

1: Naming and Necessity - Saul A. Kripke - Google Books

2. KRIPKE'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST DESCRIPTIVISM () The modal argument (,) In Lecture I, Kripke introduced the notion of rigid designation. There we saw that we.

It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. Let me state then what the cluster concept theory of names is. At the time that Kripke gave these lectures, the dominant theory in the philosophy of language was the Frege-Russell theory of reference. Essentially, the idea was that names are shorthand descriptions. This way of analyzing names was, I believe, partly adopted because it carried no ontological commitment. Thus, by specifying the criteria, lots of annoying existential questions can be side-stepped. Nevertheless, I think that most people, when they first learn of this theory, feel a bit uncomfortable with it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. Seeing as Kripke is not fond of theories as the opening quote shows and is quite fond of intuition, this puts him into a bit of a pickle, for how is he supposed to argue against the theory? Suppose that someone presumably with far too much time and money on their hands, and with a questionable sensitivity to animal rights decided to take some lions from Africa and introduce them into Asia. Suppose Saul is even such a genius animal trainer that he trains these lions to behave indistinguishably from tigers – to be solitary hunters, and to hunt the same prey, and so on. Now we return to the above example. Thus, Kripke is really reviving the old notion of essentialism: In the case of lions and tigers, I suppose the essential quality would be their genotypes. This leads Kripke to disagree with another engrained philosophical idea the second N of the title: It was thought that only necessary truths could be known a priori, and only a priori truths were necessary. In other words, you could only be certain about things you knew independently of experience. This restriction of necessary statements to trivial tautologies was, I think, a way of fighting against obscure metaphysical arguments, such as the ontological argument for the existence of God. Kripke, as I said, disagrees with this line of thinking. The case of the genotypes of lions and tigers is a case in point; it took a long time to discover DNA, and to create the tools needed to investigate it in depth. DNA was, in other words, obviously learned of empirically. Thus, necessary truths need not be known a priori. In other words, you can be certain about some things you learn from experience. The reverse distinction can also be made. However, the exact length of a schmeter is contingent on the stick, and we can imagine situations in which the stick was longer or shorter, so the exact meaning of this a priori knowledge is contingent on some state of affairs. This, I think, is why Naming and Necessity is so well known: Certainly, this is not a perfect book; Kripke is pleonastic and repetitive; this already short book could probably have been much shorter and crisper, or could have at least covered more territory. Still, Kripke was arguing against a whole paradigm; and paradigms do not go gentle into that good night.

2: Kripke resigns as report alleges he faked results of thought experiments | fauxphilnews

Naming and Necessity is a book with the transcript of three lectures, given by the philosopher Saul Kripke, at Princeton University in , in which he dealt with the debates of proper names in the philosophy of language.

Kripke Author Information The author of pioneering results in modal logic while still in high school, Saul A. Kripke continued to develop and extend these insights in subsequent technical work. Then and now, his work is marked by formal rigor coupled with an engaging and accessible prose style. **Reference and Existence** Saul A. Kripke **Reviews and Awards** "The clarity, openness and, indeed, the honesty of his lectures is impressive, as are the recurring flashes of laconic humor"--Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung "Everything I think about goes back in some way to Kripke and his ideas. For years, many of his legendary lectures have been unavailable -- except in various preprints, difficult-to-read Xeroxes, etc. Now, with the publication by Oxford University Press of the first volume of his collected essays, *Philosophical Troubles*, and the John Locke Lectures, this problem has been partially remedied. His writing even though it has often come in part from spoken lectures is like no other -- equal parts perverse, funny, brilliant, and surprising. I think of him as not so much an heir to Russell and Wittgenstein, but to Poe and Twain. It is a landmark event to have them now publicly available, where they can get the critical attention--and have the full impact--they deserve. This volume will be essential reading for anyone working on fictional discourse, nonexistence claims, the ontology of fiction, and related issues. It will no doubt be a major influence on work in these areas for decades to come. In his Locke lectures he develops, extends, and elaborates the ideas in *Naming and Necessity* in major ways, and replies to potential objections. Along the way you will also learn an important part of the reason why the debate about empty names has taken the direction it has over the last forty or so years and why it continues to occupy centre stage in the philosophy of language. It anticipates many celebrated advances in metaphysics that took place in the years since the lectures were delivered. Parts of it have shaped the debate in the philosophy of language in the same period. It is full of deep and original insights not yet fully appreciated by those working in the field. And it completes the picture painted in *Naming and Necessity*, one of the most important philosophical works published in the twentieth century. Forty years was a long time to wait. It was worth it! And this reviewer stresses further that publication finally allows an extremely important body of work to take its rightful place in the published canon of analytic philosophy.

