, a drone can arrive within minutes at any location within a few kilometers of the launch site. In short, there is no city, neighborhood or building on the planet that is beyond their reach. Ideally, access to drones would be limited to only those people and organizations that could be trusted to use them responsibly. In practice, however, attempts to limit their spread through nonproliferation efforts would face significant challenges. The core information technologies used in small drones—extremely small video cameras, chips to process video and high-speed wireless communications systems—are routinely found in inexpensive consumer electronics products. There is a large and growing set of do-it-yourself hobbyists who in some cases build remarkably sophisticated and capable drones. In addition, because drones are manufactured in many different countries and are increasingly available on the global market, efforts within any one country to limit their spread would have little global effect. And given their many legitimate nonmilitary uses in applications such as law enforcement, surveying and monitoring of infrastructure such as oil pipelines, banning their sale is impractical. Whereas the overwhelming majority of people who build or buy drones would never consider using them for harmful ends, as the number of UAVs and people who have related expertise continues to grow, it is inevitable that they will attract the attention of terrorist groups. In fact, they already have. The Colombian insurgent group FARC, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect that carried out the Tokyo subway attack, and al Qaeda have all reportedly considered the use of drones pdf pdf , although there is no evidence that any of these groups employed them in an actual attack. The security threat posed by drones has been considered before. In a U. An unclassified report issued by the federally-funded Institute for Defense Analyses pdf observed that a drone " could be fired from beyond visual range at a target while the terrorists make their escape before impact" and that there " would be little danger of detection in transportation, launch or escape. In the early s UAVs were typically considered jointly with cruise missiles in nonproliferation discussions. But times have changed. The future This does not mean, however, that there is nothing that can be done. Drones could be equipped with kill switches and hidden tracking software that would enable them to be disabled or traced if they go missing. An appropriate combination of domestic regulation and international nonproliferation efforts could help reduce, although not eliminate, the possibility that drones will fall into the wrong hands. It may be possible to equip sensitive government buildings and areas with new systems to detect and, if appropriate, electromagnetically or kinetically engage low-flying incoming drones. In the future we will no longer have the luxury of assuming that the skies above us are free of pilotless machines that might be used for to do us harm. Taking the right steps now can minimize that chance. He has over two decades of experience performing research on information technology, and has examined the intersection of civil liberties, privacy and information technology through the Brookings Institution.

## 2: National security - Wikipedia

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The Pentagon is working with South Korea, Japan and other countries to counter "the continued and growing threat from North Korea, its nuclear and missile programs, and its proliferation of related technology," the report said, adding that the U. On the nuclear threat, the report singled out missile programs as a major worry. The report said North Korea possesses one submarine-launched missile system, along with less than short-range Scud missiles and fewer than 50 mile-range Nodong missiles. An intermediate-range missile also is deployed. The North Koreans possess an unknown number of long-range TD-2 missiles like the one test-fired last weekend. Additionally, the North Korean military has at least six KN road-mobile missiles. The missile has been ground-tested extensively but has not been flight tested. Both the Taepodong and KN are assessed as having ranges greater than 3, miles. North Korea has said the TD-2 is a space launcher that placed a payload into orbit on Sunday. The report said that without a reentry vehicle capable of surviving the heat of reentry "North Korea cannot deliver a weapon to target from an ICBM. The North is believed to have an arsenal of between 10 and 20 nuclear warheads and has boasted of the capability of launching long-range nuclear missiles. In September, North Korea announced that nuclear facilities at Yongbyon had been restarted for a nuclear forces buildup. Despite outdated military equipment and arms, the one million-strong army can "inflict serious damage" on South Korea, using thousands of artillery guns and rockets capable of reaching the South Korean capital of Seoul. The government also announced plans to deploy weather and geostationary satellites. The test Sunday placed a payload in a polar orbit that nuclear experts say could be used by North Korea to develop a space-based nuclear blast designed to disrupted all electronics in the United States with an electromagnetic pulse. According to the Pentagon, North Korea does not trust China and Russia and claims to be under imminent threat from outside the country. The "garrison state worldview" is used to justify draconian security controls and large military expenditures. The regime is unlikely to conduct a large-scale military attack that would invite counterattacks but is willing to use smaller, asymmetric warfare strikes, like the DMZ mining and the Sony cyber attack. The report said North Korea state-run media revealed an unmanned aerial vehicle that appears to be a copy of the Raytheon MQM Streaker target drone. In addition to nuclear forces, North Korea also has biological and chemical weapons arsenals. On arms proliferation, the report said Pyongyang has continued to sell conventional arms and ballistic missiles that provide a source of hard currency for the internationally isolated regime. Pyongyang has used various means to circumvent the sanctions, including the falsification of documents, mislabeling crates, and using front companies to hide the ship and air transfers. International interdictions of North Korean arms transfers included the July seizure in Panama of air defense systems and MiG jets. Previous reports were limited to one or two pages.

