

1: Utilitarianism, Act and Rule | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Perspective of the Acting Person introduces readers to one of the most important and provocative thinkers in contemporary moral philosophy. In this collection of essays Martin Rhonheimer examines the central themes of natural law, moral action, and virtue emphasized by John Paul II's encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*.

Keep the video in mind as you read the following: The underlying perspectives and principles that helped make it possible for human beings to commit the horrible wrongdoing evil seen in the video were taught with state sponsored propaganda and force to a generation of German youth. These Nazi teachings were not just meant to last a lifetime, but years worth of lifetimes. Above, we wrote that Socrates believed the most terribly harmed of all human beings was the tyrant who was able to commit great wrongdoing for many years without being held accountable to justice. Socrates believed that doing wrong was a much worse fate than suffering wrong. This leads me to say something that, on the surface, seems to strain common sense to the point of offense. That something is this: In the Nazi Shoah, the most terribly harmed people were the ones who committed the most wrongdoing. If it is true that doing wrong is more harmful than suffering wrong, then the Nazis were their own greatest victims. They harmed themselves in ways worse than the harm that fell upon those victims who suffered without doing wrong. The scope and intensity of Nazi crimes gives us pause with regard to allowing this thought. Think of it this way, would you rather be killed by Nazis in a concentration camp or be a Nazi running a concentration camp? Would you rather suffer greatly because of the lack of justice and virtue in the human character of other people or would you rather cause people to suffer greatly because of your own lack of justice and virtue? Which is worse, to do wrong or to suffer wrong? Doing Wrong or Suffering Wrong: Which is the greater harm to the goodness, integrity, and value of your life? If you have decided that you believe that doing wrong is more harmful to your well being than suffering wrong, then we ask you to consider if this is a consistent principle that should govern all of our choices at all times. It is at the point of considering the possibility of exceptions to the principle that doing wrong is more harmful than suffering wrong, and in the throes of suffering we all have a strong and persistent instinct to consider this possibility, that people enter into their own personal calculus of measuring the results of wrongdoing compared to the intensity of their own suffering. It is in these calculations of personal intuition that humanity often succumbs to the fear of suffering and to the lack of understanding regarding the nature of our own well being. In these calculations, we make choices, commit our energies to fulfill our choices, and in our willful choosing give birth to all the good and evil that flows from the heart of humanity. In these calculations, it is easy to mistake what is right for what is easy. I think most readers, with regard to the example of Nazi wrongdoing, would agree that doing wrong is a worse fate than suffering wrong. When the measure of the negative results of wrongdoing are extreme, the choice is clearer. Not many people would say, "Sure, I will be a mass murdering Nazi if it is convenient for me in the moment. However, it is not in the extremes that human evil is propagated, no matter how much the bizarrely vicious results of such extremes may lead us to believe otherwise. It is not in the extremes that we find our greatest moral difficulty. It is in the smaller dimensions of wrongdoing that we most often lose our way. It is in regularly losing our way in the small things that we find ourselves unprepared to handle the extremes of life. It is much easier to believe that a small wrong, which spares us from great suffering is justifiable. When subtlety challenges us, our personal intuition about our own well being will be prone to translate possible wrongs into sure rights. Those who are absolutely sure they are right stop questioning the possibility that they may be wrong. In ceasing to question, we cease to be capable of being moral. For, in the cessation of thoughtful questioning, ethical thinking is murdered with the result that moral action stops being a thoughtful choice and is transformed into a matter of blind repetition. In such blindness the movement from the small wrongdoings of daily life to the extremes of human evil is a fast and compelling one. One change in circumstance, one additional danger, and the daily exercise of committing the smaller wrongdoings, which are the fruit of our ignorance, will be amplified according to the nature of our habits. Small wrongdoings that inconvenience are quickly transformed into actions with life devastating consequences. When preexisting bad habits are the ground upon which we first meet the extremes of life,

