## 1: Philosophy in Classical India: An Introduction and Analysis by Jonardon Ganeri

*Philosophy in Classical India: An Introduction and Analysis [Jonardon Ganeri] on www.enganchecubano.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. This original work focuses on the rational principles of Indian philosophical theory, rather than the mysticism more usually associated with it.*

Reasoning and Logic Humans reason: If this is done in thought, one performs an inference; and if this is done in speech, one makes an argument. Indeed, inference and argument are but two sides of the same coin: Logic, at least as traditionally conceived, seeks to distinguish good reasoning from bad. More particularly, it seeks to identify the general conditions under which what one concludes is true, having taken other things to be true. These conditions can be sought in the nature of things. One asks, then, under what conditions do certain facts require some other fact. This perspective on reasoning is an ontic perspective. Next, insofar as facts are grasped in thought, one can also ask under what conditions does knowledge of some facts permit knowledge of another fact. Such conditions, once identified, would distinguish good inferences from bad inferences. This perspective on reasoning is an epistemic one. A third perspective is a dialectic one. After all, insofar as facts have been stated, one can ask as well under what conditions does the acceptance by someone of some facts require him or her to accept some other fact. These conditions, once identified, would distinguish good arguments from bad arguments. Finally, since an argument is an expression of an inference, and to that extent, expressed in a language, it is natural to use the forms of linguistic expressions to identify forms of inferences and arguments and thereby to distinguish forms of good inferences and arguments from forms of bad inferences and arguments. This perspective is a linguistic one. The study of reasoning in India has been from the ontic, epistemic and dialectic perspective, and not from the linguistic perspective, the perspective best known to modern thinkers. Pre Classical Period The fact that humans reason is no guarantee that those who do reflect on which reasoning is good and which is bad. Clearly, the activity of reasoning, on the one hand, and the activity of reflecting on which reasoning is good and which is not, on the other, are distinct, though naturally they are intimately related. The exposition here, while reporting primarily on what is explicit, will also report on what is implicit. In looking at the origins of reasoning in India, it is natural to begin with the practices in which reasoning played a role and which, as a result, were likely candidates for reflection. The obvious starting points for such practices are all forms of rational inquiry. Rational inquiry comprises the search for reasons for publicly accepted facts, subject to public and rational scrutiny. This activity involves people both severally and collectively. It involves people severally insofar as people, individually, are the locus of inference. It involves people collectively insofar as arguments, the public manifestation of inferences, are sharpened by the scrutiny of others. Public debate is not the only form of public deliberations in pre-classical India. As reported by Solomon By the fifth century BCE, rational inquiry into a wide range of topics was under way, including agriculture, architecture, astronomy, grammar, law, logic, mathematics, medicine, phonology and statecraft. Nonetheless, scholars agree that incipient versions of the first extant texts on these topics were being formulated and early versions of them were redacted by the beginning of the Common Era. Early Classical Period The first five hundred years of the Common Era also saw the redaction of philosophical treatises in which proponents of diverse philosophical and religious traditions put forth systematic versions of their world view. These latter works bear witness, in a number of different ways, to the intense interest in argumentation during this period. This interest reveals itself in three different ways. First, authors made arguments which correspond to well-known forms of logical argument. Second, authors used or adduced logical principles of reasoning such as the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of excluded middle and the principle of double negation. Third, some authors isolated canonical forms of argument. Nor are such formulations rare. Moreover, because of the exclusivity of being eternal and being non-eternal, eternality and non-eternality must be excluded as two properties of the very same property-possessor. That is, they cannot occur together. Like Aristotle, classical Indian thinkers were aware of the possible limitation of the principle of excluded middle. But to some who have acquired a clear view of truth through very long practice and by whom the roots of the trees of obstruction have been unuprooted by only a little, it has been

taught that it is neither true nor untrue; in order to destroy the least obstruction, both have been denied, just as one denies both whiteness and blackness of the son of a barren woman. The treatment of each point comprises an exchange between a proponent and an opponent. The refutations, of course, turn on demonstrating the inconsistency of a set of propositions. Is the soul known truly and ultimately? Is the soul known truly and ultimately just like any ultimate fact? Acknowledge your refutation, If the soul is known truly and ultimately, then indeed, good sir, you should also say that the soul is known truly and ultimately just like any ultimate fact. What you say here is wrong: If the latter statement b cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement a should not be admitted. It is wrong to affirm the former statement a and to deny the latter b. If C is not D, then A is not B. It is wrong that A is B and C is not D. Indeed, this form is repeatedly instantiated throughout Book 1, Chapter 1. Clearly, the author takes for granted the following: The remaining texts are found in the Buddhist philosophical literature. No Sanskrit original of any of these survives, though Sanskrit fragments of the last have been collected by E. Finally, there is another work which is only in Chinese. It is of unknown author and date. Early polemical Buddhist texts are filled with arguments, many of them analogical arguments. Though, at this point, there was no accepted, canonical form for analogical arguments, nonetheless many either have one of the two forms set out below, or can be easily and faithfully put into one of them. Such arguments have two premises: The conclusion asserting that the second thing also has the second property. Arguments by analogy through similarity, then, have this form. The names for the statements have been added for ease of comparison. Argument by Analogy Through Similarity conclusion:

*In this series of episodes, co-authored with Jonardon Ganeri (Professor of Philosophy at NYU, Visiting Professor at King's College London and Professorial Research Associate at SOAS - and author of numerous books and articles on Indian philosophy), Peter considers the rich philosophical tradition of India. The podcasts cover the first thousand.*

Common Presuppositions of Classical Indian Schools Commonalities in the classical Indian approaches to knowledge and justification frame the arguments and refined positions of the major schools. Epistemic evaluation of memory, and indeed of all standing belief, is seen to depend upon the epistemic status of the occurrent cognition or awareness or awarenesses that formed the memory, i. It is error and falsity that are the deviations from the normal and natural. We would not so act if we had doubt, guided as we are by our knowledge. Belief, which cognition embeds, is tied to action, and action, in turn, blunts the force of skepticism, it is pointed out in several of the classical schools. Knowledge is cognition that has been produced in the right way. Cognitions are moments of consciousness, not species of belief, but we may say that cognitions form beliefs in forming dispositions and that veridical cognitions form true beliefs. A knowledge episode—to speak in the Indian manner—is a cognition generated in the right fashion. There are different theories of truth, but everyone sees knowledge as not only indicating the truth but arising from it. Knowledge episodes form non-occurrent knowledge it is assumed, we may say , and so an examination of what is crucial to the arising of a knowledge episode is crucial to the evaluations of epistemology. Knowledge cannot arise by accident. A lucky guess, though true or veridical, would not count as knowledge because it would not been generated in the right fashion, would not have the right pedigree or etiology. For no knowledge source ever generates a false belief. Thus there can be no wedge driven between cause and effect such that there could possibly be knowledge by accident. That is to say, no non-veridical cognition is knowledge-source-generated. A knowledge source is then not merely a reliable doxastic practice. Being merely reliable does not fit the bill. So, for example, perception and inference—more exotic candidate sources, too—are defended as veritable knowledge-generators by the observation that people commonly regard them in that way. Note that even in English we do commonly recognize perception and some of the others as certificational. Habits of speech are reinforced by success in action, classical theorists recognize in accepting the presumptive authority of common opinion. But from a distance, we can see common conceptions linking at least many of the Indian views. One is to draw a distinction between everyday and spiritual knowledge and to theorize about their relationship. A prominent position is that thinking about the world is an obstacle to spiritual enlightenment. Another is that proper understanding of the world helps one disengage and to know oneself as separate from material things, and so is an aid to transcendence. The most distinctive form of skepticism in classical Indian thought is that so-called worldly knowledge is not knowledge at all but is a perversion or deformation of consciousness. Who seems a philosophical skeptic is really a saint helping us achieve our truly greatest good of world-transcendence by helping us see the paradoxes and other failures of theory. Inference depends upon generalizations which outstrip perceptual evidence, everything F as a G. Testimony is also no good since it presupposes that any speaker would tell the truth and thus is subject to the same criticism of lack of evidence. The standard response is pragmatic. We could not act as we do if we could not rely on inference etc. But to accept that sometimes we reason in ways that mimic but fail to instantiate right forms is not to be a skeptic. A different kind of skepticism is broader in scope, not restricted to inference or other candidate sources. From this it follows that only awareness is right concerning all questions about awareness, since only awareness itself has, so to say, access to itself. Awareness itself is the only consideration relevant to any question about awareness itself, its existence or its nature. The same causal nexus that produces a veridical cognition produces knowledge of its veridicality. With respect to knowledge of non-veridicality, extrinsic certification is necessary. Certification, psychologically considered, involves apperception, a seeing that a challenged, target cognition is false or true. If comprehension of perception or another knowledge source landed us in infinite regress, then everyday action and discourse would not go on through comprehension of self-consciously known objects and their known causes. However everyday action and discourse do proceed for someone

