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Block 6 Objective 5: Public administrators and public policy Public policy is a goal-directed course of action, taken by government, to deal with a public problem. Governments use public policy to solve a social problem housing, welfare , to counter a threat crime, illegal drugs , or to pursue an objective revenue generation. Public policy, then, is a choice made by official government bodies and agencies that affect the public interest. Public policymaking involves a series of activities that leads ultimately to a policy decision and the application of that decision. There are three major types of public policy: Each type has its own special purpose. Regulatory Public Policy A major goal of regulatory policy is to maintain order and prohibit behaviors that endanger society. Government accomplishes this goal by restricting citizens, groups, or corporations from engaging in those actions that negatively affect the political and social order. Examples include attempts to administer voting procedures, provide traffic ordinances, and prohibit people from using certain drugs. Another goal of regulatory policy is to protect economic activities and business markets by prohibiting industry from practicing activities detrimental to the free market, such as the creation of monopolies. Regulatory policy is also evident in the use of laws designed to protect the workplace and the environment. Distributive Public Policy Distributive policy refers to the provision of benefits to citizens, groups, or corporations. Governments also use distributive policy to encourage certain activities. Tax abatements and farm subsidies to promote economic development, and tax write-offs for homeowners to promote the housing industry, are good examples. Distributive policy is also evident when the government promotes the purchase of U. Redistributive Public Policy The major purpose of redistributive policy is to promote equality. The government redistributes societal wealth from one group to another group. This occurs when the government provides benefits directly to citizens through social programs such as welfare. Progressive taxation, where tax rates increase as your income increases, is another example of a redistributive policy. The Process Scholars have identified seven stages in the policymaking process Wayne et al. The first, and often the most critical, is problem recognition. Before an issue can be considered, policy makers must recognize it as a problem requiring public attention. The second stage, agenda setting , means that a government body empowered to resolve the problem considers the issue. Interest group strength, political support, and the severity of the issue determine whether the issue reaches the political agenda. Our government could address many problems. Not all problems, however, are visible political issues. For many years the intelligence agencies of our government, for example, were concerned about international terrorism. Unfortunately, few people throughout our society paid attention. More pressing concerns dominated the political agenda. Sadly, it took the activities of September 11, , to make terrorism a significant political issue. By policy agenda , we mean the range of issues the political system is addressing. There is not an official agenda for all of government, so we are not referring to a formal document. Once an issue is on the agenda, the institutions of government will consider different policy solutions. No one necessarily takes quick action. Being on the agenda can be a long road for the issue to travel. Congress, for example, struggled with immigration reform for years and it is still struggling with problems associated with Social Security. Once one institution takes action, though, it is likely that the others will be drawn into policymaking, too. For example, if Congress passes a bill creating a new program or amending an old one, an administrative agency will probably have to write regulations for it. It is also likely that there will be a court challenge to the way the agency is carrying out the program. Policy formulation , the third stage, involves the shaping of specific proposals addressing the problem. Formulating policy in a way that maximizes official and public support for the measure is important because it helps to ensure its adoption and practice. The fourth stage is policy adoption. This is the most political stage of the policy process. It involves bargaining, compromising, and negotiation. Seldom does a proposal emerge from the process as originally formulated. Politicians often use policy-negotiating tactics such as pork barrel politics and logrolling during this stage. Policy implementation, the fifth stage, involves putting the policy into action. This is normally the

responsibility of an administrative board or agency. Policy implementation is often left to the discretion of the administrative agency, with the Congress playing an oversight role. The sixth stage of the process is policy evaluation. Evaluation can take place when an agency assigns staff members to examine how well a program is working. Using social science methodology, the staff will try to design a valid means of collecting data to find out how well the program is addressing the original policy issue. Administrators may also hire outside consultants to do evaluations if in-house personnel are not available. In a less formal way, evaluation also takes place through communication from the field. They will encourage the headquarters in Washington to change those policies that are not working. Change can also come from new agency regulations or by asking the Congress to revise the statute. The final stage is policy termination. Government must cancel policies when they become dysfunctional or unnecessary. Government, however, often neglects this stage. Consequently, the size, scope, and influence of government grow. Public Administrators as Policy Makers

Chief executives, the legislature, the courts, various linkage institutions, and private citizens are players in the policymaking process. Public administrators are also influential because they often play a role in each stage of the process. Administrators are responsible for delivering services to the public. As such, they often identify problems not envisioned by those who enact public policy. Thus, administrators may call for the legislature to place the problem on the political agenda. Since they are the experts in policy delivery and are closest to the constituency, policy makers often address their demands. Administrators can also affect policy during the formulation stage because they have the information concerning the substantive impact of the policy. They also have the expertise to decide how policy makers can change the policy to meet the needs of most of the possible policy beneficiaries. Administrators most affect policy development during the implementation stage. Because legislation or executive orders establishing policy are normally vague, administrators often specify policy as they carry it out. Legislative bodies are often understaffed and without the necessary expertise to comprehend all facets of program needs. Therefore, they often delegate policymaking tasks to the administrative agencies with the required expertise. Thus, administrators not only carry out policy as an official part of their daily operation, but they also polish it.

2: Public Administration

Suggested Citation: "POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE s." National Research Council. Population Redistribution and Public www.enganchecubano.comgton, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: /

Flight and expulsion of Germans – 50 Germans being deported from the Sudetenland in the aftermath of World War II Historically, expulsions of Jews and of Romani people reflect the power of state control that has been applied as a tool, in the form of expulsion edicts, laws, mandates, etc. The most famous such event was the expulsion of Jews from Spain in Another event, in , was the Expulsion of the Moriscos , the final transfer of , Muslims out of Spain, after more than a century of Catholic trials, segregation, and religious restrictions. He expelled the Poles and Jews who formed there the majority of the population. In Austria, they succeeded in driving out most of the Jewish population. However, increasing foreign resistance brought this plan to a virtual halt. Later on, Jews were transferred to ghettos and eventually to death camps. The Germans abducted about 12 million people from almost twenty European countries; about two-thirds of whom came from Eastern Europe. The same applied to the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line , where German citizens were transferred to Germany. Germans were expelled from areas annexed by the Soviet Union and Poland as well as territories of Czechoslovakia , Hungary , Romania and Yugoslavia. The Statistisches Bundesamt estimates the loss of life at 2. Population transfer to Soviet Ukraine occurred from September to May approx. During the Yugoslav wars in the s, the breakup of Yugoslavia caused large population transfers, mostly involuntary. Because it was a conflict fueled by ethnic nationalism , people of minority ethnicities generally fled towards regions that their ethnicity was the majority. The phenomenon of " ethnic cleansing " was first seen in Croatia but soon spread to Bosnia. Since the Bosnian Muslims had no immediate refuge, they were arguably the hardest hit by the ethnic violence. United Nations tried to create safe areas for Muslim populations of eastern Bosnia but in the Srebrenica massacre and elsewhere, the peacekeeping troops failed to protect the safe areas, resulting in the massacre of thousands of Muslims. The Dayton Accords ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina , fixing the borders between the two warring parties roughly to those established by the autumn of One immediate result of the population transfer after the peace deal was a sharp decline in ethnic violence in the region. Turkey and Greece[edit] Main article: Population exchange between Greece and Turkey Greek refugees from Smyrna , The League of Nations defined those to be mutually expelled as the " Muslim inhabitants of Greece" to Turkey and moving "the Christian Orthodox inhabitants of Turkey" to Greece. The plan met with fierce opposition in both countries and was condemned vigorously by a large number of countries. Undeterred, Fridtjof Nansen worked with both Greece and Turkey to gain their acceptance of the proposed population exchange. When the exchange was to take effect 1 May , most of the prewar Orthodox Greek population of Aegean Turkey had already fled and so only the Orthodox Christians of central Anatolia both Greek and Turkish-speaking , and the Greeks of Pontus were involved, a total of roughly , As a result of the transfers, the Muslim minority in Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey were much reduced. Cyprus and the Dodecanese were not included in the Greco-Turkish population transfer of because they were under direct British and Italian control respectively. For the fate of Cyprus, see below. The Dodecanese became part of Greece in Italianization aimed to suppress the native non-Italian populations living in Italy. Because of the outbreak of World War II, the agreement was only partially consummated. Meanwhile, in the Aosta Valley, Italianization was forced, with population transfers of Valdostans into Piedmont and Italian-speaking workers into Aosta, fostering movements towards separatism. Population transfer in the Soviet Union Shortly before, during and immediately after World War II , Stalin conducted a series of deportations on a huge scale, which profoundly affected the ethnic map of the Soviet Union. Separatism, resistance to Soviet rule and collaboration with the invading Germans were cited as the main official reasons for the deportations. One of the conclusions of the Yalta Conference was that the Allies would return all Soviet citizens that found themselves in the Allied zone to the Soviet Union Operation Keelhaul. That immediately affected the Soviet prisoners of war liberated by the Allies, but was also extended to all Eastern European refugees. Outlining the plan to force refugees to return to the Soviet Union , the codicil was