disrespect can become murder in the blink of an eye. This law describes a comparison used for the purpose of argument that is usually seen as a negative weakness in discussion. If a conversation with enough participants goes on long enough, and there is sufficient controversy, the law seems to hold. Inevitably somebody eventually compares someone or something to Nazism or to Hitler. In a public discourse with differing perspectives, resorting to such comparisons is seen as a failure to uphold the necessary standards of an intelligent conversation. Instead of needing many people to manifest, it requires just one. Instead of the idea that, given enough time a Nazi comparison will manifest, its principle is to willfully manifest the comparison in the short term. Instead of the collapse of reasoned examination being a requirement for most instances of manifestation, the inverse of the law requires that reasoned examination be alive and well. We can and should compare ourselves to the Nazis in order to think about the nature of human evil as it has life in our own hearts. All human beings have more in common with one another by virtue of the fact that we are all human beings than we have differences between us. There is no person who is completely devoid of ignorance or the wrongdoing that rises from ignorance. Furthermore, there is no person who can even precisely define right behavior down to the smallest detail for all circumstances. In this deficit of expressed behavior and knowledge, we must regularly think on our feet. Socrates believed that we must persistently set our hearts to the task of questioning the nature of human justice and virtue as a matter of daily practice. This habit should include the consideration of even our smallest behaviors. In the practice of this habit, we become skillful at thinking on our feet in real time. In this daily practice, questioning ourselves becomes a matter of life affirming necessity. In this necessity of living ethical practice, we share a common fate with the Nazis. That fate is the common human dilemma that comes from our common human character. In our ignorance we all make mistakes and embrace wrongdoing, thinking it will be good for us. Under the influence of fear, we all circumvent and abridge our ethical thinking. Perhaps the idea that you have something morally or ethically in common with the Nazis is revolting. Does it make sense to compare our tiny wrongdoings with the horrors of Nazi extremes? We ask you to consider what was discussed above, that "The full identity of human evil is already manifest in the smallest of events, because the smallest of discourtesies find their origin in the same grounding of ignorance and fear as the largest of holocausts. The motivation for our smallest wrongdoing is not to become a monster. The motivation is to benefit ourselves, to protect ourselves. We aspire not to be the devil, but merely to survive and thrive. We desire what we believe will be, in the light of our own idiosyncratic personal calculus, good for us. We commit the smaller wrongdoings and all wrongdoing according to Socrates because we are motivated by our own instinctual aspiration to virtue, which is misguided by our ignorance. With regard to motivation and goals, Hitler did not begin his rise to power because he gave speeches about burning millions of people in gas ovens, which were responded to by a universal cry of "Heil Hitler! He spoke of creating great good. Hitler talked passionately in service to the ideal of how they could make Germany great again. When Hitler expressed his belief that he alone could bring Germany to greatness, he saw himself as a great good and not as a great evil. They were an expression of the natural human aspiration to live well. Like all human beings, Hitler, and the Germans who followed him, were required by their instinctual human character to seek to better themselves. Not all of his talk fit the stereotype of a madman raving about war and genocide. It would have been impossible to rally the German people with horrifically destructive talk. Even Hitler had to appeal to the human instinct to seek virtue. For example, below is a video with subtitles where Hitler speaks like a combination of Bernie Sanders and Jesus: In spite of the non-objectionable focus in the video above, the correct methods required for transforming nice sounding ideas into living truths requires real knowledge about what is good, just and virtuous in human life. It requires that such knowledge affect our actions. With regard to method, the knowledge that is gained through the reasoned examination of ideas was absent. Employing the standard methods of the demagogue, Hitler scapegoated and alienated the Jews, worked to inflame the passions of the German people, and met those who disagreed with him with dismissal and violence instead of intelligent questions. The surety of approved knowledge became more important than the critical self examination of individuals and the state. Easy lies were more important than difficult truths. Winning was more important than the intelligent discussion of issues. Consensus was created through passion and force rather than the reasoned examination of ideas. The Nazis failed tragically

not because they were inhuman monsters. They failed because they were ordinary human beings following ordinary human instincts in the lack of adequate knowledge. Confidence in our ignorance is not a virtue, and acting on the behalf of such confidence is not righteousness. Acting out with blind vigor on behalf of false confidence is the highway to hell. If we are human, we have a great deal in common with the Nazis. This comparison is not to measure wrong for wrong according to the scope of results. It is the recognition that we share common motivations with the Nazis that lead to common failures, because our small wrongdoings have the same fundamental nature as large wrongdoings. If we are not careful, we can find that a lack of daily thoughtfulness about our small wrongdoing will, if life pushes us in a provocative manner, allow us to commit greater evils than we previously thought possible. The greatest of human evil has small beginnings. Be mindful each day of your capacity for wrongdoing and for good. The most terrifying thing about contemplating the Nazis is not that they were some kind of inhuman monsters. The most terrifying thing is that they were just like us. They were ordinary human beings filled with the amazing human potential for virtue and beauty, and who were also capable of behaving like monsters. We all have this capacity. If we are human beings, remaining mindful about even the smallest wrongdoing in our attempts to live well is more important than many imagine, because the nature of human evil is the same in both small and large wrongdoing according to the ignorance and fear within the heart of the wrongdoer. The character of both small and large wrongdoing, as a fruit of ignorance and fear, is identical.

2: What is Dramatic Point of View? - Ingrid Sundberg

In the Western tradition, freedom and the human person have been at the center of philosophical, theological, moral, and political debates since the origins of this tradition. Although contemporary discourse betrays the multiplicity of these roots, the necessary historical perspective.

First-person narrative With the first-person point of view, a story is revealed through a narrator who is also explicitly a character within his or her own story. In a first person narrative, the narrator can create a close relationship between the reader and the writer. Frequently, the narrator is the protagonist, whose inner thoughts are expressed to the audience, even if not to any of the other characters. A conscious narrator, as a human participant of past events, is an incomplete witness by definition, unable to fully see and comprehend events in their entirety as they unfurl, not necessarily objective in their inner thoughts or sharing them fully, and furthermore may be pursuing some hidden agenda. Forms include temporary first-person narration as a story within a story, wherein a narrator or character observing the telling of a story by another is reproduced in full, temporarily and without interruption shifting narration to the speaker. The first-person narrator can also be the focal character.

Second-person The second-person point of view is a point of view where the audience is made a character. This is done with the use of the pronouns "you", "your", and "yours. Stories and novels in second person are comparatively rare. But here you are, and you cannot say that the terrain is entirely unfamiliar, although the details are fuzzy. This makes it clear that the narrator is an unspecified entity or uninvolved person who conveys the story and is not a character of any kind within the story, or at least is not referred to as such. It thus allows a story to be told without detailing any information about the teller narrator of the story. Instead, a third-person narrator is often simply some disembodied "commentary" or "voice", rather than a fully developed character.

Alternating person While the tendency for novels or other narrative works is to adopt a single point of view throughout the entire novel, some authors have experimented with other points of view that, for example, alternate between different narrators who are all first-person, or alternate between a first- and a third-person narrative perspective. The ten books of the Pendragon adventure series, by D. MacHale, switch back and forth between a first-person perspective handwritten journal entries of the main character along his journey and the disembodied third-person perspective of his friends back home. Often, a narrator using the first person will try to be more objective by also employing the third person for important action scenes, especially those in which they are not directly involved or in scenes where they are not present to have viewed the events in firsthand. This novel alternates between an art student named Clare, and a librarian named Henry. He is then put in emotional parts from his past and future, going back and forth in time. It alternates between both boys telling their part of the story, how they meet and how their lives then come together. They then form a group, and continue to meet up. Often, interior monologues and inner desires or motivations, as well as pieces of incomplete thoughts, are expressed to the audience but not necessarily to other characters. Irish writer James Joyce exemplifies this style in his novel Ulysses.

