

1: Nationalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Nationalism and Belonging. Pages: April GO TO SECTION. Published on behalf of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism. More from.

Each of these aspects requires elaboration. Although sovereignty is often taken to mean full statehood Gellner , ch. Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount of agreement about the historically paradigmatic form of nationalism. Territorial sovereignty has traditionally been seen as a defining element of state power and essential for nationhood. It was extolled in classic modern works by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and is returning to center stage in the debate, though philosophers are now more skeptical see below. Issues surrounding the control of the movement of money and people in particular immigration and the resource rights implied in territorial sovereignty make the topic politically center in the age of globalization and philosophically interesting for nationalists and anti-nationalists alike. This classical nationalism later spread across the world and still marks many contemporary nationalisms. In breaking down the issue, we have mentioned the importance of the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity. This point raises two sorts of questions. First, the descriptive ones: Second, the normative ones: Is the attitude of caring about national identity always appropriate? This section discusses the descriptive questions, starting with 1a and 1b. The normative questions are addressed in Section 3 on the moral debate. If one wants to enjoin people to struggle for their national interests, one must have some idea about what a nation is and what it is to belong to a nation. So, in order to formulate and ground their evaluations, claims, and directives for action, pro-nationalist thinkers have expounded theories of ethnicity, culture, nation and state. Their opponents have in turn challenged these elaborations. Now, some presuppositions about ethnic groups and nations are essential for the nationalist, while others are theoretical elaborations designed to support the essential ones. Since nationalism is particularly prominent with groups that do not yet have a state, a definition of nation and nationalism purely in terms of belonging to a state is a non-starter. This leaves two extreme options and a number of intermediates. The first extreme option has been put forward by a small but distinguished band of theorists, including Renan and Weber ; for a recent defense, see Brubaker and for a comparison with religion, Brubaker According to their purely voluntaristic definition, a nation is any group of people aspiring to a common political state-like organization. At the other extreme, and more typically, nationalist claims are focused upon the non-voluntary community of common origin, language, tradition and culture: Philosophical discussions centered around nationalism tend to concern the ethnic-cultural variants only, and this habit will be followed here. One cannot chose to be a member; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and early socialization. However, commonality of origin has become mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: This is the kind of definition that would be accepted by most parties in the debate today. So defined, the nation is a somewhat mixed category, both ethno-cultural and civic, but still closer to the purely ethno-cultural than to the purely civic extreme. The wider descriptive underpinnings of nationalist claims have varied over the last two centuries. For almost a century, up to the end of the Second World War, it was customary to link nationalist views to organic metaphors for society. Most contemporary defenders of nationalism, especially philosophers, avoid such language. The organic metaphor and talk about character have been replaced by one master metaphor: It is centered upon cultural membership, and used both for the identity of a group and for the socially based identity of its members, e. Various authors unpack the metaphor in various ways: Seymour have significantly contributed to introducing and maintaining important topics such as community, membership, tradition and social identity into contemporary philosophical debate. In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds of views. A volume dedicated to A. Smith debates his ethno-nationalism Leouss and Grosby, eds. The second are the modernist views, placing the origin of nations in modern times. They can be further classified according to their answer to an additional question: The modernist realist view is that nations are real but distinctly modern creations, instrumental in the genesis of capitalism Gellner , Hobsbawn , and Breuilly and The realist view contrasts with more radical antirealism. These divergent views seem to support rather divergent moral claims about nations: For an