kept secret from the American and British people for over 50 years. Never fully successful in the pre-Columbian era, the totalitarian policies had their greatest success when they were adopted, from the 16th century, to create a pan-Andean identity defined against Spanish rule. Thousands died of drowning, starvation, or illness as a result of the deportation. Some of the Acadians who had been relocated to France then emigrated to Louisiana, where their descendants became known as Cajuns. The relocation has been a source of controversy: Both sides acknowledge that the relocated Inuit were not given sufficient support. Japanese Canadian internment[edit] Main article: The forced relocation subjected Japanese Canadians to government-enforced curfews and interrogations and job and property losses. The internment of Japanese Canadians was ordered by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, largely because of existing racism. However, evidence supplied by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Department of National Defence show that the decision was unwarranted. Until, four years after World War II had ended, all persons of Japanese heritage were systematically removed from their homes and businesses and sent to internment camps. The Canadian government shut down all Japanese-language newspapers, took possession of businesses and fishing boats, and effectively sold them. To fund the internment itself, vehicles, houses, and personal belongings were also sold. Independence[edit] During and after the American Revolutionary War, many Loyalists were deprived of life, liberty or property or suffered lesser physical harm, sometimes under acts of attainder and sometimes by main force. Parker Wickham and other Loyalists developed a well-founded fear. As a result, many chose or were forced to leave their former homes in what became the United States, often going to Canada, where the Crown promised them land in an effort at compensation and resettlement. Most were given land on the frontier in what became Upper Canada and had to create new towns. The communities were largely settled by people of the same ethnic ancestry and religious faith. In some cases, towns were started by men of particular military units and their families. Native American relocations[edit] In the 19th century, the United States government removed a number of Native Americans to federally-owned and -designated Indian reservations. Native Americans were removed from the Northern to the Western States. The most well-known removals were those of the s from the Southeast, starting with the Choctaw people. The process resulted in great social dislocation for all, numerous deaths, and the " Trail of Tears " for the Cherokee Nation. Resistance to Indian removal led to several violent conflicts, including the Second Seminole War in Florida. The Long Walk of the Navajo refers to the relocation of the Navajo people by the US government in a forced walk from their land in what is now Arizona to eastern New Mexico. The federal government restricted Plains Indians to reservations following several Indian Wars in which Indians and European Americans fought over lands and resources. That followed extensive insurgency and guerrilla warfare. The Army cleared the area to deprive the guerrillas of local support. Union General Thomas Ewing issued the order, which affected all rural residents regardless of their loyalty. Those who could prove their loyalty to the Union were permitted to stay in the region but had to leave their farms and move to communities near military outposts. Those who could not do so had to vacate the area altogether. In the process, Union forces destroyed considerable property, and deaths because of conflicts. Japanese American internment[edit] Main article: European Americans often bought their property at losses. In the late 20th century, the US government paid some compensation to survivors of the internment camps. Other forced population transfers[edit].

3: Alberto Alesina on Immigration and Redistribution - Econlib

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Population and Public Policy We have reviewed population trends in the United States and examined their implications. Four things stand out: First, the effects of our past rapid growth are going to be with us for a long time. Second, we have to make a choice about our future growth. Third, the choice involves nothing less than the quality of American life. And, fourth, slower population growth provides opportunities to improve the quality of life, but special efforts are required if the opportunities are to be well used. A Legacy of Growth Regardless of what happens to the birthrate from now on, our past growth commits us to substantial additional growth in the future. At a minimum, we will probably add 50 million more Americans by the end of the century, and the figure could easily be much higher than that. We will be living for a long time with the consequences of the baby boom. Not long ago, that surge of births caused double sessions, school in trailers, and a teacher shortage. Now it is crowding the colleges and swelling the number of people looking for jobs. As these young people grow older, they will enter the ranks of producers as well as consumers, and they will eventually reenter dependency—the dependency of the aged. We are going to have to plan for this. Swelling numbers of job applicants put an extra burden on full employment policy, if only because failure in this respect now affects so many more people than it did once. This will continue to be true for many years. That was only when it reached its peak. The last year when births exceed four million was , only eight years ago. So it is not too late to try to do better by the youngest of the baby-boom babies than we did by the oldest. The baby boom is not over. The babies have merely grown older. It has become a boom in the teens and twenties. In a few decades, it will be turning into a retirement boom. Will we develop alternatives to treating the elderly as castoffs? We may be through with the past, but the past is not done with us. Our demographic history shapes the future, even though it does not determine it. It sets forth needs as well as opportunities. It challenges us to get ready. While we cannot predict the future, much of it is foreseeable. For this much, at least, we should be prepared. As a Commission, we have formed a definite judgment about the choice the nation should make. We have examined the effects that future growth alternatives are likely to have on our economy, society, government, resources, and environment, and we have found no convincing argument for continued national population growth. On the contrary, the plusses seem to be on the side of slowing growth and eventually stopping it altogether. Indeed, there might be no reason to fear a decline in population once we are past the period of growth that is in store. Neither the health of our economy nor the welfare of individual businesses depend on continued population growth. In fact, the average person will be markedly better off in terms of traditional economic values if population growth slows down than if it resumes the pace of growth experienced in the recent past. With regard to both resources and the environment, the evidence we have assembled shows that slower growth would conserve energy and mineral resources and would be a significant aid in averting problems in the areas of water supply, agricultural land supply, outdoor recreation resources, and environmental pollution. For government, slower population growth offers potential benefits in the form of reduced pressures on educational and other services; and, for the people, it enhances the potential for improved levels of service in these areas. We find no threat to national security from slower growth. While population growth is not by any means the sole cause of governmental problems, it magnifies them and makes their solution more difficult. Slower growth would lessen the increasing rate of strain on our federal system. To that extent, it would enhance the likelihood of achieving true justice and more ample well-being for all citizens even as it would preserve more individual freedom. Each one of the impacts of population growth—on the economy, resources, the environment, government, or society at large—indicates the desirability, in the short run, for a slower rate of growth. And, when we consider these together, contemplate the ever-increasing problems involved in the long run, and recognize the long lead time required to arrest growth, we must conclude that continued population growth—beyond that to which we are already

committed by the legacy of the baby boom is definitely not in the interest of promoting the quality of life in the nation. The Quality of American Life We are concerned with population trends only as they impede or enhance the realization of those values and goals cherished in, by, and for American society. As a Commission, we do not set ourselves up as an arbiter of those fundamental questions. Over the decades ahead, the American people themselves will provide the answers, but we have had to judge proposals for action on population-related issues against their contribution to some version of the good life for this society and, for that matter, the world. What we have sought are measures that promise to move demographic trends in the right direction and, at the same time, have favorable direct effects on the quality of life. We know that problems of quality exist from the variety of indicators that fall short of what is desirable and possible. There are inequalities in the opportunities for life itself evidenced by the high frequency of premature death and the lower life expectancy of the poor. There is a whole range of preventable illness such as the currently high and rising rate of venereal disease. There are a number of congenital deficiencies attributable to inadequate prenatal care and obstetrical services and, in some cases, to genetic origin. Not all such handicaps are preventable, but they occur at rates higher than if childbearing were confined to ages associated with low incidence and if genetic counseling were more widely available. Innate human potential often has not been fully developed because of the inadequate quality of various educational, social, and environmental factors. Particularly with regard to our ethnic minorities and the female half of the population, there are large numbers of people occupying social roles that do not capitalize on their latent abilities and interest, or elicit a dedicated effort and commitment. There is hunger and malnutrition, particularly damaging to infants and young children, that should not be tolerated in the richest nation the world has ever known. Sensitive observers perceive in our population a certain frustration and alienation that appears to go beyond what is endemic in the human condition; the sources of these feelings should be explored and better understood. And we can also identify and measure the limiting factors, the inequalities of opportunity, and the environmental hazards that give rise to such limitations in the quality of life—for example, inadequate distribution of and access to health, education, and welfare services; cultural and social constraints on human performance and development associated with race, ethnic origin, sex, and age; barriers to full economic and cultural participation; unequal access to environmental quality; and unequal exposure to environmental hazard. There are many other problems of quality in American life. Thus, alongside the challenges of population growth and distribution is the challenge of population quality. The goal of all population policy must be to make better the life that is actually lived. Opportunity and Choice While slower population growth provides opportunities, it does not guarantee that they will be well used. It simply opens up a range of choices we would not have otherwise. Much depends on how wisely the choices are made and how well the opportunities are used. For example, slower population growth would enable us to provide a far better education for children at no increase in total costs. We want the opportunity presented by slower growth to be used this way, but we cannot guarantee that it will be. The wise use of opportunities such as this depends on public and private decisions yet to be made. For example, our economic and political systems reward the exploitation of virgin resources and impose no costs on polluters. The technology exists for solving many of these problems. But proper application of this technology will require the recognition of public interests, the social inventiveness to discover institutional arrangements for channeling private interests without undue government regulation, and the political courage and skill needed to institute the necessary changes. Slower population growth offers time in which to accomplish these things. But if all we do with breathing time is breathe, the value of the enterprise is lost. Population change does not take place in a vacuum. Its consequences are produced through its joint action with technology, wealth, and the institutional structures of society. Hence, a study of the American future, insofar as it is influenced by population change, cannot ignore, indeed it must comment upon, the features of the society that make population growth troublesome or not. Hence, while we are encouraged by the improvement in average income that will be yielded by slower population growth, we are concerned with the persistence of vast differences in the distribution of income, which has remained fixed now for a quarter of a century. We rely largely on private market forces for conducting the daily business of production and consumption. These work well in general and over the short run to reduce costs, husband resources, increase