Character voice One of the most common narrative voices, used especially with first- and third-person viewpoints, is the character voice, in which a conscious "person" in most cases, a living human being is presented as the narrator; this character is called a viewpoint character. In this situation, the narrator is no longer an unspecified entity; rather, the narrator is a more relatable, realistic character who may or may not be involved in the actions of the story and who may or may not take a biased approach in the storytelling. If the character is directly involved in the plot, this narrator is also called the viewpoint character. The viewpoint character is not necessarily the focal character.

Unreliable narrator The unreliable narrative voice involves the use of an untrustworthy narrator. This mode may be employed to give the audience a deliberate sense of disbelief in the story or a level of suspicion or mystery as to what information is meant to be true and what is meant to be false.

Epistolary novel The epistolary narrative voice uses a usually fictional series of letters and other documents to convey the plot of the story. Although epistolary works can be considered multiple-person narratives, they also can be classified separately, as they arguably have no narrator at all—just an author who has gathered the documents together in one place. *Les Liaisons dangereuses*

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Dangerous Liaisons , by Pierre Choderlos de Laclos , is again made up of the correspondence between the main characters, most notably the Marquise de Merteuil and the Vicomte de Valmont.

3: The Perspective Of The Acting Person | Download eBook PDF/EPUB

The Perspective of the Acting Person introduces readers to one of the most important and provocative thinkers in contemporary moral philosophy.

Preliminaries Aristotle wrote two ethical treatises: In any case, these two works cover more or less the same ground: Both treatises examine the conditions in which praise or blame are appropriate, and the nature of pleasure and friendship; near the end of each work, we find a brief discussion of the proper relationship between human beings and the divine. Though the general point of view expressed in each work is the same, there are many subtle differences in organization and content as well. Clearly, one is a re-working of the other, and although no single piece of evidence shows conclusively what their order is, it is widely assumed that the Nicomachean Ethics is a later and improved version of the Eudemian Ethics. Not all of the Eudemian Ethics was revised: Perhaps the most telling indication of this ordering is that in several instances the Nicomachean Ethics develops a theme about which its Eudemian cousin is silent. The remainder of this article will therefore focus on this work. Page and line numbers shall henceforth refer to this treatise. It ranges over topics discussed more fully in the other two works and its point of view is similar to theirs. Why, being briefer, is it named the Magna Moralia? Because each of the two papyrus rolls into which it is divided is unusually long. Just as a big mouse can be a small animal, two big chapters can make a small book. A few authors in antiquity refer to a work with this name and attribute it to Aristotle, but it is not mentioned by several authorities, such as Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, whom we would expect to have known of it. No one had written ethical treatises before Aristotle. The Human Good and the Function Argument The principal idea with which Aristotle begins is that there are differences of opinion about what is best for human beings, and that to profit from ethical inquiry we must resolve this disagreement. He insists that ethics is not a theoretical discipline: In raising this question—“what is the good? He assumes that such a list can be compiled rather easily; most would agree, for example, that it is good to have friends, to experience pleasure, to be healthy, to be honored, and to have such virtues as courage at least to some degree. The difficult and controversial question arises when we ask whether certain of these goods are more desirable than others. To be eudaimon is therefore to be living in a way that is well-favored by a god. But Aristotle never calls attention to this etymology in his ethical writings, and it seems to have little influence on his thinking. No one tries to live well for the sake of some further goal; rather, being eudaimon is the highest end, and all subordinate goals—“health, wealth, and other such resources—“are sought because they promote well-being, not because they are what well-being consists in. But unless we can determine which good or goods happiness consists in, it is of little use to acknowledge that it is the highest end. One important component of this argument is expressed in terms of distinctions he makes in his psychological and biological works. The soul is analyzed into a connected series of capacities: The biological fact Aristotle makes use of is that human beings are the only species that has not only these lower capacities but a rational soul as well. The good of a human being must have something to do with being human; and what sets humanity off from other species, giving us the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using reason. If we use reason well, we live well as human beings; or, to be more precise, using reason well over the course of a full life is what happiness consists in. Doing anything well requires virtue or excellence, and therefore living well consists in activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence. No other writer or thinker had said precisely what he says about what it is to live well. But at the same time his view is not too distant from a common idea. As he himself points out, one traditional conception of happiness identifies it with virtue—“1. He says, not that happiness is virtue, but that it is virtuous activity. Living well consists in doing something, not just being in a certain state or condition. It consists in those lifelong activities that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul. At the same time, Aristotle makes it clear that in order to be happy one must possess others goods as well—“such goods as friends, wealth, and power. Someone who is friendless, childless, powerless, weak, and ugly will simply not be able to find many opportunities for virtuous activity over a long period of time, and what little he can accomplish will not be of great merit. To some extent, then, living well requires good fortune; happenstance

