

1: Why a Turkey-US trade spat could shake Europe and Syria - www.enganchecubano.com

Chapter 74 Conclusions Prospects of Turkish Political Culture Theoretical Considerations Path Dependence and Turkish Political Culture The study of EU-sponsored political reform in Turkey in the previ-

Despite important legislative victories, Democrats had been outflanked. Republicans had successfully sold themselves as the party of economic growth, the party of the angry out-of-work American, and, most dissonantly, the party of change. They owned the narrative and won big. In the dark days following George W. Funders and strategists created new institutions and scaled up existing ones, including think tanks, civic-engagement organizations, and media-watchdog groups. These institutions played a key role in the Democratic takeover of Congress, the election of President Barack Obama, and the passage of parts of the Obama platform in and . Yet as progressives watched Democrats suffer the worst election loss since the Republican collapse of , they seemed to be back where they started. Just as in , many have blamed the losses on ineffective Democratic campaign messaging. The problem, however, runs much deeper. Electoral and Beltway politics are episodic, short-term, and transactional. Movements, however, are long-term. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed. They must change the culture. Culture is the space in our national consciousness filled by music, books, sports, movies, theater, visual arts, and media. It is the realm of ideas, images, and stories -- the narrative in which we are immersed every day. It is where people make sense of the world, where ideas are introduced, values are inculcated, and emotions are attached to concrete change. Cultural change is often the dress rehearsal for political change. Or put in another way, political change is the final manifestation of cultural shifts that have already occurred. Board of Education by seven years. Until progressives make culture an integral and intentional part of their theory of change, they will not be able to compete effectively against conservatives. Conservatives have long recognized the role that culture plays in shaping public sentiment and building movements. The modern conservative movement built an infrastructure to deploy its own cultural strategy. In a famous memo, corporate lawyer and later Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell argued that the time when a policy elite -- the political leaders, wonks, and the chattering class -- could advance ideas and shape debate was ending. Instead of catering to this elite, conservatives formed alternative media networks that bypassed mainstream-media gatekeepers and allowed them to communicate their stories to the American public directly. Now conservatives dominate both the top cable-news programs and the top AM talk-radio shows. Conservatives have used these outlets and media figures to mobilize their supporters, promote "traditional values," and neutralize progressive ideas and thinkers with stories that are divisive. Shortly after September 11, Bush adviser Karl Rove met with more than 40 Hollywood leaders, including heads from Paramount, Viacom, the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences, and the Motion Picture Association of America to discuss seven administration-approved themes. Rove avoided the word "propaganda. Far too many progressives still focus on speaking to a consensus-seeking policy elite -- one that privileges objectivity, data, and argument -- instead of pushing their ideas out to a divided public that responds to values, images, and stories. Andrew Rich of the progressive Roosevelt Institute has found that 77 percent of conservative think-tank leaders place a high priority on shaping public opinion, compared to 58 percent of liberal think-tank leaders. Rich concluded that left-leaning think tanks remain badly positioned to fight a war of ideas. More than that, progressives cede the cultural terrain, allowing conservatives to shape the narrative. When election season rolls around, they spend huge amounts of money trying to change it. But facts are useless without a story. To take just one example, the Obama administration created the Recovery. Featuring lots of maps, charts, and dollar amounts -- but no stories -- the site quickly became just another data-heavy government website. Progressives actually hold a natural advantage on the culture front. The latest neuroscience research suggests that progressives are more open to new information, ideas, and cultures. That may be why they are overrepresented in the loose, diffuse networks of creative professionals who drive music, arts, comedy, literature, and media. Yet progressives have been slow to claim their history of cultural strategy. Kennedy used cultural strategy to solidify Cold War

liberalism. Conservatives frame change as restoration. Progressives see change as possibility. At a University of California, Los Angeles, rally for Obama, the appearance of 4, Shepard Fairey posters sparked a nationwide creative operation that directly involved hundreds of artists. By the fall, millions of T-shirts, prints, murals, and ephemera, unauthorized by the Obama campaign, heralded a new face of progress and change. This lesson has been lost on the left. Liberals tend to call on creative types -- especially famous ones -- only around election time to raise money or reach a crucial demographic. In the campaign off-season, the left has depended upon a deep reservoir of goodwill from artists and patrons and the ample gumption of arts organizers to take up the fight. Creatives may be the most underutilized asset in the progressive movement. But they are not tools of propaganda, either. Cultural strategy is not about agitprop, benefit concerts, and lapel buttons; those are tactics, sometimes useful, sometimes terrible. When artists tell new stories, they can shift the culture and make new politics possible -- cultural strategy is about understanding that fact and empowering artists to do what they do best. The play helped organize support nationally for the introduction and final passage of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. It tied emotion to a tangible vehicle for change. The movie framed the facts in cascading images that illustrated the stakes of political failure, reaching through the histrionic media environment to win new audiences. These projects also highlighted values -- inclusion, sustainability, the right to live free of violence, the common global good -- that point to a progressive agenda. When such values are promoted in the culture, they are normalized. They become core American values. A new cultural majority -- an emerging American public that is the most demographically diverse ever and predisposed to support a progressive agenda, a public that elected Obama in but mostly stayed home in -- is still out there. Meanwhile, the right is constantly working in the culture to fragment it. During periods of economic and social upheaval, people seek a way of making sense of the chaos that surrounds them. Caught in the storm, they desire comfort and strength. Conservatives address this by pulling people backward to an imagined past. Progressives prepare people to come together to face the coming world. Culture is where they can instill faith. In freeing creativity -- that most renewable, sustainable, and boundless of resources -- progressives can once again capture and carry forward our national imagination.

