

## 1: Polarized Politics And Policy Consequences | Download eBook PDF/EPUB

*Consequences and Correction of America's Polarized Politics, held at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on January , We have benefited greatly from the presenta-*

Galston and Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Polarized in what sense? Congress is more polarized ideologically than it was just a generation ago. Activists in both parties have long been extremely polarized, and there are indications that the gap between them has widened even more in recent decades. Also, religiosity not to be confused with the denominational hostilities of the past has become a telling determinant of political orientations and voting behavior. All else equal, individuals who attend church frequently are more likely to regard themselves as conservatives and vote Republican. Put simply, in a polarized America most Democratic and Republican voters are, if not increasingly segregated geographically, decidedly at odds over a number of salient policy issues. Fiorina of Stanford University has observed, polarized politics are one thing, close division or partisan parity quite another. The conventional wisdom is that the electorate has been both deeply and closely divided during most of the national elections of the past decade. We argue that this proposition is valid to an extent. Its proponents often go on to claim, however, that the interaction between deep and close division is bound to create inertia. But as George W. Here is another important distinction: But an economic crisis, not a cultural one, was at the root of the polarization. Polarization in Perspective A plurality of the U. In , 21 percent of the voters described themselves as liberals, 34 percent said they were conservatives, and fully 45 percent were self-described moderates. Both presidential candidates amassed support from these voters. In fact, the reelection of President Bush was secured chiefly by his improved performance among swing voters such as married women, Hispanics, Catholics, and less frequent church attendeesâ€”not just aroused Protestant fundamentalists. President Bush endorsed the concept of civil unions in the course of the campaign, and about half of those who thought this solution should be the law of the land wound up voting for him. Initiatives to ban same-sex marriages were on the ballot in three battleground states, yet John Kerry still managed to carry two of the three. Political scientists Stephen Ansolabehere and Charles Stewart III carefully examined county-level election returns and discovered an irony: In the midst of the continuing partisan schism, a recent analysis shows that Republicans are consistently winning among those voters more than 60 percent of the electorate who believe that policy on abortion should be more selective. They are colorful but crude. Plenty of states ought to be purple. Some red states, such as Tennessee and Mississippi, send at least as many Democrats as Republicans to the House of Representatives. Michigan and Pennsylvaniaâ€”two of the biggest blue states in the last electionâ€”send more Republicans than Democrats. North Dakota is blood red Bush ran off with 63 percent of the vote there , yet its entire congressional delegation is composed of Democrats. On election night, Bush also swept all but a half-dozen counties in Montana. There have been long stretches of American history in which conflicts were far worse. Epic struggles were waged between advocates of slavery and abolitionists, between agrarian populists and urban manufacturing interests at the end of the nineteenth century, and between industrial workers and owners of capital well into the first third of the twentieth century. Yet what those now nostalgically pining for a more tranquil past remember are the more recent intervals of consensus. We have to ask: Four decades ago, cities were burning across the United States. A sitting president, one presidential candidate, and the leader of the civil rights movement were assassinated. Another sitting president was driven from office, another presidential candidate was shot, and a hail of bullets felled antiwar demonstrators at Kent State University. Badly in need of a reality check, popularized renditions of the polarization narrative were subjected to a more systematic assessment a couple of years ago in a book provocatively titled *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. Ideologues of the left or rightâ€”that is, persons with a Weltanschauung, or whose politics consistently form an overarching world view that tilts to extremesâ€”are conspicuous on the fringes of the two parties and among political elites, but scarcely among the public at large. Indeed, sentiments there appear to be moderating, not polarizing, on various hot-button issues. Moreover, the authors argued, the moderate consensus seems almost ubiquitous. The inhabitants of red states and blue states differ little on matters such as gender equity, fair treatment of blacks in employment,

