

# PATTERNS OF STATE FAILURE : THE CASE OF LEBANON FARID EL KHAZEN pdf

## 1: Project MUSE - Pax Syriana

*The results also show that Cheikh Farid Elias El Khazen, a member of The Khazen Family scored votes, being fourth on Aoun's list. Profile of Cheikh Farid Elias El Khazen was previously published on this web page under the title "The Professor and the Politician."*

By and large, parliamentary elections in the s were less corrupt, freer and more representative than those of the s. The s elections, likewise, were better than those of the s. This pattern of improvement continued until the elections recorded the best performance in both relative and absolute terms. What applied to elections is equally applicable to the making of electoral laws since Contrary to the controversy that accompanied the promulgation of three electoral laws in , and , the law of was well received and was the basis on which four successive parliaments were elected every four years. Moreover, electoral reform figured in political discussions and debates. Parties, groups and politicians put forward many suggestions to make the electoral system more representative and more confessionally balanced. In contrast to the parliamentary elections of , which were held two years after the crisis and after the crisis was settled, the elections were held amid heated debates over unresolved problems left by the war. The most important problem was the displacement of , people from all sects and regions from their homes and lands. Also, in contrast with the regime of President Chehab , whose reform plan aimed to build state institutions and promote social justice, the election was conducted by a government that enjoyed little trust and inspired even less credibility. The government of Rashid al-Solh came to power after that of his predecessor Omar Karami was forced to resign because of the economic crisis; it was the first government in Lebanon to fall for a seemingly non-political reason. Lebanon lost desperately needed financial resources through tile election being held in the summer. In the past, elections were usually held in the spring or autumn so as not to interfere with the summer tourist season and the large gains to the Lebanese economy. The four or five months prior to the election, gave the impression that the regime was playing a frivolous political game. Declarations by the Minister of the Interior that preparing the corrected voter lists would take two years were followed by counter declarations that it would merely take a few months. While the cabinet decided that a voting card for the elections was an indispensable necessity for an orderly electoral process, the idea was dropped a few weeks before election day. This occurred after the cards were printed and the treasury had borne their cost. Elections had not been held in the presence of foreign troops on Lebanese soil since That election, however, elected a parliament that abolished the French mandate and turned Lebanon into an independent state. State Versus Society and the Packaging of Deadlocks Irregularities and problems associated with the election notwithstanding, the electoral process did have some attributes, particularly at the level of local electoral politics. The election re- established the direct political contact between people and their parliamentary representatives that had been interrupted by the war. It also revived the principle of accountability through the return of some form of communication between the voter and the candidate. The negative repercussions of the election were, however, quite numerous. First, they widened the rift between the state and the people. It was also due to the limited ability of the state to make final decisions in matters of domestic and foreign policy. The decisive factor in the election lay neither with the state nor with the people. Second, the election was also marked by the absence of political opposition capable of introducing change. This phenomenon, which was first apparent in the mids, reached its height in the early s. In prewar Lebanon, opposition was a principal part of the political process. However, during the war the opposition became the political equivalent of boycotting, resulting in institutional paralysis. For example, it was intersectarian opposition that forced President al-Khoury to resign in This election and the political alliances it generated affected the outcome of the presidential election, which opposition candidate Suleiman Franjeh won by one vote. That one vote margin enabled the opposition to end more than a decade of Chehabist influence in both the army and government. None of the vigour and assertiveness of prewar opposition politics are present in postwar Lebanon. Both government and opposition are stalled. Just as the

