

PART SIX: WHAT IS THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION AND KNOWLEDGE? pdf

1: Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Justification, thus, is central to this idea of knowledge. The question of what kind of justification is necessary to constitute knowledge is the focus of much reflection and debate among.

According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge: S knows that p iff p is true; S believes that p; S is justified in believing that p. Much of the twentieth-century literature on the analysis of knowledge took the JTB analysis as its starting-point. It became something of a convenient fiction to suppose that this analysis was widely accepted throughout much of the history of philosophy. In fact, however, the JTB analysis was first articulated in the twentieth century by its attackers. Consequently, nobody knows that Hillary Clinton won the election. One can only know things that are true. Many people expected Clinton to win the election. Not all truths are established truths. If you flip a coin and never check how it landed, it may be true that it landed heads, even if nobody has any way to tell. Truth is a metaphysical, as opposed to epistemological, notion: Knowledge is a kind of relationship with the truth—“to know something is to have a certain kind of access to a fact. The general idea behind the belief condition is that you can only know what you believe. Failing to believe something precludes knowing it. Outright belief is stronger see, e. Suppose Walter comes home after work to find out that his house has burned down. Critics of the belief condition might argue that Walter knows that his house has burned down he sees that it has , but, as his words indicate, he does not believe it. A more serious counterexample has been suggested by Colin Radford Suppose Albert is quizzed on English history. One of the questions is: E Elizabeth died in Radford makes the following two claims about this example: Albert does not believe E. The fact that he answers most of the questions correctly indicates that he has actually learned, and never forgotten, such historical facts. Since he takes a and b to be true, Radford holds that belief is not necessary for knowledge. But either of a and b might be resisted. David Rose and Jonathan Schaffer take this route. The justification condition is the topic of the next section. Why not say that knowledge is true belief? The standard answer is that to identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief might be true even though it is formed improperly. Suppose that William flips a coin, and confidently believes—“on no particular basis—“that it will land tails. For William to know, his belief must in some epistemic sense be proper or appropriate: For example, if a lawyer employs sophistry to induce a jury into a belief that happens to be true, this belief is insufficiently well-grounded to constitute knowledge. Internalists about justification think that whether a belief is justified depends wholly on states in some sense internal to the subject. Conee and Feldman present an example of an internalist view. Given their not unsubstantial assumption that what evidence a subject has is an internal matter, evidentialism implies internalism. Propositional justification concerns whether a subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition;[9] doxastic justification concerns whether a given belief is held appropriately. The precise relation between propositional and doxastic justification is subject to controversy, but it is uncontroversial that the two notions can come apart. Suppose that Ingrid ignores a great deal of excellent evidence indicating that a given neighborhood is dangerous, but superstitiously comes to believe that the neighborhood is dangerous when she sees a black cat crossing the street. Since knowledge is a particularly successful kind of belief, doxastic justification is a stronger candidate for being closely related to knowledge; the JTB theory is typically thought to invoke doxastic justification but see Lowy This view is sometimes motivated by the thought that, when we consider whether someone knows that p, or wonder which of a group of people know that p, often, we are not at all interested in whether the relevant subjects have beliefs that are justified; we just want to know whether they have the true belief. For example, as Hawthorne One could allow that there is a lightweight sense of knowledge that requires only true belief; another option is to decline to accept the intuitive sentences as true at face value. In what follows, we will set aside the lightweight sense, if indeed there be one, and focus on the stronger one. Although most agree that each element of the tripartite theory is necessary for knowledge, they do not seem collectively to be

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sufficient. There seem to be cases of justified true belief that still fall short of knowledge. Here is one kind of example: Imagine that we are seeking water on a hot day. We suddenly see water, or so we think. In fact, we are not seeing water but a mirage, but when we reach the spot, we are lucky and find water right there under a rock. Can we say that we had genuine knowledge of water? The answer seems to be negative, for we were just lucky. The 14th-century Italian philosopher Peter of Mantua presented a similar case: Let it be assumed that Plato is next to you and you know him to be running, but you mistakenly believe that he is Socrates, so that you firmly believe that Socrates is running. However, let it be so that Socrates is in fact running in Rome; however, you do not know this. Gettier presented two cases in which a true belief is inferred from a justified false belief. He observed that, intuitively, such beliefs cannot be knowledge; it is merely lucky that they are true. Since they appear to refute the JTB analysis, many epistemologists have undertaken to repair it: Above, we noted that one role of the justification is to rule out lucky guesses as cases of knowledge. A lesson of the Gettier problem is that it appears that even true beliefs that are justified can nevertheless be epistemically lucky in a way inconsistent with knowledge. Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on the right track must choose between two different strategies for solving the Gettier problem. The first is to strengthen the justification condition to rule out Gettier cases as cases of justified belief. No False Lemmas According to one suggestion, the following fourth condition would do the trick: There are examples of Gettier cases that need involve no inference; therefore, there are possible cases of justified true belief without knowledge, even though condition iv is met. Suppose, for example, that James, who is relaxing on a bench in a park, observes an apparent dog in a nearby field. So he believes There is a dog in the field. Suppose further that the putative dog is actually a robot dog so perfect that it could not be distinguished from an actual dog by vision alone. Given these assumptions, d is of course false. And since this belief is based on ordinary perceptual processes, most epistemologists will agree that it is justified. If so, then the JTB account, even if supplemented with iv, gives us the wrong result that James knows d. Suppose there is a county in the Midwest with the following peculiar feature. The landscape next to the road leading through that county is peppered with barn-facades: Observation from any other viewpoint would immediately reveal these structures to be fakes: Suppose Henry is driving along the road that leads through Barn County. Naturally, he will on numerous occasions form false beliefs in the presence of barns. Since Henry has no reason to suspect that he is the victim of organized deception, these beliefs are justified. Now suppose further that, on one of those occasions when he believes there is a barn over there, he happens to be looking at the one and only real barn in the county. This time, his belief is justified and true. Yet condition iv is met in this case. His belief is not the result of any inference from a falsehood. Once again, we see that iv does not succeed as a general solution to the Gettier problem. Sensitivity, to a first approximation, is this counterfactual relation: Given a Lewisian Lewis semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the sensitivity condition is equivalent to the requirement that, in the nearest possible worlds in which not-p, the subject does not believe that p. One motivation for including a sensitivity condition in an analysis of knowledge is that there seems to be an intuitive sense in which knowledge requires not merely being correct, but tracking the truth in other possible circumstances. This approach seems to be a plausible diagnosis of what goes wrong in at least some Gettier cases. For if there were no water there, you would have held the same belief on the same grounds—viz. However, it is doubtful that a sensitivity condition can account for the phenomenon of Gettier cases in general. It does so only in cases in which, had the proposition in question been false, it would have been believed anyway. But, as Saul Kripke Consider for instance the Barn County case mentioned above. Henry looks at a particular location where there happens to be a barn and believes there to be a barn there. The sensitivity condition rules out this belief as knowledge only if, were there no barn there, Henry would still have believed there was. But this counterfactual may be false, depending on how the Barn County case is set up. Relatedly, as Kripke has also indicated We assume Henry is unaware that colour signifies anything relevant. Since intuitively, the former belief looks to fall short of knowledge in just the same way as the latter, a sensitivity condition will only handle some of the intuitive problems deriving from Gettier cases. Most epistemologists today reject

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sensitivity requirements on knowledge. For example, George, who can see and use his hands perfectly well, knows that he has hands.

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2: Faith Has Its Reasons

The debate over the structure of knowledge and justification is primarily one among those who hold that knowledge requires justification. From this point of view, the structure of knowledge derives from the structure of justification.