## 3: 6 Largest National Security Threats Facing the U.S. Today

*Part 4 Looking Toward the Future 14 Long-Range Issues of National Security 15 Making the System Work For Further Reading Index About the Book viii Contents.*

Military security In practice, national security is associated primarily with managing physical threats and with the military capabilities used for doing so. Most states, such as South Africa and Sweden, [14] [10] configure their military forces mainly for territorial defence; others, such as France, Russia, the UK and the US, [15] [16] [11] [12] invest in higher-cost expeditionary capabilities , which allow their armed forces to project power and sustain military operations abroad. Economic security Economic security, in the context of international relations , is the ability of a nation state to maintain and develop the national economy, without which other dimensions of national security cannot be managed. In larger countries, strategies for economic security expect to access resources and markets in other countries, and to protect their own markets at home. Developing countries may be less secure than economically advanced states due to high rates of unemployment and underpaid work. Environmental security Ecological security, also known as environmental security, refers to the integrity of ecosystems and the biosphere , particularly in relation to their capacity to sustain a diversity of life-forms including human life. The security of ecosystems has attracted greater attention as the impact of ecological damage by humans has grown. The scope and nature of environmental threats to national security and strategies to engage them are a subject of debate. These include global environmental problems such as climate change due to global warming , deforestation , and loss of biodiversity. These include resource scarcities leading to local conflict, such as disputes over water scarcity in the Middle East ; migration into the United States caused by the failure of agriculture in Mexico ; [1]: These include acts of war that degrade or destroy ecosystems. Energy security Resources include water, sources of energy, land and minerals. Availability of adequate natural resources is important for a nation to develop its industry and economic power. For example, in the Persian Gulf War of , Iraq captured Kuwait partly in order to secure access to its oil wells, and one reason for the US counter-invasion was the value of the same wells to its own economy. The interrelations between security, energy, natural resources, and their sustainability is increasingly acknowledged in national security strategies and resource security is now included among the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Computer security Computer security , also known as cybersecurity or IT security, refers to the security of computing devices such as computers and smartphones, as well as computer networks such as private and public networks, and the Internet. It concerns the protection of hardware, software, data, people, and also the procedures by which systems are accessed, and the field has growing importance due to the increasing reliance on computer systems in most societies. Infrastructure security seeks to limit vulnerability of these structures and systems to sabotage , terrorism , and contamination. There are also commercial transportation security units such as the Amtrak Police in the United States. Critical infrastructure is vital for the essential functioning of a country. Incidental or deliberate damage can have a serious impact on the economy and essential services. Some of the threats to infrastructure include: In the November Mumbai attacks , the Mumbai central station and hospital were deliberately targeted, for example. Cyberattacks on Estonia and cyberattacks during the South Ossetia war are examples. Issues in national security[ edit ] Consistency of approach[ edit ] The dimensions of national security outlined above are frequently in tension with one another. The high cost of maintaining large military forces places a burden on the economic security of a nation. Unilateral security action by states can undermine political security at an international level if it erodes the rule of law and undermines the authority of international institutions. The invasion of Iraq in and the annexation of Crimea in have been cited as examples. If tensions such as these are not managed effectively, national security policies and actions may be ineffective or counterproductive. National versus transnational security[ edit ] Increasingly, national security strategies have begun to recognise that nations cannot provide for their own security without also developing the security of their regional and international context. Some argue that the principal beneficiary of national security policy should be the nation state itself, which should centre its strategy on protective and coercive capabilities in order to safeguard itself

in a hostile environment and potentially to project that power into its environment, and dominate it to the point of strategic supremacy. For example, the rights and liberties of citizens are affected by the use of military personnel and militarised police forces to control public behaviour; the use of surveillance including mass surveillance in cyberspace ; military recruitment and conscription practices; and the effects of warfare on civilians and civil infrastructure. This has led to a dialectical struggle, particularly in liberal democracies , between government authority and the rights and freedoms of the general public. The National Security Agency harvests personal data across the internet. Even where the exercise of national security is subject to good governance and the rule of law , a risk remains that the term national security may be become a pretext for suppressing unfavorable political and social views. In the US, for example, the controversial USA Patriot Act of , and the revelation by Edward Snowden in that the National Security Agency harvests the personal data of the general public , brought these issues to wide public attention. Among the questions raised are whether and how national security considerations at times of war should lead to the suppression of individual rights and freedoms, and whether such restrictions are necessary when a state is not at war.