government is unable to make final decisions on important and sometimes unimportant political matters, so the opposition is equally unable to hold government accountable and ultimately to bring it down and replace it. There are many vocal critics of the government and debates in Parliament are loud and can even get stormy, but they never translate into proposals for a vote of no confidence by the opposition or the resignation of the cabinet. Both government and opposition seem to have an undeclared quota of political manoeuvring they cannot surpass. In this way, deadlocks become inherent in the decision-making process and politics, internal and external, become a function of the skilful packaging of deadlocks. When opposition leaders raise fundamental issues, they either make no real impact on the political process, or they opt for boycott and exit from the political process. The middle position, which allows the practice of an effective opposition from within the political system, has no place in the politics of Lebanon today. Indeed, in no election was the overlap between government and opposition so complete as in . The irony also lay in the fact that had real opposition forces existed and had they been effective, their demands could not have been entertained either by state institutions or by officials since the decision-making process is de jure in Lebanon and de facto elsewhere. Third, the election deepened the internal sectarian divide on the one hand and the divide between state and society on the other. In the past, divisive issues revolved around the state, which provided the axis on which the political system rested. Today, no such role is performed by the state, while Christians and Muslims are still far apart. The election was held against the will of many Lebanese, notably the Christians, whose political and religious leaders voiced strong opposition to the electoral law and rejected the timing of the election, nor were Muslims any more content with the elections. Fourth, the increased power of parliament, notably of its speaker, as stated in the amended constitution, gives elections and the new parliament unprecedented importance. In exceptional circumstances, such as the first parliamentary elections held in a country emerging from 15 years of war, elections are as politically significant as adopting a new constitution. Fifth, the structure of fragmented representation, which the election produced, is cause for concern. A large number of deputies entered the parliament in unopposed electoral contests because of the absence of true competition through the vacuum caused by the boycott. This does not, however, mean that the leading figures of the chamber do not enjoy popular support, or that they would have failed to enter parliament under other electoral conditions. It was evident that the internal and external circumstances that surrounded the holding of the election reflected the peculiar nature of the state of affairs that prevails in postwar Lebanon. In other countries recovering from years of war, the role of elections is to make the transition from war to peace smooth and orderly. Such elections have attracted the interest and the active involvement of the international community. This was the case, for example, in Cambodia, where the United Nations ran its largest peace operation in its history. Cambodia, like Lebanon, was the scene of war and fragmentation but, unlike Lebanon, it attracted little attention from the international community. Non-competitive Elections to the Benefit of Another State In the light of the above, why were elections held in Lebanon and why specifically in the summer of ? Who benefited and why? One plausible explanation lies in what Guy Hermet calls the functions of non competitive elections. Whereas the functions of competitive elections are well-defined to provide an orderly succession of office holders, or help legitimise leaders and governments , non-competitive elections fulfil functions that are not so different from those fulfilled by competitive elections. The fact of organising elections in a certain form and at a certain time never constitutes a gratuitous act.

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## 2: Lebanon's First Postwar Parliamentary Election, An Imposed Choice - Part 3

*Patterns of State Failure: The Case of Lebanon Farid el Khazen State Sponsorship - A Root Cause of Terrorism? State Sponsorship - A Root Cause of Terrorism? Louise Richardson*

Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. Three possible scenarios for the future of the Palestinian refugee problem are envisaged: In pre-war Lebanon, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon provoked deep communal divisions, intense political debate, and ideological controversy, From the late s, no issue did more to militarize the country, mobilize communities, political parties and leaders, and split public opinion than the PLO military presence. And when the war broke out in the mids, what prolonged it and turned it into a full-fledged regional conflict was the direct involvement of the PLO. Since the end of the military confrontations in , however, an issue on which there has been unprecedented consensus shared by all Lebanese communities and by leaders in government and in the opposition, both in Lebanon and abroad, has been the rejection of permanent settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon tawteen, in Lebanese political jargon. Indeed, one of the modifications in the amended Lebanese constitution of 21 September that provoked no opposition from any faction was the provision introduced in the preamble: From the most divisive issue in post-independence Lebanese politics to one of the few issues to arouse national consensus in post-war Lebanon, the Palestinian presence has been a highly delicate and controversial matter at all political, social, and economic levels. This paper addresses the nature and scope of the Palestinian refugee problem in pre- and post-war Lebanon and the official and non-official positions on permanent settlement since the launching of the peace process at the Madrid conference in October Nor did the Lebanese actively seek to deal with them, either initially as refugees, a few years later as enemies at the time of the PLO guerilla activities , or today as an unwanted burden. Historically, there is no legacy of enmity between the Lebanese and the Palestinians. Palestinian-Lebanese relations before were orderly, involving a significant movement of people and a flourishing trade. But in , Lebanese and Palestinians had to deal with a situation not of their own making. They had to draw on scarce political and economic resources, and to operate under regional and international circumstances over which they had little control. Only five years after independence in , Lebanon became a participant in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lebanon took part in the Arab-Israeli war and signed an Armistice agreement with Israel in see Diab That was the first and last regional war in which the Lebanese state was directly involved. The large-scale military confrontation that took place on Lebanese soil and had to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in see for example Kimhe It was preceded by an earlier Israeli invasion in , more limited in scope and objectives than that of While officially not in a state of war with Israel since and not involved in Arab-Israeli wars, Lebanon was in fact the most involved of the Arab countries, but always through non-Lebanese parties. While Lebanon has not lost territory in war against Israel, it has had territory occupied by Israel. Lebanon was a passive actor in regional power politics, in inter-Arab rivalries as well as in Arab-Israeli politics. Unlike other Arab states, particularly in the Arab East, the Lebanese state did not have political ambitions that went beyond its borders. Nor did it have an ideological agenda and a revolutionary model to export to neighbouring countries. Nor did the Lebanese state make calls to liberate Palestine as other Arab regimes did. After independence, Lebanon sought to maintain a relatively neutral posture. This was in line with the National Pact which constituted the communal platform for independence. The first event that altered the course of Arab politics and Arab-Western relations after the war of was the coming of Nasser to power in In the mids, Lebanon, like other Arab countries, had its own response to Nasserism-an internal crisis which lasted six months and was only brought to an end following the election of a new president Qubain ; Gerges ; Salibi A destabilizing factor in the late s, Nasserism in Lebanon was a stabilizing factor in the s. Lebanon versus the PLO The other event that radically transformed regional politics both in Israel and in the Arab world was the war and its military and political repercussions. Once again, regional development occurring outside Lebanon set the pace for change in regional politics and in the international politics of the