comprehending self-consciously known objects and their known causes: Everyday discourse and action would cease to be possible for such a subject if what is alleged were indeed to hold justificational regress. We assume without checking that our cognition is veridical, but sometimes we need to check. Perception All the classical schools that advance epistemologies accept perception as a knowledge source although there is much disagreement about its nature, objects, and limitations. Are the objects of perception internal to consciousness or external? Are they restricted to individuals, e. A self, awareness itself? What are the environmental conditions that govern perception, and how do these connect with the different sensory modalities? Are there internal conditions on perception such as attention or focus, viewed by some as a voluntary act? Is a recognition, e. And does it prove the endurance of things over time including the perceiving subject? How do we differentiate veritable perception, which is defined as veridical, and pseudo-perception illusion , which is non-veridical? How is illusion to be explained? These are some of the outstanding issues and questions that occupy the schools in all periods of their literatures. Phenomenologically humans would seem to have much in common with infants and animals considering this type of perception. Awareness of the object is only quasi-propositional in the first moment, and at the second has its content filled out to become the means whereby an individual is ascertained to have a certain character, to be a certain kind of substance or to possess a universal or an action, etc. The object perceived, the lotus or whatever , is known in the first stage as an individual whole, both in its individuality and as having a character. Concepts are the records of previous experiences. All predication involves repeatable general terms. Classical Indian realists hold that perception is none the worse for being concept-laden in that concepts are features of the world as impressed upon the mind or self. Perception founds true beliefs, and the repeatable predicates and concepts cowhood perceptually acquired and re-presented and employed in verbalizations pick out constituents of real objects, things that do re-occur there are lots of cows in the world. Perception in its epistemological role is concept-laden. Otherwise, it could not be certificational. Perception as a knowledge source is a doxastic, belief-generating process. A rope can be perceived as a snake, with no difference, from the perspective of the perceiver, between the illusion and a veridical snake perception. Here we touch the heart of classical Indian realism. Snakehood is available to become illusory predication content through previous veridical experience of snakes. Illusion involves the projection into current determinate cognition which would be pseudo-perception of predication content preserved in memory. Sometimes the fusion of an element preserved in memory is cross-sensory, tasting sourness, for instance, when perceiving a lemon by sight or smelling a piece of sandalwood which is seen at too far a distance for actual olfactory stimulation. These are cases of veridical perception with an obvious admixture or tinge of memory. Repeatable features of reality get impressed on the mind or self in the form of memory dispositions. For most adults, prior determinate cognition is partly responsible for the content predicable of a particular, or a group of things, presented through the senses. We see the tree as a tree. But sometimes neither a prior determinate cognition nor a memory disposition is at all responsible for the predication content, for example, when a child sees a cow for the very first time. In other words, there are cases of determinate cognition where indeterminate, concept-free perception furnishes the qualifier independently and the ensuing concept-laden perception is not tinged by memory. Concept-free perception need not provide the classifying not only with second and third-time perceptions of something as F but not even, strictly speaking, with a first-time perception, since there could be an intervening cognitive factor provided, say, by analogy: But with that factor again the question would arise how it gets its content, and so since an indeterminate perception has to be posited at some point to block a regress it might as well be at the start. Nevertheless, for all intents and purposes, perception embodies beliefs, according to the realists. More accurately, a perceptual belief is the result of the operation of perception as a knowledge source. Everything that is nameable is knowable and vice-versa. There is nothing that when we attend to it cannot bear a name, for we can make up new names. We can in principle verbalize the indications of our experience, though many of them are not named since we are indifferent pebbles perceived along the road. Epistemologically, it plays no role, since it is itself a posit and is unverbalizable and not directly apperceived A. The different views of the objects of perception feed different views of inference. Inference Logic is developed in classical India within the traditions of epistemology. Inference is a second knowledge source, a means whereby we can know

things not immediately evident through perception. Oetke finds three roots to the earliest concerns with logic in India: The three of these come together though the latter two are predominant within the epistemological traditions in an almost universal regard of inference as a knowledge source. Seeing classical Indian logic as part of epistemology, as explaining how we know facts through the mediation of our knowledge of other facts, makes it easy to understand why both the Buddhist and Vedic schools count a valid but unsound argument as fallacious: S must connect by reflection the pervasion with the inferential site. Things are yet more complicated. Inferential knowledge is defeasible, or, more precisely stated, what a subject takes to be inferential knowledge may turn out to be pseudo, non-genuine, a false cognition imitating a true one, or even in Gettier-style cases an accidentally true cognition masquerading as one genuinely inference-born. Knowledge has a social dimension. Not only would awareness of a counterexample be a defeater, but also if someone were to present a counterinference to a conclusion opposed to ours, no longer would we have inferential knowledge. The paradigm logical form embedded in a good inference is monotonic. Examples of inferences in classical texts often seem non-monotonic because fallibility attaches to the premises. Such fallibility of course passes to the conclusion, too. Israel who similarly voices an epistemological complaint against the very idea of non-monotonic logic, according to Koons We may think of this as an internal relation between concepts and thus as similar to the a priori of Western philosophy. Western interpretations and representations of inference as classically conceived have often missed its unity as a knowledge source. Case-based reasoning need not be interpreted as relying on universal quantifiers, and the representation of Schayer and others which uses them is misleading.

*This is a book about philosophical theory in classical India. It is an attempt to understand the nature of the classical Indian philosophical endeavour, and in so doing to reveal a richness of projects and a dive rsity of methods.*

Difference between Astik schools and Nastik schools The basic difference between the two branches of Hindu Philosophy schools is said to be based on the recognition of Vedas. Out of these nine systems, eight are atheistic as there is no place for God in them. Only Uttara Mimansa, which is also called Vedanta, has a place for God in it. Almost all Indian schools of thought accepted the theory of karma and rebirth, and the ideal of moksha is conceived as liberation from the cycle of births and deaths. Sankhya Philosophy Sankhya is the oldest philosphy. Sankhya philosophy provided the materialistic ontology for Nyaya and Vaisheshik, but there is very little original literature in Sankhya. Samkhya emphasizes the attainment of knowledge of self by means of concentration and meditation. Sankhya holds that it is the self-knowledge that leads to liberation and not any exterior influence or agent. Samkhya forms the philosophical basis for Yoga. In the beginning, the philosophy was materialistic as it talked only about Prakrithi, but later the element of purush was also added to it. While Purusha is posited as the only sentient being, ever existent, and immaterial, Prakriti is said to be the material basis of this universe, composed of three basic elements Gunas â€" namely Tamas, Rajas, and Sattva. Yoga Philosophy Yoga presents a method of physical and mental discipline. The Yoga presents a practical path for the realization of the self whereas the Samkhya emphasizes the attainment of knowledge of self by means of concentration and meditation. Releasing Purush from Prakriti by means of physical and mental discipline is the concept of Yoga. Founder of Yoga is Pathanjai. Yoga does not require belief in God, although such a belief is accepted as help in the initial stage of mental concentration and control of the mind. Nyaya Philosophy Nyaya Philosophy states that nothing is acceptable unless it is in accordance with reason and experience scientific approach. Nyaya says that the world is real and the philosophy does not follow a monist view. Nyaya philosophy relies on several pramanas i. According to it, the pradhan pramana or principal means of obtaining knowledge is pratyaksha pramana i. Subsequent philosophers who claimed to be Nyayiks, e. Navya Nyaya scholars like Gangesh resorted to gymnasics in logic. It propounded the atomic theory of its founder Kannada. At one time Vaisheshik was regarded as part of the Nyaya philosophy since physics is part of science. But since physics is the most fundamental of all sciences, Vaisheshik was later separated from Nyaya and put forth as a separate philosophy. To make it short, Vaisheshik is a realistic and objective philosophy of the universe. Purva mimansa mimansa The word Mimamsa means to analyze and understand thoroughly. Purva Mimamsa examines the teachings of the Veda in the light of karma-kanda rituals, ie karma-mimamsa system is called purva-mimamsa. Purva mimansa or briefly mimamsa lays emphasis on the performance of the yagya for attaining various spiritual and worldly benefits. Hence this philosophy relies on the Brahmana and samhita part of the Vedas. Uttara Mimamsa Vedanda Vedanta says that the world is unreal, Maya. Vedanta is monistic, in other words, it says that there is only one reality, Brahman. Vedanda has its roots in Sankya Philosophy. There are three sub-branhces for Vedanda: The following schools belong to heterodox schools of Indian Philosophy. Carvaka It is characterised as a materialistic and aesthetic school of thought. Accepted direct perception as the surest method to prove the truth of anything. Insists on joyful living. Also known as Lokayata, Carvaka is a materialistic school of thought. Its founder was Carvaka, author of the Barhaspatya Sutras in the final centuries B. The original texts have been lost and our understanding of them is based largely on criticism of the ideas by other schools. As early as the 5th Century, Saddaniti and Buddhaghosa connected the Lokayatas with the Vitandas or Sophists , and the term Carvaka was first recorded in the 7th Century by the philosopher Purandara, and in the 8th Century by Kamalasila and Haribhadra. Buddhist Philosophy It is a system of beliefs based on the teachings of Siddhartha Gautma. Buddhism is a non-theistic philosophy whose tenets are not especially concerned with the existence or non-existence of God. Four Noble Truths in Buddhism are the following. Right Faith Samyak Dristi.