can rob even the most excellent human beings of happiness. Nonetheless, Aristotle insists, the highest good, virtuous activity, is not something that comes to us by chance. Although we must be fortunate enough to have parents and fellow citizens who help us become virtuous, we ourselves share much of the responsibility for acquiring and exercising the virtues. Suppose we grant, at least for the sake of argument, that doing anything well, including living well, consists in exercising certain skills; and let us call these skills, whatever they turn out to be, virtues. Even so, that point does not by itself allow us to infer that such qualities as temperance, justice, courage, as they are normally understood, are virtues. They should be counted as virtues only if it can be shown that actualizing precisely these skills is what happiness consists in. What Aristotle owes us, then, is an account of these traditional qualities that explains why they must play a central role in any well-lived life. But perhaps Aristotle disagrees, and refuses to accept this argumentative burden. In one of several important methodological remarks he makes near the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he says that in order to profit from the sort of study he is undertaking, one must already have been brought up in good habits (1095a6). The audience he is addressing, in other words, consists of people who are already just, courageous, and generous; or, at any rate, they are well on their way to possessing these virtues. Why such a restricted audience? Why does he not address those who have serious doubts about the value of these traditional qualities, and who therefore have not yet decided to cultivate and embrace them? Addressing the moral skeptic, after all, is the project Plato undertook in the *Republic*: He does not appear to be addressing someone who has genuine doubts about the value of justice or kindred qualities. Perhaps, then, he realizes how little can be accomplished, in the study of ethics, to provide it with a rational foundation. Perhaps he thinks that no reason can be given for being just, generous, and courageous. These are qualities one learns to love when one is a child, and having been properly habituated, one no longer looks for or needs a reason to exercise them. One can show, as a general point, that happiness consists in exercising some skills or other, but that the moral skills of a virtuous person are what one needs is not a proposition that can be established on the basis of argument. This is not the only way of reading the *Ethics*, however. For surely we cannot expect Aristotle to show what it is about the traditional virtues that makes them so worthwhile until he has fully discussed the nature of those virtues. He himself warns us that his initial statement of what happiness is should be treated as a rough outline whose details are to be filled in later (1095a20). His intention in Book I of the *Ethics* is to indicate in a general way why the virtues are important; why particular virtues—courage, justice, and the like—are components of happiness is something we should be able to better understand only at a later point. His point, rather, may be that in ethics, as in any other study, we cannot make progress towards understanding why things are as they are unless we begin with certain assumptions about what is the case. Neither theoretical nor practical inquiry starts from scratch. Someone who has made no observations of astronomical or biological phenomena is not yet equipped with sufficient data to develop an understanding of these sciences. The parallel point in ethics is that to make progress in this sphere we must already have come to enjoy doing what is just, courageous, generous and the like. We must experience these activities not as burdensome constraints, but as noble, worthwhile, and enjoyable in themselves. Then, when we engage in ethical inquiry, we can ask what it is about these activities that makes them worthwhile. We can also compare these goods with other things that are desirable in themselves—pleasure, friendship, honor, and so on—and ask whether any of them is more desirable than the others. We approach ethical theory with a disorganized bundle of likes and dislikes based on habit and experience; such disorder is an inevitable feature of childhood. But what is not inevitable is that our early experience will be rich enough to provide an adequate basis for worthwhile ethical reflection; that is why we need to have been brought up well. Yet such an upbringing can take us only so far. We seek a deeper understanding of the objects of our childhood enthusiasms, and we must systematize our goals so that as adults we have a coherent plan of life. We need to engage in ethical theory, and to reason well in this field, if we are to move beyond the low-grade form of virtue we acquired as children. His project is to make ethics an autonomous field, and to show why a full understanding of what is good does not require expertise in any other field. There is another contrast with Plato that should be emphasized: In Book II of the *Republic*, we are told that the best type of good is one that is desirable both in itself and for the sake of its results (357a). Plato argues that justice should be placed in this category, but since it is generally agreed that it is desirable for its

consequences, he devotes most of his time to establishing his more controversial point—that justice is to be sought for its own sake. By contrast, Aristotle assumes that if A is desirable for the sake of B, then B is better than A¹⁴; therefore, the highest kind of good must be one that is not desirable for the sake of anything else. To show that A deserves to be our ultimate end, one must show that all other goods are best thought of as instruments that promote A in some way or other. He needs to discuss honor, wealth, pleasure, and friendship in order to show how these goods, properly understood, can be seen as resources that serve the higher goal of virtuous activity. He vindicates the centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that in the normal course of things a virtuous person will not live a life devoid of friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the like. Virtuous activity makes a life happy not by guaranteeing happiness in all circumstances, but by serving as the goal for the sake of which lesser goods are to be pursued. That is why he stresses that in this sort of study one must be satisfied with conclusions that hold only for the most part¹¹. Poverty, isolation, and dishonor are normally impediments to the exercise of virtue and therefore to happiness, although there may be special circumstances in which they are not. The possibility of exceptions does not undermine the point that, as a rule, to live well is to have sufficient resources for the pursuit of virtue over the course of a lifetime. Virtues and Deficiencies, Contenance and Incontinence Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue¹. Intellectual virtues are in turn divided into two sorts: He organizes his material by first studying ethical virtue in general, then moving to a discussion of particular ethical virtues temperance, courage, and so on, and finally completing his survey by considering the intellectual virtues practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, etc. All free males are born with the potential to become ethically virtuous and practically wise, but to achieve these goals they must go through two stages: This does not mean that first we fully acquire the ethical virtues, and then, at a later stage, add on practical wisdom. Ethical virtue is fully developed only when it is combined with practical wisdom¹⁴. A low-grade form of ethical virtue emerges in us during childhood as we are repeatedly placed in situations that call for appropriate actions and emotions; but as we rely less on others and become capable of doing more of our own thinking, we learn to develop a larger picture of human life, our deliberative skills improve, and our emotional responses are perfected. Like anyone who has developed a skill in performing a complex and difficult activity, the virtuous person takes pleasure in exercising his intellectual skills. Furthermore, when he has decided what to do, he does not have to contend with internal pressures to act otherwise. He does not long to do something that he regards as shameful; and he is not greatly distressed at having to give up a pleasure that he realizes he should forego. Aristotle places those who suffer from such internal disorders into one of three categories: 1 Some agents, having reached a decision about what to do on a particular occasion, experience some counter-pressure brought on by an appetite for pleasure, or anger, or some other emotion; and this countervailing influence is not completely under the control of reason. Such people are not virtuous, although they generally do what a virtuous person does. 2 others are less successful than the average person in resisting these counter-pressures. The explanation of *akrasia* is a topic to which we will return in section 7.