capital punishment, and the merits of environmental protection. No knowledgeable observer doubts that the American public is less divided than the political agitators and vocal elective office-seekers who claim to represent it. The interesting question, though, is, how substantial are the portions of the electorate that heed their opinion leaders, and thus might be hardening their political positions? Even though the mass electorate has long formed three comparably sized blocs 29 percent identifying themselves as Republicans, 33 percent as Democrats, and almost all the rest as independents, the attributes of the Democratic and Republican identifiers have changed. They are considerably more cohesive ideologically than just a few decades ago. Since then, those shares have declined precipitously. As Princeton University political scientist Larry Bartels has demonstrated, party affiliation is a much stronger predictor of voting behavior in recent presidential elections than it was in earlier ones. A paltry 12 percent of Democrats concurred. What counts, in other words, is the distance between their respective sets of convictions. On the issues that mattered, the distance was considerable. Consider the main one: Democrats assigned roughly equal priority to the war on terrorism and protecting American jobs 86 percent and 89 percent, respectively. By comparison, Republicans gave far greater weight to fighting terrorism than to worker protection. Yet, as of March, nearly seven out of ten Republicans still perceived the U. Two-thirds of Democrats but only 27 percent of Republicans felt the United States should bring its troops home as soon as possible. Abramowitz of Emory University and Kyle Saunders of Colorado State University report that 70 percent of Democrats, but just 11 percent of Republicans, typically favored diplomacy over the use of force. On major questions of domestic policy, the difference was only a little less pronounced. The issue of health insurance, for example, ranked high for 66 percent of the Democrats, but for only 15 percent of the Republicans. Wade decision, no domestic issue has been more contentious. And no other issue has played a bigger role in mobilizing observant religious voters a force about which we will have more to say later. A majority of Americans accept abortion under various circumstances. But the majority wobbles when abortion is framed as an absolutely unrestricted right to choose. The persistence of this dichotomy is noteworthy. Fiorina and his colleagues, in fact, provide perhaps the most emblematic evidence of the ongoing rift. When people were asked in whether abortion should be called an act of murder, 46 percent said yes and exactly 46 percent demurred. The question is of importance because if voters tend to migrate geographically toward like-minded voters, the resulting political segregation of Democrats and Republicans could increasingly lock in their differences: According to Fiorina and his associates, no wide gulf separates the residents of Republican-leaning red states and Democratic-leaning blue states. But states are large aggregates in which the minority party almost always obtains one-third or more of the vote. This raises the question of what constitutes a significant difference among states. Consider some of the data Fiorina himself presents from the election. In red states, Republican identifiers slightly outnumbered Democrats, but in blue states, Democrats enjoyed an edge of 15 percentage points. In red states, the share of the electorate that was conservative was 20 points larger than the share characterized as liberal. Blue state residents were 15 points less likely to attend church regularly, 11 points more supportive of abortion rights, 12 points more likely to favor stricter gun control, and 16 points more likely to strongly favor gays in the military. In there were only fifteen states in which George H. Bush won with a vote share greater than 5 percentage points above his national average, and only nine states in which his share was more than 5 points below his national average. Put another way, twenty-six states were within a 5 point range of his. By contrast, in, George W. Bush carried twenty states with a share of the vote more than 5 points above his national share, in twelve states he ended up more than 5 points below it, and in just eighteen states his share fell within the 5 point range. In the election of, which produced a near tie in the popular vote between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon, a remarkable thirty-seven states yielded results within 5 percentage points of the national margin. In, another election year with a razor-thin popular vote margin, only twenty-one states ended up within this range. These results do not reflect only the polarizing consequences of George W. In the race between Bill Clinton and Bob Dole, only twenty-two states were within 5 points of the national margin, nearly identical to the result. In fact, the past three presidential elections have produced three of the four most polarized state results in the past half-century. The Reagan-Carter election of is the fourth. One way to get closer to developments on the ground is to examine the share of the population living in places where voters

sided with one party or the other by lopsided margins. Compare the three closest elections of the past generation. In 1976, when Jimmy Carter beat incumbent Gerald Ford by a scant 2 percentage points, only 27 percent of voters lived in landslide counties where one candidate wins by 20 points or more. In 2000, when Al Gore and George W. Bush fought to a virtual draw, 45 percent of voters lived in such counties. By 2004, that figure had risen even further, to 48 percent. Compare this low figure to 1952, when there were eighty-six such districts, or 1960, when there were more than a hundred. That separation is not in doubt. In the 1950s, the ideological orientations of many Democratic and Republican members of Congress overlapped. Today, the congruence has nearly vanished. By the end of the 1990s, almost every Republican in the House was more conservative than every Democrat. And increasingly, their leaders leaned to extremes more than the backbenchers have. Outside Congress, activists in the political parties have diverged sharply from one another in recent decades.