productivity, and provide a higher material standard of living for the individual. But the market mechanism has been ineffective in allocating the social and environmental costs of production and consumption, primarily because public policies and programs have not provided the proper signals nor required that such costs be borne by production and consumption activities. Nor has the market mechanism been able to provide socially acceptable incomes for people who, by virtue of age, incapacity, or injustice, are poorly equipped to participate the market system for producing and distributing income. Often the time horizon for both public and private decisions affecting the economy has been too short. It seems clear that market forces alone cannot be relied upon to achieve our social and environmental goals, for reasons that make exchange, though the main organizing principle, inadequate without appropriate institutional and legal underpinnings. The fact that such policies have shown little conspicuous success in the past gives rise to the skepticism we have expressed above in our discussion of the relations between government and population growth. The problem is not so much the impact of population on government as the adequacy of government to respond to the challenge of population and the host of issues that surround it. Long-term planning is necessary to deal with environmental and resource problems, but there are only beginning signs that government is motivated or organized to undertake it. A major commitment is required to bring minorities into the mainstream of American life, but the effort so far is inadequate. Population, then, is clearly not the whole problem. But it is clearly part of the problem, and it is the part given us as the special responsibility of this Commission. How policy in this area should be shaped depends on how we define the objectives of policy in respect to population. Policy Goals Ideally, we wish to develop recommendations worthwhile in themselves, which at the same time, speak to population issues. These recommendations are consistent with American ethical values in that they aim to enhance individual freedom while simultaneously promoting the common good. It is important to reiterate that our policy recommendations embody goals either intrinsically desirable or worthwhile for reasons other than demographic objectives. Moreover, some of the policies we recommend are irreversible in a democratic society, in the sense that freedoms once introduced cannot be rescinded lightly. This irreversibility characterizes several of the important policies recommended by this Commission. We are not really certain of the demographic impact of some of the changes implied by our recommendations. One or two could conceivably increase the birthrate by indirectly subsidizing the bearing of children. The rest may depress the birthrate below the level of replacement. In any event, it is naive to expect that we can fine-tune such trends. In the broadest sense, the goals of the population policies we recommend aim at creating social conditions wherein the desired values of individuals, families, and communities can be realized; equalizing social and economic opportunities for women and members of disadvantaged minorities; and enhancing the potential for improving the quality of life. At the educational level, we wish to increase public awareness and understanding of the implications of population change and simultaneously further our knowledge of the causes and consequences of population change.

4: Formats and Editions of Population redistribution and public policy [www.enganchecubano.com]

25 POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY. Ed. with L. P. Silverman. Washington, D.C.: National Research Council. "Creating Future Geographies.

The generality of the definition lends itself to varying interpretations. Additions to membership are effected only through births and immigration, losses are caused by emigration and by deaths. Concern with this last component is usually seen as a matter for health policy, leaving fertility and migration as the key objects of governmental interest in population policy. International aspects of population policy have become increasingly salient in the contemporary world. Population Control in Traditional Societies Rulers of any political unit have a stake in the size and composition of the population over which they have authority, hence an incentive to try to influence demographic change in a desired direction. Thus "population policy" may be said to have a long history, starting at least with the empires of the ancient world. Greater numbers tended to connote greater wealth and power, at least for those at the apex of the social pyramid. Measures encouraging marriage and sometimes immigration testify to the prevailing populationist sentiment among rulers throughout history. But the leverage of the weak premodern state over fertility in traditional societies was necessarily limited. The dominant influence setting the patterns of reproduction was located, instead, in a deeper layer of social interaction. Births, the key element affecting population change, are produced by individual couples—seemingly an intensely private affair yet one in which the immediate kin group and the surrounding local society in which that group is embedded have a material stake. All societies, if at varying degrees, grant a measure of self-sovereignty to their members. An individual has certain rights over his or her direction in life. But this is always subject to some constraints, not only biological but also social. Well before rights and obligations are formally codified in legal terms, they are established through spontaneous social interaction—a self-organizing process. Restrictions on freedom to act take the form of social expectations and pressures that individuals can ignore only at considerable personal costs to themselves. Typically, there is strong expectation that men and women should marry and have children. Parental and kin obligations in the matter of bringing up children are well understood by all adults and informally enforced by the community. In most societies there is the expectation that children are to be born to married couples only; that a man can have one wife at a time; that a husband is obligated to support his wife and a father his children; and that he can expect reciprocal services from them. And informal rules shaped by community interest tend effectively to regulate the entry of foreigners. The fabric of such demographically relevant behavioral stances, supported by internalized personal norms and buttressed by religious injunctions, is a product of social evolution; how effective such institutions are becomes an important determinant of societal success. As a classic statement of the British demographer Alexander Carr-Saunders, p. Those groups practicing the most advantageous customs will have an advantage in the constant struggle between adjacent groups over those that practise less advantageous customs. Few customs can be more advantageous than those which limit the number of a group to the desirable number. Given the harsh biological and economic constraints premodern societies invariably experienced, that "desirable number" presupposed fairly high fertility; high enough to provide a sufficient margin of safety over mortality. Successful societies—societies that survived to the dawn of the modern era—thus obeyed the biblical injunction to be fruitful and multiply, even though such multiplication as a matter of historical record was necessarily very slow. But traditional demographic regimes resulting from spontaneous social interaction achieved modest growth rates at varying levels of fertility and mortality. Early modern Western Europe succeeded in maintaining a relatively low average level of mortality by means of keeping birth rates low, primarily by means of a fairly high average age of marriage and substantial proportions that remained permanently single. A contrasting pattern, such as in India, combined early and universal marriage and a consequent high level of fertility with slow population growth by virtue of death rates that were also high, approximating the level of the birth rate. With respect to the rate of population growth these different combinations of birth and death rates in traditional societies were very similar. The potential for rapid population growth that might be triggered by a fall of mortality was, however much higher

when the premodern equilibrium was the result of a combination of high mortality and high fertility. Rationale for Population Policy Modernityâ€™the rise of democratic state formations reflecting the public interest and the emergence of rapid economic developmentâ€™brought about the realistic promise of realizing age-old human aspirations for a better life. The state increasingly came to be seen as an institution created by the voluntary association of free individuals to further their interests. The central function of the state was to produce public goodsâ€™goods that individuals cannot secure for themselves. Constitution, promulgated in , articulated key items in the collective interest concisely and with universal validity. And aggregate fertility may also be construed a public good, if its level as determined by spontaneous social interaction is too high or too low in terms of the collective interest. The potential role of the state in regulating immigration is straightforward: Individual preferences in the matter, however, are likely to differ. It is the task of the government to weigh and reconcile conflicting individual desires and come up with a policy deemed the best under the accepted rules of the political process. To claim a role for the state in the matter of fertility is more problematic. Additions to the population are the result of a multitude of individual decisions concerning childbearing. Within the constraints of their social milieu, these decisions reflect an implicit calculus by parents about the private costs and benefits of children to them. But neither costs nor benefits of fertility are likely to be fully internal to the family: Such externalities, positive and negative, do represent a legitimate concern for all those affected. Remedying such market failure may then be attempted through intervention by the state so as to affect individual behavior in order to best serve the common goodâ€™the good of all individuals. The earliest clear formulation of the population problem as a problem of coordination among individual preferences, hence establishment of the rationale for potential state intervention in the matter of fertility, was given by William Foster Lloyd, an Oxford mathematician and economist, in an essay published in *The simple fact of a country being overly populous* â€ is not, of itself, sufficient evidence that the fault lies in the people themselves, or a proof of the absence of a prudential disposition. The fault may rest, not with them as individuals, but with the constitution of society, of which they form part. Population policy should therefore strive toward institutions and incentive systemsâ€™a constitution of societyâ€™that provide signals to individuals guiding them to behave in harmony with the collective interest. Population Policy in the Liberal State Technological progress and consequent improvements in the standard of living in modernizing societies result in a far more effective control of mortality than was possible in the traditional society. But the fall of the death rate accelerates the rate of population growth which, in turn, could strain the capacity of the economic system to accommodate the increased population numbers. Falling living standards then would once again increase death rates, reestablishing an approximate balance between births and deaths at a low standard of living. This was the pessimistic central vision of T. But this outcome, although held to be highly probable, was, according to Malthus, avoidable. Given sound public policies, there was an alternative to subsistence-level equilibrium, both agreeable and achievable. A salient element in the *Essay*, and in sub-sequent writings influenced by it, was disapproval of the schemes for poor relief prevailing in Britain and elsewhere in Europeâ€™on the grounds that they were likely to encourage irresponsible reproduction. Efforts of the paternalistic state to reduce poverty were held to be misguided; by stimulating fertility, hence population growth, such efforts would generate only more misery. This would foster the prudential habits among the general population similar to those that already existed among the propertied classes. It would do so by assuring that the costs of childbearing were not shared by society at large but were primarily borne by the individual couples having children. Heeding such a prescription did not imply that the state was to play a passive role in demographic matters. Material improvements, such as higher wages for labor, could indeed be defeated if they would be "chiefly spent in the maintenance of large and frequent families. To Malthus, the causes of these divergent responses were to be found in the circumstances, social and political, in which people livedâ€™in particular, whether those circumstances hindered or rewarded planning for the future. From his analysis he derived a prescription for a population policy that would yield the hoped-for demographic outcome: Of all the causes which tend to generate prudential habits among the lower classes of society, the most essential is unquestionably civil liberty. No people can be much accustomed to form plans for the future, who do not feel assured that their industrious exertions, while fair and honourable, will be allowed to have free