References and Further Reading 1. The word "knowledge" and its cognates are used in a variety of ways. One common use of the word "know" is as an expression of psychological conviction. This point is discussed at greater length in section 2b below. Even if we restrict ourselves to factive usages, there are still multiple senses of "knowledge," and so we need to distinguish between them. One kind of knowledge is procedural knowledge, sometimes called competence or "know-how;" for example, one can know how to ride a bicycle, or one can know how to drive from Washington, D. Another kind of knowledge is acquaintance knowledge or familiarity; for instance, one can know the department chairperson, or one can know Philadelphia. Epistemologists typically do not focus on procedural or acquaintance knowledge, however, instead preferring to focus on propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge, then, can be called knowledge-that; statements of propositional knowledge or the lack thereof are properly expressed using "that"-clauses, such as "He knows that Houston is in Texas," or "She does not know that the square root of 81 is 9. Propositional knowledge, obviously, encompasses knowledge about a wide range of matters: Any truth might, in principle, be knowable, although there might be unknowable truths. One goal of epistemology is to determine the criteria for knowledge so that we can know what can or cannot be known, in other words, the study of epistemology fundamentally includes the study of meta-epistemology what we can know about knowledge itself. We can also distinguish between different types of propositional knowledge, based on the source of that knowledge. Non-empirical or a priori knowledge is possible independently of, or prior to, any experience, and requires only the use of reason; examples include knowledge of logical truths such as the law of non-contradiction, as well as knowledge of abstract claims such as ethical claims or claims about various conceptual matters. Empirical or a posteriori knowledge is possible only subsequent, or posterior, to certain sense experiences in addition to the use of reason ; examples include knowledge of the color or shape of a physical object or knowledge of geographical locations. Some philosophers, called rationalists, believe that all knowledge is ultimately grounded upon reason; others, called empiricists, believe that all knowledge is ultimately grounded upon experience. A thorough epistemology should, of course, address all kinds of knowledge, although there might be different standards for a priori and a posteriori knowledge. We can also distinguish between individual knowledge and collective knowledge. Social epistemology is the subfield of epistemology that addresses the way that groups, institutions, or other collective bodies might come to acquire knowledge. The Nature of Propositional Knowledge Having narrowed our focus to propositional knowledge, we must ask ourselves what, exactly, constitutes knowledge. What does it mean for someone to know something? What is the difference between someone who knows something and someone else who does not know it, or between something one knows and something one does not know? Since the scope of knowledge is so broad, we need a general characterization of knowledge, one which is applicable to any kind of proposition whatsoever. Epistemologists have usually undertaken this task by seeking a correct and complete analysis of the concept of knowledge, in other words a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions which determine whether someone knows something. Further, knowledge is a specific kind of mental state. While "that"-clauses can also be used to describe desires and intentions, these cannot constitute knowledge. Rather, knowledge is a kind of belief. If one has no beliefs about a particular matter, one cannot have knowledge about it. For instance, suppose that I desire that I be given a raise in salary, and that I intend to do whatever I can to earn one. Given that I do not believe that I will be given a raise, I cannot be said to know that I will. Only if I am inclined to believe something can I come to know it. Similarly, thoughts that an individual has never entertained are not among his beliefs, and thus cannot be included in his body of knowledge. Some beliefs, those which the individual is actively entertaining, are called occurrent beliefs. Truth Knowledge, then,

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requires belief. Of course, not all beliefs constitute knowledge. Belief is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. We are all sometimes mistaken in what we believe; in other words, while some of our beliefs are true, others are false. As we try to acquire knowledge, then, we are trying to increase our stock of true beliefs while simultaneously minimizing our false beliefs. We sometimes, of course, form beliefs for other reasons – to create a positive attitude, to deceive ourselves, and so forth – but when we seek knowledge, we are trying to get things right. And, alas, we sometimes fail to achieve such a match; some of our beliefs do not describe the way things actually are. Note that we are assuming here that there is such a thing as objective truth, so that it is possible for beliefs to match or to fail to match with reality. That is, in order for someone to know something, there must be something one knows about. This assumption is not universally accepted – in particular, it is not shared by some proponents of relativism – but it will not be defended here. However, we can say that truth is a condition of knowledge; that is, if a belief is not true, it cannot constitute knowledge. Accordingly, if there is no such thing as truth, then there can be no knowledge. Even if there is such a thing as truth, if there is a domain in which there are no truths, then there can be no knowledge within that domain. For example, if beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then a belief that something is beautiful cannot be true or false, and thus cannot constitute knowledge. Justification Knowledge, then, requires factual belief. However, this does not suffice to capture the nature of knowledge. Just as knowledge requires successfully achieving the objective of true belief, it also requires success with regard to the formation of that belief. In other words, not all true beliefs constitute knowledge; only true beliefs arrived at in the right way constitute knowledge. What, then, is the right way of arriving at beliefs? In addition to truth, what other properties must a belief have in order to constitute knowledge? We might begin by noting that sound reasoning and solid evidence seem to be the way to acquire knowledge. By contrast, a lucky guess cannot constitute knowledge. Similarly, misinformation and faulty reasoning do not seem like a recipe for knowledge, even if they happen to lead to a true belief. A belief is said to be justified if it is obtained in the right way. The requirement that knowledge involve justification does not necessarily mean that knowledge requires absolute certainty, however. Between beliefs which were necessarily true and those which are true solely by luck lies a spectrum of beliefs with regard to which we had some defeasible reason to believe that they would be true. Even though there was some chance that my belief might have been false, there was a sufficient basis for that belief for it to constitute knowledge. This basis is referred to as the justification for that belief. We can then say that, to constitute knowledge, a belief must be both true and justified. Note that because of luck, a belief can be unjustified yet true; and because of human fallibility, a belief can be justified yet false. In other words, truth and justification are two independent conditions of beliefs. The fact that a belief is true does not tell us whether or not it is justified; that depends on how the belief was arrived at. So, two people might hold the same true belief, but for different reasons, so that one of them is justified and the other is unjustified. Of course, a justified belief will presumably be more likely to be true than to be false, and justified beliefs will presumably be more likely or more probable to be true than unjustified beliefs. As we will see in section 3 below, the exact nature of the relationship between truth and justification is contentious. The Gettier Problem For some time, the justified true belief JTB account was widely agreed to capture the nature of knowledge. However, in 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short but widely influential article which has shaped much subsequent work in epistemology. Gettier provided two examples in which someone had a true and justified belief, but in which we seem to want to deny that the individual has knowledge, because luck still seems to play a role in his belief having turned out to be true. Suppose that the clock on campus which keeps accurate time and is well maintained stopped working at 12:00. On my way to my noon class, exactly twelve hours later, I glance at the clock and form the belief that the time is 12:00. My belief is true, of course, since the time is indeed 12:00. And my belief is justified, as I have no reason to doubt that the clock is working, and I cannot be blamed for basing beliefs about the time on what the clock says. Nonetheless, it seems evident that I do not know that the time is 12:00. After all, if I had walked past the clock a bit earlier or a bit later, I would have ended up with a false belief rather than a true one. This example and others like it, while perhaps somewhat far-fetched, seem to show that it is possible for justified true belief