### 2: Polarized Politics and Policy Consequences - Diana Epstein, John David Graham - Google Books

*The authors discuss the need for research to examine the effects of partisan polarization on the daily lives of U.S. citizens, how much it complicates the conduct of defense and foreign policy, and precisely how it affects different policy areas.*

Polarization politics In the world of politics , polarization or polarisation can refer to the divergence of political attitudes to ideological extremes. Polarization can refer to such divergence like public opinion or even to such divergence within certain groups. When polarization occurs in a two-party system , like the United States , moderate voices often lose power and influence. Polarization as a state refers to the extent to which opinions on an issue are opposed in relation to some theoretical maximum. Polarization as a process refers to the increase in such opposition over time. In either context, opinions and policy positions are characterized by strict adherence to party lines. Elite polarization and popular polarization can occur at the same time or independently of each other. A central issue in the study of political polarization is investigating the relationship between elite polarization and popular polarization, particularly any causal relationships between the two. Polarized political parties are internally cohesive and unified, programmatic, and ideologically distinct, and are typically found in a parliamentary system of democratic governance. This leads to the conflation of political parties and ideologies e. For many years, political scientists measured polarization by examining the ratings of party members published by interest groups, but now, most analyze roll-call voting patterns to determine trends in party-line voting and party unity. There is much more research on polarization in Congress than on polarization in the other branches of government or in state governments. Members of the electorate and general public typically become less moderate in cases of popular polarization. Party polarization Some scholars argue that diverging parties have been one of the major driving forces of polarization as policy platforms have become more distant. This theory is based on recent trends in the United States Congress , where the majority party prioritizes the positions that are most aligned with its party platform and political ideology. For example, after the passage of the Voting Rights Act , the number of conservative Democrats in Congress decreased, while the number of conservative Republicans increased. Within the electorate during the s, Southern Democrats shifted toward the Republican Party , showing polarization amongst both the elites and the electorate of both main parties. As a result, political leaders may be more likely to take polarized stances. He theorizes that the extremism of public ideological movement is the basis for the creation of highly polarized multiparty systems. Sartori named this polarizing phenomenon polarized pluralism and claimed it would lead to further polarization in many opposing directions as opposed to in simply two directions, as in a polarized two-party system over policy issues. After *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* , special interests in the U. These scholars argue that a single donor who is polarized and contributes large sums to a campaign does not seem to usually drive a politician toward political extremes. They argue that there is a link between public differences in ideology and the polarization of representatives, but that an increase in preference differences is usually temporary and ultimately results in compromise. Fiorina , posits the hypothesis that polarization is a phenomenon which does not hold for the public, and instead is formulated by commentators to draw further division in government. According to Layman et al. Republicans and Democrats also crosses into the religious cultural divide. They claim that Democrats have generally become more moderate in religious views whereas Republicans have become more traditionalist. For example, political scientists have shown that in the United States, voters who identify as Republican are more likely to vote for a strongly evangelical candidate than Democratic voters. Dutch Afrikaners , white English, and native Africans split based on racial divisions, causing polarization along ethnic lines. As a result, the disenfranchised working class aligned with extreme socialist leader Hugo Chavez. This results in elected representatives who represent more polarized beliefs. This effect is more modest when analyzed over multiple election cycles and in the United States as a whole. House of Representatives between and The impact of redistricting on political polarization is measurable, but over broad areas and time periods, the effect of redistricting on polarization is found to be minimal. Political scientists argue that this has