scope; and that the property which they either possess, or may acquire, will be secured to them by a known code of just laws impartially administered. But it has been found by experience, that civil liberty cannot be secured without political liberty. Consequently, political liberty becomes almost equally essential. During the long nineteenth-century—that may be thought of as stretching to the outbreak of the First World War—the politics in Europe and in its over-seas offshoots favored, even if imperfectly, the development of institutional and legal frameworks in harmony with such principles. This, in interaction with economic and cultural changes shaped by the industrial revolution, created a milieu that fostered the prudential habits of parents, rendering the micro-level calculus of the costs and benefits of children increasingly salient. Rising demand for labor, including greater use of child labor, and rising income levels tended to sustain high fertility or even to stimulate it. But rising material expectations, broadening opportunities for social mobility, and the patterns and circumstance of urban living pulled in the opposite direction. This was powerfully reinforced by some programmatic activities that were consistent with the limited role the liberal state claimed in managing the economy. These included public health programs and projects aimed at improving basic infrastructure for transport and communication. And most importantly, the state, or local government, assumed a key role in fostering, organizing, and financing public education. At basic levels school attendance was made mandatory and enforced and, in parallel, labor laws curtailed the employment of children. Reflecting long-standing cultural values and religious injunctions, and contrary to laissez-faire principles, the liberal state generally banned the spreading of contraceptive information and the sale of contraceptive devices and made abortion illegal. Such restrictions typically remained in effect well into the twentieth century. But by all evidence, any upward pressure on fertility from these restrictions was swamped by the downward pressure on parental demand for children resulting from the state policies and programs just mentioned. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century birth rates were falling rapidly in the countries of the West. In many cases, rates of population growth fell also, despite continuing improvements in mortality. In Europe this trend was facilitated by emigration, which both sending and receiving countries—notably the United States, Canada, and Australia—either positively encouraged or at least permitted. The stance of the liberal state on population policy thus brought about the prospect of a new demographic equilibrium in the West that could be consistent with continuing material progress: Population Policy between the World Wars The massive losses of life resulting from World War I and from the influenza pandemic at its immediate aftermath, and the sharp drop in the number of births during the war years, were temporary disruptions in the steadily declining trends of fertility and mortality characterizing the prewar decades in the West. Those trends soon made it evident that there is no built-in guarantee that the sum total of individual fertility decisions will eventually settle at a point at which, in the aggregate, the rate of population growth will be exactly zero or fluctuate tightly around a zero rate. Although, owing to relatively youthful age distributions, the rate of natural increase remained positive, by the late s demographers realized that fertility rates in several Western countries had fallen to such a low level that, in the longer term, natural increase would become negative. This trend became more accentuated and more general under the impact of the Great Depression. Some observers foresaw a "twilight of parenthood. In some countries the ban on contraceptives was tightened and the penalties on abortion were increased. These measures had little effect. So did, predictably, governmental exhortation appealing to families to have more children. The most promising avenue for population policy seemed to be to use the instruments available to the state for redistributing income so as to reward demographic behavior considered socially desirable and to discourage contrary behavior. By the s such pronatalist policies came to be fairly widely if rather tight-fistedly applied in a number of countries. Sweden, however, also allowed liberal access to contraception. Similar policies were applied with equal or greater vigor in fascist Italy and Germany. Invariably, the proponents of such policies claimed some results in terms of birth rates somewhat higher than would have been expected in their absence. But the latter quantity is a hypothetical one, which introduces a necessary caution to such claims. More pertinently, when average fertility is low, the birth rate in any given year is an unreliable measure of long-run fertility. Couples have considerable latitude to time the birth of their children earlier or later, without affecting the number of children they ultimately wish to have. Logically, pronatalist policies seek to affect that lifetime total rather than aiming at temporary increases in the birth rate.

5: Population Redistribution and Public Policy | The National Academies Press

The Role of Redistribution in Social Policy IN THE literature of the West, concepts and models of social policy are as diverse as con-

This statement is intended to identify these principles and roles and to clarify their relationship to personal health services and other health activities provided by the private sector. Introduction Society must create and maintain the conditions under which members of the community can be healthy. Through the activities of both private and governmental health care providers, organizations, and institutions, the personal health care system provides primarily curative services, such as treating illnesses and injuries, to individuals with relatively little attention to prevention. The financing of these services comes from the out-of-pocket payments of patients, private health insurance, and government. The public health system focuses on prevention through population-based health promotion-those public services and interventions which protect entire populations from illness, disease, and injury-and protection. The primary providers of these public health services are government public health agencies. Public health agencies in communities throughout the United States are responsible for protecting, assessing, and assuring individual, community, and environmental health. These agencies build partnerships and often provide or coordinate direct services to ensure that there is access to adequate health services in a community. Public health agencies have particularly played this role in efforts to reduce the toll from illness, injury, and environmental and other risks. They have also directly taken on the challenges of addressing the health care service needs of the most vulnerable and at-risk. Public health agencies meet obligations to their communities in many different ways: Another role public health agencies play is to regulate sources of risk and promote health and safety practices such as by licensing restaurants and health facilities, and regulating water and air quality. Some non-governmental organizations and private individuals perform public health activities in cooperation with or at the request of government agencies. Frequently, the government agency provides either financial or technical assistance. Because government functions as a representative of the people and needs to be responsive to them, the ultimate responsibility for public health activities must lie with government agencies. Non-governmental organizations carry out many useful activities. However, only government agencies derive their authority from the entire community, locality, and nation and are therefore accountable to the entire public. Since , American life expectancy at birth has increased from 45 to 75 years. Much of this year increase is the result of actions by the public health system and improvements in living conditions such as better sanitation, the provision of clean drinking water and safe food, and the elimination of occupational and worksite hazards. Coronary heart disease, stroke, diabetes, and certain cancers are the result of environmental, occupational, or social conditions that have been responsive to public health interventions. Morbidity associated with some of these chronic diseases can be controlled or eliminated by public health activities. Personal health care providers have little incentive to consider population-based services, although they may provide individual clinical preventive care. Even with increased attention to the provision of clinical preventive services by managed care organizations and others, the clinical preventive services provided will often be those with short-range, immediate payoffs. Moreover, populations most at risk for increased morbidity and mortality may be least likely to receive these clinical preventive services because of financial and non-financial barriers. Public health addresses these issues through outreach, health education, transportation and translation services, and culturally sensitive provision of services. These are provided by the public health system. Personal health care can help heal injuries, alleviate disorders, and treat many diseases, but it is public health programs that prevent the onset and spread of disease and diminish the likelihood of injury. The activities within the public health and personal health care systems must be integrated and coordinated. A better job of integration and coordination needs to occur within each of these systems as well as between them. Functions of Public Health Agencies The public health system forges community partnerships and community action, providing leadership for the integration and coordination of the personal health care and public health systems. Health departments and agencies can be objective, are publicly accountable, and have legal responsibility for those in their geographical jurisdictions.

Prevention of the health consequences of workplace hazards, polluted air and water, and contamination of the food supply requires government action and intervention, as only government has the legal authority to require action. In order to understand the risks and health status of populations, data and surveillance systems must be maintained and improved. The monitoring of health hazards, including newly emerging diseases, and the creation of standards of protection are important functions of public health agencies. Public health laboratories, other facilities, and the tools for carrying out health hazard appraisals are crucial for maintaining the critical surveillance systems. Many local health agencies have experience in working with their communities to develop public policies, plan improvements, implement new interventions, and translate research into community-appropriate programs. Within the public health system, governmental health agencies have a legal and constitutional responsibility for protecting the health of the public. The participation of these agencies in such activities should result in the health care system placing greater emphasis on disease prevention and health promotion. Historically, most health agencies have not been able to act consistently upon such a broad interpretation of their role, nor have they been funded to do so. This results in fragmentation of services. To meet their goals, health agencies must first assess the state of health of their communities, identify variations in health status, and analyze the factors responsible for poor health. Interventions then must be designed to address these factors. To do so requires a three-pronged approach: The social and public policies will need to ensure adequate food and shelter, clean air and water, and protection from workplace hazards. Community-based health promotion programs must be planned with the participation of the community to address its priority areas. Personal preventive services should be part of comprehensive care and meet the standards developed by the U. Preventive Services Task Force. Rapid changes in the organization and delivery of personal health services, specifically the growth of for-profit medical care and managed care organizations, affect access for vulnerable populations, the health outcomes of the general public, and the activities and abilities of local public health agencies to operate. Finally, the effectiveness of these solutions must be reviewed and modified in the light of what was learned. Government health agencies will need to develop comprehensive plans working collaboratively with the community, social agencies, and the personal health care system, including both the public and private sector.