4: A Socratic Perspective on the Nature of Human Evil

The Perspective of the Acting Person Rhonheimer, Martin, Murphy Jr., William F., Murphy, William F Published by The Catholic University of America Press.

Collections of Essays 1. Overall View Utilitarianism is a philosophical view or theory about how we should evaluate a wide range of things that involve choices that people face. Among the things that can be evaluated are actions, laws, policies, character traits, and moral codes. Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism because it rests on the idea that it is the consequences or results of actions, laws, policies, etc. In general, whatever is being evaluated, we ought to choose the one that will produce the best overall results. Utilitarianism appears to be a simple theory because it consists of only one evaluative principle: Do what produces the best consequences. In fact, however, the theory is complex because we cannot understand that single principle unless we know at least three things: Jeremy Bentham answered this question by adopting the view called hedonism. According to hedonism, the only thing that is good in itself is pleasure or happiness. Likewise, on the negative side, a lack of food, friends, or freedom is instrumentally bad because it produces pain, suffering, and unhappiness; but pain, suffering and unhappiness are intrinsically bad, i. Many thinkers have rejected hedonism because pleasure and pain are sensations that we feel, claiming that many important goods are not types of feelings. Being healthy or honest or having knowledge, for example, are thought by some people to be intrinsic goods that are not types of feelings. Other thinkers see desires or preferences as the basis of value; whatever a person desires is valuable to that person. If desires conflict, then the things most strongly preferred are identified as good. This debate will not be further discussed in this article. Utilitarian reasoning can be used for many different purposes. It can be used both for moral reasoning and for any type of rational decision-making. In addition to applying in different contexts, it can also be used for deliberations about the interests of different persons and groups. When individuals are deciding what to do for themselves alone, they consider only their own utility. For example, if you are choosing ice cream for yourself, the utilitarian view is that you should choose the flavor that will give you the most pleasure. If you enjoy chocolate but hate vanilla, you should choose chocolate for the pleasure it will bring and avoid vanilla because it will bring displeasure. In addition, if you enjoy both chocolate and strawberry, you should predict which flavor will bring you more pleasure and choose whichever one will do that. Because Bentham and other utilitarians were interested in political groups and public policies, they often focused on discovering which actions and policies would maximize the well-being of the relevant group. Their method for determining the well-being of a group involved adding up the benefits and losses that members of the group would experience as a result of adopting one action or policy. The well-being of the group is simply the sum total of the interests of the all of its members. To illustrate this method, suppose that you are buying ice cream for a party that ten people will attend. Your only flavor options are chocolate and vanilla, and some of the people attending like chocolate while others like vanilla. As a utilitarian, you should choose the flavor that will result in the most pleasure for the group as a whole. If seven like chocolate and three like vanilla and if all of them get the same amount of pleasure from the flavor they like, then you should choose chocolate. Similarly, if a government is choosing a policy, it should give equal consideration to the well-being of all members of the society. Bentham is often cited as the source of a famous utilitarian axiom: Actual Consequences or Foreseeable Consequences? Utilitarians disagree about whether judgments of right and wrong should be based on the actual consequences of actions or their foreseeable consequences. This issue arises when the actual effects of actions differ from what we expected. Smart 49 explains this difference by imagining the action of a person who, in ,saves someone from drowning. Had Hitler drowned, millions of other people might have been saved from suffering and death between and One reason for adopting foreseeable consequence utilitarianism is that it seems unfair to say that the rescuer acted wrongly because the rescuer could not foresee the future bad effects of saving the drowning person. In response, actual consequence utilitarians reply that there is a difference between evaluating an action and evaluating the person who did the action. They stress the difference between evaluating actions and evaluating the people who perform them. Foreseeable consequence utilitarians accept

