

1: Table of contents for Metaethics after Moore

To anticipate, it turns out that Moore and Jackson are both right about something and wrong about something. The correct view combines elements from both. Keywords: Practical Ethics, Moore, Frank Jackson, rightness, uncertainty.

Now we start again, this time with electrons fig. The source is a filament, the barriers tungsten plates, these are holes in the tungsten plate, and for a detector we have any electrical system which is sufficiently sensitive to pick up the charge of an electron arriving with whatever energy the source has. If you would prefer it, we could use photons with black paper instead of the tungsten plate – in fact black paper is not very good because the fibres do not make sharp holes, so we would have to have something better – and for a detector a photo-multiplier capable of detecting the individual photons arriving. What happens with either case? I will discuss only the electron case, since the case with photons is exactly the same. First, what we receive in the electrical detector, with a sufficiently powerful amplifier behind it, are clicks, lumps, absolute lumps. When the click comes it is a certain size, and the size is always the same. If you turn the source weaker the clicks come further apart, but it is the same sized click. If you turn it up they come so fast that they jam the amplifier. You have to turn it down enough so, that there are not too many clicks for the machinery that you are using for the detector. Next, if you put another detector in a different place and listen to both of them you will never get two clicks at the same time, at least if the source is weak enough and the precision with which you measure the time is good enough. If you cut down the intensity of the source so that the electrons come few and far between, they never give a click in both detectors at once. That means that the thing which is coming comes in lumps – it has a definite size, and it only comes to one place at a time. Right, so electrons, or photons, come in lumps. Therefore what we can do is the same thing as we did for bullets: What we do is hold the detector in various places – actually if we wanted to although it is expensive, we could put detectors all over at the same time and make the whole curve simultaneously – but we hold the detector in each place, say for an hour, and we measure at the end of the hour how many electrons came, and we average it. What do we get for the number of electrons that arrive? The same kind of N12 as with bullets? Figure 30 shows what we get for N12, that is what we get with both holes open. That is the phenomenon of nature, that she produces the curve which is the same as you would get for the interference of waves. She produces this curve for what? Not for the energy in a wave but for the probability of arrival of one of these lumps. The mathematics is simple. In this case a_1 is the probability amplitude to arrive from hole No. To get the total probability amplitude to arrive you add the two together and square it. This is a direct imitation of what happens with the waves, because we have to get the same curve out so we use the same mathematics. I should check on one point though, about the interference. I did not say what happens if we close one of the holes. Let us try to analyse this interesting curve by presuming that the electrons came through one hole or through the other. We close one hole, and measure how many come through hole No. Or we can close the other hole and measure how many come through hole No. The question is how it can come about that when the electrons go through hole No. For instance, if I hold the detector at the point q with both holes open I get practically nothing, yet if I close one of the holes I get plenty, and if I close the other hole I get something. I leave both holes open and I get nothing; I let them come through both holes and they do not come any more. Or take the point at the centre; you can show that that is higher than the sum of the two single hole curves. You might think that if you were clever enough you could argue that they have some way of going around through the holes back and forth, or they do something complicated, or one splits in half and goes through the two holes, or something similar, in order to explain this phenomenon. Nobody, however, has succeeded in producing an explanation that is satisfactory, because the mathematics in the end are so very simple, the curve is so very simple fig. Feynman only adds to the mystery by saying a particle is both a wave and a particle. The wave is just abstract information a theoretical and statistical prediction about the distribution of paths and positions of particles over large numbers of experiments. There is no "it" in the wave. I will summarize, then, by saying that electrons arrive in lumps, like

particles, but the probability of arrival of these lumps is determined as the intensity of waves would be. It is in this sense that the electron behaves sometimes like a particle and sometimes like a wave. It behaves in two different ways at the same time fig. That is all there is to say. I could give a mathematical description to figure out the probability of arrival of electrons under any circumstances, and that would in principle be the end of the lecture "except that there are a number of subtleties involved in the fact that nature works this way. There are a number of peculiar things, and I would like to discuss those peculiarities because they may not be self-evident at this point. To discuss the subtleties, we begin by discussing a proposition which we would have thought reasonable, since these things are lumps. Since what comes is always one complete lump, in this case an electron, it is obviously reasonable to assume that either an electron goes through hole No. It seems very obvious that it cannot do anything else if it is a lump. Now we have already discussed a little what happens with proposition A. If it were true that an electron either goes through hole No. The total number which arrive will be the number that come via hole 1, plus the number that come via hole 2. Since the resulting curve cannot be easily analysed as the sum of two pieces in such a nice manner, and since the experiments which determine how many would arrive if only one hole or the other were open do not give the result that the total is the sum of the two parts, it is obvious that we should conclude that this proposition is false. We can show that the electron can go through just one hole and yet proposition A is not false, because Feynman has ignored something very important - the wave function that determines the probabilities of finding particles is different when both holes are open. The information that generates interference comes from the surrounding environment. If it is not true that the electron either comes through hole No. So proposition A is false. Unfortunately, or otherwise, we can test logic by experiment. We have to find out whether it is true or not that the electrons come through either hole 1 or hole 2, or maybe they go round through both holes and get temporarily split up, or something. Why interference patterns show up when both holes are open, even when particles go through just one hole, though we cannot know which hole or we lose the interference When there is only one slit open here the left slit, the probabilities pattern has one large maximum directly behind the slit and small side fringes. If only the right slit were open, this pattern would move behind the right slit. When both slits are open, the maximum is now at the center between the two slits, there are more interference fringes, and these probabilities apply whichever slit the particle enters. The "one mystery" remains - how these "probabilities" can exercise causal control statistically over material particles. His "virtual particles" explore all space the "sum over paths" as they determine the variational minimum for least action, thus the resulting probability amplitude wave function can "know" which holes are open. All we have to do is watch them. And to watch them we need light. So we put behind the holes a source of very intense light. Light is scattered by electrons, bounced off them, so if the light is strong enough you can see electrons as they go by. We stand back, then, and we look to see whether when an electron is counted we see, or have seen the moment before the electron is counted, a flash behind hole 1 or a flash behind hole 2, or maybe a sort of half flash in each place at the same time. We are going to find out now how it goes, by looking. We turn on the light and look, and lo, we discover that every time there is a count at the detector we see either a flash behind No. What we find is that the electron comes one hundred per cent, complete, through hole 1 or through hole 2 "when we look. Let us squeeze nature into some kind of a difficulty here. I will show you what we are going to do. We are going to keep the light on and we are going to watch and count how many electrons come through. We will make two columns, one for hole No. What does the column for hole No. If I watch behind hole No. I see the curve N1 fig. That column is distributed just as we thought when we closed hole 2, much the same way whether we are looking or not. If we close hole 2 we get the same distribution in those that arrive as if we were watching hole No. Now look, the total number which arrive has to be the total number. It has to be the sum of the number N1 plus the number N2; because each one that comes through has been checked off in either column 1 or column 2. The total number which arrive absolutely has to be the sum of these two. But I said it was distributed as the curve N It really is, of course; it has to be and it is. This is the result that we get when the light is on. We get a different answer whether I turn on the light or not. If I turn off the light, the

