

1: The UK and the international division of labour | Eurofound

In economics, the new international division of labor (NIDL) is an outcome of globalization.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of division of labor? By division of labor we mean an arrangement where by people perform different functions at the same time. There may be three forms of division of labor. Thus, there are farmers, weavers, teachers, priests, laborers etc. Thus within a factory there are weavers, spinners, designers, accountants, managers and engineers. The work may be divided into complete tasks like spinning, weaving, bleaching, designing, finishing etc. It is said that work in a modern spinning factory is divided into 18 processes. Technical division of labor is marked feature of modern machine age. Certain places or regions come to specialize in the making of certain articles; Hosiery at Ludhiana, Cotton textiles at Ahmadabad and Bombay, Jute industry at Calcutta, Leather industry at Agra and Kanpur etc. Division of labor is based on the principle of co-operation or interdependence. The different persons among whom the work is divided co-operate in the production of a thing for example, to make a chair, one group is engaged in making backs another seats and still another joining them and finally there is group of workers polishing the chairs. All of them co-operate and through their cooperation, a chair is made. Division of labor is both a divisional and integrating social principle. Division of labor is found in all societies. In the earlier societies marked by handicraft economy it was a simple division of labor. The societies in those days were a simple organization based upon primary group relationships. Such a society neither needs nor permits a wide range of economic specialization. Economy was a self-sufficient type. There were little trades and techniques were few and simple. There was a little need for supervision and authority. In modern machine age, division of labor is a complicated phenomenon. Now there are thousands of workers in an industry to perform different specialized task in order to produce, say a pair of shoes. A line of command is necessary to ensure that all these workers perform their individual tasks in an integrated manner.

Merits of division of labor. Division of labor is an inevitable feature of the modern industrial system. It is advantageous in the following ways.

Merits of Division of Labor

- i The right man in the right place Under division of labor, the chance is that each man will get the job for which he is best fitted. There will be no round pegs in square holes. The work will be better done. By constant repetition, he is bound to become expert in his task. He will be able to turn our better goods. There is an increase in the skill and craftsmanship. Only light work is done by workers so that there is less strain on them. Long and costly training is rendered unnecessary. It will take long time for a man to learn how to make a complete chair but it will take him less time to learn how to polish it. This leads to many inventions. These inventions make for economic progress. On account of mass production make possible by division and the use of machinery, cheaper things are turned out. Even poor persons can buy them. Standard of living improves. It is not necessary to provide each worker with a complete set of tools. He needs only a few tools for the job he has to do. These tools are kept continuously employed. This is very economical. He is employed on the same process. He therefore goes on working without loss of time.
- Demerits of Division of Labor

The demerits of division of labors are the following:

- Work becomes joyless and monotonous. There is no pleasure in the job. The worker cannot be expected to take any interest. The quality of work suffers. His creative instinct is not satisfied. The work gives him no pride and no pleasure, since no worker can claim the product as his own creation. Instead the making of whole article, he is required just. The skill gradually dies out. He knows only that much and no more. It may not be easy for him to find exactly the job elsewhere, if he desires a change. In this way, the workers losses his mobility
- v Risk of unemployment If the worker is dismissed from one factory, he may have to search far and wide before he secures a job in which he has specialized. He may be making only the legs of a chair. It is doubtful if he can get the complete chair. His chance of getting a job elsewhere would be brighter. A narrow sphere of work checks proper physical and mental development of the worker,
- vii Loss of sense or responsibility None can be held responsible for bad production because none makes the complete article. When the thing is bad, everybody tries to shift the responsibility to somebody else. It spoils the beauty of the place all round, leads to exploitation of women and children and removes the personal factor in the production and management. They must receive a due share of the product and it is not

easy to determine this share. Thus, the problem of distribution is made difficult. If the worker makes the article, independently he gets its value and there is no trouble. But division of labor had divided the community into two conflicting groups, i. The gap between them is daily growing wider strikes and lock out have become a common occurrence in the present day.

2: International Division Of Labour | www.enganchecubano.com

(NIDL) A global division of labour associated with the growth of transnational corporations and the deindustrialization of the advanced economies. The most common pattern is for research and development in more economically developed countries, and cheap, less skilled labour in less economically developed countries.