overview of nationalism in political theory see Vincent and the encyclopedic volume edited by Delanty and Kumar. Indeed, older authors – from great thinkers like Herder and Otto Bauer to the propagandists who followed their footsteps – took great pains to ground normative claims upon firm ontological realism about nations: See, for instance, MacCormick ; Miller , ; Tamir , Gans , Moore , , Dagger and, for an interesting discussion, Frost. They point out that common imaginings can tie people together, and that actual interaction resulting from togetherness can engender important moral obligations. Let us now turn to question 1c about the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issue that has interested political and social scientists concerns ethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-national attitude. Is it as irrational, romantic and indifferent to self-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has divided authors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who try to explain it as being in some sense rational. Authors who see it as irrational propose various explanations of why people assent to irrational views. But where does such false consciousness come from? On the opposite side, the famous critic of nationalism Elie Kedourie thinks this irrationality is spontaneous. A decade ago Liah Greenfeld went as far as linking nationalism to mental illness in her provocative article; see also her book. On the opposite side, Michael Walzer has offered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion in his . Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeper explanations. For an overview of Marxist approaches see Glenn. Now we turn to those who see nationalist sentiments as being rational, at least in a very wide sense. Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to become nationalists. Hardin. Consider the two sides of the nationalist coin. On the first side, identification and cohesion within an ethno-national group relates to inter-group cooperation, and cooperation is easier for those who are part of the same ethno-national group. To take an example of ethnic ties in a multiethnic state, a Vietnamese newcomer to the United States will do well to rely on his co-nationals: Once the ties are established and he has become part of a network, it is rational to go on cooperating, and ethnic sentiment secures the trust and the firm bond needed for smooth cooperation. A further issue is when it is rational to switch sides; to stay with our example, when does it become profitable for our Vietnamese to develop an all-American patriotism? This has received a detailed elaboration in David Laitin , summarized in ; applied to language rights in Laitin and Reich ; see also Laitin , who uses material from the former Soviet Union. On the other side of the nationalist coin, non-cooperation with outsiders can lead to sometimes extreme conflict between various ethno-nations. Can one rationally explain the extremes of ethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do so in terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see the other as increasingly inimical. It then becomes rational to start treating the other as an enemy. Mere suspicion can thus lead by small, individually rational steps to a situation of conflict. It is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this general pattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts see also Wimmer. It has enabled the application of conceptual tools from game-theoretic and economic analyses of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior to the explanation of ethno-nationalism. It is worth mentioning, however, that the individualist rational-choice approach, centered upon personal rationality, has serious competitors. A tradition in social psychology, initiated by Henri Tajfel , shows that individuals may identify with a randomly selected group even when membership in the group brings no tangible rewards. Does rationality of any kind underlie this tendency to identification? They propose a non-personal, evolutionary sort of rationality: But cultural evolution has taken over the mechanisms of identification that initially developed within biological evolution. As a result, we project the sentiment originally reserved for kinship onto our cultural group. More detailed explanations from socio-biological perspectives differ greatly among themselves and constitute a wide and rather promising research program see an overview in Goetze. There is a growing literature connecting these issues with cognitive science, from Searle-White to Hogan and Yack. Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz express a common view when they write about belonging to a nation: One cannot choose to belong. Belonging brings crucial benefits: Why is national belonging taken to be involuntary? It is often attributed to the involuntary nature of linguistic belonging: All these are embedded in the language, and do not exist without it. Early socialization is seen as socialization into a specific culture, and very often that culture is just assumed to be a national one. The resulting belonging is then to a large extent non-voluntary. There are exceptions to this basically

non-voluntaristic view: Strict and Wide We pointed out at the very beginning of the entry that nationalism focuses upon 1 the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and 2 the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve or sustain some form of political sovereignty. The politically central point is 2: To these we now turn, beginning with sovereignty and territory, the usual foci of a national struggle for independence. They raise an important issue: The classical answer is that a state is required. A more liberal answer is that some form of political autonomy suffices. Once this has been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues: Consider first the classical nationalist answer to 2a.

2: Religions | Free Full-Text | The Question of Nationalism and Belonging

This paper situates an analysis on the commonalities and ordinariness of Jewish and Muslim experiences vis-à-vis a critique on nationalism and belonging in the literature of Edeet Ravel and Mohsin Hamid, in addition to other writers.