3: Naming and Necessity - Wikipedia

NAMING AND NECESSITY Saul A. Kripke *Lecture II Lecture III Addenda Index CONTENTS* 1 22 71 *The ideas in Naming and Necessity evolved in the early sixties.*

In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke considers several questions that are important within analytic philosophy: How do names refer to things in the world the problem of intentionality? Are all statements that can be known a priori, necessarily true, and all statements that are known a posteriori or empirically, contingently true? Do objects including people have any essential properties? What is the nature of identity? How do natural kind terms refer and what do natural kind terms mean? Kripke attributes variants of descriptivist theories to Frege, Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, among others. Kripke rejects both these kinds of descriptivism. He gives several examples purporting to render descriptivism implausible as a theory of how names get their reference determined. As an alternative, Kripke adumbrated a causal theory of reference, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection with the object as mediated through communities of speakers. He points out that proper names, in contrast to most descriptions, are rigid designators: A proper name refers to the named object in every possible world in which the object exists, while most descriptions designate different objects in different possible worlds. Kripke also raised the prospect of a posteriori necessities – facts that are necessarily true, though they can be known only through empirical investigation. Finally, Kripke gave an argument against identity materialism in the philosophy of mind, the view that every mental fact is identical with some physical fact. See talk. Kripke argued that the only way to defend this identity is as an a posteriori necessary identity, but that such an identity is not. Similar arguments have been proposed by David Chalmers. Titled *Reference and Existence*, they are in many respects a continuation of *Naming and Necessity*, and deal with the subjects of fictional names and perceptual error. Marcus, however, has refused to publish the verbatim transcript of the lecture. However, Kripke believed that the existing arguments against the Frege-Russell descriptive theory of names failed to identify the real problems with the theory. Kripke begins by summarising the conclusions drawn in the first two lectures. First, the referent of names is not usually fixed by some property or set of properties that the speaker believes are possessed by the thing or person named. Instead, the referent of names is usually determined by a series of causal links between people who have used the name. Second, when the referent of a name is determined by a property attributed to the thing named, the link is contingent, rather than necessary or essential. So, the name was fixed to its referent by a description. However, the person who carried out the murders might have been jailed for another crime and, thus, might never have had the property of murdering those women. So, the link between the property of being a murderer and the person referred to is contingent. Third, identity is not a relation that holds between names. It is a relation that holds between an object and itself. When someone accurately claims that two names refer to the same object, the claim is necessarily true, even though it may be known a posteriori. Thus, Kripke claims to have successfully refuted the assumption made by everyone before him that anything that is necessarily true will be known a priori. The *Age of Meaning*, author Scott Soames wrote: In the philosophy of language, *Naming and Necessity* is among the most important works ever, ranking with the classical work of Frege in the late nineteenth century, and of Russell, Tarski and Wittgenstein in the first half of the twentieth century. *Naming and Necessity* played a large role in the implicit, but widespread, rejection of the view – so popular among ordinary language philosophers – that philosophy is nothing more than the analysis of language.

4: What's the point of Naming and Necessity? | Plato is Terrible

Kripke ends Lecture II, and starts Lecture III, by discussing certain sorts of identity sentences as examples of the necessary a posteriori. Lecture III goes on to focus on two.