The aftermath of the economic crisis saw a round of currency wars—the main combatants were the US and China, with some emerging markets Brazil in particular joining in. There were accusations and counter-accusations that competitive devaluation had been used to boost exports and steal an unfair advantage. National and local states constantly intervene to protect the capital in their territories and to enhance the structures for attracting new capital, and use the full range of legal weapons at their disposal to gain advantage over their competitors. But there are also contradictions within the process of accumulation and expansion, which means that the movement of capital or employment to other countries is not inevitable, inexorable or irreversible. In other words, capitalists have to manage large and geographically spread organisations in a context of increasingly intense competition. Transnational corporations search the globe for the best fit of skills, wages and regulatory frameworks before they commit to a location. Firms try to assess the costs of competing destinations and then recalibrate their strategy as relative wages and other costs change. Managers are not the rational agents with perfect knowledge that are central to neoclassical economics. Richard Hyman points out that strategic decisions made by capitalists are an attempt to resolve a series of contradictions inherent in capitalist production: Monopolisation or state intervention alter the form of such contradictions but do not transcend them. It is on this basis that managerial strategy can best be conceptualised: Competition drives other capitalists in the same sector to follow a similar strategy—in other words, if one capitalist expands output and shifts production then other capitalists are compelled to follow a similar strategy to defend their competitive position. By relocating across national boundaries firms may be able to employ workers who they can hire for a lower wage or who they can compel to work longer and harder. This is one of the countervailing influences on the falling rate of profit identified by Marx. Competition on the labour market and the attendant rise in confidence of workers collectively or individually will push up wages and erode the differential. However, the fact that labour has less freedom to move across national boundaries than capital means that differences in the rate of exploitation may be sustained for long periods of time—depending on the strength and combativity of workers. There is a complex interplay between the rate of exploitation and the level of investment per worker which means that the impact on profits cannot be simply read off the strategies of firms and sectors. However, the influx of investment to China on the basis of low costs does provide a clear example of the erosion of the success of a particular model of social relations. But there is no longer an endless stream of pliant migrant workers happy to accept monotonous and exhausting work. Labour markets have tightened with more vacancies than workers looking for work. All of these reduce the level of profit that firms can make in a particular locality. Some labour-intensive businesses are moving from the coastal regions to inland China. In , citing many examples of companies moving their production back to the United States, the Boston Consulting Group BCG argued that the differential is closing between the opportunities offered in China and in the southern states of the United States. Rising labour rates have been a fact of life in Chinese factories for years. Average wages leapt by percent from through a period when China emerged as the workshop of the world for a range of industries. Those increases started from a low base, but now the tipping point is in sight. For one thing wage growth has accelerated much faster than productivity growth. From through , pay and benefits for the average Chinese factory worker rose by 10 percent annually. From through , wage hikes averaged 19 percent per year, while the fully loaded costs of US production workers only rose by only 4 percent! Minimum wages rose by more than 20 percent in 20 Chinese regions and up to 30 percent in Sichuan province. In this case capital returns, but on new terms, with poorer terms of employment and lower wages. For US corporations, the possibility of intellectual property theft and trade disputes resulting in punitive duties reduce differentials even further. This is not to suggest that all US production will leave China or that firms will cease to locate there—for some sections of capital it will continue to be advantageous for

production and to access the vast market. The laws of competition erode any initial advantage and this results in a new round of relocations either back to the home economy or, in the case of some capitals, to other cheaper destinations. Substituting technology for workers As some sections of capital reach the limits of operating in low-cost locations they may look to another strategy for staving off, limiting or temporarily resolving the aggregate crisis of accumulation by adopting more or newer technology. The example of Foxconn illustrates the limits of low-wage production predicated on a particular set of social relations. Foxconn is a Taiwanese firm that has a gargantuan manufacturing operation in China as a subcontractor for large transnational corporations such as Apple and HP. It employs 1 million workers, many of who live in dormitories in factory towns. Each worker focuses on a single action, like putting stickers on the front of an iPhone or packing a finished product into a box—it takes five days and steps to assemble an iPad. Based on a division of labour that involves a series of repetitive tasks, there is little room for any sort of enlightened work practice as this would undermine the basis of the model. Foxconn has diversified its strategies. It plans to shift some of its production to Brazil, Mexico and Eastern Europe. Also, although Foxconn continues to build new plants and hire thousands of extra workers to make smartphones, it also plans to install a million robots inside of three years to supplement its workforce in China. But the calculus of how to extract maximum surplus value can change, and an alternative strategy is to return some or all production to the higher labour cost home country and invest in new technology. At the Phillips Electronics factory on the coast of China electric shavers are assembled by hundreds of workers by hand. At a sister factory—in the Dutch countryside, robot arms do the same thing with yoga-like flexibility. One robot arm endlessly firms three perfect bends in two connector wires and slips them into holes too small for the eye to see. The arms work so fast that they must be enclosed in glass cages to prevent the people supervising them from being injured. And they do it all without a coffee break—three shifts a day, days a year. All told, the factory here has several dozen workers per shift, about a tenth as many as the plant in the Chinese city Zhuhai. Automating assembly lines would require the rejigging of entire manufacturing processes. Smaller firms cannot afford to invest in robotics. However, the point is that the technological capacity of capitalism changes incessantly and there will be developments in technology that will change how things are produced in incremental or revolutionary ways and which will alter the balance sheet of profits. How far and how quickly new technologies will be adopted is not predictable, and it will be uneven between firms. However, there will be a pressure on them to adopt these new technologies in order to keep pace with their rivals. The falling costs and growing sophistication of robots mean that individual firms may be able to steal an advantage over their competitors, but for the system as a whole it leads to falling profits. I begin by looking at foreign direct investment FDI as a proxy for the extent to which capital is being internationalised. Table 4 shows that between and there was a shift towards China capturing an increasing share of global flows of FDI, but the majority of flows were concentrated in the core capitalist economies of the United States and Europe. Flows of foreign direct investment by selected region and country, , and , as a percentage of the world total Source:

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Based on a division of labour that involves a series of repetitive tasks, there is little room for any sort of enlightened work practice as this would undermine the basis of the model. Terry Gou (CEO of Foxconn) said: "As human beings are also animals, to manage 1 million animals gives me a headache". 46 Aside from the disgraceful reference to workers as animals, this remark reveals the limits of mass production.