## 4: Pentagon: North Korea Nuclear, Missile Threat Increasing

*Today, the Army's longest-ranging ground missile has a range of roughly 1,000 miles, but the service has been pursuing long-range artillery that can hit targets over 1,000 miles away.*

We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom. For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great struggle over ideas: That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends. This is also a time of opportunity for America. We will work to translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: It is open to all. To achieve these goals, the United States will: Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity "Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and to live free from poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police. America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: These demands can be met in many ways. Many other nations, with different histories and cultures, facing different circumstances, have successfully incorporated these core principles into their own systems of governance. History has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people. Our own history is a long struggle to live up to our ideals. But even in our worst moments, the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence were there to guide us. As a result, America is not just a stronger, but is a freer and more just society. Today, these ideals are a lifeline to lonely defenders of liberty. And when openings arrive, we can encourage change—as we did in central and eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991, or in Belgrade in 1995. When we see democratic processes take hold among our friends in Taiwan or in the Republic of Korea, and see elected leaders replace generals in Latin America and Africa, we see examples of how authoritarian systems can evolve, marrying local history and traditions with the principles we all cherish. Embodying lessons from our past and using the opportunity we have today, the national security strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty. They will guide our actions and our words in international bodies. We will champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist it. But our responsibility to history is already clear: War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents. In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror. The United States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them. The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes—some seen, some unseen. Today our enemies have seen the results of what civilized nations can, and will, do against regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism to achieve their

political goals. Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield on which we will engage terrorists. Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. We will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists. Once the regional campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task. The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism. However, this campaign need not be sequential to be effective, the cumulative effect across all regions will help achieve the results we seek. We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction WMD or their precursors; defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of selfdefense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities. We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism. This Administration has proposed the largest government reorganization since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. Centered on a new Department of Homeland Security and including a new unified military command and a fundamental reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive plan to secure the homeland encompasses every level of government and the cooperation of the public and the private sector. This strategy will turn adversity into opportunity. For example, emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with terrorism but with all hazards. Our medical system will be strengthened to manage not just bioterror, but all infectious diseases and mass-casualty dangers. Our border controls will not just stop terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of legitimate traffic. Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism. Where governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and our allies can provide. As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists. In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life. Freedom and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy end to this conflict. In leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new, productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts "We build a world of justice, or we will live in a world of coercion. The magnitude of our shared responsibilities makes our disagreements look so small. In an increasingly interconnected world, regional crisis can strain our alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity. When violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to alleviate suffering and restore stability. No doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which U. We have finite political, economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities. The United States will approach each case with these strategic principles in mind: The United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge. The United States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively. There can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. The United States will continue to encourage

all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict. The United States, the international donor community, and the World Bank stand ready to work with a reformed Palestinian government on economic development, increased humanitarian assistance, and a program to establish, finance, and monitor a truly independent judiciary. If Palestinians embrace democracy, and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state. Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. So the United States continues to challenge Israeli leaders to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state. As there is progress towards security, Israel forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to September 28, And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop. As violence subsides, freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians to resume work and normal life. The United States can play a crucial role but, ultimately, lasting peace can only come when Israelis and Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them. This Administration invested time and resources building strong bilateral relations with India and Pakistan. These strong relations then gave us leverage to play a constructive role when tensions in the region became acute.