Public Health Agency Roles: Public health functions and agencies exist on the federal, state and local levels. The division of responsibilities and authority varies considerably by state. Nevertheless, at each level of government, the public health agency is responsible for the following essential health services: The agency must have sufficient capacity and financial support to carry out these functions. Past federal funding has concentrated on categorical programs intended to deal with specific problems. Some of these programs have been very important and successful. However, categorical programs are competitive and not available to all communities. Reliance on such single-focus programs for financing has sometimes left public health agencies with insufficient resources to deal with health threats not included in those categorical programs, and little funding for broad health promotion and prevention efforts. Broader funding, such as a general operations budget, is necessary at all levels to provide the public health system with ongoing capacity to monitor, anticipate, and respond to health problems. Public health services should be considered part of the social safety net which is the responsibility of government to provide for all people. Stable funding is also necessary. One way of ensuring stable funding is by requiring organizations and institutions paying for personal health services to support public health in proportion to the amount they spend on personal health care. State governments have carried a major responsibility for governmental health activities. The scope of these activities, and the organizational entity within the state government responsible for them, varies from state to state. Variation among the more than 3,000 local public health agencies is even greater. Several political jurisdictions may be served by a jointly sponsored multi-county or city-county agency. The relationship of these agencies to their state agencies is complementary, and varies widely. Defining the role of the government with respect to health and strengthening the role of federal, state, and local health agencies. A stronger government health system which ensures the provision of essential public health services and works actively with the personal health system to promote and protect health will result in improved health and cost efficiency across the nation. The federal government must: Federal, state, and local public health agencies must: Establishing a leadership role for the

public health community in decisions that shape the personal health care system and models of health care delivery. New ways of making policy and of organizing the purchase and delivery of personal health care are needed, and public health officials should have a major role in developing them to ensure health promotion and prevention. This requires a central role in the allocation of capital resources and in ensuring the adequacy of the primary care infrastructure and the distribution of adequate primary care personnel to currently underserved areas. State and regional health planning should draw together the public and private sectors in a collaborative model that is publicly accountable. State and local health agencies should articulate the division of labor between agencies. State and local health agencies should collaborate with purchasers and providers of personal health care and with community-based organizations representing ethnic and other minorities, women, and vulnerable groups to assure that health plans and health delivery are culturally sensitive and are appropriate to meet population needs. Working with the private sector, public health agencies must define standards to ensure high quality services are provided to all populations, and encourage a phased redistribution of resources from illness to preventive care with targets and timelines. Existing models need to be utilized and new models need to be developed that go beyond the provision of personal health care to enhance the health status of populations. These models require particular emphasis on culturally sensitive personal health delivery systems. One such model is Community-Oriented Primary Care COPC , which designs and evaluates community health interventions as an integral part of the provision of primary medical care. Many community migrant health centers and other models of integrated practice have developed COPC practices in which personal health services and public health interventions are combined in one organizational model. Such programs have great potential to develop more effective health promotion, social support, and personal health care approaches to all populations. Particular attention must be paid to assure personal health care for indigent persons not eligible for Medicaid. Educating public health workers, public and private sector policy makers and leaders, health service payers and providers, and the general public about essential public health functions to be performed by federal, state, and local governments and the private sectors, and their implementation and effectiveness around the nation. Encouraging the training of public health professionals to participate in influencing public policy. Encouraging academic health centers to emphasize the teaching of concepts, skills, and attitudes about prevention and coordination to students of the health professions and research to document the cost effectiveness of prevention. Providing technical assistance and encouragement to public health workers to actively participate in national and state health reform efforts, articulating the appropriate role for public health in such efforts. Advocating funding for essential public health services. Advocating a strong infrastructure that will be capable of implementing the roles and responsibilities described in this position paper. References Institute of Medicine. The Future of Public Health. National Academy Press, Bunker JP, et al. Measuring effects of medical care. For a Healthy Nation: Returns on Investment in Public Health, Freeman P, Robbins A.

6: The Role of Public Health in Ensuring Healthy Communities

We have reviewed population trends in the United States and examined their implications. Now we are ready to talk about the meaning of these trends for policy.. Four things stand out: First, the effects of our past rapid growth are going to be with us for a long time.

Distributive Justice and Redistribution The concept of distributive justice is sometimes understood as the moral assessment of distributions, or as the moral assessment of individual or collective decisions in light of how they affect distributions. These distributions affecting institutions include laws and other social rules governing what kinds of things can be owned and by whom, how they can be acquired, transferred, relinquished, and forfeited, how markets and the production systems are structured, the manner in which decisions concerning trade policy and the monetary system are made, and so on. The concept of redistribution has been invoked extensively in discussions of distributive justice in both the domestic and global context. Indeed, the differences between popular recent approaches to distributive justice, such as libertarianism, prioritarianism, and so-called luck egalitarianism, are sometimes characterized in terms of their attitudes towards redistribution Scheffler Given its robust role in discussions of distributive justice, it is unsurprising that disagreements concerning the permissibility of redistribution have often been quite heated. In this vein, critics of so-called redistributive policies often claim that while individuals may have positive ethical duties to aid poor or unwell persons, it is morally impermissible to compel them to do so through state-administered tax and transfer or other means, unless universal consent for these policies can be secured Narveson, ch. Egalitarians, on the other hand, have often argued that redistribution through compulsory taxation and other coercively imposed measures is required to meet basic material needs or to promote other valuable social goals, and provide a legitimate, though perhaps not morally costless means of doing so. This essay aims to clarify and evaluate some of these disagreements by exploring the many different senses in which the concept of redistribution has been used. It also indicates some of the confusions to which equivocation among different senses of this concept has led. It concludes that the use of the concept of redistribution has tended to obscure rather than clarify the true nature of substantive disagreements about distributive justice. Two kinds of questions concerning redistribution can be identified: Does it have a unified and coherent meaning? Is it purely descriptive, so that we can classify practices as redistributive without evaluating them? Or does the correct application of the term, like democracy, liberty, and perhaps also coercion depend on evaluative judgments? Does the concept of redistribution provide a helpful framework for understanding and evaluating institutional arrangements, or does it invite confusion? Can social practices that are commonly said to involve redistribution be justified? In what contexts and for what purposes is it permissible to adopt these practices? Does the fact that a social practice involves redistribution count for or against it, or does it lack basic moral significance? We might begin to address these questions by looking more closely at the structure of the concept of redistribution. The concept of redistribution can be characterized in terms of four parameters. In assessing whether and how redistribution has occurred, then, the following four questions must be answered: Among which if any subjects did the redistribution take place? Which if any baseline can be defined, of which the present distribution can be seen as a modification? Through which if any social mechanism was the redistribution brought about? Which if any goods have been redistributed? Redistribution refers to modifications of the holdings of particular persons, collective agents, or groups as defined in terms of non-resource holding characteristics, or changes in holdings by groups as defined by resource holdings. Sometimes those from and to whom resources are redistributed are defined as individuals, other times as groups to which individuals are rigidly assigned for example, Whites and Hispanics, and other times to groups that are defined by their holdings for example, the top and bottom quintile. Whether redistribution has occurred, then, can only be determined relative to the set of subjects that is identified. Discussions of redistribution are not always very specific about which kinds of subjects they are concerned with, or about the possible significance of the fact that policies will be more or less redistributive depending on how these subjects are defined. Take, for example, the following claim by Harvard economist Richard Freeman, p. If

substantial numbers of people have moved up or down, then redistribution in this sense has taken place. My focus in this entry will be on the issue of the baseline, since this seems most fundamental. The Baseline Distribution Talk of redistribution implies a baseline, some distribution to which another distribution can be compared. We can explore this concept by examining the different baselines that are implicitly or explicitly adopted when people claim that redistribution has taken place. Once these baseline distributions are clarified, questions regarding the meaning and moral significance of redistribution can be more easily addressed. Economists, for example, often refer to policies as having redistributive effects when they engender a different pattern of holdings than obtained previously. Redistribution of wealth, in this sense, occurs whenever there is a shift in patterns of holdings over time among some set of subjects in response to some policy or other social mechanism. On this understanding, we can determine whether redistribution has taken place by identifying 1 a pattern of holdings at time t_1 that characterizes the initial distribution; 2 a pattern of holdings at time t_2 that characterizes the later distribution; and 3 some policy or other social mechanism that, intentionally or not, caused the change in patterns of holdings between t_1 and t_2 . Changes in the structure of markets, the production system, monetary policy, the allocation of public funds for primary and secondary education, or the level of the minimum wage have all been adopted at least partly for the purpose of bringing about changes in the pattern of holdings. In a recent study, for instance, Alberto Alesina et al. Purposive diachronic redistribution involves the successful implementation of institutions and policies whose purpose is to bring about changes in the holdings of different subjects. On this interpretation, determining whether redistribution has taken place involves identifying 1 the holdings of a set of subjects at time t_1 ; 2 the holdings of these subjects after the policy or institutional changes at t_2 ; 3 an agent or set of agents who have enacted the policy or institutional changes that have engendered changes in holdings; and 4 the purposes of these agents in bringing these changes about. It will not always be easy to identify whether redistribution in this sense has occurred, since the purposes of those who choose and implement policies are often opaque, and also because changes in policies and institutions result from collective decisions involving many agents with diverse and often conflicting purposes. Whether this was an instance of purposive diachronic redistribution is less clear. It may have been part of an overall plan to improve the position of the least advantaged. Or, instead of reflecting a systematic attempt to intervene on behalf of those at the low end of the labor market, the purpose of the legislation may have been to appease organized labor and a generally dissatisfied public. Still other policies may be adopted for the purpose of bringing about changes in the patterns of holdings, but fail to do so, either because of internal flaws in the policies themselves, or because of countervailing pressure from other factors. Expropriation is a clear and familiar case of redistribution as taking. Some local government agency, for example, may expropriate a condominium from the Jones family without compensation and subsequently transfer the condominium to the Matua family. In this example, a good that was initially in the possession of some person or persons is taken out of their possession by some agent perhaps by force or with the threat of force and given to someone else. All of these understandings of redistribution are purely descriptive. These understandings identify distinct but partially overlapping sets of practices and actions as redistributive. Some policies and institutional changes, for example, may involve redistribution in all of these senses. Take, for instance, Taiwan, which, in the course of a decade, radically reduced levels of income inequality “thereby involving a case of diachronic redistribution. And among the most important agricultural reforms were changes in land distribution” thereby involving redistribution as taking. In other cases it may be unclear whether redistribution occurred in any of these three senses. Take, for example, the question of whether income redistribution occurred in the United States between and , accepting as true the findings of a U. With respect to purposive diachronic redistribution, matters are still less clear, since in the case at hand it is hard to determine whether or not officials in the Reagan Administration intended that their policies should have these effects. And the congressional study provides no information about whether purposive taking occurred, since it refers only to income quintiles, which are non-rigidly defined. It is hard to see how redistribution in any of the diachronic senses could have any basic moral significance. That is, that some social reform involves redistribution in this sense would not as such count for or against it. Different institutional arrangements, policies, conventions, and individual behaviors will tend to produce different patterns of holdings. Each set of