distribution is N So you see, nature has squeezed out! We could say, then, that the light affects the result. If the light is on you get a different answer from that when the light is off. You can say too that light affects the behaviour of electrons. Electrons are very delicate. When you are looking at a baseball and you shine a light on it, it does not make any difference, the baseball still goes the same way. But when you shine a light on an electron it knocks him about a bit, and instead of doing one thing he does another, because you have turned the light on and it is so strong. Suppose we try turning it weaker and weaker, until it is very dim, then use very careful detectors that can see very dim lights, and look with a dim light. As the light gets weaker and weaker, somehow it should get more and more like no light at all. How then does one curve turn into another?

2: Moral Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. They pressed radical doctrines with considerable bravado. Intoxicated by the apparent implications of logical positivism, early non-cognitivists would say things like, "in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement Later non-cognitivists developed the position into a more subtle doctrine, no longer committed to the revisionary doctrines associated with its forefathers. For example, Simon Blackburn has undertaken the "quasi-realist" project of showing how a non-cognitivist can "earn" the right to the seemingly realist discourse on a less metaphysically controversial and semantically implausible basis by giving a non-cognitivist analysis of realist-sounding semantics and pragmatics Blackburn To retain its distinctively non-cognitivist credentials ¹, quasi-realism must emphasize the role of desire-like states. To succeed in its aims, quasi-realism must accommodate the belief-like features of moral judgement countenanced by common-sense. Smith argues that because of their emphasis on desire, non-cognitivists cannot accommodate all of these belief-like features. The challenge is an interesting and novel one, but non-cognitivists have ample resources with which to meet it. Beliefs can be held with greater or less confidence, and moral judgements seem to share this feature. Finally, evaluative judgements can be comparative. I can judge not only that pleasure and beauty are good but I can also judge that pleasure is better than beauty. Smith argues that his own cognitivist theory see Smith is well-placed to accommodate these features of evaluative judgement. Smith then suggests that agents are ideally situated to offer advice when their psychologies have been purged of all cognitive limitations and rational failings. The content of this advice is fixed by the desires the agent would have if purged of all cognitive limitations and rational failings. Smith argues that this account is well placed to accommodate Certitude, Importance and Robustness. On this account are just a species of belief, so whatever account we give of these features of belief in general should extend to evaluative judgements so understood. Smith argues that non-cognitivism, by contrast, is ill-suited to accommodate these features. Smith characterizes non-cognitivism as the thesis that evaluative judgements are expressions not of beliefs that things are a certain evaluative way, but rather are expressions of desires that things be a certain non-evaluative way The problem for non-cognitivism so understood arises from the fact that Certitude, Robustness and Importance are distinct structural features of evaluative judgements. Unfortunately, Smith argues, desires "posses just two structural features that look like they will be of any use in the present connection. This latter feature is clearly well-suited to characterize the Robustness of moral judgement. The problem is that this leaves only one structural feature - motivational strength - to play the role of Importance and Certitude. Since Importance and Certitude are distinct, it seems unlikely that motivational strength could adequately model both. This leaves it open that evaluative judgements might express beliefs about the ways that things stand in non-evaluative respects. The non-cognitivist sketched here and the cognitivist remain deeply divided on at least two important questions. First, cognitivists maintain that to accept a moral judgement an agent must have a belief with a particular kind of content, and non-cognitivists deny this. Moorean non-naturalists maintain that accepting an evaluative judgement requires a belief about a certain kind of non-natural property. Different cognitivists differ over the privileged content of evaluative beliefs, but they are all united in maintaining that the acceptance of an evaluative judgement requires adopting a belief with a particular content. Second, cognitivists maintain, but non-cognitivists deny, that evaluative utterances express beliefs that are thereby guaranteed to provide the truth-conditions for those utterances. Non-cognitivists can allow that accepting evaluative utterances does always involve the having of beliefs as well as desires, but deny that such beliefs are thereby guaranteed to provide the truth-conditions for the corresponding evaluative utterances. For example, perhaps Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit are right to hold that non-cognitivists must admit that moral utterances express the belief that the speaker has the relevant

