

1: Javanese women and the veil in post-Soeharto Indonesia, JAS | Nancy J. Smith-Hefner - www.enganch

The Post-Suharto era in Indonesia began with the fall of Suharto in during which Indonesia has been in a period of transition, an era known in Indonesia as Reformasi (English: Reform).

To survive, they slipped into the arena of fine art oriented to the market paradigm. These themes are free from political interpretations. Soeharto and the army, with the help of anticommunist mass organizations, launched the purge on everything they deemed communist-related, including cultural works like paintings, following a foiled coup attempt allegedly conducted by the Indonesian Communist Party PKI. Consequently, ethnic Chinese art and cultural figures, obviously rooted in Chinese culture, had no freedom of movement. Ethnic Chinese artists were also under surveillance for decades, while references to anything Chinese was stigmatized. As an impact of the repression, ethnic Chinese citizens had to be very cautious in rendering their creativity, so as not to be perceived by the government as part of politics. In , a Black December Movement appeared in Jakarta. It was a small demonstration of young painters protesting against a decision made by the jury of the Indonesian Painting Art Biennale at Taman Ismail Marzuki, Central Jakarta. The uproar spread to the campus where the artists studied. In an interrogation conducted behind closed doors at the Asri, now the Jogja National Museum, on Jan. Even his family was examined. After questioning whether he wanted to ruin national culture and whether he realized his actions would be exploited by certain elements, it was decided to expel Harsono. Harsono later rose to fame as a contemporary artist with an international reputation. A painting of life in Bali by Huang Fong that features artistic Chinese influences. As a result, the painters were also expelled from the school. Undeniably, for three decades, ethnic Chinese artists were politically subjected to discrimination and later marginalization. In the s in Warsaw, a museum especially dedicated to Asia-Pacific fine arts was established Among the hundreds of paintings shown were the works of AD Pirous, T. The museum, which made Indonesia proud, was also reported by Indonesian journalists. Several years after the mass rehabilitation of communist political detainees in , over a dozen non-political ethnic Chinese painters tried to gather and display their works at Balai Budaya, Central Jakarta. The exhibition was an unwelcome event. The artists also felt some alienation. In fact, the Broad Outlines of State Policy of mandated equal recognition of indigenous culture and the ethnic Chinese culture. The discrimination continued, even expanding to different areas. No such story was ever heard afterward. In this context, ethnic Chinese artists were evidently equated with those of Lekra. The repression even further covered graveyards. In , the Bandung regional administration ordered the removal of Chinese characters beautifully carved into gravestones in the local Chinese cemetery. However, the outrageous instruction was later revoked.

2: Suharto - Wikipedia

In fact, despite the expectation that post-Soeharto Indonesia would embark on a swift process of change towards a liberal mode of markets, the clientelist nature of Indonesian politics, as well as the patrimonial features of the state, displays more fundamental continuity than discontinuity.

On his independence day speech in August, Sukarno declared his intention to commit Indonesia to an anti-imperialist alliance with China and other communist regimes, and warned the Army not to interfere. They feared imminent establishment of communist state in Indonesia. PKI has become the strongest political party in Indonesia. Abortive coup and anti-communist purge[edit] Main articles: Before dawn on 1 October , six army generals were kidnapped and executed in Jakarta by soldiers from the Presidential Guard, Diponegoro Division, and Brawidjaja Division. It was here that he was visited by Colonel Abdul Latief, a key member of 30 September Movement and close family friend of Suharto. Suharto announced over the radio at 9: He said he was in control of the army, and that he would crush the 30 September Movement and safeguard Sukarno. A propaganda campaign by the army, and Islamic and Catholic student groups, convinced both Indonesian and international audiences that it was a communist coup attempt, and that the killings were cowardly atrocities against Indonesian heroes. Indonesian killings of “ The most widely accepted estimates are that at least half a million were killed. Supersemar Sukarno continued to command loyalty from large sections of the armed forces as well as the general population, and Suharto was careful not to be seen to be seizing power in his own coup. For eighteen months following the quashing of the 30 September Movement, there was a complicated process of political manoeuvres against Sukarno, including student agitation, stacking of parliament, media propaganda and military threats. The students received support and protection from the army. Street fights broke out between the students and pro-Sukarno loyalists with the pro-Suharto students prevailing due to army protection. There, they persuaded and secured a presidential decree from Sukarno see Supersemar that gave Suharto authority to take any action necessary to maintain security. The army arrested 15 cabinet ministers and forced Sukarno to appoint a new cabinet consisting of Suharto supporters. The army arrested pro-Sukarno and pro-communist members of the MPRS parliament , and Suharto replaced chiefs of the navy, air force, and the police force with his supporters, who then began an extensive purge within each services. Against the wishes of Sukarno, the government ended the Konfrontasi with Malaysia and rejoined the United Nations [54] Sukarno had removed Indonesia from the UN in the previous year. On 22 February , Sukarno announced he would resign from the presidency, and on 12 March, the MPRS session stripped him of his remaining power and named Suharto acting president. After initially being careful not to offend sensitivities of Islamic scholars who feared Pancasila might develop into a quasi-religious cult, Suharto secured a parliamentary resolution in which obliged all organisations in Indonesia to adhere to Pancasila as basic principle. He also instituted mandatory Pancasila training programs for all Indonesians, from primary school students to office workers. Consolidation of power[edit] See also: Acting presidency of Suharto Suharto is appointed President of Indonesia at a ceremony, 27 March Having been appointed president, Suharto still needed to share power with various elements including Indonesian generals who considered Suharto as mere primus inter pares , and Islamic and student groups who participated in the anti-Communist purge. Suharto, aided by his "Office of Personal Assistants" Aspri clique of military officers from his days as commander of Diponegoro Division, particularly Ali Murtopo , began to systematically cement his hold on power by subtly sidelining potential rivals while rewarding loyalists with political position and monetary incentives. Suharto sent Dharsono overseas as an ambassador, while Idris and Wibowo were sent to distant North Sumatera and South Sulawesi as regional commanders. In April , Suharto moved decisively by issuing decree on "Normalization of Campus Life" NKK which prohibited political activities on-campus not related to academic pursuits. Students demonstrating against increasing dominance of Japanese investors were encouraged by General Sumitro , deputy commander of the armed forces. However, Suharto also disbanded Aspri to appease popular dissent. Indonesian invasion of East Timor and Papua conflict To placate demands from civilian politicians for the holding of elections, as manifested in MPRS resolutions of and , Suharto government formulated a series of