particularly affected the voting public in the last three decades, as previously less partisan viewers are given more polarized news media choices. These programs tend to appeal to partisan viewers who watch the polarized programming as a self-confirming source for their ideologies. First, polarization increases gridlock in Congress and lowers the number of moderates in Congress, which limits the amount of legislation passed, decreases bipartisanship and can lead to policy inaction. Polarization has negatively influenced the proceedings of Congress by giving rise to an increase in the use of closed rules on the floor, such as limiting amendments, excluding minority party members from committee deliberations and increased use of the hold on executive and judicial appointments and the filibuster on non-contentious policy issues. This limits progress and results in less legislation being passed. Some political scientists argue that the growing polarization in government has directly contributed to political polarization in the electorate. For the United States in particular, scholars state that as polarization increases, confirmation rates of judges decrease. First, when the United States conducts relations abroad and appears divided, allies are less likely to trust its promises and enemies are more likely to predict its weaknesses. This is due to the fact that the general population cannot easily access as much information on foreign affairs as on domestic matters, so it becomes more reliant upon cues from the political elite, which has grown increasingly polarized. There are four primary arguments against the validity of political polarization: Limitations of the two-party system By solely acknowledging voting patterns, one cannot make an accurate conclusion as to the presence or absence of political polarization, because in the United States, there is a limited number of Presidential candidates in the two-party system. To assume that the majority of voters are mostly or completely in agreement with the plethora of political issues within their party is a false assumption. However, these voters most often align with their party because of the limited choice of candidates, and to do otherwise i. Civil War, [6] numerous scholars explain that much evidence shows there is a relatively stable public opinion on the majority of sociopolitical issues. Nonetheless, many scholars explain that it is not an increase in ideological coherence among individuals which separates them; it is the partisan extremism i. Republican which eventually separates voters into one party or the other. Westernized focus Much like many academic studies, political polarization scholars often are too narrowly focused within one nation and, thus, make broad generalizations regarding the concept from a national study. To have a better picture of the presence or absence of political polarization, scholars must consider widening the scope of their studies to the international contexts.

## 3: Polarization (politics)

*To elucidate the impact of polarization on the daily lives of U.S. citizens, the research community may need to modify its benchmarks for what constitutes a successful public policy.*

November 14, last updated The Romney campaign has invested heavily in ads on Spanish-language media in swing states from Colorado to Virginia, and has deployed his son Craig, who speaks Spanish, to help court Latino voters. These efforts underscore the fact that Latinos are the fastest-growing ethnic group in the United States and a crucial voting bloc in the election. Unfortunately for Romney, the outreach is also unlikely to alter his chances of winning over this constituency, which supports President Barack Obama and other Democratic candidates by a ratio of more than 2-to-1. With a decisive edge among Latino voters, the challenge for the Obama campaign has been how to energize these supporters enough to turn up at the polls. Demonstrating the advantages of incumbency, Obama issued an executive order -- known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program DACA -- in June to grant immunity from deportation for some undocumented immigrants who came to the U. He also has reminded pro-immigration audiences that the chief hurdle to comprehensive immigration reform and some form of legal relief for undocumented immigrants has been the resolute opposition of congressional Republicans. Even as the Obama and Romney camps both try to curry favor with immigrant voters and kindred ethnic groups, especially Latinos, the divide between their respective parties on unauthorized immigration is profound. Yet both also have been vague about the timing, content and ultimate chances for success of a policy overhaul. Immigration reform presents one of the most bedeviling issues on the public agenda today. Against this backdrop, state governments and federal courts have emerged as pivotal actors in U. Political Divides and Policy Stalemate The rival interests and values unleashed by unauthorized immigration make the formation of majority coalitions in Congress a tall order. National policymakers are well aware of the tortured path that earlier reformers traversed to secure comprehensive legislation on illegal immigration. False starts, grueling negotiations and unappealing compromises have been par for the course, at least during the past quarter-century. Past reform campaigns also have encouraged pitched battles both within and between each major party. For much of the 1980s, Rep. Peter Rodino, a liberal Democrat, waged a quixotic campaign for employer sanctions legislation to discourage unauthorized entries. This effort to punish employers who knowingly hired undocumented aliens was strongly endorsed by the AFL-CIO and labor unions. James Eastland, a conservative Democrat, refused to allow the Judiciary Committee he chaired to take action. When Rodino again pressed the initiative later in the decade, new resistance emerged in both the House and Senate from liberal Democrats, who warned that the measure would lead to job discrimination against Latinos, Asians and anyone who looked or sounded foreign. Most Latino organizations and civil rights groups were now lined up in opposition to employer sanctions. During the 1990s, the bipartisan team of Republican Sen. Alan Simpson and Democratic Rep. Romano Mazzoli took the lead in pressing for immigration reform. Early in the decade, the pair introduced omnibus legislation on illegal and legal immigration. However, the measure met strong resistance from a broad coalition of business interests, ethnic and civil rights groups, the American Civil Liberties Union, religious lobbies and a new immigrant rights organization, the National Immigration Forum. In Washington, opposition to the Simpson-Mazzoli initiative arose on both the right and left: Key figures in the Reagan administration saw employer sanctions and national identification cards working at cross-purposes with its regulatory relief agenda, while House Democrats, led by the Hispanic and black caucuses, raised familiar concerns about the discriminatory impact of sanctions and other provisions. The political gridlock was overcome by a package of watered-down employer sanctions, legalization for undocumented aliens living in the country since Jan. Reform campaigns during the past decade reveal familiar ideological conflicts on how to address illegal immigration. Indeed, they capture fundamentally different assumptions and beliefs about how to define the problem. In recent years, powerful organized interests and competing constituencies -- ranging from agribusinesses, service industries and Microsoft to labor unions, ethnic and civil rights advocates, church groups and anti-immigrant activists of the Minuteman Project and the Tea Party movement -- regularly mobilize and clash over immigration reform. As in the past, the resulting battles not only pit

