

PARTICULARISED ATTRIBUTES : AN AUSTRIAN TALE BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER pdf

1: Project MUSE - Bolzano on Causation and Grounding

Note: Citations are based on reference standards. However, formatting rules can vary widely between applications and fields of interest or study. The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied.

Guest speaker will be Oscar Goldstein who has appeared on many local radio and TV shows. Goldstein draws on his experiences in Jewish organizational life, working with Jewish youth, in the New York City School system, and his extensive travels visiting Jewish communities in 45 countries, for his witty and perceptive comments. There will be short Chanukah program. Refreshments will be served. Chai Chapter regular meeting on Thursday, Dec. Formerly Rockettes, this exciting group aged 55 plus, are entertaining and wowing audiences all over Florida. There will be entertainment, candlelighting ceremony and lots of fun for all. Latkes and refreshments will be served, husbands and friends are welcomed. For information call Sara Klein. Palm Beach will meet on Wednesday, Dec. Program will include a symbolic kindling of the Chanukah lights; a report by Midrasha students on their summer in Israel; piano selections by Pauline Edelson. Tikvah Chapter meeting Dec. Mary Sandier will give a book review on Kosher cooking around the World. Yovel will hold its December Chanukah meeting on Tuesday, Dec. Members and guests are invited. One price includes food and entertainment as well as transportation to and from the ship. Golda Meir Club will hold a regular meeting on Dec. Estelle Plakow will give a book review on "Maria Callas Story. Edna Friedland and Mildred Drees, two Picture Ladies will present their half hour program of art appreciation as it is given monthly to the 4th grade classes of local schools, the Picture Lady Program began over eight years ago. Club Shopping Center located next to Travel Agency. The Hansers co-chaired the event. Israel At the Crossroads.

2: Benjamin Schnieder, A note on particularised qualities and bearer-uniqueness - PhilPapers

Although an important part of the origins of analytic philosophy can be traced back to philosophy in Austria in the first part of the twentieth century, remarkably little is known about the specific contribution made by Austrian philosophy and philosophers.

The paper discusses whether there are strictly inexpressible properties. Three main points are argued for: Are all canonical property designators i. Published in Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 , 40â€” The article examines the relation between different kinds of such nominalizations: It is argued that her theory is flawed and that the existence of the problematic contexts should be explained in non-referential terms. Published in American Philosophical Quarterly 43 , â€” The paper deals with the semantics and ontology of ordinary discourse about properties. The main focus lies on the following thesis: An argument against this Synonymy Thesis is put forth which is based on the thesis that simple predications and property-attributions differ in their conditions of understanding. In defending the argument, the paper accounts for the way in which we come to adopt the conceptual framework of properties. First it is argued that, as their form suggests, the former are definite definitions, albeit of a special sort. Secondly, the prima facie plausible classification of the latter as proper names which is often met in philosophical writings is rejected. The semantics of such terms is developed and it is shown how its proper understanding yields important consequences about the concepts expressed by these terms. Published in Philosophical Studies , â€” The paper contains a novel account of ontological dependence. While dependence is often explained in terms of modality and existence, there are relations of dependence that slip through the mesh of such an account. The article develops an account of ontological dependence based on a notion of explanation; on its basis, certain relations of dependence can be established that can not be accounted by the modal-existential account. The second topic of this paper is the category of substance. On a traditional view, substances can be characterised as independent entities. Before the background of a modal-existential account of dependence, this idea appears problematic. The proposed notion of explanatory dependence is shown to vindicate the traditional approach to substance. Particularised attributes play a role in the ontologies of the Austrian philosophers Bernard Bolzano, Franz Brentano, and Alexius Meinong. The paper examines some of their arguments concerning the existence and the nature of particularised attributes. The article discusses an idea of how to extend the notion of rigidity to predicates: The relation of signification can be characterised with recourse to canonical property designators that are derived from predicates or general terms by means of nominalization: Whether signification divides into rigid and non-rigid cases will then depend upon whether canonical property designators divide into rigid and non-rigid ones. But, I shall argue, they do not, and so the only notion of rigidity gained this way is trivial. An argument to the effect that such complex canonical designators are non-rigid is rebutted, five arguments to the effect that they are rigid are formulated, and finally an explanation of their rigidity based on the general nature of canonical property designators is presented. Published in Ratio 17 , â€” It is often held that particularised qualities characteristically have a unique bearer in which they inhere. But there are apparent counterexamples: So it seems that a principle of beareruniqueness has to be modified. However, I argue that the need of a modification is not a direct consequence of the supposed counterexamples. I propose an alternative view: The genitive signifies a relation which is indeed closely related to inherence, but which is, contrary to inherence itself, partitive. It may hold between a particularised quality and another entity because it holds between the quality and a part of the entity. If one regards the ontologically interesting relation of inherence as non-partitive, one can still adhere to an unrestricted principle of bearer-uniqueness.

3: Abstracts: B. Schnieder | Nominalizations

For philosophers interested in ontological issues, the writings of the important figures of Austrian philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth century contain many buried treasures to rediscover.