attitude see Jackson and Pettit Quasi-realists often take seemingly meta-ethical claims about mind-independence, for example and argue that they are better understood as first-order claims in disguise. A similar move could be made here, assuming minimalist theories of truth and truth-aptness are defensible which, for present purposes, I must simply assume. It does at least seem very plausible that anyone who says that someone ought to do something is committed to supposing that someone ideally situated to offer advice would advise them to do it. Plausibly, a competent user of evaluative language could reject the idea that being fully informed of all relevant facts and having maximally coherent and unified desire set is sufficient for being an ideal advisor. Someone could insist that an ideal advisor must also be altruistic, and that merely being fully informed of all the facts and having a unified and coherent desire set does not guarantee altruism being fully informed may make one jaded rather than altruistic. Equally, though, someone could reject the idea that ideal advisors as such must be altruistic without thereby betraying linguistic confusion. Altruism is just one example, of course. Other competent speakers might insist that an advisor must care about justice, or the word of God, or equality to count as ideal and any of these positions plausibly can be accepted or rejected without thereby betraying conceptual incompetence. Being fully informed of all the facts might make someone jaded and cynical, and we might for that reason alone coherently doubt the credentials of such an advisor. Perhaps more provocatively, Richard Holton has argued that the Muggletonians were neither conceptually confused about the meanings of evaluative language nor could they possibly have understood ideal advisors as Smith suggests any competent user of evaluative language must see Holton ; see also Bigelow and Smith The Muggletonians were a bizarre religious sect that took the story of the tree of knowledge very seriously, and held that reason and knowledge were deeply pernicious and to be avoided. Holton makes an interesting case that the Muggletonians would not have recognized their fully informed selves as ideal advisors but as Satan-like entities, and that it is conceptual arrogance to accuse them of not understanding evaluative language but highly implausible to suppose their evaluative judgements concerned what they would want if fully rational. There is room for considerable debate about these arguments, but this is not the place to adjudicate that debate. There is a difference between believing that my favorite advisor would recommend something and believing that a fully informed advisor would recommend it; this distinction remains even if my favorite advisor happens to be a fully informed one. On this account, evaluative judgements involve both non-cognitive attitudes and beliefs. It nonetheless is a version of non-cognitivism because no particular content is privileged as the content of evaluative beliefs as such; there can be massive disagreement about what makes an advisor an ideal one. Neither are the beliefs expressed by such utterances on this non-cognitivist account thereby guaranteed to provide the truth-conditions for the corresponding utterances. This is the second reason the proposed account does not collapse into any form of cognitivism. In this respect, minimalist account of truth and truth-aptness are important resources for defending non-cognitivism. The crucial point for present purposes is that this version of non-cognitivism has ample resources with which to distinguish Certitude, Robustness and Importance in a plausible way. My confidence that telling the truth is good in such-and-such circumstances is simply my confidence in an ordinary belief - my belief that the relevant sort of advisor would approve of truth-telling here. So whatever general account we offer for confidence of ordinary descriptive beliefs in terms of counterfactual betting behavior, e. Furthermore, this account will cover both judgements of instrumental and non-instrumental value. For on this account to judge that something has non-instrumental value is just to believe that an ideal advisor would approve of it and recommend it for its own sake and not merely for its consequences. So my confidence that pleasure is good for its own sake is simply my confidence that a certain kind of advisor would approve of pleasure for its own sake and not merely as an end. Once again, this is an ordinary belief about what a certain kind of agent would prefer, so no special story needs to be told about confidence. All else being equal, the more confident I am that an action would be good the more motivated I should be to perform it. Similarly, all else being equal the more certain I am that an ideal advisor would recommend a given action the more likely I will be to perform the action, given my desire to perform actions insofar as they would be recommended by such an advisor. This is

just a special case of a general phenomenon that everyone must accommodate - if an agent wants to perform actions with a given feature F e. Perhaps the best explanation of this will appeal to the idea of confidence analyzed in terms of counterfactual betting behavior in forced choice situations or perhaps the best explanation will be rather different. So there seem to be no new problems for the non-cognitivist here. The robustness of my evaluative judgement simply consists in facts about how easily I could be brought to modify my judgement. The Robustness of my evaluative judgement is just its resistance to such changes in the face new information and further deliberation. It should be clear enough that Robustness is distinct from Certitude on this account and that Robustness is a diachronic concept while Certitude is a synchronic one. Finally, Importance is easy enough to make sense of on this account. To judge that one outcome is better than another or one kind of thing is better than another is simply to believe that the relevant sort of advisor would prefer the one to the other. How good one judges something to be, more generally, is a matter of how much one supposes the relevant sort of advisor would approve of it. Nor is it difficult to see how Importance, so understood, can play a suitable motivational role. Insofar as one is rational, all else being equal, one will also prefer what one takes to be more good to what one takes to be less good. For to judge something is good is to approve of it insofar as an ideal advisor would approve of it - the greater the approval of the object of evaluation the speaker takes it that an ideal advisor would have, the more the speaker approves of it. If one thinks an ideal advisor would more strongly approve of pleasure than knowledge but one is less certain that an ideal advisor would approve of pleasure at all then this will make a difference. Again, this is no problem on the proposed account. In a similar fashion, if I desire to act as an ideal advisor would recommend then the more certain I am that pursuing knowledge would be recommended by an ideal advisor the more strongly motivated I will be to pursue knowledge here. I also think an ideal advisor would approve even more of pleasure, but I am much less certain that an ideal advisor would approve of pleasure at all. So if I forego knowledge for pleasure then I risk going for something that does not actually satisfy my desire to act as a certain kind of advisor would recommend at all. Depending on how great my uncertainty is, it might make sense for me to go for what I take to be a lesser good I am more sure is a good than what I take to be a greater good but am much less sure really is a good at all. In the last section, I consider an objection to this proposal. One might complain that the account is fine as far as it goes, but still omits something important. A number of points should be made about this objection. First, the scope of the putative problem for non-cognitivism has at this point been dramatically reduced. So far as this objection goes, the non-cognitivist can accommodate the distinctions between Certitude, Importance and Robustness so far as ordinary first-order judgements as to what things are good and bad. The Robustness of my conception of the good is simply a function of how easily my fundamental desire to follow the advice of a certain kind of advisor would be in the face of possible new information and deliberation. Admittedly, an agent might think that one conception of the good is better to adopt than another. A conception of the good can in this way be self-effacing and not best by its own lights, but this too is easy enough to account for on the proposed account. That will just be a judgement that the relevant ideal advisor would recommend adopting this conception rather than itself in these circumstances. Second, the quasi-realist project only requires making sense of the belief-like features of evaluative judgements that are clearly countenanced by common sense. To some degree, the non-cognitivist could admit that their account does not make sense of such questions without embarrassment. We can be more or less confident that a concept or quasi-concept applies to the world; it is not at all obvious that we can be more or less confident in our concept or quasi-concept itself. In addition to applying their evaluative concepts to the world, speakers do make judgements about those concepts themselves. Presumably, these kinds of meta-ethical judgements are just ordinary beliefs about the meanings of words and not first-order evaluative judgements. In that case, we can understand Certitude here in whatever way we should understand Certitude more generally for ordinary beliefs. Fortunately, this restriction is not justified. Non-cognitivists can make room for a significant role for belief in their account without abandoning their non-cognitivism. Language, Truth, and Logic.