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*Indian philosophy refers to ancient philosophical traditions of the Indian subcontinent. The principal schools are classified as either orthodox or heterodox.*

Concept Publishing Company Format Available: Using recontructive ideas available in classical Indian original works, this book makes a departure in the style of modern writings on Indian moral philosophy. It presents Indian ethics, in an objective, secular, and wherever necessary, critical manner as a systematic, down-to-earth, philosophical account of moral values, virtues, rights and obligations. It thereby refutes the claim that Indian philosophy has no ethics as well as the counter-claim that it transcends ethics. It demonstrates that moral living proves that the individual, his society and the world are really real and not only taken to be real for behavioral purposes as the Advaitins hold, the self is amoral being a non-agent, moksa is not a moral value, and the Karmic theory, because of involving belief in rebirth, does not fuarantee that the doer of an action is also the experiencer of its results, contrary to what is commonly held, and Indian ethics can sustain itself even if such notions are dropped. Rajendra Prasad calls Indian ethics organismic because, along with ethical concerns, it also covers issues related to professions, politics, administration, sex, environment, etc. Therefore, in one format it is theoretical and applied, normative and metaethical, humanistic and non-humanistic, etc. Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Language: The work gives a survey of major contemporary, western and Indian views on the problem of induction and offers a solution to the classical problem of induction and the Grue paradox following the Nyaya perspective. Gerald James Larson Language: Motilal Banarsidass Publishe Format Available: The volume traces the intellectual history of Patanjala Yoga philosophy from the early centuries of the Common Era through the twentieth century. It also provides a systematic discussions of the philosophy of classical Yoga. Particular attention is given to the meaning of concentration Samadhi , engrossment samapatti and the extra-ordinary cognitive capacities vibhutis, siddhis and the role that these notions play in the Yoga philosophy, which are relevant for issues currently under discussion in contemporary western philosophy of mind. The volume compares and contrasts classical yoga philosophy with classical Samkhya and with Indian Buddhist thought. Although the primary focus of the volume is on Patanjala Yoga, the system of Hatha Yoga and other satellite systems of Yoga are discussed as well, and an attempt is made to differentiate clearly the classical system of Yoga Sastra from Hatha Yoga and the other satellite systems. Some twenty-eight Sanskrit texts of Patanjala. Yoga are summarized or noted in the volume. Twenty-six volumes of Hatha Yoga and the texts of some other satellite systems are also included. Altogether the volume contains summaries and or notations for some seventy-five Sanskrit texts.

## 5: Philosophy in Ancient India - Crystalinks

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Indian Philosophy Special thanks to the Microsoft Corporation for their contribution to our site. The following information came from Microsoft Encarta. Here is a hyperlink to the Microsoft Encarta home page. Indian philosophy, expressed in the Indo-European language of Sanskrit, comprises many diverse schools of thought and perspectives and includes a substantial body of intellectual debate and argumentation among the various views. Among the main classical schools of Indian thought are 1 the so-called orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy, which include Exegesis Mimamsa , Vedanta and its numerous subschools, Atomism Vaisesika , Logic Nyaya , Analysis Samkhya , and Yoga; and 2 the Buddhist so-called nonorthodox schools of Madhyamika, Buddhist Idealism Yogacara , and Abhidharma which includes numerous subschools. Indian philosophy also comprises the materialist and skeptical philosophies of Carvaka and the religious schools of Jainism. Classical Indian philosophy extends from approximately BC to AD , which marks the beginning of the modern period. Ancient Indian thought, which is also philosophic in a broader sense, originated as early as BC and appears in scriptures called Veda. Classical Indian philosophy is less concerned with spirituality than ancient thought; rather, it concentrates on questions of how people can know and communicate about everyday affairs. Indian philosophy of the later classical and modern periods to present may be distinguished from most Indian religious and spiritual thought. Indian philosophy is extensive, rich, and complex. Scholars analyze not only its significance and its insights, but also its classical teachings about knowledge and language. Meanwhile, the majority of Western students of Indian thought have been drawn to its religious and mystical teachings. Relationship with Western Philosophy Indian and Western civilizations have maintained some form of contact for at least years. In the 4th century BC, for example, the Greek emperor Alexander took troops across the Indus River, which borders the western edge of the Indian subcontinent. Even so, while trade contacts seem to have been ongoing, political contact between India and the West was largely insignificant until the 16th century. Western philosophical and religious views were carried by political emissaries and traders during voyages in the 15th and 16th centuries. Some scholars have argued that Platonism the philosophy of ancient Greek thinker Plato and neo-Platonism a 3rd-century movement based on Platonism were greatly influenced by Indian thought. Nevertheless, the traditions of Indian and Western philosophy developed largely in ignorance of one another, and, until modern times, showed few signs of influencing one another. Despite this, it is possible to discern common interests and intellectual positions between Western and Indian philosophy, such as positions concerning logic and epistemology the study of knowledge. Furthermore, when Indian philosophers ask the question "What is real? On the other hand, contrasts between Western and Indian thought dominate the arenas of religion and religious philosophy. For example, there is a certain type of Indian theism that shares similarities with the monotheism of the West. But the nirvana enlightenment goal of Buddhism, the mystical monism of Advaita Vedanta the idea that all reality is a single spiritual being , and the theorizing that forms the foundation of polytheism belief in the existence of multiple deities in Hinduism are instances of Indian philosophy that have no, or at best minor and incomplete, parallels in Western philosophy. Most ethical teachings in Indian philosophy are found in Indian literature but are influenced by religious association. Indian classical philosophers often think about ethics in connection with Indian views about actions, or habits karma , and rebirth the belief in reincarnation. Nevertheless, Indian philosophy is characterized by a highly refined ethical sensibility common among Jainism, Buddhism, and Hinduism , along with standards of character and conduct that are common to many other cultures. Influence of Religion In ancient Indian philosophy before BC , philosophy and religion cannot be meaningfully separated, primarily because of the cultural integration of religious practices and mystical pursuits. For example, ceremonies celebrating birth, marriage, and death, performed with recitations of Vedic verses mantras , were important for bonding within ancient Indian societies. Later in classical Indian philosophy, different social practices