This is because we live in a world where our belief, faith and trust in political or individual actions are increasingly being threatened, leading to despair and uncertainty. It is easy to be pessimistic with wars, ecological disasters and increasing social inequalities all around us. New technologies and global economies make our lives less real and more virtual, and lead to increasing individuation – the isolation and loneliness felt in consumerist, market-driven economies. A symptom of the times is the decline in interest in hope as a philosophical and political concept. So what might a philosophy and politics of hope involve? My initial thoughts and feelings on this were about what it means to live across a range of social realities – as a public intellectual who lives in the midst of cultural despair, and as a daughter of migrants who has not lived out the dreams of economic success in the new country. Hope, then, began to mean many things to me. Standing in dole queues I began to realise that whatever stage of life you are at – young or old, skilled or unskilled – you are always potentially on the social and economic scrap-heap. This led me to consider where hope may lie in social terms, and to reflect on the disconnectedness felt in life and labour. It brought home the real feelings of hopelessness and despair in our identities, in our sense of being in the world. Hope can be what sustains life in the face of despair, and yet it is not simply the desire for things to come, or the betterment of life. It is the drive hope. In late capitalism, our humanness is closely tied to economic definitions of the self, and notions of security and comfort. The search for happiness becomes a search for emotional security based on economic success, and our personal dreams are part of the drive to get more out of life – more success, more money, more hope. But instability at work, at home and in our social relations makes these visions of happiness an imagined reality, both individually and nationally. For instance, foreigners may be seen as threatening to us, and to our national security and comfort. In Australia, where I live, we have recently seen this in the treatment of asylum-seekers and refugees. The success of right-wing governments and sentiments lies in reworking hope in a negative frame. Hope masquerades as a vision, where the passion and insecurity felt by people become part of a call for national unity and identity, part of a community sentiment and future ideal of what we imagine ourselves to be. When, for the benefit of our security and belonging, we evoke a hope that ignores the suffering of others, we can only create a hope based on fear. Hospitality towards other people then becomes conditional and, more often than not, hostile and unforgiving. When public sentiment is fuelled by insecurity, the risks we take with each other, and the potential for public debate, are diminished. Empathy and dialogue are denied in the broader public discussion of what it means to belong to a community. In Australia, for instance, can there be a real dialogue with Afghan or Iraqi refugees when generosity towards others is restricted and the provisions for living in a country become ethnically biased? We could argue, then, that hope cannot be separated from how national debates are framed and from the reality of living in a globalised world. But community insecurity needs to be explored through individual experience as well as national debates. It is easy to take a moral stand and to blame others for their unwillingness to engage in dialogue. But we have to move beyond a politics of blame to one of compassion – a political activity that gives us hope and understands how hope and despair emerge in contemporary life, because when people have no hope to give they also have little space to reflect and engage with others. This is a symptom of the increasing disparities between rich and poor that are produced through national and global economies. The population becomes disenfranchised, giving rise to class divisions, ethnic tensions and poverty. These social conditions produce feelings of despair and anger, and those who feel bereft may call upon the last bastion of dignity – their identity. At the same time the major political parties, and democratic politics in general, are failing to provide other possibilities for hope based on compassion, sensitivity and care. We must, then, explore hope through the societies we live in: Hope is built on belief and faith, and the trust that there is a life worth living in

uncertain times. Without this kind of hope there is a denial of difference and newness, meaning that nothing is possible in personal or political terms. Without hope what is left is death – the death of spirit, the death of life – where there is no longer any sense of regeneration and renewal. And in modern concentration and asylum camps, where hope is almost totally diminished, it can be a living death. To help me through my ongoing crisis of faith, and since I have an interest in dialogue, I have invited others to come on this journey of hope with me. This book is a collection of ideas and reflections on hope by myself and various Australian and international writers and public intellectuals. Each chapter is a conversation, and each conversation looks at hope in a variety of ways and explores its potential. These conversational journeys are themselves models for dialogues that could emerge in our encounters with different people, approaches and traditions. The aim is to encourage further public dialogue, and to spur readers to engage with these thoughts and feelings on hope. I believe there is danger in ratifying systems of thinking and belief – where hope becomes polarised into political terms and rhetoric. The book was conceived and researched before September 11, the escalation of violence in the Middle East, and the Tampa crisis in Australia. Although these events are not directly addressed, there has been space for reflection and revision in some chapters. I continue to believe that we need to re-envisage and imagine hope as a convergence of new agendas, conversations and possibilities in everyday life and political activity. The hope investigated here could shed light on the false hopes and promises that have been sustained over the last several years. The central questions of the book are about individual experience and political life – what make us who we are. In global terms, what revolutions in thinking and hope can make a difference? I explore what might be important, and indeed useful, in rethinking communal politics and individual agency. For me, this is almost an existential question about our sense of being in the world and our perceptions of it – and about how time, history and living change, in our perceptions and experience. How, that is, can we reflect on the past – to learn and to challenge injustices that have occurred, and to build new sites for contemporary struggles? We need to take a critical look at ourselves and what we want our lives to be – not in some future or ideal sense hope is often thought of as future-oriented but in the act of living, the ordinary elements of everyday life. It can allow for the narratives, dreams and hopes both of people within a country and those who travel from afar to belong to it. This moment of crisis in history, and present understandings of it, may enable other ways of documenting how we may live and hope. Without a deeper understanding of its meaning, hope can only masquerade as some essential truth for capitalism. For me this involves revisiting some basic tenets of socialist and Marxist ideas of social relations – what it means to be human, our relations to labour, and the alienation experienced in class and social stratification. But we cannot ignore the failures of socialist systems and the turn towards fundamentalism, nor, in critical thinking around this, the dreams of a utopian society – where the future is seen as the end-point to all struggles. Rather, what I am exploring is how certain ideas and visions can be updated in our current economies and lives – rethinking social and economic justice, and principles of equality in a post-Marxist age. Throughout the book I explore the possible convergences and ideas that could provide the Left with new sites for change. In the movement of crowds at the May Day protests over the last several years, hope. In these protests many people who come together may be actively working against global capital and, at the same time, expressing their dissatisfaction with more Leftist traditions of political thought. So how might we consider new calls for freedom and justice, and diverse lines of power and invention? What we need to do is open out a dialogue with the Left to evoke change and find hopeful ways to envisage contemporary political activity and action. Through the conversations in this book, then, I contest various older traditions of revolutionary, socialist and Marxist thought – revisiting the old not to replace it but to think with it, and working through some new tools for a philosophy and politics of hope. I am looking for what might be more global notions of hope, where it may lie, and what human dignity and freedom may now require. For me this involves cultivating joy in critical thinking and individual life, for without the experience of joy we cannot move through the desperation that frames contemporary living. This allows us to keep asking what risks need to be taken for a hopeful world, what habits of thought need to be changed in our cultures, and what responsibilities and ethical and