3: BEARS: Symposium on Michael Smith

Moore on the Right, the Good, and Uncertainty Michael Smith 7. *Scanlon versus Moore on Goodness Philip Stratton-Lake and Brad Hooker* 8. *Opening Questions, Following Rules Paul Bloomfield* 9.

Heisenberg has found evidence for free will , in the elementary sense of randomness followed by lawful behavior, in fruit flies and even bacteria. Yet when it comes to understanding how we initiate behaviour, we can learn a lot by looking at animals. Although we do not credit animals with anything like the consciousness in humans, researchers have found that animal behaviour is not as involuntary as it may appear. The idea that animals act only in response to external stimuli has long been abandoned, and it is well established that they initiate behaviour on the basis of their internal states, as we do. Evidence of randomly generated action “action that is distinct from reaction because it does not depend upon external stimuli” can be found in unicellular organisms. Take the way the bacterium *Escherichia coli* moves. It has a flagellum that can rotate around its longitudinal axis in either direction: Heisenberg identifies two states for bacteria: Random tumbling motion when the flagella rotate clockwise. Lawful forward motion when the flagella rotate counter-clockwise and wrap together. After a random tumble, which generates alternative possibilities , the bacterium moves forward and evaluates the gradients of temperature, nutrients, toxins, etc, along its body. If things look good, it "decides" to continue in that direction. If not, it tumbles again. When you combine some randomness with some "lawful" i. In higher organisms, the brain still may include elements that do a random walk among options for action. Insufficiently equipped, insufficiently informed and short of time, animals have to find a module that is adaptive. Their brains, in a kind of random walk, continuously preactivate, discard and reconfigure their options, and evaluate their possible short-term and long-term consequences. The physiology of how this happens has been little investigated. For example, my lab has demonstrated that fruit flies, in situations they have never encountered, can modify their expectations about the consequences of their actions. They can solve problems that no individual fly in the evolutionary history of the species has solved before. Our experiments show that they actively initiate behaviour.

4: Metaethics after Moore - Oxford Scholarship

Scanlon versus Moore on Goodness. Moore on the Right, the Good, and Uncertainty In 'Moore on the Good, the Right, and Uncertainty', Michael Smith.

While at university in 1955 he played in the summer for Leicestershire County Cricket Club, the county of his birth. Smith came to prominence playing for Oxford University, scoring centuries in three consecutive Varsity matches against Cambridge, from 1955 to 1957. He also represented England at rugby union against Wales in Warwickshire captaincy. Smith was encouraged to move to Warwickshire County Cricket Club in 1958 to take over the captaincy. In the 1950s an amateur had to captain the county and Warwickshire had no capable amateurs. Despite wearing steel-rimmed spectacles Smith was a heavy run-maker in County cricket and passed 2,000 runs a season each year from 1955 to 1960, including 3,000 runs. Warwickshire tales of woe in this respect are numerous and I can remember a call between them in going something like "No A. His outwardly nonchalant captaincy hid a good cricketing brain and he took a rebuilt Warwickshire side to third, fourth and second place in the County Championship in 1957. Early England career Mike Smith was called up as a makeshift opener against New Zealand in 1958, making 0 and 7 on debut on his home ground at Edgbaston in the First Test. In the Third Test at Headingley Smith made 3 and was dropped. Recalled as a top order batsman against India in 1959 he made his maiden Test century, exactly in the Fourth Test at Old Trafford followed by 98 in the Fifth Test at the Oval. Thereafter his weakness against quality fast bowling was exposed by Wes Hall and Chester Watson with innings of 12, 0, 10, 0, 23 and 20, but he recovered with 96 in the second innings of the Fifth Test, adding for the seventh wicket with the wicketkeeper Jim Parks. Against South Africa in 1960 he started well with 54 and 28 in the First Test and top-scoring with 99 in the Second Test, where England won by an innings on another poor wicket. This was followed by 0, 0 and 11 and the next year against Australia he was out for a duck in the First Test at Edgbaston when the part-time bowler Ken Mackay took 3 wickets in four balls and he was dropped for the rest of the summer. This stood him in good stead as he made three successive ducks against India before recovering with 73 when recalled for the Fifth Test. England Captain Smith captained England in 25 of his 50 Test match appearances, but in a period rich in batting talent he was rarely guaranteed a place. His uncertainty against fast bowling was exposed by a series of low scores in the mid 1960s, and Smith faced considerable press criticism, unusual for the time. He lost the toss five times in a row and had so many injuries and illnesses that in the Second Test at Madras Smith had to use three batsmen, two wicket-keepers and six bowlers. When Mickey Stewart was unable to play after the first day because of dysentery he seriously considered calling up the cricket journalist Henry Blofeld, but managed to survive with just 10 men. It was his best series with runs. He won 1-0 against the talented Springboks, the last captain to defeat them in a Test series until 1992. It was also a personal success as he took four catches in the vital First Test and 10 in the series. Although the press labelled the England team as the weakest to go to Australia, [9] their entertaining cricket won them favour with the crowds. They also made their runs faster than any other England team since the war and for once England batted faster than Australia, a refreshing contrast to other Ashes series of the era. At Sydney in the Third Test England rattled up and won by an innings and 93 runs to give them a 1-0 lead in the series. Rain ruined play in New Zealand and the three Test series was drawn 0-0 despite the home team suffering at the hands of the England bowlers. He was replaced by Cowdrey and retired at the end of the following season. Captaincy Style and Popularity Apparently Mrs Smith had gone shopping and M. Despite an Oxford education his accent was utterly classless and between questions to which he appeared to be paying no attention whatever, he applied himself to solving the crossword in the latest Times to arrive from Britain. It never occurred to him to leave the baby, let alone his wife, at home while he led the fight for the Ashes. I think most players appreciated this and his openness as a person brought a better response on the field". Even the truculent fast bowler John Snow "Mike Smith adding a few words of congratulations in his thoroughly open, absent-minded-professor sort of way". Swanton reported that "Smith, though outwardly