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to fail to constitute knowledge. To put it another way, the justification condition was meant to ensure that knowledge was based on solid evidence rather than on luck or misinformation, but Gettier-type examples seem to show that justified true belief can still involve luck and thus fall short of knowledge. This problem is referred to as "the Gettier problem. The No-False-Belief Condition We might think that there is a simple and straightforward solution to the Gettier problem. Note that my reasoning was tacitly based on my belief that the clock is working properly, and that this belief is false. This seems to explain what has gone wrong in this example. Accordingly, we might revise our analysis of knowledge by insisting that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be true and justified and must be formed without relying on any false beliefs. In other words, we might say, justification, truth, and belief are all necessary for knowledge, but they are not jointly sufficient for knowledge; there is a fourth condition " namely, that no false beliefs be essentially involved in the reasoning that led to the belief " which is also necessary. Unfortunately, this will not suffice; we can modify the example so that my belief is justified and true, and is not based on any false beliefs, but still falls short of knowledge. This belief, which is true, would suffice to justify my belief that the time is now The No-Defeaters Condition However, the no-false-belief condition does not seem to be completely misguided; perhaps we can add some other condition to justification and truth to yield a correct characterization of knowledge. After all, if I were asked, at the time that I looked at the clock, whether it is working properly, I would have said that it is. In other words, the proposition that the clock is working properly right now meets the following conditions: If we call propositions such as this "defeaters," then we can say that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be true and justified, and there must not be any defeaters to the justification of that belief. Many epistemologists believe this analysis to be correct. Causal Accounts of Knowledge Rather than modifying the JTB account of knowledge by adding a fourth condition, some epistemologists see the Gettier problem as reason to seek a substantially different alternative. We have noted that knowledge should not involve luck, and that Gettier-type examples are those in which luck plays some role in the formation of a justified true belief. In typical instances of knowledge, the factors responsible for the justification of a belief are also responsible for its truth. But one feature that all Gettier-type examples have in common is the lack of a clear connection between the truth and the justification of the belief in question. For example, my belief that the time is So, we might insist that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be both true and justified, and its truth and justification must be connected somehow. This notion of a connection between the truth and the justification of a belief turns out to be difficult to formulate precisely, but causal accounts of knowledge seek to capture the spirit of this proposal by more significantly altering the analysis of knowledge.

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3: Types of knowledge

The theory of justification is a part of epistemology that attempts to understand the justification of propositions and beliefs. Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief, which include the ideas of justification, warrant, rationality, and probability.

But Tobit also foresaw the time when the exiles would return, Jerusalem and the Temple would be rebuilt, and the Gentiles would give up their false religions and begin to worship the God of Israel. Tobiah lived to see the destruction of Nineveh by Cyaxares, King of Media, and then died at the age of . Historical and Geographical Difficulties in Tobit With the Book of Tobit, the questions of authorship and literary genre are intimately connected to the question of several apparent historical and geographical difficulties in the story. Until modern times most Christians and Jews accepted the Book of Tobit as an authentic account of historical persons and events, but most modern scholars tend to view Tobit as a historical novel or romance like Judith-spiritually edifying, perhaps, but not literally true. The first historical difficulty in Tobit is found in ch. In II Kings However, this is not necessarily a contradiction, because we do not know that every last Naphtalite was deported by Tiglath-pileser III. A few Naphtalite stragglers could have hung on for a few more years, and Tobit could have been one of them. Clearly it is impossible for a man who only lived to the age of to have a lifespan stretching from the days of Solomon who died circa B. But this difficulty is a mirage created by a mistranslation. In most versions of Tobit, a clear historical error exists in ch. In fact Sennacherib was the son of Sargon II cf. If this textual reading is authentic, then it would be impossible to accept the Book of Tobit as genuine history. Instead, they refer to an Assyrian king named Enemessar, which is thought to be a bizarre misspelling of Salamanasar. This solution would also resolve the abovementioned problem of ch. It is doubtful that Shalmaneser lived long enough to deport any Israelites, but Sargon claimed credit both for the conquest of Samaria and for the deportation of thousands of Israelites. A further difficulty is found in ch. This is confirmed from ch. On the other hand, even with forced marches, no army can travel as quickly as two unencumbered men. It is best not to press the literal meaning of this expression-assuming this textual reading is even authentic. There is no proof that Zoroastrianism had anything to do with the story of Tobit. Others have objected to the coincidences in the story as a sign that Tobit is a work of fiction. However, even stranger coincidences can be documented from authenticated history. Coincidences in Tobit are not enough to classify the book as fictional. However, no one knows how the stories and legends of Ahikar arose. There is simply no proof that Ahikar is legendary and unhistorical. For all we know, he really was an Israelite who attained to a position in the Assyrian government during the late s and early s B. Finally, certain Greek versions of Tobit wrongly state that Nineveh was conquered by Nebuchadnezzar and Ahasuerus. In fact Nineveh fell in B. However, an examination of the different versions shows that the reference to Nebuchadnezzar and Ahasuerus arose from scribal errors. Genre, Authorship, and Time of Composition We see, then, that point by point, each of the reasons that might be adduced for regarding this book as a work of historical fiction are capable of plausible or likely explanation. That does not prove that the events recounted in Tobit are historical. Or perhaps it really is just an ancient Jewish folktale. All the same, the case for accepting Tobit as what it claims to be-a genuine history written by Tobit and his family at the behest of an angel ch. As for genre, this book contains more than one. Besides simple narrative, Tobit also includes Hebrew poetry and hymns, as well as prophecy and examples of Jewish Wisdom literature. More generally, how one classifies the Book of Tobit depends on whether one accepts it as authentic biography or regards it as pious Jewish folklore. If it is historical fiction, the author could have been a Jew who lived anywhere from the s to the s B. It certainly already existed in both Hebrew and Aramaic versions by the second century B. Tobit in Judaism and Christianity Although the rabbis ultimately excluded the Book of Tobit from the Hebrew canon of scripture, the story of Tobit remained popular among the Jews at least until the late Middle Ages. An Aramaic version of Tobit is included in a medieval Aramaic commentary on Genesis which dates from the s, the Midrash Rabba

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of Rabba also known as the Midrash Bereshith Rabba, which is also the name of another, better known Jewish commentary on Genesis. There are also four Hebrew versions of the story of Tobit, one written in the s A. It is therefore unsurprising that Christians have regarded it as inspired scripture from the earliest times. Polycarp of Smyrna , disciple of the Apostle John, quoted from Tobit 4: Cyprian of Carthage around A. Though Origen in the third century and St. As pointed out in the introduction, the story of Tobit explores many of the same themes that are the focus of the fall festivals of the Hebrew liturgical calendar. Those 40 years also anticipated Israel Holy Land and subsequent return, both of which receive prominent mention in Tobit. Some Christians have also seen the story of Tobit as an allegorical foreshadowing of the life and ministry of Jesus Christ. Christians who were used to symbolising Jesus as a fish 1 would naturally see the fish of the Book of Tobit as a type of Christ. The Protestant Reformers who taught justification by faith alone objected to the doctrine that almsgiving can expiate any sin ch. They also opposed the invocation of the prayers of angels and saints, which can be implicitly supported by Tobit 3: Paul probably had Raphael in mind in Heb. In addition, the Book of Tobit describes many popular Jewish customs-particular marriage customs-that shed light on numerous passages of the New Testament. Finally, the Book of Tobit is the earliest appearance of the Golden Rule anywhere in Jewish literature. For all these reasons, and many others, the Book of Tobit is simply indispensable, even for Christians who do not accept it as canonical scripture.

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4: Starting a Product Organization Transformation, Part 6 - Johanna Rothman, Management Consultant

As I noted in part 4, rationalism is a position that identifies knowledge with aprioricity and deduction. Classical (or strong) foundationalism is a particularly austere theory of noetic structure and justification transfer which may be rationalist, or empiricist, or a combination thereof.