patterns of holdings engendered by changes in these factors can be viewed as redistributive relative to others, and whether a policy is redistributive will depend only on when it is adopted and which policies prevailed beforehand. Surely, some will do better after a policy or institutional change than they fared before it — but this is not in itself an objection to it. Similarly, though we may of course have grounds for criticizing the particular kinds of patterns that public officials intend to bring about, or for finding these policies objectionable on other grounds for example, if they are intended to discriminate arbitrarily against minorities or other groups that are socially disfavored, the mere fact that a policy is adopted for the purpose of bringing about changes in patterns of holdings does not count for or against it. Purposive taking may appear to have basic moral significance, such that the fact that a policy involves purposive taking always counts against it. The thought here would be that we tend to develop plans and projects based on things in our physical possession — and it therefore seems wrong to us if these goods are expropriated from us and given to others. But our assessments of takings seem to depend wholly on background facts. Did the Jones family acquire the condominium that the government has redistributed through legitimate means? Regardless of their deep attachment to the condominium, or the unpleasantness of having physical possessions forcefully expropriated, their interests are not unfairly harmed since they lack valid moral claims to its exclusive and enduring use. This example shows that whether takings are morally problematic depends not on facts about the initial physical distribution of goods, but on whether these actions take from or give to people or groups things that are rightfully in their possession. The initial possession of goods raises questions about subsequent transfers only if the initial possession is rightful rather than merely physical. Indeed, where possessions have been acquired through unjust processes, purposive takings may be required to restore rightful possession. That purposive takings have no basic moral significance can be shown in another way. In either case, people have enduring legal entitlements to their net rather than their gross incomes. Yet it seems that these contingent facts about different income tax systems could not possibly make any significant difference to our normative assessment of them. Whether a tax can be morally justified depends, therefore, not on whether it involves a redistributive taking, but whether it is compatible with a plausible account of the processes by which people can acquire valid moral claims to things. There are, of course, reasons for considering certain economic systems just, and others unjust, but the fact that these systems involve redistribution in the diachronic sense does not in itself seem to be relevant to these assessments. Since circumstance could have differed in many ways, judging whether redistribution in this sense has occurred will require identifying a more specific subjunctive baseline situation that can serve as the basis for these assessments. With respect to the question of whether the redistribution of income occurred in the U. Determining whether redistribution occurred relative to each of these baselines can be extremely difficult in practice, since the counterfactuals upon which they depend are quite complex. This is not always adequately recognized. It is sometimes assumed, for example, that baseline 2 is identical to the pattern of gross pre-tax incomes, so that difference between gross and net income will count as redistributed income according to it. But this is mistaken. The presence or absence of income tax will itself substantially influence many market outcomes, including the availability of economic opportunities to persons with different sets of skills and personal characteristics, and the gross incomes that can be earned in different jobs. Had no income tax been in place, altogether different jobs and economic opportunities would most likely have existed, and gross incomes would most likely have been very different. This is because there is no obvious way of determining how much some individual has contributed to production. In cases of interdependent production, things become even more difficult, since there is usually no non-arbitrary way of determining the contributions of different factors of production for example, labor, capital, raw materials, so-called public goods, and so on that jointly lead to total output. But this, too, is mistaken. First, in conditions where there are increasing or decreasing returns to scale, not everyone will be able to receive what they contribute. Where there are increasing returns to scale, for example, it will be impossible for people to receive what they contribute at the margins since the marginal return is greater than the average. Second, while assessments of the marginal productivity of different inputs can be useful for deciding how to use additional resources so as to maximize profit, they do not show how much each resource has produced as a proportion of the total output. Putting aside the manifest difficulties involved in

characterizing the pattern of holdings that would obtain in these subjunctive baselines, would the fact that redistribution has occurred relative to any of them count for or against them as such? Similarly, that a pattern of holdings differs from the pattern that would have obtained in the absence of any taxation would not in itself seem to give us reason to look upon the pattern of holdings that obtain with the tax positively or negatively. For although few would insist that all should receive exactly what they contributed to production, or that valuable social goals ought never to be pursued when they require that some receive more or less than what they contributed, many might feel that an economic system in which people regularly receive much less than what they contribute to production would be unjust. But granting basic moral significance to the set of holdings that would have obtained had all received what they contributed to production is less plausible than it may initially appear. If, for example, a society allowed educational opportunities for technical training only to members of certain ethnic groups, or if poorly designed education system puts these opportunities out of reach for the vast majority of people, then the fact that those who received such training might then be able to contribute more to production would not seem to entitle them to proportionally higher incomes. Second, the contribution of some person to total output will depend not only on the value of their labor, but also on the value of the resources that they own. And the claim that owners of resources should receive the marginal contribution of their resources to production is especially problematic:

7: Redistribution (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Implications of Population Redistribution for Education. Katzman, Martin T. Between and , the proportion of black children in metropolitan areas increased in all regions except the Northeast, while in all regions but the West the white population declined.

Aug 4 at 3: Mike Diaz Aug 4 at Perhaps respondents perception is based on what they perceive every day. People are not as wacky as you may think. Anyway, statistics that lump respondents from states like New Hampshire or Idaho with respondents from Florida or Texas are myopic. Andy McGill Aug 5 at 6: Even Econtalk discusses African Americans far more than their portion of the population. Blacks are not even the largest minority anymore. Doug Robinson Jul 30 at There are three countries: In brief, there were so many highly significant, factual differences with respect to Mexico and Canada in terms of environmental issues, wages, exchange rates, worker rights, transportation-related concerns, and so forth that the implications of this kind of statement seem inappropriate. Arde Jul 31 at Jul 30 at Alesina on Immigration was of particular interest to me. As part of my diplomatic career, I spent some years as a Canadian Immigration Officer interviewing and selecting and some times refusing people who wished to live permanently in Canada. I believe that Prof. No, European state has had, or currently has a program allowing individuals to apply for residence in the country, with a formal path to full citizenship. Once given formal status as an immigrant, newcomers can easily make the step to full citizen ship if desired. Alesina might well look at attitudes across these four long standing immigrant receiving nations. This group stands in contrast with the European states cited. None of these have had, or have at present formal immigration programs. Thank you Russ for this interesting episode. As usual, your insightful questions and comments brought the episode to life. Ian Jul 30 at 9: It is entirely possible to immigrate to the UK and gain citizenship. Once in the country for at least 2 years, this can usually be converted to indefinite leave to remain and, after 10 years, citizenship. Earl Rodd Jul 30 at 1: In a question about whether the poor were poor because they were lazy or unfortunate, I found that had I been presented this question, I could not answer. It is not an either or. Perhaps better would be a scale of whether poor are poor due to their own actions lazy, drugs, not study in school vs. I found the question presenting 2 names to people and asking how much each would depend on various forms of government welfare. That would be an interesting study. Some names have high associations with various subgroups of natives or immigrants. Many Americans believe that regardless of what may be said, politicians want to consider illegal and legal immigrants equally thus skewing American answers about legal immigrants. Writing good questions is really hard! Jul 30 at 3: The current percentage of the population that are immigrants may be a somewhat myopic view of the impact of immigration on the makeup of the US. Peter Gordon Jul 30 at 4: Scott Jul 30 at 4: And would that get the figures more inline with the reality? These results are valid only if the definition of immigrant in the questionnaire and official statistics are the same. The official definition is someone who was not born in the country of respondent, while people may count also second and even third generation immigrants, especially if they are significantly different from local population different clothes, language, religion etc. If the questionnaire did not specifically ask people to estimate the share of first generation immigrants only, then you are comparing apples with pears and your conclusions are not credible. Ian Aug 1 at 1: Donald Fisher Aug 1 at People develop impressions of things by looking at those things in their surroundings. Fold in the effect of their exposure to various types of media content popular entertainment is highly mult-culti these days and its no wonder that their estimates are not necessarily a true picture. This is not news. By the way, I suspect the German results being closer to the truth probably has a lot to do with the relative quality of their journalism and educational system. When everyone knows that laws are not being enforced it makes them feel vulnerable and engenders mistrust. Andy McGill Aug 1 at 6: They rarely report the key numbers of how many immigrants, how many poor, how many minimum wage workers, etc. The debates would then be in context and not thrown out like a national epidemic. When I worked in relatively menial jobs in the late s and early s, I was often hired at just above minimum wage and quickly received tiny raises of 15 or 20 cents an hour with good attendance, etc. Most of the comparable workforce was paid