2: Turkish Currency Crisis and its Political Implications

The study of EU-sponsored political reform in Turkey in the previous chapters made it clear that path dependence theory could help explain the process of liberalization of Turkish political culture

A biweekly column on patterns in diplomacy. Even before the new tariffs, the Turkish economy was in crisis. Yet as is so often the case on an international stage where institutions, alliances, and assumptions have been shifting, the economics of the dispute will probably prove less important than the politics. The open question is whether, and how, he will follow through on that threat. Turkey matters in geopolitical terms. The Turks are central players in neighboring Syria, where their forces control the area across the border. That makes a trade war into something more politically volatile. London Not all trade wars are created equal. And the latest one to hit the headlines “ between the United States and its fellow NATO member, Turkey “ could turn out to be among the most consequential of all. But the political context is more complex, the political ripples more important, and the longer-term political effects unpredictable and potentially risky. Turkey was among the dozens of countries on which President Trump imposed steel and aluminum tariffs in March. Trump and Washington say are baseless charges of anti-government activity. And even before the new tariffs, the Turkish economy was in crisis, saddled by double-digit inflation, a devaluing currency, and huge foreign debt. During the cold war, Turkey was a linchpin of the Western alliance: Though his political roots were in a banned Islamist party, he has ruled less as an Islamist than a populist-nationalist firebrand. Since a failed army coup in July and his ascendancy to the presidency, he has increasingly concentrated power in his own hands, purged the army, arrested thousands of alleged enemies as well as journalists, and moved to take control of all the reins of the economy. The most likely route to de-escalation of the latest US-Turkey conflict would be a face-saving formula under which Turkey sends home the detained American minister, Andrew Brunson. But there seems no sign of that yet. Speaking last Friday, Trump ridiculed the idea Mr. Economically, his options are limited. The more serious prospect would involve practical measures on the ground. A concern for Europe is the deal reached in under which around 3 million refugees from Syria are now in Turkey, with EU funding “ a response to the arrival of around 1 million through Greece and into other European countries during Get the Monitor Stories you care about delivered to your inbox. By signing up, you agree to our Privacy Policy and European users agree to the data transfer policy. All of that is yet to be determined. Yet should the tariff dispute further escalate US-Turkish tensions, one thing at least does seem certain.

3: Turkey's political culture and the presidential system - Daily Sabah

Here, the progress of political culture and the response of society and political parties have played an important role. www.enganchecubano.comatic politics in Turkey have substantially changed between the 1980s and today and important steps have been taken in the field of finance and the ethics of politics.

In the second, the EU became a factor providing outside pressure for change. While there has been a change in rhetoric, making a change in policy is proving very difficult. The wave of democratization that swept over much of the world in the 1990s appeared to have bypassed Turkey. Instead of experiencing a democratic breakthrough, the Turkish political system remained plagued by several problems compromising its democracy, issues further illustrated by the March financial crisis and its aftermath. These included a Kurdish insurgency; human rights violations; prohibitions on some political parties; corruption; thinly veiled interventions by the military into the political arena; and low public confidence in key democratic institutions. The parliamentary elections produced a coalition government that seemed likely to be torn between formerly implacable enemies on the nationalist right and the social-democratic left. Two events in the second half of the 2000s brought about renewed hope for political liberalization. The first was the Marmara earthquake in August that, in addition to causing human and material losses, exposed fissures in the edifice of the Turkish state. The hope among many was that these cracks would be filled by a resurgent civil society that could push for change. The expectation was that the EU would help push for change, prompting Turkey to undertake measures to eliminate its democratic deficit in exchange for admission to full membership. Arguably, one can already see results of the EU? A new president, one with solid reform credentials, has been elected, and his push for a more liberal and open government has brought him into open conflict with the current government, triggering the financial meltdown earlier this year. A year later, one can better assess how these two events and the ostensible agents of change—civil society and the EU—are re-shaping Turkish politics. In other contexts, both actors have been deemed instrumental in the processes of democratization. While the debate in Turkey has undoubtedly been transformed by these events, one wonders if this will lead to broad changes in the polity itself. This article will therefore examine the ability of Turkish civil society and the EU to compel Turkish elites to open up the political system and further processes of democratic consolidation. However, this is a minimalist definition, and many would contend that democracies depend upon other factors in order to function and be consolidated. These include basic civic freedoms, the rule of law, respect for human rights, measures of accountability, civil society, a restrained military, and popular support for democratic values and institutions. Numerous authors have tackled these subjects, and they have identified causes ranging from the Ottoman state tradition to Atatürk? Human rights are commonly cited as the largest blemish on Turkey? Party PKK broke out in and has claimed over 30,000 lives. Both sides have been accused of massive human rights violations. Turkey ranks among the leaders in the world for imprisoned journalists, and several leading human rights activists have also been imprisoned. The capture and imprisonment of the PKK? A related problem in Turkey is the powerful role of the military in politics. It also exercises a role in the State Security Courts, a constitutional body that deals with all political crimes. In 2004, the European Court of Human Rights declared that these courts—because they allow civilians to be judged by the military—violate human rights. Indeed, over 71 percent of the public in a survey expressed high trust in it. Today the military remains the most reticent actor on topics of political liberalization, and overcoming military opposition is a formidable challenge to all elected leaders. There are also limits on political competition in Turkey. By law, political parties cannot be based on class, region, ethnicity, or religion. This provision has been sporadically enforced, but in the 1990s, two groups—Kurds and Islamists—were brought into court on this issue. In 2002 and 2004, the pro-Kurdish Peoples? Both groups simply changed their name and reorganized the parties, the Kurds as the Peoples? More generally speaking, one can argue that democracy in Turkey is handicapped by a strong state tradition which fosters paternalism. Traditionally, civic groups have been seen as accessories of the state, not as genuine partners able to initiate action on their own. State corporatism, in which the state created and guided various groups, was the norm. This past continues to be reflected in the current constitutional order. Article 13 of the