## 5: Long-Range Firing Capabilities Army's No. 1 Priority After INF Withdrawal

*The picture of the national security landscape that the person commission sketched is a bleak one, in which an American military that has enjoyed undisputed dominance for decades is failing to.*

Heidenrich Commonly misunderstood, we neglect it at our peril. This year marks the 60th anniversary of the National Security Act of 1947. As a "living" document, the act has outlasted the Cold War, for which it was devised, and much more. Their thoroughness was such, however, that amendments have not radically altered what they essentially put in place. One relatively recent change, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1974, in addition to its impact on the interrelationships of the service arms, notably also mandated the creation of an annual National Security Strategy, a document produced by the president and reported annually to the Congress. The original architects, with World War II in recent memory, knew very well the importance of giving commanders enough authority, and they likewise knew the importance of strategy. By George Kennan had wired his now famous Long Telegram. Today, decades later, a national strategy is not only advisable for the republic but legally required. Strategic intelligence collection and analysis is a capability they took pains to preserve; we are perilously close to losing it. The reasons are complicated, but they deserve our examination and discussion in this anniversary year. Readers can easily get a sense of the problem by conducting a small, admittedly unscientific, survey. Hand someone a report on a foreign-related topic and describe it as "strategic intelligence. In my own surveys, a typical reply, after an awkward pause, has been that strategic intelligence is information about countries, or about strategic nuclear forces, or perhaps a long-range forecast. These might include something like "intelligence information for the tactical battlefield. Intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. A strategy is not really a plan but the logic driving a plan. When foreign areas are involved, in-depth expertise is required, which is what strategic intelligence provides. Without the insights of deep expertise--insights based on detailed knowledge of obstacles and opportunities and enemies and friends in a foreign area--a strategy is not much more than an abstract theory, potentially even a flight of fancy. The better the strategic intelligence, the better the strategy, which is why the definition of strategic intelligence should not be so mysterious. Nevertheless, in official circles and beyond, too many people attribute meanings to "strategic" and "strategic intelligence" that no dictionary supports. Ignorance of the meaning of these words has bred ignorance of the strategic product, with, in my view, enormous consequences. During the past decade and a half, since the Cold War, the production and use of strategic intelligence by the United States government has plunged to egregiously low levels. This neglect is not only perilous, it is tragic. American ingenuity has made great contributions to the ancient craft of intelligence, contributions worthy of national pride. The most famous is the American spy satellite, a Cold War invention. Yet, within the government that created it and that was once its master artisan, this analytical invention is now largely neglected. As my informal surveys suggest, very few employees of the Intelligence Community would say they are working to advance the implementation of the official National Security Strategy--or indeed, any strategy. This type of intelligence must be desirable since so many consumers do consume it, but, like journalism without investigative reporting, it is not strategic intelligence and cannot replace it. Our products have become so specific, so tactical even, that our thinking has become tactical. About 15 years ago, I used to have 60 percent of my time available for long-term products. The Intelligence Community really [is] focused on current intelligence, on policy support. It does very little research. It has very little understanding below the level of the policymaker and, in my view, on many issues. I think there is a prima facie case that the answer is no. A major [community] weakness This criticism applies to intelligence prepared both for a national policy audience and for more specialized audiences, such as battlefield commanders. But the excerpt above hints at a deeper, more insidious problem: It describes strategic intelligence as the provision of context. Context is nice, sometimes even helpful, but it does not compellingly excite the average consumer, especially the military one, because it is not strategic support. Yet "context" is what most analysts and consumers assume strategic intelligence is. Another common assumption is that strategic intelligence is merely a longer range perspective. Officialdom even promotes this, if unwittingly. Or