laws regarding elections as well as the structure and duties of parliament which were passed by MPRS in November after protracted negotiations. This mechanism ensures significant government control over legislative affairs, particularly the appointment of presidents. The first general election was held on 3 July with ten participants; consisting of Golkar, four Islamic parties, as well as five nationalist and Christian parties. Campaigning on a non-ideological platform of "development", and aided by official government support and subtle intimidation tactics, Golkar managed to secure To consider this, each country in the area needs an ideology of its own with which to counter the Communists. But a national ideology is not enough by itself. The well being of the people must be improved so that it strengthens and supports the national ideology. The government ensured that these parties never developed effective opposition by controlling their leadership, while establishing the "re-call" system to remove any outspoken legislators from their positions. Using this system dubbed the "Pancasila Democracy", Suharto was re-elected unopposed by the MPR in 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988. For all intents and purposes, he held all governing power in the nation. The government formed various civil society groups to unite the populace in support of government programs. In 1975, to promote assimilation of the influential Chinese-Indonesians, the Suharto government passed several laws as part of so-called "Basic Policy for the Solution of Chinese Problem", whereby only one Chinese-language publication controlled by the army was allowed to continue, all Chinese cultural and religious expressions including display of Chinese characters were prohibited from public space, Chinese schools were phased-out, and the ethnic-Chinese were encouraged to take-up Indonesian-sounding names. A lasting legacy from this period is the spelling reform of Indonesian language decreed by Suharto on 17 August 1972. Suharto authorized Operasi Trisula which destroyed PKI-remnants trying to organize a guerilla base in Blitar area in 1975, and ordered several military operations which ended the communist PGRS-Paraku insurgency in West Kalimantan in 1976. In March 1976, it was agreed that the plebiscite will be channeled via 1, tribal chiefs, citing the logistical challenge and political ignorance of the population. Using the above strategy, the plebiscite produced a unanimous decision for integration with Indonesia, which was duly noted by United Nations General Assembly in November 1976. Suharto travelled to Western Europe and Japan to promote investment in Indonesia. Following government regulatory frameworks, domestic entrepreneurs mostly Chinese-Indonesians emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the import-substitution light-manufacturing sector such as Astra Group and Salim Group. While some proceeds were used for charitable purposes, much of the money was re-cycled as slush fund to reward political allies and to maintain support for the New Order. The government bail-out of the company nearly doubled the national debt. Diplomatic relations with China were suspended in October 1961 due to suspicion of Chinese involvement in 30 September Movement diplomatic relations was only restored in 1966. However, from 1966 to foreign minister Adam Malik managed to secure several agreements to restructure massive debts incurred by Sukarno from Soviet Union and other Eastern European communist states. This organization is designed to establish peaceful relationship between Southeast Asian countries free from conflicts such as ongoing Vietnam War. With approval from Western countries including from US president Gerald Ford and Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam during their visits to Indonesia, Suharto decided to intervene claiming to prevent establishment of a communist state. The "encirclement and annihilation" campaigns of 1975 broke the back of Fretilin control over the hinterlands, although continuing guerilla resistance caused the government to maintain strong military force in the half-island until 1978. From 1966 to 1998, Indonesia recorded real GDP growth of 5%. The government invested in massive infrastructure development notably the launching of series of Palapa telecommunication satellites; consequently Indonesian infrastructure in the 1980s was considered at par with China. Suharto was keen to capitalize on such achievements to justify his regime, and an MPR resolution in 1992 granted him the title of "Father of Development".

3: Indonesia: The Post-Soeharto Crisis | Human Rights Watch

Indonesia's economy has been ravaged by the Asian economic crisis. Its leader for 32 years, President Soeharto, was forced from office in May amidst rioting and student demonstrations.

June 4, 8: The Post-Soeharto Crisis Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific by Sidney Jones, Human Rights Watch Share Print Indonesians have had more freedom in the last two weeks than they have had in the last three decades, but exhilaration is already being replaced by concern over the number of obstacles that lie in the path of political reform. The state of the economy, the weakness of political institutions, and the unfinished power struggle within the elite are just a few of those obstacles. It needs to continue to work toward ensuring that Indonesians have an opportunity, as soon as possible, to have a president and parliament of their own choice. Without a leadership that commands popular support, economic recovery will be all but impossible. It needs to continue to use what economic leverage it has in such a way as to help alleviate the worst hardship most Indonesians will have experienced in their lifetimes but without seeming to give a seal of approval to the Habibie government. It needs to respond to the growing pressure in Indonesia for accountability of the Soeharto government by investigating the assets of the Soeharto family in the U. There has been widespread popular support in Indonesia for a suggestion by the National Human Rights Commission in Jakarta that an independent commission of inquiry be set up to look into the Soeharto wealth. It also should encourage direct consultation between the new government and NGOs. It needs to continue to press the army for a full-scale investigation into the disappearances of political activists, four of whom remain missing, and Congress could help by holding hearings on U. It needs to work with other members of the Consultative Group on Indonesia to encourage the new government to begin a reconciliation process with the people of East Timor, a process that can only begin with the release of Xanana Gusmao. But it is critical for those in Congress concerned about East Timor to consult with the leaders of mass organizations in Indonesia, some of whom also support a change in policy toward the territory. It needs to do all this in a way that encourages and supports the pressures for reform from within Indonesia rather than seeming to create a separate agenda from outside. Chairman, I believe there is an urgency to the agenda I have outlined above, because the "spirit of reform" so evident now in Indonesia could be set back by social unrest or contradictory impulses within the political elite. The next three months are going to be key. That said, I would like to look at the gains and setbacks or "non-accomplishments" of the last two weeks and then address more specifically what the U. President Soeharto is well and truly gone; he is not sitting behind the scenes pulling the strings of a Jakarta puppet. Independent trade union leader Muchtar Pakpahan has been freed, his union and presumably all others are now free to operate, and the government has announced it is planning to ratify ILO Convention No. Anyone is free to organize or join the political party of his or her choice, even though the law prohibiting the formation of new parties has not been repealed, and parties are being created or resurrected from the distant past at the rate of about one a day. Golkar, the ruling party, has already been deserted by two factions within it, each of which has formed a party of its own. The political free-for-all is exciting, but it has also brought on unmistakable signs of nervousness within the military. The leading news magazines that were closed down in are now officially free to reopen and plan on doing so, despite the economic crisis. The Education Ministry has announced an imminent end to the ban on university political activity the program known as "Normalization of Campus Life" and a suspension of the Pancasila training programs that were widely seen as a kind of political indoctrination program. These resignations, under popular pressure to end nepotism and corruption, suggest that if this body were to be called into special session in the near future to select a caretaker president or set a date for new elections, it could be far less representative of the old guard than is currently the case more on this below. President Habibie made a high-profile visit to a major ethnic Chinese area of Jakarta to call for an end to racism and urge those who fled anti-Chinese violence to return to the country. On June 1, a court in Semarang, Central Java, acquitted four East Timorese of transporting bomb-making materials on the grounds that there was no evidence against them. The court threw out the testimony of one witness that had