the distinction between evaluating actions and evaluating the people who carry them out, but they see no reason to make the moral rightness or wrongness of actions depend on facts that might be unknowable. For them, what is right or wrong for a person to do depends on what is knowable by a person at a time. For this reason, they claim that the person who rescued Hitler did the right thing, even though the actual consequences were unfortunate. Another way to describe the actual vs. One the actual consequence view says that to act rightly is to do whatever produces the best consequences. In the case of the rescuer, the expected positive utility is high because the probability that saving a drowning person will lead to the deaths of millions of other people is extremely low, and thus can be ignored in deliberations about whether to save the drowning person. What this shows is that actual consequence and foreseeable consequence utilitarians have different views about the nature of utilitarian theory. Foreseeable consequence utilitarians understand the theory as a decision-making procedure while actual consequence utilitarians understand it as a criterion of right and wrong. Foreseeable consequence utilitarians claim that the action with the highest expected utility is both the best thing to do based on current evidence and the right action. Actual consequence utilitarians might agree that the option with the highest expected utility is the best thing to do but they claim that it could still turn out to be the wrong action. This would occur if unforeseen bad consequences reveal that the option chosen did not have the best results and thus was the wrong thing to do. How Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism Differ Both act utilitarians and rule utilitarians agree that our overall aim in evaluating actions should be to create the best results possible, but they differ about how to do that. Act utilitarians believe that whenever we are deciding what to do, we should perform the action that will create the greatest net utility. In their view, the principle of utilityâ€”do whatever will produce the best overall resultsâ€”should be applied on a case by case basis. The right action in any situation is the one that yields more utility i. Rule utilitarians adopt a two part view that stresses the importance of moral rules. According to rule utilitarians, a a specific action is morally justified if it conforms to a justified moral rule; and b a moral rule is justified if its inclusion into our moral code would create more utility than other possible rules or no rule at all. According to this perspective, we should judge the morality of individual actions by reference to general moral rules, and we should judge particular moral rules by seeing whether their acceptance into our moral code would produce more well-being than other possible rules. The key difference between act and rule utilitarianism is that act utilitarians apply the utilitarian principle directly to the evaluation of individual actions while rule utilitarians apply the utilitarian principle directly to the evaluation of rules and then evaluate individual actions by seeing if they obey or disobey those rules whose acceptance will produce the most utility. The contrast between act and rule utilitarianism, though previously noted by some philosophers, was not sharply drawn until the late s when Richard Brandt introduced this terminology. Because the contrast had not been sharply drawn, earlier utilitarians like Bentham and Mill sometimes apply the principle of utility to actions and sometimes apply it to the choice of rules for evaluating actions. This has led to scholarly debates about whether the classical utilitarians supported act utilitarians or rule utilitarians or some combination of these views. Pros and Cons Act utilitarianism is often seen as the most natural interpretation of the utilitarian ideal. If our aim is always to produce the best results, it seems plausible to think that in each case of deciding what is the right thing to do, we should consider the available options i. Arguments for Act Utilitarianism i. Why Act utilitarianism Maximizes Utility If every action that we carry out yields more utility than any other action available to us, then the total utility of all our actions will be the highest possible level of utility that we could bring about. In other words, we can maximize the overall utility that is within our power to bring about by maximizing the utility of each individual action that we perform. If we sometimes choose actions that produce less utility than is possible, the total utility of our actions will be less than the amount of goodness that we could have produced. For that reason, act utilitarians argue, we should apply the utilitarian principle to individual acts and not to classes of similar actions. Why Act Utilitarianism is Better than Traditional, Rule-based Moralities Traditional moral codes often consist of sets of rules regarding types of actions. The Ten Commandments, for example, focus on types of actions, telling us not to kill, steal, bear false witness, commit adultery, or covet the things that belong to others. Although the Biblical sources permit exceptions to these rules such as killing in self-defense and punishing people for their sins , the form of the commandments is absolute. The

philosopher Immanuel Kant is famous for the view that lying is always wrong, even in cases where one might save a life by lying. Act utilitarians reject rigid rule-based moralities that identify whole classes of actions as right or wrong. They argue that it is a mistake to treat whole classes of actions as right or wrong because the effects of actions differ when they are done in different contexts and morality must focus on the likely effects of individual actions. It is these effects that determine whether they are right or wrong in specific cases. They see no reason to obey a rule when more well-being can be achieved by violating it. Why Act Utilitarianism Makes Moral Judgments Objectively True One advantage of act utilitarianism is that it shows how moral questions can have objectively true answers. Act utilitarianism, however, provides a method for showing which moral beliefs are true and which are false. Once we embrace the act utilitarian perspective, then every decision about how we should act will depend on the actual or foreseeable consequences of the available options. Although some people doubt that we can measure amounts of well-being, we in fact do this all the time. If two people are suffering and we have enough medication for only one, we can often tell that one person is experiencing mild discomfort while the other is in severe pain. Based on this judgment, we will be confident that we can do more good by giving the medication to the person suffering extreme pain. Although this case is very simple, it shows that we can have objectively true answers to questions about what actions are morally right or wrong. Using this information, Bentham thought, would allow for making correct judgments both in individual cases and in choices about government actions and policies. Arguments against Act Utilitarianism i. Critics say that it permits various actions that everyone knows are morally wrong. The following cases are among the commonly cited examples: If a judge can prevent riots that will cause many deaths only by convicting an innocent person of a crime and imposing a severe punishment on that person, act utilitarianism implies that the judge should convict and punish the innocent person. If a person makes a promise but breaking the promise will allow that person to perform an action that creates just slightly more well-being than keeping the promise will, then act utilitarianism implies that the promise should be broken. See Ross The general form of each of these arguments is the same. In each case, act utilitarianism implies that a certain act is morally permissible or required. Yet, each of the judgments that flow from act utilitarianism conflicts with widespread, deeply held moral beliefs. Because act utilitarianism approves of actions that most people see as obviously morally wrong, we can know that it is a false moral theory. If, in cases like the ones described above, judges, doctors, and promise-makers are committed to doing whatever maximizes well-being, then no one will be able to trust that judges will act according to the law, that doctors will not use the organs of one patient to benefit others, and that promise-makers will keep their promises. More generally, if everyone believed that morality permitted lying, promise-breaking, cheating, and violating the law whenever doing so led to good results, then no one could trust other people to obey these rules. As a result, in an act utilitarian society, we could not believe what others say, could not rely on them to keep promises, and in general could not count on people to act in accord with important moral rules. An implication of this commitment is that whenever people want to buy something for themselves or for a friend or family member, they must first determine whether they could create more well-being by donating their money to help unknown strangers who are seriously ill or impoverished. If more good can be done by helping strangers than by purchasing things for oneself or people one personally cares about, then act utilitarianism requires us to use the money to help strangers in need.

