NEW WAVES IN APPLIED ETHICS (NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY) pdf

1: Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics - PhilPapers

This volume contains work by the very best young scholars working in Applied Ethics, gathering a range of new perspectives and thoughts on highly relevant topics, such as the environment, animals, computers, freedom of speech, human enhancement, war and poverty.

His main research interests are in metaethics, philosophy of emotion, and epistemology. Matthew Chrisman is Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh working on ethics especially metaethics , epistemology especially epistemic normativity , philosophy of language, and philosophy of action. He currently works in the financial services industry. He works primarily in the areas of metaethics and history of modern philosophy. He is the author of The Normative Web: He works primarily in moral, political, and legal philosophy. His book Taking Morality Seriously: His work in metaethics focuses on defending a robust ethical realism involving a non-naturalistic metaphysics of ethical facts and properties and an external reasons theory that allows for the categoricity of moral requirements. His primary research interests are in practical rationality and reasons for action, ethical theory, and philosophy of color, generally informed by a Wittgensteinian perspective in philosophy of language. He has published one book, Brute Rationality: Her main interests are in theories of practical reasons, metaethics, and normative ethics. She is interested in all aspects of moral philosophy. Her research focuses on ethics and, more specifically, on questions concerning the nature of moral reasons. She has published articles in The Philosophical Review and Oxford Studies in Metaethics, and is currently writing a book providing an internalist defense of universally shared moral reasons, which will be published by Oxford University Press. He works on contemporary moral theory and is co-author, with Michael Ridge, of Principled Ethics: His main interests are metaethics, value theory, and history of moral philosophy. His research interests include metaethics, especially issues surrounding expressivism and the debate over particularism and generalism. He works mainly in moral and political philosophy, with a particular interest in questions concerning practical reason and normativity. His book, Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality Oxford University Press, , defends a distinctively deliberative model of contractualism as an account of ultimate grounds of our moral duties. He works primarily in metaethics and has published widely in this area in journals and collections including Ethics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and Oxford Studies in Metaethics. The goal of the series is to have a New Waves volume in every one of the main areas of philosophy. We would like to thank Palgrave Macmillan for taking on this project in particular, and the entire New Waves in Philosophy series in general. The resulting collection represents something of the state of play in this core area of analytic philosophy, and provides an indication of the directions that metaethical thinking might take in the future. In addition, the contributions also provide coverage of a suitably broad range of metaethical issues: So I hope that this volume not only presents an insight into the distinctive research of individual thinkers, but also stands as an introduction to the contours of the general subject. There are certain subsidiary themes that can play an organizational role. The first four papers are focused on broadly metaphysical issues. The opening paper, William J. Moral facts and properties are, instead, sui generis or irreducibly normative. The case for non-naturalism does not stop here, however: FitzPatrick goes on to argue that i ethical naturalism faces a number of serious problems of its own, and that ii non-naturalism has the means to avoid other objections. The focus then shifts to metaethical positions that might be attractive for naturalists, but which have more of a revisionary outlook. While non-naturalist and naturalist proposals maintain that some moral or evaluative statements are true, moral error theory defends the skeptical possibility that all such claims are false. In particular, error theorists usually hold that i moral judgments involve claims about categorical reasons, and that ii there are no such reasons, in which case moral judgments are false. He then responds to recent criticisms due to Stephen Finlay, according to which ordinary speakers do not make the error of which they are accused, and finally responds to the challenge that error theory casts doubt upon the existence of hypothetical reasons and therefore proves too much. Olson argues that the error theorist can provide an account of hypothetical reasons â€" in terms of non-normative relations between means and ends â€" that is metaphysically unproblematic. A position closely related to error theory is that of moral