Chinese nationalism The awakening of nationalism across Asia helped shape the history of the continent. The key episode was the decisive defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905, demonstrating the military superiority of non-Europeans in a modern war. The defeat which quickly led to manifestations of a new interest in nationalism in China, as well as Turkey, and Persia. It was a nationwide protest movement about the domestic backwardness of China and has often been depicted as the intellectual foundation for Chinese Communism. According to historian Patricia Ebrey: Nationalism, patriotism, progress, science, democracy, and freedom were the goals; imperialism, feudalism, warlordism, autocracy, patriarchy, and blind adherence to tradition were the enemies. Intellectuals struggled with how to be strong and modern and yet Chinese, how to preserve China as a political entity in the world of competing nations. African nationalism and History of Africa Kenneth Kaunda, an anti-colonial political leader from Zambia, pictured at a nationalist rally in colonial Northern Rhodesia now Zambia in 1961. In the 19th and 20th centuries the European powers divided up almost all of Africa only Ethiopia and Liberia were independent. They ruled until after World War II when forces of nationalism grew much stronger. In the 1950s and 1960s the colonial holdings became independent states. The process was usually peaceful but there were several long bitter bloody civil wars, as in Algeria, [66] Kenya [67] and elsewhere. Across Africa nationalism drew upon the organizational skills that natives learned in the British and French and other armies in the world wars. It led to organizations that were not controlled by or endorsed by either the colonial powers or the traditional local power structures that were collaborating with the colonial powers. Nationalistic organizations began to challenge both the traditional and the new colonial structures and finally displaced them. Leaders of nationalist movements took control when the European authorities exited; many ruled for decades or until they died off. These structures included political, educational, religious, and other social organizations. In recent decades, many African countries have undergone the triumph and defeat of nationalistic fervor, changing in the process the loci of the centralizing state power and patrimonial state. From 1948 to 1994, it was controlled by white Afrikaner nationalists focused on racial segregation and white minority rule known officially as apartheid. The black nationalist movement fought them until success was achieved by the African National Congress in 1994 and Nelson Mandela was elected President. As the Ottoman Empire declined and the Middle East was carved up by the Great Powers of Europe, Arabs sought to establish their own independent nations ruled by Arabs rather than foreigners. Syria was established in 1943; Transjordan later Jordan gradually gained independence between 1941 and 1946; Saudi Arabia was established in 1932; and Egypt achieved gradually gained independence between 1922 and 1923. The Arab League was established in 1945 to promote Arab interests and cooperation between the new Arab states. Parallel to these efforts was the Zionist movement which emerged among European Jews in the 19th century. Beginning in 1882, Jews, predominantly from Europe, began emigrating to Ottoman Palestine with the goal of establishing a new Jewish homeland. The effort culminated in the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948. As this move conflicted with the belief among Arab nationalists that Palestine was part of the Arab nation, the neighboring Arab nations launched an invasion to claim the region. The invasion was only partly successful and led to decades of clashes between the Arab and Jewish nationalist ideologies. Post-Communism[edit] There was a rise in extreme nationalism after the Revolutions of 1989 triggered the collapse of communism in the 1990s. When communism fell, it left many people with no identity. The people under communist rule had to integrate, and they found themselves free to choose. Given free choice, long dormant conflicts rose up and created sources of serious conflict. In his article Jihad vs. McWorld, Benjamin Barber proposed that the fall of communism will cause large numbers of people to search for unity and that small scale wars will become common; groups will attempt to redraw boundaries, identities, cultures and ideologies. Academic Steven Berg felt that at the root of nationalist conflicts is the demand for autonomy and a separate existence. The national census numbers for a ten-year span “measured an increase from 1. Within Yugoslavia, separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia is an invisible line of

