

1: Alexander Bain - Wikipedia

Mental philosophy definition is - psychology, logic, and metaphysics in a single discipline or area of study or instruction. How to use mental philosophy in a sentence. psychology, logic, and metaphysics in a single discipline or area of study or instruction.

One is a question of moral epistemology: Ethical theorists and theologians of the day held, variously, that moral good and evil are discovered: Hume sides with the moral sense theorists: Hume maintains against the rationalists that, although reason is needed to discover the facts of any concrete situation and the general social impact of a trait of character or a practice over time, reason alone is insufficient to yield a judgment that something is virtuous or vicious. Moral rationalists of the period such as Clarke and in some moods, Hobbes and Locke argue that moral standards or principles are requirements of reason – that is, that the very rationality of right actions is the ground of our obligation to perform them. The moral sense theorists Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and Butler see all requirements to pursue goodness and avoid evil as consequent upon human nature, which is so structured that a particular feature of our consciousness whether moral sense or conscience evaluates the rest. Hume sides with the moral sense theorists on this question: Closely connected with the issue of the foundations of moral norms is the question whether moral requirements are natural or conventional. Hobbes and Mandeville see them as conventional, and Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Locke, and others see them as natural. If there were nothing in our experience and no sentiments in our minds to produce the concept of virtue, Hume says, no lavish praise of heroes could generate it. So to a degree moral requirements have a natural origin. Thus he takes an intermediate position: While even so law-oriented a thinker as Hobbes has a good deal to say about virtue, the ethical writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries predominantly favor a rule- or law-governed understanding of morals, giving priority to laws of nature or principles of duty. The chief exception here is the moral sense school, which advocates an analysis of the moral life more like that of the Greek and Hellenistic thinkers, in terms of settled traits of character – although they too find a place for principles in their ethics. Yet he insists on a role for rules of duty within the domain of what he calls the artificial virtues. Hume roundly criticizes Hobbes for his insistence on psychological egoism or something close to it, and for his dismal, violent picture of a state of nature. Yet Hume resists the view of Hutcheson that all moral principles can be reduced to our benevolence, in part because he doubts that benevolence can sufficiently overcome our perfectly normal acquisitiveness. While for Hume the condition of humankind in the absence of organized society is not a war of all against all, neither is it the law-governed and highly cooperative domain imagined by Locke. It is a hypothetical condition in which we would care for our friends and cooperate with them, but in which self-interest and preference for friends over strangers would make any wider cooperation impossible. In the realm of politics, Hume again takes up an intermediate position. He objects both to the doctrine that a subject must passively obey his government no matter how tyrannical it is and to the Lockean thesis that citizens have a natural right to revolution whenever their rulers violate their contractual commitments to the people. He famously criticizes the notion that all political duties arise from an implicit contract that binds later generations who were not party to the original explicit agreement. On his view, human beings can create a society without government, ordered by conventional rules of ownership, transfer of property by consent, and promise-keeping. We superimpose government on such a pre-civil society when it grows large and prosperous; only then do we need to use political power to enforce these rules of justice in order to preserve social cooperation. So the duty of allegiance to government, far from depending on the duty to fulfill promises, provides needed assurance that promises of all sorts will be kept. The duty to submit to our rulers comes into being because reliable submission is necessary to preserve order. Particular governments are legitimate because of their usefulness in preserving society, not because those who wield power were chosen by God or received promises of obedience from the people. In a long-established civil society, whatever ruler or type of government happens to be in place and successfully maintaining order and justice is legitimate, and is owed allegiance. However, there is some legitimate recourse for victims of tyranny: The indirect passions, primarily pride, humility

shame, love and hatred, are generated in a more complex way, but still one involving either the thought or experience of pain or pleasure. Intentional actions are caused by the direct passions including the instincts. Of the indirect passions Hume says that pride, humility, love and hatred do not directly cause action; it is not clear whether he thinks this true of all the indirect passions. Hume is traditionally regarded as a compatibilist about freedom and determinism, because in his discussion in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding he argues that if we understand the doctrines of liberty and necessity properly, all mankind consistently believe both that human actions are the products of causal necessity and that they are free. The two treatments, however, surprisingly enough, are entirely consistent. Hume construes causal necessity to mean the same as causal connection or rather, intelligible causal connection, as he himself analyzes this notion in his own theory of causation: In both works he argues that just as we discover necessity in this sense to hold between the movements of material bodies, we discover just as much necessity to hold between human motives, character traits, and circumstances of action, on the one hand, and human behavior on the other. He says in the Treatise that the liberty of indifference is the negation of necessity in this sense; this is the notion of liberty that he there labels absurd, and identifies with chance or randomness which can be no real power in nature both in the Treatise and the first epistemological Enquiry. Human actions are not free in this sense. This is the sense on which Hume focuses in ECHU: Hume argues, as well, that the causal necessity of human actions is not only compatible with moral responsibility but requisite to it. To hold an agent morally responsible for a bad action, it is not enough that the action be morally reprehensible; we must impute the badness of the fleeting act to the enduring agent. Not all harmful or forbidden actions incur blame for the agent; those done by accident, for example, do not. The Influencing Motives of the Will According to Hume, intentional actions are the immediate product of passions, in particular the direct passions, including the instincts. He does not appear to allow that any other sort of mental state could, on its own, give rise to an intentional action except by producing a passion, though he does not argue for this. The motivating passions, in their turn, are produced in the mind by specific causes, as we see early in the Treatise where he first explains the distinction between impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection: An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflection, because derived from it. Not just any ideas of pleasure or pain give rise to motivating passions, however, but only ideas of those pleasures or pains we believe exist or will exist T 1. More generally, the motivating passions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, joy and grief, and a few others are impressions produced by the occurrence in the mind either of a feeling of pleasure or pain, whether physical or psychological, or of a believed idea of pleasure or pain to come T 2. These passions, together with the instincts hunger, lust, and so on, are all the motivating passions that Hume discusses. The will, Hume claims, is an immediate effect of pain or pleasure T 2. The will, however, is merely that impression we feel when we knowingly give rise to an action T 2. The causes of action he describes are those he has already identified: Hume famously sets himself in opposition to most moral philosophers, ancient and modern, who talk of the combat of passion and reason, and who urge human beings to regulate their actions by reason and to grant it dominion over their contrary passions. His view is not, of course, that reason plays no role in the generation of action; he grants that reason provides information, in particular about means to our ends, which makes a difference to the direction of the will. His thesis is that reason alone cannot move us to action; the impulse to act itself must come from passion. The first is a largely empirical argument based on the two rational functions of the understanding. The understanding discovers the abstract relations of ideas by demonstration a process of comparing ideas and finding congruencies and incongruencies; and it also discovers the causal and other probabilistic relations of objects that are revealed in experience. Demonstrative reasoning is never the cause of any action by itself: Probable or cause-and-effect reasoning does play a role in deciding what to do, but we see that it only functions as an auxiliary, and not on its own. Our aversion or propensity makes us seek the causes of the expected source of pain or pleasure, and we use causal reasoning to discover what they are. Once we do, our impulse naturally extends itself to those causes, and we act to avoid

or embrace them. Plainly the impulse to act does not arise from the reasoning but is only directed by it. Probable reasoning is merely the discovering of causal connections, and knowledge that A causes B never concerns us if we are indifferent to A and to B. Thus, neither demonstrative nor probable reasoning alone causes action. The second argument is a corollary of the first. It takes as a premise the conclusion just reached, that reason alone cannot produce an impulse to act. Given that, can reason prevent action or resist passion in controlling the will? To stop a volition or retard the impulse of an existing passion would require a contrary impulse. If reason alone could give rise to such a contrary impulse, it would have an original influence on the will a capacity to cause intentional action, when unopposed ; which, according to the previous argument, it lacks. Therefore reason alone cannot resist any impulse to act. Therefore, what offers resistance to our passions cannot be reason of itself. The third or Representation argument is different in kind. One might suppose he means to give another argument to show that reason alone cannot provide a force to resist passion. Yet the Representation Argument is not empirical, and does not talk of forces or impulses. Therefore, a passion or volition or action , not having this feature, cannot be opposed by truth and reason. The argument allegedly proves two points: The point here is not merely the earlier, empirical observation that the rational activity of the understanding does not generate an impulse in the absence of an expectation of pain or pleasure. The main point is that, because passions, volitions, and actions have no content suitable for assessment by reason, reason cannot assess prospective motives or actions as rational or irrational; and therefore reason cannot, by so assessing them, create or obstruct them. By contrast, reason can assess a potential opinion as rational or irrational; and by endorsing the opinion, reason will that is, we will adopt it, while by contradicting the opinion, reason will destroy our credence in it. The Representation Argument, then, makes a point a priori about the relevance of the functions of the understanding to the generation of actions. Hume allows that, speaking imprecisely, we often say a passion is unreasonable because it arises in response to a mistaken judgment or opinion, either that something a source of pleasure or uneasiness exists, or that it may be obtained or avoided by a certain means. In just these two cases a passion may be called unreasonable, but strictly speaking even here it is not the passion but the judgment that is so. And there is no other instance of passion contrary to reason. Either way, Hume denies that reason can evaluate the ends people set themselves; only passions can select ends, and reason cannot evaluate passions. Instrumentalists understand the claim that reason is the slave of the passions to allow that reason not only discovers the causally efficacious means to our ends a task of theoretical causal reasoning but also requires us to take them. The classificatory point in the Representation Argument favors the reading of Hume as a skeptic about practical reason; but that argument is absent from the moral Enquiry. Ethical Anti-rationalism Hume claims that moral distinctions are not derived from reason but rather from sentiment. His rejection of ethical rationalism is at least two-fold. Moral rationalists tend to say, first, that moral properties are discovered by reason, and also that what is morally good is in accord with reason even that goodness consists in reasonableness and what is morally evil is unreasonable. Hume rejects both theses. Some of his arguments are directed to one and some to the other thesis, and in places it is unclear which he means to attack. Demonstrative reasoning discovers relations of ideas, and vice and virtue are not identical with any of the four philosophical relations resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, or proportions in quantity and number whose presence can be demonstrated. Nor could they be identical with any other abstract relation; for such relations can also obtain between items such as trees that are incapable of moral good or evil. Furthermore, were moral vice and virtue discerned by demonstrative reasoning, such reasoning would reveal their inherent power to produce motives in all who discern them; but no causal connections can be discovered a priori. Causal reasoning, by contrast, does infer matters of fact pertaining to actions, in particular their causes and effects; but the vice of an action its wickedness is not found in its causes or effects, but is only apparent when we consult the sentiments of the observer. Therefore moral good and evil are not discovered by reason alone. Hume also attempts in the Treatise to establish the other anti-rationalist thesis, that virtue is not the same as reasonableness and vice is not contrary to reason.