fictionalism. The next two papers in the collection focus on different issues raised by non-cognitive approaches to moral thought and judgment, which maintain again, roughly that moral claims or statements are not capable of being true or false. Chrisman argues that this question poses a serious problem for expressivism, but not for his preferred sort of non-representationalist account, namely inferentialism. Inferentialist or conceptual-role theories of meaning maintain that a sentence means what it does, not in virtue of what it represents or in virtue of the thought it expresses, but in virtue of its inferential relations â€" and, in particular, its inferential commitments, entitlements, and obligations. But then, contra common sense, expressivism is committed to thinking that wishful thinking is a rational method of acquiring beliefs. Schroeder aims to assess the current state of play with respect to this problem, by focusing on the attempted solutions offered by David Enoch and James Lenman. Schroeder argues that neither is particularly plausible, and suggests that any solution will require that the non-cognitivist develops a better understanding of epistemological notions of evidence and justification. The next three papers mark a shift from a focus on moral facts and ethical language to a consideration of two more central themes in metaethics, namely the nature of practical reasons, and the relation between reason, agency and value. This is the thought that reasons must be capable of explaining action: Markovits argues that, despite its initial air of plausibility, there are a host of counterexamples that force us to reject the motivating intuition. Some of these are examples where reasons we have for acting would no longer apply to us if we were fully rational. Other examples show that reasons that do apply to us when fully rational are nevertheless incapable of motivating us. In the final section of her paper Heuer assesses the prospects for such a buck-passing account. He argues that reasons relations themselves require explanation, and it is difficult to see how such demands can be met in a way that is compatible with the claim that reasons are fundamental. If so, we can doubt whether the turn to reasons offers any explanatory advantages with respect to normative and evaluative notions. Despite its intuitive appeal, constitutivism faces a serious problem, which is that agents need not care about being agents, or care about their behavior being action. A central problem with any such attempt is that social norms are both normative and a matter of custom or convention, and these aspects can seem to be in conflict. Attempts to capture the customary nature of such norms run the risk of failing to capture the fact that they are genuine requirements; but proposals that focus on the normativity of social norms can fail to capture their customary aspect. After criticizing standard accounts of social normativity, Southwood explains an approach that promises to accommodate both the customary and the normative nature of social norms. On this view, social norms are collections of normative judgments that are, nonetheless, different from other normative judgments of morality and prudence because they are grounded in social practices. This allows social norms to have a particular kind of social authority. The final two papers address metaethical questions raised by issues in epistemology and aesthetics. The puzzle is that moral epistemology has certain central features that appear to be in tension. Thus, we think that there is something suspect about forming moral beliefs purely on the basis of testimony; that deferring to the beliefs of others in moral matters is illegitimate; that we tend not to give weight to the opinions of others in moral matters, whereas we are happy to in non-moral affairs; and, finally, that taking advice from others about moral issues is often a good idea. Hills argues that standard forms of moral realism and of non-cognitivism will struggle to accommodate all four features of moral epistemology. Nevertheless, all four features can be captured, Hills proposes, provided we recognize that the target of moral thinking and inquiry is and should be moral understanding rather than moral knowledge. Generalism maintains, roughly, that there are sound and informative principles governing some domain; particularism about some domain denies this. McKeever and Ridge are concerned because they regard particularism about aesthetics and aesthetic judgment as true, but wish to defend a generalist approach in ethics. Their worry, then, is that their defense of generalism in ethics might prove too much if it rules out a plausible view in aesthetics. The authors seek to address this worry by first recapping their arguments for generalism in ethics, and by then proceeding to show why such 6 Michael Brady arguments do not apply with respect to aesthetics. There is thus sufficient asymmetry between ethical and aesthetic evaluation to undermine the challenge to generalism in ethics. Although the papers have been grouped together according to broad themes, this is, in a sense, rather artificial. For another of the notable features of the contributions is the extent to which they show how

metaethical questions and issues are interrelated and interlinked. So we see discussions of categorical reasons informing claims about moral language, accounts of linguistic capacities having a bearing on theories about moral facts, issues in moral epistemology generating views about the plausibility of expressivism, statements about internal reasons leading to theses about the nature of normativity, thoughts about normativity in the social and aesthetic realms grounding arguments about normativity in other areas, and so on. The papers in this collection thus stand as testimony to the very high quality of research in metaethics being produced by younger philosophers, and also to the rich, complex, and holistic character of this vibrant area of analytic philosophy. FitzPatrick Ethical non-naturalism, as I shall understand it, is the view that there are real ethical properties and facts that are not among the natural properties and facts of the world. This is to say that ethical properties such as moral rightness or goodness and facts such as the fact that an act is wrong, or that a certain consideration is a reason for acting are neither among the properties and facts that are the proper subject of scientific inquiry, nor constructible from those that are. They are instead sui generis. Ethical nonnaturalists are thus ethical realists who reject naturalistic construals of ethical properties and facts. It is no secret that many theorists find ethical non-naturalism intolerably mysterious and extravagant. Indeed, the latter may seem especially problematic given that we are evolved creatures with epistemic faculties forged by natural selection in ancestral environments. Irreducible normativity and non-naturalism: The question, however, is why this is and what follows from it. The non-naturalist, by contrast, holds that irreducible normativity is a feature of real ethical properties and facts, which requires that they themselves be understood as non-natural. For Gibbard, normativity is a feature only of normative concepts and thoughts â€" not of properties, facts or states of affairs in the world â€" and it is simply a matter of the essential practicality of normative concepts. Gibbard rejects any such account. For him, the irreducible normativity consists just in the practicality of the role played by directive concepts and thoughts. Instead, they will argue, in so far as ethical concepts and thoughts are irreducibly normative, this is precisely because they have irreducibly normative representational content. Of course, even an error theorist, who believes all positive ethical claims to be false, might agree with this much: So the non-naturalist, by contrast, crucially holds that there are such properties and facts, and that at least in some cases it is just such irreducibly normative facts that explain our ethical beliefs, in so far as we have the beliefs we do because we have grasped such facts. This clarifies the differences between the non-naturalist and the expressivist. While Gibbard agrees that normative concepts are in a sense non-natural they are not used to express propositions with naturalistic representational content , he does not ultimately believe in irreducible normativity, but in effect reduces normativity to the practicality of directive, plan-laden concepts and of the mental states associated with them. As with Gibbard, however, many ethical naturalists will likewise offer something that purports to capture a kind of irreducible normativity in ethics. FitzPatrick Sophisticated naturalists might thus claim that they can accommodate something like irreducible normativity in this sense: Non-normative concepts fail to track these properties only because of the complex constitution and organization of these properties, the patterns of which make sense only from the perspective of ethical inquiry and concern, within which they also play useful roles in historical and sociological explanations Boyd, ; Brink, ; Sturgeon, ; But again, there is nothing special about the nature of these properties themselves: Ethical assertions are thus unlike assertions in non-normative terms in that the former carry the implication of these attitudinal and motivational elements while the latter do not. An ethical naturalist might thus argue that he can capture a kind of irreducibly normative element in ethics in much the same way as Gibbard does: As before, the crucial question is whether these naturalistic moves succeed in adequately capturing whatever irreducible normativity there may be in ethics. Where one finds oneself in this debate, therefore, depends on whether one agrees that there is some kind of irreducible normativity in ethics, and, if so, whether it can be fully accommodated in terms of moral semantics or pragmatics of one kind or another, or instead requires locating Ethical Non-Naturalism and Normative Properties 11 irreducible normativity more deeply in the nature of ethical properties and facts themselves, committing one to ethical non-naturalism. In fact, however, the quasi-realism he offers the non-naturalist â€" and the realist more generally â€" falls far short of allaying the concerns of people with even moderate leanings in these directions, failing to provide an account of normativity that we should find attractive or tempting. So he 12 William J. FitzPatrick would not endorse the