Business Monitor, The table shows that over two-thirds Only the remaining 6. The clear implication is that labour costs are not the primary determinant of FDI. It can be argued that it is more appropriate to examine data for the flow rather than the stock of FDI because the latter is made up of investment decisions made in past years when wage differentials may have been different. Data for flows of FDI, however, are more volatile than those for the stock and we know that wage differentials between countries have been reasonably stable in the last two decades. This view is strengthened when we examine the location of British FDI in other parts of the world outside Europe. The USA receives Only the remaining Other explanations Why, then, are labour costs not such a key factor as is commonly believed? Part of the explanation lies in differences in productivity between countries, which go some way to cancelling out differences in wage costs. Thus, when we consider unit wage costs we find much smaller variations between countries "Social dumping and European economic integration", N Adnett, Journal of European Social Policy, 5, 1, A second part of the explanation lies in the small and declining proportion of total costs comprised by labour costs. The role of labour market institutions", J Gual ed , Edward Elgar A further factor is the importance of MNCs having a presence in the market that they wish to serve. In some industries, such as mining, a presence in a particular country is essential in order to gain access to a natural resource; in others, such as hotels and catering, it is essential in order to serve a market; and in yet others, such as defence, it is politically important to have a direct presence in the country in which the MNC is seeking to attract orders. More generally, MNCs may wish to establish a presence in a particular country in order to portray themselves as "local" producers, overcoming any marketing disadvantage arising from being seen as "foreign" "Multinational Britain: We have argued that the role of labour costs in explaining these decisions is often exaggerated. Differences in labour costs between countries do not appear to be as central in attracting inward investment as is often implied; rather, productivity, other costs and market access appear to be more influential. The implication is that debates about "social dumping" should see labour costs and standards as only one factor affecting the location decisions of MNCs Tony Edwards, IRRU. Tell us what you think. Hide comments Eurofound welcomes feedback and updates on this regulation Add new comment.

4: new international division of labour - oi

**international division of labour* The specialization of particular countries in distinct branches of production, whether this be in certain products, or in selected parts of the production process.*

The underdeveloped countries are increasingly chosen as sites for manufacturing industries producing goods that are competitive in the world market. In a recent anthology of his essays on Global Capitalism Hugo Radice recounts how in the 1970s and early 1980s progressive, broadly Marxist, scholarship fell short of providing a satisfactory means of understanding what was by then a rapidly changing world. Yet profound and lightning-paced transformations in worldwide production and trade were indeed palpable to any observer back then, and by the mid-1980s Marxist scholars in the UK and beyond were beginning to engage in highly productive—and still influential—debates on the labour process, state theory, and alternative political strategies in the context of deep world recession and heightened social and political tensions across much of the West. In a nutshell, the popularised version of the NIDL thesis consisted of the following stylised account of the process of global restructuring. Faced with declining profitability in advanced capitalist countries mainly due to rising wages, transnational corporations (TNCs) started to relocate labour-intensive manufacturing to the then, so-called, Third World, thus acting as a major factor in the industrial decline that seemed to prevail in the former countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Undoubtedly, this can be explained in part by changing fads and the development of new lines of inquiry and debate among academics. Yet it is also the case that some scholars had started to put forward strong reservations against the NIDL approach by the 1980s—prompted principally by some empirical developments which seemed to contradict the major claims of the NIDL thesis. More broadly, as many critics have rightly highlighted, the initial formulations of the NIDL thesis contained untenable sweeping generalisations, which could not account for national differences in the developmental path of many countries. The industrial upgrading of the first generation of Asian Tigers, for example, would eventually include 4 G. While accepting the veracity of some of the criticisms levelled at the original NIDL thesis and the version of it that became common currency by the 1990s, we believe that it now deserves to be revisited. We propose that a properly reconsidered and revised NIDL thesis can still shed light on the specificities of capitalist development in various parts of the world today, as well as the nature of uneven development across the capitalist world market. Taken together, the contributions to this book represent the basis for such a reconsideration of the NIDL thesis which rests upon the Marxian distinction between the global economic content that determines the constitution and dynamics of the international division of labour, and the evolving national political forms that mediate its development. More specifically, the book argues that national developmental processes across the world have been but an expression of the underlying essential unity of the production of relative surplus-value on a world scale. The fact that the approach taken in this book is rooted in the critique of political economy originally developed by Karl Marx over years ago does not detract from its contemporary significance. In its general determination as self-valorising value, capital is actually a materialised social relation between commodity owners differentiated into social classes, which, in its fully developed form as the total social capital, becomes inverted into the alienated subject of the unity of the process of social reproduction and its expansion Marx. Thus, capital is essentially the movement of the self-expansion of the objectified general social relation between private and independent human beings which, in its own process, produces and reproduces the latter as members of antagonistic social classes Marx. All moments of the human life-process thus become inverted into material bearers of the life-cycle of capital, or they become forms assumed by the flow of value in its circulatory process. Subsumed under the capital-form, the alienated content of social life becomes the production of surplus-value or the formally boundless quantitative progression of the general reified form of social mediation Marx. Although this content governs the movement of capital as a whole or as an alienated collective power, the total global social capital is nonetheless the product of the private and independent form taken by social labour. The general unity of the movement of the total social capital cannot be established immediately. It is thereby indirectly established through the exchange of commodities resulting from the apparently autonomous 6 G. STAROSTA actions of