2: Logic and Mental Philosophy 0

Psychiatry involves theories of the mind, theories of the causes of mental disorders, classification schemes for those disorders, research about the disorders, proven treatments and research into new treatments, and a number of professions whose job it is to work with or on behalf of people with mental disorders.

What is Mental Illness? While there is debate over how to define mental illness, it is generally accepted that mental illnesses are real and involve disturbances of thought, experience, and emotion serious enough to cause functional impairment in people, making it more difficult for them to sustain interpersonal relationships and carry on their jobs, and sometimes leading to self-destructive behavior and even suicide. The most serious mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depression, and schizoaffective disorder are often chronic and can cause serious disability. What we now call mental illness was not always treated as a medical problem. Descriptions of the behaviors now labeled as symptomatic of mental illness or disorder were sometimes framed in quite different terms, such as possession by supernatural forces. Anthropological work in non-Western cultures suggests that there are many cases of behavior that Western psychiatry would classify as symptomatic of mental disorder, which are not seen within their own cultures as signs of mental illness Warner, , p. One may even raise the question whether all other cultures even have a concept of mental illness that corresponds even approximately to the Western concept, although, as Kleinman points out, this question is closely tied to that of adequately translating from other languages, and in societies without equivalent medical technology to the west, it will be hard to settle what counts as a concept of disease. The mainstream view in the West is that the changes in our description and treatment of mental illness are a result of our increasing knowledge and greater conceptual sophistication. On this view, we have conquered our former ignorance and now know that mental illness exists, even though there is a great deal of further research to be done on the causes and treatment of mental illness. Evidence from anthropological studies makes it clear that some mental illnesses are expressed differently in different cultures and it is also clear that non-Western cultures often have a different way of thinking about mental illness. For example, some cultures may see trance-like states as a form of possession. This has led some to argue that Western psychiatry also needs to change its approach to mental illness. Kleinman, , Simons and Hughes, However, the anthropological research is not set in the same conceptual terms as philosophy, and so it is unclear to what extent it implies that mental illness is primarily a Western concept. A more extreme view, most closely associated with the psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, is that there is no such thing as mental illness because the very notion is based on a fundamental set of mistakes. He has also argued that the concept of mental illness is based on a confusion. More recent critics of psychiatry have been more focused on particular purported mental illnesses. The most heated controversies about the existence of particular mental illnesses are often over ones that seem to involve culturally-specific or moral judgments, such as homosexuality, pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder, and premenstrual dysphoric disorder. Other controversies exist over disorders that are milder in character and are on the borderline between normality and pathology, such as dysthymia, a low level chronic form of depression Radden, To reiterate, however, the dominant view is that mental illness exists and there is a variety of ways to understand it. Modern psychiatry has primarily embraced a scientific approach, looking for causes such as traumatic experiences or genetic vulnerabilities, establishing the typical course of different illnesses, gaining an understanding of the changes in the brain and nervous system that underlie the illnesses, and investigating which treatments are effective at alleviating symptoms and ending the illness. One of the central issues within this scientific framework is how different kinds of theory relate to each other Ghaemi, ; Perring, As alternatives to reductionist approaches there is also the first-person phenomenology and narrative understanding of mental illness. These focus on the personal experience of living and struggling with mental illness, and give careful descriptions of the associated symptoms. Some see a careful phenomenology as essential to scientific psychiatry e. The work in this phenomenological tradition is especially important in pressing the question of what it is to understand or explain mental illness, and how a phenomenological approach can relate to scientific approaches. See for example, Ratcliffe, and Gallagher, 2. There has been

considerable discussion of how to draw a distinction between the two. Given the current debate, the prospects of finding a principled way of drawing the distinction that matches our current practices may be slim. The main practical reason for trying to draw distinctions between physical and mental illnesses comes from demarcating boundaries between professional competencies, and, in particular, from distinguishing the domain of neurology from that of psychiatry. However, this boundary is not sharply drawn and has moved over time. It is likely that as neuroscience progresses, the domains of neurology and psychiatry will start to merge. Most agree that the distinction between mental and physical illness cannot be drawn purely in terms of the causes of the condition, with mental illnesses having psychological causes and physical illnesses having non-psychological causes. Conversely, psychological factors such as stress are reliably associated with increased susceptibility to physical illness, which strongly suggests that those psychological factors are, directly or indirectly, part of the cause of the illness. First, it is often unclear whether to categorize symptoms as mental or physical. For example, intuitions are mixed as to whether pain is a physical or mental symptom. It is also unclear whether we would want to classify insomnia and fatigue as physical or mental symptoms. However we classify fatigue, it is a symptom of illnesses normally characterized as physical such as influenza and those characterized as mental such as depression. Furthermore, distinguishing between physical and mental illness in terms of symptoms may give counterintuitive results. A person who suffers a stroke can have emotional lability, and a person who has experienced a brain injury may become disinhibited; both may suffer memory loss. Yet stroke and brain injury would generally be classified as physical rather than mental disorders. In the light of these problems, some recommend doing away with any principled distinction between physical and mental disorder. First, certain researchers with a strong reductionist inclination argue that mental disorders are ultimately brain disorders; mental disorders are best explored through neuroscience. Others defend retaining the distinction between physical and mental disorders, but to non-traditional ends. Murphy, for instance, argues that it is important to have a distinction between physical and mental disorder so that it is possible to have a distinctive science of psychiatry. He argues for an expansive definition that includes problems in all psychological mechanisms. While this would entail that forms of blindness due to neural dysfunction count as mental disorders, which goes against our normal usage, his goal is not to completely capture our intuitions, but rather to have an adequate set of definitions to accommodate a theory of psychiatric explanation within the field of cognitive neuroscience. Thus we see that there are few defenders of the traditional distinction between mental and physical illnesses. Some theorists advocate refiguring the distinction so that it becomes that between brain-based and non-brain-based disorders. Others who take a more holistic view are skeptical that even this distinction is a useful way to separate illnesses into two groups.

Classification of Mental Illness There is ongoing debate concerning the way that mental illnesses should be classified. There are two aspects to this: Controversial diagnostic categories have historically included homosexuality, personality disorders, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, dysthymia, and pre-menstrual dysphoric disorder. For example, in 1994, the American Psychiatric Association voted to remove homosexuality from its diagnostic manual, after much internal argument and intensive lobbying from activist groups. For both autism and schizophrenia, it has been suggested that these are not unitary conditions but rather collections of quite different disorders lumped together in one category. These kinds of debates span both empirical and philosophical issues, and it is the former aspect, and the distinction between normality and psychopathology, that has gained the most philosophical scrutiny. The primary questions of concern are: Will it be possible in the future to classify mental illnesses according to their causes, as we do in much of the rest of medicine? Given that we currently classify most mental illnesses according to their symptoms rather than their causes, is there any reason to think that our current diagnostic categories are. Is it possible for any classification scheme of mental illnesses to be purely scientific, and is it possible for a classification scheme to be independent of values? Or to ask the reverse, do our classification schemes in psychiatry always rest on some non-scientific conception, normative of what should count as a normal life? This last question can be extended to all illnesses, not just those with a psychiatric classification. Many have urged, though, that it is in psychiatry that there is most reason to believe that values enter into the classification scheme, and that there is concern that the profession might be medicalizing what should be seen as normal conditions. Fulford, Horwitz, The