I took a more informal approach than my professor wanted, and my grade suffered for it. In all honesty I think this part of philosophy is one of the main reasons many people dislike philosophy in general. This student is doing some sort of doctoral work in epistemology and is working on skepticism. When I asked my wife some questions about justification and epistemology, after pressing the idea a bit she finally gave up and responded, "people need to think less and go to the beach more. Epistemology, especially justification and skepticism can eventually devolve into an infinite regress. During this book-long conversation Plato brings up an allegory of people that are chained in a cave and the only things they can see are shadows that are cast along the wall. An interesting side note, different philosophers see this allegory differently. I noticed this as I had just listened to The Republic audiobook and then heard a philosophy lecture. The professor giving the lecture seemed to twist the idea and the people making the shadows into the villains. Yes, every part of The Republic is full of depth and meaning, but the people stuck in the cave and their misunderstanding of reality is not, in my opinion, the point of the allegory. Specifically, Meditation I paragraph 2 stood out to me. If the foundation is dubious the whole edifice can be considered faulty. However, in the end, Descartes finds a foundation: I doubt, which is thinking, therefore I exist. So despite all the doubting and tearing down of the edifice of knowledge, Descartes found the foundation and we can start from there. Descartes, Now we come to the pop culture treatment of skepticism. How would it feel to be hooked up to some kind of super-computer? There has to be someone there with the red pill offering answers to all our questions. Wachowski, "The Matrix", So, how can we escape these epistemological puzzles? Well, not enough that we could dispel all doubt and forever put to rest any metaphysical skepticism. One challenge would be to ask the skeptic how one can live with complete doubt of everything at all times. In other words, prove to me that we are just brains in a vat or disembodied thoughts swimming through an intricate computer SIM world. However, to me the best test for the metaphysical skeptic is to change something with your mind. Much like Professor Kreeft says of Aquinas building a huge philosophy on a single small foundational point. Even without a body, our minds still exist. We should build our noetic structure a bit like this dome: Geodome, and have the foundation, though shaky it may seem, if rooted deeply in the foundation that no matter what parts of the dome are doubted the pile upon which it rests is immovable. But, if one is driving down the road looking at street signs one cannot live as if every one of them is a lie. And there are so many signs that point to the existence of God. So, though I may have, like everyone else, started life taking all knowledge through the evidence of authority; I have since grown up and matured and thought through my philosophy quite a bit. I have come to a point where the foundation is firmly fixed on my own existence and that existence only makes sense with the existence of God. On that foundation I build my beliefs. In fact I see this as a kind of synthesis of foundationalism and coherentism. I really only hold one or two basic belief as my central belief. This is how the coherentism system gets started, with at least one or two foundational beliefs upon which other are built. If anything, my foundation can be said to be the only possible guaranteed a priori knowledge, that is, that I exist. Each different justification has its own level of importance in the structure that is my belief system. If only everyone could hang out in places like this. Meditations on first philosophy. Geodome -- Geodesic design software. Retrieved April 20, , from [http: The philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The Matrix \[Motion picture\].](http://www.geodesicdesign.com/)

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5: The Analysis of Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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They had these things in common: A senior person made it safe for the managers to create experiments. They created very small experiments either managers or teams, or together. The senior manager often asked a question like this: What do you need from me, to move to a product organization, where we optimize for the flow of product to the customers, and the satisfaction of the employees? Start with measurements driving the changes. One organization changed what they measured. The measured cycle time, lead time, employee satisfaction was the work worth it, and customer satisfaction. As they worked over the next six months yes, this was not fast, some of the managers asked to become product owners and product managers. Some of the managers asked to be technical leads or architects. Some of the managers left. They evolved their organization over time to achieve the results they wanted. Start with a reorganization. In one organization, the managers went directly to the desired end state—a reorganization around the product. The managers become a self-organizing management team—they reorganized to shepherd the business value of the product and to create a satisfactory environment for the people. Some of the managers chose from Day 1 to move to various team positions, instead of managers. The managers, as a team up, down, sideways changed the compensation system and what they measured. Do not underestimate the value and difficulty of this step. At the same time, the managers asked the teams to reorganize to become feature-set teams. The products were all larger than one team. They had about three months of total chaos, and then things settled out. When it came time for yearly review and compensation, they had a ton of trouble with the HR VP. The senior manager had to refight the fights. He succeeded because this product line made so much more money that HR acceded to their new ways of compensation. Start with the teams. One senior manager, a product line manager, decided he would ask the teams to self-organize into feature sets. The teams were happy. Many managers felt as if their manager had abandoned them. The teams figured out what to do in the first few weeks. They settled into useful patterns of frequent delivery. The managers were in chaos for months, trying to understand how to help the organization. A number of the managers left. The product line manager realized he had a too-flat organization. He asked the teams for help. They asked for two more managers and offered different dashboards. The teams had little trouble with this transformation. The senior manager sees results he wants. I never thought I could serve people with just seven managers. But, each manager understands how things work. When team members left, the teams discovered that they could refactor the code fairly quickly and understand the code better if they collaborated. Yes, some of the devs missed working with that dev manager. Yet, those people enjoyed their work more. None of these options were easy for all the people in their organizations. Creating the Agile Organization for a fuller description of the Change Model. Their experiment was too big. That organization was bought out and by now, most of the people have left. What Matters to Your Organization? The goal is to create more business value, happier customers, and satisfied employees. If the managers can work as a collaborative team, do you need to change where they sit? Here is a question that might help: What is the smallest experiment you can do to gain knowledge and see what might work for you to work for product flow? I had no idea this series would be this long. All the posts in this series:

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6: Theory of justification - Wikipedia

Since knowledge is a particularly successful kind of belief, doxastic justification is a stronger candidate for being closely related to knowledge; the JTB theory is typically thought to invoke doxastic justification (but see Lowy).

On the other hand, if something is actually known, then it categorically cannot be false. For example, if a person believes that a bridge is safe enough to support her, and attempts to cross it, but the bridge then collapses under her weight, it could be said that she believed that the bridge was safe but that her belief was mistaken. It would not be accurate to say that she knew that the bridge was safe, because plainly it was not. By contrast, if the bridge actually supported her weight, then the person might say that she had believed the bridge was safe, whereas now, after proving it to herself by crossing it, she knows it was safe. Epistemologists argue over whether belief is the proper truth-bearer. Some would rather describe knowledge as a system of justified true propositions, and others as a system of justified true sentences. Plato, in his *Gorgias*, argues that belief is the most commonly invoked truth-bearer. According to the theory that knowledge is justified true belief, to know that a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the relevant true proposition, but also have a good reason for doing so. One implication of this would be that no one would gain knowledge just by believing something that happened to be true. For example, an ill person with no medical training, but with a generally optimistic attitude, might believe that he will recover from his illness quickly. Nevertheless, even if this belief turned out to be true, the patient would not have known that he would get well since his belief lacked justification. The definition of knowledge as justified true belief was widely accepted until the 1960s. At this time, a paper written by the American philosopher Edmund Gettier provoked major widespread discussion. See theories of justification for other views on the idea. Gettier problem Euler diagram representing a definition of knowledge. That is, Gettier contended that while justified belief in a true proposition is necessary for that proposition to be known, it is not sufficient. As in the diagram, a true proposition can be believed by an individual purple region but still not fall within the "knowledge" category yellow region. According to Gettier, there are certain circumstances in which one does not have knowledge, even when all of the above conditions are met. Gettier proposed two thought experiments, which have become known as Gettier cases, as counterexamples to the classical account of knowledge. One of the cases involves two men, Smith and Jones, who are awaiting the results of their applications for the same job. Each man has ten coins in his pocket. Smith has excellent reasons to believe that Jones will get the job and, furthermore, knows that Jones has ten coins in his pocket he recently counted them. From this Smith infers, "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Furthermore, Smith, not Jones, is going to get the job. While Smith has strong evidence to believe that Jones will get the job, he is wrong. In other words, he made the correct choice believing that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket for the wrong reasons. Responses to Gettier[edit] This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. November Learn how and when to remove this template message The responses to Gettier have been varied. Usually, they have involved substantial attempts to provide a definition of knowledge different from the classical one, either by recasting knowledge as justified true belief with some additional fourth condition, or proposing a completely new set of conditions, disregarding the classical ones entirely. Infallibilism, indefeasibility[edit] In one response to Gettier, the American philosopher Richard Kirkham has argued that the only definition of knowledge that could ever be immune to all counterexamples is the infallibilist one. In other words, the justification for the belief must be infallible. Yet another possible candidate for the fourth condition of knowledge is indefeasibility. For example, suppose that person S believes he saw Tom Grabit steal a book from the library and uses this to justify the claim that Tom Grabit stole a book from the library. The Indian philosopher B. Nyaya theory distinguishes between know p and know that one knows p—these are different events, with different causal conditions. The second level is a sort of implicit inference that usually follows