developed. Thus, the orthodox classical schools of thought are distinguished from nonorthodox classical schools by their allegiance to established forms of social practice rather than to the doctrines of the Veda. Buddhism, for example, constitutes much more of a break with Vedic practices than with the ideas developed in Vedic traditions of thought. In fact, the Upanishads, mystical treatises continuous with the Vedas, foretell many Buddhist teachings. In ancient India, religion did not entail dogma, but rather a way of life that permitted a wide range of philosophic positions and inquiry. Mysticism, the claim that ultimate truth is only obtainable through spiritual experience, dominates much ancient Indian philosophy. Such experiences are thought to reveal a supreme and transmundane beyond ordinary experience reality and to provide the meaning of life. Mysticism shapes much classical and modern Indian thought as well. The presumed indications of mystical experiences, such as atman or God, were especially debated in the ancient period and influenced much subsequent Indian philosophy, including the reflections of professional philosophers of late classical times. In some schools of classical Indian philosophy, such as Nyaya Logic , neither religion nor mysticism is central. History The oldest literature of Indian thought is the Veda, a collection of poems and hymns composed over several generations beginning as early as BC. The Veda was composed in Sanskrit, the intellectual language of both ancient and classical Indian civilizations. Four collections were made, so it is said that there are four Vedas. The four as a group came to be viewed as sacred in Hinduism. Most of the poems of the Veda are religious and tend to be about the activities of various gods. Yet some Vedic hymns and poems address philosophic themes that became important in later periods, such as the henotheism that is key to much Hindu theology. Henotheism is the idea that one God takes many different forms, and that although individuals may worship several different gods and goddesses, they really revere but one Supreme Being. Indian philosophy was more decisively established with the Upanishads secret doctrines , the first of which may have been written in the 7th century BC. Early Upanishads, which dominate the late ancient period BC to BC of thought, were key to the emergence of several classical philosophies. Buddhism, now a major world religion, also appeared in the ancient period of Indian philosophy. The Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, lived during the 6th century BC. In the reign of the Buddhist emperor Asoka 3rd century BC , an enormous canon of literature, sometimes called the Southern Buddhist Canon, or the Pali Canon, was compiled. Other scriptures, eventually key to a Northern or Mahayana tradition, were composed later. Most of the great classical schools of Indian philosophy, seven or eight in number, were first articulated in texts dating from as early as BC. Early classical Indian philosophy is expressed in aphoristic sutra texts complete with elaborate commentaries. The Sanskrit word sutra means thread and, by extension, an "aphorism" that captures a philosophic tenet in a succinct statement. The sutra texts, usually accompanied with commentaries made by a second great thinker of a tradition, express world views, or philosophies, organized around reasons and arguments. The most outstanding individuals in subsequent classical Indian philosophical writing include Buddhist Idealist Dharmakirti, who lived in the 7th century; Advaita Vedantin Samkara, of the 8th century; and Logic philosopher Gangesa, of the 14th century. The writings of these thinkers represented a steady advance in persuasiveness over previous arguments. Indian Thought Exegesis The Mimamsa-sutra of the Exegesis school appears to be the oldest text BC of an emergent philosophic sastra craft or science. Exegesis is primarily concerned with questions of Vedic interpretation. Exegesis arguments about dharma Sanskrit for "duty" or "the right way to live" have been the focus of philosophic efforts through most of the many centuries of this school. In the later classical period, Exegesis philosophy focuses less on dharma, and more attention is given to technical issues in the philosophy of language. The school continues into the modern period. Vedanta Vedanta also has a long and distinguished history, as well as a bewildering number of subschools. Vedanta models itself after the philosophy of the Upanishads. For purposes of study, Vedantic philosophy may be said to fall into two subschools: The main point of contention between the two schools is the reality of God, along with the reality of the world that God presumably has created, or emanated. Thus, God and the world are illusions. The early 8th-century Advaitin philosopher Samkara is the most famous classical Vedantin. Vedanta extends through all periods of Indian philosophy and remains important among present-day philosophers in India, as well as among Hindus throughout contemporary society. Buddhism Like much Vedanta philosophy, Buddhism is concerned with mystical experience. Buddhist thinkers commonly compare enlightenment

nirvana experience to awakening from a dream. The Sanskrit word buddha means awakened. Buddhists have contributed significant ideas in epistemology and metaphysics to Indian philosophy, and have exerted a complex influence on its overall history. Buddhist philosophies were prominent in the earlier classical period BC to AD  The 2nd-century Buddhist Nagarjuna and the 7th-century Buddhist Dharmakirti are two of the greatest thinkers in classical Indian philosophy. Nagarjuna was an advocate of skepticism and mysticism, and his arguments continue to influence a majority of Indian philosophic schools. Dharmakirti was an astute logician and pragmatist who worked largely on idealist premises, such as the idea that appearances are dependent on the mind, or consciousness. Dharmakirti taught that everything is, or is directly dependent upon, Buddha Mind or Buddha Body awakened mind or awakened body. Analysis and Yoga Analysis Samkhya and Yoga are relatively minor philosophies, compared to others discussed in this overview. Both emerged before the 2nd century BC, but neither spawned a continuing philosophy comparable to that of the schools already mentioned. Neither school participated significantly in later classical debates. The Analysis school subscribes to a metaphysical dualism the claim that two types of things ultimately exist of individual souls and nature. Yoga takes a similar metaphysical stance, though it also pursues a psychological and yogic-practice dimension that the Analysis school lacks. Logic and Atomism Logic Nyaya and Atomism Vaisesika are schools that specialize in questions of epistemology nyaya means critical inquiry and of what sorts of objects and generalities we experience every day. Both schools have extensive literatures, and later Logic after is known for its professional techniques of cognitive analysis. Founded in the early classical period, both schools relied upon early sutra texts, and their literatures are distinct for almost years. However, the traditions became combined with the great 11th-century innovator Udayana, and became known simply as Logic. From the inception of both schools, reflection about knowledge in Logic was matched, roughly, by Atomist views about what is known the objects of knowledge. Carvaka The Carvaka school, a classical school of materialism and skepticism, is known for its attacks on religious practices, and, from a Western perspective, provides evidence that not all classical Indian philosophy is religiously or mystically oriented. The Logic school also rejects the influence of religious beliefs. But Carvaka, unlike Logic, goes beyond advocating knowledge based on natural experience by ridiculing what it sees as superstition, including the belief in rebirth widespread among all of the major Indian schools of thought. Although systematic philosophies are intended to stand as whole bodies of thought, it is often desirable to separate and delineate issues within them, particularly in study and debate. In the case of Indian philosophy, examining specific classical arguments and general philosophic views also facilitates comparison with Western philosophy. This section is devoted to a broad contemporary perspective of classical Indian thought on some of the great issues of philosophy. Metaphysics Religious, or spiritual, metaphysics, a field that currently receives little attention among philosophers in academia in the West, considers the question of the nature of a Supreme Being and its relation to the world. Indian Buddhism, Advaita Vedanta, and theistic Vedanta all have contributed to this debate. Within spiritual metaphysics, an insistence on spiritual monism only one spiritual being ultimately exists is probably the most important consideration that Indian thought upholds, though with numerous variations: The field of analytic metaphysics, which examines everyday experience and language, is currently more prominent among Western philosophers.