concepts of disease, illness, abnormality, malady, disorder and malfunction are closely related, but they are not the same. Much careful work has been done trying to find if one of these is more basic than any of the others, or if some of these concepts can be completely analyzed in terms of the others. For our purposes here, we shall gloss over the differences between these concepts. For the most part, we will simply refer to the concept of illness. The best-known defender of such an approach is Christopher Boorse, in a series of influential papers , , , . At the other end of the spectrum are theories that psychiatric classification depends solely on the whim or values of those doing the classification, that there is nothing objective about it at all, and that there are no facts about what is normal. These subjective theories are generally proposed in a spirit of criticizing or undermining psychiatry, and are often very sympathetic to the Szaszian view that there is really no such thing as mental illness, and so there could not be a legitimate objective classification of different kinds of mental illness. Accompanying these theories, often, is the at least implicit suggestion that classification schemes suit the needs of those in power see, for instance, the work of sociological theorists Peter Sedwick and Thomas Scheff. See Reznek, , Chapters 6 and 7. Michel Foucault argued in a similar vein that the growth of psychiatry as a supposedly scientific discipline was really a way to impose bourgeois morality on people who did not accept it. Gutting, As for its plausibility, the view that the classification is totally subjective or arbitrary stands or falls with antirealism about mental illness, and it has not received much support in the last twenty years. It would be highly implausible for a defender of the medical model to insist that values have never in fact entered into the psychiatric taxonomyâ€”a brief study of the history of various categories show that empirical research and neutral scientific facts are certainly not the only things that have been played a role in the formation of classification schemes. Sadler, ; Bayer, ; Potter, ; Thomas and Sillen, The medical model claims a that it is possible to have a value-neutral classification scheme and b it is best to use a value-neutral classification scheme. In justifying part b of their claim, some defenders of the medical model might claim we can discover a conceptual truth of the form: They are either too broad, too narrow, or both. See Wakefield, An alternative approach to defending b is to argue that medicine, and psychiatry especially, should be value-neutral and so its classification scheme should be value-neutral. Of course, there are obvious ways in which we want medicine to not be neutral: We can distinguish different forms of neutrality of diagnostic categories. The ones that are dominant in the psychiatric and psychological literature concern validity and reliability of diagnostic criteria. The validity of a category is a measure of how well it measures what it is intended to measure, while the reliability concerns how well the criteria enable those using them to consistently diagnose people with the condition. Validity and reliability are certainly virtues of diagnostic categories, although there are debates on exactly how objective they are Sadler, ; Thornton, At the same time, there are ways in which theorists embrace the values behind psychiatric categorizing, and argue that they should simply be made public. See Fulford et al, Those who argue that psychiatry and the rest of medicine are inevitably normative do not infer from this that medicine is always biased; instead, their view is that the nature of psychiatric classification requires that some normative rather than purely scientific assumptions be made about what counts as health and what counts as illness. They generally then suggest that, since medicine and psychiatry have to make such assumptions, they should be as open and honest about it as possible so that debates about certain categories of psychopathology are not based on a misunderstanding of the kind of enterprise involved. Such theorists often add the suggestion that in a democracy, there should be public debate about what values should be at the heart of medicine and psychiatry. Sadler, ; Fulford, Those who argue that psychiatric classification is necessarily value-laden rarely rest their argument on the claim that all of science is value-laden, or even more controversially, that all of science is subjective. For the sake of argument, it is possible for all sides of the debate to concede that we can know facts about the causes and consequences of the conditions we label as illnesses, and that these facts are entirely value-neutral. There are of course some who would dispute the possibility of there being, or our knowing, any value-neutral facts, but this is an extreme view, and it does not single out medical classification as an interesting and unusual case of value-ladenness. So we will set it aside. We now can ask why those who think that psychiatric classification must be value-laden think so, and how those who think it can be value-neutral propose to find such a classification. If a theory can, by itself, provide us with a way of demarcating human health from pathology, then the theory must, on its own, have some

account of what healthy function is, and what should count as a malfunction of a human being. Thus Boorse, who argues for the value-neutral view of classification, suggests that evolutionary theory can tell us what conditions are healthy. In one paper, he gives the following definition of health: An organism is healthy at any moment in proportion as it is not diseased; and a disease is a type of internal state of the organism which: Boorse, , page Those in opposition mount three kinds of claims: C1 In much of medicine, and especially psychiatry, we do not know with any certainty what is evolutionarily natural, because our scientific studies are still in their early stages or highly programmatic, and it can be very difficult to find data that will settle scientific controversies.

3: What is the relationship between philosophy and psychology? | eNotes

The Philosophy of Mental Illness is an interdisciplinary field of study that combines views and methods from the philosophy of mind, psychology, neuroscience, and moral philosophy in order to analyze the nature of mental illness.

Ancient Greece Ancient Greece was the birthplace of Western philosophical ethics. The ideas of Socrates c. The sudden flowering of philosophy during that period was rooted in the ethical thought of earlier centuries. In the poetic literature of the 7th and 6th centuries bce, there were, as in other cultures , moral precepts but no real attempts to formulate a coherent overall ethical position. The Greeks were later to refer to the most prominent of these poets and early philosophers as the seven sages , and they are frequently quoted with respect by Plato and Aristotle. Knowledge of the thought of this period is limited, for often only fragments of original writings, along with later accounts of dubious accuracy, remain. He appears to have written nothing at all, but he was the founder of a school of thought that touched on all aspects of life and that may have been a kind of philosophical and religious order. In ancient times the school was best known for its advocacy of vegetarianism , which, like that of the Jains, was associated with the belief that after the death of the body, the human soul may take up residence in the body of an animal see reincarnation. Pythagoreans continued to espouse this view for many centuries, and classical passages in the works of writers such as Ovid 43 bceâ€”17 ce and Porphyry â€” opposing bloodshed and animal slaughter can be traced to Pythagoras. This term was used in the 5th century to refer to a class of professional teachers of rhetoric and argument. The Sophists promised their pupils success in political debate and increased influence in the affairs of the city. They were accused of being mercenaries who taught their students to win arguments by fair means or foul. Aristotle said that Protagoras c. They regarded themselves as imparters of the cultural and intellectual qualities necessary for success, and their involvement with argument about practical affairs naturally led them to develop views about ethics. The recurrent theme in the views of the better-known Sophists, such as Protagoras, Antiphon c. He argued that, while the particular content of the moral rules may vary, there must be rules of some kind if life is to be tolerable. Thus, Protagoras stated that the foundations of an ethical system needed nothing from the gods or from any special metaphysical realm beyond the ordinary world of the senses. He explained that the concept of justice means nothing more than obedience to the laws of society, and, since these laws are made by the strongest political group in its own interest, justice represents nothing but the interest of the stronger. Presumably he would then encourage his pupils to follow their own interests as best they could. It is not surprising that, with ideas of this sort in circulation, other thinkers should react by probing more deeply into ethics to see whether the potentially destructive conclusions of some of the Sophists could be resisted. This reaction produced works that have served ever since as the cornerstone of the entire edifice of Western ethics. Yet, unlike other figures of comparable importance, such as the Buddha or Confucius, he did not tell his audience how they should live. What Socrates taught was a method of inquiry. When the Sophists or their pupils boasted that they knew what justice, piety, temperance, or law was, Socrates would ask them to give an account, which he would then show was entirely inadequate. For those who thought that adherence to the conventional moral code was more important than the cultivation of an inquiring mind, the charge was appropriate. By conventional standards, Socrates was indeed corrupting the youth of Athens, though he himself considered the destruction of beliefs that could not stand up to criticism as a necessary preliminary to the search for true knowledge. In this respect he differed from the Sophists, with their ethical relativism, for he thought that virtue is something that can be known and that the virtuous person is the one who knows what virtue is. SocratesSocrates, herm from a Greek original, second half of the 4th century bce; in the Capitoline Museums, Rome. He believed that virtue could be known, though he himself did not profess to know it. He also thought that anyone who knows what virtue is will necessarily act virtuously. Those who act badly, therefore, do so only because they are ignorant of, or mistaken about, the real nature of virtue. This belief may seem peculiar today, in large part because it is now common to distinguish between what a person ought to do and what is in his own interest. Once this assumption is made, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which a person knows what he ought to do but proceeds to do something elseâ€”what is in his own interestsâ€”instead.

Indeed, how to provide self-interested or merely rational people with motivating reasons for doing what is right has been a major problem for Western ethics. In ancient Greece, however, the distinction between virtue and self-interest was not made—at least not in the clear-cut manner that it is today. The Greeks believed that virtue is good both for the individual and for the community. He also took over the Socratic method of conducting philosophy, developing the case for his own positions by exposing errors and confusions in the arguments of his opponents. He did this by writing his works as dialogues in which Socrates is portrayed as engaging in argument with others, usually Sophists. Plato, marble portrait bust, from an original of the 4th century bce; in the Capitoline Museums, Rome. Suppose a person obtained the legendary ring of Gyges, which has the magical property of rendering the wearer invisible. Would that person still have any reason to behave justly? Behind this challenge lies the suggestion, made by the Sophists and still heard today, that the only reason for acting justly is that one cannot get away with acting unjustly. Plato maintained that true knowledge consists not in knowing particular things but in knowing something general that is common to all the particular cases. This view is obviously derived from the way in which Socrates pressed his opponents to go beyond merely describing particular acts that are for example good, temperate, or just and to give instead a general account of goodness, temperance, or justice. The implication is that one does not know what goodness is unless one can give such a general account. But the question then arises, what is it that one knows when one knows this general idea of goodness? It has been said that all of Western philosophy consists of footnotes to Plato. Certainly the central issue around which all of Western ethics has revolved can be traced to the debate between the Sophists, who claimed that goodness and justice are relative to the customs of each society—or, worse still, that they are merely a disguise for the interest of the stronger—and the Platonists, who maintained the possibility of knowledge of an objective Form of the Good. But even if one could know what goodness or justice is, why should one act justly if one could profit by doing the opposite? This is the remaining part of the challenge posed by the tale of the ring of Gyges, and it is still to be answered. For even if one accepts that goodness is something objective, it does not follow that one has a sufficient reason to do what is good. One would have such a reason if it could be shown that goodness or justice leads, at least in the long run, to happiness; as has been seen from the preceding discussion of early ethics in other cultures, this issue is a perennial topic for all who think about ethics. According to Plato, justice exists in the individual when the three elements of the soul—intellect, emotion, and desire—act in harmony with each other. The unjust person lives in an unsatisfactory state of internal discord, trying always to overcome the discomfort of unsatisfied desire but never achieving anything better than the mere absence of want. The soul of the just person, on the other hand, is harmoniously ordered under the governance of reason, and the just person derives truly satisfying enjoyment from the pursuit of knowledge. Plato remarks that the highest pleasure, in fact, comes from intellectual speculation. He also gives an argument for the belief that the human soul is immortal; therefore, even if a just individual lives in poverty or suffers from illness, the gods will not neglect him in the next life, where he will have the greatest rewards of all. Plato does not recommend justice for its own sake, independent of any personal gains one might obtain from being a just person. This is characteristic of Greek ethics, which refused to recognize that there could be an irresolvable conflict between the interest of the individual and the good of the community. Not until the 18th century did a philosopher forcefully assert the importance of doing what is right simply because it is right, quite apart from self-interested motivation see below Kant. To be sure, Plato did not hold that the motivation for each and every just act is some personal gain; on the contrary, the person who takes up justice will do what is just because it is just. Nevertheless, he accepted the assumption of his opponents that one could not recommend taking up justice in the first place unless doing so could be shown to be advantageous for oneself as well as for others. Aristotle Plato founded a school of philosophy in Athens known as the Academy. Aristotle was often fiercely critical of Plato, and his writing is very different in style and content, but the time they spent together is reflected in a considerable amount of common ground. Thus, Aristotle holds with Plato that the life of virtue is rewarding for the virtuous as well as beneficial for the community. Thus, Aristotle does not argue that in order to be good one must have knowledge of the Form of the Good. Detail of a Roman copy 2nd century bce of a Greek alabaster portrait bust of Aristotle, c. The highest form of existence is the life of the rational being, and the function of lower