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immediately the episode of knowing p knowledge simpliciter. The Gettier case is examined by referring to a view of Gangesha Upadhyaya late 12th century, who takes any true belief to be knowledge; thus a true belief acquired through a wrong route may just be regarded as knowledge simpliciter on this view. The question of justification arises only at the second level, when one considers the knowledgheod of the acquired belief. Initially, there is lack of uncertainty, so it becomes a true belief. But at the very next moment, when the hearer is about to embark upon the venture of knowing whether he knows p , doubts may arise. Reliabilism Reliabilism has been a significant line of response to the Gettier problem among philosophers, originating with work by Alvin Goldman in the s. According to reliabilism, a belief is justified or otherwise supported in such a way as to count towards knowledge only if it is produced by processes that typically yield a sufficiently high ratio of true to false beliefs. In other words, this theory states that a true belief counts as knowledge only if it is produced by a reliable belief-forming process. Examples of reliable processes include: In the thought experiment, a man, Henry, is driving along and sees a number of buildings that resemble barns. Based on his perception of one of these, he concludes that he has just seen barns. Theoretically, Henry does not know that he has seen a barn, despite both his belief that he has seen one being true and his belief being formed on the basis of a reliable process i . S knows that P if and only if: Nozick further claims this condition addresses a case of the sort described by D . His belief via the method of the courtroom satisfies the four subjunctive conditions, but his faith-based belief does not. If his daughter were guilty, he would still believe her innocent, on the basis of faith in his daughter; this would violate the third condition. He says that "we do not want to award the title of knowing something to someone who is only meeting the conditions through a defect, flaw, or failure, compared with someone else who is not meeting the conditions. Timothy Williamson has advanced a theory of knowledge according to which knowledge is not justified true belief plus some extra condition s , but primary. In his book *Knowledge and its Limits*, Williamson argues that the concept of knowledge cannot be broken down into a set of other concepts through analysis—instead, it is sui generis. Thus, according to Williamson, justification, truth, and belief are necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. Alvin Goldman writes in his "Causal Theory of Knowing" that knowledge requires a causal link between the truth of a proposition and the belief in that proposition. Externalism and internalism[edit] Main article: Internalism and externalism A central debate about the nature of justification is a debate between epistemological externalists on the one hand, and epistemological internalists on the other. Externalists hold that factors deemed "external", meaning outside of the psychological states of those who gain knowledge, can be conditions of justification. For example, an externalist response to the Gettier problem is to say that for a justified true belief to count as knowledge, there must be a link or dependency between the belief and the state of the external world. Usually this is understood to be a causal link. Such causation, to the extent that it is "outside" the mind, would count as an external, knowledge-yielding condition. Internalists, on the other hand, assert that all knowledge-yielding conditions are within the psychological states of those who gain knowledge. He wrote that, because the only method by which we perceive the external world is through our senses, and that, because the senses are not infallible, we should not consider our concept of knowledge infallible. The only way to find anything that could be described as "indubitably true", he advocates, would be to see things "clearly and distinctly". God gave man the ability to know but not omniscience. Descartes said that man must use his capacities for knowledge correctly and carefully through methodological doubt. In his own methodological doubt—doubting everything he previously knew so he could start from a blank slate—the first thing that he could not logically bring himself to doubt was his own existence: The act of saying that one does not exist assumes that someone must be making the statement in the first place. Descartes could doubt his senses, his body, and the world around him—but he could not deny his own existence, because he was able to doubt and must exist to manifest that doubt. Even if some "evil genius" were deceiving him, he would have to exist to be deceived. This one sure point provided him with what he called his Archimedean point, in order to further develop his foundation for knowledge. If so, what is the explanation? Socrates points out to Meno that a man who knew the way to Larissa could lead others there correctly. But so, too, could a man who had true

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beliefs about how to get there, even if he had not gone there or had any knowledge of Larissa. Socrates says that it seems that both knowledge and true opinion can guide action. Meno then wonders why knowledge is valued more than true belief and why knowledge and true belief are different. Socrates responds that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because it is tethered or justified. Justification, or working out the reason for a true belief, locks down true belief. Zagzebski analogizes the value of knowledge to the value of espresso produced by an espresso maker: If the espresso tastes good, it makes no difference if it comes from an unreliable machine. She assumes that reliability in itself has no value or disvalue, but Goldman and Olsson disagree. By analogy, having a reliable espresso maker that produced a good cup of espresso would be more valuable than having an unreliable one that luckily produced a good cup because the reliable one would more likely produce good future cups compared to the unreliable one. The value problem is important to assessing the adequacy of theories of knowledge that conceive of knowledge as consisting of true belief and other components. According to Kvanvig, an adequate account of knowledge should resist counterexamples and allow an explanation of the value of knowledge over mere true belief. Should a theory of knowledge fail to do so, it would prove inadequate. Instead, epistemologists ought to focus on other mental states, such as understanding.

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7: Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

justification for other than full and open competition far part 6 l. identification of the agency and contracting activity (far (b)(1)). bureau of land.

The National Register is administered by the National Park Service under the Secretary of the Interior in partnership with the State and Federal historic preservation offices. Properties listed in the National Register include districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture. The authority of the National Register was established by the U. Congress with the passage of the National Historic Preservation Act of Federal regulations implementing the program are contained in 36 CFR Part Listing in the National Register has the following results which assist in preserving historic properties: The listing of a property in the National Register often changes the way communities perceive their historic resources and gives credibility to efforts of private citizens and public officials to preserve these resources as living parts of our communities. Historical commissions, design review committees, or special zoning ordinances are established by State laws or local ordinances. These restrictions are not governed by the National Register program, but rather by State or local governments. The National Register is a central repository of information on historic properties. The National Register differs from other inventories of historic properties in that National Register properties have been evaluated and documented according to uniform national standards. This national inventory can be used for a variety of purposes related to planning and public awareness. Information maintained by the National Register can be incorporated into comprehensive plans, area plans, project plans, or tourism development plans, and can be integrated into Geographic Information Systems GIS maps that amalgamate environmental and other planning data. National Register documentation can be made part of heritage education programs to foster an understanding of history and pride in the community at the local level. Teachers can incorporate information on National Register properties into classroom curriculums to illustrate important trends in the past. The quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association, and: Ordinarily cemeteries, birthplaces, or graves of historical figures, properties owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes, structures that have been moved from their original locations, reconstructed historic buildings, properties primarily commemorative in nature, and properties that have achieved significance within the past 50 years shall not be considered eligible for the National Register. However, such properties will qualify if they are integral parts of districts that do meet the criteria or if they fall within the following categories: The National Register criteria are broad in order to provide an analytical framework that can encompass the diversity of historic resources across the nation. Whether or not a property can convey this depends upon its physical integrity. There are many methods of classifying types and arrangements of prehistoric and historic resources. The National Register uses the following definitions, and nominations are to be submitted in one of these categories: A district possesses a significant concentration, linkage, or continuity of sites, buildings, structures, or objects united historically or aesthetically by plan or physical development. A site is the location of a significant event, a prehistoric or historic occupation or activity, or a building or structure, whether standing, ruined, or vanished, where the location itself possesses historic, cultural, or archeological value regardless of the value of any existing structures. A building, such as a house, barn, church, hotel, or similar construction, is created principally to shelter any form of human activity. The term structure is used to distinguish from buildings those functional constructions made usually for purposes other than creating human shelter. The term object is used to distinguish from buildings and structures those constructions that are primarily artistic in nature or are relatively small in scale and simply constructed. Although it may be, by nature or design, movable, an object is associated with a specific setting or environment. A category of property may be: In either case, each district, site, building, structure, and