typical ethical naturalist claim that ethical or normative properties are natural properties; he merely says that certain properties for which we have normative concepts as well as non-normative ones are real, natural properties.

2: New Waves in Applied Ethics : Jesper Ryberg :

'This is an outstanding collection of clear and well-argued essays across a range of fundamental issues in applied ethics. The authors not only provide state-of-the-art overviews of the debate in each area, but take that debate in new and fruitful directions.'.

Reviewed by David G. Dick, University of Calgary Thom Brooks lists two goals for this new anthology. First, he hopes that "anyone coming to the study of ethics for the first time should be able to pick up this book, read its pages and become knowledgeable about major debates in [ethics]. Only in time will we be able to judge if Brooks has achieved his second goal, but his first goal has been admirably met. No doubt due to some editorial influence on his part, nearly every essay begins with a detailed summary of recent thinking surrounding an issue, and this makes each essay a nice, brief primer on a topic before the author advances the dialectic another step. For those having some basic familiarity with philosophy, each essay provides enough background for even those entirely ignorant of the work being done in the area. Averaging about 20 pages each, the essays would be appropriate for everyone from a mid-career philosophy undergraduate on up. This is quite an accomplishment for any anthology. Reading an anthology like this cover to cover is probably far less common than simply harvesting some relevant essays from it, but those who read it in its entirety will be struck by the diversity of topics that are today brought together under the title "philosophical ethics. Despite these vastly disparate topics, at least one pattern emerges across these thirteen essays: Though all the essays could have been written from an armchair, they build on knowledge that is to be found only in the lab or the field. More than half of the essays make such data central to their arguments. By far, the empirical science most heavily represented is psychology. Results from psychological research are central to the essays of Bromwich, Miller, Liao, and Webber. Motivational internalism is the view that sincere moral judgments always result in the relevant moral motivations. The view faces obstacles when it comes to commonplace counterexamples such as someone judging she ought to give to charity, but simply too depressed to do anything about it. Citing the DSM-IV and other research on clinical depression, Bromwich notes that depression typically involves cognitive impairment, as well as motivational deficiencies. If depression does impair our judgments, these apparent counterexamples disappear. They are simply instances of less than sincere judgments, which motivational internalism would not expect to result in motivation. Pointing this out is unlikely to sway a committed externalist, since adding cognitive impairment to our understanding of depression does not remove the possibility that it is still a motivational defect doing the work. It does, however, complicate things for externalists who wish to appeal to such cases. It is telling though that Bromwich, who intends to show "that the central organizing problem of meta-ethics -- the moral problem -- is based on a misconception of the nature of belief" p. Drawing on this wealth of research in social psychology, Miller aims to carve out a position between, and distinct from, the eliminativists who wish to explain away character traits and the Aristotelians who wish to insist on "global character traits such as compassion and honesty. For example, if you make a person feel guilty about her involvement in a camera malfunction, she will be far more likely to later help someone with a torn grocery bag. The cases Miller marshals to establish these "global helping traits" are remarkably consistent across times and situations, but the data simply does not yet speak to the existence of character traits that persist over time in particular individuals. It seems that we do know that everyone is more likely to help out when feeling guilty, but we still have no idea if someone who is honest at home will carry that trait over to being honest in the workplace. Miller himself finally admits this in his sixty-seventh footnote, saying what we do not have is a number of longitudinal studies focused on the same individuals. So we can only speculate at this point that the same helping trends we see across subjects involved in the same experiment will also apply with the same subjects over time. Matthew Liao "Bias and Reasoning: Haidt and others go on to show that our moral judgments are further biased to agree with those of our friends and to cohere with our identities. After rejecting two other accounts of bias as inadequate, Liao argues that we ought to conceive of bias as a lack of epistemic justification, instead of just deviation from expert-endorsed rules or from "unwanted" influences. For example, some tendencies to agree with our friends