political acts will make the world a hopeful place. The three parts are interconnected conversational journeys which explore the multitude of directions that hope can take. Each of these meditations on hope echoes my broad explorations of where hope may lie in everyday life, experience and politics. Part I provides the framework for the book – various thoughts, ideas and perspectives on hope. Part II develops these ideas of hope, and looks more closely at the social, ethnic and class relations of hope, and the connections with nationalist and political movements. Part III integrates different ideas on the philosophies of hope through scientific, cultural and political questions. It explores the changing face of technologies – our bodies and our relations to ecological and political issues – and, within this, the creative risks we need to take. Each writer and thinker, whom I will introduce in the course of the book, engages with me about these hopes in very personal ways – through their lives, work and critical perspectives. This provides a space for some visions – What might make us care for our sense of belonging, in social, political and ecological terms? What joys are possible? In uncertain times, what kinds of meaning, trust and diplomacy can move us towards the possibility of peace? What dialogues are necessary in present life, and what are the hopeful possibilities for future generations? And, in all these hopes, what might be new revolutions for our times? Imagine you have a friend who is sick or a loved one who is dying: This hope has no logical or clear definition to it. It may be the hope that things could be different or the cherishing of life, where courage marks the strength to continue, and where aspects of grief, mourning and death become part of life, and the movement is one away from despair. If we can understand hope as composing life as it emerges, there is the possibility of joy and a hopeful vision for the world. It is this hope that evokes the heroes in everyday life – the experiences of living that are not about success, or aspiring to some greater truth, but about reality itself. This involves a sensitivity towards life and the responsibilities we may have towards ourselves and others. If we introduce responsibility into individual and political discourse, what are these hopes? In this realm, ideas of hospitality and sensitivity to others become part of the critical domain. It is a sense of the deep connections in life and living, a compassion to and for life that comes out of strength, that can embrace and sustain our hopes. For to live, breathe, think and be composes the truth of what we experience, and what gifts can emerge in societies outside the alienation and disenchantment that shapes daily life. Philosopher Alphonso Lingis and I reflect on this hope: Lingis is based in the United States but travels extensively throughout the world. His writings are travel meditations and philosophical reflections on everyday life and experience. His philosophy embraces the vitality of living and the ethics of our encounters with others. The first thought I have about hope is that hope is hope against the evidence. Hope arises in a break with the past. There is a kind of cut and the past is let go of. There is a difference between simple expectation and hope. But I think hope is always hope against the evidence.

4: Hope: New Philosophies for Change - PDF Free Download

Particularised Attributes 4. *An Austrian Tale Benjamin Schnieder* 7. *Austrians on Truth Peter Simons* 8. *Analyticity and Logical Truth: From Bolzano to Quine Wolfgang KÄ¼nne* 9.