been extracted under torture. To our knowledge, this was the first acquittal ever of East Timorese arrested on charges related to political activity and suggests the highly politicized courts may also be affected by the reform spirit. Public debate is underway now over whether the police should be separated from the armed forces and put under the Ministry of the Interior. Since the Ministry of Interior traditionally has been led by an army general, the change might be more form than substance, but the idea of separating the police from the army is a sound one. The Setbacks If all of the above steps are welcome and exciting, it must be recognized first, that the popular demand for reform is so great that the Habibie government had little choice but to go with the flow. This should not detract from the value and importance of these measures, but they do not appear to have gained the new government much in terms of credibility or legitimacy. Second, many of these steps have only gone halfway, as in the very limited release of political prisoners, or they require legal changes to give them any kind of permanent underpinning. The fact that political parties are free to form by government fiat does not mean that the pressure should cease for repeal of key laws on the political system. Of the close to political prisoners in Indonesia, dozens of whom are imprisoned for non-violent political activity, only four have been released. Both President Habibie and Justice Minister Muladi have said that political prisoners who are Marxist, opposed to the Indonesian constitution, or convicted for criminal offenses will not be released. Not only should Indonesians have the right to freely express their opinions on any subject, including Marxism and the constitution, but in the case of those detained, the determination of who was a Marxist or an anti-constitutionalist was made by a politicized court system at the behest of a now discredited government. The government has also rejected the release any time soon of Xanana Gusmao. The army continues to play a powerful role, in a way that may slow down or possibly even reverse the reform process in the long term. Wiranto commander of the armed forces and Defense Minister has acted over the past few months almost as a guardian of the student movement, and he appears to have effectively sidelined his rival, Soeharto son-in-law Prabowo, who was widely suspected as being responsible for major human rights violations. But whether the military will permit a review of the concept of its role in social and political affairs *dwifungsi*, whether it will support inquiries into past abuses, whether it will follow through with investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the recent "disappearances," whether its tolerance of free speech and demonstrations will begin to wane as the cacophony of democratic debate moves into high gear, all of these questions are up in the air. Anti-Chinese sentiment remains dangerously high, and it may get worse as the economic situation deteriorates. Some of the solutions proposed are frightening: A member of parliament in Jakarta has said in the last two days that by fleeing abroad to Singapore and Malaysia when their homes and shops were being attacked, ethnic Chinese showed a lack of a sense of nationalism, and the assets of all who fled abroad should be investigated. President Habibie himself, instead of promising better protection from the Indonesian security forces at times of unrest, suggested that the ethnic Chinese form their own vigilante squads for self-defense. In this regard, it is worth noting that the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission said in a statement on June 2, that the rioting on May that led to a death toll now estimated at 1, and during which security forces in many areas seemed to stand by unwilling to take action, appeared to have been triggered by an outside group. The Commission called on the government to undertake a full investigation. It is imperative for the Habibie government and any aspirants to national leadership to tackle the question of how to end discrimination and make Indonesia a safe place for people of all ethnic backgrounds to live. Appointment of a national commission to examine this issue, from the standpoint of equal opportunity and ending discrimination, might be a good place to start. Not only social harmony but also economic recovery depend on finding a solution. The government has announced that it has no plans to change policy on East Timor. No political reform program can be complete without a review of the areas where major human rights violations have been committed and where disaffection with the Indonesian administration is so high that armed guerrilla movements are able to attract significant popular support. Given the investment by the military in East Timor, in terms of time, resources, and human lives, a change in policy will not be easy, but it is important not to let East Timor slide off the reform agenda so easily. Opposition leader Amien Rais has publicly stated his support for a referendum in East Timor, although in recent days he has warned of the dangers of disintegration. Influential members of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organization in the country, as well as many in