beings is to serve this form of life. From this perspective also came a view of human nature and an ethical theory derived from it. All living things, Aristotle held, have inherent potentialities, which it is their nature to develop. This is the form of life properly suited to them and constitutes their goal. What, however, is the potentiality of human beings? For Aristotle this question turns out to be equivalent to asking what is distinctive about human beings; and this, of course, is the capacity to reason. The ultimate goal of humans, therefore, is to develop their reasoning powers. When they do this, they are living well, in accordance with their true nature, and they will find this the most rewarding existence possible. Aristotle thus ends up agreeing with Plato that the life of the intellect is the most rewarding existence, though he was more realistic than Plato in suggesting that such a life would also contain the goods of material prosperity and close friendships. The fallacy is to assume that whatever capacity distinguishes humans from other beings is, for that very reason, the highest and best of their capacities. Perhaps the ability to reason is the best human capacity, but one cannot be compelled to draw this conclusion from the fact that it is what is most distinctive of the human species. It is the idea that an investigation of human nature can reveal what one ought to do. For Aristotle, an examination of a knife would reveal that its distinctive capacity is to cut, and from this one could conclude that a good knife is a knife that cuts well. In the same way, an examination of human nature should reveal the distinctive capacity of human beings, and from this one should be able to infer what it is to be a good human being. This line of thought makes sense if one thinks, as Aristotle did, that the universe as a whole has a purpose and that human beings exist as part of such a goal-directed scheme of things, but its error becomes glaring if this view is rejected and human existence is seen as the result of a blind process of evolution. Whereas the distinctive capacity of a knife is a result of the fact that knives are made for a specific purpose—and a good knife is thus one that fulfills this purpose well—human beings, according to modern biology, were not made with any particular purpose in mind. Their nature is the result of random forces of natural selection. Thus, human nature cannot, without further moral premises, determine how human beings ought to live. Aristotle is also responsible for much later thinking about the virtues one should cultivate. In his most important ethical treatise, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he sorts through the virtues as they were popularly understood in his day, specifying in each case what is truly virtuous and what is mistakenly thought to be so. Thus, courage, for example, is the mean between two extremes: The virtue of friendliness, to give another example, is the mean between obsequiousness and surliness. Aristotle does not intend the idea of the mean to be applied mechanically in every instance: The Buddha, who had experienced the ascetic life of renunciation, would not have agreed. This caution in the application of the idea is just as well, for while it may be a useful device for moral education, the notion of a mean cannot help one to discover new truths about virtue. One can determine the mean only if one already has a notion of what is an excess and what is a defect of the trait in question. But this is not something that can be discovered by a morally neutral inspection of the trait itself: Thus, to attempt to use the doctrine of the mean to define the particular virtues would be to travel in a circle. For Christians the corresponding excess, vanity, was a vice, but the corresponding deficiency, humility, was a virtue. He distinguishes between justice in the distribution of wealth or other goods and justice in reparation, as, for example, in punishing someone for a wrong he has done. The key element of justice, according to Aristotle, is treating like cases alike—an idea that set for later thinkers the task of working out which kinds of similarities e. Aristotle distinguished between theoretical and practical wisdom.

4: Mental Philosophy | Definition of Mental Philosophy by Merriam-Webster

The philosophy of mental health - also called the 'new philosophy of psychiatry' although it is not narrowly psychiatric - is a rapidly developing field developed by philosophers, clinicians (e.g. psychiatrists and mental health nurses) and mental health service users.

Conceptions of Mental Illness a. Alienism and Freud Although there are many conceptions of madness found throughout the ancient world demon possession, divine revelation or punishment, and so forth , the conception of a distinctly mental form of illness did not fully begin to crystallize, at least in the West, until the latter half of the nineteenth-century with the creation and rise of mental asylums. Individuals who were housed in asylums were thought to be psychotic or insane. Psychotic inmates were seen as distinctly different from the non-psychotic population and this justified the creation of special purpose institutions for the containment of psychotic individuals. Psychotics were construed as suffering from distinct and localizable organic brain disorders and were treated by medical professionals known as Alienists Elliott , All other forms of distress were thought to fall outside of the province of the asylum and of medical treatment. Non-psychotic individuals who were unhappy with their lives, who felt intense anxiety, or who might vacillate between periods of high and low-motivation were not thought to have psychotic problem. These individuals were not treated or seen by alienists but instead sought help from their family, friends, or clergy Horwitz , Non-psychotic dysphoria unhappiness was, in this context, understood not as a distinctly medical problem but instead in a variety of other forms: The solution for the unhappiness that many individuals suffered was not found within the asylum but instead from the family, god, or other social institutions. There was, at this time, a clear distinction between medical problems resulting in psychosis and social problems that caused suffering. Sigmund Freud grew up in the alienist tradition and received his medical degree in Where the alienist understood non-psychotic unhappiness as a problem to be solved by individuals and their support networks, Freud understood problems in living as the domain of the psychotherapist. Unlike Kraepelin, who understood psychotic behavioral symptoms as closely tied to specific underlying brain dysfunction, Freud did not believe that behavioral symptoms could be tied to unique disorders. The underlying source of human psychological suffering, as Freud understood it, stemmed from universal childhood experiences that if poorly resolved or understood, could manifest in adulthood as neurosis. Freud saw repression, for example, as a normal part of development from child to adult. An individual could fail to properly apply repressive techniques. If this occurs then poorly repressed trauma can manifest itself in a myriad of ways from obsessive cleaning, chronic gambling, melancholia, and so forth. Simply noting melancholia in a patient would not be enough for a psychoanalyst to understand the source of repressive dysfunction. This nosology would dominate western thinking about the mentally ill until the s. By this point, psychiatry was seen as an extension of medical practice. This required the creation of a nosology, a catalogue of disorders for clinical practice Graham , 5. The first-edition of the DSM represented a revolutionary change in the conception and treatment of mental illness. The first-edition of the DSM devotes a significant proportion of its pages to a classification of mental illness concepts and terms American Psychiatric Association , Unlike future editions of the manual, illnesses are not identified in terms of a series of symptoms but instead in terms of the underlying psychological conflict responsible. For example, the manual defines Psychoneurotic Disorder as: Yet, The presence of anxiety is not sufficient to diagnose psychoneurotic disorder. Anxiety must result from an underlying conflict between the personality and other stressors. It is the role of the analyst , in this context, to discover whether this underlying conflict is present. Dissent against this system of classification and diagnosis arose from many groups both external to psychiatry and internal to the psychiatric discipline; these criticisms solidified in the s. Conceptions of mental illness, the underlying assumptions behind the process of diagnosis, and even the status of psychiatry as a science were all subject to sustained critiques. Several of the most vocal critics of psychiatry were themselves clinical psychiatrists: Laing, David Rosenhan, and Thomas Szasz. Rosenahn conducted a pair of famous studies that would radically undermine the scientific legitimacy of clinical diagnosis, especially in the eyes of the public. In his initial study, Rosenhan, along with seven other volunteers, attempted to have