Continental Philosophy Analysed, Topoi , vol. From Bolzano to Wittgenstein. The Tradition of Austrian Philosophy, Vienna: Russell, Essays in Analysis ed. Judgement is for Brentano not a propositional attitude, it is an objectual attitude that moreover has a negative counterpart: The Philosophy of Brentano, London: Reicher eds Experience and Analyse: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, , pp. Fabian , Grazer Philosophische Studien , vol. For further discussion of these notions see the contributions in B. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Munich: Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen I: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik Max Niemeyer, , p. Brentano, Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil ed. Meiner Verlag, , p. Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and W. The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, , pp. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis , Leipzig: Meiner Verlag, , Sankt Augustin, , pp. Rang , Husserliana 22, The Hague: Oxford University Press, , pp. Philosophie Analytique et Histoire de la Philosophie, Paris: Introduction 19 40 See A. Oxford University Press, , p. Almqvist and Wiksell, Verlag Anton Pustet, Harvard University Press, , pp. Etchemendy argues in his book that no account of logical consequence in terms of substitution of expressions or ideas can do justice to the modal character of logical consequence: Harvard University Press, , p. Academia Verlag, , pp. Good corrections have been made in the recent analytic literature by David Bell , Dermot Moran and Barry Smith among others. Making the nature of this division explicit is the aim of this chapter. Third I will show how the tension between his earlier view and the later view of the appendices is in fact the tension which is responsible for the problem of intentionality as we have it today. Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional or mental inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. One popular understanding of this phrase is that intentional inexistence has something to do with the possible or actual non-existence of objects of thought. We can think about objects which exist, and objects which do not exist. But what makes it possible for us to think about things which do not exist? The object is, not, however, a concrete inhabitant of external reality, but an ephemeral entity, existing in the mind only. And according to Segal, this is true of thought about existent entities too: There are obvious and well-known objections to the view see Harman Segal seems to think that the thesis that objects of thought intentional objects are mental is a solution to the problem of non-existent objects of thought. The idea is this: This suggests that if we were just considering the phenomenon of thought about what we normally take to be existing entities, then we would not have any reason to say that objects of thought are mental. The reason is that his original introduction of the terminology of intentional inexistence in the book does not appeal to, and nor does it presuppose, any distinction between existent and non-existent objects of thought at all. So the reason for introducing the idea of intentional inexistence can hardly have been because of any problem presented by non-existent objects like Pegasus. This is not, however, because Brentano thinks that all objects of thought exist. Rather, it is closer to the truth to say that he thinks none of them exist, not even the things we take to be ordinary physical objects. To a contemporary ear, this is a rather paradoxical or nihilistic way to put the view; it would be closer to the truth to say that none of the things we take to be ordinary physical things have any kind of ultimate or transcendent reality. At the beginning of his Psychology of , Brentano discusses physical phenomena, the subject-matter of physical or natural science. The phenomena of light, sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion which [the natural scientist] studies are not things which really and truly exist. They are not, however, an adequate representation of this reality, and they give us knowledge of it only in a very incomplete sense. We can say

that there exists something which, under certain conditions, causes this or that sensation. We can probably also prove that there must be relations among these realities similar to those which are manifested by spatial phenomena of shapes and sizes. But this is as far as we can go. We have no experience of that which truly exists, in and of itself, and that which we do experience is not true. The truth of physical phenomena is, as they say, only a relative truth. But this is not because they are unreal in the way we think Pegasus is; rather it is because they are only phenomena. So Brentano did not begin with the problem that Segal says he did. Given these assumptions, then the problem of intentionality can be posed as follows: Clearly the assumption that something can only stand in a relation to something which exists is one of the assumptions which form part of the metaphysical background of contemporary realism. Now I am not disputing these assumptions; in fact, like many analytic philosophers, I accept them. Brentano himself came to realise this and abandoned the doctrine. Segal is right, however, that Brentano later abandoned his view of intentionality; we shall look into this below. I have claimed that these views involve assumptions which would be rejected by many analytic philosophers today: This is the task of the next section.

Intentional inexistence To understand properly the concept of intentional inexistence, we have to set the famous passage in the context of the general project of the Psychology. It is a science whose data comes from experience and introspection – hence it is psychology from an empirical standpoint. These two terms should really be understood together. As we have seen, Brentano believed that natural science does not uncover the real nature of things. All that science can ever discover are the appearances of things: Science studies phenomena; that is all that science can do. These phenomena or appearances are things which only exist in the mind. As Barry Smith puts it: Appearances are fundamentally mind-dependent, for example, Morrison But Brentano did not think this because he was trying to solve the problem of non-existence. Rather, it is simply a consequence of the fact that sciences study phenomena. The distinction between psychology and physics therefore amounts to the distinction between mental and physical phenomena. So what, then, are mental phenomena? All mental phenomena are directed upon phenomena, and such phenomena may be physical or mental. In the former case, a mental act would have as its object something like a sound or a shape or a colour. In the latter case, a mental act would have as its object another mental act. For example, one may think about the mental act of hearing a sound, for example. But whether physical or mental, the objects of acts are phenomena and hence fundamentally mind-dependent. The intentional inexistence of an object means, literally, existence in the mental act itself. The background to this view is partly Aristotelian, as Brentano indicates in a well-known footnote Brentano a: Brentano, like Aquinas, wanted to follow Aristotle in at least this respect: In this respect, objects of thought may be compared to universals on an Aristotelian conception of them, according to which they are immanent in the particulars which instantiate them, and do not transcend those particulars. An inner presentation may be a feeling or an awareness of some mental act; the objects of inner perception are thinking, feeling and willing. The objects of outer presentation or perception are warmth, colour, sound and so on. But, placed in wider context, the views should not be so strange. But Brentano was not a phenomenalist because phenomenism holds that the world is constructed from phenomena, appearances or in some versions sense-data. This is what distinguishes Brentano from phenomenism proper: Nonetheless, this knowledge can never come through science; so as far as science is concerned, phenomenism might as well be true. But Brentano can easily distinguish light from colour and still say that light is a phenomenon, that is, not something which really and truly exists and that it is still among the things which physics studies.