interests groups and constituencies allied with the Republican Party against those allied with the Democratic Party, they also divide organized interests within these partisan coalitions. For pro-immigration liberals, the problem is not the presence of millions of undocumented aliens in the United States, but rather their status as vulnerable, second-class persons. The chief imperative for these activists is to make the estimated 12 million unauthorized migrants living in the country eligible for legal residence. Economic protectionists warn that undocumented immigration has enhanced the wealth of corporate and professional America with little concern for the consequences for blue-collar workers and the unemployed. These critics endorse sanctions against unscrupulous employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens, and they vehemently oppose guest-worker programs, which they associate with a captive workforce subject to exploitation, abuse and permanent marginalization. Powerful business groups also oppose employer sanctions and eligibility verification requirements as an unwelcome and unfair regulatory burden placed on American businesses large and small. Finally, border hawks today see the illegal immigration problem as nothing short of an unprecedented breakdown of American sovereignty, which compromises national security, the rule of law, job opportunities for citizens, public education and social services. Amnesty or legalization proposals inspire hostile resistance from this camp, which views them as unethical rewards to those who have broken the rules and as stimulants to new waves of undocumented immigrants anticipating similar treatment. Likewise, guest-worker programs are scorned by these activists, because many guest workers historically have remained in the country illegally. Border hawks believe enforcement must come first. They endorse a strategy of attrition that uses targeted deportation efforts, workplace crackdowns, identity checks and denial of social services and other public benefits to persuade many unauthorized migrants to return home. Major immigration reform in the United States has routinely required strange bedfellow coalitions to succeed. Yet it is difficult to imagine more widely divergent definitions of a public policy problem, or, concomitantly, more disparate blueprints for reform. Clashing interests and ideals have meant that when policy initiatives are designed to meet the demands of one important constituency, they invariably incur the wrath of others. The result has often been legislative paralysis, leaving in place a status quo in which unauthorized immigrants are a significant share of new inflows. Implementation Failures and Inertia: Fostering Cynicism and Porous Borders The capacity and will of the federal government to enforce its immigration laws has long been beleaguered in the United States by a tradition of inadequate resources, erratic enforcement and poor oversight. Nearly all advanced industrial democracies have struggled to control their borders, and migration scholars remind us that the presence of undocumented immigrants is inevitable. Yet the recognition that governments cannot eliminate illegal immigration does not mean that they are incapable of exercising a measure of control over their borders. Moreover, policy choices can nurture and entrench the forces that spur large-scale illegal immigration, with policy inertia in particular often having the effect of expanding unauthorized flows. Equally important, past implementation failures have bred deep mistrust and cynicism among ordinary citizens and enforcement-minded lawmakers that the federal government will control its borders. This skepticism is a major impediment to immigration reform today. In 1986, Congress eliminated the U. These changes led to increased unauthorized inflows almost immediately, and by the early 1990s Congress began debating new immigration control measures, as noted previously. Even following passage of the IRCA in 1986, failures in implementing the reforms have helped fuel the dramatic expansion of illegal immigration in recent decades, with the population of illegal immigrants increasing roughly fourfold between 1980 and 2000. Implementation failures have also raised profound doubts among activists, policymakers and citizens that the federal government either can or will adequately control its borders. Edward Kennedy and John McCain were upended by skeptics in both parties who doubted its enforcement provisions would succeed. There was no border security to speak of, no employer sanctions to speak of, and there was no enforcement. Flawed Policy Solutions A final constraint for political leaders tackling illegal immigration is that many of the most prominent policy prescriptions on the table today appear inadequate, too costly, unpopular or likely to have unintended consequences. A few examples from recent immigration reform are illustrative. Amnesty or legalization programs are designed to adjust the status of undocumented immigrants living and working in the country for a given duration of time, but they may serve as a magnet for new unauthorized entries by migrants hoping for similar treatment in the