Middle East. The post Arab political scene was radically different from that of the s. One immediate outcome of the war was the emergence of militant Palestinian nationalism see Ajami In , the PLO came under the control of new Palestinian leaders not tarnished by defeat. Their call for an armed struggle against Israel received wide popular support. While states had recourse to political and institutional mechanisms for adjustment after a military defeat, for non-state actors like the PLO adjustment was of a different nature on Palestinian nationalist politics after , see Quandt et al. On the PLO, see Cobban The pressing problem facing the PLO after was the lack of geographic and political space in which to operate. That space had to be carved out by force and not by negotiation. This meant inevitable confrontation with existing Arab regimes. From , Lebanon gradually became a de facto confrontation state with Israel, though by default and not by a decision made by the Lebanese government. As a result, Lebanon was turned into a battleground for Palestinian-Israeli warfare, first along its southern borders, and subsequently in other parts of the country. What aggravated an already explosive situation was the Arab-Israeli war. It accelerated the disintegration process in Lebanon and deepened its marginalization El Khazen The military disengagements between Israel, Egypt and Syria that followed the war, and later the divisions between Egypt and Syria, turned Lebanon into the last active battleground for the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When war broke out in , it became difficult, if not impossible, to disengage Lebanon from the Arab-Israeli conflict. PLO militarism after , like Nasserism in the s, catalysed change in regional politics. The two Arab countries most affected by these developments were Jordan and Lebanon. Where Lebanon differed from Jordan and other Arab parties was on the nature of the state. Lebanon had an open state which reflected the plural nature of its society. Jordan had an authoritarian state. In crisis situations, principally the PLO armed presence after , the Lebanese state was at a chronic disadvantage, because it could not resort to those instruments of control that are at the disposal of the authoritarian state system. After , Lebanon and the PLO were locked in a zero-sum game. To prevail one had to neutralize the other. Nor was a negotiated settlement possible between a revolutionary movement seeking to expand and earn international recognition, and a state seeking to contain it. The inevitable outcome was military confrontation, which took place in As the war continued, Lebanese warring factions were gradually marginalized. Indeed, the war was brought to an end in the autumn of only when one non-Lebanese party Syria achieved a military victory over another non-Lebanese party the PLO. By then, Lebanese groups had only a marginal influence on the course of the war. On the war years, see Hanf ; on the early phases of the war, see also Walid Khalidi ; Deeb ; Evron Despite the ending of the war in Lebanon in , and despite achievements made in the peace talks-the agreements signed between Israel and the PLO since and the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in south Lebanon continues to be a war zone. Today, it is the only active Arab-Israeli war zone in the region. It is also the oldest, now in its 49th year. In south Lebanon, military confrontations have been going on for over 28 years and are not likely to end soon. Positions on Palestinian Refugees The positions of the parties concerned reflect their conflicting readings of the Palestinian problem at the present stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For them the Palestinians, as a people having a national cause and rights to a national home in whatever is left of Palestine, do not exist. Palestinians are tolerated in the West Bank and Gaza only because they cannot be expelled. The current Likud-headed cabinet will abide by agreements signed with the PLO, but its interpretations of these agreements differ from those of the previous Labour cabinet. The government of Prime Minister Netanyahu seeks to renegotiate these agreements with the intention of nullifying them insofar as Palestinian national rights are concerned. For them, the Palestinians have a national identity and national rights, though on a selective basis. Palestinian refugees, who will theoretically be allowed to return to the territories of the National Authority, are those displaced by the war see Tamari For these parties, the history of the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict begins in Palestinians made refugees in the war are not an issue. Consequently, pre Palestinian refugees are not part of the political problem discussed in the peace talks. The third position regarding Palestinian refugees is that of the Palestinians themselves and of the Arab countries, notably those most involved in the peace talks: Syria, Jordan, and Egypt see Zureik They call for the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly

Resolution , passed on December 11 , which calls for the right of return of refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours, and for compensation for those choosing not to return. While the return of the refugees to Israel is out of the question Peres and Naor Another position is that of Yassir Arafat, who opted for a convenient de facto reading of history which, in a way, begins in Three Nos In discussing the Lebanese position on the permanent settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon, it is necessary to distinguish between the position of the Lebanese government, and the views of the various communities and their respective political and religious leaderships, political parties and groupings, as well as mainstream public opinion. For the Lebanese government, be it the present cabinet of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri or previous cabinets formed since the signing of the Taif Agreement in , permanent settlement violates the Constitution. No Lebanese government official and no politician outside the government is in a position to propose a constitutional amendment with the objective of permanent settlement. Such action would be the most unpopular initiative in the career of any Lebanese politician, irrespective of sectarian affiliation or political orientation. That does not mean, however, that Lebanon can ignore the issue. The Lebanese government has opted for a policy of damage limitation. It is defensive both in form and substance. It derives strength from its negative posture. Unable to influence the course of events in the region, notably the peace process, and unable to distance itself from Syria, Lebanon has opted for a least costly policy that fits its political capabilities: Lebanon has refused to take part in the multilateral negotiations, a policy in line with that of Syria. But while Syria held bilateral talks with Israel under American sponsorship in and made significant progress, Lebanon did not engage in similar bilateral talks. For Lebanon, two questions are of primary concern-refugees and water. On both issues, Lebanese officials have repeatedly stated that Lebanon has nothing to offer as a compromise. On the water issue, Lebanon refuses to share or sell its water resources. First, the settlement of about , Palestinians Commissioner-General It would alter the demographic structure of Lebanese society, for the vast majority of the Palestinians are Sunni Muslim amounting to roughly 10 per cent of the Lebanese population *ibid.*: It is one thing for sectarian groups to have uneven population growth, but it is quite another to create a demographic transformation overnight. The Impact of Permanent Settlement on Lebanon Any demographic change in Lebanon has political implications, let alone when it is imposed against the will of the Lebanese. Permanent settlement would destabilize Lebanon for the following reasons. Change in the demographic structure would perhaps have limited political significance if there was one group in Lebanon that had an absolute numerical majority; if national reconciliation had really taken place following the ending of military confrontations; if Lebanon enjoyed sovereignty, which translated into the ability of the government to make final decisions on domestic and external matters; if Lebanese territories in the south and western Beqaa valley were not under Israeli occupation; and finally, if the rule of law and respect for human rights prevailed.