does strategic intelligence exist in a realm without strategy? At the risk of waxing nostalgic about the Cold War, in that era many policymakers were voracious consumers of strategic intelligence because it did provide strategic support. Used to tailor the grand strategy of communist containment, it deeply assessed the threats the United States and its allies faced, articulated their strengths and weaknesses, and noted exploitable opportunities. It was "current" in that it was timely, but it was also strategic. See the accompanying article in this issue on the Office of Research and Estimates. As intelligence agencies swell their ranks with more and more new analysts, this situation is unlikely to improve anytime soon. To stop terrorists, I need this specific piece of tactical intelligence--right now. Consequently, by default, those analytical topics that feel somehow too grand, or too distant in time and place to matter immediately, tend to get ignored. In fairness to intelligence analysts and their managers, they are merely following standard procedure, performing compartmentalized, narrowly focused routines. But reality is not entirely amenable to compartmentalization. Reality is inter-related and messy, involving deadly diseases from AIDS to avian flu; politically disruptive environmental changes; demographic dislocation; endemic corruption; trafficking in everything from people to weapons of mass destruction WMD ; intolerant belief-systems; genocide; shifting centers of economic power; global energy competition; and engineering breakthroughs from bio-manipulation to nano technology. These challenges are so profoundly complex, they cannot be well explained only in current or tactical intelligence. Even if analysts are doing the reporting, reporting the facts de jour is not analysis. At the other extreme, analysis should not exist for its own sake, as though any interpretation of facts is better than none at all. Producing token interpretations, day after day, may keep an analyst employed, but as analytical practice this is only "make work" activity. That is actionable intelligence. Showing vast detail, those studies amazed their military consumers. Kent and his colleagues--all practiced scholars supported by the full resources of the Library of Congress--knew where to find good information. Working in environments dominated by secrecy and security concerns, most analysts work in relative seclusion. As a result, compared to an experienced professor or a seasoned business researcher--both proficient at exploiting open sources deeply--most entry-level analysts are novices. Accurate, detailed information is not necessarily available via the Internet, nor is it always free. Far more exists off the Internet, but the daily deadlines of current intelligence discourage its deep exploitation. So, for reasons of ease, speed, and perhaps a little arrogance, most community analysts confine their raw material to secret information. Secret information may be very good, but information need not be secret to be accurate. And, as we know from the experience of Iraqi WMD, secret information is not necessarily always accurate. In , it subjected its famed infrastructure studies to military-economic analysis and, in so doing, invented multi-departmental strategic intelligence. Embassy in London, sent Allied bombers toward German fighter aircraft factories in and early Imagine if nobody had bothered to think any harder, too cautious or too busy to consider, let alone attempt, a thoroughly multi-disciplinary analysis in the hope of creating a decisive advantage. Quite young, they could have been derided as "a bunch of silly economists ignorant of real war. They knew what they were talking about, and it showed. Their thorough study of the multi-disciplinary material they accumulated made them true subject-matter experts. The respect they received, they earned. Initially transferred to the State Department, it went to CIA because the strategic intelligence capability it embodied was understood to be essential to the national security, whether in war or peace. Preserving that capability was one of the objectives the architects of the National Security Act of had in mind. Although the term "strategic intelligence" does not appear, for that term was not yet commonly used among civilians, the act did call for the continuous production of "national intelligence," a category the act treats as distinctly different from tactical intelligence. Informative or Ivory Tower? What keeps the policymaker receptive to such analysis, despite the bad news it may contain, is its claim to objectivity. Kent himself rated the risk that analysts would be contaminated by consumers a greater danger than the risk posed by self-imposed isolation. Because so much intelligence work is secretive anyway, the isolation would have felt normal. The Cold War itself reinforced the isolation by requiring little daily interaction between analysts and consumers, the Cuban Missile Crisis being a rare exception. More typically, the president and other senior officials received daily intelligence briefings, delivered by a briefer not an analyst or as a document. That arrangement worked throughout the Cold War because most policymakers knew which countries mattered and

knew a lot about them. Bush witnessed the opening of the Cold War as adults and learned the dynamics of the containment strategy and the key countries in the game. The Cold War dominated current events, university discussions, and, of course, military planning. With decades of experience, each president would find the Intelligence Community effort to be additional to their own efforts and thus only supplemental, albeit crucially so. In the military as well, limited interaction prevailed. Behind their salutes and outward camaraderie, many intelligence and operations personnel were actually a little suspicious of each other, mutually afraid of security leaks. Contingency war planning was considered so sensitive that intelligence people, ostensibly supporting the operators, were told remarkably few specifics by those very operators devising the plans. This left many analysts with time to hone their craft. Consider what they had to learn: In strategic intelligence especially, though not exclusively, every issue involves multiple disciplines: Cultural awareness is imperative, which means knowing more than just some stereotypes. Every ethnicity, religion, and organization has a culture, usually several, their diversity and dynamics revealed only through study. Another analytical skill is to see events in true proportion, using historical experience to investigate across time and distance. Intertwined with analysis is communicating it. This can be remarkably difficult because many habits of conversation tend to be remarkably sloppy. Well, everybody knows what I really mean!