MOORE ON THE RIGHT, THE GOOD, AND UNCERTAINTY MICHAEL SMITH

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unconventional and in manner casual to a degree, succeeds as a captain for the conventional reasons. Family[edit] His son Neil followed in his footsteps by captaining Warwickshire and playing, albeit only in One Day Internationals , for England. His daughter Carole is the wife of Sebastian Coe. Smith , Warwickshire, E. If The Cap Fits.

5: Michael Smith, McCosh Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University

Metaethics after Moore. Personal good, Connie Rosati 6. Moore on the right, the good, and uncertainty, Michael Smith 7.

Moral Disagreement Perhaps the longest standing argument is found in the extent and depth of moral disagreement. The mere fact of disagreement does not raise a challenge for moral realism. Disagreement is to be found in virtually any area, even where no one doubts that the claims at stake purport to report facts and everyone grants that some claims are true. But disagreements differ and many believe that the sort of disagreements one finds when it comes to morality are best explained by supposing one of two things: Taking the first line, many note that people differ in their emotions, attitudes and interests and then argue that moral disagreements simply reflect the fact that the moral claims people embrace are despite appearances really devices for expressing or serving their different emotions, attitudes, and interests. Taking the second line, others note that claims can genuinely purport to report facts and yet utterly fail consider claims about phlogiston or astrological forces or some mythical figure that others believed existed and then argue that moral disagreements take the form they do because the facts that would be required to give them some order and direction are not to be found. On either view, the distinctive nature of moral disagreement is seen as well explained by the supposition that moral realism is false, either because cognitivism is false or because an error theory is true. Interestingly, the two lines of argument are not really compatible. If one thinks that moral claims do not even purport to report facts, one cannot intelligibly hold that the facts such claims purport to report do not exist. Nonetheless, in important ways, the considerations each mobilizes might be used to support the other. And someone defending noncognitivism might point to the practical utility of talking as if there were moral facts to explain why moral claims seem to purport to report facts even though they do not. Moreover, almost surely each of these views is getting at something that is importantly right about some people and their use of what appear to be moral claims. Moral realists are committed to holding, though, that to whatever extent moral claims might have other uses and might be made by people with indefensible accounts of moral facts, some moral claims, properly understood, are actually true. To counter the arguments that appeal to the nature of moral disagreement, moral realists need to show that the disagreements are actually compatible with their commitments. An attractive first step is to note, as was done above, that mere disagreement is no indictment. Indeed, to see the differences among people as disagreements rather than as mere differences it seems as if one needs to hold that they are making claims that contradict one another and this seems to require that each side see the other as making a false claim. To the extent there is moral disagreement and not merely difference, moral realists argue, we need at least to reject noncognitivism even as we acknowledge that the views people embrace might be heavily influenced by their emotions, attitudes, and interests. While this is plausible, noncognitivists can and have replied by distinguishing cognitive disagreement from other sorts of disagreement and arguing that moral disagreements are of a sort that does not require cognitivism. Realists cannot simply dismiss this possibility, though they can legitimately challenge noncognitivists to make good sense of how moral arguments and disagreements are carried on without surreptitiously appealing to the participants seeing their claims as purporting to report facts. And, however moral realists respond, they need to avoid doing so in a way that then makes a mystery of the widespread moral disagreement or at least difference that all acknowledge. Some moral realists argue that the disagreements, widespread as they are, do not go very deep that to a significant degree moral disagreements play out against the background of shared fundamental principles with the differences of opinion regularly being traceable to disagreements about the nonmoral facts that matter in light of the moral principles. On their view, the explanation of moral disagreements will be of a piece with whatever turns out to be a good explanation of the various nonmoral disagreements people find themselves in. Other moral realists, though, see the disagreements as sometimes fundamental. On their view, while moral disagreements might in some