individual capitals in competition with each other, as each of them pursues the maximisation of its profitability through the expanded reproduction of their formally independent cycles of valorisation. In their simplest form, those cycles can be represented through the well-known general formula of capital: This is the inner or essential determination of the general social relation between capitalist firms or individual capitals. Instead, it needs to be grasped as an expression of the underlying formal and material unity of the essentially global contradictory dynamics of the accumulation of the total social capital through the production of relative surplus-value, which are economically mediated by relations of competition among individual capitals like TNCs again, as opposed to determined, on the one hand, and politically mediated by the policies of the nation state on the other. These contradictory and crisis-ridden dynamics, which, in their most developed form as large-scale industry, fundamentally entail the permanent revolution in the modes of exertion of the labour power of individual workers and of their articulation as a directly collective productive body or organism Marx Capital requires from these workers ever more complex forms of labour. Needless to say, inasmuch as this expanded productive subjectivity is nothing more than a concrete form of the production of relative surplus-value, the exercise of newly developed intellectual productive powers is also inverted into a mode of existence of capital in its movement of self-valorisation. Moreover, sooner or later many of these intellectual dimensions of living labour will also experience automation or knowledge codification and therefore become relatively simplified. As we shall see later in this book, this latter aspect has been central to the more recent phases in the evolution of the NIDL as shown in Chap. Second, it tends to degrade the subjectivity of those workers that acquire and exercise their increasingly simpler manual or experienced-based productive attributes in the direct process of production. Indeed, large-scale industry is based on the objectification of tacit knowledge, previously embodied in the manual industrial worker and largely acquired through lengthy on-the-job, learning-by-doing processes, as an attribute of the system of machinery Huws Yet the effect of increasing automation has not just been one of deskilling. It has been mixed, also entailing a certain creation of new skills required by capital even from direct production workers. The key point, however, is that these newer skills have been of a different kind from those that have been eroded. While the older skills tended to be based on the particularistic development of the productive subjectivity of wage-workers both manual and intellectual as a result of the practical experience of machining in the direct process of production, the newly created skills tend to revolve around the universalistic dimension 8 G. STAROSTA of the productive quality of labour-power, whose development is achieved in the general process of education and socialisation that precedes its actual application in the production process. In the third place, while the new technologies have not resulted in the total elimination of manual labour from automated processes of production Alcorta Fourth and last, the production of relative surplus-value through the system of machinery leads to the multiplication of the surplus population relative to the needs of the accumulation process, which also constitutes a transformation of productive subjectivity produced by the automation of large-scale industry see Marx More specifically, this tendency represents the most extreme case of material mutilation of the productive attributes of the working class resulting from capital accumulation, that is, not simply their degradation but their outright non-reproduction. Yet, it is from this tendency that the global pool of cheap but disciplined labour power, which has been central for the original constitution and evolution of the NIDL, has eventually derived. What all the contributions to this book share is a conviction that the foundation of the uneven spatial differentiation of global capitalism must be searched for in these changing forms of the exploitation of the global working class by the total social capital, through the transformation of the material forms of the capitalist production process. Production in specific industrial sectors has thereby expanded in some countries while contracting in others where new and more advanced sectors have developed, following a rhythm determined by the evolution of two main factors, that is, technological change and relative cost and productive attributes of national labour forces. This different constellation does not involve the transcendence of the NIDL, as many of the critics of the original thesis have suggested see Chap. Thus, it actually provides richer material and a more fruitful starting point for a critical investigation of the determinations underlying the, so-called, globalisation process than many other contemporary international and critical political economy analyses. In this sense, we feel that the question of the NIDL should be put back on the agenda for a robust

theorisation of global transformation and uneven development. There is no doubt, as conceded above, that the original debates around the NIDL left many theoretical and empirical questions unresolved. In particular, no contribution managed properly to account for the process of national differentiation as an expression of the underlying essential unity of the accumulation of capital on a world scale. The debate, in short, never resolved the tension between national and global dimensions in the articulation of the international division of labour. The significance of this book, then, is that taken together the contributing authors provide a basis for an alternative critique and reformulation of the NIDL thesis that, first, recovers what constituted its main achievement and which has been forgotten by contemporary theorising; namely, the understanding of national differentiation as an expression of the essential unity of the capitalist world system. In our view, attempts by world-system theorists to explain unequal development proceeded from a problematic theoretical-conceptual distinction between core and periphery. They sought to derive underlying, structural relations between different countries and regions on the basis of empirical evidence which suggested that capital-intensive production was concentrated in the core, that labour-intensive production was concentrated in the periphery, and that the international exchange relations between the core and periphery ensure the continuous development of the former at the expense of the latter. At the root of this dualistic conceptualisation of unequal economic and political international relations is an analytical distinction between economics and politics that Radice understood as an essentially global process and not the external and contingent political and exchange relations established between a multiplicity of national states themselves, that determines their development. In any case, the fate of the NIDL thesis was not decided by critical theoretical engagement over the dubious assumptions of world-systems and dependency theories. Indeed, the demise of the NIDL thesis during the 1980s went hand-in-hand with a discernible move away from the consideration of any question of the structural unity of the global accumulation of capital by IPE and cognate literatures, and instead turned towards a widespread focus on national state institutions as autonomous drivers of economic development. Not least under the influence of the 1990s. As this debate ran out of steam in the late 1980s, scholars working in development studies and economic geography then embarked upon richly detailed research into global commodity chains, as a means of examining the impact of globalisation upon industrialisation in the developing world. By deciphering the national forms taken by the general content of an historically specific mode of the reproduction of total worldwide society, on the basis of the fragmentation of the productive subjectivity of the international working class, and through the development of the automation of large-scale industry within the NIDL, this book advances a substantive explanation of the inner relation between global transformation and uneven development that may well provoke criticism and debate, but which at least does so on distinctive and hitherto largely unfamiliar grounds. On the basis of this critical re-examination of the NIDL thesis, the book goes on to argue that a revised NIDL thesis can shed new light on the specificities of capital accumulation in various parts of the contemporary world. Two particularly significant general insights emerge from these early chapters. First, that both the classical and new international divisions of labour should be most fruitfully re-signified in terms of the role played by ground-rent in specific national spaces of accumulation a category explained in Part I. And second, that there remain essential continuities inherent to the classical international division of labour which necessitate that the current constellation of the world economy be understood as being constituted by the co-existence of both old and new international divisions of labour. STAROSTA Such insights carry with them important and hitherto unacknowledged implications for the study of international political economy, and conclusions that contrast sharply with dominant critical and orthodox theories of global capitalism and uneven development. The remainder of the book incorporates case study material on four countries in Latin America, two European countries, and one Southeast Asian country. The choice of national case studies in Part II is by no means arbitrary. Argentina and Brazil, for example, are the most visible examples of countries in which the structural characteristics of the CIDL persist and complement those of the NIDL to this day certainly since the recent commodity export boom, and the revival of import substitution industrialisation under the Kirchners in Argentina. He argues that there is an objective determination relating to the formation of a general rate of profit as the regulator of the unity of the process of capital accumulation, and which