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object included in the nomination will be evaluated individually against the National Register Criteria. The Multiple Property Documentation Form NPSb is a cover document and not a nomination in its own right; it serves as a basis for evaluating the National Register eligibility of related properties. On it, the themes, trends, and patterns of history shared by the properties are organized into historic contexts and property types representing those contexts. It may be used to nominate a large number of related historic properties simultaneously, or to establish the registration requirements for properties not yet identified or documented, but which are expected to be nominated in the future. The nomination of each building, site, district, structure, or object within a thematic group is made on the National Register Registration Form. The name of the thematic group, denoting the historical framework of nominated properties is the multiple property listing. When nominated and listed in the National Register of Historic Places, the Multiple Property Documentation Form, together with the individual Registration Forms, constitute a multiple property submission. Review Board members should be thoroughly familiar with the National Register regulations, all National Register Bulletins, and the record of former Review Boards in evaluating similar properties. The evaluation process is challenging because the concept of significance is relative, and therefore places considerable responsibility on the board members to ensure that the evaluation is carefully considered and analytical. Judging the significance of historic resources requires placing them in a variety of contexts, by asking, for example: How does the resource represent a theme such as building type, or development of a historic pattern such as transportation or settlement? How does the resource relate to or impact on the historical development of its community as a whole? How does the resource compare with similar properties in the past and how does it compare with similar properties still extant? It is not necessary to evaluate the property in question against other properties if: Is the resource important to the local community, the State, or the nation? In reviewing and commenting on nominations, board members should be particularly aware of strong citizen interest in nominations. Nominations are frequently prepared by citizens who may attend a public board meeting; their interest in preservation should be acknowledged and appropriately stimulated. In recent years, some citizens have expressed the concern that documentation requirements have become so burdensome that only professional consultants can prepare nominations. The National Park Service has recently taken the following steps to address the issue of public accessibility to the nomination process: Researching a Historic Property contains useful guidance on sources of information for documenting historic properties. This bulletin is particularly useful for those who do not routinely perform original historical research. Both the National Register Registration Form and Multiple Property Documentation Form have been redesigned and reissued in formats that are easier to use and can be used with personal computers. Templates for these forms have been sent to the State historic preservation offices for distribution to the public. The National Register has prepared a casebook with examples of nominations with concise documentation and multiple property nominations. National Register Bulletin 16A includes an example of a concise, single-property nomination. The Review Board plays a key role in making the National Register accessible by recognizing that nominations need to adequately describe and justify the eligibility of the property, but that they need not be unnecessarily lengthy or technical. The goal is to provide citizens who are seeking recognition for significant properties access to National Register listing with as little frustration as possible. When the owner or majority of private owners of a property or properties being considered for inclusion in the National Register formally objects to National Register listing, the SHPO forwards the nomination to the Keeper of the National Register for a determination of eligibility. Anyone may appeal the refusal of the State Historic Preservation Officer to nominate a property to the National Register. In addition, anyone may appeal the nomination of a property. Beyond the intricacies of historic judgment, other important issues faced by the Review Board are the political and economic ramifications of National Register listings. On the other hand, an owner may push for nominating a property that does not have sufficient historical significance to justify listing in order to take advantage of certain tax incentives. These factors shall not be taken into consideration by the State Review Board. Their responsibility is to apply professional, technical standards in an unbiased fashion to determine if properties meet the

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National Register Criteria. While the cultural resources programs of the Department of the Interior establish basic policy under the law and set general standards for the National Register program, the Secretary of the Interior and the Keeper of the National Register of Historic Places rely on the Review Boards and the staff of the State historic preservation offices for judgments concerning what is important within the States. Their judgments are justifiable and more predictable as a result of comprehensive preservation planning, which places resources in a comparative context. It can produce indices and computerized tapes by State, county, city, or Federal agency; it can provide in-depth, full page "property reports" of a single property, or group of properties; it can generate reports by major categories such as historic and current function, or areas and periods of significance; it can summarize data by communities or by States; and it can order word searches of any text field, for example all listed buildings in a community associated with a particular period of history, or built by a particular architect, or representing a particular historic function 19th century commercial buildings. The National Register establishes policy and provides guidelines concerning these issues through a set of publications called the National Register Bulletin series. Additional publications in this series are provided periodically as needed in order to clarify policy or to provide additional guidance. The following are brief answers to some of the most frequently asked questions about the National Register. Additional information about these and other issues is provided in National Register publications. How to Apply National Register Criteria for Evaluation is particularly helpful in answering questions about resource evaluation. The following questions are grouped into five categories: What are the main things a Review Board member should focus on when reviewing a proposed nomination? When evaluating a nomination, Review Board members should focus on three major areas: Significance within local, State, or national contexts. Definition of what constitutes the resource, including definition of the extent of boundaries of the resource. How does a Review Board member recognize well-researched and accurate historical documentation? The Review Board evaluates a resource specifically in terms of the National Register criteria and the historic context within which the property is significant. Historical documentation and research about the property under consideration should be viewed accordingly. Technical questions concerning archeological or historical documentation are best resolved through the knowledgeable judgment of the Review Board member or the State staff person with the appropriate professional discipline or specialization. How much documentation is enough? The National Register nomination should clearly describe and state the significance of the nominated property as it relates to the National Register Criteria. There is no prescribed length for a nomination, but nominations need not be long, highly technical, or scholarly in format for example, footnotes are not required. How does the Multiple Property Documentation Form differ from a historic district nomination? The Multiple Property Nomination is a format for submitting groups of related properties and can include districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects in a specific rural area, town, county, or section of a town, city, region, or State. Information common to the group of properties is documented in the Multiple Property Documentation Form. A district, on the other hand, is itself a historic resource. There may be buildings or features in a district that do not contribute to the significance of the district. However, each resource included within the boundary of a district is part of the National Register listing, not as an individual property, but as part of the grouping or the historic environment that constitutes the district. Historic districts are documented on individual nomination forms. Can properties be nominated under only one criterion or area of significance when more apply? States are encouraged to look at all aspects of a property and to present comprehensive documentation; ideally properties should be nominated under all applicable criteria and areas of significance. However, properties will be listed in the National Register provided at least one criterion is sufficiently justified. States may ask people preparing nominations to address more than one criterion or area of significance in the interest of gathering information and gaining a more complete understanding of the resource. Can a property be nominated individually if it is located within a potential historic district? If a property is individually eligible, it may be nominated, even if it is also part of an eligible district. However, many properties are eligible only as part of a district. Individual nomination of properties in historic districts is not encouraged because this is a duplication of effort and the

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protection afforded the property by National Register recognition is the same. What is the definition of local significance and how is the distinction made between local, State, and national importance?