cases be traceable to disagreements about nonmoral matters of fact, this will not always be true. They point out, for example, that many of the disagreements can be traced to the distorting effects of the emotions, attitudes, and interests that are inevitably bound up with moral issues. Or they argue that what appear to be disagreements are really cases in which the people are talking past each other, each making claims that might well be true once the claims are properly understood Harman , Wong And they often combine these explanatory strategies holding that the full range of moral disagreements are well explained by some balanced appeal to all of the considerations just mentioned, treating some disagreements as not fundamentally moral, others as a reflection of the distorting effects of emotion and interest, and still others as being due to insufficiently subtle understandings of what people are actually claiming. If some combination of these explanations works, then the moral realist is on firm ground in holding that the existence of moral disagreements, such as they are, is not an argument against moral realism. Of course, if no such explanation works, then an appeal either to noncognitivism or an error theory i. Metaphysics Putting aside the arguments that appeal to moral disagreement, a significant motivation for anti-realism about morality is found in worries about the metaphysics of moral realism and especially worries about whether moral realism might be reconciled with what has come to be called naturalism. It is hard, to say the least, to define naturalism in a clear way. Yet the underlying idea is fairly easy to convey. According to naturalism, the only facts we should believe in are those countenanced by, or at least compatible with, the results of science. To find, of some putative fact, that its existence is neither established by, nor even compatible with science, is to discover, as naturalism would have it, that there is no such fact. If moral realism requires facts that are incompatible with science as many think it does that alone would constitute a formidable argument against it. Noncognitivists and error theorists alike have no trouble respecting naturalism while offering their respective accounts of moral claims. In both cases, their accounts appeal to nothing not already embraced by naturalism. Of course noncognitivists and error theories disagree in crucial ways about the nature of moral thought, and noncognitivists and error theorists disagree among themselves too about which versions of their preferred accounts are better. But they all are, from the point of view of naturalism, on safe ground. Moral realists, in contrast, are standardly seen as unable to sustain their accounts without appealing, in the end, to putative facts that fly in the face of naturalism. This standard view can be traced to a powerful and influential argument offered by G. As Moore saw things, being a naturalist about morality required thinking that moral terms could be defined correctly using terms that refer to natural properties. Yet, Moore argued, no such definition is true. Against every one, he maintain, a single line of argument was decisive. For in each case, whatever naturalistic definition of moral terms was on offer, it always made sense to ask, of things that had the naturalistic property in question, whether those things were really good. Consider someone who held not merely that pleasure was something good but as a definition would have it that pleasure was goodnessâ€”that they were one and the same property. According to that person, in claiming that something is pleasant one is claiming that it is good, and vice versa. In that case, though, it would not make sense for people to acknowledge that something is pleasant and then wonder, nonetheless, whether it was good. That would be like acknowledging that something is a triangle and then wondering, nonetheless, whether it has three sides. Yet, Moore maintained, the two cases are not alike. A person who wonders whether a triangle has three sides shows he does not understand what it is to be a triangle. His competence with the terms in question is revealed to be inadequate. In contrast, Moore observed, for any natural property whatsoever it was always an open question whether things that had that natural property were good. A person who raised that question did not thereby reveal himself not to be competent with the terms in question. What this shows, Moore argued, was that moral terms did not refer to natural properties and so a proper account of moral claims would have to recognize that they purport to report non-natural facts. Now of course moral realists can consistently acknowledge this and then argue against naturalismâ€”perhaps, at least in part, on the grounds that naturalism is incompatible with acknowledging moral facts. Yet one then has the burden of explaining how moral facts are related to natural facts and the burden of explaining how we might manage to learn of these non-natural facts. A good deal of

the work that has been done defending moral realism is devoted either to meeting these burdens or to showing that they do not pose a special problem just for morality. Moral realists of this sort allow that moral facts are not natural facts, and moral knowledge is not simply of a piece with scientific knowledge, even as they defend the idea that there are moral facts and at least in principle moral knowledge. They thus reject the idea that science is the measure and test of all things Shafer-Landau , Parfit , Scanlon Impressed by the plausibility of naturalism, though, many moral realists have tried, in one way or another, to show that the moral facts they are committed to are either themselves natural facts or are at least appropriately compatible with such facts Boyd , Brink , Railton If they are right, then naturalism poses no special threat to moral realism. Of special concern is the fact that the argument seems to rule out inappropriately the possibility of establishingâ€”on grounds other than semantic analysisâ€”that two terms actually refer to the same property, substance, or entity. The problem becomes clear if one thinks of, for instance, the claim that water is H₂O. That water is H₂O cannot be discovered simply by appreciating the meanings of the terms involved, so if a person were to wonder of some water whether it is really H₂O he would not thereby be revealing some incompetence with the terms in question. His question would be, in the relevant way, an Open Question, even if, in fact, water is H₂O. Similarly, some moral realists argue that value might, in fact, be properly identified with, say, what satisfies desires we desire to have to take one proposal Moore considered even though this cannot be discovered simply by appreciating the meanings of the terms involved. As a result, a person might intelligibly wonder whether something that satisfied a desire she desired to have was actually good. The question might be, in the relevant way, an Open Question, even if, in fact, value is whatever satisfies a desire we desire to have. Of course the point here is not that one or another such proposal is true, but that the openness of the Open Question is not good grounds for supposing such proposals could not be true. Accordingly, they argue that the openness Moore points to, such as it is, is compatible with a correct semantic analysisâ€”albeit not obviousâ€”showing that moral facts are nothing over and above natural facts. Once the Open Question is sidelined as being, at least, not decisive, room is left for thinking a correct account of the moral facts might identify them as natural facts. Just which facts those might be, and what arguments one might offer for one account rather than another, remains open, but the idea that we can know ahead of time that there are no good arguments for such an account is no longer widely accepted. Exactly what the connection to motivation is supposed to be is itself controversial, but one common proposal motivation internalism is that a person counts as sincerely making a moral claim only if she is motivated appropriately. To think of something that it is good, for instance, goes with being, other things equal, in favor of it in ways that would provide some motivation not necessarily decisive to promote, produce, preserve or in other ways support it. If someone utterly lacks such motivations and yet claims nonetheless that she thinks the thing in question is good, there is reason, people note, to suspect either that she is being disingenuous or that she does not understand what she is saying. This marks a real contrast with nonmoral claims since the fact that a person makes some such claim sincerely seems never to entail anything in particular about her motivations. Whether she is attracted by, repelled by, or simply indifferent to some color is irrelevant to whether her claim that things have that color are sincere and well understood by her. Noncognitivists often appeal to this apparent contrast to argue that moral claims have this necessary connection to motivation precisely because they do not express beliefs that might be true or false but instead express motivational states of desire, approval, or commitment that might be satisfied or frustrated but are neither true nor false. Nonmoral claims, they maintain, commonly express beliefs and for that reason are rightly seen as purporting to report facts and as being evaluable as true or false. Yet, because beliefs alone are motivationally inert, the fact that someone is sincerely making such a claim that is, is expressing something she actually believes is compatible with her having any sort of motivation, or none at all. In contrast, claims that commonly express desires, preferences, and commitments do not purport to report facts and are not evaluable as true or false. Yet, because these are all motivationally loaded, the fact that someone sincerely makes such a claim that is, is expressing something she actually feels is incompatible with her failing to have the corresponding motivations. Some moral realists respond to this line of argument by rejecting the idea that