5: Aristotle's Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late s. Neither of them, at that time, paid attention to a number of topics that had always figured in the virtue ethics tradition—virtues and vices, motives and moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of what sorts of persons we should be and how we should live. Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. It has also generated virtue ethical readings of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle, such as Martineau, Hume and Nietzsche, and thereby different forms of virtue ethics have developed Slote ; Swanton , a. See Annas for a short, clear, and authoritative account of all three. We discuss the first two in the remainder of this section. Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplors dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed through deception rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased as appropriate when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on. Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal Athanassoulis Most people who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots—little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise. If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts—say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help—then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character—the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others—then it is not. The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular putative examples of virtues to give these truisms up. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to

be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion? The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. Aristotle makes a number of specific remarks about phronesis that are the subject of much scholarly debate, but the related modern concept is best understood by thinking of what the virtuous morally mature adult has that nice children, including nice adolescents, lack. Both the virtuous adult and the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends. A virtuous adult is not, of course, infallible and may also, on occasion, fail to do what she intended to do through lack of knowledge, but only on those occasions on which the lack of knowledge is not culpable. So, for example, children and adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken. Such ignorance in small children is rarely, if ever culpable. Adults, on the other hand, are culpable if they mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint. They are also culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom. One is that it characteristically comes only with experience of life. Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced. It is part of practical wisdom to be wise about human beings and human life. It should go without saying that the virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not? The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with their under-developed virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice. These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well.

Forms of Virtue Ethics While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue ethics, namely, a eudaimonist virtue ethics, b agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, c target-centered virtue ethics, and d Platonistic virtue ethics. A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy. If I think I am happy then I am—it is not something I can be wrong about barring advanced cases of self-deception. Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing but be wrong. Most versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. This supreme good is not conceived of as an independently defined state made up of, say, a list of non-moral goods that does not include virtuous activity which exercise of the virtues might be thought to promote. It is, within virtue ethics, already conceived of as something of which virtuous activity is at least partially constitutive. Kraut Thereby virtue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of wealth is not eudaimon, but a wasted life. But although all standard versions of virtue ethics

insist on that conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia, further links are matters of dispute and generate different versions. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient—what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. For Plato and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. According to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and the virtues are what enable a human being to be eudaimon because the virtues just are those character traits that benefit their possessor in that way, barring bad luck. So there is a link between eudaimonia and what confers virtue status on a character trait. For a discussion of the differences between eudaimonists see Baril. It is unclear how many other forms of normativity must be explained in terms of the qualities of agents in order for a theory to count as agent-based. The two best-known agent-based theorists, Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski, trace a wide range of normative qualities back to the qualities of agents. Similarly, he explains the goodness of an action, the value of eudaimonia, the justice of a law or social institution, and the normativity of practical rationality in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents. Zagzebski likewise defines right and wrong actions by reference to the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious agents. Her definitions of duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs are similarly grounded in the motivational and dispositional states of exemplary agents. However, there could also be less ambitious agent-based approaches to virtue ethics see Slote. At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this is not yet a sufficient condition for counting as an agent-based approach, since the same condition will be met by every virtue ethical account. For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else such as eudaimonia or states of affairs which is taken to be more fundamental. Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions. As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them in at least some respects and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars. This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations. Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking. Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue. However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking or disliking to exemplars. The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton, by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve. A complete account of virtue will map out 1 its field, 2 its mode of responsiveness, 3 its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4 its target. Different virtues are concerned with different fields. Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. Courage aims to control fear and handle

danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them. A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way. Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it. This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose.

6: 5 Ways to Write in Third Person - wikiHow

The Perspective of the Acting Person introduces readers to one of the most important and provocative thinkers in contemporary moral philosophy. eISBN:

Existence precedes essence Sartre claimed that a central proposition of Existentialism is that existence precedes essence, which means that the most important consideration for individuals is that they are individuals— independently acting and responsible, conscious beings "existence" —rather than what labels, roles, stereotypes, definitions, or other preconceived categories the individuals fit "essence". The actual life of the individuals is what constitutes what could be called their "true essence" instead of there being an arbitrarily attributed essence others use to define them. Thus, human beings, through their own consciousness, create their own values and determine a meaning to their life. His form must be just as manifold as are the opposites that he holds together. The systematic eins, zwei, drei is an abstract form that also must inevitably run into trouble whenever it is to be applied to the concrete. To the same degree as the subjective thinker is concrete, to the same degree his form must also be concretely dialectical. But just as he himself is not a poet, not an ethicist, not a dialectician, so also his form is none of these directly. His form must first and last be related to existence, and in this regard he must have at his disposal the poetic, the ethical, the dialectical, the religious. Subordinate character, setting, etc. The setting is not the fairyland of the imagination, where poetry produces consummation, nor is the setting laid in England, and historical accuracy is not a concern. The setting is inwardness in existing as a human being; the concretion is the relation of the existence-categories to one another. Historical accuracy and historical actuality are breadth. Instead, the phrase should be taken to say that people are 1 defined only insofar as they act and 2 that they are responsible for their actions. For example, someone who acts cruelly towards other people is, by that act, defined as a cruel person. Furthermore, by this action of cruelty, such persons are themselves responsible for their new identity cruel persons. This is as opposed to their genes, or human nature, bearing the blame. As Sartre says in his lecture Existentialism is a Humanism: The more positive, therapeutic aspect of this is also implied: A person can choose to act in a different way, and to be a good person instead of a cruel person. In a set of letters, Heidegger implies that Sartre misunderstood him for his own purposes of subjectivism, and that he did not mean that actions take precedence over being so long as those actions were not reflected upon. This way of living, Heidegger called "average everydayness". Absurdism The notion of the Absurd contains the idea that there is no meaning in the world beyond what meaning we give it. This meaninglessness also encompasses the amorality or "unfairness" of the world. According to Albert Camus, the world or the human being is not in itself absurd. The concept only emerges through the juxtaposition of the two, where life becomes absurd due to the incompatibility between human beings and the world they inhabit. These are considered absurd since they issue from human freedom, undermining their foundation outside of themselves. The notion of the Absurd has been prominent in literature throughout history. It is in relation to the concept of the devastating awareness of meaninglessness that Albert Camus claimed that "there is only one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide" in his *The Myth of Sisyphus*. The possibility of having everything meaningful break down poses a threat of quietism, which is inherently against the existentialist philosophy. The ultimate hero of absurdism lives without meaning and faces suicide without succumbing to it. Facticity Facticity is a concept defined by Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* as the in-itself, which delineates for humans the modalities of being and not being. This can be more easily understood when considering facticity in relation to the temporal dimension of our past: As an example, consider two men, one of whom has no memory of his past and the other who remembers everything. They both have committed many crimes, but the first man, knowing nothing about this, leads a rather normal life while the second man, feeling trapped by his own past, continues a life of crime, blaming his own past for "trapping" him in this life. There is nothing essential about his committing crimes, but he ascribes this meaning to his past. Another aspect of facticity is that it entails angst, both in the sense that freedom "produces" angst when limited by facticity, and in the sense that the lack of the possibility of having facticity to "step in" for one to take responsibility for something one has done, also produces angst. Authenticity Many