engenders a qualitative difference between those capitals that are able to contribute to that formation and those which cannot—resulting therefore in differentiated concrete rates of profit. The chapter builds, again, upon the notion of capital accumulation as being global in content and national in form. From this perspective Caligaris challenges a dominant perspective that explains the functioning of a national economy as the result of domestic politics, and another that explains it as a consequence of foreign influence and domination. The chapter therefore further advances the critique of those approaches that attempt to explain such characteristics through theories and analyses of unequal exchange with advanced capitalist countries. The latter sections of the chapter use empirical evidence from the example of capitalist development in Argentina during the twentieth century to illustrate the core argument. While acknowledging the insights of the original thesis, Starosta argues that the foundation for the emergence of the NIDL does not reside in the intensification of the manufacturing division of labour, that is, in the deskilling resulting from the subdivision of the production process into elements. Instead, the NIDL developed as an expression of the impact that the progress of the automation of capitalist large-scale industry has had on the individual and collective productive subjectivity of the working class. As a result of its own immanent tendencies, the simplest original form of the NIDL has evolved into a more complex constellation, whereby capital searches worldwide for the most profitable combinations of relative cost. Each national sphere of accumulation therefore tends to concentrate a certain type of labour-power of distinctive material and moral productive attributes of a determinate complexity, which are spatially dispersed but collectively exploited by capital as a whole in the least costly possible manner. Production in specific industrial sectors has thereby expanded in some countries, while contracting in others where new and more advanced sectors developed, following a rhythm determined by the evolution of those two main factors. An important claim made by this chapter, therefore, and which subsequently has relevance for Chaps. This, the chapter concludes, actually confirms the validity of a reworked NIDL thesis rather than its unequivocal refutation. Part II turns to national case studies of capitalist development within the international division of labour. Taking his cue from Part I, Purcell argues that the CIDL was never simply reducible to the polarisation of an industrialised core and a dependent periphery, with the latter restricted to the role of supplier of raw materials and staple foods. Rather, there was an important process of accumulation in the periphery, whereby national industrial capital was able to valorise through the appropriation of inflows of ground-rent; a process which today also points towards the continuation of elements of the classic within the new IDL. The global rise in primary commodity prices in recent years has put the question of the use of income from natural resources for developmental goals back on the political agenda across Latin America. He argues that dual landlordism in Ecuador—in the form of an agro-export elite and a state-controlled oil sector—contrasts with the singular dominance of the state-controlled oil sector in Venezuela, and this, for Purcell, explains the manner in which the two national forms of

INTRODUCTION: According to this alternative view, the Irish case is actually that of a Network Developmental State that manages the connection between the local and the global and, through its active involvement in industrial development, steers the national economy along a path of integration into the technologically most dynamic elements of the world economy. By contrast, this chapter argues that the Irish experience is yet another concrete expression of the further development of the essentially global dynamics of the NIDL. More specifically, it argues that the continuous skill-replacing technical change characterising the production of relative surplus-value across the globe has allowed capital to integrate national working classes with more skilled, but still relatively cheaper, labour-power into the NIDL. The peculiar state policies and institutions prevailing in Ireland are therefore grounded in this specific form of integration into the NIDL. Focusing on Spain, they argue that it is precisely on the material basis of its full integration within the NIDL from the mid-1980s that the conditions of the reproduction of the working class were reshaped, and it is this historical component in the reproduction of the Spanish accumulation process that has prefigured the process of the differentiation of the conditions of the reproduction of the working class across and within its borders ever since. The choice of case studies is again not arbitrary, since the automotive and steel production sectors have been at the historical vanguard of the move towards the NIDL, and they have been industries in which the actual determinants of the NIDL, which the book seeks to identify, have been most visible. They argue first that the

peculiar characteristics of low scales of production, obsolete technology, and the resulting low global competitiveness of the local auto industry in its initial stages were determined by the specific form of capital accumulation prevailing in Argentina as a result of its participation in the CIDL. This specificity had at its core the process of appropriation by industrial capital of a portion of the relatively abundant ground-rent available in Argentina; in this case, by transnational automotive manufacturers. Challenging the dominant point of view that the development of the NIDL led to the qualitative restructuring of the Argentinean automotive industry, this chapter examines concrete changes within the labour process and forms of valorisation of capital in the industry. In so doing the chapter argues that, despite these changes, the automotive industry in fact continued its development on the same basis as before. Focusing on the development of the Brazilian and Korean steel industries, Grinberg claims that the specific form of participation of each economy in the production of relative surplus-value on a global scale has determined both the pattern of industrialisation that followed, and the political processes through which it came about. In Brazil, industrial capital has accumulated through the state-mediated recovery of ground-rent, which has implied small-scale production for protected domestic markets. By contrast, in South Korea industrial capital has accumulated through the exploitation of a relatively cheap and disciplined workforce performing simplified activities for world market production in increasingly complex sectors. It ought to be self-evident from the foregoing outline of the approach taken in this book that a focus on country case studies does not imply a crude 20 G. But to clarify, Part II focuses on countries for two reasons:

5: New divisions of labour in the global economy – International Socialism

The countries that chose to build socialism broke away from this system, and a new kind of international division of labor – the international socialist division of labor – took shape. The collapse of the colonial system has introduced new elements into the international division of labor.