themselves admitted several mental health institutions Rosenhan , Rosenhan instructed his collaborators to claim that they heard a voice which said only two words: Once admitted, subjects took as long as 52 days before they were released, despite the fact that they did not play-act any symptoms of any mental illness. Rosenhan noted that once he and his confederates had been admitted, everyday behavior began to be interpreted as a sign of their underlying mental illness. Once Rosenhan publicized the results of his initial study, several institutions challenged his results by re-asserting the validity of the diagnostic process. Again it seemed as if the diagnostic process was incapable of accurately separating the mentally ill from the healthy. Beginning as early as , the American Psychiatric Association would assign a taskforce to prepare for the publication of the next edition of the DSM. The DSM III that would result from this process, published in , would represent a rejection of the psychodynamic assumptions built into the previous versions of the manual and provide a framework for all future editions of tDSM. This edition does not substantially modify the conception of mental disorder that has been offered by the manual since its third edition, first published in In comparison with the first edition of the DSM, the DSM 5 includes diagnostic criteria for more than individual disorders. The conception of mental disorders used in the DSM 5 presents them as biological, psychological, or social dysfunctions in an individual; this model has, unsurprisingly come to be called the Bio-psycho-social model. It represents the current consensus view of mental disorder among psychological researchers and clinical practitioners. Psychologists disagree about whether to understand this definition conjunctively or disjunctively Ghaemi , 8. The Biopsychosocial model states: Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior e. From this characterization we can extract four criteria that serve to a genuine mental disorder from other sorts of issues problems in living, character flaws, and so forth. In order for a disturbance to be classified as a mental disorder it must: However, an individual who feels dysphoria as a result of their homosexuality can be diagnosed with an Unspecific Sexual Dysfunction in the DSM 5 American Psychiatric Association , Subjects with cluster B disorders often do not suffer as a result of their condition. Indeed, those with Antisocial Personality Disorder, for example, may not see themselves as disordered and may even approve of their condition. This has led some individuals with personality disorders to align with the emerging Neurodiversity movement see section 3 below. The patterns of behavior manifested by those with cluster B personality disorders are, nonetheless, understood as reflecting clinically significant disturbances in cognition, emotion regulation, and behavior. Some philosophers have argued that the cluster B personality disorders should not be understood as mental disorders but instead that they are better understood as distinctly moral disorders. Louis Charland argues for this conclusion. He claims that, unlike the cluster A and C personality disorders, the only treatment for the cluster B disorders is distinctly moral improvement; because this fact about the treatment of cluster B personality disorders uniquely distinguishes them from all other mental disorders in the DSM. Thus Charland concludes that they reflect moral as opposed to value-neutral dysfunction Charland a, Since the publication of the DSM III, mental disorders have been defined as being caused by a clinically significant dysfunction of a mental mechanism. Because the definition of mental illness invokes the concept of dysfunction, it is often subject to critique see the following section. Although the general definition of mental disorder used by the DSM invokes the concept of dysfunction, the diagnostic criteria for particular mental illnesses do not. It is instructive to provide an example of how particular disorders are defined within the manual. Anorexia Nervosa, for example, is defined by the presence of three clusters of behavioral symptoms American Psychiatric Association , Restriction of energy intake relative to requirements, leading to a significantly low body weight in the context of age, sex, developmental trajectory, and physical health. Intense fear of gaining weight or of becoming fat, or persistent behavior that interferes with weight gain, even though at a significantly low weight C: Given the underlying conception of mental disorder offered by the authors of the DSM, Anorexia Nervosa cannot simply be the result of a conflict between the individual and society. It also must not result from an individual accurately trying to adopt social norms about beauty or appearance or diet. Stemming in part for reasons of this sort, both the general bio-psycho-social model of mental disorder and the uses of the model to characterize particular disorders, like

Anorexia Nervosa, have been subject to repeated criticism by philosophers. Criticisms of the Bio-psycho-social Model The definition of mental disorder that stems from the bio-psycho-social model has been subject to several criticisms. Philosophical critiques of the definition of disorder have ranged from calling for revision and specification of the concept of disorder to abandonment of the concept altogether. In some cases, these critiques are internal: Many members of the antipsychiatry movement described in section 1b were responsible for setting the stage for the criticisms of the bio-psycho-social model. Mental Illness as Dysfunction Nassir Ghaemi has criticized the current conception of mental disorder as resting on an unscientific political compromise between factions within clinical and research psychologists and to stave off the looming threat of neurobiological eliminativism see section 2b. Ghaemi argues that many psychologists view the Bio-psycho-social conception of mental illness disjunctively and focus predominantly on their preferred method for understanding a disorder depending on their own assumptions of dysfunction Ghaemi , Although this compromise presents the appearance of consensus, Ghaemi argues that it is an illusion. He advocates for a form of integrationism about mental disorder that has become popular in some circles Ghaemi , ; Kandel , A true integration of biology and psychology requires solving the currently unresolved issue over consciousness and how consciousness is realized by the brain. Philosophers have also criticized the DSM conception of mental disorder for its lack of a unified theory of dysfunction. The current DSM requires that mental disorders reflect a dysfunction of biological, psychological, or social mechanisms though the text itself is silent on what it would mean for a mechanism to be dysfunctional and does not provide any evidence that the symptoms used for clinical diagnosis of a disorder are caused by a single underlying dysfunction. Philosophers have appealed to at least three distinct senses of dysfunction to craft a unified theory of mental disorder: Etiological function and dysfunction is construed in evolutionary terms. A mechanism is functioning, in the etiological sense, if it evolved to serve a specific purpose and if it is, currently, serving its evolved purpose. In order to discover the function of a mental mechanism, it is necessary to discover its evolved function. Dysfunction can then be construed relative to this purpose Wakefield , ; Boorse , A mechanism is dysfunctional if it is not fulfilling its evolutionary purpose. Depression, for example, may, in some cases, represent a dysfunction of a mechanism evolved for affective regulation. However, evolutionary psychological theories of mental function are still in their early stages. Furthermore, some philosophers want to allow for the possibility that many of our mental mechanisms may not have evolved to serve the functions to which we currently put them to use. A propensity function is not constrained by past selective pressures but instead defines function and dysfunction based upon current and future selective success. Male aggression, for example, may have been adaptive in our ancestral environment and hence may represent a case of proper functioning on the etiological theory. On the propensity view, however, male aggression may not be adaptive for life in modern societies even if it was fitness-enhancing in our ancestral environments. Male aggression might therefore, on a propensity account of function and dysfunction, represent a dysfunctional mechanism and hence a mental disorder Woolfolk , As with the evolutionary view, propensity function conceptions of mental dysfunction have the advantage of appealing to descriptive evidence in order to determine whether or not a specific pattern of behavior is fitness-enhancing in its current context Boorse , However, crafting a theory of function and dysfunction in terms of present-day fitness appears to allow some conditions to count as mental disorders that we may be averse to label mental illnesses. One major issue with appealing to propensity function is that it appears to resurrect defunct mental illness.

5: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge - Wikipedia

*The Elements Of Mental And Moral Philosophy Founded Upon Experience, Reason And The Bible [Catharine Esther Beecher, Conn.], Hartford Female Seminary (Hartford] on www.enganchecubano.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.*

However, philosophy and psychology continue to address many of the same questions, albeit from different points of view, and the work of each discipline continues to illuminate that of the other. Expert Answers Certified Educator Introduction The relationship between philosophy and psychology is complex. Psychology has its origins in philosophy, and until the mid-twentieth century, psychology was part of the philosophy department at universities. To recognize the split is to define psychology as an empirical science, as many have done. However, psychology and philosophy address many Introduction The relationship between philosophy and psychology is complex. However, psychology and philosophy address many of the same questions, questions that have puzzled people since time immemorial and that have been addressed not only by psychology and philosophy but also by religion, anthropology, political science, and other social sciences and humanistic disciplines. Not all those questions can be or have been addressed empirically, and the empirical work of psychology has raised many philosophical questions in its own right. The concerns addressed by both disciplines include questions of metaphysics including ontology , epistemology, and moral philosophy ethics , although the distinctions between these areas often blur, and other topics have also been addressed by both disciplines such as phenomenology and hermeneutics. Philosophical Origins of Psychology Many trace the origin of psychology to the ancient Greek philosophers, particularly Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Certainly, topics such as the ones favored by the philosophers were being addressed long before psychology developed a disciplinary identity. Throughout the Middle Ages, philosophers and theologians such as Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Saint Bonaventure, and William Ockham explored the realm of human knowing, thinking, feeling, and sensing, although without the extensive empirical investigation of these states that came to characterize the psychological method. Metaphysics Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that addresses questions regarding the nature of reality and the sorts of things that exist in the world. In modern philosophical usage, this branch includes questions of ontology, including the philosophy of mind. Both psychology and philosophy are concerned with the philosophy of mind. The philosophy of mind traces its origins to the ancient Greek philosophers, as well as Franz Brentano, William James, and John Dewey, among others. The philosophy of mind has primarily been concerned with three questions: Philosophers have asked what it means to have intentionality. For example, I think that it is almost time for dinner; I wish that my homework were done; I believe I can succeed. The philosophy of mind also looks at the relationship between the mind and the body the mind-body problem and asks: If all mental acts arise from physical states, what claims are left for the realm of the purely mental, rather than physical? The mind-body problem is related directly to questions regarding idealism versus materialism whether the world is reducible to ideas or to the material world and indirectly to questions of free will versus determinism. It is also related to questions of dualism versus monism for example, the question of whether there are two sorts of things in the world or one. Under dualism, if the brain and mind or body and mind are wholly separable, questions arise concerning how the two are linked and how something that has no physical properties might be related to, communicate with, or affect something that has exclusively physical properties. These types of questions have been addressed by research in cognitive neuroscience by scientists such as Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland and by philosophers such as Davidson and Thomas Nagel. However, if mind and brain are assumed to be the same monism , other questions arise. For example, if mental states are wholly determined by physical changes in the brain, in what sense is it possible to claim that human beings have free will? Free will versus determinism is the third question addressed by the philosophy of mind. Although this issue is not completely separate from religious questions treated by philosophers and theologians, the question has taken a different form in psychology. Psychologists as varied as the American behaviorist B. Skinner and the Viennese psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud have held that human behavior is determined, either by conscious or unconscious forces, while