previous conquests of the region. Croatia and Slovenia to the northwest were conquered by Catholics or Protestants, and benefited from European history; the Renaissance, French Revolution, Industrial Revolution and are more inclined towards democracy. In the s the leadership of the separate territories within Yugoslavia protected only territorial interests at the expense of other territories. In Croatia, there was almost a split within the territory between Serbs and Croats so any political decision would kindle unrest, and tensions could cross the territories adjacent; Bosnia and Herzegovina. Political organizations were not able to deal successfully with such diverse nationalism. Within the territories the leadership could not compromise. To do so would create a winner in one ethnic group and a loser in another, raising the possibility of a serious conflict. This strengthened the political stance promoting ethnic identities. This caused intense and divided political leadership within Yugoslavia. In the s Yugoslavia began to break into fragments. Conflict in the disputed territories was stimulated by the rise in mass nationalism and inter-ethnic hostilities. This combined with escalating violence from ethnic Albanians and Serbs within Kosovo intensified economic conditions. The ongoing conflict in Kosovo was propagandized by Communist Serbian Slobodan Milosevic to further increase Serb nationalism. As mentioned, this nationalism did give rise to powerful emotions which grew the force of Serbian nationalism through highly nationalist demonstrations in Vojvodina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. Within Slovenia, fear was mounting because Milosevic was using the militia to suppress a in Kosovo, what would he do to Slovenia. In fall of tensions came to a head and Slovenia asserted its political and economic independence from Yugoslavia and seceded. In January , there was a total break with Serbia at the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, an institution conceived by Milosevic to strengthen unity and became the backdrop for the fall of communism within Yugoslavia. In August , a warning to the region was issued when ethnically divided groups attempted to alter the government structure. The republic borders established by the Communist regime in the postwar period were extremely vulnerable to challenges from ethnic communities. Ethnic communities arose because they did not share the identity with everyone within the new post-Communist borders. The same disputes were erupting that were in place prior to Milosevic and were compounded by actions from his regime. Also within the territory the Croats and the Serbs were in direct competition for control of government. Elections were held and increased potential conflicts between Serb and Croat nationalism. Serbia wanted to be separate and decide its own future based on its own ethnic composition. But this would then give Kosovo encouragement to become independent from Serbia. Albanians in Kosovo were already independent from Kosovo. Muslims nationalists wanted their own territory but it would require a redrawing of the map, and would threaten neighboring territories. When communism fell in Yugoslavia, serious conflict arose, which led to the rise in extreme nationalism. Nationalism again gave rise to powerful emotions which evoked in some extreme cases, a willingness to die for what you believe in, a fight for the survival of the group. In the six years following the collapse , people died in the Bosnian war. Please improve the article by adding information on neglected viewpoints, or discuss the issue on the talk page. May Main article: Neo-nationalism Arab nationalism began to decline in the 21st century leading to localized nationalism, culminating in a series of revolts against authoritarian regimes between and , known as the Arab Spring. Following these revolts, which mostly failed to improve conditions in the affected nations, Arab nationalism and even most local nationalistic movements declined dramatically. The rise of globalism in the late 20th century led to a rise in nationalism and populism in Europe and North America. This trend was further fueled by increased terrorism in the West the September 11 attacks in the U. The result had been largely unexpected and was seen as a victory of populism. His unexpected victory in the election was seen as part of the same trend that had brought about the Brexit vote.

3: Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism by Michael Ignatieff

Nationalism has been, without question, one of the most potent political and cultural forces within Europe since the late 19th century. Placing particular emphasis on transnational and comparative links, Nationalism in Modern Europe provides a clear and accessible history of the development of.

It fell from almost half the votes to slightly over a third; at the same time its traditional rival and partner in the national coalition government, the Social Democrats, did even worse and slumped to fifth place. The huge gainers were the Greens, now almost twice as large as the Social Democrats, and after them the anti-immigrant AfD in fourth place. The CSU lost votes to both right and centre; more votes to the centre, in fact, than to the populists. But across Europe it is the populist parties that seem to be having their moment now. This cannot derive only from their most obvious feature, which is hostility to outsiders. There is also the sense of belonging that they produce by combining religion and nationalism to imagine, and so create, communities. This is a deep human instinct. Children spontaneously do it in play. That does not make nationalism or religion primitive, though: But neither is necessarily liberal or market-oriented. Both reject the ideal of freedom or self-sufficiency which suffuses the contemporary world. Both see that the individual derives her value from being part of a larger whole, rather than from being a fundamentally autonomous figure who must choose as freely as possible. In this sense, both are profoundly illiberal. Why is this vision so attractive to so many? The most obvious answer is that it is at least half true. Two more assertions of the importance of community make the populist vision attractive to some. It may seem that the essence of populist parties is that they deny these rights to others. The danger is that they may have to do so. All three are tangled together in contemporary populism. This need have nothing to do with theology. Many of the strongest voices for refugee rights in Europe are religious leaders. But Christianity is also a way of situating a community in history and it can be used to assert that strangers have never belonged here just as easily as it can urge that they be welcomed. In England, membership of the Anglican church correlates strongly with hostility to the EU; in the US, white evangelical Christianity is almost united in its support of Donald Trump. How is the progressive left to combat this or to harness these longings to more generous purposes? The European welfare states were once available to all regardless of merit. The Greens still have a story of a better, transformative future to tell alongside the threatened apocalypse. The mainstream left must find its own. This has been corrected.