Possibilities for relocation of production stages to low-wage countries imply huge cost savings and productivity gains for firms. The manufacturing industries have long profited from these savings, but in the service industries offshoring is not yet a very common strategy. In general, backoffice services in all sectors of the economy have hardly ever been offshored. Service offshoring, which might importantly include the offshoring of medium- to high-skilled tasks, is only made possible by new ways of communication and storage internet, which allows the fast and secure transmission and delivery of codifiable output that does not have to be delivered in person. Potential cost savings are sizeable: The new global division of labour also allows developing countries to participate in production stages that have formerly been unavailable to them. Such new opportunities might change the incentive structure of educational investment in these countries, so that the existing education gap between developed and developing nations might finally be closed. In this respect, also western economies have an incentive to cooperate on education questions because the more skilled the foreign labour force is, the more attractive it becomes as an offshoring location. On the one hand, it thus appears that a new global division of labour is generally a desirable development. On the other hand, it brings with it a number of uncertainties and consequences, which may present a big challenge to society and politics. In particular, the new global division of labour is likely to affect people that have not formerly been exposed to the forces of globalisation, namely those workers with skilled jobs. These workers suddenly become vulnerable, might slip into unemployment, or might see their wages fall relative to those of others. Entirely new patterns of inequalities might emerge. Mixed with the current financial crisis and the looming recession, public support for globalisation might be severely threatened, the risk of protectionism rises, and ultimately even a surge in political extremism is thinkable. Unwanted consequences of the new global division of labour need to be prevented. It is yet unclear how firms react to contemporary critical situations, but structural change which usually takes a long time to unfold might be accelerated strongly due to the crisis. Prevent protectionism Less globalization and more redistribution would be an intuitive though misleading response to the perceived increase in inequality, for two reasons. One is that the increased international mobility of goods, financial assets, people, and ideas is most likely to create income gains and hence is worth having. What seems to matter for changes in inequality is technological change, or possibly the combination of globalization with technological change. Thus reducing globalization by taxing the winners to compensate the losers is a solution that will not help, because it will mean foregoing income gains without necessarily affecting rising inequality. We need clarification which new patterns of inequalities might emerge and who becomes vulnerable. Many researchers suggest that it will turn out to be wrong to look solely at educational skills only when considering emerging inequalities. Instead, job content in terms of tasks will matter more routine vs. Only jobs consisting of internationally contestable tasks will be threatened by the new global division of labour. Technological change might play an important part in continuously altering the spectrum of contestable tasks. Hence, inequalities will be determined along these dimensions in the future, whereas they were clearly determined along educational differences in the past. Hence, economic policy might promote and strengthen the learning of personal, non-routine, cognitive tasks as these are the tasks that make a job a good job in the future. Research in this area should be strengthened to make clear where inequalities emerge and where action should be taken. We have to teach the right skills for people to become and remain successful when the nature of work is becoming more heterogenous. Rapid changes of job contents, individualised employment biographies, and the blurring occupational borders will make work very heterogenous. Consequently, workers will have to stay adaptable. It has been argued that workers need strong competences in social and emotional competences, problem-solving skills, and versatility to cope with such challenges. Teaching social and emotional competences so-called non-cognitive skills cannot start early

enough, possibly even with children at pre-school age Nobel Laureate James Heckman is a prominent proponent of this idea. At school and university, lessons have to strictly convey problem-solving capacities by designing instruction in a participative and activating manner. Such capacity will also foster versatility, which is urgently needed to stay successful in a world with rapid organizational change. Instructional methods at school and university has to change radically. Reports and videos from class rooms show a very limited number of varieties of instructional methods: Yet, in order to obtain problem-solving skills and versatility, this is not sufficient. Instead, lessons should involve the study of real-life problems, should emphasize team work and cooperative learning, encourage students to produce own new ideas, and train social and organising abilities. Students should be able to autonomously analyse an issue, structure information, work in a team, conduct and chair discussions, and to present own ideas to an audience. Learning should occur by actively going out and finding the information the students need. Previous knowledge should be evoked, learning objectives should be transparent to the students, and the individual learning process should be closely monitored. Finally, also instructional quality is important. Educational research stresses three elements necessary for high-quality instruction: Incentives for educators to adhere to these goals have to be improved. The welfare state needs to consistently focus on policies that enable people to adapt to their individual new situation. The welfare state will have to part from the current strategy of income support and helping particularly the low-skilled, low-paid workers in vulnerable sectors. For example, it is no longer appropriate to train people from losing sectors for jobs in apparently winning sectors. Instead, welfare state policies should enable all workers affected by the new global division of labour to adapt to their new situation, and hence account for the diversity in terms of skills and sectors of the affected. Welfare accounts and benefit transfers are two such measures: Welfare accounts transfer property rights to people so that they can use their accounts of e. Benefit transfers focus on changing the incentives to take on employment or participate in training programmes by transforming part of the benefit into vouchers. Developing countries should take the chance to participate in the global market place and work on improving educational levels in their countries. Recently emerging possibilities for services offshoring opens up new fields in which developing countries can participate in the global market place. Previously, only unskilled tasks were shifted abroad, but now also medium- and even high-skilled tasks might be done in developing countries. This entirely changes the incentives for a developing country citizen to obtain education. The argument here is similar to the brain gain idea from migration studies: Under a new global division of labour, this may be similar, except for the fact that one does not have to migrate. The new global division might thus help to close the education gap between developed and developing countries. The financial and economic crisis makes developing countries especially vulnerable. Consequently it will be important to continue the integration of poorer countries into the new global division of labour.

6: Division of labour - Wikipedia

The term new international division of labor (NIDL) was coined by theorists seeking to explain the spatial shift of manufacturing industries from advanced capitalist countries to developing countries—“an ongoing geographic reorganization of production, which finds its origins in the formation of the “world market for labor” and “world.