## 6: Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*This original work focuses on the rational principles of Indian philosophical theory, rather than the mysticism more usually associated with it. Ganeri explores.*

General considerations Significance of Indian philosophies in the history of philosophy In relation to Western philosophical thought, Indian philosophy offers both surprising points of affinity and illuminating differences. The differences highlight certain fundamentally new questions that the Indian philosophers asked. The similarities reveal that, even when philosophers in India and the West were grappling with the same problems and sometimes even suggesting similar theories, Indian thinkers were advancing novel formulations and argumentations. Problems that the Indian philosophers raised for consideration, but that their Western counterparts never did, include such matters as the origin utpatti and apprehension jnapti of truth pramanya. Problems that the Indian philosophers for the most part ignored but that helped shape Western philosophy include the question of whether knowledge arises from experience or from reason and distinctions such as that between analytic and synthetic judgments or between contingent and necessary truths. Indian thought, therefore, provides the historian of Western philosophy with a point of view that may supplement that gained from Western thought. A study of Indian thought, then, reveals certain inadequacies of Western philosophical thought and makes clear that some concepts and distinctions may not be as inevitable as they may otherwise seem. In a similar manner, knowledge of Western thought gained by Indian philosophers has also been advantageous to them. Vedic hymns, Hindu scriptures dating from the 2nd millennium bce, are the oldest extant record from India of the process by which the human mind makes its gods and of the deep psychological processes of mythmaking leading to profound cosmological concepts. The Upanishads speculative philosophical texts contain one of the first conceptions of a universal, all-pervading, spiritual reality leading to a radical monism absolute nondualism, or the essential unity of matter and spirit. The Upanishads also contain early speculations by Indian philosophers about nature, life, mind, and the human body , not to speak of ethics and social philosophy. General characteristics of Indian philosophy Common concerns The various Indian philosophies contain such a diversity of views, theories, and systems that it is almost impossible to single out characteristics that are common to all of them. Acceptance of the authority of the Veda s characterizes all the orthodox astika systemsâ€"but not the unorthodox nastika systems, such as Charvaka radical materialism , Buddhism, and Jainism. Moreover, even when philosophers professed allegiance to the Vedas, their allegiance did little to fetter the freedom of their speculative ventures. Thus, the Vedas could be cited to corroborate a wide diversity of views; they were used by the Vaisheshika thinkers i. In most Indian philosophical systems, the acceptance of the ideal of moksha, like allegiance to the authority of the scriptures, was only remotely connected with the systematic doctrines that were being propounded. Many epistemological, logical, and even metaphysical doctrines were debated and decided on purely rational grounds that did not directly bear upon the ideal of moksha. The logical systemsâ€" Nyaya , Vaisheshika, and Purva-Mimamsaâ€"are only very remotely related. When Indian philosophers speak of intuitive knowledge , they are concerned with making room for it and demonstrating its possibility, with the help of logicâ€"and there, as far as they are concerned, the task of philosophy ends. Indian philosophers do not seek to justify religious faith; philosophic wisdom itself is accorded the dignity of religious truth. Theory is not subordinated to practice, but theory itself, as theory, is regarded as being supremely worthy and efficacious. Three basic concepts form the cornerstone of Indian philosophical thought: Leaving the Charvakas aside, all Indian philosophies concern themselves with these three concepts and their interrelations, though this is not to say that they accept the objective validity of these concepts in precisely the same manner. Of these, the concept of karma, signifying moral efficacy of human actions, seems to be the most typically Indian. The concept of atman, not altogether absent in Western thought, corresponds in a certain sense to the Western concept of a transcendental or absolute spirit selfâ€"important differences notwithstanding. The concept of moksha as the concept of the highest ideal has likewise been one of the concerns of Western thought, especially during the Christian era, though it probably has never been as important as for the Hindu mind. In addition to karma, the

lack of two other concerns further differentiates Indian philosophical thought from Western thought in general. Since the time of the Greeks, Western thought has been concerned with mathematics and, in the Christian era, with history. Neither mathematics nor history has ever raised philosophical problems for the Indian. In the lists of pramana s, or ways of knowing accepted by the different schools, there is none that includes mathematical knowledge or historical knowledge. Possibly connected with their indifference toward mathematics is the significant fact that Indian philosophers have not developed formal logic. The theory of the syllogism a valid deductive argument having two premises and a conclusion is, however, developed, and much sophistication has been achieved in logical theory. Indian logic offers an instructive example of a logic of cognitions jnanani rather than of abstract propositionsâ€"a logic not sundered and kept isolated from psychology and epistemology, because it is meant to be the logic of actual human striving to know what is true of the world. Forms of argument and presentation There is, in relation to Western thought, a striking difference in the manner in which Indian philosophical thinking is presented as well as in the mode in which it historically develops. Out of the presystematic age of the Vedic hymns and the Upanishads and many diverse philosophical ideas current in the pre-Buddhistic era, there emerged with the rise of the age of the sutra s aphoristic summaries of the main points of a system a neat classification of systems darshanas , a classification that was never to be contradicted and to which no further systems are added. No new school was founded, no new darshana came into existence. But this conformism, like conformism to the Vedas, did not check the rise of independent thinking, new innovations , or original insights. If one is to be counted as a great master acharya , one has to write a commentary bhashya on the sutras of the darshana concerned, or one must comment on one of the bhashyas and write a tika subcommentary. The usual order is sutraâ€"bhashyaâ€"varttika collection of critical notes â€"tika. At any stage a person may introduce a new and original point of view, but at no stage can one claim originality for oneself. Not even authors of sutras could do that, for they were only systematizing the thoughts and insights of countless predecessors. The development of Indian philosophical thought has thus been able to combine, in an almost unique manner, conformity to tradition and adventure in thinking. Roles of sacred texts, mythology, and theism The role of the sacred texts in the growth of Indian philosophy is different in each of the different systems. In those systems that may be called adhyatmavidya, or sciences of spirituality, the sacred texts play a much greater role than they do in the logical systems anvikshikividya. In the case of the former, Shankara , a leading Advaita Vedanta philosopher c. In matters regarding supersensible reality, reasoning left to itself cannot deliver certainty, for, according to Shankara, every thesis established by reasoning may be countered by an opposite thesis supported by equally strong, if not stronger, reasoning. The sacred scriptures, embodying as they do the results of intuitive experiences of seers, therefore, should be accepted as authoritative , and reasoning should be made subordinate to them. Whereas the sacred texts thus continued to exercise some influence on philosophical thinking, the influence of mythology declined considerably with the rise of the systems. The myths of creation and dissolution of the universe persisted in the theistic systems but were transformed into metaphors and models. With the Nyaya problem of knowledge â€" Vaisheshika analysis of nature systems, for example, the model of a potter making pots determined much philosophical thinking, as did that of a magician conjuring up tricks in the Advaita nondualist Vedanta. The nirukta etymology of Yaska, a 5th-century-bce Sanskrit scholar, tells of various attempts to interpret difficult Vedic mythologies: Such interpretations apparently prevailed in the Upanishads; the myths were turned into symbols, though some of them persisted as models and metaphors. The ancient Indian tradition, however, classified the classical systems darshanas into orthodox astika and unorthodox nastika. Astika may also mean one who accepts the authority of the Vedas; nastika then means one who does not accept that authority. Not all among the astika philosophers, however, were theists, and, even if they were, they did not all accord the same importance to the concept of God in their systems. The Samkhya system did not involve belief in the existence of God, without ceasing to be astika, and Yoga a mental-psychological-physical meditation system made room for God not on theoretical grounds but only on practical considerations. The Purva-Mimamsa of Jaimini c. The Advaita Vedanta of Shankara rejects atheism in order to prove that the world had its origin in a conscious, spiritual being called Ishvara , or God, but in the long run regards the concept of Ishvara as a concept of lower order that becomes negated by a metaphysical