## 6: US national security : policymakers, processes, and politics in SearchWorks catalog

*6. Methods for Assessing National Security Threats. The preceding chapters, following the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2, examined and evaluated evidence about the relationships and mechanisms that could link climate change and climate events over the next decade to outcomes of importance to U.S. national security.*

Appendix E presents and discusses a wide range of these. A major challenge of monitoring lies in setting priorities: This task involves determining which of the many possible measures of a factor such as exposure to coastal flooding, susceptibility to malaria, or effectiveness of disaster response will be most reliable, valid, and useful as part of a larger monitoring system for assessing security threats. Setting Data Priorities Because of the multifaceted nature of the phenomena that might connect climate events to national security concerns and because of the complexity of these connections, setting priorities for monitoring is a significant challenge. Substantial ongoing monitoring activities may prove useful for measuring aspects of the key phenomena. Many are already being carried out by the intelligence community and other parts of the U. However, much of this work has been organized for other purposes. In the area of climate change, the activities include efforts to forecast climate events and estimate the vulnerabilities to climate change of various aspects of human well-being. Outside of the climate change community, monitoring of environmental conditions and changes is carried out largely by environment agencies, and monitoring relevant to exposure and susceptibility is carried out largely by departments and organizations focused on development or disaster assistance. A number of these monitoring efforts are described in Appendix E. There is strong reason to try to identify a small number of reliable and valid indicators to cover a great variety of phenomena. Some potentially useful indicators are already in use or in development in the U. It is important to emphasize, however, that the basis for constructing such indicators is quite uneven across variable types and across parts of the world. For example, it is possible to develop a map of the western United States with fairly sharp spatial resolution that indicates the risk for forest fires and related events as a function of projected increases in average temperature see Figure , but much less confidence can be Page Share Cite Suggested Citation: Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis. The National Academies Press. Less well established is the practice of developing indicators for such things as the coping capacity of communities or the ability of governments to mobilize disaster response. For many of these factors, however, sufficient knowledge exists to identify some of the measures that might constitute an indicator and therefore to begin building and testing indicators. For example, a recent analysis of the determinants of political instability features the effects of political institutions and policies for allocating resources Goldstone et al. That analysis identified episodes of political instability that occurred between and and demonstrated that 80 percent of them could have been predicted two years in advance using an indicator that combined measures of regime type degree of democracy , infant mortality, incidence of conflict in neighboring countries, and internal favoritism. The greatest likelihood of instability was associated with political regimes intermediate between democracy and autarchy that practiced discriminatory policies. Despite progress in developing indicators of several of the key phenomena and the connections among them, it is premature to settle on a small number of variables to monitor that will be sufficient to meet the needs of analysis. Research, including experiments and pilot studies, will be required to determine which measures can serve as proxies for which others and thus to develop an efficient and effective monitoring system. In many instances, existing knowledge does not yet support reliance only on quantitative indicators. Progress can be made by focusing on each class of phenomena separately. Appendix E illustrates the current state of thinking about data needs and discusses examples of current monitoring efforts for climate and biophysical variables, exposures, susceptibility to harm, and coping, response, and recovery. It shows that across these types of phenomena there are substantial differences in the level of consensus within the relevant communities of experts about which are the key variables from which a small and useful set of indicators could be developed. As discussed further in Appendix E , a number of efforts are under way to use these variables to create a more limited set of indicators that could be more relevant to policy making. This indicates a good level of progress in priority setting. However, to our knowledge there has as yet been no serious effort