4: National identity - Wikipedia

There is also the sense of belonging that they produce by combining religion and nationalism to imagine, and so create, communities. This is a deep human instinct. Children spontaneously do it in.

Click to print Opens in new window In *Everyday Nationhood*: Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich eds. *Everyday Nationhood* is a timely and engaging book, offering a collection of different empirical studies and theoretical discussions that aim to revitalise, rethink, supplement and also pay tribute to the concept of banal nationalism, originally introduced by Michael Billig in . It is clear that globalisation did not diminish the importance of nations, and this is because of the international character of nationalism, as contributors Craig Calhoun and Atsuko Ichijo particularly demonstrate within the volume. In *Banal Nationalism* , Billig drew on the insights of a one-day survey of national newspapers in England to demonstrate that well-established Western democratic countries rely heavily on national symbols and signs, and pointed out that these banal forms of nationalism had been largely overlooked. The book also considers how banal nationalism has been reproduced on the international stage through the support of international institutions and digital media Ichijo; Eleftheria J. Lekakis; and Melissa Aronczyk , which reaffirms the conclusion of this book “ that nation states are still the main international players. To close the volume, Billig provides his response to the contributors. For instance, Antonsich and Skey distinguish between banal nationalism and everyday nationalism, whereby the latter is employed to refer to conscious manifestations of nationalism in quotidian settings, such as when students discuss national symbols in a classroom. A number of media audience studies have demonstrated that every symbol is polyvalent. People do not always interpret television programmes or newspaper articles according to their intended, preferred or dominant codes “ that is, in the ways journalists and media professionals want them to do. In his contribution, Bart Bonikowski also emphasises that nations are not a coherent whole that possess core values shared by most citizens; instead, there are differences in terms of the repertoires of dispositions that members share towards the nation. It is also hard to claim that manifestations are noticed or unnoticed without ethnographic inquiry or interviews. Drawing on the findings of 60 in-depth interviews and 4 focus groups in two Russian regions on the topic of patriotism undertaken in , Goode reveals the difference between publicly expressed views as given in focus groups and privately held views as provided in interviews. In the former, people showed they endorsed government-led patriotic rhetoric, whereas in the latter these were seen as inauthentic and unconvincing. He exposes the advantages and disadvantages of focus groups and in-depth interviews, and when and why researchers should use each. This would be useful to explain what he observes “ that people do not express their critical views publicly because they think they are isolated and that the majority endorses the dominant patriotic rhetoric. The familiarity of banal symbols of nationalism has also often meant they have remained unquestioned. However, there are several contributions to this book that have demonstrated when, how and why the banal manifestations of nationalism can also be recognised, challenged and transformed into a matter of strategic efforts. Her PhD thesis looks at ordinary expressions of nationalism and cosmopolitanism of Serbian Londoners in the digital media, and for this she conducted ethnography, online ethnography and in-depth interviews. Her research interests include social and mobile media, migration, identities particularly national, cosmopolitan, class and gender and media audiences.

5: Nationalism - Wikipedia

Nationalism: Belonging and Otherness Prof. Aviel Roshwald During the late 18th and 19th centuries, nationalism was a major political force in Europe, laying the grounds for the establishment of modern nation states.

6: Zionists in Interwar Czechoslovakia

Newcomers and Nationalism - Video Lectures. This lecture series for the programme: "NEWCOMERS AND

NATIONALISM AND BELONGING pdf

NATIONALISM: Exploring the challenge of belonging in Europe" is presented by academics and practitioners and complimented by views of the public.

7: The Guardian view on populism: belonging not believing | Editorial | Opinion | The Guardian

Nationalism is associated with the sense of belonging and be a part of a common culture, speaking a common language, sharing customs and culture living in a particular geographical region.

8: The Nationalism Project: Ernest Gellner's Definition of "Nation"

Propertied belonging " possessive and constitutive " unfolds through bodies, pr Just as the nation is imagined and produced through everyday rhetoric and maps and flags, it is also constructed on the skin, and through bodies, by different t.

9: Nationalism, secularism, belonging, and identity in Philip Roth, Salman Rushdie, and Orhan Pamuk

While Michael Billig's 'banal nationalism' points to the significance of the trivial reproduction of national representations in everyday routines, feminist political geographers have highlighted how the nation is brought into being through embodied and emotional practices.

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