knowledge of brahman , the absolute, nondual reality. Only the non-Advaita schools of Vedanta and the Nyaya-Vaisheshika remain zealous theists, and, of these schools, the god of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika school does not create the eternal atoms, universals, or individual souls. For a truly theistic conception of God, one has to look to the non-Advaita schools of Vedanta, the Vaishnavite devotees of Vishnu as the supreme God , and the Shaivite devotees of Shiva as the supreme God philosophical systems. Whereas Hindu religious life continues to be dominated by these last-mentioned theistic systems, the philosophies went their own ways, far removed from that religious demand. A general history of development and cultural background S. Dasgupta , a 20th-century Indian philosopher, divided the history of Indian philosophy into three periods: What Dasgupta calls the prelogical stage covers the pre-Mauryan and the Mauryan period c. The logical period begins roughly with the Kushanas 1stâ€"2nd centuries ce and reaches its highest development during the Gupta era 3rdâ€"5th centuries ce and the age of imperial Kanauj 7th century ce. The prelogical period In its early prelogical phase, Indian thought, freshly developing in the Indian subcontinent, actively confronted and assimilated the diverse currents of pre-Vedic and non-Vedic elements in the native culture that the Indo-Aryan-speaking migrants from the north sought to appropriate. The marks of this confrontation are to be noted in every facet of Indian religion and thought: Both religious thought and philosophical discussion received continuous challenges and confrontations. The resulting responses have a dialectical character: Nevertheless, through all the vicissitudes of social and cultural life, Brahmanical thought has been able to maintain a fairly strong current of continuity. In the chaotic intellectual climate of the pre-Mauryan era, there were skeptics ajnanikah who questioned the possibility of knowledge. There were also materialists, the chief of which were the Ajivikas deterministic ascetics and the Lokayatas the name by which Charvaka doctrinesâ€"denying the authority of the Vedas and the soulâ€"are generally known. Furthermore, there existed the two unorthodox schools of yadrichhavada accidentalists and svabhavaha naturalists , who rejected the supernatural. Kapila , the legendary founder of the Samkhya school, supposedly flourished during the 7th century bce. Proto-Jain ideas were already in existence when Mahavira flourished 6th century bce , the founder of Jainism, initiated his reform. Gautama the Buddha flourished c. He sought to forge a new pathâ€"though not new in all respectsâ€"that was to assure blessedness to man. Orthodoxy, however, sought to preserve itself in a vast Kalpa-sutra ritual literatureâ€"with three parts: Though the writing of the sutras continued over a long period, the sutras of most of the various darshanas probably were completed between the 6th and 3rd centuries bce. Two of the sutras appear to have been composed in the pre-Mauryan period but after the rise of Buddhism ; these works are the Mimamsa-sutra s of Jaimini and the Vedanta-sutra s of Badarayana c. The Mauryan period brought, for the first time, a strong centralized state. The Greeks had been ousted, and a new self-confidence characterized the beginning of the period. This seems to have been the period in which the epics Mahabharata and Ramayana were initiated, though their composition went on through several centuries before they took the forms they now have. Manu , a legendary lawgiver, codified the Dharma-shastra ; Kautilya , a minister of King Chandragupta Maurya , systematized the science of political economy Artha-shastra ; and Patanjali , an ancient author or authors, composed the Yoga-sutras. Brahmanism tried to adjust itself to the new communities and cultures that were admitted into its fold: The Bhagavadgita â€"the most famous work of this periodâ€"symbolized the spirit of the creative synthesis of the age. A new ideal of karma as opposed to the more ancient one of renunciation was emphasized. The logical period The logical period of Indian thought began with the Kushan dynasty 1stâ€"2nd centuries ce. Gautama author of the Nyaya-sutras; probably flourished at the beginning of the Christian era and his 5th-century commentator Vatsyayana established the foundations of the Nyaya as a school almost exclusively preoccupied with logical and epistemological issues. Though Buddhist logic in the strict sense of the term had not yet come into being, an increasingly rigorous logical style of philosophizing developed among the proponents of these schools of thought. During the reign of the Guptas , there was a revival of Brahmanism of a gentler and more-refined form. Vaishnavism of the Vasudeva cult, centring on the prince-god Krishna and advocating renunciation by action, and Shaivism prospered, along with Buddhism and Jainism. The most notable feature, however, was the rise of the Buddhist Yogachara school, of which Asanga 4th century ce and his brother Vasubandhu were the great pioneers. The greatest names of Indian philosophy belong to the post-Gupta period from the 7th to the 10th century. At that time Buddhism was on the decline

and the Tantric cults were rising, a situation that led to the development of the Tantric forms of Buddhism. Shaivism was thriving in Kashmir and Vaishnavism in the southern part of India. The great philosophers Mimamshakas Kumarila 7th century , Prabhakara 7thâ€"8th centuries , Mandana Mishra 8th century , Shalikanatha 9th century , and Parthasarathi Mishra 10th century belong to this age. The greatest Indian philosopher of the period, however, was Shankara. The debate between Brahmanism and Buddhism was continued, on a logical level, by philosophers of the Nyaya schoolâ€"Uddyotakara, Vachaspati Mishra, and Udayana Udayanacharya.

## 7: Did Ancient Greece Borrow Its Philosophies from India? - Jason Colavito

*Philosophy in Classical India Recent years have seen the beginning of a radical reassessment of the philosophical literature of ancient and classical India.*

Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy Published: Instead, it is a critical, revisionist, and systematic argument for the centrality of ethics in classical Indian philosophy, as against the more common view that, while there is an abundance of rigorous work in epistemology, metaphysic, logic, etc. In order to make his case for the centrality of ethics in Indian philosophy, Ranganathan develops an ambitious and controversial account of the term "dharma" a term that has a wide variety of referents and is generally thought to have widely divergent uses as fundamentally and always a moral term. Further, in the course of defending his revisionist account of the term "dharma," he develops novel -- and again controversial -- approaches to determining the meaning of terms in general and of moral terms in particular. Thus the first two-thirds of the book is taken up with issues in the philosophy of language and meta-ethics. Then, having laid the groundwork for his approach to Indian ethics, in the final third of the book Ranganathan turns his attention to an examination of some of the key ethical themes in the various schools of classical Indian philosophy. Finally, he concludes the book with a thoughtful discussion of the importance of ethics to Indian philosophy and of the importance of Indian ethics as such. Indian ethics and meaning s of "dharma" Renowned scholar of Indian philosophy, B. Matilal, expresses a fairly common view of the tradition when he remarks: Professional philosophers of India over the last two thousand years have been consistently concerned with the problems of logic and epistemology, metaphysics and soteriology, and sometimes they have made very important contributions to the global heritage of philosophy. But, except some cursory comments and some insightful observations, the professional philosophers of India have very seldom discussed what we call "moral philosophy" today. And from there one could begin to assess the importance of ethics in Indian thought. However, a problem with this approach immediately arises in that, on the standard view, not all dharma discourse is moral discourse. According to what the author terms the Orthodox View, "dharma" has a number of different meanings it can denote morality, justice, intrinsic quality, an ontologically basic event or property, etc. Alternatively, according to the so-called Conservative View, the various uses of "dharma" are explained etymologically. Hence, the term can refer to moral law and to ontologically basic entities. Ranganathan rejects both of these views in favor of what he calls the Reform View, which consists of two theses. But if, as the author admits, "dharma" can, in different contexts, refer to quite a disparate range of things -- attributes, ritual, constituents of reality, and so on 22 -- on what basis can he claim that the term always means "moral"? It would appear that the Orthodox View is supported; "dharma" sometimes means "moral" and sometimes it does not. Ranganathan responds to this line of thought by arguing that "dharma" should not be defined in terms of its referents, but rather in terms of the intention with which it is used. In his terminology, a term can be defined either by its typical extention i. Thus an extentional definition of a term will be based primarily on the kinds of objects to which that term refers, while an intentional definition will be based primarily on the attitude or intentions of the user of the term. For instance, the term "pleasurable" may be applied to a very wide and internally inconsistent range of extentions. If one were to try to define it extentionally, one might be led to hold that the masochist and the nonmasochist simply do not mean the same thing when using the term. Once this assumption is made, recognizing the disparate extentions of the term naturally leads to the conclusion that it has no single meaning, and hence no single English equivalent. In contrast, the author holds that while "dharma" has quite disparate extentions, it has only one intentional meaning: Thus, for example, Buddhist philosophers at times use "dharma" to refer to the basic constituents of reality in the context of discussions about, for instance, the number and types of these constituents, whether composite entities are reducible to them, how they interact causally, and so on. In such a case it would be tempting to think that what the Buddhist philosophers are up to here is ontology and not ethics, and therefore, given what it refers to in this context, that "dharma" is being used in a non-moral sense. But Ranganathan argues that we ought to resist this temptation because it is likely to lead to question-begging assumptions about the scope of morality in the