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8: An Introduction to the ApocryphaPart Six

The Book Thief - Part Six and Part Seven Vocabulary - Take Quizlet "Test" by December 3rd for a Daily Activities Grade in Focus. 14 terms The Book Thief - Part Four and Part Five Vocabulary - Take Quizlet "Test" by November 26th for a Daily Activities Grade in Focus.

What are these about? Why make these distinctions? Consider that you probably would claim to know the following things. There are three sides to a triangle. The sum of their angles is degrees. There is a computer in front of you right now. A bachelor is an unmarried male. If a is more than b, and b is more than c, then a is more than c. These sentences all make claims that can be determined to be either true or false. They are sentences that express propositions. They are claims about which you can come to a judgment as to whether or not they are true. You probably know that they are true. Now how is it that you come to know these things? Obviously you come by this knowledge in different ways. This relates to the idea of the different types of knowledge. There are the rules or laws of logic that permit claims to knowledge that are further statements of ideas consistent with the rules and the ideas already accepted. Here is another example where you do not need to know what I am talking about because you know the relationships involved. All gazintz are gazatz B. All gazatz are garingers C. Therefore, all gazintz are garingers. You can claim to know that: Knowledge of words is knowledge of definitions. Such definitions are set in dictionaries. So bachelors are unmarried males. You can look it up. Are newborn baby boys Bachelors????????? Do people say to the new mother in the hospital nursery: This knowledge is empirical knowledge. Science is the best example of a method for ascertaining the accuracy of such knowledge. Scientific knowledge is a result of the practice of the method: Observation, abduction of a hypothesis, careful observation, refinement of hypothesis, deduction of test for hypothesis, testing and experimentation, confirmation or falsification of the hypothesis. What do these four types of knowledge have in common? Belief does not Imply Knowledge. Wherever people claim to know that something is true they believe that it is so. To begin with it must be true. You can not know something that is false, that is not so. It must be true and you must claim to know it and it be true not by accident or coincidence but because there is evidence to support and enough to warrant or justify the claim to know. Knowledge as Justified True Belief [http: January 1](http://), the claim is made: It turns out that several weeks later they did win. Can I claim that I knew it on January 1st or was it just a lucky guess or a well informed guess? How does a person gain the warrant or the justification for the belief? Well, depending on the type of belief that it is there are different kinds of warrants. Follow them and the claim is warranted. Use them, be consistent with them and the claim is warranted. How is the evidence to be gathered, examined and evaluated? Ther will be m ore on this under the topic of TRUTH There are four types of beliefs when considering truth and warrants: Justification , Warranty comes in degrees! How much evidence is needed in order to determine whether or not someone knows something or not? How much evidence is needed in order to determine whether or not someone has sufficient warrant to make a claim to know something or not? How much is needed depends on what is riding on the outcome of the claim. For simple matters of little consequence humans appear to accept fairly small amounts of evidence. For important matters much more evidence is needed. How old is someone? If someone claims to know how old John Smith or Mary Doe is we probably accept the claim on their word if it is just gossip. We might go to the person and ask them to confirm the claim. The highest consequences on claims to know: At a criminal trial, a capital homicide case, what is the standard of proof? It is evidence that is convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. NOT beyond all doubts. But beyond reasonable doubts, meaning beyond all doubting or questioning of the evidence that we have reason to doubt or question. Scientists have their reputation riding on their claims to know things. The standard for the warrant in Science sis that heir claims be supported by evidence that other scientists can examine, experiments that others can repeat and get the same result and equations that others can examine to check against errors. So, claims to know may be accepted depending on amounts of support that may vary in the type and amount depending on the type of

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claim that it is. However, to know something that which you claim to know must be TRUE and truth does not have degrees:

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9: PART 6 - RENT INCREASE JUSTIFICATIONS | Rent Board

1 justification for other than full and open competition far part 6 1. identification of the agency and contracting activity (far (b)(1)).

A Brief History of Apologetics While apologies or defenses of the Christian faith go all the way back to the first century, the formal science of apologetics is a more recent development. In this chapter we will survey the history of apologetics in three stages. First, we will discuss in some detail apologetics in the New Testament itself. Second, we will give detailed attention to the thought of the leading apologists prior to the Reformation, notably Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas. Third, we will present a more cursory overview of apologetics from the Reformation to the present.

Apologetics in the New Testament Although perhaps none of the New Testament writings should be classified as a formal apologetic treatise, most of them exhibit apologetic concerns. Many New Testament writings are occupied with polemics against false teachings, in which the apologetic concern is to defend the gospel against perversion from within the church. The very structure and content of this two-part work suggests it was written at least in part as a political apology for Paul: Acts ends with Paul under house arrest yet preaching freely in Rome, and both books emphasize that Jesus and the apostles especially Paul were law-abiding persons. Along the way Luke uses the speeches of the apostles to present apologetic arguments to a wide variety of audiences, both Jewish and Gentile. Thus this one speech has traditionally been regarded as a paradigm or model of apologetics. Challenged to explain his position by Stoic and Epicurean philosophers, Paul set his message in a rational context in which it would make sense to his philosophically minded audience. The speech was quite unlike those Paul delivered to Jewish audiences, which emphasized Jesus as the fulfillment of Old Testament messianic promises and quoted Old Testament proof texts liberally. In fact, Paul used a form of speech recognized by the Greeks as a philosophical address, such as was commonly used by the Stoics and Cynics of his day. Throughout the speech Paul speaks biblical truth but uses Stoic terms and argues in Stoic fashion, even quoting a Stoic poet in support of his argument verses 1-32. Essentially, the point of this first and longest part of the speech is that idolatry is foolish and that the Stoics themselves have admitted as much, though they had failed to abandon it completely. Having proved his major premise, Paul then announces that God has declared an end to ignorance of his nature and will by revealing himself. This scandalized the Athenians verse 32, in part because Greek thought generally found the idea of physical resurrection foolish, and in part because the idea of a final judgment was offensive to them. Nor should 1 Corinthians 2: Paul takes over Hellenistic Jewish apologetics here on the folly of Gentile culture chapter 1, first half of chapter 2, then argues that the Jews are not above the same sins as the Gentiles second half of chapter 2. Along the way he sets forth some notions about the knowledge of God that have been extremely important for apologetics. The past tense of the verb certainly allows for this interpretation, and in support it may be noted that Paul elsewhere consistently says that the Gentiles do not know God besides Acts. In other words, since the suppression continues, so must the knowledge being suppressed. The true knowledge of God "in which one knows God, not merely knows that there is a God of some kind" was once had by all people, but no longer. All human beings continue to know that there is a God and continue to be confronted with internal and external evidence for his deity, but generally speaking they suppress or subvert this knowledge into idolatrous religion of varying kinds. In 1 Corinthians 1:2 Paul warned the Corinthian believers against trying to accommodate the gospel to the wisdom of the Greeks. Paul is not advocating a kind of anti-intellectualism. This is a classic model of apologetic argument, locking opponents of gospel truths in a logical dilemma. Still, to any Gentile or Hellenistic Jewish reader the term Logos would have immediately conjured up Platonic and Stoic notions of the universal Reason that was believed to govern the cosmos and was thought to be reflected in the rational mind of every human being cf. It required a completely new way of looking at God and humanity to believe that Jesus was the divine Logos incarnate. First, Peter is definitely instructing believers to make a reasoned