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## 3: NPR Choice page

*14 Patterns of state failure: the case of Lebanon FARID EL KHAZEN Patterns, Perpetrators and Farid el Khazen is Professor and Chair of the Department of.*

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Cedar Revolution is the term used in English, coined by officials in the State Department. Important studies in English of the prewar Lebanese political scene include Leonard Binder, ed. Studies that analyze the war years include Charles Winslow, Lebanon: In this book, I also draw from studies of Lebanese electoral politics that were published in Arabic in Beirut, including Farid el-Khazen and Paul Salem, eds. The term political elite is said to have been coined in the nineteenth century by Italian sociologist Vildredo Pareto. The term has been used more recently by political scientists such as Harold Lasswell and Robert Dahl. The reputational method involves using the judgment of elite individuals to determine who the most influential people in the system are. In some cases, I found that I could not gain access to specific politicians despite my ongoing efforts to arrange an interview. A generous interpretation of this difference in treatment would be that Lebanese politicians often view foreign scholars as a conduit to share their ideas with the outside world. Research Problems and Methodologies. The Lebanese Political System: The Elite Pacts of and 1. Fakhoury Muehlbacher, Power-Sharing and Democratisation, "Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, Bassem Jisr, Mithaq , "47 my translation. The Making and Politics of the National Pact, This analysis develops the insights of Richard H. The Case of Lebanon. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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## 4: Rote pedagogy and deferred adulthood main causes of stagnation among Arab youths | Al Bawaba

*Cheikh Farid Elias El Khazen, The Professor and the Politician Cheikh Farid Elias El Khazen is the chair of and Professor of political science at the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut.*

The Aftermath of Saddam: Anti-Americanism is broken down into two dimensions: The discussion shows that, unless the US opts for a shift in its Middle Eastern policy, endorsement for political Islam and therefore the propensity of violent retaliation against US targets will increase. Introduction The US-led war on Iraq has generated an intense wave of anti-American sentiments across the globe. International opposition to the invasion has varied between two poles: In fact, the diplomatic fallout over the war has produced standard-bearers of potent anti-Americanism. Despite close historical cooperation between the US and some European countries, serious tensions have marred US relations with standard allies such as France and Germany over the war. Another manifestation of anti-American feelings occurred when Millions took the streets to protest US war on Iraq, they were especially colossal and unprecedented in Britain, Italy, Spain and Australia, the countries whose governments support US policy making this support massively unpopular with their own populations. US unilateralism has apparently antagonized its European allies who are demanding a multi polar world. Resentment grew also because the US was perceived to be exerting its power in an unfair, biased, and arbitrary manner in pursuing its national interests. Middle East Oil supplies [3]. With the end of the invasion, and while the political debate regarding the future of Iraq rages, Arab anti-American sentiment continues to worry US policy-makers. For, in the Arab world public discontent with US policy and action in Iraq retains a more alarming and powerful message: This reality has been confirmed by the fact that the perpetrators involved in anti-American violence during the last decade were mostly Arabs. This study examines the nature and evolution of anti-American sentiment in the Arab world, especially in light of the September 11 attacks and the US-led war on Iraq. I-Anti-Americanism in the Middle East: Arab alienation was accelerated by the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the surge of European imperialism after the establishment of the mandate system, the failed experiments of liberalism and the consolidation of the modern state system after the First World War. Many argue that the imperative of modernization itself have caused a resurgence of Islam, especially in the form of religious fundamentalism. Khashan [5] contends that modernization has failed and religious issues have become important in reaction to this failure. Insufficient modernization efforts and the continued dependence of Arab states on the West have added to the grievances of religious movements. Faksh blames fundamentalism on the failure of secular national ideologies and movements advocating secular nationalism that rallied millions across the Arab World [6]. Old ideologies have failed to deliver their promises of national strength, social and economic development and political freedom, i. Furthermore, modernization has contributed to a breakdown in community values, lifestyles and traditions, causing widespread feelings of dislocation, alienation and disorientation. The failure to secure independence coupled with political corruption and chronic economic stagnation, paved the way for the appearance of Islamist movements struggling against the West. With the creation of Israel and the end of European colonialism, the people of the Middle East became that much more disillusioned with the West and, subsequently, with the leader of the West, the United States. Anti-Americanism is not rooted in Arab culture or Islam. He advised his country to adopt an impartial policy in the Middle East, to show respect for democratic values and real understanding of Arab mentality [9]. Historical setbacks, such as the military defeat of have led to the resurfacing of Islamist movements, who are at least in their rhetorical stances, totally opposed to the West, and in particular to the United States. Thus, they rejected US-brokered Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of and subsequent efforts for Arab-Israeli peace, which they regarded as evidence of new forms of Western encroachment on sacred Arab territory. The West viewed the Iranian regime as fanatic and aggressive characterized by excessive religious zeal, violence, radicalism and antagonism toward the United States. The