constitution, written in under military rule, includes a host of restrictions. The state has the right to interpret vague notions such as? Interior Minister Saadetdin Tantan ranks corruption as the primary threat to stability today. Investigations into the Susurluk scandalâ€”in which a member of parliament, a law enforcement official, and an internationally wanted criminal were found together in a wrecked automobile along with thousands of dollars in cash and weapons with silencersâ€”brought no convictions, despite massive public outcry. In November , several banking scandals, one involving the nephew of former President Suleyman Demirel, threw prospects for economic reform and stability into doubt. These have been compounded by more bank failures and an open schism between President Ahmet N. Sezer and the government headed by Bulent Ecevit on efforts to fight corruption. In addition, the leaders of several major partiesâ€”Tansu Ciller of the True Path Party, Mesut Yilmaz of the Motherland Party, and Erbakan of Refah, all former prime ministersâ€”have been accused of corruption, but squashed a full inquiry by supporting each other in parliament. The fact that Ciller and Yilmaz remain heads of their parties after this problem and their electoral defeats in , points to the additional difficulty of political stagnation. The parties themselves are not run in a democratic manner, making it difficult for new ideas and leaders to emerge from below. In sum, the survey gives a somewhat mixed rating of a democratic political culture in Turkey. Something would have to emerge to change this situation. In , two eventsâ€”the earthquake and the EU? But were these events harbingers for real and lasting change? In addition to death and destruction, the event also highlighted weaknesses in the Turkish political system. Relief teams and materials arrived late, if at all, and officials of the Turkish Red Crescent were found to have embezzled funds and sold donated equipment. The health minister caused a furor by rejecting blood arriving from Greece. He also showed little compassion for victims by dismissing the need for portable toilets, suggesting instead that the displaced simply use the nearby Sea of Marmara. One Turkish columnist concluded,? This earthquake created a faultline in the Turkish political system. Everyone saw how inept the whole system isâ€”the bureaucracy, the state mechanism. What collapsed is the whole system. In the long run, the ramifications will be very drastic.? People rushed in to search for victims, supply food and medicine, and build shelters for the displaced. Some, such as Search and Rescue Association AKUT , became media stars, and their heroics stood in stark contrast to the performance of state organs. This phenomenonâ€”civil society responding to natural disasterâ€”is common, and disaster relief specialists have noted that these events? True, many groups are still active, and certainly civic organizations enjoy a higher profile in Turkey than before the disaster. However, they have been unable to sustain their level of political mobilization or come together to spearhead a push for sweeping reforms beyond the arena of public safety and disaster preparedness. Civil society, one could say, exists more as a slogan than as a reality. By the first anniversary of the quake, hope for political reform had been largely displaced onto the European Union or to President Sezer. In other words, Turkish civil society was no longer viewed as the primary agent for change; if change was to come, it would be either? Why did this pessimistic prospect for Turkish civil society take place? One important point in evaluating the issue is that Turkish civil society is far from homogeneous. Relief organizations span the entire spectrum of Turkish politics. Some have a liberal orientation; some are status-quo-oriented or? Some are clearly adversarial to the state; some are described as? The CCC was primarily composed of liberal groups. Islamist organizations, working together with the Fazilet Party, coordinated their own efforts. In my research in the summer of , I contacted dozens of NGOs in Turkey and asked them whether they worked closely with others. None reported systemic cooperation, and many complained about the ineffectiveness and over-bureaucratic nature of the CCC, which prevented it from sustaining any sort of cooperation. For example, several local search-and-rescue teams proposed creating a larger organization under the CCC but AKUT, by far the largest, refused, claiming there was no need to do so and it could not ensure that other groups were of high standards. In other words, while all groups might agree that things need to change in Turkey, there is no consensus as to the directions of such changes. Thus, loosely tied networks of relief organizations could not transform themselves into a movement for broader political change. The second obstacle faced by civil society was the state? Immediately after the earthquake, government officials spoke out against AKUT, accusing it of trying to make the state look bad and of not really helping people. Islamic groups complained the state overstepped its authority and played favorites,

allowing some to work but harassing others. Other groups, however, managed to stay on by concluding agreements with state ministries and local governments. Few, if any, of these groups protested the actions taken against the Islamists. Moreover, the success of arrangements would often depend upon good relations with the military. One organizer of a relief effort conceded that in order to overcome problems posed by local military officials, she would have to tell them, "My generals outrank your generals." This was clearest and perhaps most significant in the case of AKUT, whose standing in the public mind-set dwarfed that of any other group. He defended his decision, claiming AKUT had no capacity or desire to play such roles. Many thought that involvement in politics would tarnish their relief work or lead to pressures on them from above, and thus there has not been a connection with the exception of the Islamists between groups in civil society and expressly political groups such as parties. Another weakness of civil society was that it lacked a proper structure or strong roots. This energy could not be sustained or channeled into new directions. Today these groups, with the exception of AKUT, do not find themselves with significantly more members or funds. Thus, not only did they run up against the state structure, but they themselves lacked the basic resources to push harder for a democratic breakthrough. As one commentator noted, "The opportunity was in our hands, but we dropped the ball." One leader of the CCC acknowledged that the one-year anniversary would be marked more by prayers than protest at such problems as the appalling housing for many survivors and the fact that many of the same contractors who had built shoddy homes were now receiving contracts for the rebuilding effort.

4: Political Culture | www.enganchecubano.com

TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE FUTURE OF THE GRECO-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT Costas Melakopides — *The Questions Conflicting signals are emanating from Ankara regarding its bilateral relations.*