future. Enforcement proposals feature their own share of potential woes. Creating strict, militarized control over the 2-mile U. Adequate enforcement will also slow the movement of tourists and commercial goods, and it will reinforce the incentives for those who entered the country illegally to avoid returning home and thereby risk not getting back in. The notions of mass deportation campaigns or systematic internal enforcement draw little support in opinion polls, would require major new budget commitments and could involve significant incursions upon the civil liberties of legal immigrants and citizens. Along similar lines, effective employer sanctions would entail new mechanisms for verifying employee eligibility that would infringe on privacy and result in higher costs for businesses and consumers alike. Whereas recent reforms of legal immigration have included something to please almost everyone mobilized on the issue, comprehensive initiatives on illegal immigration promise plenty of bitter pills to go around. States, Courts and the Quest for Reform Few issues on the national agenda today are more challenging or contentious than illegal immigration. For more than a decade, the federal government has been unable to come up with a solution that meets the demands of those favoring tougher border and workplace enforcement to discourage unauthorized flows of people, while also satisfying those concerned about legalizing and integrating the more than 11 million undocumented immigrants now living in the country. Gridlock in Washington over immigration reform has made state and local governments restive, with many protesting that this inaction has significant implications for their budgets, public safety, the utilization and quality of their services and the character of their communities. Amid intense media scrutiny, bruising debates and legal uncertainty, a number of state and local leaders have seized the initiative by adopting their own policy responses. Critics charged that the measure would spur racial profiling by targeting people who look or sound foreign, especially anyone of Latino descent. Defenders retorted that strong action was needed, and that law enforcement would be sensible and respectful in enforcing the law. Within days of its signing, SB was challenged in federal court as an unconstitutional violation of equal protection, due process and the supremacy of the national government over immigration matters. In particular, the court struck provisions making it a crime to be in Arizona without legal papers; making it a crime for undocumented immigrants to apply for or get a job in the state; and allowing for the warrantless arrest of individuals if there is probable cause that they committed crimes that could lead to their deportation. It is expected that the implementation of this last provision will generate a new round of litigation that ultimately challenges its constitutionality. Undaunted by the controversy that swirled around SB, other states have followed suit with legislation requiring police to check the immigration status of criminal suspects; compelling businesses to check the legal status of workers using a federal system called E-verify; and forcing applicants for public benefits to verify eligibility with new documentation of lawful presence. In Alabama, for instance, a state where the undocumented immigrant population grew fivefold to roughly , in the past 10 years, Republican Gov. Along with familiar law enforcement, employment and public benefits provisions, the Alabama law went further than most in mandating that schools determine the legal status of students and making it a crime to knowingly rent or give a ride to an undocumented immigrant. While restrictive laws in states like Arizona and Alabama continue to steal most of the headlines, numerous other states have adopted very different approaches. From New York to California, state lawmakers have passed bills aimed at helping legal and undocumented immigrants in housing, health, employment, education and other areas of integration. In the winter of , Utah legislators passed a package of bills providing for a temporary worker program, law enforcement, public benefits and immigrant services. To date, this sort of bipartisan compromise has been impossible in Washington. Among ordinary citizens, at least two key constituencies remain hostile toward both legalization and relatively generous immigration rules: The economic downturn and growing American skepticism about the benefits of globalization have created additional hurdles to reform. At the same time, Latinos and Asians also represent important constituencies whose demographic gains and support for legalization and visa reform create countervailing political incentives. The prospects for comprehensive reform will increase as the political influence of Latino and Asian voters grows, and demographic trends make it easy to predict that over time national lawmakers will agree on sweeping policy innovations. Today, however, the scope of conflict in American politics over illegal immigration and the future of undocumented aliens is greater than it has been for decades, if not ever. The national candidates who triumph in the election