PARTICULARISED ATTRIBUTES : AN AUSTRIAN TALE BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER pdf

5: gftbiloxi's Profile - IMDb

of) what the author calls "particularised attributes", i.e. those entities known within ontology, and especially within Austrian Philosophy, which are referred to by terms like "(individual) accidents, modes, particularised qualities (or: properties), instances or cases of properties.

Reference to properties is normally achieved by the use of nominalizations of predicative expressions. The article examines the relation between different kinds of such nominalizations: It is argued that her theory is flawed and that the existence of the problematic contexts should be explained in non-referential terms. This paper examines aspects of the ontology of properties employed in ordinary discourse. For the purpose of talking about properties, natural languages allow to generate designators of properties by the means of nominalization. In section 1, I shall give a survey about different sorts of such nominalized property designators and formulate the Uniformity Thesis, according to which the different sorts of nominalization are merely linguistic variants to talk about the same things. While the Uniformity Thesis had been the standard view for quite a time, Friederike Moltmann recently attacked it on the basis of some intriguing linguistic data. A note in advance: These are not data invented to prove a philosophical point, but data about how non-philosophers actually talk, when they talk about properties. Nominalizations as Property Designators a. A Survey of Property Designators Philosophers most often use one of two kinds of expression when they intend to refer to properties: But it is instructive to realize that there is a bigger variety of expressions that are apt for identifying reference to properties. Being wise is a property. To be wise is a property. We can discover two further kinds of property designators by realising that we may combine the grammatical subjects of 1 and 2 with either a formal prefix e. The quality of being wise is a property. What is often overseen is that we can also use a that-clause to designate a property, as in: Strawson once pointed out; see p. It is one of the properties of a triangle that the three interior angles taken together are equal to two right angles. Firstly, I should point out that although terms of the mentioned classes can be used as property designators, they are not always so used. Most of them exhibit also other uses. But the same is also true for at least some abstract nouns: When I will nevertheless speak as if certain terms instead of: But we should not conclude that such sentences are semantically defective and that the contained nominalizations are not property designators after all. Rather, the awkwardness of such sentences can largely be explained by the fact that they are highly uninformative. The reason is that in many cases, the knowledge that a given term in a certain use denotes a property seems to be a condition of being a competent user of that term in that use. This feature of a term which we may call its categorial transparency is in particular exhibited by the kinds of property designator used in statements 1 to 6. In fact, many smooth examples of such predications can be found, as for instance the following ones: Nay; children, to be null is merely a negative property [The Prairie It is the quality of reason to be invariable and constant [So, the above test works in spite of a certain awkwardness of some cases which could be avoided by modifying the test a little bit, although I see no need to actually do that. Furthermore, the property designators in 4 and 5 are also nominalizations, but enriched with an additional prefix that adds some classification of the referents of the terms. It seems plausible to suppose that designators being thus 4 On this view cp. Wolterstorff, On Universals Univ. Let us call this supposition the Uniformity Thesis Any two property designators that are derived from the same descriptive material in the same use , refer to the same object. It should be noted that the Uniformity Thesis asserts only sameness of reference of two property designators with the same origin, but not sameness of sense. M1 Abstract nouns e. M2 Abstract nouns refer to kinds of tropes. M3 Kinds of tropes are not properties. With my denial of M1 , I do not intend to repudiate M2 as well; this thesis can be held independently of M1 , by denying M3 and regarding properties as kinds of tropes. Moltmann points out that there is a contrast between many statements which differ only in that one of them has an abstract noun as its grammatical subject, while the other has the corresponding gerund plus categorial prefix as its subject. Some examples of the kind with which Moltmann illustrates this claim are they