success of Iranian-sponsored suicide bombings throughout the 1980s and 1990s in linking religious zeal to political objectives, sparked martyr operations, which have been on the rise since the 1990s. It has been transformed from an exemplary act of sacrifice into an inspirational model for revolution and action. This helped create an atmosphere that is conducive to suicide bombings. During the 1980s, a series of suicide bombings were staged against the U. Embassy in Beirut and U. The image of US citizens held hostage between and was sealed into the American mind. Faction of the Lebanese resistance carried out suicide attacks against Israeli forces in Lebanon. The litany of Islamic militant attacks against the U. Cole in Aden in 1985. On September 11, 2001, suicidal Arab Muslim militants seized four commercial carriers and crashed into the World Trade Center and Pentagon- symbols of American economic and military might. Thousands of civilians were killed in the attacks, making it the largest loss of civilian life in a single terrorist attack anywhere in the world. While many denounced the terrorist attacks, calling them a perversion of Islam, Osama bin Laden, the alleged instigator, and a chorus of voices in the West portrayed the suicide bombings and US retaliation as a clash of civilizations. His analysis is part of a larger notion that conflicts are defined by a clash of civilizations. Huntington holds that conflicts involving Islamic civilization will be particularly common and violent and that Islamic civilization will be the greatest threat to Western civilization. While many aspects of Huntington theory are controversial, his arguments concerning Islam have found acceptance among intellectuals and policymakers. They suggested that the conflict between the US and Muslim fanatics is more rooted in the nature of Islam than its defenders suggested [14]. Within the context of these reactions therefore, Islam is portrayed as a primary security concern and Muslims frequently referred to as extremists, fanatics, terrorists, or fundamentalists, associating Islam as a religion with violence. Chomsky argued that terrorism needed to be understood as a response to and product of United States foreign policy [16]. Most of the people questioned said they thought the United States was aggressive and biased against Islamic values. Specifically, they cited bias against the Palestinians. The survey also found that respondents viewed American culture as a corrupting influence on their society [18]. The poll which included nine Muslim countries, contended itself with reporting that two-thirds of those interviewed expressed unfavorable opinion of the U. Similarly, a poll by Zogbi International limited itself to reporting that 86 percent of Lebanese it interviewed have negative impressions of U. American Historian Tony Judt sustains this reality: That interest derives from many factors: Israel enjoys the strong and emotional support of a large segment of the American population. The Arabs look with disaffection the continued American military and technological support that helps assure conventional Israeli security. The Oslo Accords enabled Jordan to sign a peace treaty with Israel, led to negotiations between Israel and Syria, and emboldened Arab states in the Gulf and North Africa to forge closer ties with Israel. The deadlock in the peace process in the past year has halted further normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world and has intensified opposition to normalization by the general Arab public and its intellectual elites, putting strains even on the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. There is no dearth of scholars who attempt to explain the causes of political terrorism to legitimate grievances, related to US policy, that contribute to Arab hatred. A chorus of voices in the Arab world called on the US to redirect its foreign policy in the area. Acknowledging Arab negative perceptions of his country, US State Secretary Colin Powell announced an initiative aiming at improving the US poor image in Arab states by helping them build democracy and increase economic opportunities. However, Powell announced no change in fundamental policies cited by many Arabs as underlying their resentment such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, US pressure on Iraq, and other countries said to support terrorism [28] VI-The Occupation of Iraq: A Catalyst of Militant Islam? Many thought that Saddam will paint any attack on Iraq as a conflict pitting Islam against the West. Earlier this year, former American security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft argued that Saddam Hussein is seen as a brutal dictator oppressing his own people but not an immediate threat to the US or its neighbors. A nuclear-armed Iraq could menace its neighbors and the stability of world oil supplies but this could be met initially through resuming UN role and a decision to go to war should have the backing of a multinational force. There is a widespread sentiment that United Nation Security Council ought to be the principle arbiter of