beliefs are all motivationally inert. Platts According to them moral beliefs stand as a counter example. But it is not the only apparent counter example. Consider, for instance, first person claims concerning the prospect of pain. If a person claimed that an experience would be painful and yet had no motivation whatsoever, other things equal, to resist, oppose, or in some way avoid that experience, there would be reason to suspect either that she is being disingenuous or that she does not understand what she is saying. That, though, is no reason to think a sincere claim that some experience would be painful does not express a belief, purport to report a fact, and open itself to evaluation as true or false. Other moral realists reject the idea that moral claims are as tightly bound up with motivation as the noncognitivist argument supposes. They point out that, while an absence of appropriate motivation would raise questions, there might be answers. The person making the claims might be so depressed or so weak-willed or so evil, that she remains utterly unmoved even when she sincerely thinks action would secure something valuable. To suppose this is not possible is to beg the question against those who would grant that beliefs are motivationally inert while holding that moral claims express beliefs. However, they maintain, the distinctive connection is either itself a normative connection between the claims and motivation or else it is a conceptual connection between the claims or their truth and which actions a person has reason to perform. Smith On the first suggestion, a person might well fail to be motivated appropriately by the moral claims she sincerely embraces, but in failing to be appropriately motivated she would thereby count as irrational. On the second suggestion, again a person might well fail to be motivated appropriately by the moral claims she sincerely embraces, but either the fact that she sincerely embraces the claims or the truth of the claims she embraces if they are true provide reasons for her to act in certain ways. All of these views involves rejecting motivational internalism even as they each maintain that there is a conceptual connection of some sort between moral claims or their truth and action or the motivation to act. The resulting views are often characterized as versions of reason internalism. Nonmoral claims alone never imply anything in particular about what people have reason to do or refrain from doing, but moral claims, in contrast, do have such implications, they argue.

6: Martin Heisenberg

For more information about Michael Smith, "Moore on the Right, the Good, and Uncertainty" in Metaethics After Moore edited by Terence Horgan and Mark.

Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons eds. *Metaethics After Moore* Published: March 20, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons eds. Reviewed by James Lenman, University of Sheffield This substantial collection of sixteen original papers is one of a number of publishing ventures to have recently marked the centenary of the publication of *G*. Evidently what the editors have encouraged contributors to provide are cutting edge contributions to contemporary metaethics that engage with Moorean themes and concerns in ways that make the continuing relevance of those themes manifest. And this, to an impressive extent, is precisely what most of them have delivered. This is true for any maximally decided or hyperdecided agent. So it is true for us on any way of completing our less than hyperdecided views without changing our minds. So we are committed to it. But, as Gibbard goes on here to note, his reasoning presupposes an extremely liberal conception of properties as encompassing without restriction all functions from worlds to extensions however cumbersome and disjunctive. This conception of properties is hardly the focus of a philosophical consensus, but Gibbard is doubtful about the credibility of any alternative. Many properties which are wildly gerrymandered from the point of view of physics do explain things. The property of yellow, for example, has explanatory work to do -- it helps explain why you sent me daffodils when I had told you what my favourite colour was. Yellow only does explanatory work because of the existence of creatures with visual sensibilities like ours. But yellow existed before there were any such creatures and would have existed even had we not. And there are countless wildly disjunctive properties that have no explanatory importance in the actual world but might if some species were to come into being that was as responsive to them as we are to yellow. Though these fantastic species are not actual, the properties surely are. Given such considerations, Gibbard thinks, a liberal conception of properties starts to look pretty credible. I have here summarized only one of several seams of argument in this very rich paper a limitation that will inevitably, I fear, be quite general in this brief review. The notion of a pro tanto command makes little sense so it is unhelpful to speak, as Hampton does, of such reasons prescribing or compelling. The "isolation approach" taken by Ross in characterizing prima facie duties fares no better. Difficulties such as these in making the notion of a contributory reason clear, vex, he urges, attempts to do so by Humean realists such as Smith and expressivists such as Gibbard. The only people with much hope of adequately characterizing contributory reasons are, he suggests, intuitionists, by appealing to a notion "of being fitting in a certain respect" or "partial fittingness" p. The suggestion is intriguing but receives no development. Normative sentences, they say, do not attribute properties, serving instead to express attitudes of approval and disapproval. That normative sentences lack any truth values is a claim from which many expressivists nowadays retreat, impressed as they are by minimalism about truth. But minimalism about truth does not impress Thomson and she thinks the retreat premature. We cannot, she goes on to suggest, legitimately argue from the premise that normative predicates are, logically speaking, predicates to the truth-evaluability of normative sentences. But she urges that the expressivist is less well placed to resist an argument from the same premise to the conclusion that normative sentences attribute properties. But this insight she thinks inadequate to warrant any claim so drastic as a blanket denial that there are any normative properties. She herself, of course, thinks there are normative properties, lots of them, but they do not include goodness as Moore conceived it. Such "thin" normative terms as "good" "right" etc. Seeing this, she argues, begins to dispel any sense we might have of a deep semantic or metaphysical gulf separating the natural and the normative. Deep, persisting and intractable disagreement, a limited responsibility to empirical evidence, an unavoidable reliance on the deliverances of intuition, a preoccupation with normative claims whose truth is not plausibly supposed to pull any weight in the causal order: They are also however, he urges, features of philosophy more generally. Because we do not take these features of philosophy to undermine a robustly