at priority setting among climate measurements, or among environmental measurements more broadly, for the purpose of informing security analysis. In other domains in which monitoring is needed, there is variation in the degree to which the relevant scientific communities have defined priorities for monitoring and in the degree to which the monitoring systems are relevant to the climate–security nexus. Two other examples of active monitoring efforts that reflect substantial consensus but also suggest the degree to which such systems learn and adapt by gathering and assessing data come from food security and public health. Created in and funded by the U. Agency for International Development, the project is a collaboration among national, regional, and international partners, including expert field personnel on the ground that monitor and analyze relevant data and information in terms of its impacts on livelihoods and markets to identify potential threats to food security. Less extensive coverage is provided for 15 more countries through partner-based monitoring. FEWS NET, which relies on a combination of physical and socioeconomic indicators to estimate and predict the degree of, and changes in, the food security conditions of vulnerable countries, was one of the earliest users of satellite imagery to monitor rainfall and crop conditions in the developing world. It now also looks at longer-term global climate variability to help assess future threats to food security and inform priorities for climate adaptation activities. Both the phenomena and the ECVs are color coded to describe the adequacy of the current monitoring systems for capturing trends on climate time-scales. Green indicates global coverage with a sufficient period of record, data quality, and metadata to enable meaningful monitoring of temporal changes. Yellow indicates an insufficiency in one of those three factors. Red indicates insufficiency in more than one of the factors. Courtesy of James McMahon. Page Share Cite Suggested Citation: Monitoring and evaluation efforts for public health began more than years ago. Emerging infectious diseases are receiving increasing attention because there is a long history of such diseases surprising societies and causing high morbidity and mortality, sometimes accompanied by social disruption Lindgren et al. In response to a presidential directive in , the U. Department of Defense established a Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System, with the mission to monitor newly emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases among U. The program includes 39 funded partners working in 92 countries Russell et al. Other organizations monitoring emerging infectious diseases include the U. These activities could be enhanced to consider how climate variability and change could alter the risks of outbreaks in geographic regions of interest. The intelligence community should participate in a whole-of-government effort to inform choices about adapting to and reducing vulnerability to climate change. One of the objectives of this effort should be to build the scientific basis for indicators in this domain. This effort would support activities by the research communities involved in assessing exposures and vulnerabilities to environmental change to identify a relatively small number of key variables relevant to the social and political consequences of climate events. A recent effort by the National Research Council b took an initial step in this direction. The recommended effort might identify sets of variables to monitor that could become elements of indicators of exposures to such events, susceptibilities to harm, and of the likely effectiveness of coping, response, and recovery efforts at the levels of communities, countries, and systems that support critical human needs. It would also support research to develop and validate indicators of key phenomena linking climate and security, as has been done with research on the phenomena of political instability. The Role of Quantitative Data Quantitative indicators that combine multiple datasets are often highly useful for giving decision makers a broad picture of a phenomenon of concern. For example, composite indicators are sometimes created to summarize knowledge about various phenomena of interest, such as drought, susceptibility to damage from flooding, health status of a population, emergency coping capacity, or political instability. Developing such indicators for the full range of security threats related to climate change presents a major challenge for several reasons. Integrating Data Types Observations relevant to climate–security linkages may come from a great diversity of sources: Some of these data sources are quantitative and others qualitative. Of the quantitative indicators, some are already well calibrated and validated, others much less so. For example, data on some socioeconomic factors, such as demographics and gross domestic product, are routinely collected by well-developed methods. Other data, such as on the ability of a region or country to cope with an extreme event of a particular magnitude or on the condition of resource stockpiles, are often collected through surveys. Because the design, conduct, analysis,

and archiving of survey data can be time-consuming and costly, it would be prudent to determine in advance what types of data are likely to be needed and how often the survey should be repeated for critical information, taking into consideration how data might be relevant. This not only would be good planning but also could offer opportunities to identify surveys already being conducted to which additional components could be added. Integration will be necessary in part because different methods are necessary to gather different kinds of information. Some important kinds of information, such as how governments are likely to respond to disasters, are difficult to collect because many governments will be responding without elaborate advance planning or training. Also, different methods of validation are appropriate for different kinds of data and information see, e. All methods should be used to gain insight. Where the same kind of information can be obtained by multiple methods, this situation creates an opportunity to use each method as a check against the others and thus increase overall confidence in assessments. We note that it may be possible to advance the objectives of both analysis and risk reduction if information gathering is done through open dialogue, sometimes with the assistance of the U. Developing the needed broad monitoring system for climate-related security threats will also require integration of climate science, various branches of social science, and security analysis. The integration of the social science of natural disasters and disaster response with other forms of analysis will be particularly important for assessing the security consequences of climate change because many disruptive climate events will be perceived and responded to as natural disasters. Judgment is involved in creating indicators, even when they are built on highly reliable observations. Expert assessment is needed of the accuracy and validity of indicators and of whether other relevant information should be taken into consideration. For example, weather forecasts are only partially based on the vast amounts of data analyzed by highly sophisticated computer models; skilled meteorologists modify the forecasts based on an understanding of the complex weather systems that extends beyond what can be coded into a model and of the performance of a particular computer model for a weather variable in a specific region. Coverage and Resolution Because of the various purposes for which data collection has been organized, existing data may or may not have the coverage or offer the degree of spatial or temporal resolution needed to track and analyze the key variable sets in ways needed for security analysis. In many cases, data need to be collected at higher resolution than in the past in order to support improved analytic assessment. High-resolution monitoring will be especially important for highly significant and highly vulnerable locations. Some indicators, such as of the capacity of national governments to provide response and recovery support after a disruptive event, are most appropriately measured at the national level. Others, such as the risk of coastal flooding, may need much finer resolution, especially in areas of dense population. It may be necessary to develop indicators of community coping capacity separately for communities defined by geography and for communities defined by business relationships or cultural similarities. Similarly, risk indicators may require more frequent updating for some climate events than for others. The need for temporal resolution is probably greatest during the development of a slow-moving climate event, such as a drought, and in the immediate aftermath of a disruptive climate event. For many existing and potential indicators the required spatial and temporal resolution is finer than what is currently available. In setting priorities for indicator development and improvement, the intelligence community should take into account the gaps between the existing and the desired resolution and should invest in improved resolution for those indicators judged to be the most needed and the most useful in places of concern. When considering how to invest in the development of indicators focused on a particular country or region, it will be worth considering the extent to which an indicator could be applied elsewhere. It should also be kept in mind that existing datasets may provideâ€”or may be analyzed to provideâ€”useful information. Over time, determining the needed data coverage and resolution tends to proceed from an initial assessment of the main data needs and to evolve as the monitoring system is used. Validating Indicators Validation involves determining the extent to which an indicator actually measures the phenomenon it purports to measureâ€”a task that can be extremely challenging. Validation is a long-term process, especially for measures associated with the likelihood and consequences of disruptive events, which are almost by definition uncommon. A measure of the likelihood of a climate event that occurs only once in several decades may require a century or more for full validation, so validation efforts might involve using one indicator to validate another. For