Overview[edit] Language is a primary concern of analytic philosophers, particularly the use of language to express concepts and to refer to individuals. In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke considers several questions that are important within analytic philosophy: How do names refer to things in the world? Do objects including people have any essential properties? What is the nature of identity? How do natural kind terms refer and what do they mean? Kripke rejects both these kinds of descriptivism. He gives several examples purporting to render descriptivism implausible as a theory of how names get their reference determined. As an alternative, Kripke adumbrated a causal theory of reference, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection with the object as mediated through communities of speakers. He points out that proper names, in contrast to most descriptions, are rigid designators: A proper name refers to the named object in every possible world in which the object exists, while most descriptions designate different objects in different possible worlds. Kripke also raised the prospect of a posteriori necessities – facts that are necessarily true, though they can be known only through empirical investigation. Examples include "Hesperus is Phosphorus", "Cicero is Tully", "Water is H₂O" and other identity claims where two names refer to the same object. Finally, Kripke gave an argument against identity materialism in the philosophy of mind, the view that every mental fact is identical with some physical fact. See talk. Kripke argued that the only way to defend this identity is as an a posteriori necessary identity, but that such an identity –. Similar arguments have been proposed by David Chalmers. Titled *Reference and Existence*, they are in many respects a continuation of *Naming and Necessity*, and deal with the subjects of fictional names and perceptual error. They have recently been published by Oxford University Press. Marcus, however, has refused to publish the verbatim transcript of the lecture. Apparently, the theses and condition had been written up on a board for all to see. This text was reproduced, as quoted below, in the "lightly edited" transcript of p. One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely. C For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate. However, Kripke believed that the existing arguments against the Frege-Russell descriptive theory of names failed to identify the real problems with the theory. Kripke begins by summarising the conclusions drawn in the first two lectures. First, the referent of names is not usually fixed by some property or set of properties that the speaker believes are possessed by the thing or person named. Instead, the referent of names is usually determined by a series of causal links between people who have used the name. Second, when the referent of a name is determined by a property attributed to the thing named, the link is contingent, rather than necessary or essential. So, the name was fixed to its referent by a description. However, the person who carried out the murders might have been jailed for another crime and, thus, might never have had the property of murdering those women. So, the link between the property of being a murderer and the person referred to is contingent. Third, identity is not a relation that holds between names. It is a relation that holds between an object and itself. When someone accurately claims that two names refer to the same object, the claim is necessarily true, even though it may be known a posteriori. Thus, Kripke claims to have successfully refuted the assumption made by everyone before him that anything that is necessarily true will be known a priori. i. The Age of Meaning, Scott Soames wrote: In the philosophy of language, *Naming and Necessity* is among the most important works ever, ranking with the classical work of Frege in the late nineteenth century, and of Russell, Tarski and Wittgenstein in the first half of the twentieth century. *Naming and Necessity* played a large role in the implicit, but widespread, rejection of the view – so popular among ordinary language philosophers – that philosophy is nothing more than the analysis of language. *Semantics of Natural Language. Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: The Age of Meaning*. Cited in Byrne, Alex and Hall, Ned. Oxford University Press pp. *Times Literary Supplement* Indeed a good deal of this paper suggests a certain formal apparatus, though the present presentation is

NAMING AND NECESSITY (LECTURE II SAUL KRIPKE pdf

informal. Byrne, Alex and Hall, Ned. In Davidson, Donald and Harman, Gilbert, eds. In Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. In Margalit, Avishai, ed. The John Locke Lectures. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.

5: Naming and Necessity by Saul A. Kripke (, Paperback) | eBay

Summary of Kripke: Lecture II of Naming and Necessity PHIL/Ling Philosophy of Language Christopher Thomas
Instructor: Dr. Yuri Balashov Kripke: Lecture II of Naming and Necessity Kripke starts with a criticism of Searle's cluster theory.