realistic understanding of its subject matter, we are entitled to be similarly resistant to any such dialectic in ethics. This appeal to philosophy as a companion in guilt would surely only be effective were the epistemology and methodology of philosophical inquiry itself less thoroughly contested than it is. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong in his "Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology" draws on evidence from empirical psychology to emphasize the extent to which in the making of moral judgements, we are subject to personal bias, extensive interpersonal disagreement, the clouding of judgement by emotion, pervasive risk of illusion due to framing effects and worries about the disreputable or unreliable sources of our beliefs. Because of all this, he thinks we can never be adequately justified in holding any moral belief on the basis of unconfirmed noninferential knowledge, so intuitionism in moral epistemology is hopeless. Michael Smith, in "Moore on the Right, the Good and Uncertainty", considers the worry raised for consequentialists such as Moore by the uncertainty that attaches to the consequences of what we do. Smith I think rather misses the point of the epistemic worry Moore raises. A plausible consequentialism could certainly live with that. Rather, if the morally relevant consequences of an action are all of its consequences indefinitely far into the future, the problem is that our epistemic position is simply hopeless in a far more serious way than mere talk of uncertainty would imply. Neither thought seems adequate to the epistemic vexation Moore was addressing. This is all, apparently, a bit like Kant and a bit like Aquinas. This is all a bit like Goodman. There were moments of insight here and there in this paper but, for this reader, I fear, exasperation overwhelmed enlightenment. They contrast two views of the relationship between the evaluative and the normative: James Dreier in "Was Moore a Moorean? What Moore was onto here, Dreier suggests, was the familiar distinction between the descriptive and the evaluative but, by focusing on properties rather than on predicates, he misdiagnosed as a distinction between different kinds of property -- natural and nonnatural -- what is rather a distinction between different kinds of predicate. She proposes that we take the things that are good for me as having the following four features: Goodness is not, she stresses, the conjunctive property of having these four features, but rather is the second-order property of being productive of them. Though as Robert Audi p. Lewis at least as much as Moore, distinguishing inherent value from intrinsic value where something is supposed of inherent value if an appropriate experience of it would be good. The "appropriate" is important here. Sadistic pleasure, says Audi, ill-befits its object. This is a matter, he suggests, of "opposing valences": Considerations of what is intrinsically good ground reasons to bring such things into being and keep them there. But, as Audi stresses, this is not to presuppose that all reasons for action are grounded in considerations of value. Here they urge that expressivists should drop any reservations about allowing that moral utterances are assertions and moral judgements beliefs. What they should instead do is recognize two distinctive categories of beliefs: Logically complex commitment states should be understood, they propose, in terms of their constitutive inferential roles. This in turn is to be understood in terms of a logical consequence relation among beliefs, one that is characterized in a short technical appendix dealing with the basic constants of propositional and predicate logic. The account is elegant and I am certainly sympathetic to the project, but worries remain. It is just to have an is-not commitment. Commitment to the negation of p is the case is quite straightforwardly just commitment to p is not the case. But the negation of an ought-commitment is not an ought-not commitment. Quite consistently I think it false both that I ought sometimes to visit Wales and that I ought not sometimes to visit Wales. And it better not, if we are expressivists, be an is-not-the-case-that-ought commitment. And, whether we are expressivists or not, we better not say having a not-ought-commitment is a matter of not having an ought-commitment. The answer we get in Horgan and Timmons is just going to be that negative ought-commitments are understood in terms of their constitutive inferential role. So "not" is just the connective that behaves in a logically not-like way as described in the appendix. But raising such issues is to ask a great deal from an already impressive paper that goes some real distance in grappling with the multiple vexations raised by the Frege-Geach Problem. This paper makes a number of radical and fundamental proposals about how we should understand the relevant issues in the philosophy of language that, in its page compass, Barker can do nothing like enough adequately to motivate and defend. In making an assertion,

Barker contends, a speaker represents himself as in a certain state and sets himself up to defend some commitment. Where an assertion expresses some belief he sets himself up to defend that belief. Where it reports some belief he sets himself up to defend his so representing himself. So in asserting that lying is wrong I represent myself as holding a certain con-attitude to lying and set myself up to defend my commitment to that attitude. It is this defensive dimension, and not that they are representational, that Barker thinks essential to assertions. For he thinks all discourse is representational. The essence of assertion, he claims, is that: Orders are autocratic" p. That is why assertions are truth-apt and orders are not. Taken at face value, this certainly seems questionable. Not all orders are issued by drill sergeants. But it need not be autocratic at all. And assertions can of course be highly autocratic. He intends no challenge to debate, just an insistence that his audience assimilate his words. But he nonetheless quite incontestably asserts something. So, without further clarification, I remain to be convinced that such considerations can be used to circumscribe the category of assertion in the way Barker supposes. This is a rewarding collection of papers, abundantly illustrating the lively state of contemporary metaethics. Anyone interested in moral philosophy could very profitably read it.

7: Richard Feynman - Probability and Uncertainty

Presents sixteen essays that represent the work in metaethics after, and in some cases inspired by, the work of G E Moore. While normative ethics is concerned to answer first-order moral questions about what is good and bad, right and wrong, metaethics is concerned to answer second-order non-moral questions about the semantics, and metaphysics.

8: Metaethics After Moore // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame

Moore on the right, the good, and uncertainty / Michael Smith. Scanlon versus Moore on goodness / Philip Stratton-Lake and Brad Hooker. Opening questions, following rules / Paul Bloomfield.

9: Works by Michael Smith - PhilPapers

Michael Smith, in "Moore on the Right, the Good and Uncertainty", considers the worry raised for consequentialists such as Moore by the uncertainty that attaches to the consequences of what we do. He contrasts Moore's conception of rightness as whatever maximizes value with Jackson's as whatever maximizes expected value.

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