Print The already troubled Turkey-US relations have come to their lowest point so far and are currently the most explosive ingredient in the Syrian tinderbox. With an election on the Turkish horizon in the conflict may rather be expected to grow. By this he reacted on an earlier comment by Funk, a leading US commander in the anti-IS coalition, who said that Turkey would receive a harsh response when attacking the town of Manbij in Syria. Furthermore, the active support of Kurdish militias in Syria is a constant offence for the Turkish government which fears a strong Kurdish presence along its borders. Lately it threatened to expand its military operation to Manbij, a region with US presence. Whereas the US appreciate the Kurdish fighters as reliable and competent allies in their fight against the IS, Turkey fears a growing Kurdish autonomy region. Indeed, it is likely that the Kurds seek to link the region around Afrin with Kobane and regions in the East of Syria. This might also give a boost to Kurdish autonomy ambitions in Turkey. The Ottoman slap is a fighting-technique used by Ottoman soldiers particularly those in the front lines either in close combat with the enemy or if one had lost his weapon. It can be executed with both sides of the hand; the fighters were said to be trained by slapping oil marble all day long. The slap could be placed anywhere on the face and neck and at times was hard enough to break the nose, skull or neck of the counterpart. Thus, an Ottoman slap was clearly painful, often even deathly. In July after the Gezi park protests, for example, the Turkish government threatened social media websites as Facebook and twitter with an Ottoman slap, if they refused to provide user data to the government. At least three of them got injured when the two parties could not come to a conclusion on a commission on Islamist extremists in Iraq. Although verbal and physical violence is clearly not unique to Turkey, it nevertheless reveals much about the tightening of the political climate characterised by verbal threats as well as a vilifying and brutalised language that actively refers to physical attacks. Turkey has historically been characterised by authoritarian politics. The AKP -at least when it took office in presented itself as a counter-movement to such elite-driven, top-down practices. However, the last years have shown that differences are rather small. Particularly since the Gezi protests the AKP-led government is accused of ruling the country in an increasingly authoritarian manner. This leads to the question of political culture in Turkey per se. What are the overarching principles that determine political practice irrespective of ideology or party affiliation? Firstly, political practice and framing are person-based, institutions receive much less appreciation. Thus, instead of relying on institutional processes citizens seek to establish relations to political figures or at least door openers to decision-makers. In this regard, primary identities and affiliation with ethnic or religious networks is of outmost importance. Clearly this also reflects in clientelistic relations between rulers and ruled. Patriarchic societal relations are wide-spread and can be observed from a familial level to one of primary identities and the structuring of Turkish political parties, which are characterised by a lack of inner-party democracy. Indeed, Turkish party presidents regularly nominate the delegates to the party congresses — the body that decides about their reelection or not. Secondly, Turkish politics, and subsequently political culture, is male. Nationalist and militarist discourse have historically portrayed women as passive and in need of protection, whereas males were or had to present themselves as proactive and courageous. These ideas also translate into politics, e. The so far only female Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller is said to have had to adopt a male body language to gain respect and indeed was often portrayed in military clothing. Opposition is easily framed as a traitor to the national cause, instead those in power seek to impose their view on the consistency single-handedly. If the principles described above are interpreted as more underlying principles of Turkish political culture than what is new with the AKP? Further, the former institution of the Turkish military as an unofficial checks and balances has vanished. On the other hand, Turkey is pursuing a pro-active foreign policy which is quite untypical for the country. Although Turkey maintains a powerful military due to its insecure neighborhood, we do not make threats. The continuous reference to an Ottoman past is highly popular with the citizens as e. Also, the current government actively engages in an Ottoman discourse, e.

Further, Turkey is seeking to enlarge its area of influence in the region, often referred to by critics as a neo-Ottoman foreign policy. The AKP domestically is and frames itself as a counter movement against a Kemalist domination since Furthermore, it is also motivated to revive the idea of a Turkish-led Sunni Islam. The longing for leadership of Sunni Islam is at the same time a longing for the Ottoman Classical age, an outstanding time in Islamic history and civilisation. The Ottoman slap is thus an attempt to show who is wearing the pants around here, both nationally and internationally, a move supported by the AKP constituency as well as a large nationalist segment. It plays well, as anti-imperialism is a common theme popular in the whole political spectrum from ultra-left to the ultra-right with the possible exception of pro-Kurdish parties. At least, it should be stated that this strategy is among the possibilities.

5: World Bank June global economic prospects report sees Bulgaria's GDP growth this year at 3%

Yet the Alevi revival of the s showed that despite being closer to the dominant Turkish political culture paradigm that Kurdish political sub-culture, Alevi political sub-culture retained a considerable degree of independence and originality (KÄAk,).

Permalink Illustration by Necmettin Asma Turkey can keep the patched politics and find short-term solutions or it will turn its political experience to the bigger picture, which is the presidential system The Constitution, which is the embodiment of the political system and is seen as a result of the social contract, is the political road map of the community. In modern societies, you can understand easily what people understand from politics and how it is applied in real life through looking at the Constitution. In Turkish politics, the experience of the Constitution has come about as a result of its modernization process. However, this experience accommodates an inherent conflict in itself. The coup tradition that accompanies our constitutional experience means that the Constitution is not a legal text created by the will of the society. This tradition has turned the Constitution into the political idea of the military. Therefore, when the parliamentary tradition, which is defended in a conservative manner, is examined, it is able to provide a very undemocratic result. The Constitution of reviewed by the first Parliament before the establishment of the Republic stands in a privileged place with its democratic pluralism and the absolute legislative supremacy of its powers. It gave way to the Constitution of during the initial phase of the single-party period. In contrast, constitutional changes that have come into existence from the second Constitutional period to the present day are quite far from the democratic construction format. The changes of the Constitution of , which gave parliamentary property to Kanun-i Esasi the first Ottoman Constitution , were realized as a result of the military coup in The Constitution of , within the unity of power, condemned Turkish politics to an authoritarian system and has prevented the existence of democracy because of majoritarian politics in spite of the transition to a multiparty system after The Constitution of was legislated as a result of the military junta on May 27, but it was restricted by the Memorandum of because it was deemed to be too libertarian. Although it has changed many times, the current Constitution of was prepared by the military after the military coup on Sept. In summary, from another point of view, it can be concluded that our constitutional tradition, which is a reflection of a democratic political society, is the history of coups. In order to overcome this trauma, tens of laws and the article of the Constitution have been amended but the need could not be fulfilled because of the absence of a holistic system change. The ruling Justice and Development Party AK Party has significantly contributed to the process of this renovation via European Union negotiations and the quest for democratization. On the other hand, in order to regulate the "civil Constitution," the parties represented in Parliament have discussed this for a long time. However, this initiative could not have created a tangible outcome. Despite it all, it needs to be emphasized that the changes that were made in the name of keeping the democratic system alive have made the system more fragile. This crisis is the counterpart of the problem of "double legitimacy" in Turkish politics. In order to overcome this situation, the president should be elected by the assembly by maintaining a symbolic state in accordance with the parliamentary system or by switching to a presidential system where executive authority is in the hands of the president in a real sense. Otherwise, two actors who have the same political opinion may experience this crisis. However, reducing the change to just the executive authority is only a solution for the visible face of the problem. The Constitution should be replaced fully and it should be supported by political parties and electoral law. Changing the political system on a piecemeal basis makes the system vulnerable to crises and weak against problems. Theoretically elected democratic leaders play a unifying role in politically divided societies. Therefore, this makes the presidential system a facilitating factor for Turkey. The most important criticism of this subject is that elected leaders will see themselves as a savior. The term of the leader is an important political issue not only for the presidency but also for parliamentary regimes. Despite the existence of Turkish politics in the parliamentary regime, Turkey has been leading through the leaders of the parties who are public figures for a long time. After these issues have been determined, the elected leader remaining within the limits can be a unifying figure not an authoritarian one. The most important example of