are but three of a whole number of similar cases that Moltmann came up with: Sentence 9 amounts, roughly, to the claim that shy behaviour or shy attitudes are nice or perhaps that shy people are nice, as far as their shyness is considered. Properties such as being wise, on the other hand, have the character of conditions that can only be fulfilled or not. Strawson, *Individuals* London, New York: Routledge, , p. Perhaps, someone working on ontology might utter it, because he uses the property of being earnest as his standard example of a property and cannot think of using a different one. Things are even worse with the third case: Their subject terms refer to different entities, and indeed, to entities about a different sort. Such entities are not objects, i. But this strikes me as rather mysterious. It seems to me a plain truism that whatever there is, must have some properties. Moltmann would apparently deny this; but her position raises many questions to which there seem to be no answers: But then, they should have at least the following property: But so, every non-object would have to both lack properties and yet possess one. I may add that Moltmann wavers between different formulations of thesis M4. She sometimes uses a formulation that sounds weaker than M4 , when she says that non-objects must inherit their properties from other entities;¹² this claim seems incompatible with M4 , because if something inherits a property P, it certainly has P. Anyway, a variant of my criticism applies also to the weaker claim; if an entity x only possesses properties that it inherits from other entities, this should also be true of its property of possessing only inherited properties. But this property is obviously not inherited itself. But there is a straightforward argument against her thesis: Since the following claim is true by any ordinary standards: By transitivity of identity, we immediately arrive at: Wolterstorff, *On Universals*, pp. However, in her proposal Moltmann provides the material for a response to this argument. But it does not do so as employed in ¹² Shyness is a property. Here, it refers to the property of shyness. So, Moltmann supplements her theses with the following claim: Against the Shift-of-Reference Thesis If a certain phrase p generates a reference-shifting context for some term t a context in which t has a different reference than in its default reading , then the concatenation of p and t should not accept all the complements which t accepts. Let us look at an example which illustrates this claim: To wit, take a look at the following quotations: *The Life and Adventures of Martin Chuzzlewit* There is nothing in which our Species so far surpasses all others, than in the Capacity of acquiring the Faculty of Thinking and Speaking well: That this is a peculiar Property belonging to our Nature is very certain [So, you can say about properties that they are rare. The alleged difference between properties and kinds of tropes, consisting in the circumstance that some predicates only apply in different ways to them while others apply only to the latter, breaks down in light of the above quotations. The point I made can be illustrated with the kind of sentence on which Moltmann primarily relies: And since this is correctly said to be a nice property, it is correctly said to be a property. But yet, something remains to be explained: In this section, I shall argue that the difference is not to be explained, as Moltmann suggested, as a difference in reference and ontological commitment. In the next section, I shall show how it can be accounted for in other terms. I agree with what Moltmann says about the natural interpretation of 9: But is the natural interpretation the only available one? To prepare for an answer, we should notice that to be is nice is a matter of degree and aspect: We may say that being nice is an aspectival trait. Now, if a property is said to possess some aspectival trait, such as being shy, interesting, or helpful, while the relevant aspect is not specified, there seems to be a default assumption that the aspect meant is closely related to the characteristic relation in which properties stand to things: In fact, our understanding of what a property is seems to be intimately connected to our grasp of this relation. Now, if a property is said to be interesting, while no aspect of interest is specified, then the default assumption is: If a property is said to be helpful, then the default assumption is: That there are default assumptions about non-specified aspects in which aspectival predicates apply to some kind of object can also be seen from other kinds of discourse. But such a default assumption can be wrong in a particular case. One can find English beer nice for some other reason, its colour for example, or because it is associated with some nice memories: But it always reminds me of some nice summer night in Brighton. I may find a property interesting, nice etc. This is why we could use 9 to say something different from what 9 is normally taken to say. Imagine the following dialogue: You mean, you really like shy people, shy behaviour etc.?

PARTICULARISED ATTRIBUTES : AN AUSTRIAN TALE BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER pdf

Indeed, I rather dislike shy people, at least for their shyness. But it is neither incomprehensible, nor contradictory. Whatever shyness might be a kind of tropes, a property, a set of its instances, or what have you , you could find it nice for certain philosophical, aesthetic or just silly reason, without generally liking its instances, without thinking that it is nice to have shyness etc. They are compatible with the assumption that shyness is a property namely that of being shy.

6: Items where Year is - Middlesex University Research Repository

A note on particularised qualities and bearer-uniqueness. About us. Editorial team.

Volume , October 4, A scoping review of Lyme disease research relevant for public health â€” Supplementary References. Can Commun Dis Rep ;44 Scoping review, Lyme disease, public health, Ixodes ticks, research This supplement provides the additional references for the article entitled A scoping review of Lyme disease research relevant for public health published in this issue Footnote 1. Arkansas Department of Health, Division of Epidemiology. Tickborne diseases in Arkansas. J Ark Med Soc. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Lyme diseaseâ€”â€”United States, Tick, tock, tick, tock: Tick-borne illness increasing in Oklahoma. J Okla State Med Assoc. Centers for Disease Control. Physician reporting of Lyme diseaseâ€”â€”Connecticut, Lyme disease surveillanceâ€”â€”United States, Lyme disease in Canada. Can Med Assoc J. Lyme diseaseâ€”â€”United States, and Canada Diseases Weekly Report. Lyme disease surveillance in New York State. New York State J Med. Borrelia burgdorferi infection in UK workers at risk of tick bites. Tickborne diseases in Georgia, J Med Assoc Ga. Lyme disease and cases occurring during pregnancy. Lyme disease knowledge, attitudes, and behaviorsâ€”â€”Connecticut, Current trends Lyme disease surveillanceâ€”â€”United States, International notes Lyme diseaseâ€”â€”Canada. Lyme disease and cases occurring during pregnancyâ€”â€”United States. Effect of electronic laboratory reporting on the burden of Lyme disease surveillanceâ€”â€”New Jersey, Lyme diseaseâ€”â€”US, Lyme disease surveillanceâ€”â€”United States, Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center. Lyme disease among U. Detection of Borrelia burgdorferi in human skin biopsies by a nested polymerase chain reaction, In: Rolfs et al, Editors. Lyme disease, â€”â€” United States. Can Commun Dis Rep. Lyme disease in horses. Experts, activists looking to agree on Lyme disease fight. The Guardian Charlottetown March 10, , p. Reported vectorborne and zoonotic diseases, U. Tickborne diseases in Arkansas, Erythema chronica migrans, ticks and Lyme disease in Missouri. Lyme disease vaccine available for patients at high risk. Lyme disease in unwary physicians: Evaluation of Borrelia burgdorferi sensu lato seroprevalence in the province of Bolu, Turkey. Turk J Med Sci. Lessons learned from a microscopy method claimed to be useful for detecting Borrelia and Babesia organisms in human blood. Positive or false positive Eia in Lyme disease a use for Western blot? Incidence rates of selected infectious diseases in the most populated counties, United States, Prevalence of Borrelia burgdorferi, Bartonella spp. Seroprevalence of Borrelia burgdorferi antibodies in white-tailed deer from Texas. Int J Parasitol Parasites Wildl. Health care costs, utilization and patterns of care following Lyme disease. Evidence of rapid changes in Lyme disease awareness in Canada. Ticks Tick Borne Dis. Factors associated with preventive behaviors regarding Lyme disease in Canada and Switzerland: Acceptability of tick control interventions to prevent Lyme disease in Switzerland and Canada: From Lyme disease emergence to endemicity: A cross sectional comparative study of risk perceptions in different populations. Ann NY Acad Sci. Clinical comparison of borreliacidal-antibody test with indirect immunofluorescence and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays for diagnosis of Lyme disease. Evolution of the serologic response to Borrelia burgdorferi in treated patients with culture-confirmed erythema migrans. Serodiagnosis in early Lyme disease. Serologic survey of wild cervids for potential disease agents in selected national parks in the United States. Demonstration by immunodiffusion agar-gel test of Borrelia anserina antigen in the organs of infected chickens. Lyme disease testing in children in an endemic area. Diagnostic value of cerebrospinal fluid examination in children with peripheral facial palsy and suspected Lyme borreliosis. Abiotic parameters and diel and seasonal activity of Borrelia-infected and uninfected Ixodes Persulcatus Acarina: Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis. Effect of forest fragmentation on Lyme disease risk. Allen R, Thrush GR. Incidence and prevalence of Lyme disease in a suburban Westchester County community. NY State J Med. Spatial Lyme borreliosis risk assessment in north-eastern Italy. Int J Med Microbiol. Distribution, density, and Lyme disease spirochete infection in Ixodes dammini Acari: Ixodidae on white-tailed deer in Maryland. Borrelia burgdorferi