Indian tradition  The Buddhist philosophers may look like they are doing ontology and not ethics, and therefore that "dharma" is not being used as a moral term in this context, but that might well be because there is a substantive philosophical disagreement over the proper scope of the moral. The problem with this argument, though, is that it gives too simplistic an account of how an extentionalist might go about determining whether "dharma" is being used as a moral term. The extentionalist need not decide once and for all in advance what extentions are or are not moral in nature. Rather her own intuitions about the relevant extentions can be taken as fallible guides. Other things being equal, finding a discourse in which philosophers use "dharma" to refer to the constituents of reality -- rather than actions, rules, rituals, duties, norms, virtues, etc. This interpretation could be overridden in light of other considerations, but it still, for all that, could be a relevant consideration and not necessarily question-begging. Furthermore, the role the term plays in various moves within the discourse -- questions, judgments, inferences, arguments -- will be relevant to deciding whether "dharma" is being used as a moral term. That is, we must look not only at what the word refers to, but also how it is being used in the context in order to assess its meaning. It seems to me that the burden of proof is on the intentionalist in this kind of case. The Anger Inclination Thesis Now if the intentionalist is to define moral terms without reference to their typical extentions, some account is needed of the attitudes or intentions that typically accompany the use of moral terms. In order to do this, Ranganathan first examines and rejects an impressive range of views about the nature of moral statements, and then offers his own account, namely, The Anger Inclination Thesis AIT. According to the AIT: Further, "the prime function of a moral term," writes Ranganathan, "is to intentionally refer to the anger inclination attached to an evaluation"  The meaning of "dharma," then, is determined by this reactive attitude, rather than the kinds of things to which this attitude is directed. Hence, the definition does not presume to encroach on substantive philosophical debate over the proper scope of morality. As evidence for his account of "dharma," Ranganathan points out several examples of a more or less explicit connection between "dharma" and anger inclination. The attempt to understand moral terms and the domain of the moral in general in terms of characteristic reactive attitudes is interesting and plausible, even if one has reservations about the details of the Anger Inclination Thesis. However, what these examples show is that dharma discourse is often or even usually moral discourse, but not that it is always moral discourse. Ranganthan admits that, "a hard-line position has been consistently adopted in the argument for the Reform View; that there is such a thing as an essential meaning to all moral terms" , and thus that "dharma" has a single, essential, and moral meaning. The author addresses the idea that "dharma" might be a family resemblance term , , but his rejection of the idea is based on a specifically Wittgensteinian account of family resemblance. Yet the idea that there could be deviant, non-moral meanings of "dharma" does not rest on a strictly Wittgensteinian approach. Returning to the Buddhist use of "dharma" to refer to the basic constituents of reality, how are we to tell whether this is a deviant non-moral use of "dharma" or a perhaps exotic moral use of the term? Let us grant that the fact that the term refers to constituents of reality does not settle the matter. Is the function of the term "to intentionally refer to the anger inclination attached to an evaluation"? In the context of what is usually called Buddhist metaphysics or ontology , the term "dharma" is employed in a way that gives no clear indication that it is intended to express moral evaluation or to communicate an anger inclination. In other words, sometimes "dharma" has an ontological meaning and not a moral one. Of course, Buddhist philosophers hold that ontological issues can have profound moral import and one can imagine a Buddhist philosopher who is inclined to get angry over ontological disputes , but it does not follow from this that "dharma" must have a moral meaning even in the context of technical Buddhist metaphysics. The chapters are brief, clear, and generally insightful. This is an interesting and fruitful approach for a short survey of Indian ethics. Furthermore, the survey never loses the thread of the argument for the Reform View developed in the first two-thirds of the book. Both are morally relevant, but neither can serve as the master concept in terms of which Indian ethics is to be understood. Having surveyed the moral philosophies of the main schools of the classical Indian tradition, and having articulated what he takes to be their moral first principles, Ranganathan returns to the issue of the relative place of moral philosophy in the tradition. Given the centrality and importance of the term "dharma" for all of the main schools of Indian philosophy, Vedic and non-Vedic, and given the moral meaning of this term, one can, he argues, conclude that

ethics is central to Indian philosophy. Methodologically, his mix of Indology with contemporary work in the philosophy of language and meta-ethics provides for a challenging and rewarding approach to Indian moral philosophy.

## 8: Ancient Indian Philosophy: A Painless Introduction

*Indian Philosophy (or, in Sanskrit, Darshanas), refers to any of several traditions of philosophical thought that originated in the Indian subcontinent, including Hindu philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, and Jain philosophy (see below for brief introductions to these schools).*

Back to Top Indian Philosophy or, in Sanskrit, Darshanas , refers to any of several traditions of philosophical thought that originated in the Indian subcontinent, including Hindu philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, and Jain philosophy see below for brief introductions to these schools. It is considered by Indian thinkers to be a practical discipline, and its goal should always be to improve human life. Orthodox Hindu Schools The main Hindu orthodox astika schools of Indian philosophy are those codified during the medieval period of Brahmanic-Sanskritic scholasticism, and they take the ancient Vedas the oldest sacred texts of Hinduism as their source and scriptural authority: Samkhya is the oldest of the orthodox philosophical systems, and it postulates that everything in reality stems from purusha self or soul or mind and prakriti matter, creative agency, energy. It is a dualist philosophy, although between the self and matter rather than between mind and body as in the Western dualist tradition, and liberation occurs with the realization that the soul and the dispositions of matter steadiness, activity and dullness are different. The Yoga school, as expounded by Patanjali in his 2nd Century B. Its methodology is based on a system of logic that has subsequently been adopted by the majority of the Indian schools, in much the same way as Aristotelian logic has influenced Western philosophy. Its followers believe that obtaining valid knowledge the four sources of which are perception, inference, comparison and testimony is the only way to gain release from suffering. Nyaya developed several criteria by which the knowledge thus obtained was to be considered valid or invalid equivalent in some ways to Western analytic philosophy. The Vaisheshika school was founded by Kanada in the 6th Century B. The Vaisheshika and Nyaya schools eventually merged because of their closely related metaphysical theories although Vaisheshika only accepted perception and inference as sources of valid knowledge. The main objective of the Purva Mimamsa school is to interpret and establish the authority of the Vedas. It requires unquestionable faith in the Vedas and the regular performance of the Vedic fire-sacrifices to sustain all the activity of the universe. Although in general the Mimamsa accept the logical and philosophical teachings of the other schools, they insist that salvation can only be attained by acting in accordance with the prescriptions of the Vedas. The school later shifted its views and began to teach the doctrines of Brahman and freedom, allowing for the release or escape of the soul from its constraints through enlightened activity. The Vedanta, or Uttara Mimamsa, school concentrates on the philosophical teachings of the Upanishads mystic or spiritual contemplations within the Vedas , rather than the Brahmanas instructions for ritual and sacrifice. The Vedanta focus on meditation, self-discipline and spiritual connectivity, more than traditional ritualism. Due to the rather cryptic and poetic nature of the Vedanta sutras, the school separated into six sub-schools, each interpreting the texts in its own way and producing its own series of sub-commentaries: Advaita the best-known, which holds that the soul and Brahman are one and the same , Visishtadvaita which teaches that the Supreme Being has a definite form, name - Vishnu - and attributes , Dvaita which espouses a belief in three separate realities: Vishnu, and eternal soul and matter , Dvaitadvaita which holds that Brahman exists independently, while soul and matter are dependent , Shuddhadvaita which believes that Krishna is the absolute form of Brahman and Acintya Bheda Abheda which combines monism and dualism by stating that the soul is both distinct and non-distinct from Krishna, or God. Heterodox Non-Hindu Schools The main heterodox nastika schools, which do not accept the authority of the Vedas, include: Also known as Lokayata, Carvaka is a materialistic, skeptical and atheistic school of thought. Its founder was Carvaka, author of the Barhaspatya Sutras in the final centuries B. As early as the 5th Century, Saddaniti and Buddhaghosa connected the Lokayatas with the Vitandas or Sophists , and the term Carvaka was first recorded in the 7th Century by the philosopher Purandara, and in the 8th Century by Kamalasila and Haribhadra. As a vital philosophical school, Carvara appears to have died out some time in the 15th Century. Buddhism is a non-theistic system of beliefs based on the teachings of Siddhartha Gautama, an Indian prince later known as

the Buddha, in the 5th Century B. The question of God is largely irrelevant in Buddhism, and it is mainly founded on the rejection of certain orthodox Hindu philosophical concepts although it does share some philosophical views with Hinduism, such as belief in karma. Buddhist philosophy deals extensively with problems in metaphysics, phenomenology, ethics and epistemology. The central tenets of Jain philosophy were established by Mahavira in the 6th Century B. A basic principle is anekantavada, the idea that reality is perceived differently from different points of view, and that no single point of view is completely true similar to the Western philosophical doctrine of Subjectivism. According to Jainism, only Kevalis, those who have infinite knowledge, can know the true answer, and that all others would only know a part of the answer. During the Indian struggle for independence in the early 20th Century, Mahatma Gandhi popularized the philosophies of ahimsa non-violence and satyagraha non-violent resistance , which were influenced by the teachings of the Hindu Bhagavad Gita, as well as Jesus, Tolstoy, Thoreau and Ruskin.