the Indonesian NGO movement have also urged a change in policy. No solution is ideal, but the option chosen by Habibie appears to guarantee that he will stay in power for almost two years. Given the economic and political problems facing Indonesia, the need for a leader with a popular mandate is more acute than ever. There are two major proposals on the table for how and when to hold elections, each with several variations, and both rooted in the current Indonesian constitution. Those elections would be held in the first half of , and sometime thereafter, the newly elected MPs, joined by their appointed colleagues would meet to elect a new president and vice-president. A second proposal, favored by several ministers in the current cabinet as well as some opposition leaders, is to call a special session of the current MPR for July to select a new "caretaker" administration that would serve until new parliamentary elections could be held sometime in . Different formulations for the caretaker administration have been proposed, ranging from a single individual to a five-member presidium consisting of four civilians and one military officer. A variant of this proposal would merely lessen the interval between the selection of the caretaker and the holding of parliamentary elections. The advantage of the first is that the new president would be chosen by a much more representative body than is currently available; the disadvantage is that Habibie, whom many in the country distrust, would stay in power until late . In response to concerns that the MPR that would select the caretaker is the same old body that elected Soeharto less than two months ago, proponents of this option argue that the combination of popular stigmatization of crony appointees, the process of "recall" whereby existing parties can effectively expel unwanted members, and the reformist atmosphere now prevailing will militate against a non-reformer being chosen. It is not for the U. Specific Steps the U. There is no question that aid is needed and needed badly. Food shortages are a real danger; delivery of government services is threatened. As recently as last week, we advocated conditioning further disbursements of IMF aid on concrete steps toward political reform, some of which have been taken or promised. If President Habibie makes an effort to consult with the students and NGOs who set the reform process in motion, if he commits himself to a definitive schedule for elections designed to give Indonesia a new president as soon as possible in as open and fair a procedure as possible, if he succeeds in removing legislation from the statutes that penalizes peaceful dissent and restricts political participation, and if he continues to release political prisoners, including those from East Timor, disbursements from international financial institutions should proceed, on the understanding that they can always be suspended again if the political situation deteriorates. Those allegations include not only the disappearances of activists from January through March but also the killings recently disclosed that took place in Irian Jaya in and during counterinsurgency operations in the Mapnduma area, following the release of researchers taken hostage by the guerrilla group, the Free Papua Movement OPM. Freezing Soeharto family assets in the U. Any initiative that Congress can pursue to uncover such assets would be widely welcomed. There appears to be a backlash building among some conservative groups in Indonesia against U. President Habibie should be urged to undertake more releases of political prisoners following the releases that have already occurred and to appoint a commission to address questions of racism and discrimination, particularly against the ethnic Chinese, in the wake of his visit to Glodok, Jakarta. The general attitude Congress should take toward Indonesia is not that nothing has changed, but that with President Soeharto gone, anything is possible. Your tax deductible gift can help stop human rights violations and save lives around the world.

4: Image of man on train sparks Soeharto nostalgia - National - The Jakarta Post

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The ethnographic and life-historical materials discussed here underscore that the new veiling is neither a traditionalist survival nor an antimodernist reaction but rather a complex and sometimes ambiguous effort by young Muslim women to reconcile the opportunities for autonomy and choice offered by modern education with a heightened commitment to the profession of Islam. Case studies also reveal that the new veiling is particularly prevalent not among the old and traditional but among young, well-educated, and socially assertive members of the urban middle class. Since the early s, veiling has become especially widespread among high Nancy J. Smith-Hefner school students and on college campuses in cosmopolitan cities such as Bandung, Medan, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta. Until the Islamic resurgence of the s, however, the Islam to which the majority of Javanese subscribed was a spiritualistic blend of Javanese traditions and normative Islam Geertz ; Woodward Many Javanese Muslims admit that a generation ago, they were lax in their performance of the pillars of Islam, including daily prayers, the annual fast, and the payment of religious alms. Few women wore the Muslim headscarf. Those who did tended to be older women from the ranks of rural traditionalists or the Muslim merchant class. According to surveys that I conducted during , , and , the percentage of Muslim women on campus who veil has risen to more than 60 percent. The practice of veiling is even more widespread among female students in technical and medical programs. The kerudung is typically made from a soft, translucent fabric chiffon, silk, or light cotton batik. By contrast, the new veil, or jilbab, is a large square piece of nontransparent fabric folded so as to be drawn tightly around the face and pinned securely under the chin so that the hair, ears, and neck are completely covered. A female medical student at the nondenominational Gadjah Mada University reported that all six Muslim women students in her department wore the veil; two of them wore the chador. Among dental students, reports were equally dramatic. Javanese Women and the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia 3 shoulders, with some styles covering the chest. The preferred colors among religious conservatives are either pale solids or, alternately, black or brown, the effect of which is intended to be modest and deliberately unalluring. Unlike modern, Western styles of dress, then, the jilbab and its associated clothing styles are designed to cover and obscure the shape of the body, albeit not nearly so radically as the full-length chador. This article examines the practice and meanings of the new veiling and of Islamization more generally for young Muslim Javanese women in the new middle class. Interviews were open-ended, though they generally covered the topics of education, religion, family life, gender, and sexuality. Respondents were selected from across academic departments and disciplines and expressed a variety of Muslim orientations modernist, traditionalist, secularist, activist, and conservative. All interviews were taped and fully transcribed. All translations are my own. Interviews with youth were supplemented by a survey of students equally divided between the National Islamic University and Gadjah Mada University and between male and female respondents on similar 4 Nancy J. Smith-Hefner that the new veiling is neither a traditionalist survival nor an antimodernist reaction but a complex and sometimes ambiguous effort by young Muslim women to reconcile the opportunities for autonomy and choice offered by modern education with a heightened commitment to the profession of Islam. Education is also linked, Hull observed, to higher rates of female employment, membership issues, as well as more informal interviews with parents, teachers, and religious and community leaders, for a total of more than interviews. Javanese Women and the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia 5 in civic organizations, and the expansion of extrafamilial social participation Hull , 78” Hull went on to note that in comparison to their counterparts in the Muslim world and the premodern West, Javanese women have long played a prominent role in the family and public life. For centuries, Javanese women have owned farm land, operated small businesses, and had the right to initiate divorce. Hull recognized that at the idealized level of expression, Javanese do tend to see the husband as the patriarchal head of the household. However, as Hull also noted, in the less idealized conduct of everyday life,