the figure of the inclusivist leader is that the President could not be selected for a long time before Sept. Public figures can be nominated by various political parties by the alliance and it is not seen as a crisis in modern Turkey. The most important criticism related to countries that are ruled by a presidential regime is that military intervention is more common in moments of political crisis. The "protecting the country" reflex of the military has always been present in Turkey regardless of the form of government and these initiatives have been realized in the parliamentary regime. The July 15 coup attempt is the last and most unsuccessful example of this tradition. Here, the progress of political culture and the response of society and political parties have played an important role. Democratic politics in Turkey have substantially changed between the s and today and important steps have been taken in the field of finance and the ethics of politics. With the hard separation of powers regime in the presidential system, the legislative-executive and judicial relations can have a more democratic nature. Just like in the U. Today, Turkish politics should make a selection between a stable and corporate structure and politics which is patched and vulnerable to the political crisis. Turkey can keep the patched politics and find short-term solutions or it will turn into its political experience to the bigger picture, which is the presidential system.

6: Political Culture in Turkey by Eva Peskova on Prezi

Conclusions Prospects of Turkish Political Culture. theory could help explain the process of liberalization of Turkish political culture. 1 Turkey's approach to the European Union required a.

In October, in the midst of the nationwide purges that Turkish President Erdogan had unleashed following the failed coup attempt of July, pastor Brunson was detained by the Turkish authorities. Pastor Brunson "â€” Source: Getty Images At first, the pastor was under the impression that he was being summoned for an interview for the visa renewal that he had recently filed for. Instead, he, all of a sudden, found himself facing a combination of accusations that included the support for the Gulen movement which the Turkish state considers to be a terrorist organization and the main perpetrator of the coup attempt, political and military espionage, and involvement in the failed coup. By adding up these charges together, pastor Brunson would be looking at the possibility for a life sentence. The pastor was put into house arrest in July for his deteriorated health condition, though. Seeing no signs of retreat from the Turkish president, President Trump imposed a new set of sanctions on Turkey on the 10th of August. This time, the sanctions came in the form of the doubling of tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum. In addition to these, tariffs were increased on a number of other commodities including cosmetics, rice, and coal. The brief answer is NO. Much of the decline can be attributed to mismanagement, cronyism, and the fact that the growth was primarily fueled by foreign borrowing that hugely burdened the Turkish lira. Can the Turkish lira in this state endure against a strengthened US dollar? And if so, how long can it go? Granted, the US dollar in its current state is a major threat to the Turkish lira. After all, Turkey is still an emerging economy, and the United States the leading economy in the world. The announcement of the package gave a brief boost to the lira from 6. Each of Germany and France were also quick to assert their support for the Turkish economy through tighter relations. Right now, it is hard to tell. The market is surely not rooting for it as the Turkish currency crisis continues to linger. We can see this in the upward trend of gold purchases. The main benefit from this goes to the purchasers rather than the Turkish economy, though. Turkish real estate developers are actually accumulating losses because of the devaluation of the lira and the strengthening of the dollar, since a major part of their costs are in US dollars, whereas they are paid in lira. Even the investors might bear a huge risk by putting their money in Turkish real estate. What the Dubai-based global equities strategist and fund manager Matein Khalid wrote in the Khaleej Times back in April still holds today: If Erdogan decides in an act of abrupt burst of anger to introduce capital controls, it could have a severe knock-on effect on all other emerging markets in the region and beyond. Right now, the chances of this happening are small, but these are based on sound rational and logical conclusions. We are afraid, we have long passed this stage.

7: The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey

demqxd 28/11/ Page 22 Political Culture in Turkey: Connections Among Attitudes Toward Democracy, the Military and Islam M A R K T E S S L E R and E B R U A L T I N O G L U Against the background of Turkey s continuing but unconsolidated democratic transition, this article examines the nature and determinants of attitudes toward democracy held by ordinary Turkish citizens.