## 9: Indian Philosophy

*Hindu Philosophy. Hindu philosophy (one of the main divisions of Indian philosophy) is traditionally seen through the prism of six different systems (called darshanas in Sanskrit) that are listed here and make up the main belief systems of Hinduism.*

A Painless Introduction A Painless Introduction This is a short book about ancient Indian philosophy for people who care more about the central questions of philosophy themselves â€" What exists? How should we live? How can we know? But current research in philosophy often refers to the ideas of ancient Indian philosophy, so it is worth knowing a bit about it. My book explains the bare essentials about ancient Indian philosophy you must understand to do philosophy today. This book does not assume you know much about philosophy. It will only tell you what you need to know to engage with philosophy today. Luckily, that knowledge can fit on just a few pages. My main sources are the historical works of Surendranath Dasgupta, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, and Satishchandra Chatterjee of whom you will hear echoes below , along with translations of the original works. Ancient India No ancient culture but Greece was more fertile in philosophy than India. Unfortunately, one cannot write a history of Indian philosophy the way one can write a history of Western philosophy. In Western philosophy, particular individuals are known to have advanced certain views, and the historian may arrange each philosopher chronologically and comment on how each thinker responded to their predecessors and how they influenced later philosophers. But ancient Indian philosophy is represented in a mass of texts for which the authors and dates of composition are mostly unknown. Chief among these texts are the Vedas, written from perhaps B. They consist mainly of praise hymns to nature gods and instructions for ritual, and exemplify a primitive pre-theism. The latest works among the Vedas, the Upanishads, were written after B. So early Indian philosophy is much foggier to us than is early Western philosophy. What, then, shall be our strategy? We will examine each major school of ancient Indian philosophy, and we will not speculate much about who influenced whom or when certain developments occurred. Indians distinguish two classes of Indian philosophies: The astika systems respect the Vedas to some degree. The nastika systems reject Vedic thought. Jainism, Buddhism, and Lokayata. Though forms of most of these schools still exist today, I will write of them in the past tense to refer to their ancient forms. In the West, philosophical schools tended to rise and fall, one after the other. But in India all these systems competed for adherents beside each other for centuries. But the systems themselves predate their sutras, probably by many centuries. Agreements Except for the Lokayata materialists, all these systems agreed about karma and reincarnation. When the fruits of karma cannot be experienced in the present life, the individual must be reincarnated â€" he must die and be reborn as a human or another being â€" to experience them. Most Indian systems also agreed on the doctrine of samsara: The goal of these systems was moksha or mukti: Except for Buddhism and Lokayata, the Indian systems agreed on the existence of a permanent soul, or atman. In most systems, it was a kind of purification of the soul that lead to moksha, though what this means varied from system to system. The Indian systems shared many ethical values, too. Generally, passions and desires were to be controlled, and harm was not to be done to any forms of life. The Indian conceptions of space and time were vast. The past stretched back into infinity, or at least for billions of years. The Earth was but one of millions of worlds in an infinite universe. Accordingly, Indian thought emphasized the smallness of Earth, the insignificance of worldly possessions, and the transient nature of human life. Perhaps most centrally, the ancient Indians did not see philosophy as a disinterested investigation of the nature of reality. Rather, philosophy was a practical matter: Lokayata Atheists and materialists were apparently common in ancient India, for the Hindu scriptures found it necessary to respond to the arguments of non-believers on many occasions. Lokayata held that perception is the only valid source of knowledge, for all other sources like testimony and inference are unreliable. Perception revealed only the material world, made of the four elements: Minds and consciousness were, too, the products of matter. Souls, gods, and the afterlife could not be perceived, and thus could not be said to exist. Religious rituals were useless, and scriptures contained no special insight. Thus, the only purpose of life was to enjoy pleasure and avoid pain. Critics described the

ethics of the Lokayata as egoistic, hedonistic, or even nihilistic. Some Lokayata were accidentalists, in that they thought the world was ruled by chance: But most Lokayata were naturalists. They believed things moved and transformed because of their inherent natures, according to lawful necessity. Their fundamental principle was nature svabhava. The earliest known Indian materialist was Brhaspati, whose dates are unknown. He had no positive system to advance, but merely denied orthodox views of theology, ethics, and dualism. He was quoted as saying: Ideas like generosity are the concepts of a stupid person. He who speaks of their existence, his words are empty and confused; a cry of desperation. Later Indian materialism is sometimes called Carvaka after the supposed author of the Barhaspatya sutras, which are now lost. One particularly interesting dialogue between an orthodox believer and a materialist was recorded in the Payasi Suttanta 6th century B. In it, a materialist named Payasi denies dualism, reincarnation, and karma. An orthodox thinker, Kassapa, challenges Payasi to prove that those things do not exist. First, Payasi says he has known some very evil men and some very good men, and he made them promise to tell him of their experiences if they died and were reincarnated. But many of them have died, and Payasi has not heard from any of them. So he doubts reincarnation. Kassapa replies that Payasi is foolish and evil, like a pregnant woman who cuts open her own belly to discover the sex of her child before it is born. Virtuous people have a reason for their Earthly life that Payasi cannot understand because he is foolish, Kassapa says. Finally, Payasi suggests a way to test the theory of dualism. They could put a living man into a large jar and seal it with leather and cement, then put it in a fire so the man inside is roasted. Then they could take the jar out of the fire and uncover the top to watch the soul escape. If no soul escapes, then man has no soul. But this would prove nothing, says Kassapa, because souls are invisible. Jainism The Jains replied to the Lokayata that if we are to reject testimony and inference because they sometimes mislead, then we must also reject perception because it, too, can mislead. So the Jains accepted inference assuming that the rules of correct reasoning are followed , and they accepted testimony when it came from a reliable authority. For the Jains, it was through perception that we know of the material world. But we also know the soul through inner perception, just as we perceive pain and pleasure by inner perception. Through inference we know consciousness cannot be material, for without consciousness matter alone could not be animated like living bodies are. And it was on the authority of all-knowing saints tirthankaras that the Jains claimed knowledge of spiritual matters. The Jains held that there are souls in humans, animals, plants, and even in dust particles perhaps an anticipation of microorganisms. Some souls are more conscious than others. Dust particles may have only a sense of touch, while men and higher animals have touch, sight, taste, smell, and hearing. But all souls are capable of consciousness. Unfortunately, the desires of souls attract tiny bits of matter that weigh them down. Only by removing its desires can a soul free itself from the bondage of matter and achieve happiness. What can free a soul from its desires? Right conduct consisted of abstinence from injury to life, from lying, from stealing, from sensual indulgence, and from attachment to earthly objects. When liberated from its desires, the soul may attain infinite knowledge, power, and bliss. This is the state achieved by the Jaina saints of the past, who led the way for others. Though all Indian darshana stressed non-violence ahimsa , this doctrine was most important to the Jains. Thus, the most radical Jaina might wear a mask to avoid inhaling gnats â€” not to avoid tasting a gnat but to avoid harming one. It was from the Jains that Gandhi inherited his insistence on non-violence, and from the Jains that many Hindu systems inherited vegetarianism. Jains believed that Jainism had always existed, but the earliest historical figures to whom we can ascribe a Jaina philosophy are Mahavira 6th century B. Jainism was an atheistic view, like Lokayata and Buddhism. As with Buddhism and the Hindu philosophies below, Jainism branched into an immense variety of religious worldviews, but in this short book we are only concerned with its ancient philosophical thought. Along with Muhammad, Jesus and Confucius, the Buddha became one of the most influential thinkers of all time without writing any texts. Instead, his sayings and doctrines were compiled later by his disciples, who unfortunately disagreed with each other on some points, and thus it is difficult to reconstruct the views of the historical Buddha. According to legend, Siddhartha was a prince who became dissatisfied with his life of luxury when he realized that every life eventually succumbs to sickness and death. After observing the joy of a compassionate monk, he renounced his princely life to seek a higher purpose. Finally, he achieved enlightenment under a bodhi-tree, and set out to teach what he had learned.

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