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defense of their beliefs. Logos the same word used in John 1: Second, this apologetic mandate is given generally to all Christians, requiring them to give reasons for faith in Christ to anyone who asks for them. In the context Peter is specifically urging believers to be ready to do this when threatened with suffering for their faith see 1 Peter 3: Third, Peter instructs us to engage in apologetics with proper attitudes toward both the non-Christians with whom we are speaking and the Lord about whom we are speaking: However, Peter has just said we are not to show phobos toward people 3: Almost certainly, then, Peter is telling us to conduct our defense of the faith with an attitude of holy fear or reverence toward Christ, whom we honor as Lord 3: We do so by striving to be faithful to Christ both in what we say and in how we live verse The Early Church Fathers In the postapostolic era, the new challenges that confronted the burgeoning church as it spread throughout the Roman Empire required a new apologetic counterthrust. Rabbinic Judaism, fully developed Gnosticism, persecuting paganism, and Hellenistic culture and philosophy all opposed the fledgling church. The religious apologists defended Christianity against these attacks and sought to gain converts to the faith by arguing for the superiority of the Christian position. There were also political apologists who argued that the church should be tolerated by the state. The apologists of the second century 12 modeled their arguments after contemporary philosophical refutations of polytheism and the critiques of pagan philosophy by Hellenistic Jews. Of the many apologists from this period, the most important by far was Justin Martyr ca. In his two Apologies he appealed for the civil toleration of Christianity and argued that it was in fact the true philosophy. To show that Christianity should be tolerated, he refuted common errors and rumors for example, that Christians were atheists and that they ate flesh and drank blood and presented Christianity as a morally superior religion. However, his efforts were commendable given his place in Christian history even before the process of collecting the New Testament canon was completed and in view of his role as a pioneer in Christian theologizing and apologetics. By far the most important Greek apologist of the third century was Origen ca. Christian apologists, both Latin and Greek, wrote with pride of the progress and life-changing effects of Christianity. They also became more systematic in their presentation of Christianity as a worldview in contrast to competing philosophies, notably Neoplatonism. As Augustine became more involved in church life, his apologetic works became more diversified. Over the course of his life he wrote numerous works championing Christianity over paganism, refuting heresies plaguing the church, and expounding Christian truth in a positive manner in teaching manuals and in sermons for the edification of Christians. An original and multigifted writer, thinker, and scholar, Augustine was able to develop an apologetic that was built on a stronger metaphysical or worldview base. While his worldview was at first heavily Platonic, as he matured his theology and philosophy became significantly less Platonic and more and more biblical. This Pauline theology, in turn, enabled him to develop the first philosophically sophisticated, biblically sound, and comprehensive Christian view of the world and of history. Such a Christian philosophy was necessary to combat pagan philosophies, including Platonism, the philosophy he considered closest to Christianity. All such philosophies were corrupt and incapable of bringing people to God. In his approach, faith and reason are interactive in coming to know the true God in Jesus Christ. Reason precedes faith in that a rational mind and recognition of the truth of what is to be believed must exist if we are to believe anything. Therefore do not seek to understand in order to believe, but believe that thou mayest understand. Augustine cited Romans 1: The line of reasoning by which even pagans can be made to admit a Creator is essentially what philosophers would later call a cosmological argument, reasoning from the changeableness of all things in the world Greek cosmos to the existence of an unmade Maker of all things. This was one of a number of arguments by which Augustine reasoned that knowledge of God was available to pagans. Such faith is not a groundless faith: The church was the central vehicle of Western culture, and its apologists during the Middle Ages directed their efforts in three directionsâ€”toward unconverted Judaism, the threat of Islam, and the rational ground for belief. Anselm , the bishop of Canterbury, was one of the most creative and original philosophers the Christian church has ever produced. On the other hand, he did intend at least some of his arguments as proofs to answer unbelievers and to confront them with the truth, as we shall see. The essence of the argument is that the notion of a being of

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unsurpassable greatness is logically inescapable. The argument has been interpreted in several markedly divergent ways. Frequently it has been treated as a rational proof of the existence of God, and as such it has usually but not always been rejected by both Christian and non-Christian philosophers. Some philosophers have taken it to prove that if there is a God, he must be a necessary being that is, a being that must exist, that cannot not exist rather than a contingent being one that might or might not have existed. Others have argued that it proves that necessary existence must be acknowledged for some being, either for the cosmos itself or for a being transcendent to the cosmos. Still others have offered radical reinterpretations of the argument. For example, Karl Barth took it to mean that God must reveal himself in order to be known. This bewildering diversity of interpretations of Anselm testifies to the provocative genius of his argument. And this book goes on to prove by rational necessityâ€”Christ being removed from sight, as if there had never been anything known about Himâ€”that no man can possibly be saved without Him. While careful to disavow any intention of displacing faith as the basis of Christian certainty, Anselm did hope to offer reasoned arguments that would show unbelievers that Christian faith has a rational basis. Evidently he viewed these arguments as designed to render unbelievers without rational excuse and even to persuade them to accept the Christian faith. But while such arguments might help in bringing a person to faith, for Anselm such faith would have to be placed, not in his rational arguments, but in the God-man himself. Thomas Aquinas

In the thirteenth century Christian Europe was shaken by the rediscovery and distribution of the philosophical works of Aristotle and the strong impetus given to the Aristotelian worldview by the very capable Spanish-Arab philosopher Averroes. The growing influence of Averroist thought in European universities led to a crisis for Christian thought. Some scholars at the universities were embracing an uncritical Aristotelianism, while others, especially high-ranking church officials, uncritically condemned anything Aristotelian. Albert the Great was one of the earliest philosophers to rise to this challenge, writing *On the Unity of the Intellect* against Averroes. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, he presented an apologetic directed primarily against Averroism but also offering a sweeping, comprehensive Christian philosophy in Aristotelian terms. According to Aquinas, some truths about God are discoverable through reason or through faith, while others are discoverable only through faith. Aquinas is perhaps best known for his five ways, five arguments for the existence of God. These theistic arguments have been the subject of enormous debate for over two centuries. According to Aquinas, that God or, a God exists is vaguely recognized by all; that it is God, however, is not universally recognized. These proofs according to Aquinas himself show that a God exists, but do not prove God per se; for Thomas, faith in God ought to be based on his revelation in Scripture, not on the proofs. Interestingly, Aquinas was himself a critic of certain types of theistic proofs. Aquinas gave particular attention to arguments based on philosophical proofs against the eternity of the world. Aquinas used the traditional evidences for Christianity in much the same fashion as Augustine, including the conversion of the masses, fulfilled prophecy, and miracles. The Reformation

The primary concern of the Protestant Reformers of the sixteenth century was the doctrine of salvation. In their view the Aristotelianism of the Scholasticsâ€”the medieval theologians on whose teachings the sixteenth-century Roman Catholic system was basedâ€”had led to a confusion and perversion of the gospel of salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. Moreover, the Renaissance was marked by an infatuation with pagan antiquity, especially Plato and Neoplatonism, and the result was a further corruption of the Christian message in what came to be known as humanism. Originally humanism was essentially an intellectual approach to literature and learning, emphasizing the study of the classics and of the Bible directly instead of through medieval commentaries. By the sixteenth century, though, Catholic humanism as represented, for instance, by Erasmus was characterized by a man-centered philosophy emphasizing human dignity and freedom at the expense of the biblical teachings on sin and grace. He therefore emphasized the limitations of reason and rejected the traditional theological project of employing logic and philosophy to explicate and defend the Christian faith. However, reason is incapable of helping them know who the true God is or how to be justified in his sight.

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