the early American psychologist William James and the American founder of person-centered therapy Carl R. Rogers, as well as other humanistic and existential psychologists, have held that humans have free will. However, if humans have free will and therefore can make choices that are independent of antecedent conditions, the question arises of whether psychology is a science in the sense of being a discipline that can make reliable predictions that can be tested and produce results that can be replicated by others. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy devoted to the question of how people know what they know. This includes questions regarding the nature, scope, and possibility of any knowledge, and psychological knowledge. The nature of consciousness has been a central question of both psychology and philosophy. This topic has been explored phenomenologically, including by Freud, and also through an attempt to identify the neural correlates of consciousness, a method pursued by cognitive neuroscientists as well as the philosopher John Searle. Questions regarding consciousness have become increasingly intriguing with the discovery of functional magnetic resonance imaging fMRI, which permits correlation of the structures of the brain with the functions that they are performing in real time. Included in the study of consciousness are questions regarding sensation and perception, which raise philosophical problems, including whether the sensation of the object is separate from the perception of it, the knowledge of it, or both. The problem of other minds, or intersubjectivity, has been of concern in both psychology and philosophy. Philosophers Daniel Dennett and Davidson in particular have addressed this question. In psychology, this question is central to both clinical practice and research methodology, insofar as both depend on understanding the minds of those whom psychologists are studying and treating. Philosophers have asked how people can be sure about the contents of their own minds and on what authority they issue claims about their self-knowledge. These questions have been pursued by the philosophers Wittgenstein and Davidson and the cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor. Such questions have clear implications for introspective talk psychotherapies, which rely heavily on first-person assertions by clients regarding their mental states. Philosophy of Science The philosophy of science is primarily concerned with the question of whether and to what extent the claims made by empirical psychology can be justified; that is, whether psychology is in fact a science like chemistry and physics. This critique has its origin in the work of the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, who pointed out that sciences move forward through a process of paradigm shifts, in which previously inchoate data or anomalous data become organized by a new explanatory rubric that better accounts for them than the previous theory did. By such standards, many have concluded that psychology is a preparadigmatic science. The work of philosophers Karl Popper and Paul Feyerabend is related to this topic. Psychoanalysis in particular has been concerned with questions of whether its findings are best judged by scientific criteria a correspondence theory of truth or by hermeneutic or aesthetic criteria coherence or parsimony. This debate has gained force because the status of psychoanalysis as a medical, and therefore presumably scientific, treatment rests on data obtained through the methods of free association and recollection, which raise unique philosophical problems. This debate has often taken the form of whether psychoanalysis is a hermeneutic pursuit, with the philosopher of science Adolf Grunbaum and the American psychoanalysts Donald Spence, Arnold Modell, and Roy Shafer weighing in on the matter. Moral Philosophy Moral philosophy is the branch of philosophy that concerns ethics. Less attention has been devoted to broader questions of the place of values in human life, and such work has rarely drawn on the related work in moral philosophy. Its premise is that reality is based on how objects and events are perceived or understood by the human consciousness and not on anything independent of human consciousness. Its concern with first-person subjective mental states made phenomenology a natural fit for the emerging discipline of psychology, and existential and humanistic psychology in particular have conducted research to test phenomenological assertions as a guide to effective treatment. The work of the American person-centered psychologists Carl R. Rogers and Eugene Gendlin and the existential Swiss psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss have been influential among clinicians interested in phenomenology. The Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology has served as one intellectual home for those interested in such topics. Bibliography Honderich, Ted, ed. *The Oxford Guide to Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, A History of Psychology: Main Currents in Psychological Thought. The Persistent Problems of Psychology. Duquesne University Press, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Hermeneutics and Psychological

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Note: Citations are based on reference standards. However, formatting rules can vary widely between applications and fields of interest or study. The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied.

Fiske then explored the theory among the Moose people of Burkina Faso in Africa. He soon realized that its application was far more general, giving special insight into human nature. According to RMT, humans are naturally social, using the relational models to structure and understand social interactions, the application of these models seen as intrinsically valuable. All relational models, no matter how complex, are, according to RMT, analyzable by four elementary models: Any relationship informed by Communal Sharing presupposes a bounded group, the members of which are not differentiated from each other. Distinguishing individual identities are socially irrelevant. Generosity within a Communal Sharing group is not usually conceived of as altruism due to this shared identity, even though there is typically much behavior which otherwise would seem like extreme altruism. Members of a Communal Sharing relationship typically feel that they share something in common, such as blood, deep attraction, national identity, a history of suffering, or the joy of food. Those ranked higher have prestige and privilege not enjoyed by those who are lower. Further, the higher typically have some control over the actions of those who are lower. However, the higher also have duties of protection and pastoral care for those beneath them. Metaphors of spatial relation, temporal relation, and magnitude are typically used to distinguish people of different rank. For example, a King having a larger audience room than a Prince, or a King arriving after a Prince for a royal banquet. Brute coercive manipulation is not considered to be Authority Ranking; it is more properly categorized as the Null Relation in which people treat each other in non-social ways. In Equality Matching, one attempts to achieve and sustain an even balance and one-to-one correspondence between individuals or groups. When there is not a perfect balance, people try to keep track of the degree of imbalance in order to calculate how much correction is needed. If you and I are out of balance, we know what would restore equality. Market Pricing is the application of ratios to social interaction. This can involve maximization or minimization as in trying to maximize profit or minimize loss. But it can also involve arriving at an intuitively fair proportion, as in a judge deciding on a punishment proportional to a crime. In Market Pricing, all socially relevant properties of a relationship are reduced to a single measure of value, such as money or pleasure. Most utilitarian principles involve maximization. An exception would be Negative Utilitarianism whose principle is the minimization of suffering. But all utilitarian principles are applications of Market Pricing, since the maximum and the minimum are both proportions. Other examples include rents, taxes, cost-benefit analyses including military estimates of kill ratios and proportions of fighter planes potentially lost, tithing, and prostitution. RMT has been extensively corroborated by controlled studies based on research using a great variety of methods investigating diverse phenomena, including cross-cultural studies Haslam b. The research shows that the elementary models play an important role in cognition including perception of other persons. Resemblance to Classic Measurement Scales It may be jarring to learn that intense romantic love and racism are both categorized as Communal Sharing or that tithing and prostitution are both instances of Market Pricing. These examples illustrate that a relational model is, at its core, a meaningless formal structure. Implementation in interpersonal relations and attendant emotional associations enter in on a different level of mental processing. Each model can be individuated in purely formal terms, each elementary model strongly resembling one of the classic scale types familiar from measurement theory. Strictly speaking, it is each mod which can be individuated in purely formal terms. This finer point will be discussed in the next section. Communal Sharing resembles a nominal categorical scale. A nominal scale is simply classifying things into categories. A questionnaire may be designed to categorize people as theist, atheist, agnostic, and other. Such a questionnaire is measuring religious belief by using a nominal scale. The groups into which Communal Sharing sorts people is similar. One either belongs to a pertinent group or one does not, there being no degree or any shades of gray. Authority Ranking resembles an ordinal scale in which items are ranked. The ranking of students according to their performance is one example. The ordered

classification of shirts in a store as small, medium, large, and extra large is another. Equality Matching resembles an interval scale. On interval scales, any unit measures the same magnitude on any point in the scale. For example, on the Celsius scale the difference between 1 degree and 2 degrees is the same as the difference between 5 degrees and 6 degrees. Equality Matching resembles an interval scale insofar as one can measure the degree of inequality in a social relationship using equal intervals so as to judge how to correct the imbalance. It is by use of such a scale that people in an Equality Matching interaction can specify how much one person owes another. However, an interval scale cannot be used to express a ratio because it has no absolute zero point. For example, the zero point on the Celsius scale is not absolute so one cannot say that 20 degrees is twice as warm as 10 degrees while on a Kelvin scale because the zero point is absolute one can express ratios. Given that Market Pricing is the application of ratios to social interactions, it resembles a ratio scale such as the Kelvin scale. One cannot, for example, meaningfully speak of the maximization of utility without presupposing some sort of ratio scale for measuring utility. Maximization would correspond to percent. Self-Organization and Natural Selection The four measurement scales correspond to different levels of semantic richness and precision. The nominal scale conveys little information, being very coarse grained. Giving letter grades is even more precise and semantically rich, conveying how much one student out-performs another. This is the use of an interval scale. The most informative and semantically rich is a percentage grade which illustrates the ratio by which one student out-performs another, hence a ratio scale. For example, if graded accurately a student scoring 90 percent has done twice as well as a student scoring 45 percent. Counterexamples may be apparent: To take an extreme case, a very generous instructor might award an A to every student after all, no student was completely lost in class while at the same time mentally ranking the students in terms of their performance. Split grades are sometimes used to smooth out the traditional coarse-grained letter grading system. But, if both scales are as sensitive as possible and based on the same data, the interval scale will convey more information than the ordinal scale. The ordinal ranking will be derivable from the interval grading, but not vice versa. This is more obvious in the case of temperature measurement, in which grade inflation is not an issue. One scale is more informative than another because it is less symmetrical; greater asymmetry means that more information is conveyed. On a measurement scale, a permutation which distorts or changes information is an asymmetry. Analogously, a permutation in a social-relational arrangement which distorts or changes social relations is an asymmetry. In either case, a permutation which does not carry with it such a distortion or change is symmetric. The nominal scale type is the most symmetrical scale type, just as Communal Sharing is the most symmetrical elementary model. In either case, the only asymmetrical permutation is one which moves an item out of a category, for example, expelling someone from the social group. Any permutation within the category or group makes no difference; no difference to the information conveyed, no difference to the social relation. So long as the student does well enough to pass or poorly enough to fail, this would not have changed the grade. Thanks to this high degree of symmetry, the nominal scale conveys relatively little information. The ordinal scale is less symmetrical. Any permutation that changes rankings is asymmetrical, since it distorts or changes something significant. But items arranged could change in many respects relative to each other while their ordering remains unaffected, so a high level of symmetry remains. Students could vary in their performance, but so long as their relative ranking remains the same, this would make no difference to grades based on an ordinal scale. An interval scale is even less symmetrical and hence more informative, as seen in the fact that a system of letter grades conveys more information than does a mere ranking of students. An interval scale conveys the relative degrees of difference between items. If one student improves from doing C level work to B level work, this would register on an interval scale but would remain invisible on an ordinal scale if the change did not affect student ranking. Analogously, in Equality Matching, if one person, and one person only, were to receive an extra five minutes to deliver their campaign speech, this would be socially significant. By contrast, in Authority Ranking, the addition of an extra five minutes to the time taken by a Prince to deliver a speech would make no socially significant difference provided that the relative ranking remains undisturbed for example, the King still being allotted more time than the Prince, and the Duke less than the Prince. In Market Pricing, as in any ratio scale, the asymmetry is even greater. Adding five years to the punishment of every convict could badly