noted existentialist writers consider the theme of authentic existence important. Authentic existence involves the idea that one has to "create oneself" and then live in accordance with this self. This can take many forms, from pretending choices are meaningless or random, through convincing oneself that some form of determinism is true, to a sort of "mimicry" where one acts as "one should". How "one should" act is often determined by an image one has, of how one such as oneself say, a bank manager, lion tamer, prostitute, etc. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre relates an example of a "waiter" in bad faith: *The Other and the Look*[edit] Main article: Other philosophy The Other when written with a capital "O" is a concept more properly belonging to phenomenology and its account of intersubjectivity. However, the concept has seen widespread use in existentialist writings, and the conclusions drawn from it differ slightly from the phenomenological accounts. The experience of the Other is the experience of another free subject who inhabits the same world as a person does. In its most basic form, it is this experience of the Other that constitutes intersubjectivity and objectivity. To clarify, when one experiences someone else, and this Other person experiences the world the same world that a person experiences – only from "over there" – the world itself is constituted as objective in that it is something that is "there" as identical for both of the subjects; a person experiences the other person as experiencing the same things. This is because the Look tends to objectify what it sees. Suddenly, he hears a creaking floorboard behind him, and he becomes aware of himself as seen by the Other. He is thus filled with shame for he perceives himself as he would perceive someone else doing what he was doing, as a Peeping Tom. Another characteristic feature of the Look is that no Other really needs to have been there: Angst and dread[edit] See also: Living educational theory "Existential angst", sometimes called existential dread, anxiety, or anguish, is a term that is common to many existentialist thinkers. It is generally held to be a negative feeling arising from the experience of human freedom and responsibility. The archetypical example is the experience one has when standing on a cliff where one not only fears falling off it, but also dreads the possibility of throwing oneself off. Angst, according to the modern existentialist, Adam Fong, is the sudden realization of a lack of meaning, often while one completes a task that initially seems to have intrinsic meaning. While in the case of fear, one can take definitive measures to remove the object of fear, in the case of angst, no such "constructive" measures are possible. There is nothing in people genetically, for instance that acts in their stead – that they can blame if something goes wrong. Therefore, not every choice is perceived as having dreadful possible consequences and, it can be claimed, human lives would be unbearable if every choice facilitated dread.

7: Virtue Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The perspective of the acting person: essays in the renewal of thomistic moral philosophy 3. by Martin Rhonheimer; William F Murphy; Catholic University of America.

8: Point of View - Examples and Definition of Point of View

Third Person Omniscient. The narrator actually inserts himself into the play several times to describe characters and tell us what we should think about them (such as when he tells us that Judge Hathorne is a bitter man).

9: The Perspective of the Acting Person – HFS Books

Dramatic Point-of-View is a specific style of writing in which the author chooses to only share the action of a scene and not the internal thoughts or emotions of a character. Some people refer to this as the "fly-on-the-wall" POV, where the narrator is a fly observing the events but not commenting upon them.

Koda tadashi manga eyes What you should know about eating disorders ch. 6. When students choose content Physics 212 lecture 20 Critics of modernity Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, 1775 The soul of an organ Deconstructing the reconstruction Differences between animal and plant cells The institutionalization of industrial relations in Australasia, Canada and the United Kingdom Essential oils uses book Queen Latifah becomes a star. Master Techniques in Cataract and Refractive Surgery Pioneering irrigation in Australia to 1920 Bibliography on the Relations of Literature and the Other Arts Practice book grade 4 macmillan mcgraw hill Americas first traitor Soccer drills for individual and team play Music for the people 1871-1895. At the Death or Burial of a Pope, 121 The coincidence of callie and kayden The emergence of homo CCENT: Cisco Certified Entry Networking Technician Study Guide Silhouette Sensational How to Investigate Your Friends Enemies Ignore the guy get the guy Golden peacock [by Gertrude Atherton. Grade 6 maths exam papers sinhala medium The trust in Liechtenstein law Killing many to save a few? : preliminary thoughts about avoiding collateral civilian damage by assassina Tohi Vagahau Niue: Niue Language Dictionary Articles 1 and 2 of the Code : anti-doping rule violations under the Code Conspiracy trial, 1865. Size-acceptance links and blogs A Mothers Guide to Raising Healthy Children-Naturally Introduction: mass immigration, past and present The Barry Diller Story To flash flip book Grandparents in charge Guarded by angels