will have even less room to maneuver on this issue than their predecessors, even as the choices they make as they try to navigate the immigration policy minefield will have lasting social, economic and political implications. Tichenor is the Philip H. He has written extensively on U.

## 4: Political Polarization | Pew Research Center

*Story time just got better with Prime Book Box, a subscription that delivers hand-picked children's books every 1, 2, or 3 months â€” at 40% off List Price.*

One of the most striking macroeconomic developments during the last three decades is the rise and persistence of large fiscal deficits in a number of countries. Despite recent major fiscal reforms around the world, many countries suffer from recurrent large fiscal imbalances that often reflect lack of fiscal discipline. Why do some countries have recurrent fiscal deficit or volatility problems, while others do not? What factors are most important in explaining cross-country variation in fiscal outcomes? How are they related to growth or inflation? This book presents new, rigorous, theoretical and empirical studies on these fiscal issues, and highlights social polarization as an essential organizing principle in a political economy approach. Also, it discusses how institutional constraints may favourably affect fiscal dynamics in the presence of social polarization. University of Chicago Press Format Available: Major polls all report that "trust in government is at an all-time low" in the United States. At the same time, polarization is at an all-time high. Drawing on a cornucopia of evidence and data, the authors show that since the early s polarization in the electorate has increasingly been rooted not in ideological or policy differences, but, for the first time, in extremely negative feelings toward the other party. To an unprecedented degree, Republicans and Democrats simply do not like each other. In order to pass legislation, however, a public consensus is needed to push policymakers toward action. Some proportion of the out-party partisans and independents have to have enough trust in government to make an ideological sacrifice and form that consensus. As the authors persuasively explain, this is no longer occurring. Far from being a long-term and relatively stable psychological trait, political trust is highly variable and contingent. Political trust increases, for example, when the public identifies international issues as most important as during the s and 60s. They also find that the effects of economic performance on political trust are asymmetric: Ultimately, Hetherington and Rudolph have to conclude that it is unlikely political trust will ever to return to s levels a high point in the US for any length of time unless international concerns again dominate politics and, just as important, the economy becomes consistently strong. Jong Ki Kim Language:

## 5: The Mischiefs of Faction: Partisan Polarization in Congress: Causes, Consequences, Solutions?

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Polarization as a state refers to the extent to which opinions on an issue are opposed in relation to some theoretical maximum. Polarization as a process refers to the increase in such opposition over time. In either context, opinions and policy positions are characterized by strict adherence to party lines. Elite polarization and popular polarization can occur at the same time or independent of each other. A central issue in the study of political polarization is investigating the relationship between elite polarization and popular polarization, particularly any causal relationships between the two. Polarized political parties are internally cohesive, unified, programmatic, and ideologically distinct; they are typically found in a parliamentary system of democratic governance. This leads to the conflation of political parties and ideologies i. For many years, political scientists measured polarization by examining the ratings of party members published by interest groups, but now, most analyze roll-call voting patterns to determine trends in party-line voting and party unity. There is much more research on polarization in Congress than on polarization in the other branches of government or in state governments. They find that polarization has increased dramatically since Members of the electorate and general public typically become less moderate in cases of popular polarization. Political scientists, though, generally agree that such accounts are too simplistic and ignore the complex factors that can account for polarization. Party polarization[ edit ] Some scholars argue that diverging parties has been one of the major driving forces of polarization as policy platforms have become more distant. This theory is based on recent trends in the United States Congress , where the majority party prioritizes the positions that are most aligned with its party platform and political ideology. For example, after the passage of the Voting Rights Act , the number of conservative Democrats in Congress decreased, while the number of conservative Republicans increased. Within the electorate during the s, Southern Democrats shifted toward the Republican Party , showing polarization among both the elites and the electorate of both main parties. As a result, political leaders may be more likely to take polarized stances. He theorizes that the extremism of public ideological movement is the basis for the creation of highly polarized multiparty systems. Sartori named this polarizing phenomenon polarized pluralism and claimed it would lead to further polarization in many opposing directions as opposed to in simply two directions, as in a polarized two-party system over policy issues. After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission , special interests in the U. La Raja and David L. Wiltse, note that this does not necessarily hold true for mass donors to political campaigns. These scholars argue a single donor who is polarized and contributes large sums to a campaign does not seem to usually drive a politician toward political extremes. They argue that there is a link between public differences in ideology and the polarization of representatives, but that an increase in preference differences is usually temporary and ultimately results in compromise. Fiorina , posits the hypothesis that polarization is a phenomenon which does not hold for the public, and instead is formulated by commentators to draw further division in government. According to Layman et al. Republicans and Democrats also crosses into the religious cultural divide. They claim that Democrats have generally become more moderate in religious views whereas Republicans have become more traditionalist. For example, political scientists have shown that in the United States, voters who identify as Republican are more likely to vote for a strongly evangelical candidate than Democratic voters. Dutch Afrikaners , white English, and native Africans split based on racial divisions, causing polarization along ethnic lines. It has been linked to the rise in polarization by some political scientists. This results in elected representatives who represent more polarized beliefs. This effect is more modest when analyzed over multiple election cycles and in the United States as a whole. House of Representatives between and The impact of redistricting on political polarization is measurable, but over broad areas and time periods, the effect of redistricting on polarization is found to be minimal. Political scientists argue that this has particularly affected the voting public in the last three decades, as previously less partisan viewers are given more polarized news

media choices. These programs tend to appeal to partisan viewers who watch the polarized programming as a self-confirming source for their ideologies. Other research also shows that online media does not contribute to the increased polarization of opinions. This suggests that subtle factors like the mood and tone of partisan news sources may have a large effect on how the same information is interpreted. Effects[ edit ] The implications of political polarization "are not entirely clear and may include some benefits as well as detrimental consequences. Westwood state that individuals do not necessarily become polarized through media because they choose their own exposure, which tends to already align with their views. Some argue that the growing polarization in government has directly contributed to political polarization in the electorate, [9] but this is not unanimous. A bulk of the research into global polarization comes from Europe. One example includes Pasokification in Greece. This is the trend from a shift from the center-left to a more far-left stance. Parties who have made the shift left have recently shown a decline in the voting booths, evidence their supporters are uneasy of the future. In those countries, there is heavy anti-Islam sentiment and the rise of populist commentary. The general population of the right in these countries tends to hold onto these more aggressive stances and pulls the parties further to the right. These more polarized parties grow from the discontent of more moderate parties inability to provide progressive changes in either direction. Critiques[ edit ] There have long been numerous scholarly debates that argue over the concept of political polarization, both in whether it is valid, and how it can accurately be measured. There are four primary arguments against the validity of political polarization: Limitations of the two-party system[ edit ] By solely acknowledging voting patterns, one cannot make an accurate conclusion as to the presence or absence of political polarization, because in the United States, there is a limited number of presidential candidates in the two-party system. To assume that the majority of voters are mostly or completely in agreement with the plethora of political issues within their party is a false assumption. However, these voters most often align with their party because of the limited choice of candidates, and to do otherwise i. Civil War, [6] numerous scholars explain that much evidence shows there is a relatively stable public opinion on the majority of sociopolitical issues. Nonetheless, many scholars explain that it is not an increase in ideological coherence among individuals which separates them; it is the partisan extremism i. Republican which eventually separates voters into one party or the other. Westernized focus[ edit ] Much like many academic studies, political polarization scholars often are too narrowly focused within one nation and, thus, make broad generalizations regarding the concept from a national study. To have a better picture of the presence or absence of political polarization, scholars must consider widening the scope of their studies to the international contexts.

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