skew what should be proportionate punishments. But giving an extra five minutes to each candidate would preserve balance in Equality Matching. The symmetries of all the scale types have an interesting formal property. They form a descending symmetry subgroup chain. In other words, the symmetries of a ratio scale form a subset of the symmetries of a relevant interval scale, the symmetries of that scale form a subset of the symmetries of a relevant ordinal scale, and the symmetries of that scale form a subset of the symmetries of a relevant nominal scale. More specifically, the scale types form a containment hierarchy. Analogously, the symmetries of Market Pricing form a subset of the symmetries of Equality Matching which form a subset of the symmetries of Authority Ranking which form a subset of the symmetries of Communal Sharing. Descending subgroup chains are common in nature, including inorganic nature. The symmetries of solid matter form a subset of the symmetries of liquid matter which form a subset of the symmetries of gaseous matter which form a subset of the symmetries of plasma. This raises interesting questions about the origins of these patterns in the mind: Darwinian adaptations are genetically encoded, whereas spontaneous symmetry breaking is ubiquitous in nature rather than being limited to genetically constrained structures. That is, are the elementary relational models results of self-organization rather than learning or natural selection? If they are programmed into the genome, why would this programming imitate a pattern in nature which usually occurs without genetic encoding? The spiral shape of a galaxy, for example, is due to spontaneous symmetry breaking, as is the transition from liquid to solid. But these transitions are not encoded in genes, of course. Being part of the natural world, why should the elementary models be understood any differently?

7: Moral reasoning and mental health - Philosophy for life

In Section IV, I'll take a brief look at a rather different project in moral philosophy. This project, I'll argue, is compatible with a wide range of theories about the structures subserving mental representation.

Philosophy is the systematic and critical study of fundamental questions that arise both in everyday life and through the practice of other disciplines. Some of these questions concern the nature of reality: Is there an external world? What is the relationship between the physical and the mental? Others concern our nature as rational, purposive, and social beings: Do we act freely? Where do our moral obligations come from? How do we construct just political states? Others concern the nature and extent of our knowledge: What is it to know something rather than merely believe it? Does all of our knowledge come from sensory experience? Are there limits to our knowledge? And still others concern the foundations and implications of other disciplines: What is a scientific explanation? What sort of knowledge of the world does science provide? Do scientific theories, such as evolutionary theory, or quantum mechanics, compel us to modify our basic philosophical understanding of, and approach to, reality? What makes an object a work of art? Are aesthetic value judgments objective? The aim in Philosophy is not to master a body of facts, so much as think clearly and sharply through any set of facts. Towards that end, philosophy students are trained to read critically, analyze and assess arguments, discern hidden assumptions, construct logically tight arguments, and express themselves clearly and precisely in both speech and writing. Here are descriptions of some of the main areas of philosophy:

Epistemology Epistemology studies questions about knowledge and rational belief. Traditional questions include the following: How can we know that the ordinary physical objects around us are real as opposed to dreamed, or hallucinated, as in the Matrix? What are the factors that determine whether a belief is rational or irrational? What is the difference between knowing something and just believing it? Part of the answer is that you can have false beliefs, but you can only know things that are true. Some other questions that have recently been the subject of lively debate in epistemology include: Can two people with exactly the same evidence be completely rational in holding opposite beliefs? Does whether I know something depend on how much practical risk I would face if I believed falsely? Can I rationally maintain confident beliefs about matters on which I know that others, who are seemingly every bit as intelligent, well-informed, unbiased and diligent as I am, have come to opposite conclusions?

Metaphysics Metaphysics is the study of what the world is like—or some would say what reality consists in. Metaphysical questions can take several forms. They can be questions about what exists questions of ontology ; they can be questions what is fundamental as opposed to derivative ; and they can be questions about what is an objective feature of the world as opposed to a mere consequence the way in which creatures like us happen to interact with that world. Questions that are central to the study of metaphysics include questions about the nature of objects, persons, time, space, causation, laws of nature, and modality. The rigorous study of these questions has often led metaphysicians to make surprising claims. Plato thought that alongside the observable, concrete world there was a realm of eternal, unchanging abstract entities like Goodness, Beauty, and Justice. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz claimed that the world was composed of tiny indivisible souls, called monads. Even today contemporary metaphysicians have been known to doubt the existence of ordinary objects, to deny the possibility of free will, and to argue that our world is just one of a plurality of worlds.

Logic Logic is the study of the validity of patterns of inference. Logic is not a branch of psychology: It does not concern how people actually reason or which kinds of reasoning they find intuitively compelling. Rather, logic concerns the question of when a claim is conclusively supported by other claims. In studying the notion of logical validity, logicians have developed symbolic languages. These enable us to state claims clearly and precisely, and to investigate the exact structure of an argument. These languages have turned out to be useful within philosophy and other disciplines, including mathematics and computer science. Some of the questions about logic studied by members of the philosophy department include: Given that logic is not an empirical science, how can we have knowledge of basic logical truths? What is the connection between logic and rationality? Can mathematics be reduced to logic? Should we revise logic to accommodate vague or imprecise language? Should we revise logic to answer the liar

paradox and other paradoxes concerning truth? Political Philosophy Political philosophy is the philosophical study of concepts and values associated with political matters. For one example, is there any moral obligation to do what the law says just because the law says so, and if so on what grounds? Many have said we consent to obey. Did you consent to obey the laws? Can one consent without realizing it? Are there other grounds for an obligation to obey the law? Another central question is what would count as a just distribution of all the wealth and opportunity that is made possible by living in a political community? Is inequality in wealth or income unjust? Much existing economic inequality is a result of different talents, different childhood opportunities, different gender, or just different geographical location. What might justify inequalities that are owed simply to bad luck? Some say that inequality can provide incentives to produce or innovate more, which might benefit everyone. Others say that many goods belong to individuals before the law enters in, and that people may exchange them as they please even if this results in some having more than others. So a third question, what does it mean for something to be yours, and what makes it yours? Philosophy of Language The Philosophy of Language is devoted to the study of questions concerned with meaning and communication. Such questions range from ones that interact closely with linguistic theory to questions that are more akin to those raised in the study of literature. Very large questions include: What is linguistic meaning? How is the meaning of linguistic performances similar to and different from the meanings of, say, gestures or signals? What is the relationship between language and thought? Is thought more fundamental than language? Or is there some sense in which only creatures that can speak can think? To what extent does the social environment affect the meaning and use of language? Other questions focus on the communicative aspect of language, such as: What is it to understand what someone else has said? What is it to assert something? How is assertion related to knowledge and belief? And how is it that we can gain knowledge from others through language? Yet other questions focus on specific features of the languages we speak, for example: What is it a name to be a name of a particular thing? Is there an important difference between literal and figurative uses of language? And how does it work? Moral Philosophy Ethics is the study of what we ought to do and what sorts of people we ought to be. Ethicists theorize about what makes acts right and wrong and what makes outcomes good and bad, and also about which motivations and traits of character we should admire and cultivate. Some other questions that ethicists try to answer are closely related to the central ones. Are moral claims true and false, like ordinary descriptive claims about our world, and if they are what makes them so? Aesthetics [forthcoming] History of Philosophy The History of Philosophy plays a special role in the study of philosophy. Like every other intellectual discipline, philosophy has of course a history. However, in the case of philosophy an understanding of its history - from its ancient and medieval beginnings through the early modern period the 17th and 18th centuries and into more recent times - forms a vital part of the very enterprise of philosophy, whether in metaphysics and epistemology or in ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy. To study the great philosophical works of the past is to learn about the origins and presuppositions of many of the problems that occupy philosophy today. It is also to discover and to come to appreciate different ways of dealing with these problems, different conceptions of what the fundamental problems of philosophy are, and indeed different ways of doing philosophy altogether. And it is also the study of worksâ€”from Plato and Aristotle, through Kant and Mill and more recent writersâ€”that have shaped much of Western culture far beyond academic philosophy. Many of the most creative philosophers working today have also written on various topics in the history of philosophy and have found their inspiration in great figures of the past. This question may be understood in two ways: Why would one engage in the particular intellectual activities that constitute philosophical inquiry? And how might the study of philosophy affect my future career prospects? Philosophy as intellectual activity may have a number of motivations: Why is it this way, rather than another?

8: Philosophy and Mental Health - Tim Thornton

The Greeks made a connection between mental health and moral excellence. Plato wrote: 'excellence is a kind of mental health or beauty or fitness, and defect a kind of illness or deformity or weakness.'