might undermine our epistemic justification in some cases, but if we believe that our friends make trustworthy judgments, it could be epistemically rational to move our differing judgments closer to theirs p. In what is probably the most readable essay of the collection, Jonathan Webber makes an explicit appeal for moral philosophy to be done with more careful attention to facts about human psychology. In "Climate Change and Public Moral Reasoning," Webber says himself that "the idea is that one proper task of moral philosophy is to view contemporary ethical issues through the lens of current empirical psychology. While the deeper desires may be hard-wired and unchangeable, the surface desires are historical and contingent. Research into which desires are deep and irrevocable and which are surface and changeable might yield some surprising options for moral behavior. Taking climate change as his example, Webber points out we might reduce our emissions not through an austerity that thwarts our deepest desires, but through changes that might even make our lives more pleasant. For example, as George Monbiot suggests, there may be "massive energy savings" to be had if we simply replaced our current slog back and forth to the supermarket in our cars with a delivery system that came right to our doors. Value Pluralism and Patterns of Choice. Famously value monists, like some utilitarians, face no such problem since their position permits them to make all values commensurable, measuring the values of everything against one another in a single currency. Just as with currencies, value pluralism faces no difficulty if the plural values can be judged in terms of one another: But if you want to resist the conclusion that there is a legitimate exchange rate that holds between your morning doughnuts and your daughter, you might be forced to adopt a plurality of values that are different in kind. This will allow you to insist that there is literally no number of doughnuts that could be an adequate replacement for your daughter, but it leaves you in a tighter spot when values are genuinely incomparable. What to do, then, if you are faced with a decision where there simply is no overriding value? This decision might be as simple as deciding what to have for lunch. Plausibly, no lunch accommodates all three, nor can the values be weighed against each other, so how can reason tell us what is best to do when there simply is no uniquely best value to respect? Who knew that choosing lunch could be so stressful? Even this simple choice reveals the terrifying prospect that there might be problems beyond the capacity of reason to solve. How could we ever rationally choose among differing values that are all legitimate but cannot be compared? As Andreou puts it, "Doing justice to a plurality of values is not the sort of thing that can normally be achieved in one decision; but sometimes it can be achieved over a set of decisions" p. Even if no single lunch can simultaneously respect the values of health, pleasure, and wealth, a pattern of lunches can. Reason may be incapable of reconciling this incomparability in a single choice, but it can construct a pattern of choices that amounts to a reconciliation by appropriately acknowledging and respecting these values at different times. Obviously, there will be limitations to how far this approach can extend. The example values Andreou chooses are all forgiving since they do not demand constant attention or adherence for appropriate respect. Consider instead the plausibly unforgiving moral values of honesty and non-maleficence, both of which demand constant adherence. A plan to refrain from lying except on Tuesdays fails to respect the value of honesty just as much as a plan to refrain from doing harm except on Thursdays fails to respect the value of non-maleficence. Deciding on the appropriate pattern of actions just might be the right strategy for reconciling the otherwise irreconcilable values in our private lives and political institutions. That conclusion, like this collection, is well worth our time and attention.

3: New waves in applied ethics - Jesper Ryberg, Thomas SÃ¸birk Petersen, Clark Wolf - Google Books

This volume contains work by the very best young scholars working in Applied Ethics, gathering a range of new perspectives and thoughts on highly relevant topics, such as the environment, animals, computers, freedom of speech, human enhancement, war and poverty. For researchers and students working.

4: Jesper Ryberg, Thomas S. Petersen & Clark Wolf (eds.), New Waves in Applied Ethics - PhilPapers

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NEW WAVES IN APPLIED ETHICS (NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY) pdf

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5: - New Waves in Applied Ethics (New Waves in Philosophy) by Jesper Ryberg

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6: New Waves in Ethics // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame

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