It will be argued that political and social developments in the late Ottoman Empire and early republican Turkey had a crucial impact on the formation of a subject mainstream Turkish political culture. Yet political culture diversity was maintained at the sub-national level through the hammering of minority group political sub-cultures. Kurdish and Alevi political sub-cultures were shaped under the influence of Ottoman parochial and republican subject political culture elements, while their distinct historical legacies were also influential. Being a resultant of mainstream and minority political cultures, Turkish political culture indicates the extent to which liberalisation of the Turkish state and society has been successful. Definitions of Political Culture a. What is Political Culture The failure of purely institutional descriptions of political systems to offer adequate explanations of post-Second World War political developments led scholars to delve into the reasons why similar political institutions performed so divergently in different countries. Political culture soon attracted the interest of academics whose debate gained intensity in the ideologically polarised environment of the Cold War era. The building blocks of political culture are, therefore, the knowledge, beliefs, opinions and emotions of individual citizens toward their form of government Hague and Harrop, Almond and Verba, In parochial political culture there are no specialised political roles in societies, and for members of these societies political orientations to these roles are not separated from their religious and social orientations. It is essentially a passive system as far as government influence is concerned. In participant political culture, citizens tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole. Close attention is paid to politics, while popular participation is regarded as both desirable and effective. It should however be clarified that applying the political culture model is not tantamount with endorsement of culturalist theories. Political culture should not be understood as an immutable property that precludes the possibility of political change and favours the perpetuation of status-quo. Processes of political socialisation are highly important for the formation of political culture. School, family and other social groupings have their contribution in the hammering of perceptions, affects and evaluations that constitute political culture. Although historical memories and political socialisation have considerable impact on the formation of political culture, political culture can be to a large extent- considered as independent variable in political science research. In other words, political culture should not always be considered as an independent variable in the study of political behaviour and institutions. The Political Sub-culture Debate The question whether the political culture of a people is further divisible into smaller sub- national units sub-cultures has resulted to controversy among the exponents of the political culture concept and a part of their critics that still viewed political culture as a useful analytical tool in the study of comparative politics. Whether population groups, distinct on the basis of their ethnicity, religion, class or gender, could hold different cognitions, affects and evaluations of political systems and states, has been the crux of this debate. The view that sub-national groups and not only peoples can serve as unit of political culture analysis has opened new ways in the comparative study of political systems and states. In other words, in parallel with existing national political cultures, minority political cultures exist and have significant influence on national political cultures. Kavanagh succinctly pointed out in his study of British political culture the usefulness of a study on British political sub-cultures, both on ethnic and class bases. A comparison of Scottish and English political sub-cultures as well as of British working- and middle-class political sub-cultures could be illuminating for many aspects of British political culture Kavanagh, Political liberalisation steps since the s have also imbued Kurdish and Alevi political sub- cultures with more participant elements. Features of Turkish Political Culture a. Citizens had to curtail their critical thought and individual human rights to the extent that they diverged from the officially sponsored political, cultural and national models. Dissidents had to choose between persecution whose intensity would vary according to

political circumstances and emigration. It would be inaccurate to argue, however, that Turkish political culture has remained unchanged and void of participant elements or that there has been no interest of citizens in political and social developments. DP policies attempted to loosen the ideological grip of the Kemalist elite over Turkish society by allowing for the dissemination of alternative political, social and economic programmes. Nonetheless, elites had to come into terms with societal demands. The Constitution could thus be seen as a compromise between elites and emerging societal forces: Under the relatively favourable circumstances of the Constitution, citizens and civil society associations engaged in activities aiming at increasing popular participation in politics. Yet any incremental steps made toward the adoption of participant political culture elements were weakened by two more military coups that struck Turkish democracy in and

Minority Political Sub-cultures in Turkey The importance of studying political sub-cultures becomes evident in the case of Turkey. While the quest for a Kurdish identity resulted in insurgency and terrorism in the late 20th century, these acts were by no means representative of the whole Kurdish identity movement and did not significantly impact the stance of other minority groups. Their allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan and Islam was not translated into willingness to submerge their identity into the modern Turkish national identity.

The Birth of Kurdish Nationalism The spread of nationalist ideas among Kurds was not as successful as in the case of other ethnic groups that comprised the poly-ethnic mosaic of the Ottoman Empire. Westview Press, , p. Despite the formation of Kurdish nationalist groups, the vast majority of the Kurdish population remained loyal to the Ottoman rule and sided with those forces that opposed the partition of the Ottoman Empire along ethnic lines. Strong tribal identity was an additional reason for the failure of Kurdish nationalism to appeal to the majority of Kurds. Tribal allegiance was stronger than national, which allowed for state intervention in intra-Kurdish affairs by means of siding with some tribes against others. Intra-Kurdish feuds substantially weakened prospects for the forging of a strong common Kurdish national identity. Ottoman Kurds fought on the side of Ottoman Turks in the wars that sealed the demise of the Ottoman Empire. The decision to ignore their own nationalist ambitions and fight on the side of Ottoman Turks showed that religion was still the primary defining factor of Kurdish identity to be followed by tribal "and not ethnic" allegiance. Early Kurdish Rebellions The first armed Kurdish rebellion against Kemalist secularisation and ethnic homogenisation plans took place in Under the leadership of Sheikh Said of Palu, a number of Kurdish tribes rebelled against Turkish rule. The character of the Sheikh Said revolt was two-fold, religious and ethnic: Turkish armed forces succeeded in quickly suppressing the rebellion, which, nonetheless, became a watershed: Large-scale purges against Kurdish and other dissident elements in Turkey followed shortly after. Nonetheless, military and police measures could not extinguish Kurdish opposition to the Kemalist programme and willingness to resist. The Re-emergence of Kurdish Nationalism in the s and s The advent of multi-party politics in improved the condition of Kurds in Turkey as competing political parties had to provide them with incentives in order to attract their vote. The coup of 27 March did not prevent the ongoing politicisation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Interest in Kurdish identity and cause would re-emerge under the suitable political environment created by the Turkish Constitution. The liberal air of the Constitution favoured the development of a wide spectrum of political activities. The coup and constitution compromised some of the most liberal elements of the Constitution, yet the emergence of the Kurdish issue, as one of the most important political issues in Turkish politics could not be prevented. Kurdish political groups were formed addressing their agenda in a socialist or nationalist backdrop. The hardening of state policies in the aftermath of the coup, which included abolition of human rights legislation and came to the point of denying the existence of a separate ethnic Kurdish group in Turkey, increased the popularity of armed struggle among many disaffected Kurds. PKK started attacking Turkish military and police outposts in south-eastern and eastern Turkey effectively challenging Turkish sovereignty. Kurdish Political Sub-culture Tribalism and marginalisation have been the most important determinates in the formation of Kurdish political sub-culture. The rise of civil society movements since the s has allowed for the articulation of Kurdish political sub-culture, while urbanisation has contributed in the alleviation of its diverging points. The tribal base of Kurdish social organisation in south-eastern Turkey has deep historical roots. Ever since the time Kurdish-populated provinces were split between the Ottoman and Persian Empires in the 16th century, strong