Navigation Philosophy and Mental Health Because of its very nature, mental health care raises as many conceptual questions as empirical ones. As well as its youth, the new philosophy of psychiatry has two further features that make it stand out. There is not an established set of inter-related problems with familiar, if rival, solutions. It is an area where philosophical methods, accounts and theories can be applied to psychiatric phenomena and thus it also serves to test those accounts. To take one type of example, psychopathology is a test track for theories in the philosophy of mind. But there is also traffic the other way. Three centuries of discussing the relationship of mind and body have furnished philosophers with a variety of subtle models from forms of dualism, through gradations of physicalism, to eliminativism with modern alternatives such as enactivism which can help in the interpretation of psychiatric data. Secondly, unlike some areas of philosophy, philosophy of psychiatry can have a genuine impact on practice. It is a philosophy of, and for, mental health care. It provides tools for critical understanding of contemporary practices, and of the assumptions on which mental health care more broadly, and psychiatry more narrowly, are based. Thus it is not merely an abstract area of thought and research, of interest only to academics. In providing a deeper, clearer understanding of the concepts, principles and values inherent in everyday thinking about mental health, psychiatric diagnoses and the theoretical drivers of mental health policy, it can impact directly on the lives of people involved in all aspects of mental health care. Values, meanings, facts A brief examination of the history of the subject reveals why the discipline of psychiatry is particularly suited to contributions from philosophy. Whilst the father of psychopathology, the German philosopher and psychiatrist Karl Jaspers, combined psychiatric and philosophical expertise, within the English speaking tradition philosophy and psychiatry went their separate ways throughout most of the twentieth century. But towards the end of the twentieth century, the rise of the anti-psychiatry movement prompted a resurgence of philosophical interest in psychiatry. This was because a key element of the anti-psychiatric criticism of mental health care turned on a contentious claim about the nature of mental illness: Such a sceptical claim is paradigmatically philosophical and one of the main proponents of anti-psychiatry, the psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, put forward a number of philosophical arguments in support of it. These turned on the fact that psychiatric diagnosis is essentially evaluative. From this he concluded that, unlike physical illness, it could not be medically treated because as illness it was not real. The apparent reality of mental illness is best explained, according to Szasz, as the reality of non-medically treatable life problems. Thus the analysis of mental illness, and the role of values in that analysis, lies at the heart of recent philosophy of psychiatry. In addition to the importance of values, two further key areas of mental health care prompt immediate philosophical questioning. Firstly, psychiatry since Jaspers has sought to balance two key elements: Both bio-medical facts and meanings broadly construed to include experiences, beliefs and utterances need somehow to be integrated into mental health care. If there is a clear distinction and meanings are conceptually irreducible to biomedical facts, efforts to understand the nature of this relationship become all the more philosophically interesting. Secondly, there has been much work by psychiatrists since the Second World War to develop psychiatric classification or taxonomy. This has, historically, been in response to a concern about a lack of agreement or reliability about psychiatric diagnosis. More recently, there has been growing concern that reliability has been improved but only at the cost of validity, or underlying truth, of classificatory schemas. This concern has also been reflected in philosophy of psychiatry as an instance of a broader question of the role of science in mental health care. Thus the nature of the facts in question is still very much up for grabs.

9: Mental Illness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The book develops some interesting conclusions, among them that sound morality is indeed healthy, and that moral values are inevitably embedded in our conceptions of mental health. In the end, the book shows how both morality and mental health are inextricably intertwined in our pursuit of a meaningful life.

At age eleven he left school to work as a weaver [1] hence the description of him as Weevir, rex philosophorum. Towards the end of his undergraduate degree he became a contributor to the Westminster Review with his first article entitled "Electrotype and Daguerreotype," published in September. This was the beginning of his connection with John Stuart Mill, which led to a lifelong friendship. His college career and studies was distinguished especially in mental philosophy, mathematics and physics and he graduated with a Master of Arts with Highest Honours. In , Bain substituted for Dr. Glennie the Professor of Moral Philosophy, who, due to ill-health, was unable to discharge his academic duties. He continued to do this three successive terms, during which he continued writing for the Westminster, and also helped John Stuart Mill with the revision of the manuscript of his System of Logic. In he contributed the first review of the book to the London and Westminster. A year later, preferring a wider field, he resigned the position and devoted himself to writing. In he moved to London to fill a post in the Board of Health under Sir Edwin Chadwick where he worked for social reform and became a prominent member of the intellectual circle which included George Grote and John Stuart Mill. In he published his first major work, The Senses and the Intellect, followed in by The Emotions and the Will. These treatises won him a position among independent thinkers. Bain was also Examiner in Logic and Moral Philosophy from 1847 and 1848 for the University of London and also an Instructor in moral science for the Indian Civil Service examinations. Linguistics[edit] Until , neither logic nor English had received adequate attention in Aberdeen, and Bain devoted himself to supplying these deficiencies. He succeeded not only in raising the Standard of Education generally in the North of Scotland, but also in establishing a School of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, and in widely influencing the teaching of English grammar and composition in the United Kingdom. His efforts were first directed to the preparation of textbooks: These works were wide-ranging and their original views and methods met with wide acceptance. Accordingly, in , he published his Manual of Mental and Moral Science, mainly a condensed form of his treatises, with the doctrines re-stated, and in many instances freshly illustrated, and with many important additions. The year saw the publication of the Logic. He also started the philosophical journal, Mind; the first number appeared in January, under the editorship of a former pupil, George Croom Robertson, of University College London. To this journal Bain contributed many important articles and discussions; and in fact he bore the whole expenses of it till Robertson, owing to ill-health, resigned the editorship in and George Stout took up the baton. Psychology[edit] Although his influence as a logician and linguist in grammar and rhetoric was considerable, his reputation rests on his works in psychology. He sought to chart physiological correlates of mental states but refused to make any materialistic assumptions. His idea of applying the scientific method of classification to psychical phenomena gave scientific character to his work, the value of which was enhanced by his methodical exposition and his command of illustration. In line with this, too, is his demand that psychology should be cleared of metaphysics; and to his lead is no doubt due in great measure the position that psychology has now acquired as a distinct positive science. Bain established psychology, as influenced by David Hume and Auguste Comte, as a more distinct discipline of science through application of the scientific method. Bain proposed that physiological and psychological processes were linked, and that traditional psychology could be explained in terms of this association. Moreover, he proposed that all knowledge and all mental processes had to be based on actual physical sensations, and not on spontaneous thoughts and ideas, and attempted to identify the link between the mind and the body and to discover the correlations between mental and behavioural phenomena. William James calls his work the "last word" of the earlier stage of psychology, but he was in reality the pioneer of the new. Subsequent psycho-physical investigations "have all been in" the spirit of his work; and although he consistently advocated the introspective method in psychological investigation, he was among the first to appreciate the help that may be given to it by social

psychology , comparative psychology and developmental psychology. He may justly claim the merit of having guided the awakened psychological interest of British thinkers of the second half of the 19th century into fruitful channels. Bain emphasised the importance of our active experiences of movement and effort, and though his theory of a central innervation sense is no longer held as he propounded it, its value as a suggestion to later psychologists is great. His thought that a belief is but a preparation for action is respected by both pragmatism and functionalism. Social Reform[edit] Bain took a keen interest in social justice and development and was frequently an active part in the political and social movements of the day; after his retirement from the Chair of Logic, he was twice elected Lord Rector of the University of Aberdeen each term of office extending over three years. He was a strenuous advocate of reform, especially in the teaching of sciences , and supported the claims of modern languages to a place in the curriculum. His services to education and social reform in Scotland were recognised by the conferment of the honorary degree of Doctor of law by the University of Edinburgh in A marble bust of him stands in the Aberdeen Public Library and his portrait hangs in Marischal College. Later life and death[edit] Bain retired from his Chair and Professorship from the University of Aberdeen and was succeeded by William Minto , one of his most brilliant pupils. Nevertheless, his interest in thought, and his desire to complete the scheme of work mapped out in earlier years, remained as keen as ever. This was succeeded , by a new edition of the Rhetoric, and along with it, a book On Teaching English, being an exhaustive application of the principles of rhetoric to the criticism of style, for the use of teachers; and in he published a revised edition of The Senses and the Intellect, which contain his last word on psychology. In also appeared his last contribution to Mind. His last years were spent in privacy at Aberdeen, where he died on 18 September He married twice but left no children. His last request was that "no stone should be placed upon his grave: As Professor William L. It is rare to find a philosopher who combines philosophical with educational and practical interests, and who is also an active force in the community in which he dwells. Such a combination was here. Let us not fail to appreciate it.

Social work and social movements in late twentieth-Century Europe Reduction of particle size of drug substance for low-dose drug products Christopher L. Burcham . [et al.] Voyage from Glasgow to Georgetown, British Guyana, 1837 The De Poenitentia. Teeth are terrific Preface acknowledgments Carter E. Foster, Franklin Sirmans Torts in New Zealand Millers Preferable accounting principles Garfield Sobers : the greatest by Keith Sandiford. 1996 Wiley Expert Witness Update Harthaven, the best darned place to grow up Phantasie iii the wrath of nikademus manual Aunts Arent Gentlemen (Bertie Wooster Jeeves) Fat cats craft and coloring book The Christ Sparks High-frequency and microwave circuit design Recent Advances in the Structural Dynamic Modeling of Composite Rotor Blades and Thick Composites Before and after Darwin Focus on Literature People Project report on kcc bank L. Augustine WADDELL: Note on some Ajanta Paintings. . p. 8 Athenian culture and society Paddle Your Own Canoe, 97 The wrong way to plan Time-domain analysis and design of control systems The economics of dispute resolution Differentiating the related concepts of ethics, morality, law and justice Terry T. Ray The Making miracles happen Soren kierkegaard either or Introducing erlang getting started in functional programming 2nd edition The little girl who could see Death Farther considerationson the present state of affairs, at home and abroad A Genealogical and Historical Record of the Descendants of John Pease, Sen, Last of Enfield, Conn Mario, the Magnificent Mario, el magnifico Nidas theory of translation The father of British Canada Vice principals pilot script I. Ionian science before Socrates. Walkingsticks (Bugs Bugs Bugs) The basic argument for vegetarianism