The main application of canonical models are completeness proofs. Properties of the canonical model of K immediately imply completeness of K with respect to the class of all Kripke frames. This argument does not work for arbitrary L , because there is no guarantee that the underlying frame of the canonical model satisfies the frame conditions of L . We say that a formula or a set X of formulas is canonical with respect to a property P of Kripke frames, if X is valid in every frame which satisfies P , for any normal modal logic L which contains X , the underlying frame of the canonical model of L satisfies P . A union of canonical sets of formulas is itself canonical. It follows from the preceding discussion that any logic axiomatized by a canonical set of formulas is Kripke complete, and compact. GL and Grz are not canonical, because they are not compact. The axiom M by itself is not canonical Goldblatt, , but the combined logic $S4$. In general, it is undecidable whether a given axiom is canonical. We know a nice sufficient condition: Sahlqvist identified a broad class of formulas now called Sahlqvist formulas such that: This is a powerful criterion: A logic has the finite model property FMP if it is complete with respect to a class of finite frames. An application of this notion is the decidability question: In particular, every finitely axiomatizable logic with FMP is decidable. There are various methods for establishing FMP for a given logic. Refinements and extensions of the canonical model construction often work, using tools such as filtration or unravelling. As another possibility, completeness proofs based on cut-free sequent calculi usually produce finite models directly. Most of the modal systems used in practice including all listed above have FMP. In some cases, we can use FMP to prove Kripke completeness of a logic: As an example, Robert Bull proved using this method that every normal extension of $S4$. Kripke semantics has a straightforward generalization to logics with more than one modality.

6: Kripke's Naming and Necessity II by Peter Susanszky on Prezi

Saul Kripke - Naming and Necessity Notes theo@www.enganchecubano.com 19/06/ Page 3 of 73 1. PREFACE Introduction *â€¢ This book is not a revision of the lectures.*

Everybody was either furious, or exhilarated, or thoroughly perplexed. No one was indifferent. This welcome republication in a separate volume with a helpful new preface, but no substantive changes provides a chance to look back at a modern classic, and to say something about why it was found so shocking and liberating. On this naive view, there is a right way of describing things, corresponding to how they are in themselves, to their real essences. Scientists, philosophers like to say, are especially prone to adopt this unreflective view. They think they are discovering the secrets of nature, but philosophers know that they are really constituting objects by synthesising the manifold of intuition, or predicting the occurrence of sensations, or wielding instruments to cope with the flux of experience, or something equally pragmatic and anthropocentric. This condescending attitude towards common sense, Aristotle and science has been shared by people as far apart as Russell and Bergson, Whitehead and Husserl, James and Nietzsche, Carnap and Cassirer. Until Kripke came along, almost the only exceptions to this consensus were the Catholics and the Marxists. But nobody listened, and after the aggiornamento the neo-Thomists pretty well gave up. But nobody listened to them either, and after the discovery of the young, humanist, pragmatist Marx they, too, gave up. Just when it seemed that the dialectic which Kant began had culminated in universal acceptance of the relaxed pragmatism of Wittgenstein and Quine, Kripke exploded his bomb. We build a world inside our minds by tying concepts together so as to package sensations more conveniently. Frege and Russell updated this picture by handing the mind over, with a shrug, to empirical psychology and putting the point in terms of language *â€”* talking about words instead of ideas. Meaning, Frege claimed, determines reference. This claim is uncontroversial if you think of the world as an undifferentiated manifold waiting for us to structure it. But, as Marxists and neo-Thomists insist, such a view smacks of idealism. Philosophers raised on Frege and Russell are so habituated to this Kantian way of thinking that the very idea that some properties of a thing are necessary ones *â€”* properties a thing could not lack while remaining the same thing *â€”* has seemed merely a Gothic curiosity, the last enchantment of the Middle Ages. There is something giddy and intoxicating about this Kantian freedom to redescribe, and thus to create new essences, new necessities, new structures. Kripke tries to sober us up by denying that meaning determines reference. Rather, we name things by confronting them and baptising them, not by creating them out of a list of qualities. Names are not, pace Russell, shorthand for such lists. The non-philosopher can hardly imagine how shocking these Kripkean claims sounded. The whole idea of what it was to be an analytic philosopher, what it was to be sophisticated about the relation of thought to the world, began to totter. For a moment, nobody could quite believe that a leading modal logician should seriously commend the Aristotelian way of looking at things. Perhaps it was merely affected Gothicising? Kripke was, however, entirely serious. But Kripke showed how to do it, and now philosophers are busily rewriting all of semantics and a good deal of epistemology in Kripkean terms. Kripke showed that one could be coarse about how language works while being delicate and polished in the theory that spells out the details. It would be impossible, in this space, to exhibit just how Naming and Necessity did this. Instead, it might be well to ask: How do we choose between the attractions of the Gothic and the modern, between naive realism and quasi-idealism? Sometimes Kripke suggests that there are simple arguments which show he is right *â€”* as when he urges that no Russell-like account can pick out a unique bearer for a proper name. This pragmatic cop-out would leave the argument up in the air. He asks his reader to cleave to untutored intuition and resist the false sophistication of the schools. It has even been suggested in the literature, that though a notion of necessity may have some sort of intuition behind it It is very far from being true that this idea [that a property can meaningfully be held to be essential or accidental to an object independently of its description] is a notion which has no intuitive content, which means nothing to the ordinary man. It seems to me obviously to be the second. The second man has a philosophical theory. Philosophers of language have to supply truth-conditions in such puzzle-cases; it is their job. But it is not clear that the man in the street is going to be of much help to either side in the controversy.