the husband-wife partnership is conceived as one of complementarity rather than subordination. In household economic matters, it is common in Java for rural women to contribute substantially to household income; many even take primary responsibility for managing the family budget. In addition, as other researchers have noted, it is common in Java for both men and women to view women as more resourceful and responsible in the handling of money than men Hull , 79; see also Brenner ; Geertz ; Keeler ; Smith-Hefner Having summarized the conventional view of the status of women in Java, however, Hull introduced a wrinkle into the account. The wrinkle concerns the position of women in high-status circles, especially among members of the traditional aristocracy and court elite, known as priyayi. As the ranks of the colonial bureaucracy swelled with native administrators during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the category of priyayi was extended to include not only aristocrats but all Javanese employed in state administration. Although later scholars would point out that, in fact, many priyayi were pious Muslims Bachtiar ; Woodward , Geertz regarded the priyayi as mystical relativists. To this summary portrait, Hull added the observation that the priyayi also differed from lower-status Javanese in their family and gender organization. Unlike their rural counterparts, the demands of family honor for priyayi women often required that women remain secluded in their homes and not be exposed to the status-demeaning bustle of the public world. As these restrictions illustrate—and as was made famous in the published letters of the great Javanese priyayi writer Kartini now a heroine of Indonesian national culture; see Sears ; Tiwon —priyayi women were subject to more severe social controls than their counterparts in other sectors of Javanese society. Priyayi girls were provided with only limited education and were often forced to marry at a young age and to a husband chosen by their parents Cote Equally 6 Nancy J. Smith-Hefner important, priyayi girls were not supposed to engage in demeaning physical labor, with the notable exception of that associated with the relatively prestigious, home-based industry of batik cloth painting and production Brenner ; Gouda ; Hull ; Koentjaraningrat Although they were provided with access to formal education and extrafamilial employment, women in the emerging middle class tended to be more, not less, focused on the household. The interviewees who made these criticisms included not only members of the middle class but also village women who were compelled to work by economic hardship. The consensus among these informants was that women who worked outside the home could not adequately care for their children. Hull discovered, then, that middle-class women with the means to do so opted not to work outside the home so as to devote themselves to childrearing and homemaking. In short, among educated middle-class women, Hull saw a trend toward heightened domesticity and social insularity rather than greater equality and public involvement. Among other things, 6 Hull linked this pattern to several factors: Between and , the percentage of young adults with basic literacy skills skyrocketed from 40 percent to 90 percent. The percentage of youths completing senior high school grew from 4 percent to more than 30 percent Hefner , Although female enrollments continue to lag those of males, the gap has shrunk considerably. In , there was a 48 percent excess of males over females in school enrollments at the university level; by , that gap had shrunk to 29 percent Hull and Jones , — These educational developments have been accompanied by a substantial movement of women into the civil service and professions. This new generation of women are also all graduates of the compulsory religious courses conducted in all Indonesian schools. Since , two to three hours of religious education each week has been a state-mandated feature of Indonesian education from grade school through college. The phenomenon of veiling is indicative of this change. Rather than an icon of Islamic traditionalism or antimodernization, for most middle-class Muslims, veiling is a symbol of engagement in a modern, albeit deeply Islamic, world. Although its meanings are varied and contested, for most Muslim women, veiling is an instrument for heightened piety and public participation rather than domestic insulation. At the same time, however, the cultural terms for this heightened participation, as well as its practical consequences, differ from those offered to women in the postfeminist West. Modernity, we are reminded, is multiple in its meanings and organizations, not least of all when it 7 In some parts of Indonesia, it should be noted, the regulation was not implemented until the mid-or even late s. Smith-Hefner comes to gender cf. At Gadjah Mada University in the late s, there was a new spirit of Islamic activism that, rather than just emphasizing prayer and religious study, sought to de-privatize Islam by linking it to social and political transformation. Muslim activists associated

with the Salahuddin campus mosque, in particular, took the lead in coordinating the stated-mandated religious classes required of every university student. The new Islamic activism emerged in the wake of far-reaching changes in campus life. Young women activists in jilbab became a familiar sight on the front lines of the demonstrations that eventually brought down the regime in May. Veiling offered female activists symbolic protection from threats of violence during prodemocracy rallies. Mahmood ; White For women and girls, these uniforms have long consisted of a knee-length skirt and a short-sleeved blouse or jacket. Prior to , there was no long-skirted, veiled option for students or government employees. Even more serious, they faced the possibility of expulsion from school or the loss of their job. Interviewees reported that at some high schools, virtually the entire Muslim female student body adopted the veil in a matter of days, although in the weeks that followed, some women began to reevaluate their decision. Some of the most vigorous opposition to veiling came from 8 The decision to allow high school students to wear the jilbab to school SK No. According to my inter- views, however, even after its announcement in Jakarta, many outlying school districts were slow to implement the new regulation. For an insightful account of veiling in Yogyakarta and Surakarta in the early s, when the practice was still relatively uncommon, see Suzanne A. Yayuk adopted the jilbab in when she was in her second year at a public high school. In response, Yayuk and three other girls wrote a letter of protest to the school authorities. Upon hearing of the policy change, Yayuk and twenty of her classmates came to school wearing jilbab. During this same period, Yayuk explained, the number of veiled students fell as girls began to realize the seriousness of their decision and experienced pressure from disapproving parents. Smith-Hefner families in which one or both parents were employed as civil servants pegawai negeri. As representatives of the state, civil servants bore the brunt of policies during the early New Order that neither rewarded nor encouraged public piety. The early s marked the peak of the Islamic resurgence, and many young activists derided the Soeharto government as anti-Islamic. As government policies became more Islam friendly, then, pressures to veil as a symbol of anti- government protest diminished. In fact, as Soeharto sought to wrap himself in the garb of conservative Islam during his last years, some critical women activists began to insist that veiling was only meaningful if linked to demands for demo- cratic reform. As a result, they had begun serious study of Islam penga- jian and had taken up the veil themselves. Oci,¹⁴ a student in her second year at Gadjah Mada University, describes her decision to veil in just such personal and pietistic terms. She says that she began to wear the veil consistently at the beginning of her second semester of college. A few years earlier, she had attended a modernist Muslim Muhammadiyah high school where female students were required to wear the headscarf as part of their school uniform, but they were allowed to take it off after classesâ€™”and most students did. After a while we realized menyadari that we really should wear it all the time. But most of us only wore it to school and on the way home we took it off. Finally, I did a special prayer that helps you to choose between two things, the sholat Istikharah. As Oci notes, the ethical standards and behavioral restrictions associated with veiling are weighty, and most Muslims regard the decision to adopt the veil as something of a great behavioral divide. When a young woman in jilbab violates any of these prescriptions, she exposes herself to public moral censure, severe in some cases. Smith-Hefner coworkers, or she may even be challenged by total strangers on the street. For similar reasons, the majority of poor working-class women who labor as domestics do not wear the headscarf. These women typically explain that they do not veil because of the physical requirements of their jobsâ€™”cooking and clean- ingâ€™”which call for practicality and ease of movement. See Lind- quist , however, for an interesting account of veiling among Indonesian migrant workers in an area of rapid social change. They cited reports of women simply donning headscarves when entering those areas where veiling is required in order to avoid harass- ment by Muslim religious police and taking them off as soon as they leave the enforcement zones. Campus religious organizations, friends and family members, religious teachers, and Islamic pub- lications all reinforce a message of the dangers of free interaction between the sexes and press the case for veiling as the solution. Most women who live away from home take up residence in rental rooms or boarding houses kost with other women students.