tribal chieftains have successfully fought to retain a degree of local autonomy against central authorities. Kurdish tribalism was one of the biggest obstacles in all Ottoman centralisation efforts in the Tanzimat years, while it was also the main reason for the failure of the Kurdish nationalist movement to gain any impetus at the grassroots level in the late Ottoman Empire. Apart from the ethnic and religious background of Kurdish uprisings in early republican Turkey, a distinct political sub-culture was also one of the factors that instigated Kurdish reaction. As political space was not separated from religious and social space, there were no specialised political roles in the local society, which would be undertaken by the state. When republican Turkey attempted to enforce its Westernisation programme, it disturbed the perennial balance of state-society relations by separating the political from the social and religious. Tribal, religious and local affiliations were disregarded, and citizenship of republican Turkey was seen as the sole acceptable affiliation. The Turkish state was actively introducing a novel type of subject political culture, which could not tolerate the continuation of alternative allegiances. On the contrary parochial elements survived and contributed in the formation of a separate Kurdish political sub-culture in republican Turkey. Kurdish political sub-culture was also influenced by the centre-periphery divide within the Turkish state and society. Since the beginning of the Tanzimat in the 19th century Ottoman modernisation was characterised by an effort to bring Ottoman periphery under the firm control of the Ottoman state administration and elites. Kurds were among the biggest periphery groups, and state efforts for their ideological proselytisation were often met with opposition. In order to achieve that, they engaged in political mobilisation activities, which imbued Kurdish political sub-culture with participant elements. Since the s there has been Kurdish political extremism and terrorism could be viewed as unfortunate outcome in a rapid liberalisation process of a strongly parochial political sub-culture. The obdurate opposition of the Turkish state to any form of political culture other than the state-sponsored model of subject political culture was instrumental in that radicalisation process. Introduction Alevis³, the second most numerous ethno-religious minority of republican Turkey, have attracted increasing attention since the s due to the largely unexpected revival of their communal identity. Alevis represented heterodox Islam in the Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. While Sultan Selim I was claiming the title of Caliph after the conquest of the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the early 16th century, monopolising the Sunni political and religious authority, Alevis challenged the dominant Hanefi Sunni version of Ottoman Islam through their own syncretistic, tolerant and flexible version of popular Islam, a blend of Shiite Islamic, Turkic, Christian and other local religious and cultural influences. The preservation of a distinct Alevi identity would necessarily cause conflict with dominant Sunni Hanefi orthodoxy. Alevi faith was denigrated as apostasy from Islamic faith and heresy or "in the best case" as a misunderstanding to be rectified through unconditional Alevi integration into Sunni Islam. Soon the Sunni majority of the Ottoman Muslim population developed a series of prejudices against Alevis considering them to be stupid, uneducated, or immoral. Alevis would be exposed to Ottoman state discrimination, which would be 4 The Alevi case has striking similarities with the Druze in that respect. The abolition of the Caliphate and the proclamation of the Turkish republic nurtured Alevi hopes that religious discrimination against them would come to an end. Alevis joined republican secular political forces in their effort to combat Sunni Islamic political and cultural domination: A strictly secular Turkey equally repressive for the public manifestation of all religions and faiths was deemed preferable to preferential treatment of Sunni Islam against Alevism, which was the rule in the Ottoman times. The military coups of and polarised Turkish politics, and Alevis found themselves on the leftist camp. Their identification with leftist political forces led to debates whether Alevi identity should be retained or fused into the secularist, leftist strata of Turkish society. Urbanisation and immigration trends moved a large part of Alevi populations from rural Anatolia to Turkish urban centres or Western Europe. Traditional Alevi institutions and customs like *dedelik* 5 or endogamy were challenged by an increasingly educated and modernity-exposed Alevi youth. Alevis took active part in the ideological debates that dominated Turkey in the s and were finally among those to count the most civil strife victims. Sunni Islamic education was introduced, while the State Directorate of Religious Affairs recognised and financially supported only Sunni Islamic institutions. No special provisions were made for Alevi citizens, who again felt that their distinct identity was threatened by state homogenisation policies in favour of Sunni Islam. The threat of Alevi fusion into the Sunni majority acted as cementing factor

for the protection of a distinct Alevi identity Zeidan, The emergence of the Kurdish nationalist movement in the s and s and the advent of guerrilla warfare in the s would also galvanise Alevi efforts to articulate their own distinct voice in Turkish society. The latter never came to the use of violent means in order to further their goals, yet they demanded that their distinct religious and cultural identity be respected by the Turkish state. Socialist political ideas had become very popular among Alevis in the s and s and were thought to become a substitute for Alevism itself. As religious faith became less popular, Alevi social and cultural elements were viewed through a socialist lens and supplemented accordingly. Nonetheless, the end of communist domination in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late s dramatically reduced the popularity of socialist ideas.

8: Culture Before Politics

Introduction --Methodological considerations --The historical background to the debate on Turkish political culture --Civil society --The state --The secularism debate --Turkish national identity --Conclusions --Prospects of Turkish political culture.