example, a projection of drought risk from climate models might be tested against a drought severity indicator and validated even in the absence of extreme drought events. A measure of response capacity may have to wait for validation until a disruptive event occurs, but if it holds up in two or three disruptive events, confidence in its validity should increase. As already noted, the validation of indicators for many of the factors linking climate change and security will not be a Page Share Cite Suggested Citation: Open data sharing, information regarding source codes, and transparency in the analyses are also essential elements of this process. Validation is particularly an issue with emerging monitoring technologies, such as those involving sophisticated data-mining algorithms e.

## 7: The State of Strategic Intelligence – Central Intelligence Agency

*National security refers to the security of a nation state, including its citizens, economy, and institutions, and is regarded as a duty of government.. Originally conceived as protection against military attack, national security is now widely understood to include non-military dimensions, including economic security, energy security, environmental security, food security, cyber security etc.*

That is damaging to our national security. The next secretary of defense will have to face significant national security challenges, challenges as new as cyber security and as old as border security, both of which President Obama mentioned in his State of the Union address on Tuesday. Here are the six most pressing national security issues America faces today. Climate change The main national security threat facing the U. The Pentagon has been vocal about the threat of climate change since its Quadrennial Defense Review, which predicted an increase in requests for help from civilian authorities battling floods, wildfires, and hurricanes. This November, a CIA-commissioned study by the National Research Council warned of unpredictable, climate change-induced crises occurring with increased frequency. Hurricane Sandy is just a taste of the crises that may affect public health systems as well as food, energy, and water supplies and markets. The study also cites climate change-related conflicts emerging around the Nile watershed, where million Egyptians, Sudanese, and Ethiopians live and farm, and where South Korean and Saudi Arabian companies have purchased land. Nuclear security With nine countries possessing nuclear weapons, nuclear security is one of the most pressing and complex national security issues facing the Obama administration. The choice to refuse renewal is related to frustration over the U. Cyber attacks are not limited to financial institutions and infrastructure. Cyber attacks against journalists have been occurring since and are thought to be part of a spying campaign that is as much about stealing trade secrets as it is about controlling its public image. The Obama administration is no stranger to committing cyber attacks , the highest profile one being the U. The president used his State of the Union address to announce an executive order on cyber security that raised concern among tech advocates about the mischaracterization of hackers. Spending cuts to diplomatic services Another major source of national security risk stems from the potential cuts to security at U. This leads to misdirection of funds and allows for serious oversight. This mistrust of aid, combined with budget cuts to diplomatic services makes for a dangerous situation, where whatever legitimacy was left of soft power has all but disintegrated. This leads us to the next national security threat facing the U. Covert actions have been occurring in Yemen for some time now. Drone strikes began occurring in and of the 1, or so people killed in the actions, up to were civilians. For example, a recent attack has killed not only Al-Qaeda targets but also a popular moderate cleric who was in the middle of negotiations with the extremists.

## 8: The Drone Threat to National Security - Scientific American

*The ongoing US military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the focus on homeland security, the significant organizational changes in the intelligence bureaucracy, and the impact of the Bush Doctrine are among the current issues that inform the authors' clear presentation and appraisal of US security interests, politics, and processes.*

## 9: NPR Choice page

*NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER Examples of National Security Cutter Critical Operational Issues and Key Performance Parameters 10 LRI-II Long-Range Interceptor II.*

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