5: Post-Soeharto Indonesia

"What are Indonesia's prospects over the next ten years? Its economy has been ravaged by the Asian economic crisis. Its leader for 32 years, President Soeharto, was forced from office in May amidst rioting and student demonstrations."

No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The Australian Copyright Act the Act allows a maximum of one chapter or ten per cent of this book, whichever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution or body that administers it has given a remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited CAL under the Act. ISBN 1 8. Indonesia " Politics and government " ". Indonesia " Economic conditions " ". Because the events of the period lend themselves to a narrative format, the book proceeds chronologically. I have therefore aspired to relating the events in a clear and credible style; the intention is to let the events and protagonists convey their own drama. To support this narrative approach, I have emphasised careful research and annotation. This research effort would not have been possible without several factors: The research for Reformasi builds upon my experience of writing the Van Zorge Report, a bi-weekly journal on Indonesian politics and economics. I performed this role from mid through early , a period that coincided with much of the political tumult. During this time I conducted in-depth interviews with around 60 policy-makers, politicians, generals, Islamic leaders, academics, NGO figures, student activists and journalists. I certainly gained the most valuable insights from innumerable encounters with Indonesians from all walks of life. Throughout this time I have been continuously amazed by the people of Indonesia. Ultimately, it is their graciousness"amid hardship"that inspired me to produce this book. Reformasi takes a hard look at Indonesian politics, but it does so in tribute to a wonderful people who, I believe, deserve better leadership. However, this book received a tremendous amount of support in terms of encouragement, advice, corrections and input. I am very fortunate indeed that such a large number of extraordinary people were eager to help. Rather than making a difficult effort to rank them in importance, this acknowledgements section will, like the book itself, follow chronologically. My parents inspired my interest in both writing and government, and my brother Gerald first brought me to Indonesia at age Jonathan Harris and Gene Galbraith first employed me in the securities industry in Jakarta, and Belinda Tan was an exceptional colleague and friend. And my experience of performing political risk analysis with Dennis Heffernan and James Van Zorge provided invaluable experience. Gary Goodpaster convinced me to start this project, and important words of encouragement came from Mary Schwarz, Paul Wolfowitz and Adam Schwarz. Peter Milne provided editing assistance, instructive ideas and myriad shows of support along the way. Christopher Lingle, John McBeth and John Haseman each provided generously of their time and patience to offer insights, corrections and instruction in their respective fields of expertise: Dean Carignan performed a characteristically thorough and thoughtful critique of the text. My classmate Jean-Jacques Barrow lent his inimitable perspicacity. I have referenced the text with more than endnotes, but in many cases time constraints prevented me from delving deeper and achieving greater accuracy. I hope that some of the issues that I have been unable to fully answer will eventually be resolved. I have tried to delineate fact from supposition by consistently denoting the latter as such. I hope I have done justice to a story that richly deserves just that. Wealth may vanish, families may disintegrate and reputations may fall, but the post must be secured. People fight, pray, fast, slander, lie, work themselves to the bone and back-stab each other, all for the sake of a government post. One would sacrifice anything to obtain it"because with it, all can be restored. The raid itself was a simple affair. Troops launched an attack at dawn on a Saturday, and by noon they controlled the premises. The event marked a strategic success for Soeharto: It did not, however, constitute a triumph. The blunt attack made the president appear cruel and desperate. It also dashed hopes for a peaceful political transition, by demonstrating that Soeharto, at age 75, was determined to cling to power by force. For more than million Indonesians the ensuing political struggle would exact exceedingly high costs. The prize was paramount control over the most corrupt state in Asia"and the rules were nonexistent. In fact, appearances

can be misleading in Indonesia, and triumphs can prove ephemeral. Soeharto was born to a family of impoverished petty aristocrats in rural Central Java, and at the age of seventeen he joined a local military unit under the supervision of the Dutch colonial authorities. It was the eve of World War II. The Dutch sought to reclaim their huge colony after the war, but the nationalist leaders Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta declared Indonesia an independent republic. Although little more than a loosely organised network of volunteer militias, the army waged a determined guerilla campaign against Dutch forces for nearly five years. Indonesia was blessed with natural resources but three centuries of colonial rule had left the population poor and undereducated. In a dazzlingly diverse archipelago, national unity was sorely lacking. And perhaps most significantly, the political institutions left over from the Dutch colonisers were designed, not to serve the interests of the people, but to uphold the authority of the rulers. The Constitution, which had been drafted under emergency conditions, was rife with vagaries. A more sophisticated Constitution was therefore introduced in 1959 but whereas the earlier version lacked checks on presidential authority, the second provided for a parliamentary system that proved chronically unstable. Soekarno was reduced to a figurehead, and parliamentary cabinets rose and fell in rapid succession. Two years later Soekarno finally intervened. Siding with one faction of the military, the president imposed martial law and revived the Constitution. Genuine democracy would not return for more than 40 years. Amid economic malaise, Soekarno survived through cunning tactics: He balanced his presidency between three political forces: This formula kept Soekarno in power for nine years, but corruption and economic neglect eventually took their toll. Soekarno increasingly associated himself with the Communists, who whipping the political atmosphere into a frenzy. Abdul Latief and Lt Col. Controversy persists over who encouraged the attackers to act. However, Latief, Untung and at least one other senior conspirator had previously served in the Central Java Garrison under the command of Maj. As such, he was one of two generals with direct command over troops in the capital; the other was the Jakarta Garrison commander, Maj. To have any chance of success, an attack against the army leadership in Jakarta would, presumably, have had to target these two unless the attackers believed them to be partisans. Both were inexplicably spared. When President Soekarno appointed a communist-leaning general to head the army, Soeharto objected and assumed the command himself. He denounced the 30 September Movement as a communist coup attempt and arrested the conspirators. Latief says that he felt betrayed. A bloody, nationwide anti-communist pogrom ensued. Estimates of the death toll range from 80 to 100,000. Latief, who remained in prison for 33 years. And within a few months Soeharto had wrested control of the government away from the disgraced Soekarno. The New Order had been born. He imposed order, rectified the economy and eradicated the threat of communism. And the ensuing oil boom, which brought unprecedented riches to Indonesia, also enabled Soeharto to consolidate his grip on power. It was not until the mid-1980s, therefore, that succession worries first began to arise. Election outcomes were never in doubt: Nonetheless, the build-up to a parliamentary election was always marked by abnormally high levels of political tension. Before each new presidential term the cagey but inscrutable Soeharto intimated that the upcoming term would be his last. In 1988 Indonesia was the poorest country in Asia, with an estimated 60 per cent of the population or around 55 million people living in poverty. By 1990 the poverty rate had been cut to 11 per cent, or 22 million people. With land, labour and natural resources in abundance the outlook was bright for sustained growth. But despite these achievements there were reasons for dissatisfaction. Rather than serving the public, most functions of the state apparatus were concerned primarily with upholding these rent-seeking structures. Many poor Indonesians were growing gradually better off, but they also confronted mounting injustice in their daily lives. In contrast, Indonesians young and old were turning their attention to a politician whose lineage had always captivated their imagination: There Megawati was raised like a princess but her luxurious lifestyle changed abruptly at the age of eighteen, when her father was deposed. While her father remained under house arrest, Megawati tried twice to obtain an undergraduate degree but dropped out both times. Rather than pursuing a career, she chose to marry, but her first husband died in an aircraft crash and her second marriage was annulled. Her father died in 1988 and she finally married her third husband, Taufik Kiemas, three years later. In the 1990s, however, her husband helped persuade her to enter politics. Megawati had accrued few official distinctions to her name, but her name alone was sufficient distinction for prominence in Indonesian politics. She followed the proud, albeit