infection in *Ixodes Scapularis* Acari: Ixodidae in Kent County Maryland. Bulletin of the Society for Vector Ecology. Polymerase chain reaction with the kb circular plasmid of *Borrelia burgdorferi* B31 as a target for detection of the Lyme borreliosis agents in cerebrospinal fluid. Arthropod pests and the diseases they carry: Prevention in community and athletic settings. *Borrelia burgdorferi* and *Ixodes dammini* prevalent in the greater Philadelphia area. Seasonal prevalence of *Borrelia burgdorferi* in natural populations of white-footed mice, *Peromyscus leucopus*. Prevalence of *Borrelia burgdorferi* and *Babesia microti* in mice on islands inhabited by white-tailed deer. *Peromyscus leucopus* and *Microtus pennsylvanicus* simultaneously infected with *Borrelia burgdorferi* and *Babesia microti*. Antigenically variable *Borrelia burgdorferi* isolated from cottontail rabbits and *Ixodes dentatus* in rural and urban areas. *Babesia microti*, human babesiosis, and *Borrelia burgdorferi* in Connecticut. Mammal diversity and infection prevalence in the maintenance of enzootic *Borrelia burgdorferi* along the western Coastal Plains of Maryland. Am J Trop Med Hyg. Large differences between test strategies for the detection of anti-*Borrelia* antibodies are revealed by comparing eight ELISAs and five immunoblots. A Dutch nationwide evaluation of serological assays for detection of *Borrelia* antibodies in clinically well-defined patients. Diagn Microbiol Infect Dis. Comparison of antibody titres against borrelial strains isolated in Japan by the microcapsule agglutination test for serological studies of early Lyme disease. Application of the microcapsule agglutination test to serologic studies of an early stage of Lyme disease in Japan. Risk of Lyme disease:

PARTICULARISED ATTRIBUTES : AN AUSTRIAN TALE BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER pdf

7: Table of contents for The Austrian contribution to analytic philosophy

Papers - old version Particularised Attributes: An Austrian Tale (B. Schnieder) A Note on Bearer-Uniqueness and Particularised Qualities (B. Schnieder).

Origins of Analytical Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano. Grundprobleme der analytischen Ontologie. Ontologie und logische Analyse der Sprache. Vorlesungen zur Einfuehrung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie. Substanzen und ihre Eigenschaften. Referenz, Quantifikation und ontologische Festlegung. Was es nicht gibt: Ereignisse und andere Partikularien. Vorbemerkungen zur einer mehrkategorialen Ontologie. Ding - Substanz - Person. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. Dinge, Eigenschaften, Beziehungen, Sachverhalte. The Metaphysics of a Model. New Essays on the Foundation of Ontology. Oxford, ; Philosophical Applications of Free Logic. New York, ; The Ontological Turn: Studies in the Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann. Iowa, ; Relations and Predicates. Phenomenological Realism and Dialectical Ontology. London, ; Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology. London, ; Semantik und Ontologie. 1, 2. The Attack on Substances: A World of States of Affairs. The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of Being. Bedeutung, Geist und Ontologie: The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism. New Essays on the A Priori. A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics. Nachgelassene Schriften und Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel. Ontologie gibt das wirklich? Argument und Analyse, Paderborn The Categorical Structure of the World. The Structure of Mind. Einfuehrung in die Grundbegriffe und Probleme der modernen Logik. From an Ontological Point of View. Logic, Ontology and Language. Thought, Fact and Reference. The Origins and Ontology of Logical Positivism. The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence. Ding Substanz - Person. Algebraic Semantics in Language and Philosophy. More Kinds of Being: Die "logische", "lokalistische" und andere Kasustheorien. Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie. Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind, Rezension von Erwin Tegtmeier:

PARTICULARISED ATTRIBUTES : AN AUSTRIAN TALE BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER pdf

8: German addresses are blocked - www.enganchecubano.com

The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy London Studies in the History of Philosophy Series editors: Jonathan Wolff, Tim Crane, M.W.F. Stone, Tom Pink, Jill Kraye, Susan James, Daniel Garber, Steven Nadler and Christina Mercer.