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international security but an invasion without UN backing could transform Hussein into an Islamic martyr, Scowcroft warned. It is equally likely that after an interval of months or a year, Hussein overthrow would set off an explosion of radicalism and terrorism that would resound for decades to come [29]. Complicating matters the fact that justification for the assault on Iraq is not as clear as it was in At present, the stated aim was to destroy weapons of mass destruction but no evidence of them was ever found. As such, many in the Arab world are suspicious about Washington real motives. As soon as the US troops entered Baghdad, Kent deplored the US plan to impose an Interim authority under the ultimate command of general Tommy Franks, led by a retired general Jay Garner who believes the US can project its power into the region by way of the Israeli state and military. Certainly they will resist, they will defend, and this US policy will end with tragedy throughout the Middle East. The overwhelming majority endorsed retaliation attacks against US troops to force their retreat from Iraqi territories [32]. US occupation of Iraq and plans to instigate peace in the region appear to be dangerous. Islamists are calling for suicide attacks, and radicals of every stripe are competing to hijack the anger engendered by this war. In Beirut, Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fad Allah told Newsweek This war has united the Islamic world from border to border against the United States if more massacres take place and if more occupation is seen, I fear that we will witness a wave of terrorism that no one will be able to control [33]. The US needs to learn from the past. From Beirut in to the events of September 11 and their aftermath, the images of American casualties serve as a reminder for what the US is about to undertake. Conclusion and Implications Western fear of militant Islam is not new. Albert Hourani noticed the absence of militant tendencies in Islam: Two strands of thought The media has bombarded us with generalizations that the Western-led U. Treating Muslims as enemies in a new cold war would not promote such a role [37]. The cycle of religiously inspired violence has punctuated the lives of Middle Easterners for more than three decades. It eventually spilled into Western Europe before hitting the U. Bringing peace, stability and order to the Middle East is long due. If the problems of the region are not acted upon immediately, they may soon slip past the point of resolution. Since September 11 many writers have been imploring the U. However, even then anti-Americanism would not abate [39]. A second bomb went off near the US consulate in Sanur, near Kuta. The Bali attacks were believed to be part of a pattern that included attacks a week before which killed a US marine in Kuwait and another attack on a French oil tanker. During March , explosive attacks on American food outlets wounded several people in Lebanon and Egypt and the killing of an American nurse working as a missionary in South Lebanon. To date, Americans living in Beirut continue to receive several messages of warning from extremist Lebanese Islamic groups and some have fled the country after a terrorist network of Islamist militants was arrested and blamed for the crimes. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Press*, , p. Marine barracks in Beirut in Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of world order*.

### 5: A Victory for Whom? Lessons from the and Lebanon Wars | Small Wars Journal

*For El-Khazen, however, neither was the case. Lebanon had survived earlier crises, and socioeconomic differences among the different religious communities were diminishing. In fact, he argues, the Arab-Israeli conflict destroyed the state.*

### 6: Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: A Recipe for Conflict

*Root Causes of Terrorism? A Case Study of the Tamil Insurgency and the LTTE D.R. Kaarthikeyan Patterns of State Failure: The Case of Lebanon Farid el.*

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*Hippocrates, Volume IV French grammar practice with answers Militarist peace in South America Postcommunist Cuba poscomunista Report of Wenamun Frances Cann Vaughan Funding the future List of social skills Listening chart 23 : Debussy, Clouds Pushing boundaries : sports and recreation High response surveys (Research report LERN, Learning Resources Network) Local and national poets of America Farther considerationson the present state of affairs, at home and abroad Orchard cover-crops I m not afraid of anything sheet music Slim in 6 weight loss eating plan The Blacksmiths (Colonial Craftsmen, Set 3) The three lives of Helen Keller Credit and debt in medieval England, c. 1180-c. 1350 Committee on Appropriations revised allocation to subcommittees of budget totals from the concurrent reso lit jam question papers physics Part IV: The great conversion Nudes of the 20s and 30s School in the community. Tin from clay: getting the metal look Larry Nelson Anthropology of the Syrian Christians Chemical industries information sources Ument management open source Itl Integrated Total Language Autumn leaves are falling Features of a project 19. The second date The widows trial Recent work/Figures. Books on data science The collected works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Goldstein physics book End of the Soviet empire Footsteps on snow. The Challenges of Labour*