vague, tradition of her father: Soekarno had founded the Indonesian Nationalist Party PNI in , and youth militias had rallied around its symbol, a fattened bull, during the struggle for independence. The party entered a long period of decline, eventually becoming a token opposition party whose leaders willingly complied with Golkar and the military. But despite this ignominious role, Megawati joined PDI as a member of parliament in . Most outlandishly, PDI demanded multiple candidates in the presidential election, to be held in the MPR which consisted of all parliamentarians, plus appointed representatives. The Golkar-controlled election authorities credited Golkar with 68 per cent of the national vote—a figure typical of the official results of past elections.

6: Reformasi: The Struggle for power in post-Soeharto Indonesia - Kevin O'Rourke - Google Books

In July , President Soeharto crossed a point of no return. Small but vocal student groups were staging daily demonstrations to demand 'reformasi' - Indonesia's byword for democratic reform.

Play media ABC news report of Suharto announcing he would retire in and speculating on who would replace him - including Jusuf Habibie. Generally, the fall of Suharto is traced from events starting in , when forces opposed to the New Order began to rally around Megawati Sukarnoputri , head of the PDI and daughter of the founding president Sukarno. When Suharto attempted to have Megawati removed as head of this party in a back-room deal, student activists loyal to Megawati occupied the headquarters of PDI in Jakarta. This culminated in Black Saturday on 27 July, when the Indonesian military broke up the demonstrations. These further worsened when the Asian financial crisis reached Indonesia, highlighting the corruption of the New Order. Economic instability from the crisis affected much of the country, in the form of increased prices for staple foods and goods, and lowered standards of living and quality of life. These touched off riots, many targeting ethnic Chinese Indonesians ; bolstered by the findings of Parliamentary and independent investigations, it is often theorised that these anti-Chinese riots were instigated or aided by the military to divert anger away from Suharto himself. During the years " mainly at 13"15 May , a massive riot broke out in Indonesia. People were burning everything within the city including cars, motorcycles, buildings, and monuments in addition to pillaging and looting from stores. This was further worsened when many were killed and raped, most of which were Indonesians of Chinese descent. No action was taken by the army or the police. In , Suharto made the decision to stand before the parliament for a re-election and won. The result was considered so outrageous that students occupied the Parliament. Suharto soon stood down from the presidency, and named B. Considered the unseen power behind the throne, General Wiranto of the Chief of Staff over the military that was central to the New Order, is believed to have been behind the decision of Suharto to step down. Habibie was sworn in as President of Indonesia. As President, Habibie undertook numerous political reforms. Political parties were also not required to have Pancasila as their ideology. This resulted in the emergence of many political parties and 48 would go on to compete in the legislative election. Habibie also presided over the legislative elections, the first free election since This election was supervised by the independent General Elections Commission KPU instead of an elections commission filled with government ministers as had been the case during the New Order. In a move that surprised many, and angered some, Habibie called for a referendum on the future of East Timor. Subsequently, on 30 August, the inhabitants of East Timor voted to break away from Indonesian rule and become an independent country. In , Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected President. His coalition, which brings together figures from the military, business community, and conservative Islam, has restabilised the office of the Presidency. Kabinet Persatuan Nasional , was a coalition cabinet which consisted of members of various political parties. Non-partisans and the military TNI were also represented in the Cabinet. Wahid then went on to make two administrative reforms. However, this referendum would be to decide on various modes of autonomy rather than to decide on independence like in East Timor. Two months later, in May, the Government signed a memorandum of understanding with GAM to last until the beginning of , by which time both signatories would have breached the agreement. During his visit, Wahid was successful in convincing West Papuan leaders that he was a force for change and even encouraged the use of the name Papua. By now, it was evident that Laskar Jihad , a radical Islamic militia, were being assisted by members of the military and it was also apparent that they were financed by Fuad Bawazier, the last Minister of Finance to have served under Suharto. On 24 December , a series of bombings were directed against churches in Jakarta and in eight cities across Indonesia. In July, Agus began uncovering a scandal involving Dharma Putra, a foundation with affiliations to Kostrad. Through Megawati, military members began pressuring Wahid to remove Agus. Wahid gave in to the pressure but then planned to have Agus appointed as the Army Chief of Staff to which top military leaders responded by threatening to retire and Wahid once again bowed down to pressure. The militia had planned earlier in the year to go to the archipelago and assist the Muslims there in their communal conflict with the