similarly. Glenn Mercer Aug 2 at Assume a couple moves to the USA from country X. In our statistics that means we have two immigrants. If the couple now has 4 children, born in the USA, I think we still count only 2 immigrants. Obviously there are many issues here. If that couple has been here 30 years and their kids have grown up and moved away, the perception will be different than if they still have four small children in their original house. Ben Riechers Aug 3 at 5: Roberts was by this study. He has had many podcasts challenging the quality of studies and the certainty of what those studies conclude. Alesina seemed less certain about conclusions that Mr. I agree that Mr. Alesina asked some interesting questions. However, any inferences from the data need a lot more study. Plus, averages were often used as basis for conclusions when the distribution of data is often more informative. Broad assumptions about conservatives and liberals undermine the study as well. Is a liberal someone who wants the government to create equal opportunities or equal outcomes? I have no idea what people mean any more when those labels are used. Any label needs some examples to know what people mean. BTW, I think we confuse culture and ethnicity all the time—and we have many competing cultures in this country. Many people will self-report different ages, sex, politics, etc. I know I do on phone surveys all the time because they lie to me about the time and subject of the survey. Jakob Aug 7 at 2: Such as the actual composition of the immigrants in the various countries. Not sure what the situation is in Italy or France, but my impression is that Sweden and Swedish business is a lot more international than what you find in southern Europe — I mean, when you have a meeting with French people they actually talk French between themselves. When you have a meeting with Swedes, we all just talk English since there is likely a bunch of Indians, Chinese, Americans, or whatever in the office and in the room. It would have been good to delve deeper into the aspect of traditionalism vs globalization. Once again, my personal impression is that smaller countries like Sweden tend to be a lot more internationalized and open to outside influence than the bigger countries like Germany, France, or Italy. Just look at the kinds of restaurants you find in a smaller town — in France, you find plenty of fundamentally French restaurants, like Ross said, a bit like a museum. When Ross summarizes all of Europe as a single entity, it rings entirely false to me. There are places that have changed not much at all in the last years, usually in the south, and places that have embraced change and modernity like the north. John McCue Aug 7 at Roberts could do an episode on what seems to me at least to be the tension between the following two propositions, which come across in EconTalk podcasts as being among the, shall we say, Guiding Principles of Roberts-ness: I am a huge fan, BTW. Thomas Leitgeb Aug 11 at 4: I live in Germany, was born in Austria. My girlfriend is the same. And our little daughter has 2 citizenships — Austrian and German — because she was born here in Germany and both parents did live more than 5 years here. That the percentage of legal immigrants in Germany could be single digits I could not believe while walking. I know I have a lot of colleagues here that are from Austria, France, even some English and Japanese — I know that Germany took more than 1 million refugees in while it has close to 80 million inhabitants. That is close to 2 percent immigrants in a year. And I do not consider somebody illegal, who applied for asylum here. So first thing back home I had to check. And I am right. So the number is double digit

8: Distribution and Redistribution - Oxford Scholarship

Take, for example, the question of whether income redistribution occurred in the United States between and , accepting as true the findings of a U.S. congressional study (released in March,) which claimed that the average family net income of the poorest fifth of the American population declined by over 6 percent from to

History[edit] In ancient times, redistribution operated as a palace economy. Another early form of wealth redistribution occurred in Plymouth Colony under the leadership of William Bradford. Free-market capitalist economies tend to feature high degrees of income redistribution. Likewise, the socialist planned economies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc featured very little income redistribution because private capital and land income “the major drivers of income inequality in capitalist systems” was virtually nonexistent; and because the wage rates were set by the government in these economies. In his article *Redistribution*, [14] Dwight R. Instead, government takes from the relatively unorganized e. The most important factor in determining the pattern of redistribution appears to be political influence, not poverty. Another way is by restricting competition among producers. The inevitable consequence“indeed, the intended consequence“of these restrictions is to enrich organized groups of producers at the expense of consumers. Here, the transfers are more perverse than with Medicare and Social Security. They help relatively wealthy producers at the expense of relatively poor and, in some cases, absolutely poor consumers. Many government restrictions on agricultural production, for example, allow farmers to capture billions of consumer dollars through higher food prices see agricultural subsidy programs. Most of these dollars go to relatively few large farms, whose owners are far wealthier than the average taxpayer and consumer or the average farmer. Two other common types of governmental redistribution of income are subsidies and vouchers such as food stamps. These transfer payment programs are funded through general taxation, but benefit the poor or influential special interest groups and corporations. Social Security program redistributes income from the rich to the poor, but the majority of those receiving Social Security earned their benefits through tax withholding from their paychecks or quarterly income statements, and most benefits are indexed to the actual earning levels of individual workers. Only the highest- and lowest-income workers fall outside normal rates. Contrary to popular belief, a recent study [18] found that, overall, the Social Security System was slightly regressive against the poor and not redistributive, once important factors were taken into account for example, the longer life expectancy of the wealthy when compared to the poor gives them more years to collect benefits. Governmental redistribution of income may include a direct benefit program involving either cash transfers or the purchase of specific services for an individual. Medicare is one example. This is a direct benefit program because the government is directly providing health insurance for those who qualify. The difference between the Gini index for the income distribution before taxation and the Gini index after taxation is an indicator for the effects of such taxation. Before-and-after Gini coefficients for the distribution of wealth can be compared.

Objectives[edit] The objectives of income redistribution are to increase economic stability and opportunity for the less wealthy members of society and thus usually include the funding of public services. One basis for redistribution is the concept of distributive justice , whose premise is that money and resources ought to be distributed in such a way as to lead to a socially just , and possibly more financially egalitarian , society. Another argument is that a larger middle class benefits an economy by enabling more people to be consumers , while providing equal opportunities for individuals to reach a better standard of living. Seen for example in the work of John Rawls ,[citation needed] another argument is that a truly fair society would be organized in a manner benefiting the least advantaged, and any inequality would be permissible only to the extent that it benefits the least advantaged. Some proponents of redistribution argue that capitalism results in an externality that creates unequal wealth distribution. This view was associated with the underconsumptionism school in the 19th century, now considered an aspect of some schools of Keynesian economics ; it has also been advanced, for different reasons, by Marxian economics.

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Redistribution of income and redistribution of wealth are respectively the transfer of income and of wealth (including physical property) from some individuals to others by means of a social mechanism such as taxation, charity, welfare, public services, land reform, monetary policies, confiscation, divorce or tort law.

Angel, and Omer R. Galle This chapter examines what is known about patterns of geographic distribution and redistribution of the elderly population, focusing mainly on the United States. At a national level, the general pattern of population aging around which spatial variations occur is relatively well known. From to the population of the United States increased by 9. Hence, as a result of its more rapid growth, the population aged 65 and over increased from In the future, the U. Bureau of the Census population projections forecast that the proportion of the population aged 65 and over will grow to The occurrence and effects of aging are not evenly experienced throughout the country. The public policy implications of population aging are felt not only at the national level, but are also important at the state and local levels Zedlewski et al. A noteworthy example is Medicaid, the major federal and state program for providing medical care to the poor. Even though the elderly comprised only about one-seventh of Medicaid beneficiaries in fiscal year , they accounted for one-third of Medicaid payments to health care providers Kane and Kane, ; Ward-Simon and Glass, States whose populations are disproportionately made up of the aged will accordingly shoulder larger relative financial responsibilities for Medicaid and other state and locally funded programs because of their age structure. The relative contributions of fertility, mortality, and migration to population aging differ at the subnational compared to the national levels. Although geographic variations in fertility and mortality patterns make small contributions to differential rates of aging among states and regions, patterns of internal migration seemingly account for most of the variation Rogers, a; Serow et al. And given the rising levels of immigration experienced by the United States since World War II, the age pattern of net international migration is likely to exert an increasing effect on population age composition. This factor is undoubtedly more important for explaining subnational temporal and geographic variations in population aging than it is for explaining population aging at the level of the nation as a whole. The reasons are that the postwar growth in net international migration is relatively recent occurring mostly over the past 20 years and that immigrants tend to concentrate in only a few states Bean et al. The purpose of this review is to examine the geographic distribution of the elderly population in the United States and the factors that contribute to its change over time especially migration. The second section focuses on patterns of elderly and nonelderly population redistribution and on patterns of migration that contribute to redistribution at various spatial levels of analysis. The third section examines the results of research about migration, focusing on both elderly and nonelderly migration behavior, each of which holds implications for patterns of population redistribution by age. A fourth section introduces international comparisons, not only for what they reveal about migration and redistribution in other countries, but also for what they imply about U. The fifth section specifies some of the major remaining gaps in knowledge about elderly migration and redistribution, and assesses the extent to which newly developed and recently available data sets might contribute to their resolution. Patterns of Geographic Distribution Examining the geographic distribution of the older U. Demographers typically define the elderly population as those individuals aged 65 years or older, whereas gerontologists sometimes use age 60 as the cutoff. Some agencies within the U. Some migration researchers advocate 60 years as a boundary Longino et al. In this chapter we use 65 years or over, in part because it is consistent with the usage of the Bureau of the Census in recent reports on the aged population Taeuber, In the final analysis, however, the multiple definitions used by different researchers and agencies serve as a reminder 1 that any definition of the elderly population is somewhat arbitrary and 2 that the elderly population has diverse characteristics. For example, researchers and policy makers are paying increasing attention to the so-called oldest-old, a group usually but not always defined as those aged 85 years or over. The importance of this group derives not only from its rapidly growing size but also from the fact that it differs substantially in a number of ways from the younger-old years and the middle-old Suzman et al. In recognition of the increasing significance of the