Well then, how will our state supply these needs? It will need a farmer, a builder, and a weaver, and also, I think, a shoemaker and one or two others to provide for our bodily needs. So that the minimum state would consist of four or five men Silvermintz notes that, "Historians of economic thought credit Plato, primarily on account of arguments advanced in his Republic, as an early proponent of the division of labour. Just as the various trades are most highly developed in large cities, in the same way food at the palace is prepared in a far superior manner. In small towns the same man makes couches, doors, ploughs and tables, and often he even builds houses, and still he is thankful if only he can find enough work to support himself. And it is impossible for a man of many trades to do all of them well. In large cities, however, because many make demands on each trade, one alone is enough to support a man, and often less than one: In his Muqaddimah , he states: The power of the individual human being is not sufficient for him to obtain the food he needs, and does not provide him with as much as he requires to live. Even if we assume an absolute minimum of food Thus, he cannot do without a combination of many powers from among his fellow beings, if he is to obtain food for himself and for them. Through cooperation, the needs of a number of persons, many times greater than their own number, can be satisfied. Classically the workers in a shipyard would build ships as units, finishing one before starting another. But the Dutch had it organized with several teams each doing the same tasks for successive ships. People with a particular task to do must have discovered new methods that were only later observed and justified by writers on political economy. Petty also applied the principle to his survey of Ireland. His breakthrough was to divide up the work so that large parts of it could be done by people with no extensive training. Bernard de Mandeville[edit] Bernard de Mandeville discusses the matter in the second volume of The Fable of the Bees But if one will wholly apply himself to the making of Bows and Arrows, whilst another provides Food, a third builds Huts, a fourth makes Garments, and a fifth Utensils, they not only become useful to one another, but the Callings and Employments themselves will in the same Number of Years receive much greater Improvements, than if all had been promiscuously followed by every one of the Five. David Hume[edit] When every individual person labors apart, and only for himself, his force is too small to execute any considerable work; his labor being employed in supplying all his different necessities, he never attains a perfection in any particular art; and as his force and success are not at all times equal, the least failure in either of these particulars must be attended with inevitable ruin and misery. Society provides a remedy for these three inconveniences. By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of employments, our ability increases: And by mutual succor we are less exposed to fortune and accidents. We are going to go through these operations in a few words to stimulate the curiosity to know their detail; this enumeration will supply as many articles which will make the division of this work. Adam Smith[edit] In the first sentence of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations , Adam Smith foresaw the essence of industrialism by determining that division of labour represents a substantial increase in productivity. Like du Monceau, his example was the making of pins. Unlike Plato , Smith famously argued that the difference between a street porter and a philosopher was as much a consequence of the division of labour as its cause. Therefore, while for Plato the level of specialization determined by the division of labour was externally determined, for Smith it was the dynamic engine of economic progress. However, in a further chapter of the same book Smith criticizes the division of labour saying it can lead to "the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the great body of the people. Smith saw the importance of matching skills with equipment — usually in the context of an organization. For example, pin makers were organized with one making the head, another the body, each using different equipment. Similarly he emphasised a large number of skills, used in cooperation and with suitable equipment, were required to build a ship. In modern economic discussion, the term human capital would be used. Babbage wrote a seminal work "On the Economy of

Machinery and Manufactures" analyzing perhaps for the first time the division of labour in factories. All crafts, trades and arts have profited from the division of labour; for when each worker sticks to one particular kind of work that needs to be handled differently from all the others, he can do it better and more easily than when one person does everything. Where work is not thus differentiated and divided, where everyone is a jack-of-all-trades, the crafts remain at an utterly primitive level. He described the process as alienation: The worker then becomes "depressed spiritually and physically to the condition of a machine". As the work becomes more specialized, less training is needed for each specific job, and the workforce, overall, is less skilled than if one worker did one job entirely. He also argues that in a communist society, the division of labour is transcended, meaning that balanced human development occurs where people fully express their nature in the variety of creative work that they do. He claimed that the average man in a civilized society is less wealthy, in practice, than one in a "savage" society. Durkheim arrived at the same conclusion regarding the positive effects of the division of labour as his theoretical predecessor, Adam Smith. In *The Wealth of the Nations*, Smith observes the division of labour results in "a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labor. Durkheim hypothesized that the division of labour fosters social solidarity, yielding "a wholly moral phenomenon" that ensures "mutual relationships" among individuals. The main argument here is the economic gains accruing from the division of labour far outweigh the costs. It is argued that it is fully possible to achieve balanced human development within capitalism, and alienation is downplayed as mere romantic fiction. The price system is just one of those formations which man has learned to use though he is still very far from having learned to make the best use of it after he had stumbled upon it without understanding it. Through it not only a division of labour but also a coordinated utilization of resources based on an equally divided knowledge has become possible. The people who like to deride any suggestion that this may be so usually distort the argument by insinuating that it asserts that by some miracle just that sort of system has spontaneously grown up which is best suited to modern civilization. It is the other way round: Had he not done so, he might still have developed some other, altogether different, type of civilization, something like the "state" of the termite ants, or some other altogether unimaginable type. This would mean that countries specialize in the work they can do at the lowest relative cost measured in terms of the opportunity cost of not using resources for other work, compared to the opportunity costs experienced countries. Critics, however, allege that international specialization cannot be explained sufficiently in terms of "the work nations do best", rather this specialization is guided more by commercial criteria, which favour some countries over others. Efficient policies to encourage employment and combat unemployment are essential if countries are to reap the full benefits of globalization and avoid a backlash against open trade. Job losses in some sectors, along with new job opportunities in other sectors, are an inevitable accompaniment of the process of globalization. The challenge is to ensure that the adjustment process involved in matching available workers with new job openings works as smoothly as possible. Few studies have taken place regarding the global division of labour. Information can be drawn from ILO and national statistical offices. The majority of workers in industry and services were wage and salary earners – 58 percent of the industrial workforce and 65 percent of the services workforce. But a big portion were self-employed or involved in family labour. Filmer suggests the total of employees worldwide in the s was about million, compared with around a billion working on own account on the land mainly peasants, and some million working on own account in industry and services. Agriculture decreased from The industry sector accounted for Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. April Learn how and when to remove this template message In the modern world, those specialists most preoccupied in their work with theorizing about the division of labour are those involved in management and organization. In view of the global extremities of the division of labour, the question is often raised about what division of labour would be most ideal, beautiful, efficient and just. Two styles of management that are seen in modern organizations are control and commitment, control being the division of labour style of the past and commitment being the style of the future. Control management is based on the principles of job specialization and the division of labour. This is the assembly line style of job specialization where employees are given a very narrow set of tasks or one specific task. Commitment division of labour is oriented on including the employee and building a level of