One, of course, is Turkey. Today, even while loosening its traditional enforcement of militant secularism, it is embarking on the most ambitious diplomatic project in its history, seeking to project power by resolving regional conflicts through dialogue and compromise. This is not where East and West divide. This is where they come together. That country is Iran. Beneath the heavy veneer of theocratic rule, a vibrant civil society thrives. No generation in the world understands democracy better or wishes for it more fervently than do young Iranians. In the future, it is not Turkey alone where "they come together. The three countries share strategic interests, and their people share values. Our evolving relationship with a changing Turkey offers a model for the kind of relationship we might one day--not necessarily tomorrow--have with a changing Iran. This is the tantalizing possibility of a new way for the U. Today we work in the region primarily through two bilateral relationships--with Israel and with Saudi Arabia. These pairings served Washington well during the Cold War. They have not, however, produced a stable Middle East. On the contrary, the region is torn by violence, hatred, terror, and war. The dilemma can be simply stated: America wants to stabilize the Middle East, but its policies are having the opposite effect. Nowhere in the world is an overarching strategy more glaringly absent or more desperately needed than in the Middle East. During this period, threats emerging from the Middle East have become steadily more urgent and terrifying. A new triangular relationship involving the United States, Turkey, and Iran cannot emerge overnight. In order to become a reliable American partner, Iran would have to change dramatically. Turkey would also have to change, although not nearly as much. So would the United States. Our world, how-ever, advances only as a result of strategic vision. First must come a grand concept, a destination; once the destination is clear, all parties can concentrate on finding the way to reach it. In every other way, though, Turkey was a country on the periphery. Turkey was a Cold War outlier, a strategic afterthought with no distinct role in the world or even its own region. After giving itself what one scholar has called a "historical lobotomy" in the s, the Republic of Turkey spent three-quarters of a century denying and hiding from its Ottoman past, when the Turks ruled a vast empire that spread from Algiers to Mecca to Budapest. That may have made sense; the fragile new country of Turkey had urgent challenges at home, did not want to be seen as neo-imperialist, and embraced Western security goals as its own. Neither of those objections applies to Turkey today. It is governed by pious Muslims and has its own foreign policy. Its leaders are warmly welcomed in many places where, in the past, they would not even have cared to visit. And since the end of the Cold War, few countries have so completely redesigned their approach to the world. On the new world map, Turkey is no longer on the edge of anything. It is once again the epicenter of the immense Eurasian landmass. It is seizing that potential in ways that benefit not only itself but also the United States and the West. When Israel wished to begin secret talks with Syria, it asked Turkey to arrange them. After Sunnis in Iraq decided to boycott national elections, Turkey persuaded them to change their minds and participate. Whenever Turkish officials land in a bitterly divided country like Lebanon or Pakistan or Afghanistan, every faction is eager to talk to them. No other nation is respected by Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Taliban while also maintaining good ties with the Israeli, Lebanese, and Afghan governments. His next ambition is grander, not just "zero problems with neighbors" but "zero problems between neighbors. Turkey has found remarkably little resistance to its new ambition. By intervening only when asked and maintaining good relations with such a wide range of governments and factions, it plays a role no other country can. It has unique credentials. Turkey is big--more than 70 million people with the largest economy in the Middle East. Its Ottoman past gives it enormous historical weight. It is also a highly alluring model, not just because of its relative prosperity but also because its society is relatively free, notably in the freedoms accorded women. The Lebanese scholar Fares Braizat spoke for many Middle East intellectuals when he called Turkey "a role model that has successfully balanced tradition and modernization. It is an

antidote to al-Qaeda extremism [and] the best place to make a call to the Muslim world for cooperation with the U. Having resolved nearly all of its international disputes, it must now finish putting its domestic affairs in order. Turkish law still limits freedom of speech. The military still plays a role in politics that is unacceptable in a democratic country. Minorities are still less than fully protected--it is not just Kurds, whose culture was brutalized by years of official repression, who face discrimination but also Christians, non-mainstream Muslims, and unbelievers. The press is weak and corrupted. Political parties are closed autocracies. The education system is rigid and discourages free thinking. Until Turkish democracy is made whole, its ability to serve as a beacon of freedom will be limited. For a time in the mids, Allied leaders considered the option of punishing Germany by cutting it into pieces, demolishing its factories, and forcing it to earn its living from agriculture alone. That plan was based on emotion: Cooler heads prevailed, though, and a different plan emerged. Four decades later, Germany was peacefully reunited. It has become a normal country, a promoter of peace instead of a maker of war. Nonetheless, the underlying dilemma is the same. Is it better to sanction and punish a troublemaker or entice it toward normality? Beneath that question lies a deeper one: Does the United States shape its foreign policy according to emotion or by cool calculation of self-interest? These Americans have spent decades trying to punish Iran. Negotiating, reconciling, and perhaps even building a partnership with Iran seemed to them a form of surrender. But the goal of diplomacy--or of avoiding diplomacy--should not be to punish, inflict pain, extract tribute, or redeem festering emotions. Nor should it be seen as a way to make friends. Its essential purpose is to advance interests. There are a host of abstract reasons to negotiate with Iran, and just as many others not to do so. None are truly important. As the last 30 years of history amply prove, an isolated Iran is a spoiler. A calm and prosperous Iran can be to the Middle East what a calm and prosperous Germany has been to Europe: Crippling American sanctions turned out to be not so crippling after all; they impoverished ordinary Iranians, enriched a class of smugglers tied to the regime, and led Iran to develop a web of new economic ties to more pragmatic countries, including Russia and China. Then, during the presidency of George W. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst who advised three presidents on the Middle East and South Asia, has asserted that "for 30 years, the United States has tried to deal with Iran and its revolutionary ideology without a well-grounded understanding of what motivates and inspires Iranians. Blinded by emotion, the United States sank into willful ignorance. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice seemed almost proud of it. For the first time, however, there are signs that Washington is considering the advantages that might emerge from a new understanding between the United States and Iran: Iran can do more than any other country, including the United States, to assure long-term peace in Iraq. Iran can also help stabilize Afghanistan, where it has been engaged for centuries. A stable and secure Iran, no longer in need of a scapegoat, might stop threatening Israel. Iran can tame militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which would contribute to Israeli security, help stabilize Lebanon, and dramatically improve the prospects for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Reconciliation between Iran and the United States would decisively improve relations between the United States and the Muslim world. Iran will have less incentive to invite Russian power into the Middle East, something the United States is rightly eager to avoid. Iran is an enemy of al-Qaeda and would cooperate in a transnational effort to crush it. An Iran that no longer feels threatened by the United States might be more willing to compromise on nuclear issues. What would the United States have to do in order to secure these results? Above all, it would have to recognize Iran as an important power with legitimate security interests. Successive American presidents have rejected the idea of compromise for exactly this reason. They wished to punish and contain Iran, not reward it with a promotion to regional-power status. That ignored the reality that Iran needs no promotion. It is already a regional power. The United States may wish that this were not the case, but self-delusion is an unsound basis for foreign policy. It is not unreasonable for Iran to want the capacity to generate nuclear energy. Just as worrisome is the fact that as Iran presses ahead with its nuclear program, it is broadening its regional ambitions, testing ballistic missiles, and recklessly threatening Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran might well set off an arms race in the region, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and perhaps other countries pressing for nuclear weapons of their own--a race that could set off a regional conflagration.

The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey 36 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer) declared that these courts--because they.

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