oldest-old, we also introduce data pertaining to the geographic distribution of the population aged 85 and over. The extent of aging in different populations can be compared by calculating the proportions of individuals in those populations who have reached age . Calculating a mean or a median age provides an alternative method for assessing population aging . It is important to remember that these measures—the proportion 65 years and over and mean age—provide information about different aspects of population aging Liao, The former provides a better measure of old-age concentration than the latter to the extent that the age distributions under comparison are differentially affected by changing age patterns of migration, which might occur as a result of substantial net international immigration to some states but not others. In general, it is increasingly important to consider both measures as the volumes of net migration and net international migration increase and as the age structures of in-migrants and out-migrants, and of immigrants and emigrants, change in relation to that of the host population. And at another level, neither the proportion of elderly nor the mean age may suffice for some purposes. Organizations interested in social service planning or in targeting certain marketing strategies may need information about the absolute size of the elderly population living in a given geographic area Myers, In what follows, we at times make use of each of these alternative measures. Patterns of Regional Concentration The geographic distribution of the elderly may be approached in either of two ways. Viewed in this way, more than half In some respects, however, this pattern is less interesting than it might at first seem because these same states in contained For our purposes, a second approach for examining geographic distribution, termed age concentration Rogers, b , is preferable because it provides an indication of the extent of aging within an area. This approach calculates the proportion of elderly within given geographic boundaries. Thus, for example, in the elderly constituted Generally speaking, in moving from smaller to larger geographic units from counties to states to regions, for example , differences in the proportion of the elderly among areas become less pronounced United Nations, Examining the proportion of elderly in in aggregations as large as Census Bureau regions, however, reveals several interesting patterns Table First, all regions of the country experienced growth rates among their elderly populations between and that exceeded their rates of population growth see also Siegel, Thus, in all parts of the country, the number of elderly grew faster than the rest of the population. Second, although in the elderly were appreciably overrepresented only in the Northeast, in they were overrepresented in both the Northeast and the Midwest. Third, on a regional basis in , the oldest-old were distributed more or less in proportion to population, whereas by the Northeast and Midwest showed disproportionately high numbers of persons in this age group. Fourth, between and , the oldest-old population grew substantially and increasingly became overrepresented in the Northeast especially in the New England states and in the Midwest especially in the Great Plains states. Although the rate of growth in the oldest-old population was sizable, the relative and absolute size of this group is not very large in relation to the younger- and middle-old groups. But the oldest-old use a substantially disproportionate share of health and social services Binstock, For example, those aged 85 and older are more than 20 times as likely to reside in nursing homes as persons aged Hing, It is also interesting that at the level of aggregation of states the data reveal the complex nature of the processes generating patterns of elderly population distribution. For example, several of the states of the industrial midwest e. The midwestern farm states, however, show high proportions of elderly but not unusually high rates of growth see appendix. California shows a below-average rate of increase in its proportion of elderly, at the same time that its growth in the absolute number of elderly is far above average and its median age is below average. And New York reveals a quite high median age, but a proportion of elderly not much above average. A number of different processes generate these patterns. In the case of the midwestern farm states, it is likely that outmigration of nonelderly during the s contributed to population aging Frey, Part of the reason is that California experienced outmigration of the elderly during the s that was nearly as great as immigration DeAre, Patterns by Size and Type of Place The elderly population is also variously distributed according to size and type of place. Since , the United States population has increasingly resided in cities. In broad outline, this is true of the elderly population as well, although in part it depends on what is meant by the term "city. Furthermore, both of these figures have changed by almost the same amount over the past 40 years, moving from about 64 percent urban in to about 75 percent urban in Serow et al. By contrast, if the focus is on residence in metropolitan versus nonmetropolitan areas roughly on

living in localities with more than , inhabitants , the elderly are somewhat less likely to live in metropolitan areas than the total population Thus, the elderly are somewhat more likely than the general population to live in nonmetropolitan urban places i. Within metropolitan areas, however, the elderly are about as likely as the general population to live in central cities However, 40 years ago the elderly were much more likely to reside in central cities, a difference that has diminished as larger proportions of the elderly have come to reside in suburbs. By , for example, Broadly speaking, these patterns reflect the general urbanization and suburbanization tendencies characteristic of postindustrial societies in the post-World War II period Champion, ; Frey, ; Hall and Hay, One of these has consisted of increasing urbanization and metropolitanization, although the latter process slowed down and in some cases slightly reversed itself during the s, before reemerging in the s Frey, b. The other has consisted of increasing suburbanization within metropolitan areas, as movement has occurred away from central cities outward to suburban areas Frey, a. These trends, however, are less characteristic of the elderly than of the nonelderly, thus reinforcing the point that the redistribution patterns of these groups require separate study. Population Redistribution and Migration Populations defined on the basis of geographic boundaries are constantly involved in the process of redistributing their members from one geographic subarea to another. When the concern is with the distribution of population characteristics and their change over time as is the case here, given the interest in age structure , it can be somewhat misleading to speak in terms of "redistribution" because the term implies the geographic mobility of persons defined as making up the population. However, geographic mobility is only one of several mechanisms that can affect the distribution of population characteristics such as age. As noted above, the age structures of states and regions are affected by fertility, the age pattern of mortality, the age pattern of net internal migration, and the age pattern of net international migration. As a result of the former two processes acting alone, the proportion of elderly within an area can change over time without any geographic mobility occurring. Little research on the magnitude of the contribution of each of these components to population aging at the region or state level has been carried out. Studies have been conducted that distinguish the contributions to aging of 1 net migration and 2 natural increase often called aging-in-place; Rogers and Woodward, ; Clifford et al. The contribution of net migration reflects the extent to which the proportion of elderly in a given area is affected by the net geographic movement of older persons to that area, whereas that of aging-in-place reflects the extent to which the proportion of elderly in a given area is affected by persons already living in the area reaching age It is important to note that this latter component, the aging-in-place component, will itself consist of fertility, mortality, internal migration, and international migration subcomponents. The latter two factors influence the size of the nonelderly population "at risk" of reaching age To our knowledge, no research has sought to estimate the magnitude of each of these separate subcomponents of aging-in-place. Despite the relative lack of research on the magnitude of these components, it seems likely that fertility and mortality differences will not account for a great deal of the contemporary variation in age structure among U. The major determinant of both cross-sectional and dynamic geographic variations in population aging thus is probably the age pattern of net internal migration, which affects the proportion of elderly within a geographic area in two ways. As noted above, one is by virtue of the elderly themselves moving into or out of an area in sufficient numbers to change the age structure appreciably. Given that outmigration among the elderly is not nearly as location-specific as immigration Rogers, a , the latter makes by far the greater difference. States and areas that have attracted large numbers of elderly in-migrants are Florida, Arizona, California, the lake regions of Michigan and Minnesota, the Ozarks region of Arkansas and Missouri, Oregon, and Washington Rogers and Watkins, ; Rowles, By far the most significant of these in terms of the numbers involved is Florida, which has been a destination for elderly migrants for at least three decades Rogers and Woodward, A second way aging can occur through internal migration is as a consequence of migration of the nonelderly Frey, ; Graf and Wiseman, ; Fuguitt and Beale, For example, states and regions that have experienced substantial outmigration of the nonelderly, often apparently seeking better employment opportunities as a result of industrial restructuring, have experienced aging as a result of this process. These include the farm states of the Midwest and the New England states of the Northeast, all of which experienced outmigration of nonelderly during the s and early s, as well as the industrial midwestern

states which experienced increases in outmigration during the 1980s Long, 1990. Moreover, the influence of this type of migration on U. It has involved many more movers than is the case among the elderly, both because the numbers of nonelderly are larger and because younger persons are much more likely to move Long, 1990; Frey, 1990. This difference in behavior by age emphasizes the need to adopt a life-course migration perspective in the assessment of the influence of migration on the aging patterns of states and regions, especially to the extent that nonelderly groups display different life-course migration patterns than the elderly Frey, 1990.

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