internal commitment towards accomplishing tasks. Tasks include more responsibility and are coordinated based on expertise rather than formal position. However, disadvantages of job specialization included limited employee skill, a dependence on entire department fluency, and employee discontent with repetitious tasks. Labour hierarchy is a very common feature of the modern workplace structure, but of course the way these hierarchies are structured can be influenced by a variety of different factors. Size, cost, and the development of new technology are factors that have influenced job specialization structures in the modern workplace. The cost of job specialization is what limits small organizations from dividing their labour responsibilities, but as organizations increase in size there is a correlation in the rise of division of labour. Technological developments have led to a decrease in the amount of job specialization in organizations as new technology makes it easier for fewer employees to accomplish a variety of tasks and still enhance production. New technology has also been supportive in the flow of information between departments helping to reduce the feeling of department isolation. This important concept of meritocracy could be read as an explanation or as a justification of why a division of labour is the way it is. In general, in capitalist economies, such things are not decided consciously. This does not present a problem,[citation needed] as the only requirement of a capitalist system is that you turn a profit. Limitations[edit] Adam Smith famously said in *The Wealth of Nations* that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market. This is because it is by exchange that each person can be specialized in their work and yet still have access to a wide range of goods and services. Hence, reductions in barriers to exchange lead to increases in the division of labour and so help to drive economic growth. Limitations to the division of labour have also been related to coordination and transportation costs. Hence, a Taylorist approach to work design contributed to worsened industrial relations. There are also limitations to the division of labour and the division of work that result from work-flow variations and uncertainties. For instance, one stage of a production process may temporarily work at a slower pace, forcing other stages to slow down. One answer to this is to make some portion of resources mobile between stages, so that those resources must be capable of undertaking a wider range of tasks. Another is to consolidate tasks so that they are undertaken one after another by the same workers and other resources. Stocks between stages can also help to reduce the problem to some extent but are costly and can hamper quality control. Note also that modern flexible manufacturing systems require both flexible machines and flexible workers. In project-based work, the coordination of resources is a difficult issue for the project manager as project schedules and resulting resource bookings are based on estimates of task durations and so are subject to subsequent revisions. Again, consolidating tasks so that they are undertaken consecutively by the same resources and having resources available that can be called on at short-notice from other tasks can help to reduce such problems, though at the cost of reduced specialisation. There are also advantages in a reduced division of labour where knowledge would otherwise have to be transferred between stages. It is also likely to result in the query being handled faster due to the elimination of delays in passing the query between different people. Gendered division of labour[edit] Main articles:

7: Managing the New Global Division of Labour – Global Economic Symposium

A decision by a corporation to turn over much of the responsibility for production to independent suppliers. Ex.: a rich individual putting its money in a bank account out of its original country so then it wouldn't have to pay taxes over it.

8: SAGE Reference - New International Division of Labor

A global division of labour associated with the growth of transnational corporations and the deindustrialization of the advanced economies. The most common pattern is for research and development in more economically developed countries, and cheap, less skilled labour in less economically developed countries.

9: New International Division of Cultural Labour - P2P Foundation

CHAPTER 1 Introduction: The New International Division of Labour and the Critique of Political Economy Today Greig Charnock and Guido Starosta Thus, from the bare enumeration of some of the more glaringly obvious features of the present-day world economy, it can be seen that the old or 'classical' international division of labour, by which the underdeveloped countries were on the whole.

Supply and demand as applied to high-school teachers. Conclusion: The contradictory spaces of mothering Webster and his master-pieces. Cooking for kings The railway cat and Digby Curriculum development a guide to practice Badge of betrayal Social and economic networks jackson The organic and the inorganic. A lonely crowd or a network society? The Brown execution Debt of Honor (Tom Clancy) Visual studio 2008 manual espa±ol Columbia Hospital land transfer legislation Fe review manual 3rd edition Plastic injection molding manufacturing startup and management Ophthalmic therapeutics Allan J. Flach Frederick W. Fraunfelder Caillou, Whats That Noise (Clubhouse USA) Drive to Dodge City. Sport physical exam history and physical Python 3 web development beginners guide Marketing concepts and strategies 5th edition Mining engineers the American West Some experiments on the X-rays Gait, posture, ergonomics and occupational health Sitting Bulls wise words. The timekeeper Bhopal gas tragedy Multicultural dynamics and practices in vocational assessment Decontamination of large animals Lisa Murphy, Dawn Slessman, and Bob Mauck Preparing for Tasp An examination of the Chilean incident Examples of this relationship. The arts of prayer A paire of spy-knaues] Fifth grade math minutes 2002 creative teaching press Generator and lead selection Samuel J. Asirvatham, David L. Hayes, Paul A. Friedman The Biochemistry of archaea (archaeobacteria) Mathematics a discrete introduction edward scheinerman Great Wall Griffin Smith, Jr.