Based on the novel by T. John Harvey Kellogg, co-inventor of the famous Kellogg cornflake and proponent of numerous "healthful" ideas that seem calculated to make moderns squirm. The film presents a triple story line. Eleanor has accidentally poisoned William and hopes a trip to Dr. These include George Kellogg Dana Carvey , who seems to live to make the life of his adoptive father Dr. Kellogg Anthony Hopkins unmitigated hell. The various stories are extremely entertaining as they intertwine--but most of the laughs come at Dr. Much of it is crude, bad taste, bathroom humor--but it is expertly, hilariously handled. The performances are sharp, clever, and make the most of the various outlandish situations into the characters are forced. Broderick carries the film with tremendous charm and Fonda follows suit, but the real acting awards go to Anthony Hopkins, Dana Carvey, and a supporting cast that includes outrageously funny performances by the likes of Camryn Manheim, Traci Lind, Colm Meaney, and John Neville. Laugh your way to health the Kellogg way! In this particular instance the story focuses on Jaguar Paw Rudy Youngblood , whose presumably peaceful village is destroyed by Mayans intent upon obtaining human sacrifice to appease their bloodthirsty gods. After a harrowing march to the Mayan city, Jaguar Paw escapes death--and the city, with a furious party of Myan warriors in hot pursuit. The two have often been compared in terms of violence, but the connection goes quite a bit deeper this; it is embedded in the subtext of the film itself. A forced march while tied to long poles; a prayer uttered by a woman that sounds suspiciously like a Mayan-language Hail Mary; a prophesy that warns about a man "reborn from mud and earth" who will "end your world;" and enough arrow and javelin wounds to slay Saint Sebastian himself several times over. And we need hardly mention the title of the film itself, a reference to the vision of St. Even so, I cannot actually say that the violence or its graphic nature are implausible within the context of the film. What IS completely implausible is the amount of physical damage Jaguar Paw sustains without being mortally wounded. He is dragged along in bondage, half hung by accident, escapes sacrifice by a fraction of a second, is shot through with an arrow, and all the rest--but like the old Timex Watch slogan, he takes a licking and keeps on ticking, seeming to run without pause for forty-eight hours, vaulting down a waterfall, and even getting clipped a time or two more, most often with scarcely a pause to wince. But Gibson is fair about it: Everything from cast to costumes is truly amazing, and the film moves with tremendous speed. But it is extremely troubling. The violence is essentially pornographic in nature, teasing us, leading us on to increasingly intense climaxes of blood and gore. It would seem that Gibson is determined to have a personal martyrdom by cinematic proxy. The DVD quality is very fine and offers a commentary track by Gibson, et al and a making-of featurette. Three stars for technical brilliance.

9: Read The Importance of 'Being Earnest'

CV Benjamin Schnieder ii. Refereeing Work Occasional Referee for American Philosophical Quarterly, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Dialectica, Disputatio, Erkenntnis, Grazer philosophische Studien, Logique et.

PARTICULARISED ATTRIBUTES : AN AUSTRIAN TALE BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER pdf

GIS 87-San Francisco Atomic physics max born Body Piercing and Tattoos Baldwins cosmopolitan loneliness James Darsey Superstring theory 25th anniversary edition 11th edition gmat review We substitute media for people Public finance in a democratic society Roadside geology of Minnesota History of Richard Cromwell and the restoration of Charles II Book templates for word Republic of Palau Jazz fractures : F. Scott Fitzgerald and epochal representation. Call for 1972 convention Chapter 6 California socially, morally, religiously The charter and by-laws of the New York historical society. Improve your Spanish Politics and power: the movement for woman?s rights Social media impact on journalism On The Great Plains Irving Babbitt in our time Rand McNally Louisville Kentucky Supporting the curriculum South Africa and international sports factfinder Buying Right Country In lieu of a conclusion. Outlines Of Cosmic Philosophy 2 volumes Advanced password recovery old version Do controls on the arms trade help peace? The Psychotherapy and Infancy Tropical manifestations of common viral infections Jashin J. Wu . [et al.] Africa in War and Peace Cases in mathematics teacher education Influencing the Judicial Mind Healing the ache of alienation SAS Guide for Introduction to the Practice of Statistics, Third Edition Elizabeth Kandel Englander. Mike Males. Dennis D. Embry. Mary E. Muscari. Alfred Blumstein. John Rosemond Great powers and the decline of the European states system, 1914-1945 The domestic front Andrew Ross Ancestry of mayor Harold Washington, 1922-1987