Still, even if we have no intuitions about truth-conditions in weird counterfactual situations, maybe we do have intuitions about realism v. Or is this a matter for the cultivated taste of those who have savoured both? Is the success of Kant among practically everybody from Schiller to Goodman a matter of his seductive appeal to our more irresponsible impulses? Or does Kant have some sturdy intuitions on his side too? Modern thought on everything from politics to literature to religion is, after all, shot through with Kantian assumptions. Maybe a thorough house-cleaning is in order? One can play it either way, and develop a system from either starting-point with equal completeness and elegance. In either case, the budget of paradoxes will be about equally long, though much will depend upon what one has been brought up to find paradoxical. On still larger questions, it is very doubtful indeed that the Kantian ideas which are taken for granted in our culture are going to be refuted by anything that philosophy professors do. Nor, of course, need Kripke claim that such deductions are possible. It is enough for his purposes in this book to have pointed semantics in a new direction. Such reflection suggests that Kripke may have demoted philosophy of language in the course of revolutionising it. If we lose our grip on the Kantian picture, this structure-content distinction begins to evaporate. So does the notion of philosophy as the armchair study of the nature of representation. So, a fortiori, does semantics as the study of how language relates to the world. It eschews theories of how language either structures or copies the world. It may become the sort of academic speciality which neither wants nor needs links with, or readers in, the larger world. Perhaps, however, such speculations are premature. At the moment, everybody is waiting for Kripke to drop the other shoe, to tell us in on his new way of seeing things, beyond the few tantalising details revealed in Naming and Necessity. Since Kripke changed the tone of analytic philosophy with ideas formulated before his 25th year see page 3 , he may well have surprises in store.

7: Reference and Existence - Hardcover - Saul A. Kripke - Oxford University Press

Chapter 10 Naming and Necessity S. Kripke Lecture 1: January 20, I hope that some people see some connection between the two topics in the.

8: Saul Kripke - Wikipedia

Ever since the publication of its original version, Naming and Necessity has had great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of reference, in particular of naming, and of identity.

9: Naming and Necessity by Saul A. Kripke

Reference and Existence, Saul Kripke's John Locke Lectures for , can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. We use cookies to enhance your experience on our website. By continuing to use our website, you are agreeing to our use of cookies.

NAMING AND NECESSITY (LECTURE II SAUL KRIPKE pdf

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