Christians. Impeachment[edit] By the end of , there were many within the political elite who were disillusioned with Wahid. The most obvious person who showed this disillusion was Amien Rais who showed regret at supporting Wahid to the Presidency the previous year. Amien also attempted to rally opposition by encouraging Megawati and Akbar to flex their political muscles. Megawati surprisingly defended Wahid whilst Akbar preferred to wait for the legislative elections. In a meeting with university rectors on 27 January , Wahid commented on the possibility of Indonesia descending into anarchy. Wahid then made the suggestion that he may be forced to dissolve the DPR if that happened. The vote was overwhelmingly for the memorandum and PKB members could only walk out in protest. The memorandum caused widespread protests by NU members. Wahid denied it and went to talk to the protesters at the town of Pasuruan , encouraging them to get off the streets. In March, Wahid tried to counter the opposition by moving against dissidents within his own cabinet. Yudhoyono refused and Wahid removed him from his position. TNI, having had a bad relationship with Wahid through his tenure as President, stationed 40, troops in Jakarta and placed tanks with their turrets pointing at the Presidential Palace in a show of force. Wahid continued to insist that he was the President and stayed for some days in the Presidential Palace but bowed down to reality and left the residence on 25 July to immediately fly overseas to the United States for health treatment. Megawati presidency â€” [edit] Play media ABC news report on the political rise of Megawati Sukarnoputri suggesting she "might one day become president". Under Megawati Sukarnoputri , the process of democratic reform begun under Habibie and Wahid continued, albeit slowly and erratically. Megawati appeared to see her role mainly as a symbol of national unity, and she rarely actively intervened in government business. Under her tenure, the Mutual Assistance Cabinet Indonesian: Kabinet Gotong Royong helped govern the country. Corruption continued to be pervasive, though Megawati herself was seldom blamed for this. Megawati, they said, saw her father, Sukarno, as a "Good King" of Javanese legend. Once this had been achieved, they said, Megawati was content to reign as the Good Queen and leave the business of government to others[citation needed]. Some prominent critics such as Benedict Anderson jokingly referred to the president as "Miniwati. The Indonesian Constitution was amended to provide for the direct election of the President, and Megawati stood for a second term. She consistently trailed in the opinion polls, due in part to the preference for male candidates among Muslim voters, and in part due to what was widely seen as a mediocre performance in office. Despite a somewhat better than expected performance in the first round of the elections , in the second round she was defeated by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono presidency â€” [edit] Two months after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono assumed office, the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami struck in the province of Aceh and many other countries along the Indian Ocean coastline. Three months later, an aftershock of the earthquake triggered a tsunami which occurred in Nias Island. In , Mount Merapi erupted and this was followed by an earthquake that struck Yogyakarta. Indonesia also suffered a small outbreak of bird flu and endured the Sidoarjo mud flow. In severe floods struck Jakarta. Yudhoyono allowed Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso to open the Manggarai watergate with the risk of flooding the Presidential Palace. The attacks bear the hallmarks of the militant Islamic group Jemaah Islamiyah JI -- a group with links to Al-Qaedaâ€”though the police investigation is ongoing. This group was also responsible for the Bali bombings. Yudhoyono condemned the attack, promising to "hunt down the perpetrators and bring them to justice. In , 11 trillion rupiah was set aside, increasing to 23 trillion in and 42 trillion in For , 51 trillion was allocated. In , Yudhoyono was elected for a second term in the presidential election along with Boediono , former Governor of Bank Indonesia. They defeated 2 candidates: In , Yudhoyono, unable to run for a third term in the office as dictated by Indonesian law, was succeeded by Joko Widodo with Kalla returning as vice president, defeating Prabowo and Hatta Rajasa , making Jokowi the first Indonesian president without a high-ranking military or political background.

7: Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia - PDF Free Download

Indonesia: The Post-Soeharto Crisis. Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific by Sidney Jones, Human Rights Watch.

8: Post-Suharto era - Wikipedia

Indonesia Post-Soeharto 31 December pm {mosimage}"Indonesia Post-Soeharto" brings together eleven of Indonesia's key democracy figures and critics, together with East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao and a victim of the brutality of the Soeharto regime in East Timor.

9: Indonesia Post-Soeharto Â« FORUM-ASIA

Indonesia's soaring country risk-ratings meant that international banks were no longer willing to deal with Indonesian counterparts. This rendered many exporters unable to obtain post-shipment facilities and finance their cashflows.

The social context of professional nursing Mary W. Stewart Human gene mapping 4 Contemporary Parish Prayers The stagnation of desire A risk management approach to occupational stress Monitoring fiber stress during curing of single fiber glass and graphite-epoxy composites An experimental study of a regularity in the perception of visual brightness. 3. Geology, while it takes us back very far, Teaches us Nothing of the Origin of the Earth . 186 Lennon, what happened! Chronicles of Carter barracks, by H. W. Closson. Image processing tutorial matlab Introductory statistics Gould 2nd edition How she has her own way Neoliberalism, civil society and security in Africa Behavior Modification Procedure Meat and Spirit Plan Communicating qualitative and quantitative decision support information Marsha K. Moss Teacher, you have class! Fundamentals of plant genetics and breeding Azar fundamentals of english grammar 4th edition Reflections on cognitive and epistemic diversity : can a Stich in time save Quine? Michael Bishop A Is for Attitude The Columbia Presbyterian Guide to Surgery No continuation, no presentation (1:23) The five-minute moms club oath Knitters almanac. The theory practice of poster art The Jacket I Wear in the Snow (Mulberry Big Book) My own little world Philip Doddridge of Northampton, 1702-51 Ways of ing 9th edition The good relationship guide The Secret History (Large Print) Histology Study Guide 9 : John McEnroes Wimbledons Baudelaire and intertextuality Doctor Leeds Selection Of Popular Epic Recitations Rs agarwal quantitative aptitude 2014 The Peninsular war: Martin Diaz. 31 days of prayer ruth myers